PhD.

, Lecturer, Claudiu Mesaros

Philosophy of Aristotle. Theory of substance.

Socrates lectures. University of Rzeszow, Poland 2005

1. What it means to be wise. Metaphysics I, 1. 2. Concepts of ontology. Categories, 1-5. 3. Substance. Categories, 5. 4. Substance in Metaphysics, VII. 5. Soul as a substance. De anima, II, 1.

1. What it means to be wise. Metaphysics I, 1.

First chapter of the Metaphysics is a search for: What a wise man look like? What are the signs for a wise and wisdom? The signs of wisdom are:
1. We naturally desire knowledge: Ei)/dw - ednai eidenai: to know; To activate at the level of mind. - to see with eyes - to observe, to examine - to look face to face - to build an image / representation - to see well, adequate NOT proper word for: to see. It means: INSIGHT By nature (fsei): - we have the desire to see - discussion: what we understand by physis? * We wish to see with no practical purpose (prattomen). Therefore there is an action of non-practical seeing; a seeing without actually doing something. It is a non-instrumental act of seeing. This first use of seeing (eidenai) and senses is a metaphysical one. To prove our metaphysical use of senses Aristotle brings as examples our common use of senses: - esteem for senses (their own sake) - we prefer sight as the most helping sense in revealing distinctions An indication of this is our esteem for the senses; for apart from their use we esteem them for their own sake, and most of all the sense of sight. Not only with a view to action, but even when no action is contemplated, we prefer sight, generally speaking, to all the other senses. shmeon d' tn asqsewn gphsij ka gr cwrj tj creaj gapntai di' atj, ka mlista tn llwn di tn mmtwn. o gr mnon na prttwmen ll ka mhqn mllontej prttein t rn aromeqa nt pntwn j epen tn llwn. ation d' ti mlista poie gnwrzein mj ath tn asqsewn ka pollj dhlo diaforj. [980a][21] All men naturally desire knowledge. Pntej nqrwpoi to ednai rgontai fsei.

The reason of this is that of all the senses sight best helps us to know things, and reveals many distinctions. 2. We value sensation. Sensation is the first step on the road to wisdom. Now animals are by nature born with the power of 2

All animals have senses by nature. - some have no memory - some have memory - some do not hear sounds One condiiton for learning (mathesis, to acquire instruction) is: to have senses. Animals have sight (aisthesis) but not sight (eidesis). + Though they are capable of: - sensation (aisthesin), wherefrom: - memory (mneme), weherefrom: - learning (mathesis) + But very few (mikron): - experience (empeiria) + And not at all: - art (techne) - reflection/ reasoning (logismos) First conclusions: beasts do not all the senses therefore do not acquire complete experience There is a hierarchy of signs for wisdom: - senses - memory - imagination - experience - art - reasoning Art and reasoning are possible only from a complete experience. CONCLUSION: SENSATION IS NOT ENOUGH

sensation, and from this some acquire the faculty of memory, whereas others do not. [980b][21] Accordingly the former are more intelligent and capable of learning than those which cannot remember. Such as cannot hear sounds (as the bee, and any other similar type of creature) are intelligent, but cannot learn; those only are capable of learning which possess this sense in addition to the faculty of memory. Thus the other animals live by impressions and memories, and have but a small share of experience; but the human race lives also by art and reasoning.

fsei mn on asqhsin conta ggnetai t za, k d tathj toj m atn ok n gggnetai mnmh, toj d' gggnetai. ka di toto tata fronimtera ka maqhtiktera tn m dunamnwn mnhmoneein st, frnima mn neu to manqnein sa m dnatai tn yfwn koein (oon mlitta kn e ti toioton llo gnoj zwn sti), manqnei d' sa prj t mnmV ka tathn cei tn asqhsin. t mn on lla taj fantasaij z ka taj mnmaij, mpeiraj d metcei mikrn t d tn nqrpwn gnoj ka tcnV ka logismoj.

3. Experience. Experience (empeiria) is acquiring numerous memories of the same thing.

It is from memory that men acquire experience, because the numerous memories of the same thing eventually ggnetai d' k tj mnmhj mpeira toj 3

It does not mean to see now, but to see within the mind. Experience it similar to art and science (homoion einai he empeiria), which memans: experience is a sort of art and science experience is ordering what we see and remember produce the effect of a single experience.

nqrpoij a gr polla mnmai to ato prgmatoj mij mpeiraj dnamin potelosin.

[981a][1] Experience seems very similar to science and art,but actually it is through experience that men acquire science and art;

discussion: lack of experience (peira), ignorance, lack of limitations. Words related to apeiria: apeiron. Words related to empeiria (finitude): - Empireus (visible universe)

ka doke scedn pistmV ka tcnV moion e nai ka mpeira, pobanei d'epistmh ka tcnh di tj mpeiraj toj nqrpoij

for as Polus rightly says, "experience produces art, but inexperience chance."11 mn gr mpeira tcnhn pohsen, j fhs Ploj, d' peira tchn.

Empeiria is a condition for techne and episteme. It is determination, limitation, finitude. It is opposed to infinite as meaning: - lack of limitation - lack of border

EXPERIENCE IS NOT ENOUGH, AS WE SHALL SEE.

4. Art (techne)
1

Plat. Gorgias 448c, Plat. Gorg. 462b-c

Art is a general supposition concerning similar cases occurred in experience. * ggnetai d tcnh art is born / generated from universal presuppositions (hypolepseis). From experience (to see in the mind) art is generated. Experience is organizing sensations in a system (see also De anima II, 6) What kind of universal is tchne? Obviously not universal concept like in science. It is: opinion concerning many instances (pollois) Experience: supposition that case B is similar to case A. Art: judgement that cases A and B are a class and therefore similar by nature. In this sense art is universal like science. It is a practical science. Experience can be similar to art: - in practice (for practical purposes) - according to success (pitugcnw) To have a supposition that when Callias was suffering from this or that disease this or that benefited him, and similarly with Socrates and various other individuals, is a matter of experience; but to judge that it benefits all persons of a certain type, considered as a class, who suffer from this or that disease (e.g. the phlegmatic or bilious when suffering from burning fever) is a matter of art. It would seem that for practical purposes experience is in no way inferior to art; indeed we see men of experience succeeding more than those who have theory without experience. Art is produced when from many notions of experience a single universal supposition is formed with regard to like objects. ggnetai d tcnh tan k polln tj mpeiraj nnohmtwn ma kaqlou gnhtai per tn mown plhyij.

t mn gr cein plhyin ti Kallv kmnonti thnd tn nson tod sunnegke ka Swkrtei ka kaq' kaston otw polloj, mpeiraj stn t d' ti psi toj toiosde kat' e doj en forisqesi, kmnousi thnd tn nson, sunnegken, oon toj flegmatdesin coldesi [] purttousi kasJ, tcnhj. prj mn on t prttein mpeira tcnhj odn doke diafrein, ll ka mllon pitugcnousin o mpeiroi tn neu tj mpeiraj lgon cntwn

It is because in experience success might happen: Experience is: - knowledge (gnosis, not episteme) of particulars - knowledge of incidental successions in particulars - lack of knowledge in general Art is: - knowledge of universals - knowledge of effects in general.

The reason of this is a that experience is knowledge of particulars, but art of universals; and actions and the effects produced are all concerned with the particular. For it is not man that the physician cures, except incidentally, but Callias or Socrates or some other person similarly named, who is incidentally a man as well.

(ation d' ti mn mpeira tn kaq'

May lack experience of particulars [20] So if a man has theory without experience, and knows the universal, but does not know the particular contained in it, he will often fail in his treatment; for it is the particular that must be treated.

It is a first sign that: - theory has no practical goal - practice has individual goals It is like Ethics: has individual goals like good in particular occasion. NEVERTHELESS: Art is conditioned by: - Knowledge, seeing inside (ednai) - Proficiency/skillfullness (pa ) ein Therefore, artists: - are wiser (sofwtrouj) than men of experience - know the cause (wherefore) - have understanding CONCLUSION: Wisdom depends (that is: has as sign) understanding, the seeing inside (eidenai)
DISCUSSION: We have a hierarchy of signs for wisdom: Empeiria .........PRACTICAL GOAL Techne ...PRACTICAL GOAL AND UNDERSTANDING Eidenai (insight)..NO PRACTICAL GOAL

kastn sti gnsij d tcnh tn kaqlou, a d prxeij ka a genseij psai per t kaq' kastn esin o gr nqrwpon gizei atrewn ll' kat sumbebhkj, ll Kall an Swkrthn tn llwn tin tn otw legomnwn sumbbhken nqrpJ enai n on neu tj mpeiraj cV tij tn lgon, ka t kaqlou mn gnwrzV t d' n totJ kaq' kaston gno, pollkij iamartsetai tj qerapeaj qerapeutn gr t kaq' kaston)

Nevertheless we consider that knowledge and proficiency belong to art rather than to experience, and we assume that artists are wiser than men of mere experience (which implies that in all cases wisdom depends rather upon knowledge);

and this is because the former know the cause, whereas the latter do not.

ll' mwj t ge ednai ka t pa t ein tcnV tj mpeiraj prcein omeqa mllon, ka sofwtrouj toj tecntaj tn mperwn polambnomen, j kat t ednai mllon kolouqosan tn sofan psi

For the experienced know the fact, but not the wherefore; but the artists know the wherefore and the cause.

toto d' ti o mn tn atan sasin o d' o.

CONCLUSION: BEING ARTIST IS STILL NOT ENOUGH FOR WISDOM o mn gr mpeiroi t ti mn sasi, diti d' ok sasin o d t diti ka tn atan gnwrzousin.

5. Leadership or master craftsmanship (to architekton) Architekton knows the cause.

Discussion: Aristotle said that artist also knows the cause. It is possible that for the master is essential to know the cause. He had just said that the artisan has insight skillfulness Master of art must have more. What?

For the same reason we consider that the master craftsmen in every profession are more estimable and know more and are wiser than the artisans, [981b] [1] because they know the reasons of the things which are done;

The simple artisan knows through habit. His insight and skills are practical and come from habit. It is not theoretical knowledge but a repetitive action. Artisan is like inanimate objects which perform actions in virtue of a natural quality. CONCLUSIONS ABOUT ARTISAN: - performs an action according to practical akills - practical skill means repeating - repeating is habit (ethos) - habit is mechanical action - mechanical action is like inanimate action - inanimate action is not knowledge but natural quality - artisan aquires a mechanical quality by natural potencies not by knowledge IT TAKES MORE FOR WISDOM. Superiority of wisdom must be: - not doing things, but

but we think that the artisans, like certain inanimate objects, do things, but without knowing what they are doing (as, for instance, fire burns);only whereas inanimate objects perform all their actions in virtue of a certain natural quality, artisans perform theirs through habit.

di ka toj rcitktonaj per kaston timiwtrouj ka mllon ednai nom zomen tn ceirotecnn ka sofwtrouj, ti tj ataj tn poioumnwn sasin

(toj d', sper ka tn ycwn nia poie mn, ok edta d poie poie, oon ka ei t pr t mn on yuca fsei tin poien totwn kaston toj d ceirotcnaj di' qoj), Thus the master craftsmen are superior in wisdom, not

- possessing a theory - knowing the causes (this can be achieved even by artist, so we need more): - ability to teach Ability to teach makes wisdom rather than simple knowing because simple knowing can be mechanical.

because they can do things, but because they possess a theory and know the causes.

In general the sign of knowledge or ignorance is the ability to teach, and for this reason we hold that art rather than experience is scientific knowledge;

First proper sign of wisdom is being able to share wisdom. Discussion: Wise men must be able to share wisdom. Aristotle sums up that wisdom is where there is: not aiming utility (no practical goal) knowing why (the causes) ability to teach (share wisdom) causing admiration (thaumazein) for the artists can teach, but the others cannot. Further, we do not consider any of the senses to be Wisdom. They are indeed our chief sources of knowledge about particulars, but they do not tell us the reason for anything, as for example why fire is hot, but only that it is hot. It is therefore probable that at first the inventor of any art which went further than the ordinary sensations was admired by his fellow-men, not merely because some of his inventions were useful, but as being a wise and superior person.

j o kat t praktikoj enai sofwtrouj ntaj ll kat t lgon cein atoj ka tj ataj gnwrzein. lwj te shmeon to edtoj ka m edtoj t dnasqai didskein stn, ka di toto tn tcnhn tj mpeiraj gomeqa mllon pistmhn e nai

Senses do not give knowing why Experience does not give lack of utility Arts do not give ability to teach But each of them may cause admiration when no utility is aimed (perhaps by chance). Therefore lack of utility is the main condition for wisdom. Why?

6. Theoria. Skhole. Because lack of utility is a sign for leisure (skhole). Leisure is a condition for wisdom. The very sign of it. Skhole: means time not aimed at practical purposes.

dnantai gr, o d o dnantai didskein. ti d tn asqsewn odeman gomeqa e nai sofan katoi kuritata g' esn atai tn kaq' kasta gnseij ll' o lgousi t di t per odenj, oon di t qermn t pr, ll mnon ti qermn. t mn on prton ekj tn poianon ernta tcnhn par tj koinj asqseij qaumzesqai p tn nqrpwn m mnon di t crsimon ena ti tn ereqntwn ll' j sofn ka diafronta tn

(See Nicomachean Ethics, X, 6, 7, especially 1177b 4-6). Skhole is seen there as a condition for autarkheia therefore happiness. Skhole is the time that only the free person has. There are several categories of spending time time with practical purpose (necessities of life): - work for survival - resting time with no practical purpose: - playing (amusing), the hobby - intellectual activity (skhole), free of purpose There are two terms here also: - diagoge (hobby) - skhole (leisure) First there was the hobby, then it wisely turned into leisure. And as more and more arts were discovered, some relating to the necessities and some to the pastimes of life (hobby), the inventors of the latter were always considered wiser than those of the former, [20] because their branches of knowledge did not aim at utility. Wise men are where there is leisure: - not pleasure (hedone, associated with playing in N.E.) - not necessities (tanagkata)

llwn

Hence when all the discoveries of this kind were fully developed, the sciences which relate neither to pleasure nor yet to the necessities of life were invented, and first in those places where men had leisure. Thus the mathematical sciences originated in the neighborhood of Egypt, because there the priestly class was allowed leisure.2 The difference between art and science and the other kindred mental activities has been stated in theEthics3 ;

pleinwn d' eriskomnwn tecnn ka tn mn prj tnagkaa tn d prj diagwgn osn, e sofwtrouj toj toiotouj ke nwn polambnesqai di t m prj crsin enai tj pistmaj atn.

7. Abstract by Aristotle
2 3

Cf. Plat. Phaedrus 274, Hdt 2.109. Aristot. Nic. Eth. 6.1139b 14-1141b 8.

He declares as generally assumed that wisdom is where is: knowledge of primary causes knowledge of principles That is, to see, to have insight. And he has shown more: Knowledge is made possible by skhole. What is insight? It is a progressive state of no-purpose attitude at each level: sensation (aisthesis) and experience (empeiria) practical arts (techne and master of arts or architekton) theory (theoria) so that, as has been already stated, the man of experience is held to be wiser than the mere possessors of any power of sensation, the artist than the man of experience, the master craftsman than the artisan; and the speculative sciences to be more learned than the productive. the reason for our present discussion is that it is generally assumed that what is called Wisdom 4 is concerned with the primary causes and principles,

qen dh pntwn tn toiotwn kateskeuasmnwn a m prj donn mhd prj tnagkaa tn pisthmn erqhsan, ka prton n totoij toj tpoij o prton sclasan di per Agupton a maqhmatika prton tcnai sunsthsan, ke gr feqh scolzein t tn erwn qnoj. erhtai mn on n toj qikoj tj diafor tcnhj ka pistmhj ka tn llwn tn mogenn

So it is visible (there is the evidence) that Wisdom means knowledge of causes and principles.

o d' neka nn poiomeqa tn lgon tot' stn, ti tn nomazomnhn sofan per t prta atia ka tj rcj polambnousi pntej

[982a][1] Thus it is clear that Wisdom is knowledge of certain principles and causes.

ste, kaqper erhtai prteron, mn mpeiroj tn poianon cntwn asqhsin enai doke softeroj, d tecnthj tn mperwn, ceirotcnou d rcitktwn, a d qewrhtika tn poihtikn mllon.

ti mn on sofa per tinaj rcj ka ataj stn pistmh, dlon.

i.e. Metaphysics.

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2. Categories. Substance
Concepts of ontology (knowledge of substance) First quest for science of being qua being. To build a science of being we need to know first: what is real - in what way a thing is real - how many kinds of real things there are what are the realities we can speak (think) upon - in what way we can name a thing - how many kinds of naming are there CONCEPTS OF SPEECH Homonimy. A name stands for two things and two different logoi: translated by E. M. Edghill

1 Things are said to be named 'equivocally' when, though they have a common name, the definition corresponding with the name [logos tes ousias] differs for each. Thus, a real man and a figure in a picture can both lay claim to the name 'animal'; yet these are equivocally so named, for, though they have a common name, the definition corresponding with the name differs for each. For should any one define in what sense each is an animal, his definition in the one case will be appropriate to that case only. On the other hand, things are said to be named 'univocally' which have both the name and the definition answering to the name [logos tes ousias, the logos of the thing] in common. A man and an ox are both 'animal', and these are univocally so named, inasmuch as not only the name, but also the definition, is the same in both cases: for if a man should state in what sense each is an animal, the statement in the one case would be identical with that in the other. Things are said to be named 'derivatively', which derive their name from some other name, but differ from it in termination. Thus the grammarian derives his name from the word 'grammar', and the courageous man from the word 'courage'.

`Omnuma lgetai n noma mnon koinn, d kat tonoma lgoj tj osaj teroj, oon zon te nqrwpoj ka t gegrammnon totwn gr noma mnon koinn, d kat tonoma lgoj tj osaj teroj n gr podid tij t stin atn katrJ t zJ enai, dion katrou lgon podsei. sunnuma d lgetai n t te noma koinn ka kat tonoma lgoj tj osaj atj, oon zon te nqrwpoj ka boj totwn gr kteron koin nmati prosagoreetai zon, ka lgoj d tj osaj atj n gr podid tij tn katrou lgon t stin atn katrJ t zJ enai, tn atn lgon podsei. parnuma d lgetai sa p tinoj diafronta t ptsei tn kat tonoma proshgoran cei, oon p tj grammatikj grammatikj ka p tj

Synonimy: A name stands for two or more things and one single logos

Paronimy: More syntactically composed names stand for many things, and many logoi.

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Naming may be simple or composed. 2 Forms of speech are either simple or composite. Examples of the latter are such expressions as 'the man runs', 'the man wins'; of the former 'man', 'ox', 'runs', 'wins'. CONCEPTS OF REALITY There are

ndreaj ndreoj.
Tn legomnwn t m n kat sumplokn lgetai, t d neu sumplokj. t mn on kat sumplokn, oon nqrwpoj trcei, nqrwpoj nik t d neu sumplokj, oon nqrwpoj, boj, trcei, nik.

two meanings of being real - to be in a subject - to be out of a subject

of each reality we can either say something or not. Therefore there are four kinds of realities. 1. exist on their own and predicable not in a subject (subsist; substance)

Of things themselves some are predicable of a subject, and are never present in a subject. Thus 'man' is predicable of the individual man, and is never present in a subject. By being 'present in a subject' I do not mean present as parts are present in a whole, but being incapable of existence apart from the said subject. Some things, again, are present in a subject, but are never predicable of a subject. For instance, a certain point of grammatical knowledge is present in the mind, but is not predicable of any subject; or again, a certain whiteness may be present in the body (for colour requires a material basis), yet it is never predicable of anything.

predicable of a subject (universals) - universal substances

Tn ntwn t mn kaq' pokeimnou tinj lgetai, n pokeimnJ d oden stin, oon nqrwpoj kaq' pokeimnou mn lgetai to tinj nqrpou, n pokeimnJ d oden stin t d n pokeimnJ mn sti, kaq' pokeimnou d odenj lgetai, n pokeimnJ d lgw n tini m j mroj prcon dnaton cwrj e nai to n stn, oon tj grammatik n pokeimnJ mn sti t yuc, kaq' pokeimnou d odenj lgetai, ka t t leukn n pokeimnJ mn sti t smati, pan gr crma n smati, kaq' pokeimnou d odenj lgetai t d kaq' pokeimnou te lgetai ka n pokeimnJ stn, oon pistmh n pokeimnJ mn sti t yuc, kaq' pokeimnou d lgetai tj grammatikj t d ote n pokeimnJ stn ote kaq' pokeimnou lgetai, oon

2. do not exist as such and not preducable

not predicable of a subject (particular) - particular accidents Other things, again, are both predicable of a subject and present in a subject. Thus while knowledge is present in the human mind, it is predicable of grammar. There is, lastly, a class of things which are neither present in a subject nor predicable of a subject, such as the individual man or the individual horse.
But, to speak more generally, that which is individual and has the character of a unit is never predicable of a subject. Yet in some cases there is nothing to prevent such being present in a subject. Thus a certain point of grammatical knowledge is present

in a subject (do not subsist; accidents)

3. do not exist as such but predicable

predicable of a subject (universals) - universal accidents 4. exist as such but not predicable

in a subject (do not subsist; accidents)

not in a subject (subsist; substance)

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not predicable of a subject (particular) - particular substances

in a subject.

tj nqrwpoj tj ppoj,
odn gr tn toiotwn ote n pokeimnJ stn ote kaq' pokeimnou lgetai plj d t toma ka n riqm kat' odenj pokeimnou lgetai, n pokeimnJ d nia odn kwlei e gr tj grammatik tn n nai pokeimnJ stn.

CONCEPTS OF REASONING Composed speech means reasoning (logos and logos) - Genus and species - predicates of predicates may be predicated of subject

3 When one thing is predicated of another, all that which is predicable of the predicate will be predicable also of the subject. Thus, 'man' is predicated of the individual man; but 'animal' is predicated of 'man'; it will, therefore, be predicable of the individual man also: for the individual man is both 'man' and 'animal'.

- Differentiae different species have different differentiae. Different differentia indicates different species

If genera are different and co-ordinate, their differentiae are themselves different in kind. Take as an instance the genus 'animal' and the genus 'knowledge'. 'With feet', 'twofooted', 'winged', 'aquatic', are differentiae of 'animal'; the species of knowledge are not distinguished by the same differentiae. One species of knowledge does not differ from another in being 'two-footed'. But where one genus is subordinate to another, there is nothing to prevent their having the same differentiae: for the greater class is predicated of the lesser, so that all the differentiae of the predicate will be differentiae also of the subject.

Otan teron kaq' trou kathgortai j kaq' pokeimnou, sa kat to kathgoroumnou lgetai, pnta ka kat to pokeimnou hqsetai
oon nqrwpoj kat to tinj nqrpou kathgoretai, t d zon kat to nqrpou okon ka kat to tinj nqrpou t zon kathgorhqsetai gr tj nqrwpoj ka nqrwpj sti ka zon.

sub-ordinate species may have the same differentiae similar differentiae indicates

tn terogenn ka m p' llhla tetagmnwn terai t edei ka a diafora, oon zou ka pistmhj zou mn gr diafora t te pezn ka t pthnn ka t nudron ka t dpoun, pistmhj d odema totwn o gr diafrei pistmh pistmhj t dpouj e . nai tn d ge p' llhla genn odn kwlei tj atj diaforj enai t gr pnw tn p' at genn kathgoretai, ste sai to kathgoroumnou diafora esi tosatai ka to pokeimnou sontai.

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Simple speech divides reality into substance and accidents.

SUBSTANCE: osan or (ti/ e)sti): what it is ?

ACCIDENTS (because they cannot subsist outside substance):

4 Expressions which are in no way composite signify substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, action, or affection. To sketch my meaning roughly, examples of substance are 'man' or 'the horse', of quantity, such terms as 'two cubits long' or 'three cubits long', of quality, such attributes as 'white', 'grammatical'. 'Double', 'half', 'greater', fall under the category of relation; 'in a the market place', 'in the Lyceum', under that of place; 'yesterday', 'last year', under that of time. 'Lying', 'sitting', are terms indicating position, 'shod', 'armed', state; 'to lance', 'to cauterize', action; 'to be lanced', 'to be cauterized', affection. Tn kat mhdeman sumplokn legomnwn kaston toi osan shmanei posn poin prj ti po pot kesqai cein poien pscein. sti d osa mn j tpJ epen oon nqrwpoj, ppoj posn d oon dphcu, trphcu poin d oon leukn, grammatikn prj ti d oon diplsion, misu, mezon po d oon n LukeJ, n gor pot d oon cqj, prusin kesqai d oon nkeitai, kqhtai cein d oon poddetai, plistai poien d oon tmnein, kaein pscein d oon tmnesqai, kaesqai.

Quantity(posn): how much of it? Quality (poin): how it is? Relation (prj): in what relation? Place (po): where? Time (pot): when? Position/situation (kesqai): how it stands? State (cein): What is has? Action (poien) : What it does ? Affection (pscein) : What it suffers ?

No one of these terms, in and by itself, involves an affirmation; it is by the combination of such terms that [positive or negative] statements arise. For every assertion must, as is admitted, be either true or false, whereas expressions which are not in any way composite such as 'man', 'white', 'runs', 'wins', cannot be either true or false.

Simple speech is neither true nor false. Composed speech: is affirmation or negation unifies substance and accidents. It is true or false It asserts categories. kaston d tn erhmnwn at mn kaq' at n odemi katafsei lgetai, t d prj llhla totwn sumplok katfasij ggnetai pasa 14

5 Substance, in the truest and primary and most definite sense of the word, is that which is neither predicable of a subject nor present in a subject; for instance, the individual man or horse. SUBSTANCE The first and main meaning of Substance: - not predicated - not in a subject Primary substance is particular substance. It is not predicable, therefore not object of knowledge. It is only an object of sensation and imagination. Secondary meaning of substance: But in a secondary sense those things are called substances within which, as species, the primary substances are included; also those which, as genera, include the species. For instance, the individual man is included in the species 'man', and the genus to which the species belongs is 'animal'; these, therefore-that is to say, the species 'man' and the genus 'animal,-are termed secondary substances.

gr doke katfasij toi lhqj yeudj e , tn d kat nai mhdeman sumplokn legomnwn odn ote lhqj ote yedj stin, oon nqrwpoj, leukn, trcei, nik.

includes primary substances. [Predicated and in a subject] Primary substances are included (prcei) in secondary substances It is plain from what has been said that both the name and the definition of the predicate [logos] must be predicable of the subject. For instance, 'man' is predicted of the individual man. Now in this case the name of the species man' is applied to the individual, for we use the term 'man' in describing the individual; and the definition of 'man' will also be predicated of the individual man, for the individual man is both man and animal. Thus, both the name and the definition of the species are predicable of the individual. Osa d stin kuritat te ka prtwj ka mlista legomnh, mte kaq' pokeimnou tinj lgetai mte n pokeimnJ tin stin, oon tj nqrwpoj tj ppoj. deterai d osai lgontai, n oj edesin a prtwj osai legmenai prcousin, tat te ka t tn edn totwn gnh oon tj nqrwpoj n edei mn prcei t nqrpJ, gnoj d to edouj st t zon deterai on atai lgontai osai, oon te nqrwpoj ka t zon.

Primary substance is included (prcei) into secondary substance just as accidents are included in (n pokeimnJ stn) primary substance. RELATION BETWEEN PRIMARY AND SECONDARY SUBSTANCE: - They are synonimous

both name and logos must be said of the subject (substratum) Primary substance means what secondary substance means Secondary substance is always predicable of the primary substance (example: animal, below) If it is not predicable of the individual, it is not 15

fanern d k tn erhmnwn ti tn kaq' pokeimnou legomnwn

predicable of the species (all men see below*)

With regard, on the other hand, to those things which are present in a subject, it is generally the case that neither their name nor their definition is predicable of that in which they are present. Though, however, the definition [logos] is never predicable, there is nothing in certain cases to prevent the name being used. For instance, 'white' being present in a body is predicated of that in which it is present, for a body is called white: the definition, however, of the colour white' is never predicable of the body.

RELATION BETWEEN SUBSTANCE AND ACCIDENTS: Accidents in general are not synonymous with the substance they stand within.

Everything except primary substances is either predicable of a primary substance or present in a primary substance. This becomes evident by reference to particular instances which occur. 'Animal' is predicated of the species 'man', therefore of the individual man, for if there were no individual man of whom it could be predicated, it could not be predicated of the species 'man' at all (*). Again, colour is present in body, therefore in individual bodies, for if there were no individual body in which it was present, it could not be present in [all the] bodies at all. Thus everything except primary substances is either predicated of primary substances, or is present in them, and if these last did not exist, it would be impossible for anything else to exist.

nagkaon ka tonoma ka tn lgon kathgoresqai to pokeimnou oon nqrwpoj kaq' pokeimnou lgetai to tinj nqrpou, ka kathgoreta ge tonoma, tn gr nqrwpon kat to tinj nqrpou kathgorseijka lgoj d to nqrpou kat to tinj nqrpou kathgorhqsetai, gr tj nqrwpoj ka nqrwpj stin ste ka tonoma ka lgoj kat to pokeimnou kathgorhqsetai.

some accidents are predicated (universal accidents)

no accident has a common logos (definition or species) with substance.

Accidents cannot exist withous primary substance (once the primary substance disappears, they are extinct). Example: color. There are

tn d' n pokeimnJ ntwn p mn tn plestwn ote tonoma ote lgoj kathgoretai to pokeimnou p' nwn d tonoma mn odn kwlei kathgoresqai to pokeimnou, tn d lgon dnaton oon t leukn n pokeimnJ n t smati kathgoretai to pokeimnou, leukn gr sma lgetai, d lgoj to leuko odpote kat to smatoj kathgorhqsetai. t d' lla pnta toi kaq' pokeimnwn lgetai tn prtwn osin n pokeimnaij ataj stn.

primary accidents (in the primary substances)

secondary accidents (predicated of primary substances) QUESTION: Are secondary accidents (categories other than 16

substance) organized in genuses and species?

Aristotle speaks of color (an accident) being present in all the bodies (en somati holes). So it is possible to say All the bodies have color. But it is a material, not formal species.

ON SECONDARY SUBSTANCE Secondary substance means species and genus.

Of secondary substances, the species is more truly substance than the genus, being more nearly related to primary substance. For if any one should render an account of what a primary substance is, he would render a more instructive account, and one more proper to the subject, by stating the species than by stating the genus. Thus, he would give a more instructive account of an individual man by stating that he was man than by stating that he was animal, for the former description is peculiar to the individual in a greater degree, while the latter is too general. Again, the man who gives an account of the nature of an individual tree will give a more instructive account by mentioning the species 'tree' than by mentioning the genus 'plant'. Moreover, primary substances are most properly called substances in virtue of the fact that they are the entities which underlie everything else, and that everything else is either predicated of them or present in them. Now the same relation which subsists between primary substance and everything else subsists also between the species and the genus: for the species is to the genus as subject is to predicate, since the genus is predicated of the species, whereas the species cannot be predicated of the genus. Thus we have a second ground for asserting that the species is more truly substance than the genus. Of species themselves, except in the case of such as are genera, no one is more truly substance than another. ()

toto d fanern k tn kaq' kasta proceirizomnwn oon t zon kat to nqrpou kathgoretai, okon ka kat to tinj nqrpou, e gr kat mhdenj tn tinn nqrpwn, od kat nqrpou lwj plin t crma n smati, okon ka n tin smati e gr m n tin tn kaq' kasta, od n smati lwj ste t lla pnta toi kaq' pokeimnwn tn prtwn osin lgetai n pokeimnaij ataj stn. m osn on tn prtwn osin dnaton tn llwn ti enai pnta gr t lla toi kaq' pokeimnwn totwn lgetai n pokeimnaij ataj stn ste m osn tn prtwn osin dnaton tn llwn ti enai.

Species is more truly substance than genus because is closer to particular.

DISCUSSION: To render (podid - to order, to know according to reality). Mentioning species is closer to the truth than mentioning genus.

For primary substance: - secondary substance is predicate - cannot be predicated about genus

accidents are into it 17

Tn d deutrwn osin mllon osa t edoj to gnouj ggion gr tj prthj osaj stn. n gr podid tij tn prthn osan t sti, gnwrimteron ka okeiteron podsei t edoj podidoj t gnoj oon tn tin nqrwpon gnwrimteron n podoh nqrwpon

Species: - Genus is predicate for them - cannot be predicated of the genus (they behave like individuals towards genus)

It is, then, with good reason that of all that remains, when we exclude primary substances, we concede to species and genera alone the name 'secondary substance', for these alone of all the predicates convey a knowledge of primary substance. (). All other things that we state, such as that he is white, that he runs, and so on, are irrelevant to the definition. Thus it is just that these alone, apart from primary substances, should be called substances. Further, primary substances are most properly so called, because they underlie [are the subjects of] everything else.

podidoj zon, t mn gr dion mllon to tinj nqrpou, t d kointeron, ka t t dndron podidoj gnwrimteron podsei dndron podidoj futn.

Species are substances to the same degree Also, Individuals are substances to the same degree

There is no hierarchy between substances

ti a prtai osai di t toj lloij pasin pokesqai ka pnta t lla kat totwn kathgoresqai n tataij enai di toto mlista os ai lgontai j d ge a prtai osai prj t lla cousin, otw ka t edoj prj t gnoj cei pkeitai gr t edoj t gnei t mn gr gnh kat tn edn kathgoretai, t d edh kat tn genn ok ntistrfeiste ka k totwn t edoj to gnouj mllon osa. atn d tn edn sa m sti gnh, odn mllon teron trou osa stn

Things that can be predicated are genuses and species accidents Species and genuses are alone secondary substances because they convey (dhlo - show, provide evidence) knowledge of primary substance Therefore: accidents do not provide knowledge

Now the same relation that subsists between primary substance and everything else subsists also between the species and the genus to which the primary substance belongs, on the one hand, and every attribute which is not included within these, on the other. For these are the subjects of all such. If we call an individual man 'skilled in grammar', the predicate is applicable also to the species and to the genus to which he belongs. This law holds good in all cases.

FIRST ELEMENT FOR DEFINITION OF SUBSTANCE Essence of substance is to underlie [be subject] of everything else.

IMPORTANT: any predicate applies to primary substance predicates that apply to primary substance applies also to secondary substance

It is a common characteristic of all substance that it is never present in a subject. For primary substance is neither present in a subject nor predicated of a subject; while, with regard to secondary substances, it is clear from the following arguments (apart from others) that they are not present in a subject. For 'man' is predicated of the individual man, but is not present in any subject: for manhood is not present in the individual man.

Ektwj d met tj prtaj osaj mna tn llwn t edh ka t gnh deterai osai lgontai mna gr dhlo tn prthn osan tn kathgoroumnwn

18

universal accidents are predicates [therefore] universal accidents apply to secondary substance (see Figure 1) Discussion: Is accidental determination contained in definition? (is it like undesignated matter in Thomas Aquinas?) NEXT ELEMENTS FOR DEFINITION OF SUBSTANCE Substance is not in a subject. Primary substance is not predicated This means: S1 is never ontologically dependent S1 is not object of science

In the same way, 'animal' is also predicated of the individual man, but is not present in him. tn d' llwn ti n podid tij, llotr wj stai podedwkj, oon leukn trcei tion tn toiotwn podidoj ste ektwj tata mna tn llwn osai lgontai. Again, when a thing is present in a subject, though the name may quite well be applied to that in which it is present, the definition cannot be applied. Yet of secondary substances, not only the name, but also the definition, applies to the subject: we should use both the definition of the species and that of the genus with reference to the individual man. Thus substance cannot be present in a subject. Yet this is not peculiar to substance, for it is also the case that differentiae cannot be present in subjects. The characteristics 'terrestrial' and 'two-footed' are predicated of the species 'man', but not present in it. For they are not in man. Moreover, the definition of the differentia may be predicated of that of which the differentia itself is predicated. For instance, if the characteristic 'terrestrial' is predicated of the species 'man', the definition also of that characteristic may be used to form the predicate of the species 'man': for 'man' is terrestrial. ti a prtai osai di t toj lloij pasin pokesqai kuritata osai lgontai j d ge a prtai osai prj t lla pnta cousin, otw t edh ka t gnh tn prtwn osin prj t loip pnta cei kat totwn gr pnta t loip kathgoretai tn gr tin nqrwpon rej grammatikn, okon ka nqrwpon ka zon grammatikn rej satwj d ka p tn llwn.

QUESTIONS ARISE: S2 is predicated of S1 Accidents are predicated of S1 What is the difference between S2 and accidents? Are accidents like genuses and species? Can we recognize them as different and not being proper science?

ANSWER: definition (logos) cannot be applied. Therefore: S2 is synonymous to S1 Accidents are homonymous to S1 (See Figure 2)

RELATION OF DIFFERENTIAE TO SUBSTANCE Differentiae is problematic: it is not substance (primary or second)

The fact that the parts of substances appear to be present in the whole, as in a subject, should not make us apprehensive lest we should have to admit that such parts are not substances: for in explaining the phrase 'being present in a subject', we stated' that we meant 'otherwise than as parts in a whole'.

Koinn d kat pshj osaj t m n pokeimnJ enai. mn gr prth osa ote kaq' pokeimnou lgetai ote n pokeimnJ stn. tn d deutrwn osin fanern mn ka otwj ti ok esn n pokeimnJ gr nqrwpoj kaq' pokeimnou mn to tinj nqrpou lgetai, n pokeimnJ d ok stin, o gr n t tin nqrpJ nqrwpj stin satwj d ka t zon kaq'

19

 it is not accident Though it is: not present in a subject predicated of the subject is differentiae substance or accident?

() All substance appears to signify that which is individual. In the case of primary substance this is indisputably true, for the thing is a unit.

pokeimnou mn lgetai to tinj nqrpou, ok sti d t zon n t tin nqrpJ.

1. 2. 3.

Not accident because specific (see above, chapter 3) It is predicated. Therefore universal (not individual). So it is not primary substance. In the case of secondary substances, when we speak, for instance, of 'man' or 'animal', our form of speech gives the impression that we are here also indicating that which is individual, but the impression is not strictly true; for a secondary substance is not an individual, but [a class with] a certain qualification; for it is not one and single as a primary substance is; the words 'man', 'animal', are predicable of more than one subject. ti d tn n pokeimnJ ntwn t mn noma odn kwlei kathgoresqa pote to pokeimnou, tn d lgon dnaton tn d deutrwn osin kathgoretai ka lgoj kat to pokeimnou ka tonoma, tn gr to nqrpou lgon kat to tinj nqrpou kathgorseij ka tn to zou.ste ok n eh osa tn n pokeimnJ. ok dion d osaj toto, ll ka diafor tn m n pokeimnJ st n t gr pezn ka t dpoun kaq' pokeimnou mn lgetai to nqrpou, n pokeimnJ d ok stin, o gr n t nqrpJ st t dpoun od t pezn.ka lgoj d kathgoretai tj diaforj kaq' o n lghtai diafor oon e t pezn kat nqrpou lgetai, ka lgoj to pezo kathgorhqsetai to nqrpou, pezn gr stin nqrwpoj. m taratttw d mj t mrh tn osin j n pokeimnoij nta toj loij, m pote nagkasqmen ok osaj at fskein enai o gr otw t n pokeimnJ lgeto t j mrh prconta n tini. 20

It is not in a subject. Is it therefore a secondary substance? NOT. It is not in a subject but NOT otherwise than as parts in a whole. Differentiae (diafor) see also Topics (101b, 122b, 125a, 128a, 143a-b):

it is a part of the (e.g.) genus. Therefore synonymous, like species Though, not species but OPPOSITIONS (like godman, philosopher-poet etc).

OTHER ELEMENTS FOR DEFINITION OF SUBSTANCE

Primary Substance means an INDIVIDUAL (tde ti). - SOMETHING THAT IS; - A CERTAIN THING

Yet species and genus do not merely indicate quality, like the term 'white'; 'white' indicates quality and nothing further, but species and genus determine the quality with reference to a substance: they signify substance qualitatively differentiated. ()

Secondary substance means qualification (poin ti): - IN WHICH WAY IT IS? - WHAT KIND OF BEING

Not the same with the category of quality: - quality indicates mere quality (they do not refer to the substance). - secondary substance indicates quality AND the primary substance

Another mark of substance is that it has no contrary. What could be the contrary of any primary substance, such as the individual man or animal? It has none. () Nor can the species or the genus have a contrary. Yet this characteristic is not peculiar to substance, but is true of many other things, such as quantity. () Substance, again, does not appear to admit of variation of degree. I do not mean by this that one substance cannot be more or less truly substance than another, for it has already been stated' that this is the case; but that no single substance admits of varying degrees within itself. For instance, one particular substance, 'man', cannot be more or less man either than himself at some other time or than some other man. () The most distinctive mark of substance appears to be that, while remaining numerically one and the same, it is capable of admitting contrary qualities. From among things other than substance, we should find ourselves unable to bring forward any which possessed this mark. Thus, one and the same colour cannot be white and black. Nor can the same one action be good and bad: this law holds good with everything that is not substance. But one and the selfsame substance, while retaining its identity, is yet capable of admitting contrary qualities. The same individual person is at one time white, at another black, at one time warm, at another cold, at one time good, at another bad. () To sum up, it is a distinctive mark of substance, that, while remaining numerically one and the same, it is capable of admitting contrary qualities, the modification taking place through a change in the substance itself. Let these remarks suffice on the subject of substance. Psa d osa doke tde ti shmanein. p mn on tn prtwn osin namfisbthton ka lhqj stin ti tde ti shmanei tomon gr ka n riqm t dhlomenn stin. p d tn deutrwn osin fa netai mn mowj t scmati tj proshgoraj tde ti shmanein, tan epV nqrwpon zon o mn lhqj ge, ll mllon poin ti shmanei, o gr n sti t pokemenon sper prth osa, ll kat polln nqrwpoj lgetai ka t zon

Therefore: primary substance is denoted by secondary substance (synonymy)

primary substance is not denoted by quality (homonimy)

FINAL DETERMINATIONS OF SUBSTANCE: it has no contrary (only its parts can be contrary, but they are differentiae) - there is no other substance B contrary to the substance A.

has no degree (nothing is more or less substance). - refers to either primary or secondary withing their range

oc plj d poin ti shmanei, sper t leukn odn gr llo shmanei t leukn ll' poin, t d edoj ka t gnoj per osan t poin for zei, poin gr tina osan shma nei. (...)

21

 has contraries within itmself - a substance can have contrary accidents at different times

`Uprcei d taj osaij ka t mhdn ataj nanton enai. t gr prtV osv t n eh nant on; oon t tin nqrpJ odn stin nanton, od ge t nqrpJ t zJ odn stin nanton. ok dion d tj osaj toto, ll ka p' llwn polln oon p to poso t gr dipcei odn stin nanton, od toj dka, od tn toiotwn oden, () Doke d osa ok pidcesqai t mllon ka t tton lgw d oc ti osa osaj ok sti mllon osa, toto mn gr erhtai ti stin,ll' ti ksth osa toq' per stn o lgetai mllon ka tton oon e stin ath osa nqrwpoj, ok stai mllon ka tton nqrwpoj, ote atj ato ote teroj trou. () Mlista d dion tj osaj doke enai t tatn ka n riqm n tn nantwn e nai dektikn ()

22

23

3. Substance in Metaphysics, VII.

The text is based on: Aristotle's Metaphysics, ed. W.D. Ross. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1924.

In book VII of Metaphysics Aristotle continues his quest: WHAT IS A THING that we can consider object of knowledge?
QUEST FOR THE THING Aristotle is trying to find what the object of knowledge is, among other things. A thing (that is: object of knowledge) must be recognized from what is real but not a thing; A real thing (to on) is said of in many ways. - ti esti (what it is) the what; the predicable substance ; - to de ti (the this) the this; the individual; - quality, quantity, and so on. DISCUSSION: Is Aristotle realist? He says the predicable substance is a real thing. To ti: the prime meaning: primary substance. - Ti esti is a to on only in a secondary sense. - An accident is not to on in itself but only as it determines the ti esti. While 'being' has all these senses, obviously that which 'is' primarily is the 'what', which indicates the substance of the thing. For when we say of what quality a thing is, we say that it is good or bad, not that it is three cubits long or that it is a man; but when we say what it is, we do not say 'white' or 'hot' or 'three cubits long', but 'a man' or 'a 'god'. () And so one might even raise the question whether the words 'to walk', 'to be healthy', 'to sit' imply that each of these things is existent, and similarly in any other case of this sort; for none of them is either self-subsistent or capable of being separated from substance, but rather, if anything, it is that which walks or sits or is healthy that is an existent thing. Now these are seen to be more real because there is something definite which underlies them (i.e. the substance or individual), which is implied in such a predicate; Therefore that which is primarily, i.e. not in a qualified sense but without qualification, must be substance. 24 tosautacj d legomnou to ntoj fanern ti totwn prton n t t stin, per shmanei tn osan (tan mn gr epwmen pon ti tde, gaqn lgomen kakn, ll' o tr phcu nqrwpon tan d t stin, o leukn od qermn od trphcu, ll nqrwpon qen), (...) di kn porsei tij pteron t badzein ka t gianein ka t kaqsqai kaston atn n shmanei, mowj d ka p tn llwn touon tn toiotwn odn gr atn stn ote kaq' at pefukj ote cwrzesqai dunatn tj osaj, ll mllon, eper, t badzon tn ntwn ka t kaqmenon ka t gianon. tata d mllon fanetai nta, diti sti ti t pokemenon atoj rismnon (toto d' stn osa ka t kaq' kaston), per mfanetai n t "THERE are several senses in which a thing may be said to 'be', as we pointed out previously in our book on the various senses of words;' for in one sense the 'being' meant is 'what a thing is' or a 'this', and in another sense it means a quality or quantity or one of the other things that are predicated as these are. T n lgetai pollacj, kaqper dieilmeqa prteron n toj per to posacj shmanei gr t mn t sti ka tde ti, t d poin posn tn llwn kaston tn otw kathgoroumnwn.

accident predicates do not denote substance (also Cat). - An action is not a real thing either.

to qualify does not mean to indicate the thing

- Only ths subject (subsistent) is a real thing.

- First meaning of Substance (real thing) is: that which stands

alone unqualified. Only substance is a thing. Does Aristotle have a system? What does he mean by in the first meaning? WHAT IS A FIRST MEANING (e.g. of substance)? - Science speaks of things from three perspectives. So Substance is the individual because of all three reasons:

kathgorv t toiatV
ste t prtwj n ka o t n ll' n plj osa n eh.

"Now there are several senses in which a thing is said to be first; yet substance is first in every sense-(1) in definition, (2) in order of knowledge, (3) in time. For (3) of the other categories none can exist independently, but only substance. And (1) in definition also this is first; for in the definition of each term the definition of its substance must be present. And (2) we think we know each thing most fully, when we know what it is, e.g. what man is or what fire is, rather than when we know its quality, its quantity, or its place; since we know each of these predicates also, only when we know what the quantity or the quality is. () Part 2 "Substance is thought to belong most obviously to bodies; and so we say that not only animals and plants and their parts are substances, but also natural bodies such as fire and water and earth and everything of the sort, and all things that are either parts of these or composed of these (either of parts or of the whole bodies), e.g. the physical universe and its parts, stars and moon and sun. pollacj m on lgetai t prton mwj n d pntwj osa prton, ka lgJ ka gnsei ka crnJ. tn mn gr llwn kathgorhmtwn oqn cwristn, ath d mnh ka t lgJ d toto prton (ngkh gr n t kstou lgJ tn tj osaj nuprcein) ka ednai d tt' omeqa kaston mlista, tan t stin nqrwpoj gnmen t pr, mllon t poin t posn t po, pe ka atn totwn tte kaston smen, tan t sti t posn t poin gnmen. (...)

the definition or rational perspective (1: the logos of a thing includes the logos of substance). That is: thing and substance are synonymous.

in order of knowledge or according to method, according to how knowledge works (2: knowing what a thing is does not require other qualifications, whereas when we know qualifications we do not understand the thing). - What it is does not depend on descriptions, like in Quine.

in time, that is, because of duration (3: it stands alone; it is separable - choriston; only substance can be without matter)

A THING IS PRIMARILY THE SUBSTANCE. NOW, WHAT IS THE SUBSTANCE? 1. Substance is obviously said of the corporeal things. We have this first quest for substance: where is substance to be found? - In the corporeal things. Corporeal things are: Animals and their parts Plants and their parts

Natural (physical) bodies - The four elements and their parts - The four elements and their compounds - Heavens and its parts (stars, moon, sun)

Supplementary question: Are there non-corporeal substances?

But whether these alone are substances, or there are also others, or only some of these, or others as well, or none of these but only some other things, are substances, must be considered. Some think the limits of body, i.e. surface, line, point, and unit, are substances, and more so than body or the solid. 25

Doke d' osa prcein fanertata mn toj smasin (di t te za ka t fut ka t mria atn osaj e na famen, ka t fusik smata, oon pr ka dwr ka gn ka tn toiotwn kaston, ka sa mria totwn k totwn stn, morwn pntwn, oon te oranj ka t mria ato, stra ka selnh ka lios)

pteron d atai mnai osai esn

- The problem of universals posed.

() Part 3

It has been said that substance is the first meaning for thing. NOW: What is the first meaning for substance? (same method required). We expect Aristotle to discuss the three criteria: reason, definition and time). He will! 2. More meanings for substance Substance has four meanings: "The word 'substance' is applied, if not in more senses, still at least to four main objects; for both the essence and the universal and the genus, are thought to be the substance of each thing, and fourthly the substratum.

ka llai, totwn tinj ka llai, totwn mn oqn terai d tinej, skepton. doke d tisi t to smatoj prata, oon pifneia ka gramm ka stigm ka monj, enai osai, ka mllon t sma ka t steren. ()

to ti hen einai (essence). - What it was [meant for] a thing to be.

quiddity (lat: quidditas). Lgetai d' osa, e m pleonacj, ll' n tttars ge mlista ka gr t t n e nai ka t kaqlou ka t gnoj osa doke enai kstou, ka ttarton totwn t pokemenon.

katholou (universal) Genos (Genre). Hypokeimenon (subject or substratum):

subject of all predicates, not itself a predicate.

[the main indication for substance was this: to be subject and not predicated]. Substance is: the substratum. * QUEST FOR SUBSTANCE AS SUBSTRATUM What is the substratum? Substratum is:

Now the substratum is that of which everything else is predicated, while it is itself not predicated of anything else. And so we must first determine the nature of this; for that which underlies a thing primarily is thought to be in the truest sense its substance. And in one sense matter is said to be of the nature of substratum, in another, shape, and in a third, the compound of these. (By the matter I mean, for instance, the bronze, by the shape the pattern of its form, and by the compound of these the statue, the concrete whole.) Therefore if the form is prior to the matter and more real, it will be prior also to the compound of both, for the same reason. "We have now outlined the nature of substance, showing that it is that which is not predicated of a stratum, but of which all else is predicated. But we must not merely state the matter thus; for this is not enough. The statement itself is obscure, and further, on this view, 26

matter (hyle) shape or configuration of logoi (morphe schema tes ideas); compound of these

t d' pokemenn sti kaq' o t lla lgetai, keno d at mhkti kat' llou di prton per totou dioriston mlista gr doke enai osa t pokemenon prton. toioton d trpon mn tina lh lgetai, llon d trpon morf, trton d t k totwn (lgw d tn mn lhn oon tn calkn, tn d morfn

QUESTION: Is matter or form the substratum in a main sense? According to the definition of substance, the matter seems to be substance as substratum.

matter becomes substance. For if this is not substance, it baffles us to say what else is. When all else is stripped off evidently nothing but matter remains. For while the rest are affections, products, and potencies of bodies, length, breadth, and depth are quantities and not substances (for a quantity is not a substance), but the substance is rather that to which these belong primarily. But when length and breadth and depth are taken away we see nothing left unless there is something that is bounded by these; so that to those who consider the question thus matter alone must seem to be substance. By matter I mean that which in itself is neither a particular thing nor of a certain quantity nor assigned to any other of the categories by which being is determined. For there is something of which each of these is predicated, whose being is different from that of each of the predicates

t scma tj daj, t d' k totwn tn ndrinta t snolon), ste e t edoj tj lhj prteron ka mllon n, ka to x mfon prteron stai di tn atn lgon. nn mn on tpJ erhtai t pot' stn osa, ti t m kaq' pokeimnou ll kaq' o t lla de d m mnon otwj o gr kann at gr toto dhlon, ka ti lh os a ggnetai. e gr m ath osa, tj stin llh diafegei periairoumnwn gr tn llwn o fanetai odn pomnon t mn gr lla tn swmtwn pqh ka poimata ka dunmeij, t d mkoj ka pltoj ka bqoj posthtj tinej ll' ok osai (t gr posn ok osa), ll mllon prcei tata prtJ, ken stin osa. ll mn fairoumnou mkouj ka pltouj ka bqouj odn rmen poleipmenon, pln e t sti t rizmenon p totwn, ste tn lhn ngkh fanesqai mnhn osan otw skopoumnoij. lgw d' lhn kaq' atn mte t mte posn mte llo mhdn lgetai oj ristai t n. sti gr ti kaq' o kathgoretai totwn kaston, t enai teron ka tn kathgorin kstV

Aristotle is not satisfied with stating that matter is the substratum. He will define matter (on one hand) and substance again.

CAN SUBSTRATUM BE MATTER (hypothesis)? BUT WHAT IS MATTER? Matter is:

(for the predicates other than substance are predicated of substance, while substance is predicated of matter). () "If we adopt this point of view, then, it follows that matter is substance.

not a (ti) particular thing (- is it a universal?) not a category ( - is it a particular?) it is predicated of (- a substratum) not a predicate (- a particular?). cannot be negated.

If matter is substratum we have a sophism: - Predicates must be different than substance - Substance is predicated of matter. It is not a sophism in case it is a tautology. It seems matter is [like] substratum.

But this is impossible; for both separability and 'thisness' are thought to belong chiefly to substance. And so form and the compound of form and matter would be thought to be substance, rather than matter. The substance compounded of both, i.e. of matter and shape, may be dismissed; for it is posterior and its nature is obvious. And matter also is in a sense manifest.

MATTER CANNOT BE (adunaton) SUBSTRATUM because the definition of matter does not include definition of substance. Substance is:

(t mn gr lla tj osaj kathgoretai, ath d tj lhs), (...)

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Separable.

To de ti (a this) These conditions are satisfied only by form and compound. But compound is not substratum because it is:

k mn on totwn qewrosi sumba nei osan enai tn lhn

Posterior (compounded by nature, so not separable)

Dele, obvious (sensible, so, not separable) Matter is also dismissed as separability and thisness do not belong to matter (substratum is fourth meaning of substance). Matter is not synonymous with substance. [Remember: we were looking for what is a thing? The first option, thing as substratum, is not satisfying. There is a result though: - a thing is not matter] * QUEST FOR SUBSTANCE AS ESSENCE [Now Aristotle discusses another hypothesis: can a thing as substance be the essence?] He says it is a difficult (aporetic) research. What is essence? 1. Dialectical inquiry Essence (to ti hen einai) is propter se (kathauto). - Thing itself, by/ in itself; the self of a thing.

But we must inquire into the third kind of substance; for this is the most perplexing. () Part 4. "Since at the start we distinguished the various marks by which we determine substance, and one of these was thought to be the essence, we must investigate this. And first let us make some linguistic remarks about it. The essence of each thing is what it is said to be propter se. For being you is not being musical, since you are not by your very nature musical. What, then, you are by your very nature is your essence. "Nor yet is the whole of this the essence of a thing; not that which is propter se as white is to a surface, because being a surface is not identical with being white. But again the combination of both-'being a white surface'-is not the essence of surface, because 'surface' itself is added. The formula, therefore, in which the term itself is not present but its meaning is expressed, this is the formula of the essence of each thing. Therefore if to be a white surface is to be a smooth surface, to be white and to be smooth are one and the same. "() "But is being-a-cloak an essence at all? Probably not. For the essence is precisely what something is; but when an attribute is asserted of a subject other than itself, the complex is not precisely what some 'this' is, e.g. white man is not precisely what some 'this' is, since thisness belongs only to substances. 28

dnaton d ka gr t cwristn ka t tde ti prcein doke mlista t osv, di t e doj ka t x mfon osa dxeien n enai mllon tj lhj. tn mn tonun x mfon osan, lgw d tn k te tj lhj ka tj morfj, feton, stra gr ka dlh faner d pwj ka lh

per d tj trthj skepton, ath gr porwtth. () 1029b1 'Epe d' n rc dieilmeqa psoij r zomen tn osan, ka totwn n ti dkei enai t t n enai, qewrhton per ato. ka prton epwmen nia per ato logikj, ti st t t n enai kstou lgetai kaq' at. o gr sti t so enai t mousik

Distinction 1:

To be musical (not kata sauton, but an accident) - the accident is not essence Distinction 2: to be (essence) to be white (accident) - the combination is not essence (the self of a thing), because

To be you essentially (kata sauton, by essence)

the accident is added into the formula. The essence does not have a formula of itself. It is only expressed by other terms. - a compound is not an essence because a compound means to predicate a thing of a different thing. There are two things in a compound. But we have a definition not where we have a word and a formula identical in meaning (for in that case all formulae or sets of words would be definitions; for there will be some name for any set of words whatever, so that even the Iliad will be a definition), but where there is a formula of something primary; and primary things are those which do not imply the predication of one element in them of another element. Nothing, then, which is not a species of a genus will have an essence-only species will have it, for these are thought to imply not merely that the subject participates in the attribute and has it as an affection, or has it by accident; but for everything else as well, if it has a name, there be a formula of its meaning-viz. that this attribute belongs to this subject; or instead of a simple formula we shall be able to give a more accurate one; but there will be no definition nor essence. "Or has 'definition', like 'what a thing is', several meanings? 'What a thing is' in one sense means substance and the 'this', in another one or other of the predicates, quantity, quality, and the like. For as 'is' belongs to all things, not however in the same sense, but to one sort of thing primarily and to others in a secondary way, so too 'what a thing is' belongs in the simple sense to substance, but in a limited sense to the other categories.
For even of a quality we might ask what it is, so that quality also is a 'what a thing is',-not in the simple sense, however, but just as, in the case of that which is not, some say, emphasizing the linguistic form, that that is which is not is-not is simply, but is non-

enai o gr kat sautn e mousikj. ra kat sautn. Therefore there is an essence only of those things whose formula is a definition. od d toto pn o gr t otwj kaq' at j pifanev leukn, ti ok sti t pifanev enai t leuk enai. ll mn od t x mfon, t pifanev leuk, ti prsestin at. n ra m nstai lgJ at, lgonti at, otoj lgoj to t n e nai kstJ, st' e t pifanev leuk ena sti t pifanev enai lev, t leuk ka leJ enai t at ka n. (...) ll t matJ enai r sti t n ena ti [] lwj; o; per gr t sti t t n enai tan d' llo kat' llou lghtai, ok stin per tde ti, oon leukj nqrwpoj ok stin per tde ti, eper t tde taj osaij prcei mnon ste t t n ena stin swn lgoj stn rismj.

The essence does not have a name must be expressed by other terms

the terms must not refer to different things (must be synonymous with the essence) [THEREFORE] The formula of an essence is a definition.

What is a definition? not a name not a description not a conventional equivalence between a name and an expression. BUT: a predication of a primary thing, that is: - Expression meaning the one and only thing The expression that describes the logos / reason / species of the thing. (Given that species is not a compound) CONCLUSION CONCERNING ESSENCE: Only species of a genus have essence. Accidents are not species.

A synonym expression for the thing

rismj d' stn ok n noma lgJ tat shmanV (pntej gr n een o lgoi roi stai gr noma tJon lgJ, ste ka 'Ilij rismj stai), ll' n prtou tinj toiata d' stn sa lgetai m t llo kat' llou lgesqai. ok stai ra oden tn m gnouj

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existent; so too with quality.

* [ Do we say definition in many ways, like thing? ] We say thing (what a thing is ti esti) in two ways:

substance and to ti (the object of knowledge) accidents (the einai that are not subsistent)

Though, categories (accidents) are not essences. They do not have a ti esti (essence). - only in a limited sense, that is:

"We must no doubt inquire how we should express ourselves on each point, but certainly not more than how the facts actually stand. And so now also, since it is evident what language we use, essence will belong, just as 'what a thing is' does, primarily and in the simple sense to substance, and in a secondary way to the other categories also,-not essence in the simple sense, but the essence of a quality or of a quantity. For it must be either by an equivocation that we say these are, or by adding to and taking from the meaning of 'are' (in the way in which that which is not known may be said to be known),-the truth being that we use the word neither ambiguously nor in the same sense, but just as we apply the word 'medical' by virtue of a reference to one and the same thing, not meaning one and the same thing, nor yet speaking ambiguously; ()

edn prcon t t n enai, ll totoij mnon (tata gr doke o kat metocn lgesqai ka pqoj od' j sumbebhks) ll lgoj mn stai kstou ka tn llwn t shmanei, n noma, ti tde tde prcei, nt lgou plo kribsteroj rismj d' ok stai od t t n enai. ka rismj sper ka t t sti pleonacj lgetai; ka gr t t stin na mn trpon shmanei tn osan ka t tde ti, llon d kaston tn kathgoroumnwn, posn poin ka sa lla toiata. sper gr ka t stin prcei psin, ll' oc mowj ll t mn prtwj toj d' pomnwj, otw ka t t stin plj m t osv pj d toj lloij n ka gr t poin romeq' n t stin, ste ka t poin tn t stin, ll' oc plj, ll' sper p to m ntoj logikj fas tinej enai t m n, oc plj ll m n, otw ka t poin. de mn on skopen ka t pj de lgein per kaston, o mn mlln ge t pj cei di ka nn pe t legmenon fanern, ka t t n enai mowj prxei prtwj mn ka plj t osv, eta ka toj lloij, sper ka t t stin, oc plj t n enai ll poi pos t n enai. de gr mwnmwj tata fnai enai nta, prostiqntaj ka fairontaj, sper ka t m pisthtn pisthtn, pe t ge rqn sti mte mwnmwj fnai mte satwj ll' sper t atrikn t prj t at mn

accidents have only a linguistic essence, like in the case when we say that non-being is not.

Aristotle is leaving the dialectical discussion and states that it is better to see how things are in reality.

In reality, we say that things are in the following manner: by equivocation (homonymously) by composition (we add accidents to substance) by abstraction (we take away the copula) by paronimy But only substance has an essence, therefore it is. Essence is always expressed by a synonymous expression.

30

ka n, o t at d ka n, o mntoi od mwnmwj ()

31

4. Soul as a substance. De anima, II, 1, 5,

Starts from a plan: what is soul what is its most general definition Most general: - for any existent soul, including animals and plants (Themistius) - For every part of the soul (Averroes) - cause for every operation and accidents of the soul (Albert the Great) * Search for a definition which explains all acts of any soul Suggestion: Soul is a substance. Therefore we need to know what is substance. SUBSTANCE: Aristotle says substance as one meaning for being. This is why he uses the term genos (gnoj): substance is a genos of being. By substance we may mean: - matter (not an individual. A potency). - species or form (secondary substance) - compound (prime substance, individual compound) (Cf. also Metaphysics, V, 8, 1017b 10 sq; 1069a 18 sq). 1. Substance is not matter. Now matter is potentiality , sti d' mn lh dnamij, Translated by J. A. Smith Book II Chapter 1 Let the foregoing suffice as our account of the views [412a] concerning the soul which have been handed on by our predecessors; let us now dismiss them and make as it were a completely fresh start, endeavouring to give a precise answer to the question, What is soul? i.e. to formulate the most general possible definition of it.

T mn d p tn prteron paradedomna per yucj ersqw plin d' sper x parcj panwmen, peirmenoi diorsai t sti yuc ka tj n eh kointatoj lgoj atj.

We are in the habit of recognizing, as one determinate kind of what is, substance, and that in several senses, (a) in the sense of matter or that which in itself is not 'a this', and (b) in the sense of form or essence, which is that precisely in virtue of which a thing is called 'a this', and thirdly (c) in the sense of that which is compounded of both (a) and (b).

lgomen d gnoj n ti tn ntwn tn osan, tathj d t mn, j lhn, kaq' at ok sti tde ti, teron d morfn ka e doj, kaq' n dh lgetai tde ti, ka trton t k totwn.

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2. Substance as species means potential form and actual form. Substance as species means act in two senses: - possible science (episteme). - actual exercise of knowledge (theoria) It is because: * species can be either potential or actual (realized; entelecheia) (Alexander of Aphrodisias) Substance as species : Matter Possible science Exerciiul ei actual

form [species] actuality; of the species there are two grades related to one another as e.g. [possible] knowledge to the exercise of knowledge.

t d' edoj ntelceia, ka toto dicj, t mn j pistmh, t d' j t qewren.

See also II, 5, 417a 21 sqq, Pure possibility to learn (potentiality that produces accidents sometimes) Potential possesion of science (formal potency) Actual exercise of science

Alexander of Aphrodisia Material intellect. (has the function of matter) Aquired intellect. Like a disposition e(/xij, habitus Active intellect

substance: MATTER pure possibility. Generates accidents. POSSIBLE SCIENCE formal possibility. Generates science ACTUAL SCIENCE - formal actuality. IS Science. COMPOUND: bodies (! Matter does not mean body !) 3. Substance as compound is the body Principle of all substances is natural body. Because it has the principle of movement in it. Substance as body Natural bodies Substances (as bodies) Artificial bodies Derrived from natural bodies Have accidental form Among substances are by general consent reckoned bodies and especially natural bodies; for they are the principles of all other bodies. osai d mlist' enai dokosi t smata, ka totwn t fusik tata gr tn llwn rca.

Themistius Composed of the four elements

Thomas (sent. II, 1, 8) Have substantial form

Aristotle
(see also Metaph., 7, 2, 1028 b8)

Have in them the principle of movement and nonmovement (De an II, 1, 412b 17). Imitate natural bodies (Phys, 194a 21-23).

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Natural bodies * Have principle of movement in them because: - have self-nutrition

have growth decay

Of natural bodies some have life in them, others not; by life we mean self-nutrition and growth (with its correlative decay). It follows that every natural body which has life in it is a substance in the sense of a composite. But since it is also a body of such and such a kind, viz. having life, the body cannot be soul; the body is the subject or matter, not what is attributed to it.

tn d fusikn t mn cei zwn, t d' ok cei zwn d lgomen tn di' ato trofn te ka axhsin ka fqsin. ste pn sma fusikn metcon zwj os a n eh, osa d' otwj j sunqth. pe d' st ka sma ka toinde, zwn gr con, ok n eh sma yuc o gr sti tn kaq' pokeimnou t sma, mllon d' j pokemenon ka lh.

* that is, they have life and are compound: Body is not predicated of the subject (Cf. Categories) - so, body is not a form or species - therefore body is not the same with the soul

CONCLUSION: SOUL MUST BE A SUBSTANCE IN THE SENSE OF SPECIES. Soul is substance as species or form of a natural living body. - soul is the species of the living bodies. - Living bodies are compound of matter and form Hence the soul must be a substance in the sense of the form of a natural body having life potentially within it. nagkaon ra tn yucn osan e nai j e doj smatoj fusiko dunmei zwn contoj.

The very form in that compound is soul

But he has already said that form has two meanings: possible form (not exercised) actual form (in exercise) WHICH ONE IS THE SOUL?

But substance is actuality, and thus soul is the actuality of a body as above characterized.

A. SOUL IS POSSIBLE FORM AND ACTUAL FORM

Soul has both meanings:

Now the word actuality has two senses corresponding respectively to the possession of knowledge and the actual exercise of knowledge.

d' osa ntelceia toiotou ra smatoj ntelceia.

possession of knowledge (episteme) actual exercise of knowledge (theorein) (not theoria but theorein , to contemplate)

ath d lgetai dicj , mn j pistmh, d' j t qewren.

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Soul is actual form in the sense of potential form (knowledge as possessed). [This baffles us. How can be actual in the sense of potential?

It is obvious that the soul is actuality [refer to entelecheia] in the first sense, viz. that of knowledge as possessed, for both sleeping and waking presuppose the existence of soul, and of these waking corresponds to actual knowing, sleeping to knowledge possessed but not employed,

fanern on ti j pistmh n gr t prcein tn yucn ka pnoj ka grgorsj stin, nlogon d' mn grgorsij t qewren, d' pnoj t cein ka m nergen

Aristotle uses the term entelecheia. So: Soul is entelecheia in the sense of potential form. That means, soul is entelecheia of the body but not yet actualized. Example: Sleeping is waking in potency. Waking is entelecheia (en telos ehein). While we sleep we have waking as potency but not yet realized. But why does Aristotle say that potential form is the first sense? - Because:

and, in the history of the individual, [possibility of] knowledge comes before its employment or exercise. ()

Possible is prime, anterior Possibility is prior to actualization

protra d t gensei p to ato pistmh. ()

The living individual (natural living body)

Potential science.

possession

of

Actual exercise of science

Prime act (soul). Prime, that is, anterior as principle. Potency of life (body) Act, similar to actual exercise of knowledge (living being).

e)ntele/ceia dynamis e)ne/rgeia

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B. SOUL IS THE ENTELECHY OF NATURAL BODY

This is why soul is the entelechy of the natural body having life in potency.

di yuc stin ntelceia prth smatoj fusiko dunmei zwn contoj.

[in conclusion] Soul is entelechy not yet realized. A full of possibilities. These possibilities should be actualised. HOW? by means of organs. Organs are tools for the body. This is a general definition, corresponding to all functions of the soul. It equals life with organs. To have life means - to have organs, that is, - to be able to exercize the potencies that were priorily given by the form. Actualised function of organs is (energeia) actual exercising of 36 [412b] () If, then, we have to give a general formula applicable to all kinds of soul, we must describe it as the first grade of actuality of a natural body having organs. () e d ti koinn p pshj yucj de lgein, eh n ntelceia prth smatoj fusiko rganiko.

entelecheia. - The form is potential first and it is understood as entelecheia.

The definition of the soul has been obtained by the method of division. These are the alternatives Aristotle had from the beginning: pure As virtual possibility to science learn Possession in potency of Ca tiin science posibil (formal potency). Ca Actual exerciiu exercise of actual science Organs, that is, Have life as instruments potency for exercising the life Have life as potency

matter (not individual)

potenc y

Form or species act (secondary substance) Substance SOUL Compound (prime Natural substance or body the individual compound) Accident (not the case)

Prime act , entelecheia SOUL energeia LIVING INDIVIDUAL

POTENCY, as species

ACT, as individual

BODY

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GENERAL CONCLUSION. SOUL AS [t t n e nai]

t t n e nai
The expression is invented by Aristotle. Thoms Aquinas,, Sentencia de anima, II, 2, 2: quod quid erat esse Albert the Great, De anima, ed. Stroick, 1968, p. 68, r. 85-86: quod quid erat esse, hoc est quidditas essentialis D. Ross, in his commentary to De anima: (1961, p. 214): what it was for it to be. Rodier, Commentaire, Aristote, De lame, Paris, Vrin, 1900, p. 180: - The expression means form as present in corporeal individual , different from universal (to\ kaqo/lou) - essence

() We have now given an answer to the question, What is soul? -- an answer which applies to it in its full extent. It is substance in the sense which corresponds to the definitive formula of a certain body's essence. ()

() kaqlou mn on erhtai t stin yuc osa gr kat tn lgon. toto d t t n e nai t toiJd smati, ()

1. 2. 3.

4.

Starting question is: what is a thing that exists? Answer is: a thing that exists is a form projected into a purpose as it is envolved in matter.

What it was for it to be is essence but still semantically it is more: it not only indicates but also explains what essence is. 38

It explains essence as presence of form in matter. It denotes the coming-to-be as a real phenomenon. Also, cf. P. Courtes, Lorigine de la formule to\ ti h)=n ei)=nai, in Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Theologiques, 1964, pp. 169-197.

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Selected bibliography : I.
Editions and translations:

Aristoteles graecae, ex recensione Immanuelis Bekkeri, Berlin, 1831. Ross, W. D., The works of Aristotle translated into English, Oxford, 1910-52. Revised text with introduction and commentary, 2 vols, Oxford, 1924 (repr. 1958). Aristotle, Categories, translated by Edghill, E. M., University of Adelaide Library. Aristote, Traite de lame, commentaire par Rodier, G., Ed. Leroux, Paris, Vrin, 1900 [1985]. Aristotle, De anima, ed. by R. D. Hicks, Cambridge, 1907. Aristotle, De anima, edited, with introduction and Commentary by sir David Ross, Oxford, 1961. Aristotel, Despre suflet, traducere din greaca sin ote de Alexander baumgarten, Humanitas, Bucuresti, 2005. II. Secondary sources:

Ackrill, J. L., Aristotle on Good and the Categories, n: J. Barnes, M. Schofield, R. Scorabji (eds.), Articles on Aristotle, 2. Ethics and Politics, Duckworth, London, 1977, pp. 17-25. Aubenque, Pierre, Hrmeneutique et Ontologie. Remarques sur le Peri Hermeneias d`Aristote, en: Penser avec Aristote, Etudes reunies sous la direction de M. A. Sinaceur, Paris, rs, 1991, pp. 93-105. Aubenque, Pierre, Le probleme de letre chez Aristote, Quadruge/PUF, deuxieme ed. Barnes, Jonathan (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995. Chevalier, Jacques, La notion du ncssaire chez Aristote et ses predecesseurs, Felix Alcan, Paris, 1915. During, I., Owen, G.E.L. (eds.), Aristotel and Plato in the Mid-Fourth Century. Papers of the Symposium Aristotelicum held at Oxford in August, 1957, Goteborg, 1960. Evangeliou, Christos, Aristotles Categories and Porphyry, E.J.Brill, Leiden, New York, Kobenhavn, Koln, 1988. Guthrie, W.K.C., A History of Greek Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, 1981, vol. VI: Aristotle: an encounter. Jaeger, Werner, Aristotle. Fundamentals of the History of his Development, Oxford, At the Clarendon Press, 1948. Nussbaum, Martha, and Rorty, Oksenberg Amelie, Essays on Aristotles De Anima, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1992. Nuyens, Francois, Lvolution de la psychologie dAristote, Louvain, La Haye, Paris, 1948. Robin, Leon, Aristote, Paris, 1944.

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