The Valparaiso Maritime Strike of 1903 and the Development of a Revolutionary Labor Movement in Chile Author(s): Peter De Shazo

Source: Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 11, No. 1 (May, 1979), pp. 145-168 Published by: Cambridge University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/156411 Accessed: 10/04/2009 23:55
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1. Lat. Amer. Stud.

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oo22-2I6X/79/JLAS-IIIO

I, 145-168 Printed in Great Britain $02.00 ? 1979 Cambridge University Press

I45

The Valparaiso Maritime Strike of I903 and the Development of a Revolutionary Labor Movement in Chile
by PETER DE SHAZO

The historical attachment of the organized labor movement of Chile to revolutionary ideologies has been unique in Latin America. Anarchosyndicalists controlled most labor unions in Santiago and Valparaiso, and the Communists those of the nitrate and coal mining zones during the I920s.' From the late I93os to the fall of Allende, a majority of Chilean labor unionists manifested their desire for socio-economic change by supporting the Communist and Socialist Parties at the polls and in the streets. A leftist-oriented labor movement developed and survived in Chile because of the failure of elites either to eliminate independent working class organizations by repression or to provide institutional means for incorporating workers into society. During the 'Parliamentary Regime ' (I89I-1924), the fiscal dependence of the State on nitrate exports and the prevalent view among politicians and entrepreneurs that the Government's role in the economy should be limited to guaranteeing a free flow of trade conditioned the relationship between the State and organized labor. Under normal circumstances, the national Government did not intervene in the affairs of labor and capital. Legislation aimed at regulating industrial relations was introduced in Congress on several occasions during the early twentieth century, but no action was taken until the passage of seven labor laws in
1 The terms ' worker ', ' labor ', and ' labor union ' as used in this article refer only to blue collar workers (obreros) and their organizations. A number of university theses and books have been written which describe the rise of the organized labor movement in early twentieth-century Chile, but few have given the subject more than superficial or ideologically-inspired attention. Two memorias de prueba, by Floreal RecabarrenRojas, Historia del Proletariado de Tarapacdy Antofagasta, I884--9I3 (Santiago, I954) and Jorge Barria Ser6n, Los Movimientos Sociales del Principio del Siglo, I9oo-I9IO (Santiago, 1953) provided the groundwork for Julio C. Jobet's book, Luis Emilio Recabarren(Santiago, I955). Barrfa later wrote an extension to his thesis, entitled Los Movimientos Sociales de Chile desde I9io hasta I926 (Santiago, 1960). These studies, despite their many shortcomings, have been cited and recited by other scholars wishing to draw conclusions about the pre1927 period before moving on to related topics.
L.A.S.-I0

146 Peter de Shazo

September 1924. Congress did produce a series of laws governing child and female labor, indemnity payments for work-related accidents, and Sunday rest, but employers generally ignored them. Labor unions before 1924 interacted with employers and the State on a purely informal basis. Mutual aid societies formed by workers could gain recognition as legally-incorporated bodies according to the terms of the Chilean Civil Code by petitioning the President of the Republic. Legal status was normally granted if the by-laws of the society in question conformed with the stipulations outlined by the Code. Labor unions, whose principal purpose was not mutual aid but the defense of membership interests through strikes and collective bargaining, seldom sought legal status. In most cases, the stated objectives and by-laws of these organizations were not compatible with the requirements of the Civil Code and would not have received favorable attention from government officials. Lack of corporate status did not, however, hinder the growth or effectiveness of most labor unions. Strikes in Chile were extra-legal in the sense that they were neither prohibited nor regulated by law. In lieu of government regulation, workers and employers formed their own de facto system of industrial relations during the first decades of the twentieth century. Early efforts at unionization were met with dismissals and blacklisting. Strikes on many occasions more closely resembled industrial warfare than labor disputes. Employers considered any union demand not related to wages to be a frontal attack on their managerial prerogatives. When labor temporarily gained the upper hand in a major strike, seriously disrupted the operations of a key industry, or threatened to disturb the peace, the Government did not hesitate to intervene. The steadfast refusal of many employers to engage in collective bargaining with their workers, especially during the initial appearance of labor unions from 1902 to I908, led to deadlocked strikes which the Government settled by force. State participation in labor disputes generally favored employers. Police units guarded their property and protected the 'right to work' of strikebreakers. Soldiers and sailors frequently replaced striking railroad, maritime, and tram workers. When events got out of hand, the armed forces received carte blanche in dealing with labor. Working class blood flowed freely in
Chile between
I903

and I907,

peak years of labor union activity and

industrial violence. This unregulated relationship between labor and capital persisted until the repression of the unions by Colonel Carlos Ibafiez in February 1927. An industrial environment marked by a quarter of a century of malign neglect on the part of the State and constant resistancefrom employers helped create

The Valparaiso Maritime Strike of I903

I47

an independent, leftist-oriented labor movement in Chile. The tactics and outlook of anarcho-syndicalismguided many of the labor unions of Santiago and Valaparaiso through their first strikes between I902 and I908. Workers learned that direct action against employers, not political or mutual aid activities, won them material benefits. The presence of police spies in labor unions, the brutality of mounted troops during demonstrations, and unenforced 'social legislation' convinced many that the State was their enemy. Either by choice or by circumstance, most workers did not vote and thus remained politically isolated from the Parliamentary Regime. Unemployment, rampant inflation, and increased poverty assaulted the working class whenever major fluctuations occurred in the nitrate economy. Under such conditions, revolutionary ideologies made headway on a step-by-step basis until nearly all the important labor unions came under anarcho-syndicalist
or communist control by the early I920s.

Labor's march to the left began with the formation of the first job-oriented unions at the turn of the century. Employers and workers had engaged in little collective bargaining before that time. Most working class organizations in nineteenth-century Chile were mutual aid societies (socorros mutuos) which provided members with sickness and accident payments, a 'dignified' burial, death benefits paid to dependents, and, in some cases, retirement stipends.2 Except for those in the maritime trades, mutual aid societies rarely undertook strike action. Strikes which did occur during the last decades of the nineteenth century appear to have been spontaneous affairs launched primarily by transportworkers. Anarchist ideology began to gain a foothold in Chile during the I89os with the establishment of the first 'social studies centers' and libertarian publications. The early anarchists of Santiago and Valparaiso were Chilean citizens who drew their revolutionary inspiration from the rapid spread of anarcho-syndicalismin Argentina.3 In 1898, the first 'resistance society' was formed among metal workers in the State Railway Yards of Santiago. Resistance societies blended the bread-and-butterconcerns of a trade union
2

The major studies of the Chilean labor movement in the nineteenth century are: Marcelo Segall, Las Luchas de Clase en las Primeras Decadas de la Republica de Chile (Santiago, 1962); Pedro Ljubetic and Marcia Ortiz, Estudio sobre el Origen y Desarrollo del Proletariado en Chile, Siglo XIX (Santiago, 1954); Recabarren Rojas, op. cit.; and Hernan Ramirez Necochea, Historia del Movimiento Obreroen Chile, Siglo XIX (Santiago, 1956). Argentine and Chilean anarchist newspapers provide the best information regarding the early development of libertarian movements in Chile. The most useful of these are: El Perseguido (Buenos Aires), I890- ; El Oprimido (Santiago), I893; La Protesta Humana (BA), I897- ; El Proletario (S), i897; El Rebelde (S), I898-9; La Tromba (S), i899; La Campaia (S), 1900-2; and La Ajitacion (S), I9oI-3. See also: Peter De Shazo, 'Urban Workers and Labor Unions in Chile, I902-I927 ', Ph.D. Thesis, University of WisconsinMadison, i977, Chap. Four.

148 Peter de Shazo with anarchist tactics and ideology. Because they dealt directly with employers and attempted to better the economic situation of their members by strike action, the sociedades en resistencia differed fundamentally from mutual aid societies. By early 1903, tram workers, printers, and bakers in Santiago and metal workers and merchant sailors in Valparaiso had established resistance societies. Most went on strike soon after their formation, anxious to win higher wages and test the effectiveness of the direct action tactics proposed by their leaders. The ValparaisoMaritime Strike, I903 Elites in Chile first realized that anarchists were operating within the working class during the much-publicized maritime strike of April-May
1903 in Valparaiso. The rioting which gripped the city on 12 and 13 May

caused great concern among well-to-do Chileans and foreigners. Suddenly, the so-called 'social question' was catapulted into national prominence, whether from fear of social upheaval or concern for the miserable lot of the working class. The conduct of the strike and its aftermath indicated the direction that labor relations in Chile would follow for the next twenty years. While few industrial disputes ended in such spectacular or violent fashion, the affair typified the normal behavior of employers and the State during strikes. The long-term importance of the strike lay in the precedents it set for both labor and government. Workers became increasingly aware of the oppressive nature of the State and more resolved to employ direct-action tactics in their labor disputes. The Government spoke of reform legislation after order had been restored in Valparaiso, but did nothing more than reinforce the city's garrison. These responses, coupled with the adamant opposition of employers to labor unions, resulted in an industrial relations system based on mutual antagonism. The strike began quietly on 17 April, when demands for higher pay by stevedores employed by the British-owned Pacific Steam Navigation Company (PSNC) were turned down by the Company's Manager, J. W. Sharpe.4 Wages paid by the PSNC were generally Io per cent higher than those of its Chilean rival, the Compania Sud Americana de Vapores (CSAV), and workers took advantage of the traditional willingness of the foreign company to pay more by making it their first target for wage demands and then hoping to apply coercive comparison to the CSAV and others. Sharpe refused to consider any wage increases, however, maintaining that the daily
4

Unless otherwise indicated, the following account of the events leading up to the 12 May riot comes from El Mercurio (Valparaiso), I7 Apr.-I2 May 1903; La Union (V), 18 Apr.12 May I903; El Heraldo (V), i8 Apr.-I2 May I903; The Chilean Times (V), I8 Apr.-I3
May I903.

The Valparaiso Maritime Strike of I903

149

rate paid to stevedores was already too high. The workers suggested that three outside persons arbitrate a wage settlement and named as their representative Admiral Fernandez Vial, Governor of the Maritime Territory of Valparaiso and honorary president of several mutual aid societies of stevedores. Fernandez was, indeed, sympathetic to the petitions of the dockers, which he considered 'very justified', and he urged the company to come to terms before the strike could seriously disrupt shipping.5 With no settlement in sight, other mutual aid societies joined the strike, at first in solidarity with the stevedores, but soon after as active participants with their own petitions. By 20 April, activity in the port had ceased. Most of the crews on board PSNC and CSAV steamers jumped ship as they entered Valparaiso, and joined the strike. No cargo was moved through the Customs House because labor contractors could not find anyone to replace the striking aduaneros. Many ships sat unloaded in the harbor, their perishable cargoes rotting, since lightermen had also joined the strike. Fernandez continued to be a point of controversybetween, on the one hand, the workers and the newspapers sympathetic to them - La Union, El Heraldo - and, on the other hand, the companies and their journalistic allies, El Mercurio and The Chilean Times. Admiral Jorge Montt, head of the Chilean Navy, finally favored the latter group by removing Fernandez from office on
25 April.

The harbor, meanwhile, remained closed as the number of strikers approached 4,000, nearly the entire work-force normally engaged in cargo handling. Most of the striking dockers passed their days playing billiards, drinking, or idling about the port area. The four organizations on strike (of sailors, lightermen, stevedores, and Customs House workers) failed to establish a united front or draft a common petition to be presented to employers. Soon after striking, the sailors revitalized their previously-established resistance society and elected the anarchist firebrand, Magno Espinoza, as its president. Espinoza tried to convince the other unions to follow suit, but anti-anarchist sentiment among the mutualists was strong, and the lightermen resisted any coordinated action because they felt certain that a separate settlement would soon be reached with their employers. On 22 April, the lancheros did in fact come to a favorable agreement with many small-scale operators and agreed to report for work. The threat of an undeclared boycott by the shipping companies and docking contractors, however, forced the small lighter-owners to cancel their pact with the mutual aid society.6 Employers steadfastly refused to enter into collective bargaining with
5 El Mercurio
6

Ibid.,

24 Apr.

(V), 24 Apr. 1903, p. 5. g903, p. 5.

150

Peter de Shazo

workers and sabotaged attempts by maritime authorities, labor societies, and interested politicians to set up an arbitrationcommittee. Although the strike had cost them a great deal of money, they had been able gradually to recruit strikebreakers from the ranks of the unemployed in Valparaiso and from dockers in other ports. Activity at the Customs House dock resumed on 27 April with police on hand to protect the Ioo scabs assembled by the contractor. Maritime authorities greatly assisted the shipping companies by allowing them to sail with smaller crews than was legally permitted. Police and workers clashed for the first time on the 27th, when strikers attempted to prevent blacklegs from entering the Customs House. By i May, the city's newspapers noted the increased activity in the port and predicted that the strike would soon be broken. Workers, meanwhile, sought the intercession of political figures, such as Democratic Party Deputy Angel Guarello, in setting up arbitration. The morale of the strikers had begun to waver noticeably until the anarchistspumped new life into the strike at a rally on 4 May. Espinoza was the featured speaker. Strikes, he told the gathered workers, were won not by filing petitions but by direct action and violence: We must not hesitate for a moment. Rather than giving in to the bosses, we should prefer to have our chests run through by bayonets.And in the midst of our death agony, we can take pleasurein watching flamesdevourthe propertyof our tyrantsand the churning waters of the bay as they sink the steamersof the companieswhich todayoppressus.7 Thousands of workers then marched down the principal streets of the city with mounted police close at hand. In spite of the increasingly aggressive behavior of the sailors, the strike continued to lose effectiveness. Workers, apparently, did not lack strike funds, since many small merchants and labor societies of Valparaiso and other cities contributed generously to the cause, and the mutualists (against the rules of their organizations) began using money earmarked for social security benefits.8 The companies were, nevertheless, able to find increasing numbers of strikebreakersand the pace of work in the bay quickened during the first ten days of May. The unions continued their fruitless effort to have an arbitration committee named. Both the Maritime Governor and the Intendant of the Province favored this solution, but the PSNC and CSAV, speaking for employers in general, refused to name representatives or sanction any binding arbitration. By 9 May, even the labor unions realized that the strike was doomed. El Trabajo of the Iquique Mancomunal (labor
8 El Heraldo 7 El Heraldo (V), 5 May I903, p. 3. El Mercurio (V), 5 May I903, (V), 28 Apr. I903, p. 2, 30 Apr., p. 2.

p. 5.

The ValparaisoMaritimeStrike of

I903

151

brotherhood) lamented: 'The proud bourgeoisie will have its moment of satisfaction and with a diabolical smile will quietly reoccupy its place of power. But, comrades, remember that in the bitter struggle for life, our defeats will be our victories! ' 9 Espinoza and the sailors' union increased their pressure on both employers and their fellow-workers to bring the strike to a successful end. They began to camp out along the docks in order to prevent the pre-dawn landing and work of blacklegs. Soon after the 4 May rally, Espinoza demanded that the PSNC and CSAV pay sailors the wages they earned during their last voyage before jumping ship at Valparaiso. Openly admitting their fear that the aggressive sailors might cause trouble, the Maritime Governor and Intendant pressuredemployers into paying the back wages. Tension continued to build. On the gth, Angel Guarello telegraphed Democratic Party boss, Malaquias Concha, in Santiago: 'people exasperated, 0 causing a most dangerous situation which threatens Valparaiso'. The unions rallied again on the Ioth, drawing a large crowd. The shipping companies adamantly refused to meet or even correspond with strikers. Top authorities expressed no concern that the strike might lead to violence until the sailors made their wage demand. Admiral Montt left Valparaiso on 4 May with the most important vessels of the fleet to participate in high-seas manoeuvers. As the activities of the sailors' union intensified, authorities stationed more police in the port, but no naval or army units were mobilized. On 1 May, the four striking crafts decided to take direct action to salvage what appeared to be a lost cause. Whether they consciously planned the violence of 12 May or simply provided the preconditions for its outbreak, no one can say with certainty. It is clear, however, that the unions had given up trying to reach a settlement through arbitration and were willing to risk violence. The strike committee informed the Intendant in writing on i i May that, after 8 p.m. on the I3th, they could no longer be held responsible for the acts of their men, but offered to help authorities maintain order if provided with 'saddled horses' to ride.1l The intent of this document is unclear. Perhaps the strike committee wished to display a show of force along the docks on the morning of the i2th and hoped that the letter to the Intendant would convince him that control over the strikers was slipping from the hands of union leaders. He would possibly then put greater pressure on the companies to come to terms. If this were the case, then the com9 El Trabajo (Iquique), 9 May I903, p. 2. 10 El Mercurio (V), 9 May 1903, p. 5.

11 Archivo Nacional de Chile (ANCh) Ministerzo del Interior (MI) Intendencias, Decretos, Y
Notas, 1903, Vol. 2704, Report of Intendant, Valparaiso to Minister of the Interior, 24 May 1903. Document enclosed.

152

Peter de Shazo

mittee did, indeed, lose control over the strike after about Io a.m. on the 12th. The strike leaders may, on the other hand, have intended to turn their rank and file loose on the city, hoping to attract support from other working-class elements and create enough havoc to bring about a settlement. They listed the I3th as the date for possible trouble in order to absolve themselves of responsibility. In this case, the committee planned to use violence from the beginning and did not wish to control it. A third explanation takes the letter of II May at face value. The committee intended to begin widespread direct action on the i4th, but could not prevent the rank and file from jumping the gun. One of the first two explanations, or, perhaps, a combination of both, appears the most likely. Direct action was intentionally planned for the morning of the i2th, but the extent to which the looting and violence which followed were decided upon beforehand is difficult to determine, given the information available. Workers began to gather in large numbers on the docks before sunrise on the I2th to prevent strikebreakersfrom going to work.12Within a few hours, all activity in the bay had ceased, and crowds of several thousand people began to form in the port section of the city. A mass of strikers and other workers poured into the Plaza Sotomayor, where the government offices were located. In the nearby Plaza Echaurren, another crowd attacked a tram and began stoning the police units which surrounded the square. At this moment, a sub-commisioner of police drew his revolver and shot a nearby bystander through the heart. Incensed, the crowd bore the corpse through the streets to the Plaza Sotomayor, where thousands of workers demanded that Intendant Jose A. Bravo restrain the police. Bravo addressed the crowd from his balcony but was unable to appease it. He did, however, order police units to take up positions in the Almendral, Valparaiso's finest residential section to the north of the port. Some 600 naval marines were disembarked to guard the docks and a contingent of 50 Infantrymen from the Maipui Battalion at Vifia del Mar were stationed in the port. Between 12 noon and i p.m., the crowd began to reoccupy the docks. The headquarters of the CSAV was attacked and eventually burned to the ground. Marine units guarding the building did not attempt to deter the incendiaries, but instead joined the crowd in looting the many warehouses along the docks. While the port area was being sacked, (circa 2 p.m.), a crowd of infuriated strikers attacked the offices of El Mercurio in the com12 The following description of the riot of 12-13 May is derived from the pages of La Union (V), El Heraldo (V), El Mercurio (V), El Chileno (S), El Diario Ilustrado (S) and the various reports (of the Intendant, Chief of Police, Commander of Lancers) in ANCh, MI,
Intendencias, Decretos, Y Notas, I903, Vol. 2704. Also: I903, pp. 184-98, and The Record (V), May, June I903. Lo Nuevo (V), No. I7, I5 May

The Valparaiso Maritime Strike of I903

I53

mercial centro of the city. The newspaper's management had taken the precaution of arming its employees with repeating rifles and they were able to defend the fortress-like building with relative ease, killing seven attackers in the process. After the assault on El Mercurio, apparently the last consciously-plannedor strike-relatedevent of 12 May, the large crowds dispersed and general looting began. The city lay at the mercy of the mob, since the marines were busy sacking the docks and police alone could not maintain control. A few lancers arrived from Limache at about 4 p.m., but it was not until midnight that cavalry, artillery, and infantry units sent by train from Santiago, under the personal orders of Interior Minister Barros Luco, reached Valparaiso. Looting continued far into the night and early morning of the I3th, but by daybreak machine-guns had been set up in Valparaiso's main squares, and cavalry units patrolled many of the city's streets. A solidarity strike among dock workers in Vifia del Mar on the I3th was broken up by the army. The city was not formally declared to be under state-of-siege until 3.30 p.m. on the I3th, indicating that the authorities did not consider themselves in control until then. Nearly Ioo persons died during the events of 12-13 May and several hundred more were wounded.13 The affair corresponded closely to Charles Tilly's portrayal of collective violence and its repression in early industrial Europe as a 'division of labor between the maimers and the smashers '.1 Few upper-class persons or police sustained injuries and none was killed, while lifeless, sometimes headless, corpses of workers littered the streets and hills of the city. Workers looted establishments with which they normally did business, especially pawnshops, bakeries, groceries, and cobblers' shops.15 The aristocratic residences of Jorge Montt and Juana Ross were stoned by crowds, but well-to-do Chileans and foreigners did not suffer greatly from mob abuse during the rioting. The workers instead vented their pent-up emotions on the property of the maritime companies, El Mercurio, and commercial establishments.
13

At ii p.m. on the i2th, the Intendant of Valparaiso claimed that 30 or more had been killed and 140 wounded. El Diario Ilustrado (S), 13 May I903, p. I. El Chileno was in contact with the Chilean Red Cross, which claimed to have found 60 dead bodies in the streets of Valparaisoby I a.m. on the i3th and more afterwards. (El Chileno, 13 May I903, p. 2.) Since many of the wounded crawled home to die and the dead were buried secretly, the extent of the carnage will, as in the cases of the Santiago riot of I905 and the Santa Maria de Iquique massacre,probablynever be known. 14 Charles Tilly, ' Collective Violence in European Perspective' in Hugh Graham and Ted Gurr (eds.), The History of Violence in America (New York, I969), p. 42. 15 ANCh, MI, Intendencias, Decretos y Notas, I903, Vol. 2704, Document No. 8, Police Report of 13 May 1903. See also: Archivo Judicial de Valparaiso, Corte de Apelaciones, Libro Copiador de Setencias Criminales de Oficio (I903), cases Nos. 286, 287, 35I-3, 365,
369-7I, 390, 404, 4I0, 4I7?

154 Peter de Shazo

As news of the riot reached Santiago and other parts of Chile, both the labor and daily press quickly condemned the lack of responsibility shown by the Government in letting events get out of hand. Four to six thousand workers led by the anarchist study centers and resistance societies staged a march in Santiago on the i4th to protest against the Valparaiso killings and arrest of Espinoza.l6 The crowd began smashing electric lights along the principal boulevard of the capital and had to be broken up by sabre-wielding cavalrymen of the crack Escolta regiment. Troops patrolled the streets of Santiago at night as if the riot had taken place there rather than in the port. Although many lives were lost in the process, the maritime strike ended successfully for workers. On the afternoon of the I3th, representatives of the shipping and contracting companies and the four striking crafts met in the office of Deputy Angel Guarello and signed an agreement establishing procedures for binding arbitration. Workers agreed to return to their jobs under pre-strike conditions, but would receive retroactive wage increases when the arbitratorsset the new pay scale.17On the i9th, all parties agreed on two arbitratorswhom they empowered to name a third. The arbitration committee reached its settlement on 31 July I903. Wages were increased for all workers by 10-20 per cent, overtime pay was granted to some, stevedores received shorter hours, and all other demands were rejected.18If labor had established the arbitrationalprocedures while bargaining from a position of strength, this settlement would have been more satisfactory. Considering, however, that the strike was all but lost on i May, the tactic of direct action bore fruit by forcing employers to accept arbitration. The violence of I2 and 13 May captured the attention of the entire country. Nearly everyone agreed that the affair was a 'national disgrace'. The newspapers of the Conservative Party claimed that events got out of hand because local authorities in Valparaiso failed to control the 'lower class' (bajo pueblo).l1 Liberals and Radicals chided the Government in Santiago for not attempting to settle the strike before 12 May, and for leaving Valparaiso undefended.20Surprisingly, the favorable public opinion enjoyed by labor during the strike did not evaporate after I2 May. Only La Union of Valparaiso accused organized labor of deliberately provoking violence. The other newspapers expressed the view that workers had acted out of desperation and were less to blame for the riot than the shipping companies
p. I. La Lei (S), I5 May I903, p. 2. Decretos, y Notas, I903, Vol. 2704, Documents Nos. I6, I9; ' Acta, Valparaiso, I3 de mayo de 1903 ' and ' Acuerdo del I9 de mayo de I903 '. 18 El Mercurio(V), 4 Aug. I903, p. 4. 19 La Union (V), 14 May 1903, p. 4. El Diario llustrado (S), I4, 15 May I903, p. I.
20 La Lei (S), I5 May I903, 16 El Chileno (S), 15 May I903, 17 ANCh, MI, Intendencias,

p. 2. El Heraldo (V), I5 May I903, p. 2.

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155

or the Government. The Municipal Council of Valparaiso voted to donate $3,000 to the survivors of each person killed during the rioting, despite the fact that many of the victims had been struck down in the act of looting.21 Elites quickly arrived at two conclusions concerning the strike. The first postulated that the miserable living conditions of the working class should be improved for reasons of security as well as for humanitarian considerations, since disgruntled workers might riot again. The second recognized the need to bolster the defenses of Chilean cities against social upheaval. In this and nearly every other similar situation during the next two decades, political elites favored the latter solution to the 'social question '. A number of editorials after 13 May called on the Government to draft 'labor legislation' which would control industrial relations and elevate the working class to a more dignified status.22 President Riesco referred to the strike and encouraged the formation of social legislation in his annual message to Congress on I June 1903.23Soon afterwards, Conservative Deputy Alejandro Huneeus introduced a bill to establish obligatory Sunday rest (Ley de Descanso Dominical) for all industrial workers.24The law was not approved by Congress until I906, however, and was so full of loopholes that employers easily sidestepped its terms.25Congress did not consider any further social legislation until more rioting and bloodshed occurred in I905 and I906. Despite its verbal support for reform legislation, the Riesco Government did nothing more after 13 May than to increase the size of the armed forces in Valparaiso. Reports, describing in full detail the sack of the city by thousands of infuriated, drunken rotos and the incompetence of local authorities, greatly upset elites. El Diario Ilustrado of Santiago expressed the concern of many when it questioned: If simultaneouslythe workers of the Mancomunalof Iquique, those of the RailroadYardsin Santiago,workersin Vifia del Mar, Concepci6n,Lota, Coronel, and Talcahuanowere to rise up againstconstitutedorder,what means would the authorities have to maintaincontrol?On which troopsof the line do they depend
to reestablish order? 26

Local authorities in Valparaiso cried out for more police, while British
21 Municipalidad de Valparaiso, Boletin Municipal, No. 145, I8 June I903. Three thousand pesos in 1903 amounted to approximately four years' pay for a stevedore. The Municipal Council did not indicate how many payments would be made. 22 El Mercurio (V), I6 May 1903, p. 4; El Heraldo (V), 18 May 1903, p. 2.
23

Sociedad de Fomento Fabril (SOFOFA), Boletin, Apr. I904, p. I53.

24

Felipe Ifiiguez Irarrazaval, Notas Sobre el Desarrollo del Pensamiento Obrero en Chile,

I90oi-906 (Santiago, i968), p. 89. 25 Archivo de la Direccio'nGeneral del Trabajo (ADGT), Estudios y Trabajos, I917, pp. 273,

345. SOFOFA, Boletin, Feb. I909, p. 75. Many workers, however, forced employers to grant them Sunday rest through union pressure.
26 El Diario Ilustrado (S), 15 May I903,

p. I.

156 Peter de Shazo

shipping companies asked their Foreign Office to station a warship of the Royal Navy in Chilean waters permanently.27Under pressure from every side, the Government eventually transferred the Maipu Battalion from Vifia del Mar to Valparaiso, moved a detachment of dragoons into the city, and added Ioo men to the police force.28 Labor's perception of the strike and its settlement guaranteed further social unrest. To the anarchists of Santiago and some leaders of the labor brotherhoods of the Northern ports, 12 May marked the first step of the Chilean working class along the road to social revolution.29The success of direct action tactics in bringing about a settlement doubtless impressed many workers. Citing the Valparaiso strike as an example, one anarchist newspaper advised its readers: 'In cases in which nothing is achieved by pacific or persuasive means, violent methods such as destruction, arson, expropriation, and armed attack and defense must be used.' 30 The working class press, both anarchist and reformist, seethed with hatred towards the Government and the shipping companies. Two weeks after the riot, maritime workers in Valparaiso staged a brief work-stoppage to impress upon the arbiters the need for a generous settlement. Nocturnal clashes between workers and police were also reported.31 The riot of I2 May I903 did not, of course, constitute a revolutionary act. Labor leaders who apparently planned the violence the day before it occurred, acted out of desperation, probably assuming that the rank and file and the urban poor would join in. For some rioters, the breakdown of traditional authority allowed them to vent their frustration on the property of the shipping companies, while for others, it meant a new pair of shoes, groceries for the family, or violent death. The final outcome of the strike may or may not have been anticipated by its leaders. The Rise of an Independent Labor Movement Violence of the magnitude as that of 12 and I3 May took place on other occasions during the following years. In each case, workers hoped to obtain higher wages or legislative reform through a show of strength which,
27 Great Britain, Public Record Office, Foreign Office (PROFO), Chilean Archive, i6/345, Letters of the PSNC, Balfour Williamson & Co., and Duncan, Fox, and Co. to the Foreign
Office, 4 June 1903. The PSNC to Foreign Office, 8 June 1903. Ibid., I6/344, Consul-

General Report, 4 June I903 and petition. 28 El Mercurio (V), 19 June I903, p. 4. Congreso de Chile, Cdmara de Diputados, Sesiones Ordinarias,7 Dec. I903, p. 696. 29 La Luz (S), 28 May 1903, p. I. La Ajitacion (S), 21 July 1903, p. I. El Defensor de la Clase Proletaria(Iquique), 14 May 1903, p. I. 30 El Faro (S), No. 9, July I903, p. X. 31 La Lei (S), 28 May 1903, p. 3; I June I903, p. 3.

MaritimeStrike of 1903 The Valparaiso

I57

according to the formula of I903, involved the threat of urban violence. The unwillingness of employers to engage in collective bargaining and the State's failure to facilitate an early settlement transformed potential conflict into bloodshed. On 22 October 1905, the mutual aid societies and Democratic Party of Santiago sponsored a mammoth demonstration to demand the repeal of a tax on imported Argentine beef. The capital was at that moment virtually defenseless, because its entire military garrison had earlier left to take part in the army's annual manoeuvers several hundred miles to the south. Within hours after it had assembled, the crowd rioted and gained control of the central portion of the city. Police units, firemen, and a 'white guard' composed of well-to-do youths defended the better neighborhoods of the capital until regular army units arrived by train to restore order.32Hundreds of working people were killed in the process and 700 were arrested. Significantly, few, if any, upper class persons died in the affair, nor did the mob demonstrate any class-conscious behavior. Evidence, nonetheless, indicates that this disturbance, like that of Valparaiso, had been planned beforehand by anarchists and a radical wing of the Democratic Party.33 The Government did not abolish the tax on Argentine beef until threatened with a similar rally in December I907. At least fifty died in the city of Antofagasta on 6 February 90o6, when naval marines and heavily-armed vigilantes fired on a dense crowd of workers participating in a general strike.34 Once again, employers (in this case the British-owned Antofagasta and Bolivia Railway Company) resisted collective bargaining with workers and demanded 'protection' from the Government. Labor persisted in its tactic of converging on the central portion of a city to demonstrate resolve and forcefulness. One of the blackest moments in the violent history of Chilean labor
32

Gonzalo Izquierdo, ' Octubre de I905. Un episodio en la historia social Chilena', Historia, I3 (I976), PP. 55-96. This brief account comes from El Chileno (S), El Diario Ilustrado (S), El Mercurio (S), 20-28 Oct. I905. Also, see ANCh, MI, Policias, Notas, y Decretos,
Vol. 2970,
I905.

33

34

The Chief of Police of Santiago received prior warning that the protest demonstration on 22 Oct. would erupt in violence, but he ignored it. (ANCh, MI, Policias, Notas y Decretos, I905, Vol. 2970, Report of Chief of Police, Santiago, 23 Oct. I905.) The Democratic Party purged its Santiago section after order was restored, claiming that party leaders had actively fomented violence. (La Democracia (S), 29 Oct. I905, p. 2.) See also: Alejandro Escobar Carvallo, ' La Ajitacion Social en Santiago, Antofagasta, y Iquique ', in Occidente, No. I21 (Nov.-Dec. I959), pp. 5-7. El Industrial (Antofagasta), 15 Feb. I906, p. I. PROFO, 37I/I7, Cablegram, General Manager in Antofagasta to Antofagasta and Bolivia Railway Co., London, 7 Feb. i906; Telegram from Kerr to Foreign Office, 9 Feb. 1906; Santiago Legation to Foreign Office, 20 Feb. I906; Telegram of Vorwerk and Company to British Legation, Santiago, 8 Feb.
1906.

158 Peter de Shazo

relations occurred on 2i December I907 in Iquique. Perhaps as many as 20,000 striking nitrate workers from the outlying pampa had descended on the city to voice their appeal for higher wages.35 Local authorities vainly attempted to mediate a settlement between workers and representatives of the powerful producers' association, the Combinacion Salitrera. The Combinacion refused to engage in collective bargaining until all workers returned to their jobs, claiming that if 'under these circumstances they (the nitrate producers) acceded to part or all of the demands made by workers, they would lose their moral prestige and sense of self-respect, which are the only forces that employers exercise over their workers '.3 Desperate to settle the strike and resume nitrate exports, President Pedro Montt offered to pay from State funds half of the monthly wage demanded by workers if employers would contribute the remainder.37The Combinacion's refusal to cooperate with Montt sealed the fate of the strikers, who by this time had massed within the confines of the Escuela Santa Maria in the heart of the city. The anarchists who led the strike felt certain that the huge size of the crowd and its refusal to leave Iquique would bring about a favorable settlement. Once again, stalemate in a major industrial dispute triggered violence. The Minister of the Interior had earlier granted the Intendant of Iquique power to maintain order 'at whatever sacrifice.38 It was Montt himself, however, who ordered local authorities to have the city cleared of strikers by military force. A brutal massacre of at least I,ooo defenseless men, women, and children followed.39
The chain of violence between I905 and I907 took place during a period

of unprecedented growth of the organized labor movement. Scores of anarcho-syndicalist resistance societies sprang up in Santiago and Valparaiso. It is likely that more strikes occurred in those years than during the past decade and a half.40 The overwhelming majority of strikes in Santiago
35 36

For a day-by-dayaccount of the strike, see La Patria (Iquique), Dec. 1907. ANCh, MI, Varias Autoridades, Decretos, y Notas, Vol. 3274, Dec. 1907, Report of Intendant Eastman, 26 Dec. 1907.

37 Ibid.
38

Ibid., Telegram from the Minister of the Interior to Eastman, 14 Dec. I907. 39 Authorities in Iquique claimed that only I26 were killed in the massacre, while the British Minister in Santiago estimated the number of dead to be 400-600. ANCh, MI, Vol. 3274, Eastman Report, iI Jan. I908. PROFO, 371/407, Monthly Report of the Santiago Legation, 3 Jan. I908. Taking into consideration the newspaper estimates of the number of people encamped in the Escuela Santa Maria and the number of survivors, it appears possible that up to several thousand were killed. Government press and telegraph censorship made accuratereporting of the massacrevirtually impossible. 40 De Shazo, op. cit., Table 4.2. From a day-by-day investigationof daily and labor newspapers in Santiago and Valparaiso, I was able to determine that at least 65 strikes took place in those cities between 1905 and I907. Using secondary sources (mainly Barria, Recabarren, and Ramirez) for his information, Manuel Barrera in ' Perspectiva Historica de la Huelga

The Valparaiso MaritimeStrike of

I903

159

and Valparaiso were settled without government interference, as dictated by the unwritten rules of the anarcho-syndicalist-employer system of industrial relations. The State avoided further massacres in urban areas after 1907 by turning cities into armed camps whenever a major protest rally or strike took place. Labor continued its cultivation of the 'show of force' tactic, but maintained better control over itself in order to avoid bloodshed. The relationship between employers, the State, and labor changed very little, however. No legislation regulating strikes, labor unions, collective bargaining, or labor contracts passed through Congress until 1924. State intervention in labor affairs continued to be of a short-term nature, such as the resettlement of unemployed nitrate workers in times of economic crisis or the breaking of strikes by force. A Labor Office (Oficina del Trabajo) attached to the Ministry of Industry and Public Works was established in 1907 to gather information on work conditions and the labor movement. Lack of funds and personnel greatly hampered the activities of the Labor Office until the early 1920S and, even then, its importance within the industrial relations' system remained minimal.41 The Government's first attempt to establish formal conciliation procedures to be followed during strikes occurred in December I9I7. After several years of inactivity, the labor unions of Santiago began to rebuild their strength and in the process, undertook a wave of strikes which commenced in I917 and peaked during I919.42Minister of the Interior Eliodoro Yanez responded to this notable increase in strike activity by issuing a decree which ordered
Obrera en Chile' in Cuadernos de la Realidad Nacional, No. 9 (Sept. I917), p. I75, claimed that only 83 strikes occurred in the entire country between 189o and I904. While this figure is certainly much lower than the actual number which took place, the years 1905-7 did constitute a true 'strike wave ', the like of which Chile had never before
41

42

experienced. A conclusion drawn from a careful reading of the reports, inspections, and correspondence of the Labor Office (1907-27) at the Archive of the Direccion General del Trabajo in Santiago. For a history of the Labor Office, see Oscar Venegas C., La Direccion General del Trabajo(Santiago, I942). I was able to identify 229 strikes as having taken place in Santiago and Valparaiso between 19I7 and I92I, 92 of which occurred in I9I9. De Shazo, op. cit., Table 6.I. Given the available information, it is almost impossible to determine the number of organized workers in Chile during the first quarter of the twentieth century. Oft-cited works, such as La Organizacion Sindical en Chile by Moises Poblete (Santiago, I926), Anexo 5, greatly overestimated union membership. The Labor Office kept no official figures regarding the size of the organized labor movement during the I920S and the labor unions grossly overstated their strength. The size of several unions can be estimated from dues payments, attendance at union meetings, the number of votes cast in union elections, etc., but such information is of little use in reaching a figure for national labor union affiliation. By even the most liberal estimates of union strength, however, only a small percentage of Chilean workers were affiliated with labor unions during the 1920S.

i60 Peter de Shazo provincial intendants to facilitate the conciliation or mediation of strikes through their good offices.43The terms of the Yafiez Decree did not legally require workers and employers to engage in conciliation. In I918 and I9I9, however, the growing effectiveness of labor unions softened the opposition of employers to mediated settlements, and the percentage of strikes in Santiago and Valparaiso which were brought to a conclusion through State
intervention rose from 13 per cent between I902 and I908 to 47 per cent during I918 and i9g9.44 Anarcho-syndicalists preferred not to deal with

government mediators, since they did not recognize the legitimacy of the State and knew that a mediated settlement resulted in fewer gains than direct conciliation with employers. The reformist Federacion Obrera de Chile (FOCh) however, gladly accepted government interference in its strikes for both ideological and practical reasons. The member unions of the FOCh in Santiago and Valparaiso were recently-formed and concentrated in industries where the bargaining position of workers had traditionally been weak: food processing, textiles, and beverages. When capital began to recuperate from labor's offensive as a result of the onslaught of a major depression in late I920 and the formation of powerful employers' associations, the percentage of mediated strikes fell. Employers thus reverted to their traditional position of intransigence regarding State mediation of labor disputes when the unions weakened. In 1921, employer associations in key industries such as coal mining, marine transport, printing, and shoes began rolling back the union gains of I917-I9 through a series of highly effective lockouts designed to crush the labor movement altogether. Workers fought desperately to preserve their unions, but several were dissolved and nearly all suffered losses of membership.45 The Alessandri Government (1921-4) at first gave half-hearted support to labor but, as soon as it became apparent that the unions could not break the lockouts, it shifted allegiance to the stronger side. Under attack from capital and retrenching everywhere, the major labor unions moved rapidly to the left by declaring their adhesion to communist and anarchist principles. A Communist Party of Chile (PCC) was formed in January 1922 and within two years dominated the FOCh through its control of unions in the nitrate and coal mining zones. Anarcho-syndicalists led the most important labor
43

La Opinion (S), 17 Dec. I917, p. I.

44

Calculations made from the strike surveys of 1902-8, 1917-21 in De Shazo, op. cit., Tables 4.12, 6.4. In most cases, the role of the Intendant was limited to invoking the Yafiez Decree and encouraging conciliation between workers and employers. 45 For a detailed description of the lockouts of I921-3, their effect on labor unions, and the changing position of the Alessandri regime vis-a-vis employers, see De Shazo, op. cit., Chap. Seven.

The Valparaiso MaritimeStrike of

1903

161

unions in Santiago and Valparaiso between 1917 and 1927, including those of printing, leather, baking, maritime, and construction workers. These organizations also became more ideologically committed as lockouts ensued. Many factors stimulated the growth of an independent, leftist-oriented labor movement before 1927. The nature of Chile's political system and the composition of the working class greatly limited the capacity of the State to repress organized labor. As previously noted, executive officials from the President of the Republic to local police chiefs used force to break strikes and quell civil disturbances, always as a stop-gap solution. Despite the infiltration of police agents into most labor organizations, the arrest of union leaders, and other acts of harassment, the Government did not attempt to dissolve unions permanently. The repression ordered by President Juan Luis Sanfuentes in July 1920 was the most determined effort of any regime before I927 to eliminate major labor unions by force, but they regained their former effectiveness within six months.46 Chilean Presidents during the Parliamentary Regime exercised limited powers and could not make far-reaching decisions without the cooperation of Congress. The host of political parties and their unstable congressional alliances paid little attention to the working class unless social upheaval threatened. In those instances, legislation calling for short-term repression such as the granting of state-of-siege powers to the President or increasing the size of the armed forces were the normal responses. Even when the major political parties clearly perceived the growing stability and leftist orientation of the labor movement, rivalry prevented them from enacting laws to prevent the continued independence of labor. Only under pressure from military golpistas in September 1924 did Congress finally pass legislation intended to subjugate organized labor to a government and employercontrolled system of industrial relations. Other factors limited the Government's repressive capabilities. Chile's independent judiciary system would not automatically convict and imprison arrested union leaders.47Labor newspapers were protected by freedom of
46 Sanfuentes directed most of his wrath against the anarcho-syndicalist Industrial Workers of

the World, which by July I920 had gained control over stevedores, teamsters, and lightermen in the port of Valparaiso. Police infiltratorsplanted a small quantity of dynamite in the IWW hall shortly before a raid took place. The Governmentthen claimed that anarchists in Chile formed part of a Peruvian-led conspiracy to overthrow the State and used this as an excuse for the dragnet arrests of union leaders which followed. See Archivo de la Intendencia de Valparaiso,Llegadas, Policia, Mayo-Septiembre, r920, Investigations Section to Chief of Police, 8, I2 July I920; Chief of Police to Intendant, 14 July 1920; Ibid., Salidas, Ministerio del Interior, Intendant to Minister of the Interior, 19 July I920. See also: La
Union (V), 22 July 1920, p. 7; La Nacion (S), 22-28 July
47
1920.

A careful reading of the labor press shows that union leaders were frequently arrested, but most were quickly released without formal charges being brought against them. Some
L.A.S.-II

162 Peter de Shazo

the press guarantees. An excessive use of force, especially in urban areas where violence was more visible, often embarrassedand politically weakened governing coalitions. Political parties both in and out of government could exploit public opinion regarding the 'social question' to their own benefit. The overwhelming preponderance of Chilean citizens in the labor movement posed another barrier to potential repression by the State.48 In Argentina and Brazil, where foreign anarchists established and led most labor unions during the first decades of the twentieth century, the Government used 'residence laws' and deportation to weaken seriously the power of the organized working class.49The Chilean Congress passed its own Ley de Residencia in November I918, reflecting the misconception of elites that 'foreign subversives' were responsible for the increased number of strikes and protest demonstrations. Only a handful of people were ever deported. Nor could the Government pit native workers against foreigners by means of preferential treatment or appeals to xenophobia. Chilean workers did not consider revolutionary ideologies and labor unions to be useless baggage from the ' old country ' as in Argentina and Brazil. Boom and bust cycles in the nitrate industry inhibited the steady growth of organized labor in Chile and, therefore, reduced the need for State intervention to repress unions. Most of the resistance societies in Santiago and Valparaiso disappeared when the financial panic of I907 led to widespread unemployment in I908. When employers (including the State railways) laid off workers, union organizers and militants were the first to go. The labor brotherhoods and resistance societies of the North were nearly all eliminated by the middle of I908. Organized labor partially rebuilt its strength when the economy recovered, but these gains were erased by the Depression of
I914.
languished in jail for several months at a time before being freed, but, unlike Luis Emilio Recabarren, few were actually convicted of a crime. Daniel Schweitzer, a young lawyer and a member of the anarchist-inspired Federacidn de Estudiantes de Chile (FECh) claimed in an interview with the author in Feb. 1975 that it was relatively easy to procure the release of labor leaders because their arrest normally constituted an act of harassment. 48 Some 55,000 foreigners immigrated to Chile between 1889 and 1914, a time when millions entered Brazil and Argentina. Carl Solberg, Immigration and Nationalism, Argentina and Chile, 189o-I9I4 (Austin, 1970), p. 35. Only a handful of foreigners rose to positions of leadership within the Chilean organized labor movement, and few unions except those in Tarapaca, Antofagasta, and Magallanes contained many non-Chileans among the rank and file. 49 For discussions of the role of immigrants in the early organized labor movements of Brazil and Argentina, see Sheldon Maram, ' Anarcho-Syndicalismin Brazil ' in Proceedings of the Pacific Coast Council in Latin American Studies, Vol. 4 (I975), pp. IOI-I6; Richard Yoast, 'The Development of Argentine Anarchism: a socio-ideological analysis ', Ph.D. Thesis, University of Wisconsin-Madison,1975.

The Valparaiso Maritime Strike of

I903

163

By 1917, industrial output reached pre-war levels and organized labor entered a phase of spectacularexpansion. Between I917 and early 1921, labor unions were established in many key industries throughout the country. These organizations, unlike their predecessors of I905-7 and I909-I3, did not automatically collapse during the Depression of I92I. Despite widespread unemployment and the hostility of employers' associations, the labor union movement in Chile could not be crushed. The introduction of authoritarian labor legislation in Congress by the Conservative and Liberal Parties in I919 and 1921 respectively is evidence that elites recognized the newly-attained stability and effectiveness of organized labor.50The leftward shift of important labor unions after 1i92 and a rapid increase in strike activity during 1924 undoubtedly hastened the passage of such legislation. Chilean workers remained isolated from the mainstream of national politics throughout the first quarter of the twentieth century. During that time, none of the major political parties enjoyed any sustained support from organized labor, due in some areas (Santiago, Valparaiso) to the anarchosyndicalists' disdain for politics, and in others (Tarapaca, Antofagasta, Concepci6n) to the interest of labor unions in political alternatives. Legislation passed in the i88os which extended the franchise to all literate adult males, and the high literacy rate (60-80 per cent in 1920) of city workers over twenty-one years of age should have guaranteed the urban working class a position of importance in Chilean politics during the Parliamentary Regime. Few of those qualified to vote registered, however, and even fewer cast ballots. The presidential election of I920, for example, captured greater working class attention than any before 1925, and yet a mere 21,338 people, or approximately 23 per cent of those eligible, voted in the Department of Santiago.51 Considering that at least 20 per cent of adult male workers in Santiago were illiterate, it appears likely that only one in six cast a ballot in I920. Traditional parties did woo the working class elector, however, since a small number of votes often spelled the difference between defeat and victory in elections. The most common and effective means of obtaining working class 'support' was to buy votes. Elections during the Parlia50 James 0. Morris, in Elites, Intellectuals, and Consensus (Ithaca, I966), discusses the role of Conservative and Liberal Party intellectuals in drafting these labor laws, but finds no relationship between the timing of their introduction in Congress and the social upheaval of 1918-21. 51 The figure of 21,388 is found in Chile, Oficina Central de Estadisticas, Censo Elecoral, I921 (Santiago, 193I), pp. 88, 89. The Censo de Poblacion de la Republica de Chile for I920 (Santiago, I925), pp. 248, 319, claims that I35,000 adult males resided in the Department of Santiago and found a literacy rate of 77-2 per cent among them. Thus, approximately 95,000 people were at least theoreticallyeligible to vote in the election of 1920.

i64

Peter de Shazo

mentary Regime were won by the candidate or party which paid more per vote and exercised greater skill in stealing or stuffing ballot boxes.52Genuine representativesof the mutual aid societies and labor unions, normally democrats before I912 and socialists and communists afterwards, were occasionally elected to Congress, but vote-buying and fraud in registering voters deprived them of a firm base of support. No social democratic party such as the Socialist Party of Argentina achieved the necessary legitimacy or power to provide Chilean workers with a means of formal political expression. Arturo Alessandri was the first representative of a major political party to attract widespread support from the working class. While running for the presidency in I920, his ceaseless demagogy promised working people nothing less than a new social order, and thousands believed what they heard. On election day, squads of working-class toughs organized by the Alessandrists prevented other workers from selling their votes to Barros Borgofio, his opponent, and in some cases, frightened legitimate voters away from the polling places. Alessandri's electoral agents also bought votes on a large scale. No candidate received a clear majority of electoral votes and a special Tribunal of Honor was convened to determine the winner. Urban crowds rallied behind Alessandri, threatening violence and destruction should he not be chosen.53 The working class, therefore, had much to do with Alessandri's victory in I920, but not because large numbers of workers freely cast their votes for him. Organized labor either supported Alessandri or, in the case of the anarchosyndicalists, refrained from actively criticizing him during his first six months in office. Alessandri, in return, helped several unions to achieve favorable settlements in their wage disputes with private employers and the State railways. This brief 'honeymoon' between the President and organized labor came to an abrupt end when Alessandri sided with employers during the nationwide maritime lockout and general strike of AugustOctober, I92I.54 Thereafter, his relationship with the labor unions deteriorated to the point of open hostility.
52 Chilean newspaperscontain many accounts of vote-buying and fraudulent tactics immediately before and after each major election during the ParliamentaryRegime. In some instances, the press even published the 'going rate ' paid by each party per vote. For an analysis of electoral fraud during the early twentieth century, see Samuel Ortiz, Vicios Electorales
,(Santiago, I909). 53 Working class participation in the Alessandri campaign is discussed in La Nacion (S), 8 June I920, p. II; IO June, p. I; 26 June 1920, pp. 12, 15. See also Manuel Rivas Vicufia, Historia Politica y Parlamentaria de Chile, 3 vols. (Santiago, I964), ii, 191, 196, 211.

54 Shipping companies and contractors broke a previous agreement by locking out all IWW marine workers in Valparaiso in Aug. I92I. The lockout later became a general maritime strike all along the Chilean coast. Alessandri promised concessions to several key unions

The Valparaiso MaritimeStrike of 1903 165 Working class participation in electoral politics appears to have increased substantially during the presidential election of I925.55 The process which governed the registration of voters was reformed in I924, eliminating many of the fraudulent means by which traditional parties had prevented workers from exercising the franchise. Popular front tactics briefly united the POC with newly-established organizations of white collar workers (empleados) for electoral purposes. Labor's choice in the election of 1925 was so clear-cut that even the anarchists of Santiago and Valparaiso may have voted.56 The major parties threw their strength behind a compromise candidate (Emiliano Figueroa), while workers and empleados, many of whom deserted the traditional parties, supported the populist army doctor, Jose Santos Salas. Although he lost the election by 170,000 votes to 70,000, Salas actually carried several working-class wards in Santiago and did well among workers and employees in the Northern Provinces.57 Electoral politics up to the time of the Ibafiez coup of I927 produced few, if any, concrete benefits for Chilean workers. Organized labor did, however, use other forms of political action in an attempt to influence the behavior of government in its favor. Massive rallies, general strikes, and one-day work-stoppages, all imbued with the threat of violence, were the principal weapons in labor's arsenal. On several occasions, such as the campaign of the 'Workers' Assembly on National Nutrition' (Asamblea Obrera de Alimentacion Nacional) to lower food costs in I91I8-I9, and the rentstrike movement of 1925, the Government reacted to intense pressure by partially granting labor's demands and at the same time by taking steps to neutralize these popular movements. 'Show of force' tactics rarely produced anything but short-term improvements in the economic lot of the workingclass. Attempts to bypasss employers and apply pressure for economic reform directly on the Government further alienated workers from the State when no basic reforms came about. An increase in the number and intensity of rallies and protest strikes after I917 eventually compelled elites to devise
and quickly withdrew them once workers returned to their jobs. See ADGT, Inspeccion
Regional, Valparaiso, I921, Vol. I, Report of 23 Sept. 1921; La Union (V), i8 Aug.-I3 Sept. 1921; 25 Oct. 1921, p. 6. El Mercurio (V), i8 Aug.-I3 Sept. 1921; 21 Sept. 1921, p. 3; 22 Sept. 1921, p. 7.

55 Nearly 50,000 people in the Department of Santiago voted in the presidential election of 1925, while only 33,685 persons were inscribed to vote in the Province of Santiago in the
congressional elections of Mar. I924. La Nacion (S), 25 Oct. 1925, pp. Io, II, I3; 2 Mar.

I924, p. IO. 56 Luis Heredia, Secretary General of the anarcho-syndicalistShoeworkers' Federation (Uni6n Industrial del Cuero) in Santiago in 1925 and Felix L6pez Caceres, an IWW leader at that time, claimed in interviews with the author (in 1975) that many anarcho-syndicalistsin Santiago voted for Salas in 1925. 57 La Nacion (S), 25 Oct. 1925, pp. IO, I3.

i66

Peter de Shazo

methods by which the organized labor movement could be controlled through incorporation in a legally-establishedsystem of industrial relations. Conclusion The organized labor movement in Chile developed and remained free of institutionalized control by either capital or the State before 1927. This was made possible by a system of industrial relations which pitted labor unions against employers in an unregulated struggle for more than twenty-five years. Neither side could vanquish the other. Employers failed to halt the spread of unions, although their tenacious opposition resulted in numerous setbacks for workers. Labor unions in most industries managed to preserve their organizational identity, but normally occupied the weaker position in collective bargaining. State intervention took place whenever the conflict between labor and capital seriously affected the economy or disturbed the status quo. The short-term, but often brutal, repression employed by the Government on occasion deepened the already profound alienation of the working class from the State. Content to leave the 'social question' in the hands of employers and the armed forces, political elites in Chile unwittingly fostered the spread of revolutionary ideology within the labor movement. Workers in many industries had cultivated the tactics of anarchosyndicalism since the turn of the century and, by 1921, most of the principal labor unions of Santiago and Valparaiso openly declared their adoption of anarchist principles. The FOCh also turned leftward during the early i920S by shedding its syndicalist identity and linking itself with the Communist Party. Even the normally complacent mutual aid societies took an active part in the rent strike and anti-labor law movements organized by the anarchistsin I925-7. More far-sighted elites wished to put an end to the de facto system of industrial relations established by labor and capital. The great revival of the labor movement after 19I7 undoubtedly influenced the Conservative Party to introduce its labor legislation in 1919. Hoping to thwart the spread of revolutionary labor unions and at the same time prevent employers from annihilating or completely dominating the labor movement, the Alessandrists in Congress and in the Labor Office put forward their own laws two years later. The hostility of employers and a majority of congressmen blocked the passage of these laws until the military coup of 1924. Even after their regulatory decrees were issued and they took legal effect (I925-6), employers and workers for the most part refused to comply with the seven labor laws.58 Just as Congress refused to regulate legally the relationship between
58 Morris, op. cit., pp. 197-204, 263, discusses the unwillingness of employers to comply with

the laws. Inspections by the Labor Office confirm this conclusion. The opposition of em-

The Valparaiso Maritime Strike of 1903

I67

workers and employers before 1924, public authorities would not and could not prevent the rise of independent, revolutionary labor unions. A host of socio-political factors either limited the ability of the State to repress labor or dampened its enthusiasm for anything but short-term, defensive measures. Although the State took a more active role in labor affairs after I917, it did so on an informal basis and failed to exercise any significant control over the behavior of employers. The independence and revolutionary outlook which most labor unions in Chile developed by 1927 had a major role in determining the course that Chilean politics would take in the following decades. Unlike their counterparts in Brazil and Cuba, Chilean anarcho-syndicalists did not become comOn the munists, nor were they displaced by communism during the I920S. the communist-dominated FOCh appears to have been weaker contrary, numerically and in terms of economic effectiveness than the anarchosyndicalist federations at the time of the Ibaniez coup. The existence of revolutionary, anti-communist forces within the Chilean working-class of the I92os facilitated the establishment of Latin America's only important Socialist Party in 1933. Evidence of the anarcho-syndicalist contribution to the Socialist Party is the sizeable number of anarchist union leaders and middle class libertarians who held important positions in the Party during its first years of life.59 When organized workers in Chile became highly
ployers to the social legislation of 1924 was not surprising, since they refused to obey previous legislation regulating working conditions. Anarcho-syndicalistsopposed the enforcement of all seven laws and the mutual aid societies joined their campaign to defeat the Obligatory Social Security Law (Number 4054). The communist-led FOCh at first toyed with the idea of using the laws to its own revolutionary ends, but later condemned them as an attempt to destroy the labor movement. 59 De Shazo, op. cit., Conclusion. From a careful reading of the working class press of I90227, I found that many important socialists of the I930s had been participants in anarchist movements during the I92os and before. Some, such as and anarcho-syndicalist-oriented Oscar Schnake, Alberto Baloffet, Amaro Castro, Julio E. Valiente, Augusto Pinto, David Uribe, Zacarias Soto, and Benjamin Pifia, had been leaders of the IWW or other anarchosyndicalist labor unions during the I92os. Carlos Caro, Schnake, Eugenio Gonzalez Rojas, Julio Ortiz de Zarate, Arturo Bianchi Gundian, and Alfredo Lagarrigue were intellectuals, often members of the Student Federation (FECh), who wrote for the anarchist press or publicly sympathized with libertarian groups. Others, including Cesar Godoy Urrutia, Eliodoro Dominguez, and Ram6n Alzamora, were teachers or empleados who previously espoused anarchistideas. The Accion RevolucionariaSocialista, which sent more delegates to the founding convention of the Socialist Party in I933 than any other group, was completely dominated by exanarchists. (According to the list of leaders given by Julio C. Jobet in El Partido Socialista de Chile, Volume I (Santiago, 197I), 65, 77.) Of the 70 delegates to the founding convention, at least Io were ex-anarchistsor had clearly espoused anarchist ideology during the Six of the I3 members of the Party's Central Directory in Oct. I933 were former I920s. anarchists and Oscar Schnake was the first Secretary General. The six were: Alzamora, Bianchi, Pifia, Pinto, Schnake, and Soto. See Jobet, El Partido Socialista, Vol. I, p. 86.

i68 Peter de Shazo politicized in the I930s as a result of their inability to bargain effectively with employers once the labor laws of I924 were finally enforced, they did not abandon their former identification with the left, but turned to politics rather than job action as a means of achieving their goals. Ibafiez began the process of creating a legal labor movement after his imprisonment of anarcho-syndicalistand communist labor leaders in 1927. He failed, however, to cultivate a personal following among workers which could maintain him in power. The immediate reappearance of anarchists and communists in labor unions after the fall of Ibafiez is proof of his failure to eradicate revolutionary ideology. The eventual linkage of the labor movement with the Communist and Socialist Parties precluded its 'capture' by a State-supportedparty or populist caudillo. Although Chilean labor unions were greatly weakened by the constricting terms of the labor laws of 1924 as codified in I93I, they did not fall under the political control of the State as in Peronist Argentina or the Estado Novo of Brazil. Instead, organized labor became an increasingly significant force on the left in Chilean politics.