The 5250th Technical Intelligence Company: Technical Intelligence in the Southwest and Western Pacific Areas, 1942-1945.

The outbreak of war in December 1941 found the United States Army generally unprepared, especially in the field of technical intelligence. Enemy equipment captured in the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) was, until 1942, only given brief examination by Ordnance or Chemical Warfare Service officers before forwarding to the Australian Army General Staff, Intelligence (10) for examination and testing. Training Circular No. 81, issued in November 1942, established proceedures for the evacuation of captured materiel, but responsibility for analysis remained with the Theater staff officers of the services and, to a large extent, with the Australian Army. The situation began to improve in late December 1942, when five Ordnance officers and ten enlisted personnel, all trained in technical intelligence at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, and Washington, D.C., arrived at Headquarters, US Army Service of Supply (USASOS), Base 3, Brisbane, Australia. On 30 December, Major Alan C. Johnston, the ranking officer, was tasked to organize an Ordnance Technical Intelligence Unit for the Theater. The unit was to be under the control of the Chief Ordnance Officer, USASOS, in accordance with policies established by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 (ACofS,G-2), USASOS. The original organization called for an Administrative Section, an Ordnance Analysis Section, and several Technical Intelligence Field Teams. The latter were designed to operate from an advance base or with a regular combat unit. The Field Teams usually consisted of one officer and one or more enlisted personnel, and had the mission of collecting enemy equipment and sending it back to the Ordnance Analysis Section for examination and evaluation. Assignments were flexible and personnel were often used interchangeably in the different sections. Responsibility for technical intelligence was turned over to the US Army Forces Far East (USAFFE) in February 1943, and Major Johnston was appointed USAFFE Technical Intelligence Officer, under the direct control of the Chief Ordnance Officer, USAFFE. Except for an enlisted assistant, all other Ordnance technical intelligence personnel were carried under the T/O's of the Ordnance Office, USASOS, and the various USASOS Base Sections. Until February 1943, Chemical Warfare Service staff officers made preliminary examinations of captured chemical equipment and munitions, but evacuation and technical analysis remained the responsibility of the Australian Army. With the formation of USAFFE in February, a Chemical Warfare Intelligence Section was formed from locally available personnel. The Section originally consisted of two officers and one enlisted man, designated the Chemical Intelligence Section, USASOS, and three field teams of one officer and one enlisted each. On 27 May 1943, Headquarters USAFFE directed the Commanding General, USASOS, to establish a salvage depot for captured enemy equipment near

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-2-

the Australian depot at Base Section 3. Although the Ordnance and Chemical Warfare Service Analysis Sections were still separate from
the salvage depot, its establishment was the first step toward a coordinated technical intelligence effort. Coordination for the analysis of equipment captured by US and Australian forces after it reached the joint salvage depot area was the responsibility of the newly established Joint Allied Captured Enemly Equipment Board. During this period both Ordnance and Chemical Warfare Service field teams operated with

Allied forces in New Guinea. On 29 September 1943, all Ordnance personnel were transferred from USAFFE to USASOS control. Headquarters USASOS began planning for the establishment of a Technical Intelligence Depot with sections from all services except Signal and Engineer. Before the plans could be implemented, a 22 December 1943 USAFFE directive, "Responsibility of Technical Intelligence," delegated the responsibility for ground technical intelligence to the CG, USASOS, and directed him to establish a Technical Intelligence Depot along slightly different lines. After study of the directive, the ACofS, G-2, USASOS, recommended the formation of a Technical Intelligence Composite Company utilizing personnel from all technical services except Transportation. The company would operate under defined T/0's and T/E's and would provide for greater centralization and flexibility of the technical intelligence effort. The recommendations were forwarded to the CG, USAFFE, on 7 December 1943, and were approved. General Orders No. 2, Headquarters USASOS, dated 3 January 1944, announced the organization of the 5250th Technical Intelligence Composite Company, Separate (Provisional), under the T/0's submitted in the 7 December recommendations. Personnel were to be carried on Detached Service from their source units, and each service section was to operate under the general supervision of the chief of the service concerned. The problem of provisional organization was that personnel detailed to the 5250th were still carried on the rosters of their source units, making promotion difficult. The formation of the 5250th as other than a provisional unit was unfavorably considered by USAFFE on 10 January. The ACofS, G-2, USASOS, directed the chiefs of all six services to furnish qualified personnel for the 5250th on 20 January 1944, and all transfers were made by February 1944. The 5250th was organized with a Coordination and Administration Section, and a Technical Section for each of the represented services. Each Technical Section was to be composed of a Laboratory Element and several Enemy Equipment Intelligence Teams. However, on the Ordnance, Signal, and Quartermaster Sections operated analysis laboratories at this time. Chemical analysis was done at either the 42d Chemical or the Victoria Munitions Supply laboratories. Engineer and Medical Services did not have teams in the field until the hlollandia operation in April 1944. General supervision over the 5250th was furnished by the ACofS, G-2, USASOS. Major Johnston continued as Acting Commanding Officer, having
no orders appointing him to command as yet. Ile also served in the Office

of the ACofS, G-2, USASOS, as Technical Intelligence Coordinator.

-3-

In December 1943, just prior to the organization of the 5250th Technical Intelligence Company, the G-2, USAFFE, had been requested to ask Sixth Army to permit a Combined Technical Intelligence Field Unit (Ordnance and Chemical Warfare Services) to participate in the Cape Gloucester operation. The Combined Field Team was authorized but Sixth Army would not allow it forward of Finschhafen, although a three-man Ordnance Team did get to Saidor from January to March 1944. For the Admiralty Islands operation (29 February - 18 May 1944), Ordnance and Chemical Warfare Service Technical Intelligence Field Teams were attached to the Counterintelligence Corps (CIC) Teams supporting the 1st Cavalry Division. The CIC officer was in charge of each of the combined teams, which also included personnel from the Naval Mobile Explosives Investigation Unit. The first technical intelligence personnel landed on 6 March (D+6). This was the first campaign in which members of more than one technical service's operations were coordinated and it proved that a larger area could be covered in less time using this method. Planning began for the Hollandia operation. Four officers from the Military Intelligence Training Center at Camp Ritchie, Maryland, and one officer and 14 enlisted personnel from the 234th Quartermaster Salvage Collecting Company arrived at the Finschhafen Depot. Both separate service and combined teams, and a composite unit were to be formed for the operation. Separate Ordnance and Chemical Warfare Service Technical Intelligence Teams supported the 41st Infantry Division, while a combination of Chemical Warfare Service and Naval Mobile Explosives Investigation Unit Teams were attached to the CIC Team in support of the ACofS, G-2, 24th Infantry Division. Technical Intelligence Composite Unit #1 was formed between 13 and 23 April and consisted of nine officers and three enlisted men representing the six technical services. Unit #1 landed on 30 April (D+8) and went into operation. Engineer Field Team #3, the first Engineer Team to operate in the field, joined the Composite Unit for a short time, then departed for operations on Biak Island. Letter, GSB 323.3, HQ USASOS, dated 25 March 1944, and Letter, FEGB, 386.3, HQ USAFFE, dated 28 March 1944, authorized the establishment of a US Army Technical Intelligence Depot at Finschhafen effective 20 April 1944. During July and August the various laboratory analysis sections moved from Brisbane to Finschhafen, thus reducing the distance between collectors (field teams) and evaluators (laboratories). The combining of the Laboratory Analysis Sections and the Receiving-Shipping Section at both Finschhafen and at the tempory Composite Unit #1 field deport at Hollandia resulted in more efficient operations. Various Field Teams participated in the Biak Island (27 May 20 August 1944) and Sansapor (30 July - 31 August 1944) operations. In July, one officer was placed on detached service from the 5250th, and became the Technical Intelligence Coordinator with Hteadquarters, Sixth Army-a move which greatly enhanced the technical intelligence coordination effort. On 25 August, Major Eugene 11. Manley, CE, was officially appointed as Commanding Officer, 5250th Technical Intelligence Composite Company, Separate (Provisional), and as the Technical Intel-

-4-

ligence Coordinator to the ACofS, G-2, USASOS. Major Johnston, the former CO, assumed coimnand of the Ordnance Technical Intelligence
Section for thle forthcoming Phil ippine Islands operation. By 31

August 1944, the 5250th consisted of 16 officers and 25 enlisted personnel from the War Department and 30 officers and 30 enlisted personnel from Theater technical service units. Although technical intelligence units continued to support the island hopping operations, emphasis was placed on preparations for the Philippine Islands operations. Plans for the Leyte phase envisioned three composite technical intelligence units - Technical Intelligence Unit #1 (Ordnance, Signal and Engineer) with the 24th Infantry Division; Unit #2 (all six technical services) with the 1st Cavalry Division; and Unit #3 (all six technical services) with the Army Service Command and further detached to Headquarters, Base K, at Tacloban, Leyte. Unit #1 was attached with the CIC Team under the ACofS, G-2, 24th Infantry Division, and landed with the second wave. After eight days of operations, Unit #1 returned to the Technical Intelligence Depot at Finschhafen. The Officer-in-Charge of Unit #2 also served as the Technical Intelligence Coordinator to Sixth Army. On 1 November, Unit #2 also returned to the Finschhafen Depot. Unit #3 landed on 21 October (D+l) and acted as a forward provisional depot for Units #1 and 2 until their return to Finschhafen. In November, after the return of the Technical Intelligence Composite Units to Finschaffen, another reorganization of the 5250th took place. Personnel from Units #1-3 were used as nuclei for the formation of Units #4-7 for the Luzon Campaign. On 14 November, the Technical Intelligence Coordinator and a reorganized Unit #1 were attached to Headquarters, Eighth Army for the remainder of the Leyte operation. In December, Field Units #1-7 moved out to join their combat units for the Luzon operation. Initially, a Technical Intelligence Composite Unit was attached to each division under supervision of the division G-2. Experience soon demonstrated that greater flexibility could be obtained by assigning units to corps, where they functioned under the corps G-2 and technical service staff officers, and from which they could be assigned to the areas of most need. In addition, one unit was designated as Sixth Army Headquarters Unit. The limited quantities of captured medical and quartermaster equipment made it unnecessary to assign technical personnel from these branches any lower than corps level. One Ordnance technican was detailed to special duty with the Special Intelligence Section, Sixth Army, to collect and repair weapons and equipment for issue to Filipino guerrilla forces. A special team, designated the JAPLAT Team, was formed to collect data from Japanese equipment nameplates to satisfy a requirement from the Military Intelligence Division in Washington. Field Units #1-7 took part in the initial Luzon operations, with Unit #3 again functioning as the forward provisional depot, first at San Jacinto and then at Angeles. By March, Field Units #1, 2, 3, 6, and 7 had been relieved of field duties and had returned to the Depot. Field Units #4, 5, 8, and 9 (the latter having been formed during the operation) remained on field duty with their combat units.

-5-

With the opening of the Luzon Campaign, steps were talen to close down the US Army Technical Intelligence Depot at Finschhafen and to move it, except for a rear-echelon force, to Manila when that city should be captured. Operations at Finschhafen ceased 28 February 1945, and the move began on 12 March. After the capture of Manila, the new US Army Technical Intelligece Depot was established there on 26 March, with eight officers and 38 enlisted personnel. The 5250th had 68 officers and 139 enlisted personnel in February, with nine field units attached to Sixth Army (36 officers and 60 enlisted), and three field units attached to Eighth Army (16 officers and 27 enlisted), but by March had grown to 90 officers and 185 enlisted personnel with a total of 72 field teams. Headquarters Eighth Army Circular #138, dated 10 May 1945, directed that the the technical intelligence teams in its area of operations would come under the operational, administrative, and technical control of the respective technical service chiefs and would coordinate with the G-2 of the unit tho which they were attached. Field Unit #1, once again reorganized, was split into various teams--referred to by the prefix Victor and a number--for mopping-up operations in the southern Philippines. Most of the Victor teams had completed their missions by June 1945 and had returned to the Depot. Planning was begun for Operations Olympic and Coronet--the invasion of Japan. Headquarters AFPAC tasked AFWESPAC and Sixth Army to provide 52 officers and 97 enlisted men divided into a "field depot", five "A" and five "B" units. The Field Depot Unit would consist of two officers and seven enlisted, and would include Ordnance, Quartermaster, and JAPLAT teams. The type "A" field units would consist of six officers and ten enlisted, and would include teams from all six technical services plus a JAPLAT team. The type "B" field units would consist of four officers and eight enlisted, composed of Ordnance, Signal, Engineer, Chemical, and JAPLAT teams. At this time, the 5250th was augmented by the arrival of HHD, 98th Quartermaster Battalion. Japan's surrender put an end to the invasion planning, but the 5250th was alerted to move the field units to Japan on 23 August. The 5250th was further strengthened with the arrival of 38 officers and 58 enlisted personnel. The "A" units, designated Field Teams #1-5, the "B" units, designated as Field Teams #51-55, and the depot, designated Field Depot Unit #71, departed Manila for Japan during late August and early September 1945. The original organization was modified slightly and the total strength of these units was 53 officers and 100 enlisted. The Field Units were assigned to the subordinate corps of the Sixth and Eighth Armies and the Field Depot Unit was attached to Sixth Army Headquarters. GHQ, AFPAC General Orders #337 and 369, dated 20 and 30 November 1945, reassigned the 5250the to the direct control of GHQ, AFPAC. GO #337 established the 5250th Technical Intelligence Company as a Theater overhead installation with an authorized strength of 90 officers and 261 enlisted personnel. GO #369 dissolved the 5250th Technical Intelligence Composite Company, (Separate) Provisional. LTC Manley remained as the Comimanding Officer and LTC David S. Tait became the Technical Intelligence Coordinator.

-6-

The 5250th was also assigned responsibility for the United States Army Technical Intelligence Center, which had been established under the G-2, GHQ, Supreme Commander Allied Powers (SCAP). The Technical Intelligence Depot began to shut down operations in October, the personnel departed Manila between 6 and 9 November, and the unit closed in Tokyo on 20 November 1945. Upon arrival in Japan, the 5250th personnel were assigned to Special Troops, GHQ, SCAP, although they worked under the control of the ACofS, G-2, GHQ, SCAP. They worked through the War Department Technical Intelligence Targeting Section (WDIT), which was headed by COL Walter S. Wood. The WDIT decided what captured enemy equipment and which enemy installations would be exploited under the provisions of General Orders #9 and 15, 2 October and 9 November 1945. LTC Tait became the head of the Technical Intelligence Section for WDIT operations. The 5250th examined a number of installations and a large amount of Japanese industrial and military equipment. The end of hostilities saw the beginning of the demise of the 5250th and of the decline of technical intelligence in the United States Army. Technical intelligence organizations were revived during the Korean and Vietnam conflicts and were based, in large part, on the lessons learned from the 5250th, but technical intelligence remained almost dormant between actual hostilities--an extremely valuable but neglected field of intelligence.

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525Oth

TFmrI

TLIGENCE COMPANY

VOLUI7
Introduction .. . .

tokyo, Japan 7 Deceiber 1945

. . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .

Chapter I .... . . .. Tech Intoll By Ord and CVS: Dec 42

. . ..
- Jan 44

..

*. . * * *. Cha'pter II . . . . . . . * *. . . .* . 5250th Tech Intoll Cornp Co, Sop (r): Jt.n -- May 44

* * . . 12

ChnptcrIII

. .

.,

.... .

..

..

.. ... .

24 36

Hollandia: 4^pr -- Jul 44

Chapter IV. . Biak to Yorotai:
. . . . . . . .

. . . . . . .

:ay -- Oct 44 ...........

Oct -Dec 44
... . . . . . . . ..

Chapter V .

. .

... ...

. .

54
63 67

Return to the .hilippines:

Chapter VI . . . . . . . . Arny Tech Intcll Depot: Oct 44 -- Fcb Chapter VII . . .. Operations on Luzon: Jan --

. . . . . . . . ... July 45 July 45

..

..

Chapter VIII . . . . . .

. .

, . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
..

.. 86
.100 .112

Southern Philippine Caapaign: Dec 44 --

Chapter IX . . . . . . . . . . . . . The 52b0th at- Ilaila: Iar -- Sept 45 Chapter X. . . . . ... . . . . . . . . Tecmical Intelligence Center, Japan: Oct -- Nov 45 VOLUME II Inclosurcs 1 - 34 inclusive

ATbY GSC gCo1101 -

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Comtlanding

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NIELLIGx

~T THE
SOMEST ANM lWESTEZ 1942 -PACIFIC WIEAS

1946

T ; 0 E UC T _ N_ _N
When the United States rras plunged into a Far Eastern war ;Tith Japan by the bo:-:bing of Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941,p we came fne t fac, :-Lth the fact that vie knew little or nothing about that Tslanc, -apire.. '-hat had Japan in the wzay of an Army a iavy? .7hat about their Mariana.s outposts and the other and Jap mandatad islands? Hov' and with What -;'eaponsvwould the Japanese fight? Many of these questions in the early phases of the war were unanswered. '.le had a war on our hands ye t vwe were uncertain of the onemy's capabilities. Our Technical Intelligence vas practically non-existent -- , and vie almost lrost the war asaresult. .ie found the enemry much more potent than -most strategists had. expected, and we paid for underestimating his strength with a series of strategic withdravals to the south. '7e lost important bases for a counter offensive -- the Philippines, Hong Kong, 'Singapore, Java, Borneo, the entire group of islands to the north of New Guinca, even the northern portion of New Guinea itself. 'JIith only trwo American and trro Australian tween them-and a completion of the conquest of tern Pacific, the Japs vrere finally stopped on (Yap, Incl 1) in their drive toward the Allied Moresby. divisions bethe whole 'besthe Tfokoda Trail base at Port

The comeback look3d long and hard. Over three thousand miles of ocean with thousands of Jap-garrisoned islands lay between us and Tokyo. :!e now kne1.r the enery's capabilities and how absolutely his ,holo home economy had been geared to total war, but an army in retreat learns little of the enemy's materiel, equipment and vieapons, except their terrific effect. These were among the major objectives of the Allies: knowr what weapons the enemy had so that ?eo c6uld devise to

pRPoET

v Us AP VMY

HIMSORY Ca TECHNICAL INELIGENCE countermeasures and countertactics of our own; to exploit important discoveries for our owvn benefit; to rrin the technological
raceO

In the earliest months of the war the United States had a mere handful of Technical Intelligence men in the Pacific Theater, dependent for training upon the iaJstralian Army. Then Technical Intell.Vgonce was" talkn over by the Ordnance and Chemical I7arfare Sc..ice sections of the United States .rxmy Forces Far East (USAf.i) under the supervision of their respective service chiefs, Thi.: operations, beginning in a small ray, culminrates 3 YJiz.ar, :.944 in the formation of a coordinated organization ofC th s:' m;r.jor services, the 5250th Technical Intelligence Coi oDsit Soparate (Provisional). The 470 technical exports cadministered through this company Xkpt the JAllied Forces infoimod of Japanose progress in arms, arminition and equipmsont. They oere the oyes and the cars of the army in the battle of the Pacific.
.Company,

As differentiated from the enenm in Earope, the Yapanese foughtw in many cases, on a shoestring; their tenuous supply lines, reaching to the various island groups, were generally severed before the llied troops ;rent into operation and bLacklogs of enemy supplies were consequently rwell depleted; surronder on masse, such as occurred in Eiropel with the accompanying seizure of large stores of cnepy supplies, was unklown in the var with Japan until the sunmer of 1945 -- when the war was over. The capture, then, of any considerable quantity of Japanese equipment was a matter of great Intelligence inportance, The following pages trace the development and operations of Technical Intelligence from NeM Guinea to the Philippinos to the occupation of Yapan, This is the history of the pioneers of Technical Intelligence in the Pacific. an integral, vital -- and norr we know -- indispensable part of the history of the Uhited States lJrn,

TCHDNICembeIL

BY O>IMOWCE 4I2IGE -Deconiember 1942 --

jai`Ra1'I

Jamary 1944

From the opening of the Pacific W7ar until. Novemiber 1942, there was little Tochnial Di 'olligonco c.ctivity in the Southwost Pacific areoa (S)SJ.'). f:. smrz: L armr3 and some amnuni,;ion plus a few items of Chemical l7arf'a, c p ._mIlnt viere turned into the Ordnance and Chemical Warfare officers for exanination and tien forwarded by both American and Australian forces to the ;ustralia.l 4rmr for examination, test and report. No organized attormit hLd been rade, however, to have Technical Intelligonce carried into the field by a team of men skillod in collecting and analyzing captured onemy equiEent.

Technical Intelligence in 4ccordance with Traliin

GCircul.ar

81

In November 1942, Training Circular No. 81 establihied a more closely knit control for processing captured enemy equipment of Intelligence value. The flow of materiel was/Mom combat troops (there were, as yet, no Technical Intelligence teams) to service troops in the combat zone, to the theater special staff officer of the appropriate service, to the (Shief of the appropriate service in the United States. Flow of informational reports uas through channels from the combat troops to the S-2 or G-2, to the Assistant Chief of Stmff, G-2, (AO of S) to the War Department, as relL as interchangeably with the service troops handling the mriteriel. Combat personnel capturing equipment of ow design sent it roarward through normal recovery channels together th accassories, anrminition, and pertinent information, each service hmndling its own equipmennt. Simultaneous3y, a report ams rendered through channela.
.

rintenance and supply service personel delivered captud equipat, with no maintenance other than the application of proservatives, direct to the Theater spooial staff officor of the

EISTOfRY aF ICIgICAL INIEI

same arm or sorvice or to his dosignated establisfmaut (such as a base Ehop or dopot). Peport nas adie at the sane timeto the

G-2 of their corm.ind, Both combat and maintenance porsonnel recovrring a now type of = teriel of a class supplied by another aervice delivered it to the nearest organization of the appropriate service.
Theatcr staff officers ;ere rospons ble for preliminary

expert anl!ysis as to the characteristics of the n-teriel.

Based

upon. this,- thoy rmade prelirninary deductions as tothe state of enerey resources for as evidenced by the nrateriel, and pube.T:? li~cd prc-limina:/T o".r :-tor's and maintenance -anue.l s, ith instructi=cs on Jiu:;1L rc:ii.cations that could bo =Mde sothat the capturod oqcipe-t CCoJ._d be usedbiy tUnited INtiors troops in the field. Those repcrts, together rith the cap. LLrd rmtoriel

(half of the capsnirod riateriol mr.nt ta the Au;l.tralim3ns

half to

the MTJited States) -7ere then transmitted to the chief of the am or service concerned in the tUited States. Complete reports

were also made by the Theter staff officers to the G-2 of the Theater staff, and e cossary arrangemonts were rmde when possible to exploit the ener- nmateriel vrhen captured in quantities. eidge

The chief of each supply arm or service in the Zore of the Interior made final analysis and deductiona and prepared final operator's and maintenance mamuals azdvisuaL training aids. The Theater G-2,. under the provisions of this circulea,
it will be noted, merely transnittod inforntion on the equip-

ment end had no responsibility in its processing. Ordinance ohanica!, Intellijence:: .v; 194Z -- Zan1-1 s _

As the battle for BAna and Gona, MNw Guinoa, 'Tsdrawing to a close in Dacember 1942, a group of five Ordnance officers and ton ennlisted men rds preparing to leave the &hited States for the Southemst Pacific Area. These meon ioere specialists in armunition, small arms, artillery, fire controL equilimmt, and traccld and rheoled vehicles. Previous to their dpeparture they had been given an intensive indoctrination ir. Ordnanoo Tochnical Intelligence at Abcrdeon Proving Ground, Mryl&ard, and at Wvishington, DO 0.

HISTIM

IC

WlEGA

On arrival at Headquarters, tfited States Arr Service of %ppl'y (tSA3Q0), Base 3, Brisbane, Australia, on 30 December 1942, WJor Alan C. Johnston, rankidng officer, vas placed in diarge of the group to set up an Ordnance Technical Intelligence organization for the Theatere The program was to operate under the technical ccntrol of the Chief vCklnance tfficer, USJISOS*, in accordance '-ith general polii:tos cstablished by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, of that headquartors. The detacilhrnt w&sc .ve S:ctioon, t Adninistr.at supervisicnr of G0.r-nlanc:: withi i~ntainm d liai.;' ;Ji izatIntel.Ligence orgaa broken do-,m into three sections: nhe besides being respcrsibla for the general ntelligence activities, issued reports, Fited Statas and ALutra.ian Technical ,;sin other theaters, collected new data

issued in, the P-ciflc Thicater on Yapmnese Crdn:lonce tiateriel, and forwvarded this inf'ormation to the Chief of &C'ibance, W7ashirngton, D. C. (Technical Intelligence personiel in the South-vwest Pacific .rea and the 'iestcrn Iacific assigned to Headquarters 2Adrinistration throughout the var arc slhorn in Incl 2).

The second section consisted of Technical Intelligeneo Field Teams composed of an officer and one or more enlisted nen, rho
operated from an .dvwnce base or with a task frces, division or corps. Their duties were to collect, identify, _repare prolininary reports on new iters, and hfip captured Japanese materiel to the Ordnance .aalysis Section, (Technical Intelligence perassigned to sonnol in the S7JP 4 and 'Jesteorn Pacific Jarea (EWSPAC)

field teams and the operations in which they participated arc shovn in Incl 3).

las the Ordnance wnalysis Section, located at The third Brisbane, iustralia, which roceived rLteriel fron field tcems, analyzed and prepared reports on new: items, prepared end shipped Japanese Ordnance materiel toJUnited States troops in the Theater for training and to the Uited States for Technical investigation and traizing, and maintained liaison -ith Technical investigation and training, and maintained liaison v:ith Technical Intelligence organizations in the vicinity (such as the Allied Tranlator and Interpreter Section (ATIS) of General Headquarters, (GHQ3) 3PA, with General Staff, Intelligence, (10) of the 'us-

tralian Army at A'ustralian Land Headquarters and with the Wsater General of ordnance, in ilborne). (Personnel assigned to analysis work in the Tcchnical Itenolligence Depots are shown in
I4ol 1)

HI3TORY OF TECHMIC,.L IITrELLG1TCE This first detach-rl-nt of Technical Intclligence personnel

assigned to thc Pacific -dcsipglated beloT:

all Ordnance --

rT;ce allocated as

Hecdauearters Section
aj .;lan Co Johnston, OUI.C. Capt Donald fr.v.;i:;,a, Xs-t '"C.r~ 'LeC_;
1st Lt T I:n _ ..
lst

S/SEt Paul F.OQick, Chf Clk CD1 Ulbcrt BeveridEco Clk Intoigjcnec Tcat:!
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T/4 Ra>yf.cnd J.

Lt EL's'

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T/4 Yobhn B., .:in

T/Sgt

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Crdntl ce ! nalysis Section

Lt Eugenc D. W7hit' T/.3't Georgc W. Bruncr 3S/3gt Roethell .-. Loveless

T/3 John L. Lisd&alk

SSt Clcnrnt JT, Tisnicrek

C;p1 Harry R. O'V.Lara

Theorc -- s considorable flexibility in these asifLn:-:nts and a they vrero often used intcrchngecably, i.e., headquarters and snalysis section personnel :-.nt into the field arnd vice versa. 'As it turned out, Capt adigan, S/Sgt Loveless and !3t Cu,.snicrek worc lwith Headquarters U3iSf3OS till Fobruary 1943 ,.hen the ;viere

transferred to the analysis section at 3risbane. Fronr- JYUclary until July, w;hoen pTt of the personnel :fas pulled for field :-irk, the Ordnance analysis section reported in great detail cn practically all of the rlatericl that -as captured. They issued 26 complete tchinical reports -- onec report on the 75rm1 Aj gun, over 50 pagecs long, and contained 30 photographs. Tchnmical Intelligence pcrsonneol received training and inforriation fronl the Aiustrali an AryV in the carly days, -- ich was h quite valuable. se an cxai.ple, Capt hidigan and two enlisted rnn spent 1.9 days in Tblbou-nc in January 1943, at the Office of the Ihster General of Ordmnnce in VFesley College, lookinp; over

their coiapleto collection of Japanese Ordnance,

apart, studyinG and analyzing then.

taking the c;apons

Though Technical Intelligence;vas nover actually under the

Yistralian Arny for administration, except in 1t saeo capacity as other lbhitcd States forcos were attached for esrly operations, the alliince and cooperation twas close and -ms of great benefit
to both arraios.

HISTORY OF TECHNIC L INTELLrtGETCE Later, in February 1943, when Technical Intelligence mas turned over to United States Army Forces Far Ea~st (USJFFE), Major Johnston vfas appointed Technical Intelligence officcr, opcrating under the direct control of the Chief Ordnanco Officer, USFAF E . The only personnel assigned to Hoadquartcrs U3AdVFE at that ti:.- were Major Johnston and S/Sgt (Qick. I11 r other Ordnance Tcohnical Intelligence personnel -.- e carried Base on. the T/O of the Ordnance Office, USASOSs and various Soections.
Oro a",- 'tiat tie operating put, fBase "B", Capt I\dig?:r Incl 1) took charge of all field tcams; Bay, Cuine .a, P x'tspC: 9;,bility for investigating the Japaneso he also L-S'ufE Ordnance mt.er:ic:! h.! :,y the Ihastor General of Ordnance, Lus6Wrch to 11 July 19i.43 went on tcmaporary tralian 4r:%r; and frcl b ,aboratoryCoanp.ny to investigate duty -rvith the 42d3 ChoLical Japancse explosives and eurnunitions.

Newuv

Cherical '.!arfaro Service :

j Dec _19}

in -=1

'Whereas Ordnance Technical. Intelligence personnel had booen sent directly to the Pacific froa the Uaitod States, the Chemical Yiarfarc Intelligence Section was formrd locally. Throughout 1942, norr types of captured eney equipment were sent to the Chcri.cal.1 ,arfer Service Intelligence Officer, Headquarters, Now Guinea Forces, fmustralia,. to idoe the prolidinary examination und determined its oporatiornal significanco. It was Molbourno, MryV,, then sent to Land Headquasters, ILustralian (later, Advance Land Headquarters, Brisbanc) for Technical Intellicenco. Land Headquarters then issued the equiprment to the appropriate arra or service for complete technical ncalysis and e report. Chomicall arfarc rmunitiors -. re sent to either 42d Chemical Laboratory or the Victoria Manitions Supply Laboratory, Marybyrnong, Victoria, Australia. The entire channel of ovacuation wa ALustralian. This was improved sormc-hat in.January 1943, wJhen arrangements mere for liited Sta*tes GChemiical i!arfare Intelligonce made Officers to be notified of rmatoriol sent back fron the for,.ard area by United States forces so th.t they could work -ith Land nSrmy, the disposition of that rnton Headquarterst, iustralirin eriel.

HISTORY CF TECAITICAL IUTELLGENCE There ,-as, however, no established Chemical ?Tarfare Intelligence organization. The work 7ras cnrried on as one of the functicnsof the chemical laboratories under the suaprvision of the Technical Intolliecnce officer of the Chenical Tarfare Section, Headqliarters, UtSA(B. Their analysis consisted merely of exanining and report.ng on Japanese chemical materiel. It becamn apparent that in addition to the laboratory analysis, an c.rta.izacltion was needed which could collect equipment and stIdy >'Panese tactics, methods and prcparat ions for chemical warfare. I u February 1943, when USLA@E rwias activated, a Chemical Wsarfoae S- t-ion -. sot up in that H aadqu-r ters with an Intelligernce officer ,ie-;aii.:.

Intolligere

to foxr2ulnte plsans for rnrre conprehensive

ord ln.iza.-t '.on,

At this tiLntthereo -icre two officers and one enlisted rTan in

the Chonical Inteilicenco Section, Ijeadqu1.rtes, USASCS: Major John A. Riddick, 1st Lt ;.illiaon . Roberts, and S/3gt Vernon G. Phipps. To these was added another officer, 2d Lt Janmes D. 7asson, responsible for docurents research and publications~ In addition, three officers and three enlisted zion .ere assigned to three field Chemical .arfuorc Intelligence teams rorkine under the direction of Headquartors USdFIE in the foruard areas, Assignmncnts were as follows: CJS Intellir-ence Tean No. 1 2d Lt Jilliam J. Barry Pfc Paul R. Going

c;JS Intellir:ence Team No. 2

2d Lt Robert 1. Bond Pfc John P. Garner

C01S Intellimence Tearl No. 3 2d Lt Donald B. Henry Cpl Leen C. Schier

On 27 May 1943 the Comranding General, US&ISCS, was directed by par 5, Circular No. 31, Headquarters UStAFF (Incl 5) to "establish at Base Section 3 a salvaGe depot for captured enemy equipment, conveniently located in rclzition to the captured encry equipment depot of the 4Australian Army now located in Base Section 3". The Ordnnnce and Chermical .. arfaro Service analysis sections were still separate fron the depot, riich was used only for shipping and receiving equiprrent; and still there ;r.s no Technical Intelligenco by Engineers, MDdical Corps, 4Qartornastcr or Signal '.orps; nevertheless, it was the first stcp toanrd coordination. 1st Lt Orrio P. Sell, Jtr., IQ , was placed in charge of the depot.

HISTORY CF TECHNICAL INTELIIGENCE

At the same time, Technica-l Intclligenco of the United States and Australia was morc closely coordinated through the activation

of the Joint Allied Captured Eoney Equipoent Board wh.ich replaced Land Headquartors in determining, the final disposition of captured AlL. natcricl received at both the United States and cquipment. chocked by the Allied Ea:iy Equipment Board Australian depots :-.~s for di.spcstion. The Board, consisting of two mmnbors from the from the gLtstrLalian forces, and one from fallied -tvo Uni ted .tates,
Naval Fordc-sp, e;cr dispcsition of matoriel b_.scd on T3chnicaL trainThq s IJr,:L 'tod both forces to obtain itor.s w-hich night inn: nccd;o blc. M-jor Yohnstor '.ras appointed as a rennot othcr-.-iso bo avc,' ber of this boa;-li in inc. 194,3 md aCainr, -. itl Lt Scll, in Decemb-r l9i3, 6 Juno to 8 Scptember 1943, Lt Barry and Durinrg the pczi.ll of C.;S ::nrcllitenc Tc:m No. .1 -;icre scnt on tempor.ry e1l Guinea (htp duty to United Statca .LLvance Pasct rort ;,brosbyt
Pfc Goi.rn

Incl 1). Their missicn was to establish liaison with Technical Intcllitenco units from United Sta.tes Army Ordnance, Fifth .ir Forceo, Naval Intelligence, the Royal iustralian A.ir Force, and Headquarters NTc; Guirnea Forces. They -;cre to clarify the ch.inels through Trhich enevy materiel and Intelligence reports cnd equipmcnt would go, and to provide that such chonnels were function:as to be prepared to ing properly. At the same tirm, the team rmtters of interest to Chemical proceed to any area to investigatc Jarfar e .
Bunas--

Gona --

Sanananda: Gona --

9 Dec 1942 --

22 Jan 1943 Incl 1) opera-

The Buna --

Sanananda, New Guinea (I!,ap,

tions vrere conducted jointly by Australian forces and by I Corps, with the 32d Division bearing the brunt of the fighting. Ordnance Technical Intelligence which had just arrived in the Theater in December had a team in the field by 18 January. Lt Bishop, Lt Cameron, end four enlisted men wrere sent to Port MNoresby Durinr the next six months to stage for tro weeks for Puna -- Gona. they covered this entire area and shipped back Y'mdi valuable Ordnance equipmnent to Brisbane fror analysis. In June, Lt B3isop and $r;t Peterson returned to Brisbane to relieve Capt DMdigan and S/,-],t Loveless in the analysis section, and Capt Madigan left irmmediately to go north to join the field detail in Guinea.

HI3TORY OF TECHNICAL INTEIUGENCE Nassau Bay: 30 Jun 1943

On 30 Juine 1943 the McKechnie Force, conposed of elements of the 41st Infantry Division attached to the 5th Australian Division, landed at Nassau Lay (!iap,, Incl 1) and quickly moppid Lup, the small ener, garrison -there. Ain Ordnance T, I. Te2n con.sistirng of Capt i
bL~diLan, officer in charge, Lt Canm-ron, T/4 '.inn, ard T/4 Levy, carmn up from the Pina --- Gona area in early JTuly so that they .might be on hand bef'c-:; the equiwr..et armd materiel could be destroyed or souvenired by UTritod States troops. Lt Car.eoron, Levy and 'Tirm left durililr Aullu st for 3.risbrne and Caplt I. -i~a-n joined a -;eek -Jas l.ter by S,t/ .,vol.s- a~nd Cpl O'"e.eaa fr'-m tle Ornnanrce nmalysis 3ettion. 7is 1 ?l t ai.. o..? 1 ,.n in the field, furnihinG a turnover of p;crsornl, fccr 'c.luty. ,As tof offensive follo..ed up the coast, the nevJy' .!o=rr.,ia Ordnance T. I.. Teamn ontinmed operations with the corabat zz'oops.

O'iJ Intelli[,ence Te-ua No. 3, Lt H-Ienry and Cpl Schier, covered the Nassau Bay o,)eration for CGS. Afir trarnsortation from Brisbano was obtaixrd by the team on 25 Jurie to Fort tMoresby, thence across the Oen Stanley Rarne to Doboaura, near Oro Day (Map Incl 1). Here the team r;as attached to the Chemical Sectior, H,3adquarters 41st Infantry Division, and spent t.-o -7eeks -oinr, through the old battiegrounds in the Buna -- Gona area where they contacted the men :7ho had taken part in the action and who-'re at this tire established in defensive positions alorIg the beach (the operation had "closed# 22 January...). The team Was trn attached to the IMicKechnic Force and sailed 12 July for Morobe and later on up to NsJassau :3ay, (Ttp Incl 1). On 22 July, their mission cormpleted, Cpl Schior -;as dispatched with the Chemical 0lrfare captured equipment to the Chemical Officor, 41st Infantry Division, and Lt Henry left 28 July for Cro Bay, reDorting to Hoadquarters 41st Infantry Division and from there flew to Brisbane.
Lae -Salamaua: 4 Sop 11I. -&. 136

196

On 4 September 1943 under cover of heavy air and naval bo-hbardrent, a large Aiustralian f'orce landed and established beachheads fifteen miles northeast of I.e, cuttinC the enenr.'s line of cor..-inications to Finschhf en onm. the north coast of Nev Guinea, (!p Incl 1). On the following day, preceded by heavy bombirn and the United States 8

strafing, 503d Parachute Infantry Reineint parachuted and captured the airfield at Nadzab (a few miles northw7est of Lae). Airborne troops vere quickly roved in, and following a rapid advance by both forces, Lae fell to the 'llied on 16 September 1943. Mean-whilo, Salamnua (MaT Incl 1) had fallen on 11 September and the re..n.n.ts of four JcpAnese divisions, half-starved and malaria rid,len, were plrs,d back east along, the coast tovrard Mrorobe, bitterly contesting ever, . liod .ain. Capt .aldimor, Z/1r,"t Lovcless aznd Cp1 O'.era vrwere in the field with. the re9 1antat;. rs until C:apt hadian3, 7'ho had been slightly :Ln wounced, ..1c et ovcr_: for Salarnau. Lt Camrreron then took over as cLff/ce: in cc-,,Le iL; the same twro onli.sted merl, operating tith the 23d Por- Hea~cr m:rs, 41st T;fanftry Iiv>: on,. at Lae, to cover the Lao --.Finsc':hh.feni a'ea. They returned to Headq[uarters USiFFE 2 December 1943 for duty 7vith one of the other field teams,. The tean salvaned all Japanese Crdnance materiel of interest in the area, totalinrg about 60 tons of weapons (including fifty pieces of artillery) c:nd ninety tons of ,nx.nition. Lac -- Salnmaua was the most productive of enemy Ordnance equipr.ent up to the Hollandia operation.
ical T1arfare equipnent stored in the Saln~.ua --

It was reported that there .ere also large quantities of Chem.Lie area. On 8

'September orders were issued attachingr Lt B.rry and Pfc Going3, Chemic-al Itarfare Intelligence Team No. l, to the 5th Australian Infantry Division, which was operating in the Se alzmaua area, It rwas not thought, ho':ever, at this tiLne, th-at Lae wrould fall in the near future, and it was anticinated that Te:r NTo. i would be able to cover the Salaru.Lua area first and then proceed to Lae. In the event that Lae fell prior to the completion of the Salaaua nission, arrangements wrere -rmde for C'3 Intellirgence Tean No. 2 to proceed to LIe irntzdiatoly, During 3epteober 1943 operatiorn around Lae '-wore intensified and with the greater part of the avail-ble transport plcnes being used to fly in troops and supplies, transportation for C'TS Intelligence Team No. 1 was delayed and they did not arrive in Dobodura until 16 September. Upon arrival, they reported to the United States liaison officer, 1st .istralian Corps, It -.as le anoed that Lae had fallen that very day and a rzssaceo was sent to Lt Bond, su'gesting that his WiS Team.No, 2 proceed there at once. Meanwhile, considerable quantities of eneny Chernical ','arfareequiprent wore found throughout the area by Teem No. 1.

HISTORY OF TECHNICAL INTEGELLINCE After an air raid alarm on the rmrning of the 20th Septembcr, Lt Bond and Pfc Garner, CWS Tean No. 2, took off from .7ard Drone, Port Moresby, and flew to Nadzab, the closest point to Lae. Upon landing, they rspcrtcd to the 7th 1Australian Division ahich -mas located a short distance from the field. There, arran-ormnts -;-ere nmdad for then to report to 26th Lustralian Brifrade, located in Lae. dhile they wore awvaiting transportation to Icr, rine Japanese bombers cao over, bhit ulistaking thenm for friendly plmnes no one paid any attcntion untfl the ,anti-aircraft guns opened up over the field. lfter all this 3dely transrortation warc finally secured to Lac. Capt Forcyth of A'vanced Alliod Translator and Interpreter soction iwas thero rit-h . Japanese intcrpreter. Lt BroTn of rIobile Exip'sivcs InvostiJ ti: Unit (I.E'IU) United States Navy, was contactud, and also Lt 0.._ito', who had becn transferred 7;ith Sgt Bruner from the Ordnance .~nalysis Srction to (rdnence qTchnical Intelligance, Fifth Air Force. Shortly aftcr arrival, the te-a --rns transferred fror the 26th Brigade to Hcadqilarters, 23d Port Detachment, 'where transportation facilities were .more available. After collccting samples of all the Japanese equiprmnt foun- in. the area, Lt Bond and Pfc Garner left Le4 on 25th Scptember for Salam-ua where they .- Lt 3t Barry and Pfc Goinf' of CJS Teau NTTo. 1. This team planned to proceed to Lae and from there to Finschhafen as soon as it should fall. All captured equipment collected by CS Tecan No. 1 in the Salamaua area was flon-m by plane from Salarmxua back to Dobodurn.

I.ustralian

On 26 September, transportation by wvter was oltairod to Lae, and Headquarters for C.JS Tce-n No. I vas set up with the 23d Tort Headquarters. After a two-day wmit for air transportation, Lt Bond and Pfc Garner left for Port bIoresby with the equipnmnt collected at Lae and Salanmua. By this tinme the oloaning up of LIe had progressed con;i derably. .is at Salaraua, it was agZain evident that the Japanose had evacuated the area in great haste. Large quantities of docunent, am-u1nition and equiprment had lkon left undestroyed. Finschhafen: 22 Sep 1!9? -- 2 Oct 1943

In a coordinated lnand, sea and air rvcorent an JAustrnalian force nmoved around the coast fron Leo and under cover of heavy air and naval bonbardmnt landed and established beachheads six miles north

10

HISTCRY OF TECHMN1IOCL IMPELtGECE of Finschhafen (Map Incl 1) on 22 Sopterber 1943. The speed of the double developnrent of L!eo and Finschhclfen appa.rently had caught the enery by surprise. Fierce fightinG followred the s.liod lmndind .nd in the latter stia,,os of the cperation rnny hundreds of rr s died of sto.r-7tion, ;.-unds .nd sickness. The capture of Firschhafen insured ilJi.cd control of Huon Gulf, (MLp Incl 1) and dislocated the cncu.y's gr., n Pritish Ncv Guinea. On 2d Cctober, Lt 3Barry -;-ms notified that Finschhef on had been occupied darrl'Gemclts for transpsortation to that .rca were mnde io idi.tei . 'Af ter l.ndinc at the v:ronr, boechhold I(.fl.cri ,.:s wvitl'i.n fiv ,nridrod y^.rds of the yTaponcse position), Lt Barry and PI' C-oing .1itch-hikod through the junglo tc Finschhafen, six miles away,. Here they attac! hed themselves to Conpany i&of the 13th Bat';alion, 20th Asustralian Brigadce, rhich vr.s in charge of salvaging enemy equipment in that orea. idter recovering all a.vailablo encny Cherical Wiarf.re equimentthe -term loft Finschhafen and returned to Lao oand then back to Nadzab, Dobodura., Port obresby and fin-ally to Prisbane. Lt Cameron with S/Sgt Loveless and Cpl O'Mrra, s-rho had been covering the Nassau Bay ancd Lae aroas for capturod ordnance Imteriel, operated out of Loae, -ihero they were attached to the 23d Port Headquertcrs, 41st Division, to cover Finschhnf on.

11

HISTORY CF TbECHNICAL II'fELLIOENCE

C H ;E P T E R IL

5250th TECHiWCtJC

INTELLIGC.EC CCWOMSITECO LNY, SEPR;CE IROVISION.L tI

JTuary 0I914 -- llt~y 194

On 29 Septer:ber 1943, all Ordnance personnel were transferred by U3,F7F to ULS/0S, L.3 in late October rlans 7:ere m'ade by ULSIJOS to prcvide for - Techzr.._:3l Intelligence Depot consistirn of five sect-ions: Dri oe -;iral ti7c, Ordnance and Chemical 'Arf -re Service, and in ad'lition, Qxartcrnaster, Medical and Transportiation. No detachment w7as formed, ho'.ever, for the entire set-up -as3 changed by IUSATE directive, Subject; "Respolsibility of Technical Inu telligence", dated 22 Decerber 1943, (Incl 6). By this directive, the responsibility for ground Technical Intelli/ence within the United States LrrVm Forces in the Far East rms delegated to the Conmarnding General, USM.AOS. Me rwas directed to appoint qualified officers to serve as United States rm representatives on the Allied Captured Enemy Equipment Board, to provide necessary officer and enlisted personnel to operate the Uthited States Captured Enemy Equipment Depot and to furnish Technica.l Intelligence personnel both officer and enlisted for inclusion in task force Intelligence teams Technical Intelligence operations in SJIWA had, in the past,. been carried on by detachfmnts of special staff sections operating under varying arrangements in regard to assignment of personnel and supervision of activities. In order to Irovide sn efficient basis for operations of the various chnical Intelliigence detachments, USA.SOS, G-2, Col Sauve', submitted a proposed plan of operation ,ith a reconrended T/O end T/E that included, for the first tite,, the six tmjor services, (all except Transportntion CorDs) and that was estimated to be adequate for Theater mfnrds, and -rcot M-h -ndc. a Technickil Intolligcncc oriestoe Cc-mpany be ~ictivacvd:, lTh.1 'proposal ams foriarded to CorlandinrE General USAFFE on 7 December 1943. It was felt that the suggested organization would give more satisfactory Technical Intelligence coverage since it included the six services, that it would ma-1 possible the necessary flexibility operation and movement of personnel which was considered essential for the efficient functioning of the sections, and would enable the forntion of well trained and balanced Technical Intelligence teams, 12

HISTCRY OF TECHNIC 4 LL INELLIGEUCE Under this arrangenent, the several Technical Intellieonce sections would be able to facilitate the.collection and rapid disser.ination of Technical Intelligence information. It would also enable them to control the distribution of captured enemy equiyrmnt according to technical and traininG noeds in the Theater and in the Utited Statess Cn 3 January 194h, the 5250th Technical Intelligence Composite
Colnpany, Senparte (r'ovisional) was organized as a prcvisional comrpary by Gcneral Ordr.- s No. 2, Headquarters UJSSCS (Incl 7), so T/O and T/L.: prrvious!r survrestcd to US1FFE, wre used as rguides, with perscnanel c-.rliod _in detached service fror. source units.

that assitnmTont of pczr-rnol1 could be ade rand operations continued.

The fo:ratioil of a separate Technical Into'lir.cnce Composite Compan y other than provislonal was not favorably considered by US1-FFE (10 January 1944). On 20 January 1944, Chiefs of 3Srvices vwere directed to furnish qualified personnel for assirnnmnt on detached service to 52350th Technical Intellidenc Composite Copanyv, Separate (rrovisional) "to enable the aocompnlishm-nt of the Technical Intelligence mission" (Incl 8). Thc transfer of personnel to the 5250th was effected by the six services concerned by February 1944. (A con:pleto roster of all personnel assimned to the _5250th from January 1944i, when it was formd, until November 1945, w.hen the 5250th Technical !ntellience Composite Colspany, Scparate (Provisional) had moved for;Jard to sapan, is shomw in Incl 9. This inclosure lists the dates each man joined and departed from the Coripany and the awaards that he received). Evaluation of The Technical Intollipgence Setlp The principle of having- a coordinatinr unit for Technical Intelligenc proved highly satisfactory in the coring months of the war. Centralized control hnidc it possible for tearlas from.i the six services to function as one unit, thus onabling" then to aid each other during the first days of an operation when speed was important. Infomation, docurnnts and equimcnt cDuld be collected for all branches by all teans, and this equiprmnt assembled in a central spot where it cmuld be sorted and evaluated by the individual service team concerned. Coordination Irovided flexibility, made for geater ease and efficiency in matter of cornand, and eliminated the question concerning responsibility and scope of authority.

13

HISTORY OF TECHINIC.IL INTELLIGENCE

Mbst important of all, co-ordination made it possible for the cormand to have adequately equipped tomns formed and trained in time for all operations and assured complete covcrage by Technical Intelligence. There was one very definite drawback, hovievcr -- the 5250th Technical Intclligenc Cor.lpany was established only as a provis! onal or;anizaction. This in certain ways, conplicated its administrazio :.of't its personnel still occupyin; T/0 vacancies in units which they had never ;worked, rade it gencrally impossiblc to secure -wellearned and long deserved prrmotions, and because the con.Da.y oP.oratod on only a quasi-acccpted basis, sormtins
ham-s-,iun~ its cffox-rz vw.en it could have booeen nst effective.

Nceverthelessr, urndr the direction of the 5250th Technical IntelliQ;onco Comrosite Comprny, Sce)prate (Yrovisional), a conprehonsivo viec, of Joaan;se capabilitics 1'as secured and Technical Intollic;once entered the period w;hen the -. ork of past yetrs brought in positive results. It -;ms e big step fo r7ard. Oranization of the 5250th Tech. Intell. Coip. Co. . (P)

The 5250th was composod of a co-ordination and administration section, and a technical section for each of the six major services. Each Technical section, composed of laboratory and enerWmy equiprent Intolligence teuems, operated under the technical supervision of the Chief of Service and under the ;enoral supervision of the .Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, USAS30S (Orgsanization Chart, Incl 10). Duties, as originally outlined in the reco.rrondation to USi3FFE, ;yore followed with only minor modifications. They were as follows: Cormnanyr Headquarters a. 44dministration of the Company and co-ordination of the activities of the sevoral sections. b. Company cormunder on duty in the Office of the LC of S, G-2, U~iSOSs, as Co-ordinator of Technical Intolligenco. .hjor Johnston, Ord, in addition to his other duties, w7as appointed informally as temporary (without orders) cooanding officer of the COoiVany and G-2 Technical Intelligence Co-ordinator.

14

HISTORY OF TECHNICLL INLTELIZG c. One officer on duty in the Office of the ,&C of S, G-2, USO3S, to conduct Tccmnical Intclligence liraison with the Allied Translator and Interpreter Section S?~. This responsibility was first delegated to Lt Col Jones, Chief Engineer IntelliGence officer, and was later turned over to his assistant, Lt Girard R. LorrTey. Service Technical Intclli~renc Officor

A Technical Intelligence clficcr in the office of each of the services. His dutioe rcro: a. To advise the Chief of Service on Intelligonco tottcrs. b. To supervise IntelliCcnce activities for the pa.rticular service, includinm-; trainint, collection, recording, storage and disposition of captured enery rnttoricl. c. To collaborate other sorvices. with the Technical Intelligonco sections of

d. To ruvievu and issue reports on captured cnejy~ mtceriol, installations and procedures, and toforvard such information to their respective Chiefs of Service in -lashington, D. C. Service Technical Intellionce officers assigned werc:

Maj 3ohn A. Riddick ....... C'JS

Lt Ctl lfalter 13. Jones ..... CE Maj Steinberg ........... EI (appointed later, in April)

Maj ;Llan C. $ohnston .... ORD Maj l~rray Herman ....... E;M No service Intelligence officer for Sirial Corps

Administrative and fnnelysis Unit Originally, only the Ordnanc', (VIartcrraster and Sign-al sections operated analysis laboratories undeor the Chief of the Intelligeonce Section of the service concerned. Choreical '!arfaro Service contimnueod to have its anurlysis ?ork c'-rried on at the 42d Chemicol or Victoria Mnitions Supply Laboaratoics, and Engineecr and Medical. Corps had no toans in the field until the Hollandia operation in .,pril 1944. Laboratories for all the services were ostablishod after that.

15

HISTORY OF TECHNICL INTELIGENCE All Technical Intellieence sections, however, mnintrined administrative divisions, which vithin the scope of their activities: a. Advised the Chief of Service on Intelligence rsmtters. b. Coordinated and supervised Intelligonce activities, c. Planned, supervised, and correlated Intelligence ing activitles . train-

d. Establ. shed and mnintained Intellig-ence liaison, and collaboro tcd rwc;t, tl;[t Technical Tntelligence sections of other arm and servslces a_,. ;.llied Forces within the Theater. e. Maintai ned ,dc-quite liaison -lth the Intelligence Office of the Chief of Service. Division,

f. Interpreted, evaluated and dissoAinatod Intellitence information as prescribed. g. Carried on adeQuate and nrcessay docunment research. storage

h. Supervised the collection, recording,, processing, and disposition of captured enemy materiel. i. enemg Obtained data on operational nEnteriel.

cxrfoaince of captured

j. Maintained a filo of all reports -nd do ta available on Technical Intelligenceo k. Reviewed and issued reports on elptured enaem installations, procedure, etc. rvateriel,

1. Lrranged for the shipmernt of selected items of captured enenr materiel, to the TJUnited States for training and other purposes, as required. m. Kept current, and subrittcd invontorios of captuxed enemy equiprut available to the service in the Ca-,tured Enemy Equipment Depot or service laboratories, or en rcuts to that depot, or in the advanced arenas

16

HISTORY OF TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE n. Proparcd prclirminary training mwnuals on tho use c captured cnemy cquipmnnt, installations, ctc., and assisted in plannfnx a training progrm for United States personnel. o. Prepared rcparts of activities of the Section. Field Tcams Field Tcaxs of each Technical Intelligence Section, -ithin the scope of their activities:
ta

Collected a:ld fcrwordcd technical combat infcrration

through G-2 of the trak force.

b. .rranred for the collection and forwarding of captured enemy equipment to the Scrvice Chief for further analysis or to the Captured Enormy Equipmont Depot for shipment to the United Statos, c, Assistod and advised G-2 and the appropriate service officer of the task force on all mattors of Technical Intelligonce. d. Invostigated reports of the uao of noCr mthods, weapons, or tactics, and submitted reports thereon through G-2 of the task forcec c. Mado preliminary examination of and report on onc.y equipmcnt captured by the task force. f. Cooperated with Technical Intelligence services and Allied forces. personnel of other

g. ;4ssisted in interrogation of prisoners of vrar when requested to do so. h. Collected informtion regarding enemy installations, and prepared reports thereon for forPrrding. i. JIranacd for the salvage of bulk supplies and materiol.

Submittod reports on captured cnry rm.tcriol for:7Tded to the Gaptured Enolmy Equipmcnt Depot. k. Maintained current inventories of captured onawr Matcriel.

3:.

17

HISTORY aF TECHNICiL IMNELLIGENCE Captured Enornr Equipmnt Deopot (W Intollipenco Section) The Captured EnonWr Equipment Depot, vrhich operated directly under the supervision of the Chief Qiartornastor Intclligence soction: a. Received, classified and maintained stock record accounts on all captured enany oquiprment formnrdod to the Depot. b. Dclivcrcd selected itcms of captured cncay equipment to the appropriats scrvic or force upon authority received from the dillicd Captul~d Enir-y Equipnont Board. c. Packed anJd 'hippod to the United States selected items of captured cnemy ou.";prlcnt, as directed. d. Propczod and kept current an inventory of captured enery oquipr.cnt and a record of the source and distribution of those items to be forwarded throuCh channels at the proper tirnc. c. Propecod a :inthly report containirr a list of captured oncry cquipment forwarded to the United States during the month. f. Returned or forwardod to individuals for souvoniring such items as vwcro released on the certificate of the AC of S, G-2, US4SOS, or other authorized agencies. Early ldministration by the 5250th Tech. Tntell Co=. Go
D :; -)

Lt Orric P. Sell, Jr. was relieved of duty .s Conmnding Officer of the Depot and as a rnnbcr of the Jldliod Enemy Equipment Board when the 5250th was formed and was replaced by Major M}.rray Hoerman, ctC. On 19 February 1944, a directive -.rs received by Hoadquortcrs, USASOS, from the Cor.ianding General, USLFFE, to the effect that photographs, prints, rubbings and dratrings of all nerloplatcs or namrplato data froa all captured cnemy equipment would be forwarded to that headquarters. The collection of nomoplates and rubbings bocamn one of the main mi~sions of Technical Intelligence personnel. They were to send in litcrally thousands of those items during the coning mrnths ofthe w-ar, and from information based on their translation (na.mes, dates, etc.) Japn oso ranufacturors of vwar nmtcriol were identified and located -- information that vas important in determining air raid targots and in studying the cnoer's economic status. 18

HISTORY OF TECHNICMJL INTELLIGENCE

Greater emphasis' was also placed on analysis of captured equipment as an additional factor for the determination of the enemy's economic position. Sound deductions as to the state of enemy resources for war could be based on ovidence obtained from a laboratory analyses of captured materiel. Technical reports included, when possible, conclusions, positive or negative, as to the enery's economic status. These conclusions were based on a comparison of material and workmanship of recently and previously captured equipment. 'hen such changes were noted, these items wiere returned to the United States for furiysis. ther laboratory ana In February 1C7'I i. fajor Johnston, accompanied by one officer from each of the o+;!:r six services and 1st Lt Jarios E. Shelby, QMC, proceeded to adw.nced areas to inform base sections and army troops that as each of the six services were interested in materiel, all captured Japslese equipment 'ras desired and should be forwarded. At the same time he informed personnel of the modification of the regulation that facilitated legitimate souveniring. (It was hoped that this would encourage troops to turn in captured equipment, thou,-h it turned out that it had little effect on the vrillful looting and destruction of enemy dumps.) Major Johnston also informed for-ard echelons of the proccedure necessary for shipment of captured materiel. Captain Madiganr having returned from field detail in the Nassau Bay, Lae and Finschhafen areas, had departed on 17 Novembor 1943 for temporary duty to the Office of-the Chief of Ordnance, ;Cashington, D. C. This was in conformi-ty with lar Department policy of having personnel of Technical Intelligence teoams on temporary duty from the WJar Depart-ment return period'ically for consultation. He was gone until 30 tMarch 1944 when he returned to report that great interest had been aroused in the .rMy Service Forces, iJashington, D. C. in Technical Intclligonce and that numerous conferences concerning the enemy materiel situation were hold. At the same time Captain Madigan left for 'ashington, permission was requested from the Chief of Ordnance to have Captain Edward I. Creed, who rwas assigned to Ordnance Intelligence activities in the Alaskan area, sent to the Southwest Pacific for duty with Ordnance Intelligence. On 15 December 1943 Headquarters Ordnance Intelligence Section was notified that Captain Creed would proceed to U.ashington for six weeks temporary duty and then would be sent to this Theater.

19

HISTORY OF TECEH2ICAiL INTELLIGENJG

Saidor: 2 Jan 1944 -10 Feb 1941

In December 1943 a request had been sent to G-2, USAFvE, to arrange with Sixth iLr.yr to have ra combined Technical Intelligence Field Unit p'rticipatc in the Cape Gloucester operation. Howeverr, after receiving permission from Sixth :Army, the unit upon arrival at Finschhafen was not allo-,ed to go forvrard. An officer and two onl.istcd men, howrever, did secure peomission to go on the Salidor (11hap Incl 1) ooen..ation 2 Janur7y 1944, thou.h the owmbincd unit .irnn and Cpl reveridge, wiho had l_,2 Bishop, T/4 ,-*as not ur-d, operated as an Ordnaa-.c Intellirrence Tce m with the 32d Divid on prticipated on this and r.inor operations 19:.';, since 20 eto>;w' up the 11evr G:.i.nea cc, t (MI;hap Incl 1). Fr.m informa tion secured, booklet as an .nmplificntion of the Allied r the tcamji Drjcp dc a ;.-,. .c'qartc.-, paurphlet on Jap-ancse oquipDcnt. Land FGrcs HTI They also assisted in the staging; programn of the 32d Division on Goodenough Island, instructing the troops on booby traps and It .:"sfound .more and moro that such enemy Ordn-nco raltoriel. training of combat troops in use of Japancse wcapons, especially task small arms and machine guns, was of considerable value to thk for co. The teanm emainad dt Saidor until March 1944, .?hen th-y.,were relieved. Lt Bishop and T/4 .Jinn '-iere then attached to the 41st Inf antry Division for the Hollandia operation.

Admiralty Islands:

29 Feb 1944 --

18 Mnay 19,44

The invasion of the Admiralty Islands (Maps Incls 1 and 11) specifically IAbmcte aiirstrip on Los Negros, was begun 29 February 1944, when the enemy v,rcs caught com-pletely off guard in a surprise landinEg. The campaign naried the final stage in the great swinging moverent, pivoting on T!evw Guinrea, :-hich had been the basic plan of operations in the Southeest Facific. Abn of the First Cavalry Division landed on Ma.lnus Island about one and a half miles northwcest of Lorongau, (MaI.p Incl 11) on 15 They wvere covered by artillery fire from small neighboring March, islands seized the day before, and 'were supported by destroyers, Brushing aside the initial light P. T. boats and air bombardment.

opposition, the force divided., one group heading tovrard the airstrip, the other branching ctff to the south.

20

HISTORY OF TECHNIC.L INI'ELLIGENCE '.7ithin three days after their landinc; on Mnnus Island tUnited States CnvalryTmn c'rpturod Lornr;au airstrip, innd on 18 March they stormied their way into Lorengau towm. They then h-ad occupied all vital areas in the .Admiralty Islands. The chief prize of the Admiralty victory vrs Sea Eagle Harbor, (Map Incl 11) which had 55 miles of protected waterway formd by a l.agoon of soveral islands and reoofs. It and the two strategic airstrips at I, rong:au on Manus Island and bMor.ote on Los Negros, fonrcd a pote:.'.l. bacso for intonsive opcr-?tions a.inst the remaininr eneomy stron<,iclds in Now Britain and Ioe-w Ireland (Map Incl 1).
omned in Novemrber 19431, and attempted for ALS crti.-gjI?-ly Tcc:;.lcal Intelligence field operations rere to Cap* G:Loucostcl-c. be baseod on the principle of assigning a field unit composed of one off icor .nd tuwo enlisted men each to a Counter Intelligence team for each task force. This provided for collection and investig-ltion of enemy materiel .t the e-rliest possible morment after combat operations.
.

In accordance with this plan it was decided that a canmbircd Ordnance and Chemical ,.arfare Service unit should accompany the 1st Cavalry Division in t1h .dmiraltios c>:zpaign. (The other four services did not have trained personnel available for field operations until the Hollandia operation in ipril 1944). A Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) officer was to be in charge of the unit and consolidated reports w;ere to be forwarded covering Counter Intelligence, Ordnance, Chemical 7iarfaro Service, and Naval Mobile Explosive Investigation Uhnit (IEIU) No. 1 activitios. Captured documents were to be forwtrded to AlliTd Translator and Interpreter Section. The CIC team consisted of one officer, 1st Lt Harold F, Frederick,, and eight enlisted mon. Tochnical Intelligence personnel consisted of one officer, Lt Cameron, and tTro enlisted men, 3/Sgt Loveless and Sgt Lischalk, of the Ordnanco Section; one officor, Lt Henry, and two enlisted men, Ffc Gaddo and Pvt Street, of the Chemical ,.'arfare Intclligence Section. iLlso as part of the unit w-ere one Naval officer, Lt Bushnell, :nd one enlisted ;man from MEIU No. 1. The group was organized and 3FFE, before being sent to join the 1st fully equipped by G-2, US. Cavalry Division. Lt Frederick was placed in cornmtnd of all personncl, including Tcchnico-l Intelligence. They functioned as a unit with success durinC the entire lxmirlty Islands campaign.

21

HISTCRY OF TIEHICAL PITELLIGEICE

Lt Frederick and 3)rt ixrrnI orson (CTC), Lt Bushnell, TEIFJ (Tavy), and Lt 'icn:...C .) )nd d r;t L1-chrlk1 (C:Od) cornmosed' the first section of t-;e ur.it to ie:.rve for the cdm,2 ties. The:y -:re attached lra to the S-2 of the 12th CavyLir Rcri1m:5- tvo o2-: 'any the.. to Los Ne;ros -vher' t.y ,r:..to r ofrce tic 5tthn C-avaIry Regir.nt, then in comb:-t. Th departre ,;as delay,,ed for t',o days and during, this ti.me Lt Henry as:sistcd ir. pre'pr,-i CeogrI'phic survey of Los NeJiros to be used by thle c1sir,ltn T-he information thus obtained proved invaluubl;e ,n ia t.r patrols. Incl 1) The iroup departed frc.lm Care Sudest, JNew Guinea, (aT,lp so as tc arrive at Hy'ame `l.r'or, Los Nee;ros, (I-ap Tncl 11) on the 6th of P}.lrch, (D plus 6 .lthou:nh te crisis of the operation had l. passed, the nrea cca3red by thl;e troops yet very small. This cTas enabled the teamn to arrive at c.ptur.ad eq.ipient and n.teriel dumps before they ha-d been pilliracd nnd scuvenired .SLt Lischalk Joined the 1st Cva.lry Division he-.aqcur Iers at Sea BEogle Harbor. The top ranrkinr; officers of the Division were interested in Technical Intcllt:enc:l, were a.nxious that the te am should start inrL.di-ately, and sa;i to it that it v.as provided wJith necessary equ iprc n t. Durin:, subsequent action, ravteriel nd docunrents were received in great quantities, and cooperation frorm the line units and individual soldiers w.'as splenrlid. They Save information as to the location of dum.pk:s -and brought in quantities of rnteriel. The lectures and demonstrations to the troops on the value of enemrr equipment for Intellijsence purposes paid hig;h dividends. On 9 Iarch, Lt Camr.eron and Sgt Loveless arrived, A collection dump was orgr.nized and the first bulk shipment of caltured rnteriel twas shipped from Hyane Harbor. The remainder of the detach'nnt arrived 16 March. Pfc Gaddo was izmmediately utilized in. fotlo'ing the assault back of 1-pitalai dission (i.Tap Incl 11) -,here a Che.:mical dumrp h-ad been repcrted. Pvt Street wvas pt busy with photoiraphic -;ork for the detachment and the Division. G-2. Both men -were subsequently used on patrols, and continued -rith this until the end cf the c:r:'paign. The dumps located consisted of -.-e.pons, aumnunition, quartermaster items, and .edical supplies of all kirss. Many stall dumps -,ere loc"-.ted a few yards off t'le trail, protected and canouflar;ed by canvas, -,rass, or ,.tai roofinZ, BE.ch dump was usually of one class of sullies such as clcthind.;, mdaical supplies or one type of ar-mmrnition. Chemical TJrf:re protection equipment and r.nitions were found in this sector. 22

FrISrORY OF TECHNICAL INTELIGENCE .1l the documents and equipment were assembled but no atteript was made to sort the materiel in respect to services until it had reached the collecting area. In this connection, transportation viwas the critical factor. Not only -,-as land transportation needed, but due to the insular nature of the campaign, water transportation also had to be available. The problem w.as nt by utilizing the trucks haliling supplies. dhen empty and ready to go back to the beachhead, captured equipment mas loaded aboard and was taken as far as the beach. BY the same procedure with the landing craft, the materiel vwas eventually returned to headquarters. This method of back loadirg for

bulk shipments, though effective, was slovw,. and caused considerable loss of time. Shipping back to the Depot at Brisbane offered little trcuble, since, with the exception of the first difficulty,
rush shipments were made by back-loading aircraft.

Photographs Y-ere taken, developed and printed of all new

typescdffqqapmrent, fortifications, and operations in so far as

possible. It was found that due to the heat and lack of proper washing facilities for the negatives and prints, photographic work-was difficult under field conditions. Ltter it was found
advantageous to wait and send exposed film to photographic lab-

oratories for developing and printing.

This arms the first campaign in which the various services were coordinated, and it confirrmed the fact that by combining their efforts they could cover more territory in less time. Only Chemical CJarf are Service and Ordnance pooled their work for this operation but their success substantiated the decision to combine all six services for the Hollandia operations By May 1944 all important areas in the Admiralty Islands had been searched and all materiel of value had been collected and shipped. The Unit had completed its mission and the personnel returned to their various organizations.

23

HISTORY OF TECHNICAL INTEULIGENCE

C Ei P T E R

III

HOLLY"DI'

April 1944 -- July 1944

To trap the 18th Japanese LArmy dispersed along the coast of Newr Guinea and to capture suitable air bases for the future offensive ag:ainst the Philippines, the Allies hurdled the stretch of northern New Guinea coast from Saidor to Hollandia. The map of Ne-7 Guinea had sugg-ested the five hundred mile hop, The Japanese response to our feints at \7Jevak and rMadang, (Map. Incl l) 205 and 385 miles bclowr Hollandia, had invited it.

It vwas a big step, and plans were laid to use the great est
force yet assembled in the Southwest Pacific -- two United States Army divisions -- to be involved in a single operation. It vras

furthtrmiore, the first all-.hoDric^an show in the Pacific. Staging, for the Hollandia Operation Technical Intelligence was to give complete coverage of
this operation, for it was knovm that Hollandia (ahp Incl 12)

was one of the important Japanese supply installations for

Southeastern Now Guinea and New Britain defensive areas. Indicative of the fact that Technical Intelligence vas still in

a fornmativa stage, organizationally speaking, were the various modes of operation used. Three teams and one composite unit
revere to go in.during the initial stages of the battle -- one team operating free lance, one team in a combined detaclhm.ent

patterned after that used for the ,.dmiralties campaign, and one composite unit representing all six services, This last, the Composite Technical Intelligence Unit, was an innovation, that laid the basis for organization of Technical Intelligence teams for the balance of the JaT anese war.
CI'S Teem No. 2 (Lt Bond and T/5 Going) and the Ordnance Technical Intelligence Team composed of Lt Bishop and Cpl Winn were both attached to the 41st Division9 but were in no combined

HISTORY C'F TC!-TIICI.L IiTELLIGEITCE tecam durinE; this operation. The C.'S Teram had not been in ,n oper?.tion since Sal aua, but the Ordnance team had becen replaced c from duty w7ith the 32d Division ,?fter the close of the Saidor operation, just in tir.: to join the 41st Division at Finschhafen in March to stad:e for Hollandia. Chemical 'Jarfare Service Ter. NTo. 6 and a MTobile Explosives Investigation Unit, w;ere attached to Combat Te-n B of the Countor IntelliGence Corps in a combined dota.chrnnt similar to th-t used in the iZdr.iralties. The group .ras attached to the Office of the .AC of S, G-2, 24th Infantry Division. C'JS Teatn No. 6 colmposed of 2d Lt Allen 'J. rhillips, ind Dvt John TIruFer, who had been cdded to the original CT.S Technic'l Intolligence personnel, -;rcnt into staj;ing early in January for this operation, The st-.;inr area, on GoodenouL;h Island, forward echelon of the 24th Infantry Division Tnas Ne-- Guinea, Here, the teanm assisted in the tr-inin-r pror;ra,, presentindg lectures on Technical Intellioenco to all units in the Division that missed it on the mainland. This lecture series vas crordinated with the CIC trainincg ro[iracrm. .hile in the staging area, a plan for establishment of a division:.l captured onemy equipment depot wrs subllitted to the G-2 of the Division. This ;is a ccepted and a mneo w;as sent to all units, outlining; channels for forwTa.rding captured encmy cquipment to this ccntra.l collection point,

First Corm.osito Unit is Forlmed for HDollandia Onceration Mtjor Riddick, C.;S, MI4ajor Talcott 'ainwriight,, E, (new with 5250th), I.ajor Madigan, Ord (wvho ha:d becn recently promoted), and Lt. Rowe, Sigrnal, arrived at Finschhafen from Brisbane 13 A.pril to start things rolling for st:a.-ing Tochnical Intclligence Unit No. 1 for H:ollandia. During that -eck the following personncl arrived at Finschh-.fen to join the unit: 1st Lt Bob C. .7oodson, Transportation Corps; Capt JilliarI . L:albcrt and fourteen enlisted menon fromr the 234th Quarterm.aster Salvaw.e CollectinE; Company -- these men were not Technical Intelligence personnel but wcre to acco.mny the Unit on the operation; and Lt Bartry from 'CTSTeam No. 1, who -ras hospitalized as soon as he arrived -- he recovered just in time to acCompany the Unit on the 0por:ation.

25

HIST(ORY OF TECthrICAL rIINThLIGENTCE On 22 Aipril 1944, four officers recently attached to the Pacific theater from th Ililitary Intelligence Training Center at CarP Ritchie, I1aryland, arrivecd: Captain Eugene H. Manley, CE, and 2d Lt I-hilip N. Van Slyck, Ord, vho were trained for Com:Lbat Inteli e;nce; 1st Lt Guy N. Birleffi, Ord, and 2d Lt Jerry ii. Ricci, (r.C, who were trained in; interrogation; of prisoners of n;ar, The last one to join the Unit 1st Lt ?.s Ed;ward S. Peck, CE, -Iho arrived 23 A.pril. Durin, the stagin:; period,, the follo:-iAn supplies typical of those t?.ken into the field by Technical Intelligence teans wore dran;: Jungle clothing., field equirpment, office supplies, Ordnance,, a'uanition, wrappin; rmaterials. Trinining was given to unit ror.lbers on identification of ap-.neso rr.teriel, especially Ordn.nce and Che:ical .7arfare Service, -rith rMajor Riddick initiatiIv; the instruction and Izajor Ma.rdigan roview-ing and am)lif yin:; the information on Ordnance. I.jjor 7ainwright discussed tropical diseases, health and s nitation in the jungle, with emphasis on prevention of zalaria and typhus. The day that Capt ilrnley and his group arrived, personnel were infozrced of the task force objective and -,reo shovm landing points and probable locations of enemy troops and du ;is, The following day Col Sauve' arrivod from Brisbane to discuss premovement platms.. The unit was not to go in on the oporntion until D plus 8. (30 April). On 25 April at 2000 they were alerted. After a 24 ton truck, tvwo jeeps and two ' ton trcilors in a pouring rain, the unit had to scour the base for a dispersinr gas dump, and reached lembarkation beach at 0200. Unable to secure permission to board, they slept in their vrehicles the rest of the night. The folloinz,, day, loadin,n ?Las a-;ain hold up and the group returned to their o-,.-, area to await devClopment. Finally, at about 1700 hours on 27 ;April, everyone except Lt Ricci, wtho was to telce over ?dministraition of the United States .rrzvr Technical Intelli,;cnce Depot that 7was to be sot up at Finsclhhafen, 1vts &.br.:. i and --g;l, "h0ro werCe ssinCod as Depot personrcl., and Lt Firleffi, :who w;as left as the rear echelon for the Unit to hLiring up vehicles and pIersonal baggage later, boarded an LN and proceded in convoy toward Hollandia, arrivirk: on D plus 8.

26

HISTORY OF TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE

Operations at Hollandia Coverin; ?. front of about 120 lmiles. ground troops hit the beaches at; .itapo. Hollandi'i and T^nahmhrah By, ({Iap Incl 12) on 22 ipri1.. 1 Corps directod operations .:ith a co-bined Task Force consistinr, of the 41st Infantry Division, landing at Humboldt Bay, (MIa?.p Incl 12) and the 24th Infantry Division, landing at Tanah;lcr?.h .ayQ Sirultaiieously, 120 :riles southeast, a sep-aratu Task Force, the 163d Regiiiental Comabat Team (part of the 41st Infantry Division)> landed at A;itape. The Hollandia, Humrboldt Bay and ThanibTerah Bay areas were pri:;1rily supply insto.lltions and v:;ere lackin-, in anti-invasion and costal defense positions, The areas did have, horrever, antiaircraft gun batteries mnd elaborate air rqid shelters typical of Japanese forriard area bases. H hour t'as schedule d for 0700. The naval bombardment beEan at 0600 hours and uwas lifted shortly before. the first walve hit the beaches. No -oposition-r.s lnet in any sector and the only fire received came from smr.rll caliber reapons wThich were quickly silenced by destroyers standing off shore. It Vas a quick and decisive illied. victory. The primary objective had boon the seizure of the Cyclops, Sentani and Hollandia airdror.es, ( Incl Ianp 13) and by the 24th Jspril, little mlore than two days -:fter the initial landincs, infantrymen had captured all three ,irdror-.es and w.ere scouring the hills north of Lake Sentani (EMp Incl 13) for si-,ns of the retreating enemy. Lt Bishop and Cpl :'irnn lended on D Day at Hunboldt Bay, lihite Beach l, with the assault troops of the 41st Division. There :-ere many lrF;e durlip areas alon; the shore and -. tempcrary captured equipment duip w;as set up on the' beach. The team bivouaced -. ith the 741st Ordnance Conmpany that first night just off ,hito Beach 1, Thc second day was spent in reconnaisance cf the area to-;mrd the to-n of Iiollandia, Considerable materiel was recovered both in the open and also stored in caves along the sides of the hills Howevcer, the ditance wrs too groet and no mraterioel .as evacuated to the durmp on this da^y. The team returned to the original bivouac area that night, and on that ni;ht -- D plus one -- a single Jap bomber dropped three. bombs into the area. Two of the bombs landed in the middle of the azaunition and gasolinQ that had been unloaded on the beach. Api:-roxirtely 53,000,000 worth of supplies were blown up that

27

HISTORY OF TECTI

ITNELLIGENCE TUC.'L

niiht, One-tenth of a second lter they would have missed the supply dumnp, for the third bom-.b landed on top of the cliff beyond the beach and did little dar ge. Dormn the beach everyone dove for ca'ves. Burning gasoline and oil spread to the anr.unition, fires burned furiously, .and armunition .7as detonating all throuwh the night., The explosionswrer terrific. Not r.ny slept that night, Follow.ing the destruction of the food supply, rations were cut one-third, later to one meeal a day. The Task Force at Hollandia was 500 miles deep into enermy country, the Jpanese held the coast and supplies 7ere going fast. On D plus three, Lt Bishop and Cpl irnnm.oved to Fim Jotty wheru the 186th Infantry ;zs proceeding tow.ard the three airdroses. This area was selected because the road Jwas open through to the drolc s and the dangier of troops movinL in and souveniring before Technical IntclliEence could recover the ma-triel -was great, whcre.as the H-ol.3nMdia area itself could only be reached by barge. It -was felt that the materiel in Hollandia would be safe from souveniring till the teamL could get at it in the future. .is it worked out, they wore even then lte in getting: along the Pim Jetty motor track as all the durmps had' been talmpered with and nearly all the boxes opened a.nd the contents scattered. Due to road conditions, only an inspection trip 7-ras made by the tea-ls into the airdrome area. Outside of the anti-aircraft gons at the strips, most of theo matcriel a?,s of .,ir Ccrps origin. There -were a gro-t ,a:ny wrecked airplanes on the strips indicating the thoroughnoss of the pre-invasion bombing. Along the road the fuel dumprs had been set on fire by strafingr attacks as shcrn by spent United [Sta.tes 50 caliber mchine ,un bullets. If ter this area was covered the tea:1 moved to the toven of Hollandia wrhcre the 162d Infantry .,s locatcd. On D plus 8, lv/jor RMIAdigan arrived v-ith the Technical Intelligence Composite TJnit No. 1 and a11 Ordnance activities were placed under his supervision. By the time CGJ.S Teami No. 6 tomether writh the MIIU and the CIC Team, arrived on Red Peach 2, cf Tanahmcrah Bay w.ith oler.mnts of the 24th Infantry Division several encmy outposts had been discovered in the beach area wihich avre evidence of hasty evacuation. Terrain difficulties betvween Red P3each 2 n.ld the advancing

28

HISTORY CF TECH1TICAL INTELLIGENCE infantry ,revcnted aldequrate spplies reaching them and nocessitated :novinc the Division Cor.rland Post to Red Bcch 1. This .ns accormplished on D rlus 1. On arrivinr.; at Red Beach 1, C.,;S Team No. 6 (Lt Ihilli-s 'n:'d Lvt 7rur;cr) fcound it i :racticdl to continue toward the air cro-.: -- a landsli<de had considerably increased the supply problem and the rains of the provious nir;hts hard mde move:mnt by truck imr:ossible. In the vicinity of Red Beach 1, several more outposts werC locsated and searched, resultinc; in the discovery of more equiplment. Shortly after the Hollanrdi drome had been taken, the first ene:ly supply dumps were loca-tcd approximatecly three rmiles northwest -f the drorm s. This was co-incidcnt with the apyearanoo Cf the first sermblance of a road seen so far, The ::ornin] of D plus 5, Lt Thillips and Ivt Kruc;:er acconpanie:l a patrol which contactcd a patrol fro,:-1 the 41st Infantry Division bet.iween Szntani and Holliandir aiir drems. xround midday C.GS Teari No. 6 net C.1S Tom-,1 I-o. 2 (Lt PConld and T/5 Goinc;) attached to the 41st Infantry Division ^nd learned that lcxro quantities of onemy equin1ment had been captured in the area. The fact that there a.-as no transaortaticn -available frorn the 24th Division an-' the appa-rent absence of Chemical equiprant in the Division's -.rc, prompted C;TS Team1 lo. 6 to join C.S3 Team No. 2 in order to evedite coveraLe c)f the large stcrraye areas captured in the 41st Division soctor. Durin,G_ the pcriod 28 ;,pril to 7 I-May, C S T-eam No. 6 workod continually -With CJS Team No. 2 in the 41st Division Sector. Contact wa.s -imaintained with the G-2, 24th Infrntry Division, but finally on 8 .Iay C,;S Teasm No. 6 reported back1 to the Comm..a-nd Post, By this tirme, Technical Intelligence Ccmposite Unit No. 1 had arrived in the operations area. to takce over the encmy equipment thus far collected. It -?was planned for this Coqmp.osite Unit to hnldle any Technical Intellicrence functions tha-t mii;ht arise in the future and for CIS Tcin \To. 6 to be made available for a future operation. On 9 Mly C'US Teamr No. 6 lcft Hollandia and reported back to Headquarters US~;OS. Tcchnical Intclli:-ence Co?:osite Unit No. 1 cmlc in on an LST on -.hito Poach 1, Humboldt- ay, Hollandia section, on D plus 8, the 30th of iiApril, The pcrsonnel assisted tho troops in discharrging cuaro, pending the arrival of labor troops. All stores were sta.cked on the beach twcnty-five yards off shore, for vrant of transportation to a safcr disposal area.

29

HISTORY OF TEC.THNIC.'L INfELLIGENCE

The. day they l.nded MIIjor Ridclick became ill and ;ras returned to Finchh.fcu I', ajor iJrn-.-riirht ,?.ssumr. coT.iand of the UIlit. .'lithout, :ro( er ordcrs .oq.tc quthoriZatJ. Onf 'b.e Onit 1n4 ran into tLie old, i'rro i.. of 2.etomirJili thcir s'atL.s anl n f.;;mulatinL; i.l;r~m foI cri1n. C sl1dedr. n Fi.s loS;, b y '';.; .ie ov, r .Jain';iris h ht's heTans t C i 'i; c _ f 1 r . i.'a 2-i b,:t lC ed qu-.rtcrs dv .Vncc.helo n an: o'esontc. :.es of 'eckless Task z Force so that the stazus of the Ujnit co-ld b~ establishedo A te.lor:.ry camp site for the UTnit ';' located on the beach s under a bluff occupi ed by a b'ttr3' of OI40 T' l A' stora.coe tent and jwuirle han.zocks wecre eroctud., but no attem!t ias rnde to set ' up i pei;rmnnnent c-mp site The first' tw;o ca?.ys, pereoruiel reconnoitered for Japanose dum;p.s onr the trail to Itln1.ndia to-rn. r.t ';.lite Perach 3 arnd on Jautef'f Py. Lt VT.n S3.yc, nid C, T. r'vs r-esesvod perml;si3 n il to ,;o to 7Sa-:rl1 ;:th o. iiLht machire ,un squad frorm the YettyJ 532.2 3Bo.t n.nd Shore Re i.ent reinferLcir: ; a riflj squad from the 24th InfYantry holdi nrg the jetty tand thei beach. Cil t.he excursion that took thenm into ',!ank Villa';c: sevcral hundrod enery dtumps of clothin[, ifood and r.ndical surplios were locatccd, 0 The secon1d niht, arounwd 2000 hours, t-7c Jrnese sinle cn.irne pll-nos car-L directly over thc beaech supliy .nd c..lp site area at -about 700 feet rand dropDed hijh explosives and anti-personnel bombs, t-.o of vihich strdr'led the camp rea , the rest landin>i on top of the bluff, -- ipiinf; out the .iA battery T-he number of killed and weoil.red from this bo'orin[; a.ttack exceeded that from the prQcviois one on D plus 1 -;hen so -1much deistructi1on ';:-sZ ca.used to the su-l:lies. Ho-i:over. no one in the UTait .,uffered injuriosO ,:Iuch of the Unit's clothing aind c;quirsmert ',ras blcw.7. up, For day3 after that they had nothi:;-, to ;ca.r exncpt -rlr'.t the. ;had on ' thoir !.ac,;k.,s or could salvpo frori Jl.a- dumps-. P.oea.'ti::er th_ food short'ac c-,u..ckd by the ori,-inal destLuction of the supply dump on D plus cno continued, is '.rrang;e'ments by 71ajor J.'Tin-rri Lht xwith G-4 of the Tsk Force the day bcfore the bo-,ubinfg the crp -;ras moved to Brixnkrm='s Pl1antati.o-Lo south':;est of 'ia etty-r on Jautef a 3ay. Lt D)ck modred oquil.-ert by LCV to the row cC1i. site hc -whic in th'C 7icinity of I Corps Si-;nal du.:i-nd ir.jor ',;aio,,.-- n smervised set tin, up the c amp -- t7wo tents for cuar.rters a.nd -r nlative buildingn for stora co lcated in a grassy area in a kapok grov.

3o0

HISTORY OF TECHNIC.iL INiTELLIGENCE That niht thoere as anothcr air raid alert. sig:htod, but no bomnbs wcre drop-ped.

rmloes wore

The next day thin,s -ot under r.ay: mj or Thain.rright procured authorizaticn from To sk Force G-2 fo: r.umembers of the Technical Intelligenc; Co:znosi-;e Unit to enter JTapanese duraps and remove equipment ^f IntclliLence value; tl?. jor M.adiLsan established liaison w.ith I Cor:s Ordna:'.co for assistance in recovcring equipr.ent and he also procured ad-itionanl space noer the cramp site as an Ordnance stor.gc. area; Lt Rowe established liaison :-ith I Corps Si,-;n.l Cf fice for assistance in collecting: Sigmanl equipmc nt . In the follow.inii; days I.Major '-Tninri;ht loc.ted l-rge MAdical durlis; Major l!6div;in took over lorge quantities of captured Ordnance which had been collected by corabat troops and toCgether with Lt Van Slyck and Cpl T.rvoes evacuated additional Japarese equipment. Lt Row.e loc--ted items of Sitgnal Intelligence value; Capt LaiLlbert broulaht in supplies of Tapaenese clothing and food. Lt anil Slyck, Lt '.foodson, and Lt Birleffi collected C:S.' materiel. Nearly all the items recovered in the Hollandia areas were in the oriLinal pa-cking and in fine sh.pe, as left by the Japanese. Hovwever, quantities of -nmateriel eore destroyod by United States 2krr souvenir hu.nters. Dtu:ps -ere ransacked, ca.ses opencd and tr.ny complete :r. ine shops were ruined by souvenir ch hunters picking them ipart. YTevertheless, tons of cnemy equipmcnt of -ll kinds were recovered by the tc.ats -- more than on any previous oel ration -- and ni.ch of this oquipmuenteas of hijeh Intel li ence value. ;mongr the other ca.ptured documents, a rather interesting Japanese propQtCandr a ?-agazin3 printed in Enrlish, Me4lay and ep a'nese, reportini, on the success of "Greater East A.sia Co-pros'pirity Sphre", vm-s turneod over by the UInit to the CIC for transl'.tion and. displosition by -ATIS. From time to time several ch.anges in assignment of personnel were made: Lt Van $lyck was appointed temporary troop co=r.ander; Lt Peck wv~as returned to Finschhafen and en route assisted in procurinrg rrwater transportation for thc Unit; Mlajor Ridclick 'who had recovered from his illness, Lt Birelffi and Tvt Ogle rejoined the Unit, having come up from Finschhafen on the Dutch ship, Towsscns w-'ith two w;capons carriers and a one-ton trailer; Itj or Riddick took over corm-_ndfrcz Major IlainvrriLht, who, having

31

HISTOR"Y OF TE.KICAkL INELLIGENCE secured five c.s.~s of Japanese Medical equipment .rith three samples of each item, terminated his detached service and flew to Brisbanc, .iustralila, with the oquirlaent to have it translated and analyzed and to report results of Mebdical Technical Intelligence to Col S&'1vc'; I-vt John Eucer,ne-.ll y ?ssiC;ncd to 5250th from C,JS section 41st Divisi on, joinod the Unit; T/5 Paul R. Goin; vwas released from the Unit to acomrpany Lt Pond, CO.7 Team No. 2, scrving ~with the 41st Division. Lt Ro:e left on temporary duty w'ith United $StatesF'orces at Diak, (Pklp Incl 12) to procure Sirnal Intelligcnee aatoriel in that -rca, his mission at Hollandia com,:pleted, he procured orders for himself from Sixth ,rxr,, sav! to it that all his cquipmcnt collected in the tollandia area w.s packed, crated and lbcolled, ready for shipim.nt, and rndc arranr;coernts with I Corps transportation for shipme.nt. On 20 May, G-2 US.S03 directed the followring. appointments: Major Madia. .................. Executive Ca~pt 1h-1anlcyo........ . ...... ..... Ld jutant
Capt Lambcrt... ........... Troop Conrtander

Lt

Van Slyck ....,....,.........froa

Cor nkndant

Lt B3irloffi.

......
........... *.

,.... Transportation Cfficr .

. .

Lt 3Joodson.. ..... . Caipt Lanmbcrt

......... , I

.. Mess Officer e.Dcpot Officer

Lt Van Slyck.....s..............SuDp;ly Officcr Lt Van Slyck ................... .ssistant Depot Officer

The Unit had the usual trouble with the misappropriation of property; the two ,rcapons carriers and the one-ton trailer, brought up from Finschhafen by Major Riddick and Lt Birlcffi was dischar:eod by mistake at ;Jhitc Bc1ach 1. -.)hn finally located by Lt Birloffi, one zeapons carrier had been taken over by a Signal unit and both truck and trailer had been looted. Report i-as rado first to Inspectinrg Gcneral, I Corps, then to Comn.andinc General, Base G. i c.aptured Ordnonce eguipmeont dui-.p set up by MAajor Madigan at Brinknian's ilanutaticn -;ith rntciriel cratcd ard stenciled for shipmcnt to the United States, .?as roa-oved -. rithout authority by 194th Ordnanco Battalion. Lotter reportinrg the incident vras sent to I Corps and la.ter to the Corranrdirnv Gonernl, Base G. Bcefore imAch improvoleont was ma.de in the sarea to better the helth and sa-nitation conditions, Kollandia tras infested with the Usual Juncle dises.sos. In the course of three rocks, nine enlisted mDen and ran officer from the 234th ciartcr.aastor Salvage Collecting Cormpany and the Tcchnical Intolligence Unit were hospitalized with Dencguo fevcr.

32

HISTORY OF TEC;i.TICAiL IT:L:TLIGE:TCE There fzorc, in addition, tw;o other c-.sualtics susta.ined by Unit m;emberrs: l-t ,t t hichest;cr wa.s lburrncd .rith c-rbolic acid while unlo-:dini- a truck and w-'as hospitalizedr ; arnd Carpt Lambert was hospita-lizccl for bone fractures and retur;ed to Finschhafon as the result of a,collision w-ith a 2-' ton ramp;hibious trud&. Tcrwrd the Cild of M.y the Unit moved to Kajoabi Delta., just evacuated by C Come any of the 842d .,Aviation Engineer B-attalion that w.as to be the site of the future Tochaical Intollirence Deot -.t ot ollndia. The area w=as high, -ravelly, h ded, hkad no undcrgrow7th, ha-d good dra.ina.ej and wc;-s anple for the Units requirer.mnt s, Here a display of cspturcd oneci equi;pront was set up for visiting officers in a wihite Japaneso tent and two pyra.midals. Shortly after the Unit had settled in their ncw -arca, a cloud burst filled and partially dad=r the arm of 1'ojcobi Delta and nearly flooded the U.it out. AOll h-ands .- orkod .t clearing i obstructions in the river bed and in da.-.-ing tho river banks. They savcd the area before any dmal;ae -. ars dcne. Engineetr Toam. Mo. 3, coI:manded by Capt Donald D. Connors, was the first Technical IntolliL;cnc Engincr np toamu in the field. It ;-as comnpiosed cof S/Sr;t Rijchrd T, -ith -nd T/4 Ro.ger Sherwocd ,ho w;re relieved froml Distribution Division at Intcrrmediate Section, USSCOS and wore sent to rnet Captain Connors, requisitioned from U$S.S03S EnCgineer a:t Hollandia on 5 June 1944., The team ins3lcted the dump areas in Hollandi?. but foound little one-y oquiprmnt. Hiarirng that quantities of cnmay Engineerintg oqui-ment especially certain mobile wvater purifying unita were being rocovered at Piak, the team departed a Jeck

later for that area, to inspect anl. inventory equipment in the Technical Intellioence Depot, On the scie day, Lt Sta'r;cr, Depot Officer ?.t Finschhcf en, arrived at Hollandia to clarify the stntus of equipment in the field depots thero and to reach an unclrstandin{% on its disposition, He took back with hi.: several items of J-panose equipz-nt
and uniforms for a display pirpose at the Finschh.afen Depot. The followin, dcy Capt Iahnlcy, who h:-d been appointed AssisOn 19 June Lt Birleffi ;ent on tenpor?7ry duty to Finschhafoe n

tant Coordinator of Technical Tntelligence in the Office of the IC* 3S G-2, U40SOS,, left by air for Brisbanc, fAustralia, Lt Van of Slyck .was .appointed A,djutant in his place and Lt Trier was appointcd IArea Comzan3der vice Lt Van Slyck.

HISTCIOR

CF T2CH-:ICILL IiTTLLLICi:CE

nho h,:d previously been rcquisitionpcrsonnel, The f1loriinrL: jcined the Unit 22 June: cd fro:-. the Chie-,f CheO:ic.l Officcr, -JuSASS, T/5 CT sp.re T.Wtnc:i.rcin~ C..;S 1st Lt Otis >I. Trir Yfc :ar G. ITilligan Cd; 2- Lt Victor Dcl CGucrcio, C:.7S Ivt Ed-r'rd T. Ilc'lcrry Crl Nlthmn H. Llrsor $hc'r:an (appcintcca Unit Clerk) T/4 Robcrt J, Toward the on-. of Juno thoro ;.s increased ncemy activity cand thouch no one in the Co:positc Unit r;as inin the vicinity, al1l corsonncl wero directed to be ar-cnd -:hn leavin; the jurc-, ca. ar

there ts some question pertainir.- to the efficiency of the unit in crforring its nission.
ocauso the unit v-as ocratin; inf-rmally, On 7 July Lt i'i'rco Butler III, CE arrived and was appointed the Dopot Co-:rancder vi.co Can)t Lrbert relicved, on 10 J.uly arnd 11 July the follo-rinj; personnel arrived and '-cre attached tc the Depot:

C. lst Lt Louis Iiccny 2d Lt Lam:-nce R. Smitl EMI/j;t E cnjai;.n Eeckl-cr T/St Hobert L. Jackson '1/3 Ka.rolU J. xrro T/3 lirchio I. Dcaniel T/3 John L. .lillard T/4 Th/-:as E. Green n. 'i.lbeck Ko-;rd T/l4 T/4 J!nmes J .. cExvoYy T/5 Charles T. Test T/5 T/ T/5 T/5 T/5 efc Tfc Ifc rfc tvt John 7. 'Tr.;o Thnomas T. Irony Gecreo Grirrcs Glcn ,. Clcsno C-rl H. Johnson Gcorge R. HlazrlinGl Rallph F. Rolott Louias C. Gorzesak Theoolhilis G. HagCGis Tlathanii C. Buccklcy

CRD

Ifc ilbcrt L. M.lorath

Ifc Robert M1I. Do Friotas AibLout the sam

P-vt i'Tick

. 'Vannlulcci

Ivt Richarrd E. Reynolds

time :la jor Ridrfick -as relieved for another

assigrLze.nt and ~,tjor

assumed command of the Unit and 6eneral ,hdif.an

supervision of the Depot,

34

HISTORY COF TCHI:IC*L, IEZLLIGEDNCE

on, Coordin.tor cf Technical The fcllowinr; clty MIjor Joh:ns t Intelli.eLnce U3ASO03, arrived to surveyr the --ork that hadi booen by the Unit anld to adlvise the ircrsormul thot capaccom1plishcl nase G ae F., and tureCd mntoriel r ud.& larTel.y be ship>ped fro:i; l.a jor That daty dopot. ly a tratnsshipr'rnt would bc i:rimcic.il Madi:an, !iAjor Shull, Mhjor Johnston, Lt Fhrlr.hy arn Lt Butler confcrrcd -!.ith Gencral Ycrer on the clispositicn of the Unit, norw that most of the enemy equipment in the area had becn rocOVvc red. M.agjr Madi;an ha-in,: completcd his ilission, returned to Brisbane for conference with the Chiof Orc'nance Cfficor, US*;SOS. On

9 October he reported to Dase F to assulme charg:e of the Ordnance %n alysis Section of the Tccbhlical Intelligonceoepot,

335

Iii3TOCY OF T7CHIC
C :_ ii P T

L IITT-i-LI lTr'TC2

1R

IV

RYI i:.

mC: CR OiAI.

.'Qi.ii

!L,!,-

October 1Q4 4

th',e .:ar mo77ed fori'ard it gPainred mo7-entum_. nrld scopo. The omcninE, of the .Jldhiralt,- Islan.ds ca-apaifn .n 'ebruary 1544 strc-t;:3e the lines of conir, unichtion w-ith heoui.quarters at Brisbane to 2,000 miles -- a longe ways by convey. For Technical Intellicence, the rapidity of collection and processing of captumred enermy Nateriel and disse-rination of information is one of' the prime missions. iThe United States Captured Snei.y Equipm.nent Depot at 2risbar.e as dropping, too far behind the front lines,
&is

The Technical IntelliL:ence Depot Is

Toved to Finschhafen

In accordance .ith letLer GSB 323.3 Headquarters USA30S, 25 Ilarch 1944 and letter F22B 386-.3 leadquarters US1iTE, 28 lihrch 1944, authority -was grranted to establish the United States .rr.my Technical Intelligen ce Depot at Firnschhafen, effective 20 4;pril 1944. wa-i.rehouse turned over by the base Chemical 'T.rf are 3ervice ':ras conlverted for u.se as the Depot bu.ilding. -. alls for the buildin., were constructed .nd it iwas mlcade rain and burglarproof, Lt Rlcci, who hVa.d been left in charge of tnhe Depot when the Coomosiite .Jnit sta[ed 'or TIcll-adie in Ipril was relieved of duty 1wi-th thie 5250th Technical Intellirence Company shortly af'ter;,erds and 1st Lt 2dw;ard R. 3tan;iler, .ACD, was appointed Depot Cfficer.. During .Tuly and Ai1ust the analysis laboratories of the Technical IntellifL.ence sections vwere moved from nBrisbane to Finsc1,hafen. .,t first, the suctions utilized the facilities of the base for their ainalysis laboratories, and for quarters for their personnel. This cor.liinirng of the analysis sections

36

HISTORY OF TCHNiIC4'L IPiTLLLIGENCE vith the receiving and shippir., Depot -- both at the main Depot at Finschhafen and the temporary fielrd depot at Hiollandia -- was a new and more efficient set-! . It cent:-alized control eliminated certain phases of dxlj lic -te administra tion. and handling of equipalent and personnel and iwa3 conducive to gtreater collaboration amonrg the services. Lt .lcide Santilli, SC, operated the S3inal analysis laboratory at ?risbane until the end of I.Tay, when he departed for Finschhafen to make arraniLnme;nts for the chan-.e in location of the a-alysis la' oratory aund to di.pose of ca-ptIured equip-ment that '-had accum.llated t;here. T/')i Plackledge and Tj5 Traub, who had a;cked soime 2,00C p ulnrds of organJ za.tion i-.:' dil;Iernte for th-e -:ove from Bris3bne to Finschh'afen, worked overti:_e -. ith 7 other depot personnel at Finschhalfn to expedite the ship.ent of captured ene: y equip:;nt that h .d stocked up there from the Trollandia, Biak, ,r ara kde, ke,nd -3Jarmi operations,
It was 1-lJanned that the United States .Jrrly T'echnical Intelligence Depot wvould not only be a center for the anualysis and shiperent of captured materiel bt also thle location for a training school for orientatioen of nefJ personnel assigned to Technical Intelli!~ence duties. lrong the first to receive this instruction .rere 1st Lt Jack 7. D)anielo and 2d Lt /acob Overholt, assigned to the 52C5th in June and se-nt f'or.-vard to the Derpot at Base F shortly afterwards to be briefed by Lt Santilli in methods of coiloctinr and evatluating senemy. Si;nal : lateriel on operations w;ith field teans. Briefing included stuldy of technical data and identification photographs, vith emihasis laid on correct m-nethod of reportinu;, particularly in the matter of supllyinr complette information on thle plce and circumstance of recovering equiprment,

Lt Col .'illiara Ait, Bexrc;in, Sig-nal Corps, rmade a special trip to lMelbourne to contact the Mh.sster Gereral of Crdnance, Australian. 'rr.y, in regard to secu.rin s3armples of captured Japanese Signal Corps equip:ent rwhich had been r-aported in the Alustralian depot there. General Brehon Somervell, Comranalding General Army Service Forces, h.ad offered the icl'rvices of .rmy Service Forces enewy equipm.ent specialists to the Pacific The ater earlier in the year, and had received iLmiodiate concurrence that they -;7ere desired. In p,.arch, General Somervell -rote a letter (Incl 14) that clearly established the status of Techniical Intelligence specialists on temporary duty to the theater, and re-emphasized the inmportance of Technical Intelligence in the rwar effort. This personnel was delayed in arriving until the sun,rer of 1944.

37

T.:STORY OF TECi2TIC;

L II.TELLGENCE

rin

t'1 t

011r

of 19..).
_'

di-:f .. ,- n .itioi rd d'rltr'L -',,- ........ .... ; O'''li--./lfD,.'i, 7 .--. HTl'o1ilerdi? :3pe'"r..:;:.2, r:',....':'e-1 :'-riT;tt. rCoort on the analysis of SO' ' r ;1 ' j ' e tce the repor t '.T1 .ic. _-'t ..... !. ^, 1booklet hke was 7t',:_ 1'i" ..< -... "":oi., Ib:t it ,'?s th.mt (desiralr1c to pub1is i i.i oi.cSiatl, o r d iseinai3,Irte it h nf'o-ation to
t~~e X e. wo i L
1

pllaccd -t.... o1..

cOi.rleirrI.,11e eelpho.sis was .tioi ,pertaininr; to caproturned fromr the ?,0-.'-i lh -. i "4t1 ,' ' t et1~{d fr h

c;.rC-

(' - - -I , ,

4.1

t:,.ou:ti. co

.i.-

ais nd 1,
-

tr.' ,li
T

+ . 1

r .,_'o'1 .o r u..
....' ..... . r;C_. 11.:'hr
,'" .

n....-s.

to t c ic l field dr.'s nid;'%ify;i',"nMedicines. and

rsu1t of . trip

-= lore ' .s

: U!:o-niO. J_ C rts, t oi * r1 .di i .y to bri.! ... a e'"" <>.ider .':l_ ,:'i:.vy t ty cf :.;l ?izu'?,:~ ~ hdm l :ma.t~rio.ceqt . rr. o o ba-c7; u:; c~ '-t to) i, 1 ca,ptu r on thtl o1) r, ion f'r :.!.-sn , 1 r-.tcrises in -Prisbane,
,J1
lni cal 2tL03e ,.

..

'.jer .

lso

Lt B3n' .:. ar Irt_ li c-e1

'-ri

..... .t.;
C- 1 .
'

- -

I.telli
T.nitei T, . I
',i0 1

'

n,' t 0 1 i",
'-.,'1

.r ..
!;i

y -'c other services; f' '.rnt., rf ?. Ch O>ical are TechC1, pt Til-Y s.is - 1 (I J .ta cn Yap.rc rrmpar d _n i su 1,u tri'.ecinical ..nc 'I .. repr s c r h rt-r ,- d to h the or' h: i'bl o h e.:ie _r-1. .. Co.n. t pt, olver his posic CC r
taire :' , i l C r.

Li is, 7:procoeo,~t;~'

;?!",L__r1Ioyvin i berl,

' 'ish . -hi; ' n rI,' -. st, .aryl~d_

.n

-. ero. -l.'eC?:)r." 0C:di ^.c:; :c.r-ve" . on '~ "', h;~'i -"- :!o, . -Li.. : 4epo ' h-lf f'/ -~~~~ _~
.' tor.-: t'r_Q .'o
be.... ,'....-_ h-,:-,1l h ,:~

nieJ !ntelli-,nCee +' .

Lt p to sutit a just as ::ajor

in',bor '::et-,il lom-ie dri:zr to the Deot from -;it'. .h r -. t inr-c -. f c::.uu recL equilent to

t'th z -c, Urutin<, adminis]_di irore:..s dsip...i . C c e''~ atinih tr--tivc am - lr thor > l ' t li nhe- d for additional hel) C'.'C 'b c rrot'l officer )nt -rend enli.sttd men ucre added ^ro r y t t:t iratiqc:i- rt rs du t the '~p t -,-id -'it' -the ...iel d teamns. L -T1, l C. ... 1 _. .. rsorn sinod ".ns +' the t h25Cth -chIi1OCU~~.. 2iCCh-p.~f~, . 5zho To nic~ ..... c- 'li once Co:"-ay e-<p-1,:C i-l~ ~ ~ ~ ilc ,~r,_~:,, .ilkde-' ,dre,
l~~~

o-' )--da
l .
--

S >. i . .;r;
'
'"'.u;t,

2 Sa 104I,
f'th

'<,r
-i

ic.,sr" ~ n3 :a

the

.n"my

hai~. dc-ed iC:o r...:..,.eot1 e (--=/ IT::cl i 2 and 13) .s a stag;-,1^ .. : o:-: for on, ;"nd s"-'lie- directed tircraft t: the ::.ore easterly auses in ,cw .- uin ea
,.rt .,.IQ'.3 0

HISTORY OF TLC7'IC;JL IMTELLGETICE

When ITollandia vas3 cTturei. by the talies in were signs that the two airdrours, one at Maffin other at Sa;or Twhose construction h.ad never been might be built up for general operations and the vorted into e? defense sector.

1April, there Bay and the fully completed, whole area con-

Th is threat luas nipped with the surprise l-ading at ixrara by the 163d Regi;lental Combat Teeml (RCT) of the 41st Infantry ?T;ro Tway days later the Yaps lost the 194) Division on 17 Sarmi position writh the United States seizure of nearby WTakde Isond. Later in this operation the l63d PCT was reinforced by ele:-ents of the 6th and 31'st Infantry Divisions. PRenmants of the Yap carrison from A1ara -.rithdrre,- overland to the rwest, over svwac2p -m.d untravcrsed jungle ranges, across country belicved to be inhabited by headhunters. Ordnance team cohpDostd of ITajor Ifigrion Penn and Sgt John Linchalk left Hollasdia on 17 June 144 to stage -ith the 31st Infoetry Division -rhich .as going to relieve the 6th Division at Sarti. During the staging period the team assisted in trainin?;, combat persormel for the cominEg operation. They part of the Divisiont arriving at loft then with the first Sarmi on 12 yuly.
.xn

Contact vr-.s mde with the 6th Divisio.n G-2, w-;hore it was found the CIC had shippod out con;siderablc Japanese Ordnance The rcnmainilnn. equipment was turned over to MTajor equipm-;nt. arackcing and shipping, flnn for Thrc-e liays later a second Ordnance team, Lt Bishop and They wiere attachod to the 6th T/4 'jimu, rCportCt at Sarrmi. Division. iSother Ordnance team:., 1st Lt Nc-:ak-kowski and T/4 Rayromlnd Lbvy also reported in to 6th Division from tHeadquarters Lt Bishop's temn pulled out for the US/ISOS four days later, Lt ITowakowski's arrival. Sansapor operation shortlJy -fter having hPcn, been ordered to the United States on jor '!, rotation, was replaced in iAuLtust by Capt Sternal w-rho took this as:-idlulent in the fI.sld as a Technical Intelligence '.s his first officer. -is toee.n cooperated -with Lt Nm;akowski. and T/4 TLvy and continued to recover Tapancse equxiplment, most of wrhich wras Depot for-w.rded to the United States f.rnry Tcchnical Intelligence rNo-.akcw:r-ski and T/4 IP;vy, when they had comat ri.lschhafcn. *Lt pleted their ruisosion in Aunust, returned to the Ordnance analysis ;as scction, zwhich -. still at Brisbneo and accom panied the section -hon it was shipped to Finsc'!hafon.

39

HISTORY OF T2C-Li'L I. . GETCE ILI Lt ,errh Tho ha- boen the Sinal Technical Intelligence hlt, r aroesrntta ive in the area left .:ith the 6th Division to go on the $3ansapor oper-tion. Lt Daniels, Signza Corps, joined the 31st Division to carry one ill av.ilable information pertaining to this area .-.- s tulned over to hi-. He continued collecting cquiplernt and iirain,- it back t the Dopot, at Finschhafen, until he w!as relived of tcmorarvy dut, with the 31st Infantry Division in Seapteirer.

itaek-:

27 MaLr --

20 .Lup;

Cn 27 ?lvy 194i Unitod 3tates ground forces 1raled on Biak Island (hFi/a Inci 12) which driLnates the northerr. ap-roachs t CGeelvink Bay. The seizure of this island iarked the practical en.d of the NeJ Guinea cmc.pein,. Bick's3 captu.re, ho-rwever, -- as not st:cthiin tor be r-itten off the 1books in a few days. .Jithin trwenty-forur hours after landicr: it was clear that ad, vance to the thtree airfiolds -would not be easy. The cdiui.ant factor of the rpcration rwas th high combat efficiency of the onaerLThe 1lst Infantry Division (minus 163d RCT) carried the early operation at Diak. Urniteo States groxLd f'orces htld the initiati-ve but it reaulired soi:P of the fiercicst fizh`tir in the history of Pacific -azrfare. .'ter a tcwr o-day boattle ending 2 Tunr, United States infnlltrygr n :on the c _c1=rz-ndU . hci:fhi; called Mo I rr ?.idce; after a three hour battle on 3 Tunc, they still held it; and by 16 June tkhey had captured o-kI-h;: r .ird;lro in a surprise fl-nk move(amrnt to t1o enels roe'ar h Bi-!.k Islaland o'-artion was ovCer except for maoppirJ up, by 2 .. une ?after Tfnitod S-'iSataes forcceq in ca sustained movor.;ent of envelopzlent, had broken stubborn Tap resistance to seize the; other to a.irstrips, or okoe amnd Sorido, and the port faciltieos of Sorido Village. Lt o o, 'SC, cn his ovwn initiative had nrde a.rrangem-.ents to .ccon.mny the 41Lst Division on this opera.tion. Having complited his 7iission at Eoll-andia, he departedc from that base with the Division 23 Iay as conayding off'icer of the Signal ntelligence Tera, a-nd landLed .t 3Biak on H plus 50 m.inutes 27 ay.V.

40

atI-ITORY CT :>C uo'w I:1TLLIcGNC2

e opocrtteod closely- :;ith the task force Signal c.mipany, for it wxas found that this ;as the rmost satisf.cto ry arrango-Ent as thlcy provided hi-m ith tr.ns.opcrtatin and nrecessary pirsomnol to re;cov-r thu cquipmr-lnt fromz the field (this -;was before 5250th . pl.cc in thoe Signal supervisd tl:e c;i-pping of ll11 tea).) aid the Divof cli-ient for the storaD dodot ;.-s sc;t"side ision Sig;nal ccrL.ipy cxtended overy effort to facilitate the

recovery and return of cnci.J equipment. Thc activities of Lt o;Je weore also closely coordinated with the Division G-2 ana the Counter Intolligcnce Corps toem.
ot3tlh ;?avc valuable assi.sJt l nce in reporting SinJ. dumps nmd

(It -ms noticeable from. operation to aid;in;, in thcir rcraoval. operation that the desire to help of the officers in charge of troops hiad , gresat do.l to do writh the success of the Technical
Intellipgnce mission. )

eofixed radio stations at Biak such as Thorec was one smaller station, however, located in thi, ontrance to onc of the largo c-aves, but by the tiime this ca.ve .s cleared of Tcaps by usoi;-e casoline, oz.bos, anft rockets, the scts ;rce3 burmuJl beyond recCg;nition. There no re ri lr
Koll

wore

found at

. 2 C.dia.

Th;ore .. s no evidence of the a.p,.r.ci; .tteLmptiing to destroy an1 of their cquipr.omnt either at opeortinii positions or in dumps. Toiioe of the cquiprelint reco-vercd had been booby-trapped although the Japancsc hadl h-d suifficient timeo to trap or dostroy the cquipament in the vicinity of the air strips. It wras oftn fouind im.possiblo, hvo-never, espocia.lly in the first few days -of opcr?.tion, to ::et oll the equipment rc-emoved from the
durmps ^.- fast as they were reported or loc.ted, so "Off Limits" signs ;rcro posted to help prevent the lootili of dtumps before itcrls of Intelligence value cculd be removed.

Lt Rorec rcmaincd ant Biaak unltil 3 Tuly, when hc returned to Base F (Finschbafcn) with all of thz Signal equipacmnt capturod -- -approxima.tecly 4,500 pounds. Lt Bishop and T/4 JTinn were the first Ordnance Tceam to be sent into the Biak oper.tion; they arrived carly in July. Howover,; bcfre the fighting wras completed, they wore orcdered by the Sixth frri:v to report to the 6th Division in the \kYffin Bay .area, Ynhere the Division ;was being. relieved from the ^rara -.?aikde -- Sarii operation for the Sansapor operation, Considerable heavy Ordnance uratricl they had collected on Biak had to be turned over to the task force Ordnanco officer w;ho shipped the equipmQnt for thon by water to .1ajor Mc.adigan at Holloandia. It arrived in good condition,

4-5

f HISTOPRt

OF TEC'T -ICiL II:TUjIGETCE

Lt Claude F. Pope, Ptvt Allbrt L. .orath,, Pvt Richard E.

Roynolds (all newly assie:gnr

Torni

to 52Cr0t), c^r:?psir

Ordnance

No. l, ;erc sent to Biac durii-: an;d ,.ias

S3ptembo'er to take over to the Depot at

a.ftcr Lt Bishop and T/4 7inn had left to join the 6th Divisi on. L c~nsiacr-clC quantity of o...e OrnncC C. rm.atericl
?as still avail:tl Finschha fc n. shipired by theo

Cn 28 3Scptc-ber Ordnrancc TeacNo. .1 prccedod to 24th Division, at that tielD strcing for the coning Philippine Islands ?p*ration. P:cca!uso of orders, for this invaceont, this Ornalnce

tlaial'3o was unable to rurn.in at Bia-k until all the captured

m:a.teriel had beeoon shipped, but arranrigctnts -.- re amde with S-4, ;IHeadquartcrs Basoe "f (.-ii.), to ship it to the Technical Intelligence Dcpot at Finschhafcn.
Engincer Teala No. 3, Ccntain Conimors, S/Sgt Srith and

T/4 Sh.rwood, arrived at Fiak fro-- the Hollandia operation 10 June. Thoy had takeln off, like Lt Reo;:e, on their own initiativec -- hopped a plane ride ',Then they heard that considecrablce encr. Eninorecr eouip-ent -;as being ca.pturod in that
arCea.

Early in tie acific :Jar, Technical Intelligence tcEan. operated under Gcneral Orders froml trcr i:Hteadaquarters. They planned their oim itinerary, secured trans-port-rtion, 1toc over eneny equiplmoent frci:m~whuom- troops to combat they .rer not n._cessarily :.ttachod, .nd did all -t'his by crather co;pre-nas i.-e 'authority from the i;r-. that thncy were "te proceed

wh-crver necessary to socurz' captured enemry cquip"nt". ?They oftcn had to win the cooc er-.-ion of leon waho had never heard
of Tec!hnical Intelli.enccn
.Lheoy

aeln

had nc conce-)tion of its

ission,

not ,only hacd to be cci.bat i n;- technical ranailysists. and , .r-ly scroungecrs of tlhv first ordcer, lxt ^also first class sales.menm. . .Thy ta-llced thloir vay throurgh.

Jthouh, the '-,iakz opcr--.tion hard been doclared "practically vwon" by various ncs cow: entators in the St-tes, the hardcst fightinf --ams still to co.-c,. 'tien Cajptain Co-:,nors and hi's teau.
arrived, Unitecd States tro.ops still had on-ly an unsteady hold

on the origina-.l b

.;cchhl.l the Japs took the beach road away --

a. that tiine, wras to recover

the equisin;nt, sub-mit a report,

.sse.ble all equiprent at one point, ald then turn it over to 42

T -I4C!L HI3TCRY OF T..'CH-

ILT~ELLIGEENCE

the base transportation officer. It was found more and more desirable, as the wfar procecded, for the teams to safehand equipnent back to the Depot to insure its arrival intact.
i- To. 3, ho;7C.zoor, like the other twro teams, had EnL;inoer Tea to leave Biak b f ore the equ'ipnment -- an entire Japanese inichine shop, mines, -!ator purifier unit, etc -- coald be shipped to the Depot act .inschhafon. Capt Connors, therefore, cratcd the matericl o.nld left it with the task force

Enr, inc r3 .
The tjal~i left Bia.k c-:rly in Tulyr and Capt Creed called

Maijor Har:zood's Enginleer Toaez: (T/3 Ellyott and T/3 P..ris) tQ

go up to Diak fro3m Fii;ci'hhafen to finish collectirg the equipnont ald to return that on hand to the Dcpots. Tv.jer Har7rood, who had. boon assigned to the 5250th Technical intolliscnco Co'.:pany in June along wiith Capt Connors, and '.-ho had the only othor Enuino,.r Technical Intelli~;crnce tmaxn in the Thheater, crrived at Biak in Septeliber after the close of oper-tions (20 ,ugust). This tii.ic arrancements hatd been mrade through the 5230th for the tear.. to be vested with r.mre specific authority to t'~kl over equipment fron troops in the area. Dutrino this post operational period, the following adcditional tee.::s, all personnel nevs in the field, arrived at Bi :k:

2l Lt Allen ]f!illips

Pvt Robert Dennigan

T/T J. Lo Garner
.Tdei cl 1

2d Lt Earl Raab Qsrtr:Laster C,.pt Yosuph 1"llvoy PvJt Loon yrcers SiTcial 2d Lt :-eI43nry Sarnvis T/3
Tohn

~p;',t Charles

::right

Lotz

".3

HISTORY OF TCPIITICCL ITLTrLIGEINCE

Thsco tenams not ornly reco7eorcd equipment re.mininfv in the Lialk 'x;i-, but :.lso .iriod expocrience in Technical Intollieonce work uLnder ficld conditions as preliL-:inary training for csarbat duty during, the coain.j. Ih.ilipine canpaitn. Late in September the follaiowLV ter--. received or'ders to report to Hollandia to
stcie .:ith the 24th Infantry Division for the IThilippines:

Lt Phillip!s C'iW Tc.ran.; Lt Ra.ab of the Medical Corps; Capt ilvcy's Quarternmaster Team; and Lt TarvJis' Signal Team.

A Tochunical InteUlliPLnce

Coordinator is

,p:!ointed to Sixth jAry

2It th.e bocinninL of the .w.r, Techrical IntelliEence had been -!opendrent upon concurrenc of the r..ry before they coald .. r o into aIy opeor.tion; the ,r-iry caild refuse, or havinCg gramted

permission, could chamCn

its mind.

Upon the formtin of iTS.E~'E another link was added, and the request to 'o into combat had to be sent to them. They in turnl requostod perm.ission from the tr'r. Even once h.Virg- gaiedd pca-iission, all not 1-as smooth sailingS. The totams frequently w-ould arrive at the Division Cor p;sr for stagiIn;, only to discover thet the, k Force lhal not been notified that the Technicel Intelligence teams wcre to be -ttached to their ho;adquerters. Not nowj-ing anything about it, the Corps ::'ould som:eotils order them back or si.aply lick up and go off on operations, leaving the tcals.. Thi, is w;hat had happened in conl:-!ection with the Cape Gloucestcr opiratiln w;rhen a qpcially fcrlmei unit, cent up for stag. in,, after per:i:ssion 'al:d orif:inally betrn ;ivon by th;trrr, w/as cdenied permission to go on the operation:-. Late in juoe 1944 Col N. B. Sauve frwrardecl a letter to Sixth .~r-,, outlining; a plcn for a Technical Ini;elligence officr to be atachl-le to Sixth Lhr- to supervise training prograri-so and to coordi-ate the activities of Tochnicol Intcllie;once personnel supulicc. by USlASOS to Sixth LyXrzr. Sixth 4iry agrceed. fAuthorization was then obtained fronr US'JFE for direct com:miication betvween Sixth Airziy and USASOS on Technical Intclli-gence matters (thus skiApping; the US3FFE link), and authority was granted for TSJ,SO.S to issue orders attaching TechnicrJl Intelligence porooinel to Sixth 1irvy.

44

HISTORY OF TECiT-TIC'.JL IiT .;LLIC--DTCC3 Captain Crccl had': arrivedl in the Theater durin: Jtune and had born lplaccd on deta.ched service with the 5250th. He and T/3 rtcorson .wore rplceod -t fir::t oni te:':-orary duty to Headquarters ilara.o Force to ilrstruct the 112th and 158th Cavalry Pegimrntal Co::lbat Tea.-s, which were to particip te in the Tlhodla.rk and Kiri;,rirr. Islris -operationls, in the identific-ation and operation of cnc:-V Orrcn -nce equi-:7ent. The first ;;eol^; of July 1544, Capt Creed ;-;asp -ced on detacheo._s0rlvice with the Sixth Ir.~r as the first Coor-.inator of Technical Intelli,:,ence f:r an ixry in this 1Theater . Attached tc the Office of the Asrisctant Chief of Staff, G-2, Sixth .rmy, his 'wrk was to coordinate activities of all Techmical Intel1 it;ence units placed on te.porr ut- with the 'rTrry; to mainuty tl.dn liaison betwrecn the AC of S, G-2, Sixth 'rny .nd AC the of I3, G-2, US'30S; to advise G-2, U 33SOS, as to the number and coi.:osition of Technical Intelligernce units requcir&d by the Ir.:!y; to coordlin-te the activities of Sixth m:r-Y-g's Technical Intlli.-;enne units; to supervise the trainiinrg pro-'ro:. for troops on Tochnical Intelliei::nce r-ntters; and to act as liaison officer with the United States r r Technical Intellirpence Depot. -y

2/3 Jolm Lotz was assinedrl t- G-2, Sixth .rlly, to ha-dle

the clerical -work, and Car-::t Stcrnal and T/:>i-t I'etercsn Vrere attached to the r-rgr to assist Capt Creed in conl'uctin a trainirng program on the use of TJatpan;se wce p1aons. Ultogether, the efficiency of the sclt-up was irlproved one huLndrcd percent. Early in Septe:imber Capt Creed cal- do-m fror Sixth lr-.y for a conference with Col Sauve' on the nu-mber and composition of' tea_.s for future operations, an-' arrzangeenentswere rar-dce to supp3,ly the requisite person- el. Task Forces then lmcv ah:-. :' f timne what Technical Intelligence tea.7ms to expect and h':.wrtheir work was to be coordinarted vith the plans of the Divi.sion or Corps. Preli:-Jinary aIrrangceents :'re also made for th6 'Tecmical Intolli 'ence teams to assist in the pre-combat training program. As it tutrned out, closer coordination was established betwe-ln the teo:lis and key peorsonnel at Task Force headquarters as well as with the troops, and the flow of infor.lation and :materiel between the teams in the field and the Depiot vrs conideorably expeited.

45

HI3TCORY 0? TECEUC-,L I IC-.T.E at toot irnschhc.Ien Is Enln-.r.,

NCLEE

The D In

i.-uTtly Major Onakle Bullock, Corip3 of En:;,inoers, frca enlist:.. -men, -,;sre tr.nsferred to -n. to-, Soi.uth Pacif ic ,cz, ny, -.rnc' after a few nte t2qOth T c:aiczl, Intellilence Co.: d.ays orientatio':, -,erc transferred to Finscfhiafern to process jczr ?__ FIarood I's -lequipimcnt seint in by the tzo EnT:ineer toas -- sent out into the field. By this tilme and- Copt Connor's ll ca?.,turcd e nemy cquii'e-t ,;a-.s bcint fJcrvT-ardced to Finschhfcrn rather than to Brisbane f or analysis .andc trans-ship:clent to the Un1tited St.atoes. Lt Col Jon:Is, Encincer Intellif inc2c Of0icr fr.om1 U;3.'30S, to studly cllndi ::s- :nt fr:iBrisbvz;.nc1 t Finbs.chhafcn :of o 'i '.1csp.?ition cap.r Deiot, t-o -' the facilitics of the nwc n. turocd .r._invcir equipmont, to conrfer -- ith th new' n in c'r Ar1:y liaison Sixth Intolliceonce te.^s arn the ncily..poirnted officer, Cao t Croc o vq.;s '.-b c interested in In .Jgujst Captain Gordon Bess, anes equip---e.t, reucsteod transfer of Jao. .,dl h:-d I :'lTicd:e tem1, he wvas ficed to a ::nt to tho 5250thh. '.';-on.in: atssi ;i dctailed to the Ordnance section tc relieve Capt Birleffi, of the Assist.ant ?h~o ;7:s being transferredo to t'he 0ffi-c; r .-eek of Soptcmhri-, :Sv2'C0 thlc first * G-2, ~Ci;if of Staif', men, cormprising dre-; MII. Ncff ailnd thre;.cnlisited ber, ;aj or 4 .l CJS Team LTo. & (to.-: nu.:bcrs, in s',e casus fr-m,hero on, unof Occup pafr:-y til t1hey -vra rye--esi.:n.ted byCf20th' for the . d by the W7ar Depart-:re designated ti'o2n fo'r JapaIn . y.-:r lato:, .already or:'er those ot .id nanl. fellow in chronolfical ;:&nt left BrisbaCne on tec:mporary ? duty assi01oJ2l in this Tln:~ater) Vwith the Doepot at Base F. .n United States Na.y M.obile Expo1sives Investigation Unit composed of one officer and one mnlisted -m%, was attaoh;.r'y Tcc!hlicC'l Tntelli'Once :Depot at

(:iETU)
iasq

ed ico the United Status

The orders s -,ritton fcr this "F" at .about the s.ome tij: . the Technicel intelligence porsonnel pcrmitted the-r. to acc-p.r:r -;ith the Sir;th ,.rr.r. teeams in tho ficld It was decided that all Technical Inteligflence teamls for m:ould star;: at the Technical Intelligence Sixth and Eighth frmiies tna t therefore the housinlg facilities andr Depot at Finschhafl n would need to be expanded so thalt personnel mi{;ht train,, amd

46

HISITCY ODF MCOTICI'L ITiL.IGENCE

ennalytic : - /)rk mi;:ht still be carried on riu'ing the staging pecriodl It v.s cod1teo.?lated, -by th.n t ha'.t than one hun1 hore drOd Tchinic3al IntclIig:nce fficers ?.nd enlisted .: 'on ul.7SA be stationed at the Technical Intellid,once De,'ot at one ti:.3 On 293 Jly, thel Thlitod St I.tts .' T ciC iicc.l Intelligen ie 1nc.:: iocltiOn sitiuatued four - i1Cs north of iou pdq:urtErs Base "1W", on North 21st Street. TLhe no'.! location of the Depot covere. a fi-e acre area, and contairSd,. six large lbuil<dins, c ach .ap.roximt-tcly 100 fect l;n,-, 20 foot wide and 15 f'et high, c-p':bleo f --ccomodratin; one- of the sCrvicos' 'ept n,-'.n lrbcatory co-ciort.ybly ;.ithin its om.structure. The site for the Deyot was sclected by IMajor J'omston, ?aJor M,;c:oy and Cv<tain Oreed. Captainr Creed had arrivcd on 23 July, brirD-in.,: with hi- . a leare shliprvint --f enc':-y eoAuip-: nt frorm Si3th f'r~:'y.
Deo-t iriovod to

Thle Che.:icl '. rf; ro, Engiieer, er dical, (p .1,rt'..:!aster, atnd Sid,nal .inlysis labor. torios, havning co:-.pl1;te ship:-1ents of alL natoriel pjort.ii.nil, to their sections that had accu:ml1!ited at Brisbarn , arrivoce . Firschhraftn 7il 25 .Tly. The Or'drLnco Intlli~e:once Section -s doel91o in moving until . d r.i.tc.ricl on l:-n-l 1a boon shipfed to the Unitcd St3tes, but by the end of &ug;ust ';rs established with the rother sections at Finschhlfcrn :-!ith Lt C0amero:--ho had beer, sent forTard with three officrs a.nd six erlijstsd mlcon to FinscEhhfnfcn in charge. Thre builJin.,, fre.rzs e.nc roof had been eroctcd writh the help c-f n. labor d:tail fro:! the Ia.so, 7T1ch floc'r -;,as laid, but thcre :eCrc no sides, partitions or fencingrrhen the nalysis sections arri-ved frtron Erisb'rmo. Evc.ry-one as-sistedr in cor.X,1,tti'i construction, foncini and protection of the buildinlgs and in the install-:tin of se>anitation, lif;hting alnd' pipin-; equi< mnt. (l a.ter -v'a. sa p frol fli;d r r nearby 70 foo-t -watorfll). I Jhon co lltod he nrew -Lited 3Sttes lr:ty Techniccal te InDtoi-eJ nce Deot cn-rtainr1d f :ciiitios for tihe an.?.lysis lboratories as w.ell as for oua.rters for Technical In;telligence pcrsoniel at thle jDpsot mu'_ frorm' the field.
S.ansaalr:

,30 ,Yl -- - 31

'L; 19L

IT.-cdiate str;tcgic geaii ;--.l te isol e .. -thcr .5,000 ya. a eanese troops a(nd to push the Unite d St-.tes effensive front

The 'llic3 leapfrvogWe:L ->.2.7in to Sa.s.. S

sr (7larlip I;cl 12).

20O muiles closer to the Thili.'i1ns

47

HISTtRY OF TECrP1ISCL

ItELLIGEICE

L'idc'elbur aend i~nstcrde.nm Islands and the adjr.cont shoreline knowm as Sansapor -were seized by J:oric"n anphibious forces on 30 July w.ith virtually no opositim. Elocrnts of the 6th Infantry Division directed operations, and nlthourh destroyers, cruisers, m.nd R?1;F Kittyhl.wks -'ore on hand to provide sea and air cover, no prelirminary b^oibardnnt was necossry, '1 objectives were occupied by nid-rnorninE. Tho occupation of Sansapor concluded Illiod re-occupation of str?.toEic centers along the northern coast of Dutch New Guinea and establisheid allied air bases from Milne Bay along; the entire coast of ITevw Guinea. The enery was no lonC;cr able to operate either by air or se.a beyond the Hal.iahlra-Philippine line, which was the r.ain defense cover for his conquered empire in the Southrwest Facific. Rather than orCanize for an attack against A'Lomrican forces at Sansanor, the Japnoese Second Lrrly withdrew in beGeos and by overland trails tovTard the south and west. The retreat was C.oncral froml all the one-time Yapanese strongholds in Geelvink Bay and in up)er Vo:;^elkop. (I-p Incl 12) J quick end had been put to the effoctivenss of the 3apaneso i',rrvy which was char-e;cd with the c'ofensc of the entire territory. The Ordnnaice Tear co.rlposed of Lt Bishiop and T/4 7inn,. who had recently been recalled from. the Bis.ak operation, loaded out of Maiffin Bay ,'ith the 6th Division and landed in the Sansapor operation c:n D-Day, 30 July 1944. Reconraisannce of the i.rcdiate qroa sho'wed no si-:ns of any Crdnancc rntcrioC and upon w-ritinL; for reports from the infretry patrols, still no,ntcricl was recovorod. The unit then rrocoeedod back to Sixth 1xrAy Headquartors VOCG, and received orders to return to Hcadqu-.rters USSOS, which had 'y.this tim-e r.oved up to Hollandia. The unit reported thero on 10 AuLust 1944, Chemical .irfare Scrvice Tce-Mn o., 6 (Lt phillips, T/5 Garner and Pfc Dtnoni;an) and Lt TJcob Overholt, 'Sir,nal Technical Intelligoenoc representative, stanscod with 6th Division at ILffin Bay with a CIC Tearl. Lt Overholt located a quantity of enonr oquiprlont of Intellic:enco valueo, and returned from Sansai:or operations 20 .&,.,ust. The Division G-2 and the CIC Tcaro wereo co-operative and the Division Ordnanco officor -z.wt on this risaion. Offioers and onlisted :r.n tf tho Dutch irxyr assisted on patrols and it was found that their nothcd of oporation and experience ere very tnetructive. r 4118

HI3S'CRY Oi' 'MMECWIX IC,.L I12.LL.tG2TE

On r s.cl11 sirpriso y-cer.tii-n such -. s t'lis .. here thore wore fc;w troi:J13 t,) o~,pc3o the Allied lnur.in.;, usually there wv.s c"-i'oreratlvcly little enc:;iy eqiip--.ont recovered -of Intellifjcrctcs val uo ,. The foll.c;-iin.- locsoins incir 1cntal, b'it tyyica-l a7nd rather transporta-ticn intercst-inL;. -;7ore ic:rrdcl on tilis op)cration: for the in fcm. c arces of ITewi CGuinea r sha-ul. ber -.lrhibi :,us Technii.c.l Into1]i_ cncc. -orkl. officers :nd enlisterd :-eon sh-uld -. be equi,.pe1 . ith side-r' s s --ell -s c..rbincs or sub- .mchine runs btcouse thc i'rc:er r.^?S r -. haed to be lai.d isido to oxcapturecd nz:inCo r h ,ndle eqouii-'ent fou.:-d ii. e:.:ey :U.-!:S it ilthout having oqui :,o. t should '- sent back Sby essenbor , deolaye.l by CIC at intcrzediotc bcsecs; For bost csc,.~icration in the Division, evcr-rthin-g fiound should be reported to the Divisinn Scr-ice officers (Ordnance, Signal, ctc.) endl t.he various units of the Divisiona contacted thrh-ugh theo.- rccr,vorel se;rchli:,-hts sh.-uld. oe t'lrned over to the Tr)-vsisn f-;r use rn the ;cri.stcr, for by litghtinc, firin and uneaesiness would be oter, U.;cr' u nncessorry up the brcug;ht to a. -:init-unli Ton cccurarCo coofperti. n in tu;, a..ny oqui,.-eont fPundq other thon that nertainin2 to the individual tear., should be turned over t- thoe --ro-er officer; enemiy coi)nd. posts ro;.ortcd ts G.-2 should be be irvesti:.ted -- vw,1uble cquip:e.nt could often be fealr in tho vicinity; in case a dur:i for one service s;cre found, the viciniCty should be scoutcd durxe775s for other services .-for airoxl'-.utely 100 y0.rds couldr ofton be locnatcc nearbyr; .u ps .:ere usually fr'und -;itnhin 'O yards -f . vehicle trail. or roead
?.rc sh,-uld boe -. ad Alcqu.intance of nsatives in the for. thoy ;.uld brin- inforrlati-n concerni he locttisn of .tin i .7il be giveI to G-2, _i._.3~ 'd ti,. 'u ,h tr::kL.s .i:o:.2r_ vTry often a c'r?.y or tvfo coul.d bc s:szzc bry GottinC; it direct;

COfficer, ancd. olJi'stod :cn shul-d receive a rQfresher course in scuticg :nd la'tr1iinl; 4 ad&aptive to the Theater, i:>;a~rtiuvlo-r instruct;ions in rcgr;anizin:f and directinclucdin:[ inf search pn.erols..

149

HIoTTOR., COF TEC7'TIC.iL IiLTELLIGENCE]

Tcripo_-f

Incroescs ctivits:,_' r Technical Intollif.tcncc

a cduly fall cf 19J4 dclitional e.Jl :7rocurdc ?.d ch'-nros of assin.r-cnt wore :an.do pcrsonncl wr.ero Dirring, the lntc sT.,r rn fr the 5230th Tecimical Intcllieonco C2'osite Co-r-1nllY7

SoD;',r.a.c ( revisiina;l). On 25 ;'.Ur:ust !'tajor ?T-nley, who had : rccontly beon :ro-::utod, :as cffici lly al>ointod Cor.n-rnlinC and Cnorin.tor of Tochnicni" Intol].C0fi.cr )oftho b250th Ho roli-ved 8, C--2, USSOS. ic. ncc Co'ficc 'f the .'C Twho tarrnd his full atton'ti-n to dircctinrg IA.'jr 'Tohnst:-n, C Crrldnmnco I!.tcllionece fCr the co,-in.r; Thi ipjiino Islarnds caLt irl1effi as dcsi-nSted aLSi.3tant Coordinator i.ai1 ;n. 1st r- .;ssist21t Vonr.aly Coi:-arndr; Lt ,Van .(3lyck an.s op ,.4to d 4dzi-nistrattive Officcr for the 5250th fo; nil i-atters porto 4tclhnical Intclltigence with the 'itchnical Intclltaijringi sup'crvisicn of the -assistant i,;cG+C Deoot, iu;dor the cenor. Exccutivc, S-2, B-ase F ^nda ur.dor the direction of Headquarters
'f

Lt C:.-:ron, scho'lulod for assirL::.7:nt to a field tea, -. with Ei-hhth 'rlr, .^as ro1.acod ?.s rfficor in char,;e of the . Orr.:ance anra.lysis section by Tinjor '..iC;r C.-t .T.-,orrcn c Sternal r] lot Lt Ihilli-,: .urzcl requestoed an -I.cre assigrLod /4 ,":illi-: L irnco; to tho 5250th in Ordnanco Intoli Thittir'crt-n", T/4 R:-lph T..}-'iokrell, T/5 ./iilio Re. Holland, Clinton 1. Ba:o,;wi;ll, ?vt Haynvo3od L. T/5 Johon ., Tos-,ne-t, tvt Ioendorson, and ivvt Tl.sco Si Mooro wore detailed for duty with the lo -ot. T/5 Pichrd T. i.cAl-in, who ropartod to the Dopot deoal of the Off ice, t )t:k oveor a,Ero 3S fr.; thtl TS.. 'G-2 ad.llnist~ tiv -elerical -. ork.
, -rsorSoel no't on duty of hav:nv -;itl, the iad-al.nistrative section and ficlJd tea-ls -?.ssir;ned to the anlysi3 section, e.ondin[; rcquest fr porsonnl l:y Sixth l wore rttached to ,iiros. UJ)on recuest, personnre.l ,.4r Eiyhth the 'r:oies fer a.sssi, LLent as field to-nrs to task fcr-cs.

TEI.

;olicy w-mas ccnltinudl

Tho nu:loecr of pcorsnnrel nssic;ned to the 35250th for Techc nical Intcllij- nct dutios as of 31 .'ucust 1944 ;nas: Six:tecn t.-:rty-f-iLv enlistQd, ein on to-..orarzy duty from Qofiftcrs an. officers oanc7 thirty onlisted ron thc .;ar Lc~.:rwtc.nLt; thirty t-tal: 44 officers rnd 55 cn'no asiz, fro;:i thi3 Thceatoe listed en.e.

5o

HISTORY OF TSCHMICA'C L IN:,LLIG.r

TCE

Late in September, M.ajor J1.nley sub'i-tted a check sheet to G-4, US,3OS3, requestinc; that necessary directives be issued .JCO 501 to XP0 ',:m transferrirn the Headquarters cf 5250th f ipaniod by the G-2 InterCol Saiuvo', acc -. 707. :~t this tile-, imediete 3ection, dopErtod fromn Brisbneo to Finschhafen to inspect the Depot there, to confer with the e.so S-2, and to vitness a firing deQoznstration cf 'a.:ancso wTea)pons. Ttchnical The dissQ:ination of writton infor.aati'on -nr Intolli.;ence ;-ias constantly r'oin- on: 4 .notebook japanese on Cheo-4cal Ja.rfaro.e .;s distributed in SCLttcr.bcr, and the first numbe,r of the Chemical ,Jarfali Intollit.once Digest also went to press. This dicest, which publicized up to date Cheoni'cal as it was received, and gen,farfare IntelliEcnce inf or.atin eralizod descriptions of captured Cher.ic.?l WT.rf are mrateriol, provided pertinent informati:n until it could be consolidated in loro perr.anent forri in the Yapanoso Chemical U..arfare notebook, ;), extensive report on Jap riunition rr.rkinL;s was -ublishcd in Novem.lber and Decosmber l944. This report was the result of almost two years! research through captured oneny docurmnts, lmnitions rnd reports from other theaters. Its pri.nary function was to serve as a g;uide in distinrjiishing Japanese Cherdcal 'Jlarfare !MnitionsBom Japanese regular Li.nitions, In Soptemborr USZF7E published Circular No. 83 (Incl 15) a standard operating procedure recon ne.nded by PT jor T:ainl1y to clarify rmthods of disposition of captured one-y equipnent and documents. This circular set forth the responsibilities of troop comranders in collecting, safe guo.rdiLng arnd turning over captured mteriel and established a control policy in regard to souveniring. As a result of the clarification of both these phases of Tochnicnal Intelligence, coordination between troop con;ders and Technical Intclligence units was con.siderably expedited. The last operation for Technical Intelligence in the southern islands would be ;,torotai. Lodkinc, ahead. from there plans were already be in mande for the next iove of the United Stqtes Ar:' 7 Technical Intclli,;onco Dcnot -- this timle to the Philippines. I.nilc ;;as selected as the nQxt site) and it .as decided that tho Depot this tire would be r.oved as a unit, rather than by sections.

51

HISTORY OF TECT7TICAL I1T:rLLIGENCE

Mlorotai:_ 15 Sep -- 4 'Oct 194

The Illies moved into position for the drive on the t P'hilipfines .-hen the 31st and 3211 Tnfantry Divisions under coi:,iand of )XI Coris seized .Morotail northErImnost of the Halinahora Islainds, lTetherlands 3ast Indies (Maip m1- 12), and marines and iinf'a_'try;:en fror. the Central Iacific struck 500 r:iles to the northeast to invade Paleu. Beautifully coordiuated, both landing s occurred on the mornn/; of 15 Selte:-ber 1.244 On Itorotai, all objectives had boeon seized by H plus four hours. On Yalau, the resistance ,2ras as tou.:h as .4lerican troops had come up a.Cainst. In takin:: l.orotai, ;rhich lies sonm 315 iiles northwvest of Sansepor, .'Te;- Guinea, and 300 mLiles southeast of ILindanao, 'hilippine Islands, United States troops capitalized on the eleent of surprise.. Heavy air bo.-abard:ent durinc the preceedinrf w:eeks h?.d decoived the enelyr into concentrating rmost northof his stren-th alone-, the coastal flats of Iaoe Bay in' the approaches to this 'T!'rotail, dominatinc: ern HaLmlahera. Jas zere Bay, was but lidhtlyr efended, and -!hat fcv J ;arriso:led there retreated into the hills duriin; the prelimLinary naval bombardment. Casualties to UJnited States rocuncd forces -ere extremely light and there vere no air and sea losses, -nit io. 1h (personnel present on Technical Intellicene are listed in Incl 3) left for Lita.pe on 28 this oporasio:i Auc:'-st 14>4 for te-aporary duty -,ith Xi Corps to stag7e for the : 15 Seteto er Trade '.inds operation at Morotai, The Unit, 7lt'h Clpt ivorrott Ce Lary in cnm-and, left !'itape on 9 SepCaptain ter:iber and landed with the fourth vnave at Morotai. Ccnncr'ts Ei:.cineev Teamal iio, 3 (S/Sort Sr-ith, T/4 Shervood) founld little erno.w Eny;ineer equipment on this operation but did o1btain inforaticn on Ja,anese En:;ineering staidards and for tificaticols. On ,11 Septeol:ber Capt Connors ::as oassigned to Hoadoquarters, US.,SC:., as EnZineer Technical iltellience Officer ReaI Echelon Services of Supply. Lt 'Tiillien LE, ?,intorstein w;ho had just recntly reported to the 5250th; T/Sot Ela:ence T'. Rossi, and rvt ITick os the Ordnance ,rntclli-ence Team at Varnnucci, were assigned .. rotai, .lso reported no no-; items reqovcread and returned in o October to the Technical Inteligenc Depot at Finschhafen,
52

HISTORY CF TECIT=ICAL INrELLIGENCE

lMorotai had turned out to be one of those Cook's Tours. No new equipr.-ont fron the operation was reported and nothing whatsoever wr-as shlip,)ed to the Uniterl States Army Technical Intelliprence Depot at Base F. It .-. the sort of unproductive rs operlation from an Intelli:oence stand point that was so inco-::proehnsible to /Jashin;ton, yet --- there sim-ply was no equipiment of Intelligence value to send back,

'53

HISTORY CF TECHNIC.L IUELLIGEI1,E (C, HAP T E R

V

TTTRN

TO T _I :ILTT IIrES

^^tober -- December 1944

By October 194W!, by means of island hoppine, the United States Forces were re.dy to embark on the t-hilippine caalpaign. .y this time, knocking; olit pillboxes and isolated stronEg points had been developed into a science, the science of fiighttir, a new type of warfrce. Storniiln the beaches was also far from no;, for behind the do-urfhfuet laoy such campaigns as Bu.na, Il:o, Hollandia, Liak and :a-any others. Somae had been bloody .and discouro;in;g 'ut a big, job had becen com:lpleted with cxceedingrly m-eaer resources. U.ith the Thilippines ('ilap ncl 16) in si.ht, V picturoe the ,s completely chan-:ed. This timle the United St?.tes ix-.my hlac the ren and the matcriel, as well as the odtcer n.:tnation to carry the v:ar through to a successful conclusion. The 13th of October 194! sa-w a gigantic two-pronged convoy of 60o trans-o4'ts, lanmding crfaft and -,arships moving northward frx.1-oollmldia and west-ward from the :':liralties. !Aboard were. troops of thQ Sixth l;r.j thin X and OjIV Corps. The g-roup was escorted by air and sea by units of the Far East ,iirForce and the ' and cloe'-nts of' the United States Third and Seventh Fleets. Gcncral 1Macrthur was in personal coemaand of the ar._mqda that was to mt7rz ood the prorise, "I shall return".
Qn. 17 October, the 6th Ranarger Battalion str.ck the opening blow wThen they seized tvwo islets guarding the entrance

to Loyto Culf (ihp, InCl 16 & 17) and on the mrorning of 20 Cctober, unloadingr bcg;an on four beachheads along Loyte's cast coast. oefore the firish of the operation, enemy forces on the island had risen to 1$30,000, including reinforcements broucht in from the other islcnds. H?:o-over, the initial attack was so ovcrw;hoelini: that Tacloban, Lcyte, (MIap, Incl 17) was captured with loss of loss than a dozen ,ten and in less 1c thcan t;wo weeks the United Sta'ies forces held tao-thirds of the island of Loyte;

54

HI3TQiRY OF TECTHNIC4L I;.LTILLIGENCE Landinr Opr-ations and Enel::v Tactics

On the mornirr:

of 20 October at 06C0 hours, the naval bom-

bardi.ent of Layte befran. Fr-nl 0600 h-^l!rs until 0900 hours the battleships and crui.ers fLied a:i.roxi 'rtely 2600 tons of explosives on that isl.c.nd. .'t 0900 hcurs3, -.'hile the heavy units still continued thieir borbarl..ent; tl)e rocket launching' LCI's moved up for the f'iall blo-w before the actual assault troops boi'an landin;. They .-.ent inr areast of each other in a long line to-.ard the beach, and be:,anr lalmchinr their riockets. Fric- 0G00 till 10C0 hours all thtat roul.d be 1heard was one long con-,inuous r;mdnb.intrl roar co.:g;; ffo0 -;the islan,. EBy this time the first assault wave had al.no.:t reacned. the I-each, the LCI's coas.ed their fiire -:nd the first wave landed oni lfyte atdai-ast only sli-,ht oppositio. Th'ne initial landings .ere made by tne 7th an,.' 24th Infantry Divislon, and the 1st Cavalry Divis ion s8.

There was no doubt of the sincerity of the natives. They were overjoyed at their release. There were, inevitably, a few pro- 'Qapnese nativecs who acted as spies for the eneyr. lJith the except-ion of the childron the natives .- re in poor e physical colcdition, having suffered fro- . a2lnutrition. m Clothin: Dand houlsehold effects -werevirtua.lly non-existent as the Jparesi ha'.d -ereisitio.red or co3mt-anderred al ost every item, Fafinilies hadL been turned out of their ho.es to nmaim room for the billeting; of tLe Ya)s.

Operation of' Technical Intelli;'ence _on LeYte

Tt was tLe plana for the Leyte operation to have three Technical Intel',',ence field units ;-rith the com!Dat trcops. They were organized alone; the lines of the first composite unit that participated in the Eollndia operation. Each unit was attached to a division anrd was conrposed of teeas cf all -- or nearly all -of the servi.ces, CoQ-i' lete covera:,e of the desir*:nated combat sector, and coordination in ad.inistration and operation were

thus as sured.
Late in SeoterSbr, Technical Intelligence Unrit ,o., 1 was place,:,d on terporary duty wit-h the 24th Irfantty DU.vision at Hollandia? to sta;-e for the Leyte operation. This UTnit was con-

posed of th'e followinn: personsnel:

555

HISTORY OF TEC]LYTlCAL IiW;,ELLIGESJ-NCE

EnriLJ;neer ^TeaiM No, 14
m1a or :-ennreth C. TIarw;ood.

T/3 Elsvrorth F. Paris

T/3 .TJaes T. E

llyrett, JTr
Orlhance, Tearm
TcR*. 1

1st Lt Claudes

'ope

Pvt Richard E t Reynolds

t:fc AtlJbert L.

J.Iorth
Sin:rl Team

2d Lt Te4ry -Tarvis

rT/3 John Lo Lotz

Leyte was the fil-st operation for the Si-ralj Tea-, composed of p rsDo.nel receintly asci.scr.id to the .250th, !Tajor Heorwood's team which w-as to operato as part of the advanc base depot tem, anrd Lt -c'-pe tca-L, hadlainel 's sose expoerenrc_ in the field durin-,; thle 'sti-operaltions period at Eiak, but it -as their first co.)ibat a Ssi.-;_rn1,rt .- ith l'cchric.al Intelli-en-co. Capt Joseph1sIL I.lvor, hor had becn a ssi-mned as '.artcrmazstcr h Inteliconc. officer for this Urnit, -as dellrod and did not arrivc at the aoborkatiun pointr in tiir.c for the operation.

During sta%:in,

uembers of Tcchnicl Intelli~ence

Unit

Mo. 1 i-;_t with the AC of S, G-2, of the Division, to whom they -wrce at bTaUched w-ith r?_;e:o.bers of TT!S, -'EU No. 1, and the CIC rteoas. f.co.pl-:tce bricfin::, -. thods of ;orking; tog;cther, prie ority in the ccluction of enory gquip-:1ont, etc., wero thorouChly covcrod. 'is .JIU had the best facilitics for rapid disscminaticn to tzhe co.iba-t troops, it -:as decided that thy worculld dct firest c ll on all explosive .matoriel captAured. The Tcchnsic- l Inatlli:;enco Ordnance Tc.a- woJl0.d -;et next highcst priority.
imlansr weroe a.de for the Unit to gc ashnore in the second wave. It bc-ac a standard policy throu'ho~ut the rest -f the -wa.rfor Technical ITtolliCeoncc teCuIs to :o in a-.rly -- within one hour if possible -- after the first wave landed, to prevent troops from scuvenirin i valuable eouipmlcnt, thus destroying its usefulness for Technical Intellil'ence.

IDuri7n st>ainir;, the Unit checked teca and individual cquipi rimot, andc dre replacecments for shortae-s. At 1800 hours, 13 Octceor, the Unit sailed wJith the convoy from Hollandia to Lcyto.

;56

_:7-U4f: LiT!:2EIOEDE: ' HIST0?`Y OF TEo

1'>iir. c-rqti'~ns, bI'>ier T-rrw;od's t'o7r enlisted D.'ri.i: lditin;.i.~he1d thcmiselves on Red a.l1ytc ..: l-,.ris,3 zion, T%-' i, - a nn cnc- >-7 ulld.zerr ndl unlc-dincl Becri c by roovoriv,:r % it ;:K'_ilc nd; .._:C :sfirs. Loyte Voaloy . ',Ci Tinit T . 1 c ovrolC C j. Toch :ic-.l ,'.:.li 2ured, it ras -s little ocqui_:_ent -- ca;on t-is cpe.: ti;, ',-ut a t ,-houi' ht::y return to tlhi; Tnitcd St-.te was !_oci !ord tit A2: ! Tcc'Lnc;' IC'z-ilit ;I'ence Dct t binschhiafIsn aftsr only Ft :hoy -tk bck e with thol: thle equipci2J iu.7.J. in the field.. :.:nt tlh-.t har b_-on recovorec.
t m Uc chci;catl Inr-tclli.enco TUnit iTh. 2 whiclh iws'sattrachod to n, ist Cavx.lry Di-visirn f-or thno LTyto c.rLtian was comrposed *thcof te fotlol;inr; to:tLrns:

Chermica-l ~Ev.ro.'tC/S,;.t C%.pt2.ii

T!'i

.':rf.re Soervice Lr/ Scc, l.ica

-r2mi -To 7

tulius Team i'--. /~

L. Horton

apt;.in rxrris Acle Quarterrraster Sct Ca;-ltain Robert S. Gunll crson T/Sj;t "-iELu_.cc F. R-:ssi Sir nrel Section 1st Lt ,Jillis ., Ho7-in! >
0,rdf'nanco Team- Tc:. 11
i

on "S/Sot !illiaJ. poss

'T/$S,?t Robert J.

PicConrk.ie

Captin DLurence A. S'[Crnl T/'S :t I-'ul F. ~lliclc En, inefr Tor L Cap4tain Donaldl C. Conn-rTrs . 2

i -vt Robert Do

-o reitas

T/!i. REoer E. Shcrwood

ITIost of this porsonnel, vpith the cxcoption of Copt Connors' teci' v;hich had beon a t ZHollanila r.nrd Biak, -,;cre nerw to Technical InntelliLonce and had only n short period of traini<,l in the iYn-llysis sections of the United States Lrrny Technical Inteoljigcence Depot.

57

i.. -chI'.:L T'ISTOPY OE ..

,i c ;eLLL;

l-CE

-ft Cir ;rna,;;i,, :t;Ui. an.L,tO -ri -'a-,it a

in I1., thl
i ,i: c.j. f r ,

(v-hich hd:! to e sent up lnter) t.heir -7hiilel roccerecd to I'hnus .t HClllan.:ia, ttc-:,..Tii
.. l , tt
s'.

.,'.li'

:r.t

i;

s; c:c 0.v!alry Div!st

Y ni:enL1 TI:'k.,i';:. _7Lny -!, :vL

cc

it

, o2 .. C. -

rorthorn

C7ili

nce Uo it

2W t 5z-d
Int ;c'-li an Or.9 rc
place l
'

. n.i... ,o .;:> ..~.,vcti-r

tl -.
Ti

Xc;

-ist 'ch:i

'" ; "-.

'11 i cc

ir

C.:rdir-.a-r of Technical to his duties as '.: ti-n

o-f ic_ .
i i ..s F_ .._ S

sll,;,r hi r

, a1 Ca :" C111ti 7.-ch; . 1thc rth:)r i.Cc4Lr.-y

. ,;i' ... ......... ;!. i' . S:,~ :.rhir

'

t .ti: s

e.
3.
'.. focar ecai.' 'ni
n'-c
*

ticula~rly on! 27
The preoscncc of a

o--.. . ..r c ll-lorated .with ( r--.. -oion td m i i ' . sooi to cc.;.'t units. r-._zIicati.rP -2
In tvlli Teh;.:-..7 nce coordinator at an

o i_' .3 . .s .-.. :l _. r , t -ls

tT-op.or rily ror ' ,:;UnL fro fo r Sixth ii.vt .i.ttd by rt s:)..

hrm.yt r--u.rin hl t4 '.-; -f .adx-.vance: ;;.llr RcSil-1. t s J.irected to Capt the course :.f thc; o: rction -- qscsios .i. '*n .o ecuiirpientt, plarticvlarly Ordnarce, Stororail c .:.cir. ilil . . werte i~nuorea;) . lc T;chn. Licai
to t

I.nte'li -cncv 'Jnit No,

u.til 03C

2 had not been attached

-a litle cvLr a- week

1st C-.vnalr, -l,

to_ bor,

b;efsore t-he Div;ision sailoa- anrl too ls.ateo to elnabl e ic is and vwii'l_ thIe Ur :it; the absence of authtra. ileriis to, be shil':edi orizvd ti;rovLs',ortfati.-n ceverelr h r, ica t..i. -t:.:.1 pcpera.tions to bhc detained to ....- . rri s " l'e-, I.cicol. Of "ic r, ha'. an ?.cco:,Wl ia:y a rear Ce .. chn...rlt t_. bl'i .`. l.i',iioi.al vehiclos. 1 il
t ll c By 1 iTOvoroear -c,',hniioC'al an'l hl ad itt .. ssion as N7o 1 h''d c.-...lt

for return to t-he Uzi-tbd ,-l ttcs

'r.r .

2 as v-oll o?'.r: rd ship a Tchcnical Tntlli c-nce

it

_i.Co

Depot "-,t FinschL:.f

n0 cos3i-osod .Techanial n.tl!li"onc.

The followinn. tcax:Unit No. 3:

Cl.S Intellience Teaml

NoR

5 &f:cE!'".ar

2d Lt Vic'Tor Dc5l ueci.ct ',/5 C-as!:lar(e '-,a. ai ci'n

u.lli;an

58.

En-irner Intellir nce C't

-... lr

o', To.

S,,

J.ohns.:n

>It Henry Carson

. CZtain -AS.:.-rI

1... . .

lCTv'CY

Intolli-'-onc :kI-7licQ.
6- t:r.n No^rris ,tlc

Toa:1 i-?

14

OrcdrLnce 7ntoil.i;ence Cc -t,.ii GordrLn Bess n-,,-...c... Tr:ti ' Caztcai; .,

eC. i :oD. 2 /SC,;.t C-lenn E. Peterson

cnce Te:: ni

'o
F.

vaLrd'

,-, .!ick -l

qi,.rtor-:-':.ster Tntlli... ec11 Te-:: ?J.-...[ e. : }{a.j r ji S.ni3dny K. 2;.'e Sig.l lli1a ':eotli;:' .e n2 'e Tc

.o
T/ Roboert S. 1_anub

21J L;;c Jco../.

rZchnnic.l

Go verlirlt Intelisan

3 No. placed o-n ter.porary :7as c -plo.i' lduty :..tit .rl, oService Cor-z nnd nd on flrttle teiiporary duty to i-o,dmortqrs, Base Tr 'I, ibclobn, Leyte ';here' they arrived on :r p.-21ntt ';as, Vrs or'anized here from hich trips ,pc, D p1-:s one. to all i;-tl;s of is1o.r -are .... l, Iv. IIt~-.ik;_ne, TBCi^:'o. y S a i.,rrcvi;si.na=l1 ipri.:'rily shipn.'ents ofi' ctured oner nical Intelliigence Units 1 ares,. troo7ps in the for-,rc.

3 iat first Unrt{itt eOot unit 'to rcc ivs equi::e nt :rcurlht in n-d! 2 c erting rith

functioned and :.ake by Techthe co:lbat

During: the first1

tcl1iL,cCQ Jil

ton :oays a ; ter arriv--l,

J

Tsclhical1 In-

N;;,u 3

n .. a - (n i.nl d

1rO
ccin'

'iT,: ,.' the field

cnth, po....f th " i -. shijn Dipot for the receiviili turex'd equi.meunt. This w.tas a tconporary idva.nco dopot si.ilar

59

HISTOCY OF TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE to that at Hollandia. Except for certain bulky equipment shipped directly to the United States, most of the captured materiel was trans-shipped to the United States Army Technical Intelligence Depot at Finschhafen for further analysis. Part of the time was also spent in checking the arunition dumps im the vicinity of Tacloban and Palo. A short time later when both Technical Intelligence Units No. 1 and No. 2 had been withdrawn from the operation, Unit No. 3 was left as the only Technical Intenligenco unit on tIyte island. As such, this Unit had the dual rosponsibility of running the depot and keeping contact with all combat organizations engaged in this operation. On the sane day Technical Intelligence Unit No, 2 departed from Loyte, Ordnance Team No. 4, ccuposed of Capt Edward Nowmkowski and T/SC;t Cgick arrived. This team, which was originally assigned to Field Unit No. 2 had had to return to the Technical Intelligence Depot at Finschhafen because of some confusion in shipping arrangements and had taken a later ship. They reported to 1st Cavalry upon arrival, but were relieved from that organization a week later and plaeed on temporary duty with Army Service Comniand. Since Technical Intelligence Units 1 and 2 had left, Capt Nowakowski and T/Sgt QWick functioned with Technical Intelligence Unit No. 3 at the depot and aided in collecting materiel. After ccnpletely covering the area in the vicinity of the depot, this teaja and Technical Intelligence Unit No. 3 went into the field with the 24th Infantry Division, covering the whole front of the Leyte campaign. MAch equipment and materiel wvas recovered during this drive and field reports on nany new items were prepared. Considerable equipment was recovered after the $apanese reinforcement paratrooper attack near San Pablo and in the (rmoc area- in the 7th and 77th Infantry Divisions' sectors. However, the lack of time, the large area involved, and the rugged terrain features, prevented the evacuation of large quantities of the material captured. Besides maintaining liaison with the previously mentioned units, liaison was also maintained with the 1st Cavalry, the 11th Airborne Division and the 24th, 32d and 96th Infantry Divisions, If any outstanding recoveries of enery equipment were made by these organizations, trained Technical IntelliGence personnel were made available to handle the field analysis of the equipment.

6:

HISTORY OF TECHNICAL INTELLIGEN=C There wvre no shipments of enemt equipment from the field depot at 3ayte until towards the end of November since routing to Finschhafen.:had been stopped and no ships left for the United States until then. Technical Intelligence for the boyte operation as a whole was not as productive of captured enorn equipment as had been anticipated.. It had been assured that large stores of enemy equipment would be uncovered there, but that assumption proved to be false. Due primarily to terrain and weather conditions, the typo of fighting encountered on oiyte throughout nearly all of the early phases of the operation was spasmodic. Few enemy dumps wore captured and proportionately, the quantities of equipment recovered intact were .liited. Upon the completion of the Ieyte operation, fcur new Technical Intelligence Units, 4, 5, 6 and 7s were formed for the "M 3 operation. (PersonDel of these units are shown in Incl 3) 411 three Technical Intelligenca Units were disbanded and the personnel used as a nuclei of experienced men for the new teams which were to be formed. During December Engineer Intelligence Team No. 7 (Lt John F. Keane,. Pvt James W. Stephens; IVt Christophcr;7. Tarar) of the re-organized Technical Intelligence Unit No, 1 engaged in collecting specimens of all available captured enemy Engineer equiprmnt from the Sixth AXW Enrineer teams in the field with a view to setting up a training progran for Eighth Army EnSpecial attention was given to land mines, gineer units, Ot 28 December the training traps and demolition5s booby materiel was turned over to the Engineer Section, Headquarters, Eighth Army.r Operations oin .yte Are Turned Over To Eighth Arm

As the control of all operations on Leyte was to be turned over to Eighth ArLM, Lt Col Erle HE. ulian who had been assigned to Eighth Army h late October as Technical Intelligenoe Coordinator and a reorganized Technical Intelligence Unit No. 1, joined that Headquarters on 14 November 1944. (Personnel composing the Unit are shown in Incl 3). As Eighth Arrfr had not participated in any combat the tine was spent by Technical Intelligence Unit No. 1 in alking contacts with the X and XXIV Corps and with the associated service chiefs, Plans wore made so that upon Eighth lrmy's takint cormzud of the remainder of the Leyte operation, there would be no time lost in taking to the field. They were ordered to report to 38th Infantry day Eighth Ary took Division on 26 December 1944,. the ersa operational control.

61

HISTOT'Y OF' TEC-i!YICAL TIT'iLLiO--ENCE A surveyr '.;as rade of all cap~turod Ordnance equipr.mnt in western TJrtYt' Tb.rouchout this <area lar1e gquarnititics of equipolent wver. r cov.ered. Eii:hteocn lic'ht tanks, tyi, 95, w;ere destroyed in thse -untains below; Linon. '.s those tank's formnd ro2a. blocks:, thley -r-e shovc over th_ si-ics -f the ruc,Toed . nountain to dispose of the,. cr'a. Cnly' twr; re:luincd in a position such as3 'oi.l.d allow; for thoir evacuation. ;.imuniti-n ;i:.s ncountered in lar:e luantities. ~ovever, . as .-ilo.y of the dceipts wr.re lmracticUlly iocrAd on the road, the :ineeors ded,;troyrl thmci as a safrety ?r-caution as they L. cleared the roads3 for ;:.ovC:ent of Illitarr supplies. Enough alrmuiition of all tyres, never-the-'ess, re:--:inod in Good condition tc satisfy the rcqucsts for its use in analysis and test firin, ., co-nsid!erable a'.ntity of renovated Americon a.-;unition w7as found in the captured dury so Japanese Lar:unition and :natericl -.-ero lsed by United States troopi's _ ossibile Jrapnese 81 m.n:i mortar am.uunition, for instaince, leirnr, utilized as harassing fire against the nemly.
;helrovr

TIe Japnmnoso rlnced greoat emphasis on destroyin-{ United States artillery piecest For this, suicide tactics were employed. I JrIp soldier w-ould strap an ex losive charge to his body andll chC.~:e into the field piece, destroying: it and him-self as he pulled the irnitea- doto-atin:- the chor.?e. .~inmlar tacctics were used against taki:rs. Captured d.-cumnents on antitank tactics described this procedure as a part of their training. During: the first half of January 1945 Ordnance Intelligence To.-eam ITo. 6 (Capt C0armeron, T/3 Carl Pc SiiaLons, Pvt Nick Vannucci) vwas allse assijgned to tbhe 38th Division, but as that division was not to be co-nmittecd to co;.mbat for soeic time, arrangc.e icnts were m-ade for this tear. to ag-;ain cover the combat areas of tihe 7-th ai:!d 77cth Divisionrs in -restern Lyte. These two divisions w-.ere cn-;o-d in moppin-; up activities at the ti:me Cooperation fromi rXTI Corps, in co:;Cand in that area, w-as excellent in th.e evacuation of equipront. They sup-,'lied all the necessary trucs and la.bor to -'et the job done.. Thel Technlical IntclliLo;-ice Orr.anceo cnlisted men 6(3 tons Cf one-ry r-tcriol -s supervised thle 'wrorvk a ra t4oti was3 evacua ted 1 d shiil :i to as> E Ta cl oban, Leyte, for .. trans-shipme;,nt to thel United Stcates . Tochn-ici rro h Intelligence. Depot at Finschhafen.. 62

HISTORY OF TECI.ICA.'L

NITTELLIGENCE

C H

4"

PT E R

VI

UNITED STQ'OT3 .2.'MY

TEICAIL INTELLIGEhET; DEP OT

October 1944 -- February 1945 The United States Ary' Technicual Intelli!-cncc Depot .as the

nerve center for Technica.l Intelligence activities. It was administered clirectly under the control of G-2, US!SOS, with each service olJer-tinC; an artdlysis section lunder the technical super-

vision of its respective service chief. Technical Intelligence units 7preparinL; for operation sta,-;cd at the Depot anEl upon
teriaination of duty in the ficld returned there, uhere the personnel were intcrgratce into the analysis section staff. ial equipment .nd iLzxteriel recovered by the teamls -,as brought or sent to the Technical Irntelligence Depot for study and research. Shipp-inc, from the Depot at Finschhafen to the United States

improv;d considerably during October, November and December. Shippinc from outlyin-, bases was sloA,. A quantity of equipuent particularly Si&,nal Corps and Ordnance materiel ;7as received fron the Ne-w Guinea operations, Diak, Sansapor and Mlorotai, and as a result of the rapid advance of United States troops during January and February :n Leyte, an unusually large quantity fro:l all the services was recovered. A1t the sam- time a steady strea-.m f small items confiscated by base censors and base Intelligence officers flowed in. Japanese aircraft equipment
shipipd from Aitape and other New Guinea bases was transshipped

to -ir Technical Intelligence, Far East Air Force, for disposition. So;:e confusion in The Uar Department had nailed to the Director 'Jashington, D.. C., but the handling of name plates was evident. directed that all nanraplates should be of Intelligence, AFrIy Service Forces, the Chiefs of Services prohibited the

rermoval of namcplates fron equipment to be shipped to the

UInited States. Howrver, Tochnical and econo:ic warfaro Intelligence requirersDnts couldc both be satisfied by double distribution of namleplate inforration and therefore, the following procodure aent into effect: narmeplates received from Technical

Intelligcnce

teams, IAnalysis Sections or postal censors, unless

63

HISTCRY OF TECHNICAL INTELLIGECCE cleared by the ;llied Translator and Interpreter Section with the task forces,, were forwarded to the AC of S, G-2, Hq. US$C3S, from where they were air milod to the Director of Intolligonce, ArWr Service Forces, .lashington. Nar3plates of extreme technical significance, integrral ports of the oquipment, were photo(graphed or duplicated by rubbings, and the prints, negatives or rubbings .ailod to 4Army Service Forces, '.ashington. Throughout this period nardplntes and operating instruction panels were received roteularly in quantity from Technical Intelligence teaMs in the field and fron. postal censors, Preliminary translntions were rendered for the benefit of the analysis sections and the plates were then transmitted directly to the United States. In view of coarents fron consignees in the United States, packing and crating of equipment for shipment was conducted with greater care for durability. Additional precautions were taln to insure adequate labeling of crates and inclosing of sufficient copies of vouchers and packing lists to facilitate recognition of equiprent and acknowledgennnt of receipts Lt Stancer was relieved as Depot Officer for another assignment 15 December 1944. On tenporary duty with the Technical Intelligence Depot as Acting Iroperty Officer and Assistant Administrative Officer were 2d Lts Edwin A. Mirtz and Kenneth li. Iaykendall, Intelligence officers assigned to Base
"Fn

The following Technical Intelligence Units, which staged during November at the Technical Intelligence Depot, moved forward during December and January to join divisions participating in the M-1 (Luzon) operation: Technical Technical Technical Technical Intellig;ence Intelligence Intelligence Intelligence Unit Unit Unit Unit No. No. No. No. 4, 5, 6, 7, 6th Division 43d Division 37th Division 40th Division

The Technical Intelligence Depot at Finschhafen is Closed: 28 Feb 19.5

TJith the opening of the Luzon operation, steps were tarwn to close dovm the Depot at Finschhafen and to prepare to rmove the entire shipping and receivinr, sections and six analysis laboratories (except for a rear-echelon force) to aLnila, Luzon, Philippine Islands, when it should be talkn.

64

HI3TORY OF TEiCHICiML ItELJCE In the ia-,o,.nti,-Je, teaal personnel rernaininr at,,ho Depot were tr?.inod under supervision of tea-a comanndors with the assistuice of analysis section chiefs, while anmlysis section personlel .omre occupiocd principally with v:'ritin: technical reports !and disposin-: of captured equipmernt on hand in preparation for the 'conteimppllted r.love. They cr.ated equipment that vJor.ld be needed and as .dditional tools and instruiments were acquired, chlsts wrere constructed, labeled and stored. Only the linil:u.i require:'-nts in tools were roetined in the shops as operting oquii"ert.. iersonnel from:- the various an?.lysis sections m:ede a trip to Sio, Iew; Gutinca, (.'p; Incl 1) to cobtain -nc:j :m.ateriel which hae. been left there by the je.lpameea-.- proxirt.mtely ten .. rnths before, British Civil Affairs units were of creat assistance in this operation. Eighteen Ei-:htbh ;rj'y Technical Intclligence officers and ton lmoved forw;rd by air during Jamlary to join units in the field. Vehicles and ooquip"':ont of these tcais -vere safehanded lator when shi'ppinac space ;;as available. Thoc Acssistant Coordinator of Technical Intelli;oence, US3$SOS, Capt " irleffi, and the Ordnance Intcllir:ence officer, sar.ne oadquarters, Bajor .iil'kes, visited the Technical IntelliGence Depot in January to expedite forward ::lovor.mnt of Technical Intelligcnce tca:,s. They brought with then a shiprnent of speed 4;raphic caeras for use in the field and in the sections, to facilitate preparation of technical reports. Operations at the Technical Intelligence Depot, Finschhafen, ceased 28 February 1945. ial analysis and organizational equipmont was readied for ir.:tediate shiplicnt to the now depot area in ,.manila. LoadinL: co.nncned 6 _'March and the detachni:nt was scheduled to sail 12 Ilarch. The closing of the Technical Intelligence Depot necessitatod turni. ov-er approxi; lately thirty-five tons of captured equiprent to the Ordrinance Officer, Ba3e 'F". Complete arrange!lents were made for expeditinE:g the loadin; of this equipment by the first available water transpcrtation. Captain Octave F.. D. Tho--as, Office cf the Assistant Executi.v 3-2, Base "F", serve-d as Capt.ired. Enerir Equiipo.nt Officer for the base and naintained liaison with the Ordnance

65

IIISTORY OF TECTV-IC.iL IJTLE=LIGCENCE officer until all captured mate:iel .at the Base had! been shipped. It was antlci-cte:1hart rcceirts of eoerir- equip:rnt at Base "F" t would cr foor o:n..;nle two .:onths ,7hile the now Depot was
gettins; cstp'`.lishcJ i n L.bnii?.,

A total 'of ,(K Officecr9 :nd 1.39 enlisted r-. n -r.s on detach ed scrvicc, durilxt' thc tibru-.ry ;2-Oil Technical Inte-lj.gence CoSo-si-tu Co G ri, $l rc.r: .c (1ro.ioe ..as). .. f t hes e, rnine Technical Ir:il .. 1i:clc uni;s, c, osei cf 36 offlceis r=ni 60 enlisted .: .men, vY&rme .lr tCrc.. rxyhdut,' to ,r~-.y y tthe and Lrore eCTVhnical Intc?.licicc: unriits, cc.posd of 15 of:'icers and 27 eillistod i;:xn, ;7mre sn toi.p)or-.r7y duty t~ the Ei.j'htn Armly. ',rd!ditional Tcchnlic!lJ. Intc'lli'enu ce teas .thich had been sta-'ing-, sailed for for?/arcl areas fro; fiase "F" beforo rnove:rnt cf the Depote

Technica.l intellir-:ence Deipot is Est::blished at Jkhnila The Headqua'ters of' the Tjnited States Ar.n Technical Intclli;encoe D:pc-t, co:-poosod of 8 officers _and 38 enlisted men, departed from TPinsc:haf.;n, 'To Guinea, for Manila, Luzon, ihilipp ine Islanlds, on 12 !rch. .Iith the mrovcr.-nt of the De!oot to }MIanila. and the transfer there of Iedquarto-rs T.US,1oS, that city bec~a', the hub of Technical Intelli!c.nce a.ctiv-ities in the i:.cific theater. Technical IntolliL:encQ in the '.;ester.n iacific area had cor. of afro and wa5s opera tinc. 'oro efficiently than at ,nyr previcus tise.

pu~ Ll ~tn~

~o

~6

HISTORY OF TECTHUICAL INTELOLIGEUCE CH A T ' R R' VII

O1TIO ONS ON LIJZON Tanuory 1945 -- Fobruary 194,5 Alth-ough the Iioytc operation was a bold and dicisivo str-ke, it was only a small part of the Philippine cc.iP:hole ipaij;n. On the 25th Octobor 1944, five days aftcr the landinC, -n Iayto, the 1st Cavalry Divisi-n struck c.,;ain n.t Sa-rr. (i.t, Incl 16 andc 17) On 15 Doconbor thc noxt strategic landing; was Made on Mindoir, 288 diles ncrthwest of Lpyte, (Iap Incl 16 and 17) by the 503d Parachutc Infantry rcirforcc. 'Ls the parntroopers lao.ixccd on Mirndorc thoy encountored little Jap resistance, alth-ur-h Tokyo radi- proclaimed Trindore the key to "control of tor.mrrow's imilitry situation". On 5 Jmrou-ry 19145 i.arincuquc -wastalkn with little opposition in the interval between ITindcro arnd Luzon by cloe:-nts of 3ixth Ari:r in the first :-rovc to clear thc Sibuyan 'a. (,ihp o Incl 18) Tlcn on 9 January, 82 days after Loytc, 600 ships of an armadac c.arzyinC Sixth 'riy trc-ps appcoreod in the Lin.,aycn Gulf, 100 rdilcs to the n-rthw-cst of Mimila (MTap Incls 16 ind 18) the point of thc initial Jo.panosc landinc; in the hilippir.os in Docciabcr 1941. :Sith the Seventh Flcot aircraft actiinf as cover, r 15 maile bcachhead was sccured and soon expanrlod to over 40 -liles, In five dys, morre than 400 square oniles had boon retakon and arl-rrod colunmns ;cro on the r.rve toward ~tnila alon, the three hih,.ways lo- in; to the south. Capture -f Urcanrctn oppened the northorn sectinn of the HiGrJhway 5 ancd snapped the enely's su-ply line through tho central Dizeon plain. Tarleac, ro-l. ;n. rail conter of tho contral plain was overrun,* (rap Tncl 18)
,tanila-Baguio

I:{,hni-. lay straight arhcad, cnd it doveloeed into a. ra.ce to see who would nrrivo thore first, the 1st Cavalry Division or the 37th Division, As the 37th -.loved rapidly dcl-.n Hic;hway 3 fron San Fornaldo and the 1st C.valry drovc down Hic;hvway 5, the race was on. (mp Inci 18) 67

HISTORY OF TECfTMCAL INTELLIGENCE 0n 3 February at midnight the 1st Cavalry Division's advanced units crashed the gates of Santa Tomas internment carp and Bilibid Prison in Manila, releasing 5,000 internees. Tne Fall of Mnila The battering down of the gates of Santa Tomas by 1st Cavalry troops heralded the opening of the battle for Manila, No more unorthodoxz battle was ever fought and seldom had such a fanatic foe been encountered. A mixed arnoy of from 16,000 to 18,000 men defended the city. The units involved consisted of a strange array of hospital patients, air oorps personnel, officer candidates, naval personnel from the sunken shipping in the harbor, newly inducted civilians and the like. These troops were organized into provisional units of company or battalion size. Roughlly two-thirds of this heterogenous fighting face consisted of naval personnel .nd one-third of army troops. Army organizational equipment of the defenders vras supplemented by armanent from the battered planes from the surrounding airfields, and from the sunken ships in the harbor. EnerW troops totePod about 18,000. Its these forces had T 4bnila to the end, little attempt becn ccmm>itted to defend was made to withdraw into the hills to the east. With minor exceptions they fought to the death according to the original plan of defense. Nor had any plans been formulated for the evacuation of the civilian population. Rather, they vero used by the Japarnse as best suited their tactical needs: As screens against attacking troops, for barter, and as a means to enable their forces to infiltrate the American lines. Manila w-as taken in thirty-five days. The mission of delaying the United S-a.tea forcs had cost the enemy 17,000 counted dead and had loft nodern Manila a shambles. After the Fall of Manila After the fall of Manila., the remaining Japanese in the area retired to a previously constructed defense system to .the. east.. This a.as the forrtidarblo Shimbu Line, In March, elements of the 1st Cavalry Division and the 6th and 43d Infantry Divisions began a strong thrust which finally cracked the line.

68

HISTORY OF TECH-ITICkL INTELLIGENCE

The Japs, however, still remained entrenched around two dams, Ipo and Otawa, vhich stored a major portion of l.anila's water supply. On 17 MTay Ipo fell. (Map, Incl. 18) The blow was so unexpected that the Japs failed to demolish the dim with their previously planted explosives. Later in Mray, the 38th closed in on 11awa and also secured that dam intact. In the meantime, the area south of Mianila, to the extreme southern tip of Luzon, was gradually cleared of organized resistance, Recapitulation of Technical Intelligence Organization vAth Sixth Army A proper understanding of Tlchnical Intelligence at this point in the war requires a recapitulation of the manner in which it had evolved in its organization and its relationshi-, to the Armies. The Technical Intelligence Field Unit was the basic organization of Technical Intelligence. The Field Unit was composed of Technical Intelligence Teams selected from each of the six major branches of service concerned vith supply. One officer and two enlisted men normally composed a T. I. Team. During the Luzon operation there were generallr six teams to a unit. The senior officer from those on the various teans functioned as the officer in charge of the unit. Initially, in the Luzon operation, a unit was attached to each division and, acting under division G-2, operated only in the division area. Liaison between C--2 and the unit was one of the functions of the officer in charge and each team in turn maintained liaison with its respective branch of service at division headquarters. Operating in this fashion, all enemy materiel captured was processed by trained personnel. Certain items of equipment requiring labatory analysis were collected by the team and shipped to the Technical Intelligence Field Depot Unit. It was the function of the Depot Unit to orperate a provisional depot in the field until the United States Army Technical Intelligence Depot wras permanently established in the Philippines. Experience demonstrated that the original assignment of the units to divisions had a tendency to make this type of work inelastic. It became the practice in the middle of this operation, as units were released from the divisions, to assign thfem to corps, and for them to function under corps G-2 and staff officers. This practice made available the entire corps area to the unit rather than the comparatively small division area. In a:dition, one unit was assigned as a Sixth Army Headquarters Unit. By making this shift, the efficiency was immeasurably increased.

692

P:STo)RY OF' TFCITTICAL :rNT 7T- I.rGTCE Based on. tie ex-:,riernce gained iIn the early A)hase of the Luzon ope~r'titon) it vwas lec;idenq tc.t the Technical Intel.igence : UInit sh'ic.not ne,;ess,..rily include 2uau'terr aster and Miedical teams d as th:,r_~ was not ;tuff'cient wrork to w. their inci .iC;1 in ev :ry unit, :['v '-:rtermnnstcr nd ono iL'edical officer assigned to onprate d:i.rcctl?- unrder the control of the coordinating office (the corps '-2) ,;.; ,;:ufficiert. Sixth Army Technical Intelli.-eonce units on lal'-r ovratotionf consist-ed only of Orcdrnnce, Enginc-r, Signal Corps alJd Che..nical. 7.arfare pcrsonnel. T.uchnical Intclligenc Uinit activities reports wrere submitted monthly through G-2 channcls. Technic.l reports were widely dissemi.n'Iid, Ccpics wrlre fcrwvrrdcd directly to the vl.i-ious Chiefs of Servic, i!';.SCOS, vi th information c'on-is :adeC ava-ilab1le to G-2. lnrly of the l;eo-,nical renorts pbi.'.x;.;c Ivr-, in the lechnical Intelligcncc, S;c-t-.on of thi, Si:xth A my G-2 Toeekly Report prepared by the Sixth A.rm;y 1'ocln:i.cal Intclli.Snc Coordl.nr,:-or. Tests madc. bh,, tc '',7:. tn rcr, am irade anvail able to .allconcerned and wjr_ of iLinoci._-.te t-.cticall v.luu to the Si::th Army Special Intolligonco S..ction and. to guerrill. irunits operati.ng with ctapturcd oqui. iincnt. Besides ni.'iting th.. usual. n.luilber of reports for dissemination to the front. line troops tlhrough the G(-2 weekl.y reports of the corps to d-'.ch the.,y :-r. ained, personnel_ f the Technical Intclligence units loroo-.red and arLri.nistcr:<,d tr-i.ning progr.ms on the use and roefir of equlipment for Sixth Army comba.t troops. Cnoy: One ordn._ance techniciia:i.vr.;s rAl]_aced on duty with Speci.al Intcl'igt-rnco, Cix-tEh Arin., to coll.ct andi rcp.ir -we.pcns !and other eq'li-oment to 'b issued -'o ,uorrilla forces. in -are s undr opera .tional control of the; Conmmnding G:nerol, Sixth Army (distinguishcd'from areas under control of the Commanding Guneral. UST:L2., '`ccgnizeodcivil go-clrmnent,) decision for or disposition oJ' 3alva~.< mat.:riel was made by Sixth Army in all but the foll.o'v-.ng cases: Tlichical I:nt.lligenc aguncics wer,~ authorized to withdra%,w for Ilntl.ligencc and tr-ining p-arposcs anyr iteoms of cap-tured suppulies and cqui..r nt. Th.iy wore advised promptly of tha loc-.tion of c.ntured mratori. a -ncl given first w.re rnd priority for rcriov-.l of nec;-iss-.ry ite.ns. Ca:.pturd food, clothi.ng, a.nd medi.c]. smu-' lie -nd cquips mcnt wir.; possed to controcl of Philippini Civil Affairs Unit (P CAU) aft r th... Technicrl Int.lligecnco officer with the cmaturing unit si.gnified termination of his interest in these
items.

7o

Cominanecnders of' c-ptvri.ng cor-s, divisions or other major ind.o-<;lndcent ur:nts coi;,rm:d;od by -:.nra!l officers, utilized any cm0t'lr.(1- suw l iesird :qu--rr :nt considered b - them necessary for tl-' rcs.cut..o h,r n of iruncdiate combat. Tochrnic.l Int. l].i~,...<c o:l I-,z7n

Vi''old ~Units o:.:; 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 7nd 7 took pa.rt in the -niti:l.J sta-.:s of th. T,uon opcration ancd _'t,.r rer, sup lmcented cr rclievcd by row t (i crsonnel comprising these and other (-ms. unzits th-.t; oper {.ted oni Luzo1 areL sLio,,rn in Incl 3). Capt Creed, recov,,dr..d from his shinr-nel vound, ag.ini tock over as CcorCinantor cf ''chlnec-. l:nlttellirnc anld .r Ca.-mt St._rn!l, vrho had ben Acting Sixth Arirr T. I. Coordiil_..ti.r, joined one of th. tcms in the field. Duie to the r.ic!d advance of United Statcs troops on Luzon, vast quantities of matoriel werc captured by thc Technical Intelligelnco field units, including many new itri:ls of J-.pnr.eso equipment. iore informa.tion 7aS liadI 'v-iliblc to tactical ccmmuanders concerning this no.-ly disccvered equinioent, particul.rly Ordnance, ouaenl-r than ir .any rmviolus o.j.r^.4-iol, In tVl-: course of their rr T'r chnc'._cll it.' i'._.g.ence activitios, ner;be;s .f th,. v i.us to-mis colle:icted dt-. _hich supolied infcrmati.on on Ja-n("l nse 2il..muficturrers, Icc.ations of Jap.nese Army units, a-ndcl th., n;ios ofcthler i.ndividualls .nd orcamiiizations that had donated supplios tc th., n::.:,y .riarl.y. b F'-ny items -e:ore discovered, such as records, m s-.nu-l, '.nd diaries, .. s, which ererturned. over to CIC or to.ATS for i.nfcrn:f tion .nd tr.nslation. T. i. Fi:ld Unit No. 3: Tochnl .cl Intceliigence Fi-eld Depot Un:it

Fi.old Unit No. 3 again .cted as the Provisional depot unit in Iuzcn as it had dcnce in the Le-to cperation. The advance sectian cf this Unit 1.eft Lryte -.nd arrive.d at $Sn Fabian ('ap, Incl 18) in thb. Li~r.gnyen Gulf region, Luzon, on 11 January 1)1!5, but was latcr m.cved to San Jacintc, F anga.sin.m.n I'rovince, as Sixth Army trc,-es mocverd rapidly inl.and. ICero, the provisional depot remained until it vwas p: ssible to estaol.ish the Uiniteid Sta.tes Army Technical Intelig.ncc Depot in a...nila.

Besides acting as a depot unit,this unit covered the 25th Division sector in the early stages of the Luzcn cperation.Engincr Team NTo*3 (Capt Johnson,T/5 Garrett,Pvt Carson) recovered a quantity of mines,of which some were stored for shipment to the Depot at Finschhafen and others werc released to Sixth Army units to be used for training purposes. Medical Team Nol (Capt Able) of this unit recovered a variety of drugs from small Medical dumps
scattered throughout the area and turned thcm over to PCAU to be

used for civilian relief.

*7i

HISTORY OF

?E"T '

..'_-1, ' "7,.. r-

;o piro-;eJori i:'po h; In Fcbruary, F'ield Unit No, ' i.o.i + from 3an Jacinuc to ,ng.:'s !a:tanfi :.- -rwvi:.e , DI.zn.., b.t. .eft

, the materiel that had beo::n col..lectc a; .l : .,.1.- tc bc- forIepot tc be n'.t!..:noe .,cnr.,:'al .. g-l.r r warded later to thU. L.'.... cstablishud at ..a.i.a, The origi.nli plan of mairi;ti.ning a depot at San Jacinto proved to be vlnfrvorab.e aLs ecquilpment received from the tea.ls wa3 b..ing taken further -ma.y frfcm imanila instead of vorking, i;tvard thalt; ci.ty as or.igina.lly -)lainned, The iopot zmunit attcmpted to k -::pcontact with the various unf'ts, but distances became tco grCat. By this time quite a few changes hnac been made in the personnel cf the I)epot Unit: Capt Bess had bcen v-'c.:ndcd by rifle fire while attempting tc render '1uisable a Japanose 12'" hovitzer and had been evacuated to Loyte; all othor personnul had. returned to the Technical Intelligence Deot except Capt Ncvmkowski, T/Sgt Peterson, and T/5 mlcorc,of Ordnmnc,;T/5 Gar'eott and Pfc Carscn, Engineers; and T/5 MI.angiaracina, Ch(hmical Wairfaroehe alsc returned to the Depot shortly thereafter; later, Lt Abbott was added to this group. From their ne;'r location, Clark Field and the country surrounding Angeles were readily accessable, '.Much equipment had been buried by the Japanese in this vicinity so that in addition to their usual duties at the depot, Field Unit No. 3 had considerable field work to handle, operating socetimes under enemy fire. Shortly after the Depot had been established in Manila, Japan* ose mrateriel recovered in Luton during proceeding operations was brought in to thle Ilanila Depot from San Jacinto, where the advance i'ield depot had been tempcrarily in operaticn; the field depot unit wThich had roved to Angeles ho-:vcr,vz-as temiporarily maintained t, facilitate the handling of the flow of captured enoeiy rlatoricl comliing in at that time. Tc suppl.cin.unt their transportation facilities, the Angeles Depot tof.l repairetl a yersonnel carrior by going out and finding another one sc that parts could bo obtained. The team also broke dovin two Japanose diroctrrs, reoporting on the inferior machining parts, All. matericl. collected.(. moppin- up cperations during quantity of captured equipment), M'larch produced only a moderate vras brougllt up tc cco..it-cn and shlipped to the Technical Intelligence Depot at Yanila or to the ';nited ,tates,

72

:T"'TO'IY 01' ?C'-7TZCT. I'7 T

I'( 'l"I

During .,pril Lt hbbott returned to the Depot at Tanila] l and Capt NMwakows!<li, beforc Yaliny' ;-ct.:'sine( to Ordnance Team No, ' T ;chnlcal Ir .I.Li::..;c -:lrUn'.t 9, was hoLp itanized for yellom- j.n',lic,'c. ':'l', -i o < L z~r p:r seI't, T/'.gt Peterson, oifc ranking, N(.Qj wv-n i.n 'ch.rl-e of the tcmporary, drepot until June, when 2d 1,, "W:r.de. l "l,5'-,ibt;i:;ineer, w's sent from the United States .. r].ly T(cchn-ic-l i:. ]ignece Depot into WTTadquarters, Sixth A,1r7!y to (racaL;.a( the :ipmcnt rcnmaining at the provisional Lq depot, nt, . n,.s It. lr.bster w-s assistcd by T/5 Garrett and Pfc Carsonj th, fc:i o 1, ', -''inol 1 t. that time returning to the Technical V-t-,1 ._g :neo Q,'q:'-t, at . a'ni]a.
'.

I. I.

iLd tnit No!

7:

ilOth Divnsior

Piel(J TTnit, No 7 was attached to the )rOth Division early in Decrmber 19L11il atr, tCpc Glnuco-str New -3ritainl. The division left No-w Y!ritain 9 pecember to conrluct a dry-run landing opecration at Ir`l:mnus T:3land in the Adcniraltties, They. landed at Lingayen beach 9 January, T-,.Day, at 1900 hours; under ?i fire, with enemy planes flying low over th(: LST they were aboard. RB 29 January they had ndvanced as far as Bamball, where stubborn enemy resistance fromi well-fortified cnves slowed down their advance.

This unit, like a.ll others in the field during op;rations, accompanied com.abat pa.trols so they would }),n on hand rrhen equipment was rccovared. and considerablc TntJligernce materiel for all the serviccs was uncovered in the Ft, Stots'enburg and Clark Field areas, although many oi the supplies had been looted by the civilians. T. I. Field Unit No., 6: 37th Division

Personne]. of TField Unit No. 6 landed at Lingayen Gulf 22 and 23 janua.ry After reporting to C-2 of Sixth Army, the Unit joined the 37th Diisiion 'at Conchpion on 27 Januar.y l9 , and operateod wi.th th;s dii- oen onl thli drive do'n Hiilrhway No. 3 all the way from that poirt' throiuh th],e ?lani l operation. ~No enemy Chemlcllc1 ;failfre equipment was uncovered by CiwS Temn No' 3 (Lt !ax Ljo Hilbbs, T/?i fTs9 Dr Garner) in the- 37th Division aS_: ntil the Uni rekahed C]irk Field and ocr t jt S+oti:rn, r ,%-;.i- : _ .'-;~Jld: o ]ai'-i,~ ano~ ~;, r. r,, : ,.lt.4; i w,. erdt.c-eJi ib%..n- a, C:n rc'.ri;lcM ,.z.e0i 1J'i.-; was i.nm,. i the Tan:l'l arl.n 6 by t. tct', 1'; th.. re+'-n" * mane nm.i-lc 1i cql.ui)jnt', 'w iYJ :;o' .edln sm:i.l qu;antla.:Ls'tt.ro. g;llhctu the city,

73

HTSTOnRY CF TEC'ITTrC'"L T'\UTT.TG'YNC,

'pparently the Japan se cer, w.ell supplied with smoke bombs and incendiaries. The latter wer? used with good acffect in portions of Manila already taken by United ,ctat.-s troops, for there was no sector after the entry of United activity in the ,Inia cn.mylair States forces, During! the early days of th, b'a tle for Manila, a lazity of gas discipline war nthed among the encmy troops, cvidenccd by the fact that few Japancse casualti.es were carrying their gas masks. During the latter stages of the Inila operation, howercr, good gas No war gases, other than a limited supply discipline wa-s apparcnt. of toxic smoke, were used, and it was believed that t he Japanese chemical vwarfare. Tt ;oere not capable of' initiating or maintaining deduced thatthe enemy did not anticipate the United waas Alrther Statcs ;.rmy intiating the use of war gases. Arrngements w..re mad:: for Capt Clyde R. Woodworth to operatec withthe 37th Division Surgeon t s office. The iianila area? was covered as sections of it fell, except th: portion immediately ncnmy around Intramuros, Tntrr-.uros, itself, and the port area. of approximatcly 200 items of drugs materiel recovered consisted not listed in the nmanumal, ,'J'panese DrUgs and ,edicine", and miscellaneous items consisi.tinrl of mcdical. notes and pharm:laceutical texts written in Japanese. No large du.'ps ware found, however. Accordin- to Filipino accounts, the prilary cause was the fact that the encemy did not have extensive supplies of either liedical equipment or drugs. A,nother important factor was that M.edical :Mlatcriel not burned by the rctre:'ting J-apanese was looted promptly by the natives. Ordnarnce Teaml`To. 3 of this Unit (Capt r;illimm E. Tinterstein, T/ VTinn) conducted firin, tests onl a newly recovered and very iip.nortant trpe , 20 cn and a hh.Sm roknt launcher. C n Capt rinterstein's re:prts on these rockets were later published by Sixth Army and by the, Tar Dcpiartlmnt. Siignal Te'mu No. 3 (Lt Daniels, T/h Tobert R. _Ap-,ar, Jr, T,/h r:.ax "A,,. Bratt) located atthie I;,anila Golf Course a transmitter station, the equivalent of the U. S. Press -ireless Corporation. '.nother ralio station was located in the San ?'iguel Brewery, :.t where other equipnent of Intelligence value was recovered. the Union Theologicalh Seminary, burned-out Signal equipment, part of the Japanese 5Kit' short -wave radio telegraph receiving equipment, was discovered.

7T

HIST(ORY OT

TTCI;IC:,lL ITTEL. I:('NCF,

Major G,-ncral. R.brrt S.lkPeil't1]cr, C-i.zarnding Gcnu.ral of the

37th Infantry Divisi;.;r) rc-tc a l-'tt;r cf c-!:mmndatinl on' the

actt-i.vties of this unit t- the Co:mmanding Gcneral, USISOS,(Incl 19), comllondinfr their e.!nthusiasmcnergy and initiative while worrking under ccnsid:rablc hlasards from enery fire, nines and booby traps, Iic wzroteo that tllri.uah1 their efforts much equipment and many supplies wvhich Twrul.(l 1lv (y hll iOsce bec-n lost weore obtained. He further stated that in (a nrw br o3f c.scs the first inf-:rmAtion on itens cf JapLanese (rclmanc.: anld -thl-r equipnmnt was obtained through tht efforts vf th]e te;a',: c rllrisinr:' Technical Intelligence Unit No.6, rocket, first encountered in M'anila. citing particularly thu 4lh7 1.n: T.I. Field Unit No, 1; XI Crps Field Unit !c.l rcported to-38th Division, Eirghth Arry,staging on Leytc fcr the Iuzon operation,and secured per.issicon to go into the i'ield wrh!re they operated in the 7th and 77th Divisions' sectors. During; the ere.ter p.art of January 1945 the Unit was preparing for the .H-7 pcerlation- On D-Day,29 January, they landed with the 38th Divisi,-'n at La Paz, ZmabalCs, :Luzn. As there was no oppcsiticn,thc 3ith r--v..d rapnidlly fcrnvrd and the TWieold Unit set up

locati.:

on n-the Ccstolajos airstrip on the n:'.!ht of 30 January.

The next dLay all. tlhe t:.ar.ms of Uni..t;io. 1 were placed on tempcrtarer duty with G-2,XI Corps in ccnfcrmity with the policy of shifti.ng T,l,units under cor 's r.ther than division headquarters.
XI Corps headquarters vwas in ccrnandl. of the entire operation and

allotwed corlpleto, covyera[o by the tvar.ms in their search for new itCols cf cncny cquipment.The corps at that time was directingl the operaiticn rf the 38th Drivision and the 3)1th lerr;inental Corbat Team of thc 2lth iJivision.hlwhso r:ission was to cut off Bataan Penninsula mand to join f:rces 'wi.th the XIV Ccrps coming down frmcn the ncrth, The ::isciin, froc:' the T.chlmical Intelli-ecnce standpointwas

not t;et: sucossful,as little equipment of Intellig.ence value was co:-llect(-d,, T:hl.e:cforfr thLe lUnit was directed by Ei(:hth .rrm.y to return to I,elte to prepare for anoth.er .:;poration. They left fromn CSubic B.a.y) ari.ivmin[: at EiL'hth Arm-y Hcadquarters cn 1_5 Fcbruary3 with only one dc.ay to prepare for another operation, They load'ed

the follciwirig (,day t,) join the task forco fcr the next operation,

75

HIS;TORY OF TI'PC NIT'AL IN'FLLIGENCE

I. i'.

Field ITnit N!o,

2:

lst

Cavalry Division

Fielld ninit Tio. on 8 K-:lrutar1ys lt915, hills to the (a :'r

Team No,

? was attached to t ::Ist Cavalry Division and opcL'ated in anrd ;l-ound 'anila and the ;'..,:u-r-' of' Ordnance -tlhaL.city. The onl:
::t,:rnal., .lli.hou',h handiica.!ppeci by lack of

11, (',i)',.

enlisted m(en (lid lo,' le seve,.:ral important O-rdnancce items. These irnc-ludecd q'arp it ie:s oi' pr,-ctically ev'.:ry type of amnmunition,. n!e,_: h.lrdidenrtified th: t ype ot artJllery beiig F'rom shell used a 'ainst Un i.te I Stat:s t;roops ari by the 3s:me method was :" rocket, Reports -u1 ll abl: tLo d t..': :a teha the .... my .va.s using :d o m..n:cmn.- tion whi.ch cold be. made ammni w'ver., *ilso rad,- of dumps ot availab.le t1o United Stat. s troops. Ch,-mie :L ,,ia.rfirt.: 1'cTlam o. '; ('rapt ,illiam J. Roberts, Sgt Chaxrl:::s B. Gt)'s, T/5 Ilaull I. rGoJig), which h.:,l flown with vehhi.clcs aindq 'i'Lpr:1(nt, 2' D.lc:-mber to join I ,orps, atis '-ssignt:d the mis:sion of conductIjn ' , sJurvwy on thh .,t.-:tus of Japanese Intelli., ncu had reports Chezmical Warfir(,e mip.l!:ionos in .,;lni'a. that sNvcrl plOaces in th,t c:ity h?,d b..ln us::: a stora-e for Th'l iLnvcsti:'utiolj, co-roborat.in- that of th:se munitions. t- m: J.n t!ie Ilanf]i. t arc.a, showed that others CIVS Intligenc ,v-'t.are!inmit-.ons and :rotect.ive. eqluipment non--lethal Chem.iccal .: had be.:n used in mod-v:...! qu:ntitI. s in -an :f.around Ymanila but clinu-h qunti ].a._; to indic:tie th-t the Japan-se not in latr: e ' were prep';-r`:d oiff'rnsii-vl or id::tO ively for Chemical Afairf-re. the entir': Philippine Campaign, Engineer IntellThroughoutl igence teams did 'a ltre ~.amount of mine. :tmoval work when it exp;dited combat ,tction, rather than waiL, for Divi7lion Engineer troops to clear tbh: -re:as. 'Th;: Enginee:r Intc-,lligence teams and thei En:illlne n:lysi:; Sction :lso assisted in settil-- up exhibits and t-l:incd Arm,/ Divisions on J.:p mni.-ns lnd booby tr:aps. th- ,,nd of' February, which ended thi- first p::riof o!' the Luzon opcrAtion, Technical Intilligcmnce per.sonl. 1 on tcmnporary duty to Si.xth Armry had ope:r'It,,.d in the, c:ntr-al plainof Luzon, Lanila, CorripFidor, .Lt.,n .nd th. hi.lls eastIin:3 southeast of IMlanila (ifap Incl 13).
3y

76

HTLST0,Y OF T.CTINTC XL INTTLT.IG2,NC Tecchnicil T tel ito ncro on Tuzon

a fter

cebruary 1945

All tie previoussly dicunse.1 'ie] 1 Tniits-- Units 1, 2, 3, 6, and 7 -- had lbeen relieved f'r,:: fiell.: duty by farch and returned t, thl(-, Teeclricn ITntelli.;ience DTnp':b for luty v.ith analysis

sectiuns.

Ficl:l lUnit No. 5, h-wewrr,

rc:..oinlel1 on operations with

XIV Corps, Three ( ti ,r units vrwrec also) in thll field after M(arch: Field Unit N:o , v.l'li::l :ls. h:.d iarticipated in the original Luzon ' assi:,rle t.; I Cor;:Is; Fil.tld Unit NC. 8, new in the field, landing:s; also assigned to T C rps; and Ficld Unit No. 9, newly assigned to XT Corps.
Special
r.

T, Teams with Sixth Arry

ITeadqularters Sixth ArcyY located at San Fernando, Panpanga province, instituted ,n extensive training course on enemy equip.
nent for its troops durinS the month of .tnay. Alto,~.ther, nine Technical Ilntell]i-enc temps, desi~gn tecd as tt"ne-'y rquipment and Materiel Instrll+,i,7on Teams;s, prt:icipatud in this program, con-

ducted under the: direction of the AC of S, 6(-3. The rorr-ups included: Chemical a..'arfare Team No. 2 from Field Unit No, 4,; ngineer Team No. 6 from Field Unit No. 8; three Ordnance tcam:s -- 5, 7, and 11 -- composed of personnel from Field Units 5, 8, anc 9; and three Signal teruns -- 1, 2, and h -- fromi Field Units 9, 4, and 5, respectively. In addition to Units 11, 5, 8, and 9 that were in the field

during rpril, and the rnemy Equipmrent and !;ateriel Instuction teams, there were addedJ two individual tenas operating directly under Sixth Xrny G-2 on special assinnments. Instead of being confined to certain sectors, those teamrs novered all areas occupied by Sixth ArTmy com:bat units on LuzOn. To assist the guerrilla forces in Northern Luzon in locating, collecting and ropairi'l- items of equiprment, T/3 Lischalk and Pvt Thevenot, Ordnance technicin.s, functioned as an Enemy 7Weaponls Team workin, directly under the Spcinl Tntellience Section, Sixth Army Headquarters. Pvt Thevwenot was hospitalized so;le t inc later, but S,3t Lischal].k, aided by his team training in the field, continued to supply the troops with we-pnns and a;nmunition. Due to his work considerably quantities of Japanese Ordnance materiel were utilized bythe guerillas in the N rthern Luzon area. The othr special tearm *was a JAPLI.T Teun consisting of T/,Sgt Julius I,.Tforton an-l Sgt Illen J. Branigan which worked directly out of Sixth ArRy He adquarters and was assigned to the collection of JY.PI.':T,. code name for nameplates and rubbings from captured

77

HI.,TORY OF TECMIHNICAL INTTELLJLENoFC

-i larre quantity of name Thl- s team processd ez:nemy equipment,. plates d-aily foi, t-aon:omittal. to A; o C-, -'SA SOS, from whom they were sent to t h'n Direct.or or oIntel]i,;Lnce, lrmy S-rvice on '(.it::r to 'iJl ( Ground rn(di st y Sectio!n, '1S, Forces, :ashi.nr-, ;'ashington). ,.'] t!r < ollection of This tean,, whiceh ;-;uc,.-. 's.. ll.. ?.exp;it namrpl.:teis wvrs orL'ti:;, 4d i, con:.t o,i.ty , .rith '" ;F lott r, 8 6 .3, ,,ubj".ct: Eamb.r .ta fron. Scril. s t scnd Simpl' FEG(-3 Capttured Jap:ln;-:,e ,..lt'i;. o'ihc r thaon airc,'-f ,. d, t.ci. 3 ehbru-ry 19115 (Inl 20()). Thi;s '.tt!: d]L.e.tei respornsibility for the i,.t~o; an(' mi:r.kings on c; ptured collection -nfl proc 3ss ,)f o,):i' n;'rrT enemy quipi'nent ini S'.i tI oto ht-. 'omcl:nuin, ; CLnei'al, TUSA0S, !nd p rsonn3l to collect and advise direc tod Tcchnireal Int(.:ligenc.c thecommands to which th,.?r wcrc attached on procossing nameplates and marking dat,,.. Sinc.; the Office, of the AS oi S, G-2, F'SASOS, was responsible for the. co :rdinai \n of T.hn-in.;1. .Tniel.ligence activitcs, the . S-2 offices of var;j. is v-S:' es in the Phi].ippines were designated the coordinating ag;eneies for Techricxal intelligoncr' whihin those bases, offict-r was app,:,i.nt,.--d at e-_ch base ,with T:.chnical Intelligence includi.na re-ponlsibilitv for' cell., cio]i 0.2 JAPL'T, as his sole function (lett::.r, ;Si3'-366.3, lieadquarters !'3A20OS, Sub ject: Nameplates and Technical Intellig.eice, d:.ted 13 Ft bruary 19b5 (Incl 21).

T. I.

Field Unit No..

I f& XIV Corps

T. I. Field Unit No. 5 had lar.:d.d or -. hite Beach No. 3 at the town of San Fabian, 'vith the 13tdd Division the morning of D-Day. During the period of 9 to 31. Janu.ry th s Unit )perlted in the h3rd and )ccasionally in the 25th Diviions' areas, b-)th in Cavite Province,, souith oJI' 1 'anila, i On 1. Ftruary th- thir t wi..' plaec: on tmporary duty with

I Corps, continuine with the !43rd and some telams with the 32nd and 33rd Divisirns, On 21 T'.ebruarv they were rtli(cved from duty with Sixth Ar!ly to be sent t.o XIV Corps, operating in Batanfgas Province in Southern Iuzon e:.st of Lake T tal, where contacts were made with thc 1st Cav/l-ry and the ~lth Airborne Divisions. Chemical ilarfare Team 1No. 7 (Crtpt Lary, Sct Pranigan, T/L[ vooney) of Fi-:ld Unit .To,5, c,ollI.ct,C(,d a c;noJid :rable quantity of Jap equipment in the: hf3d and l!,tcr in the 33d and 32d Divisionns' sectors. This include-d:. proleetiv. clothing, fl.an throwers,. :2mintenance and testing kits, detector dits, smokoe candles and ,:_s masks of various types. There se.::med to be no systematic l.ying of mine fields in the
l3d Divisiln sactor. A fiw tape measure mines were found lying on the

concr:te hihw.3y, but they wcre poorly conceAled and easly recognized. Otherss, nl)t si: easily d;tected, were placed in brokcen spots in the Pa'crmcnt.. At ni.'ht, infi.ltration parties planted mines and depth char.es at bridges and along the shoulders of prcvirusly cleared roads, Which resulted in sonme casualties and made it necessary to rcsweep the roads every morning,

T7

HISTORY OF TETC'(-TqJICAL INTELLIGENCE Several booby traps reported by civilians to PCAU were removed or neutralizcd by the Engineer Tntelligence Team (Capt J6rdan A., IHaIncr lA/4 Roeor 1'.Sherwood, and Pvt Enile M. Turcotte). Later, because cf the enomyls use of mines and booby traps, a report on their descrirtion and method of neutralization was submitted by the team to 43d Division C-2 and thence tc the S-2 of all battalions and ro-imonto. In the 11th 'Airborne area a great dcal of heavy Engineering equipnment of all, types was recovered, including diesel and gasoline engines, air ciclrossors, se;oarchlights,ccncroto mixers,well drilling rigs, stool sharpeners,lathus, bull dozorsroad rollersgasoline locomotives and lmnly other itels6I'Also, thousands of mines, mostly bombsjshells and dtepth-chargos vith pressure ifnitersjwere found in this area. Many yardstick, flowcr pots conical boat1 and lunge mines with a light metal shelloyrero also found throuLhout this area, Medical Temn No, 5 (Capt Frederick B. Thonpson Lt James Molthan) recovered the following iternswhich wrere either put for United states troops or turned over to PCAU fcr civilian a portable X-Ray unit, 2 portable surgical tables, a culture cubator,and numerous drugs and dressinl-s, L. to use use: in-

Ordnance Intelligence Teoan No, (Lt Philip A, TWurzelPvt Ben T.Garcia) in December rwas attached temporarily to 43rd Division, but on corlplction of landin4g operations on D-Dayvrcrked independently as a team lccated at San JacintoLuzon. San Jacinto made a convenient base for shcrt trips into the surrounding operational areaswhore considerable equiprment was recovered. By request of G-2 33d Division,this team submitted an instructive report on Japanese tactics and equipment used in the Luzon area which -vrs disseminated to the trcops. This tean also turned over assorted items of Intelligence value to the Depot and released a few weapons to the Ccordinator of Technical Intelligence for guerrilla supply. In April,they were joined by Capt Sternal. Previous to this Capt Sternal haOc operated alone as the only tean in the field from Field Unit No.,2. He had-been in contact with the eneny east of Mlanila throughout March,cxcept for a ten-day rest period. He resuned operations on the 25th of March and then was transferred in April to Field Unit No, 5 as officer in charge of the Unit, In Liaythis personncl .as transferred to Headquarters Sixth 'rmyyagain operating as Ordnance Tear. No, with T/5 Storckx (from Field Unit No, 8 ) added as a second enlisted rian;Capt Sternal a'ain headerd( up Ordnance Team No,l11 assisted by T/4 Blaney and T/5 Gabage from Field Units N;o. 8 and 9 respectively, Quartermaster Tean No.5,(ILt Philip C.AndorsonPvt Kenneth S, Echord) uncovered soveral large food dumps containing the usual riceo fishycrackers and cotmon condinents,which were turned over to the 43d Division Quartermaster and PCAU for distribution to the civilian Populaticn. 79 79

HTrSTCmY 01' TCUTNTC'T, TVTNLLTGJ7"1 Simnarl, Tam ?l,.. h (Lt 1'Tllir.i 1, ITar:in.l T/3 lnurt ':. Richter, T./- Julius J. ,latto) covortd thc )13d Division region south of !.anila during, J.nuary and February, securing, along with other equipment, i suitcase radnio viilently intended for espionage work. Thic iten was reported through the XIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report. In June, this tean wa; transferred to Headquarters sixth r,rmy ,as nne of th, ETnemy Equipment and ciaterial Instuction Teams. The Chcilical ?.:irfaroe, ETngincer and 'odical te'n-s from this Unit returned to the Depot carly in Trarch The rest of the teai.s, with the exception of those transferre I to Hcadquarters Sixth rrny, returnec on 25 'ipril. T. I. Field Unit iNo. L4: T Corps

%'lilc M.5anila was being cnptured to the anuth, United States Forces wheeled and struck northward toward Baguio, around which centered one of the most bitterly protracted battles of the entire
carpaign. The city fell on 29 ^.pril. Phoad lay Balete Pass, con-

trolling the -approaches to the Cagaya.n VTa]3ey, Japanese broad basket in the philippines. Field Unit No. 4 which had landed in the Lingayen Gulf area on D-Day, was nttached to I Corps, workinc: in t'he 6th, 25th, 3'3d, and 37th Divisions, sectors. Considoerble equipment and materiel were recovered as the Unit worked its wny up the Lingayen Valley. During webruary, this Unit alsfo ailed in conducting a short course
on Japanese equipment for -irriored units under I Corps.

Chemical ,nrfare Team No. 2 (Capt Paul J. ?ralsh, T/4 Robert J. Shorwman, T/5 Riayllond D. Gaddo) of this unit supplied information to Headquarters, I Corps, which enabled them to make an estinate of the enemy Chemical ',Arfare situation, including: the perccnt:l.ge of enemy troops carryin- gas masks and protective clothing; a notation of the presence of Chemical -lirfare munitions and devices used in offensive action; a record of the r'as-proofing of eneny enpl'accllents; and a report on the fact that Japanese tanks and holding (ictachments wore carrying smoke candles for screening purposes. -ith the exception of connon type smoke candles, however, this teanm found little Chenicrl TlTarfare equipment. In May, T/4 Shovnman wvas rocall-:d to the Technical Intelligence Depot, and Capt :7alsh and 9St Gaddeo wcre transferred to Headquarters, Sixth Armry, to instruct in Chemical Uarfare with the Enemy Equipment and Mfateriel Instruction To(ams conducting the Sixth /,rny training pr ogra. Engineer Temam No. 1 (Major Harwood, T/3 Ellyett, T/3 Paris),
80

ITTSTO01Y OF TTCIrTINTCALT, ITN'rLT?'ITTCr

in a 'lition toi tlli r utine recnv1'ry of enrey equipment, discovered and neultraliz1 th'n nv7 s1.'k n~in, and mrny improrvsed mines ,-nl boc.by trps3. T1he renor'r,s odit,&e by i.-s sea.1: for lissemination to- front line units on :r!:;oa.:tns ' ns in :l'! istrtL!Cti handling irnprovi.strl TT.p beotl;y tyrips wic:z i:.;:izumnta_ ir prevent.ng casualties in tec !iivisions in wlli.ch ;-iey ;cr.~, servlng. If ccmmrtnic'tions ha , been e+,tt:liv E. ' b r, 1s 'rhave bcOl saved in the 2hth Divisi on,vwhi.nUl h'dl n .stlajt c-.sualtlcs from sack mines -`wo and suffL,red cw)pcurrct m.-luje to equ-ipment:.

Sev.ral items o,.i' enemy Ordn:.ncc, of which little was known, were rdisce,,vare.! in the 6(th infantr-y Divisionrs sector by Ordnance Te,'ll o. 1 (Capt ?op, hfc ,J. -vi, peters. pvt Robert ?:To reTmrietas). These included flramec thrw'ln-- runs and tanks, and a tye 90, T15 mm . hifgh vclucity field glln, Other irtprover-ents ,ncL nevr trpe Or Inance nnted: an incrcesedl number of medliwi artilAlery guns (105 mm and 150) rmm cnlibcr) over the li.;-htcr cnlibr:rs (70 mm end 75 min types); also incre-ased aimounts of 10i5 and 150 ;im rmirunitior. Enemry st.,reo of f. w-hich were taken were turned over to A the Philippine Civil ,^ffrirs Units, who in turn distributed then to needy natives. "To lar-e f ,, dumps cr diur:ps of nlew equipment were .I encountered by Ouartermist-r Tear No. 1 (T,t Roy H. Curry and pvt Harold E, ,bbott) and st.lall durmps were ra.)idly looted by the Filipinos. Around Batuio, in the 33d and 37th Division sectors, the team recvere-l a feLw Quarternaster itemsl rff c'-,:ian type, the quantity and s tyle of items recovcre . plainly indicating the lack of supplics of the enemy: i.ters such as raincoats and blankets sherwed evidence of wear and. were evidently recl aimed, washed, patched, an-L reissue.l by the Japs; Americ:n-made GI shoes that had been captured ha,'/ the uppors cut away anl tlle edges remade so that they also might be re-issued to the Japanese. Sirnalt. Team No. 2 (Capt 're1d '. Wierst,,ad, T/Sgt Robert J. McConkic, T/.5kstill C,. ]iekl :si-mr) founl little Signal equipment until the f.sll jf T:muic:,. ITer., large quantities of equipnent were rccovrre!: fri.~ cavzes and other storage points. Some rm!ios wcore turned over to United States troops, and one, a no:Adel 94 mark 6 radio oet~, -;-as used by the 37th Division for intercept work. A Jnr.p.r.s.. public addlress srystem %with a 100watt output, completc with I '-,ynom-:ic sdeal:er, was installed in a corn :and and rec:.nnaissanc:: car by personmel of this team for use by the Sixth Ar;'y psycholuo)ica]J -;arfare Brnnch. The bulk of the captured equipment was shipped to the Technical Intelligence Depot. In June, this entire term was tr'ansferre TIeadquarters d to Sixth rnry, as one of the lneny 7quipmr:nt and T,ateriel Instruction Teeams.

81

IlISTORY OF TEC1IiIIC.T, INTELLIGENCE T.IFiold Unit N<c, 8: I Ccrns Of the seven ori!ina3 Field Units that had launched the cporaticns in S;:uthern Luzmn,only Field Units 4 and 5 rernained in the field during March and ALpril, The rest were returned to the United States !.rr.a Tcchnic.^.l Intclligence Depot and rwere replaced by Field Units 8 and 9. Field Unit No. 8 left Finschhafon on 5 I.rch 1945;just before the DeoIot clbsodl in 1-reparaticn for the transfer tc Manila0 As the Unit was now in the field", it operatcc in conjuncticn with Field lnd in the case of ncw peras Unit No,4 until the end of MSarch, scnncl,a rCcd de.l of its ti:ne v;as absorbed at first in beccring far.iliar vrith field operaticns in pre-iaration fcr future assignlontso Field Unit Noc8,acting uion instructions of G-2,I corps,operated 'idth the 32d and 25th Divisions in the Villa Verde Trail and Balete Pass areas of Northern Luzon fre.7' 24 }March on through A.ril In addition to their rcegular dutiesall sections of this Unit cooperated to collect nurercus items of enemy equipr.ent to be added to the I Corps Informnation andt Educ.ticn Conterts display Benjamin A Becker, C7S Teal No, 13 (1st Lt Louis 1}.cny,,lS/;t T/5 Charles H, Johnson) of this Unit had spent considerable tire contacting the Chr.ical lWarfare officers of I Corips, including division officrs. in order to concur vwith a new procedure of operation for C1.S Technical Intelligence teoms as directed by the Cheiical officers of sixth .rrmy and I Comrs.S !,S-t Bcker received a headvwound as a result of the In March, J accidental discharge of a 45 caliber pistoland was evacuated from the area. Engineer Tcam Nos6 (Lt Frank JDiPhillips,Pvt Rudy GoColby, Pvt Euseno F. Wcins) found a considerable quantity cf mines and booby traps, They ovrcr callcdl ui.on to fariliarize the troo% s vrith this equipment and to subl:mit rel:orts which wore published by G-2 for the interest of all ccnccrnoedLater in May they w-ere called in to Sixth 'ArLm Headquarters to assist in the Enemy Equiprment and Matoricl Instruction Tea.lst training prorgranm The m..edical officer;Lt John BiMuddilan,ooperated in conjunction ;'ith Field Units 4 and 5,in the I Cor;:s sector, Sar.rles of 195 Ja>panese mcdicinals and laboratcry reagents ireo recovcred,togother with sanmples of Jap-anese rledicl,, surgical,delntaland X-Ray equipment recovered from around Baguio, Lt Muddiman also identified the ener.y drugs stcred at PCALU hos-iital.s within the I Corps sector to I.ernit their use by PC.,U physicians,

HISTORY OF TCHIT'l ^.L IHTiTETI,I GT'.lCE Ordnan~,e Tumn No.,9 (IT,; Glenn E,. OnanSt,lt.arren D, Blaney,
T/5 Allen LI':itc:.;lckx)
Ordnancc :Lr.: L* :Ln : o ;;.. ,,er arr. used in .tCe'-.nCd ,O,:''; a-c ",of

i',velod , . ns-.da.rdoT; e ';... na,.hh.noe

amounr,

of enemy

Ordnance co.ni?;.:: . f'c .c,;~ to a coio.l. ot f. l .,anyp Mn.ny M, ;if.e5s roi j.'o-!.CJp. an:-r,:se ma;hire ,funswrc LUtrnc.l cn ':i c ner.y by U;;ited Staeo,3 and. Philippine AL.rry

ura ;,....h had b)een ' ;1.. rm;r,' was tu.neCd in to cfJi at lnd t,]l i:W.s ,-?'':;l--: mlincd ..ror

units in 'I;azr ;at 1 s. s, Lt, Omian rcu-niu to the Tech;-ical Intelligen.oe I)e-:ot in l.My. d P.c -id Vc'.t L-.' 'lrZ-1 rby tP ,l.l u;; yrep:,-T/5 S-'c?:' Garcia. cn e T07;,'.;h; i';, .ieo. .r. m c T . ; Btola.Ioy ;;el,:rte-d to pt r Sternal onr O~clnar~ :.L eoL No Ii, . ' t- e.s ;e'ar-t-:.ipciad in the Sixth A Army Enrimy E,allimnlrt arni Fl cc'p:, iest. utio; c :-.rotrar ,t lu"-k reccvcring eauiprent as nc er.eir ur':y , f .as eIsizni.'l,:.ai:.ce a'7re o"',tured along the Viila Ve.rde Trail -', the Ba'lete Pa a.'re-. thsogh Ls in cellancouls i-;enms .;vrcroec 'r".1D,! +tci t tre limrted ac'ti-- ,L' concerning enemy Ql.lart.-rMast(o--r iteri:i.s.Cat- Robert 3, Glmnderson ,Pvt Ponciano LoredDP-rt ,Ii..hl, eI J; Picoli.,of this team devoted rnach of their time to assistin, the Ordnance tean, Hovover,some research on United States quartcr;,ilstcr itei!s .as completed.
i'.na' -e .-'.

The quartcrmast,: sect-Lon ha. i-,tc-i

T.,I. Field Uni' No.9 JXI

orps

Field unit No,9'was attached to XI Ccrps coerating in the central Luzon sectors All. six services comprised the teams of this Unit. GCTVS Intelligence Team NJoh14 (Capt ILussel To,JerbyCpl Willian HDavidsonPfc George B.Reagan),covering the 28th and 43d Division arcas,found so:.ic new equipment Good examples 6f Ja-anose heavy Enrincer equipment woere located by Engineer Teamr Nco6'(Lt Frank G. PospisilS/Sgt Richard T,Smith, Pvt Frank M, LeCdesr.ia) The }.iedical cfficer,1,t Earl )D.Raabrecovered some M.edical materiel fror alarzre sxupply hJnm19: a r:ncrosc-o-~ejan anesthesian mLachinealibhGL:, .:eous ,,is:ceuJ. . bandagecs a.nd dressingslysola cdental kit a water l;rsifreranc assorted quantities of drugs and medicines, Non-expendabl. items were processed through the technical Intelligence Dcpoto Several types of heavy erquli;,ment were recovered by Ordncance Team Ioe,8 (Capt Jack K,Palce.r:Cpl John P,SramllwoodPfc Charles R. Kabele) anda ordnance Tear No c,7 (Lt Henry Lo, bbottT/i5 Victor J. Gabage)Pfc Robert PShinn).This included a 15 cm sel;-p)ropelled mount,a 70 rm battalion hcvtrit,era 75 nrm Lamaa truck and all t3yes of arnmunition.Two type 97 Jap tanks mounting 47 rmr, guns were found.

83

HISTOIY

TFTCGitE'J/L IN JLLIGEFTvE .'O

Durin? ... :.tr.:1 and ,.r'i., sev..r.l chori> s itrpers')rnel were made within thi:" ceam an c 5,'-nLn', &t'teh :rj irC hosp-Ltai .a.ton peri:o1 was ^ returne t. t.. c re:;hn n.t:_li-: ..;c::ii....ptj Ja; t eer .aL wais cs italized fcr a1o..)e,bic dvy.u.' ,"ryJ C,; , ':,.::h..slta1i: c. fa.r .n ir;crctud handl; u'lld th-; . 4 Oif).flr .rJ: t!tK"J..; we-re ro:,!lrnko :.s Ordnance tean No 7

with Lt, A : rt'' t in (:1 .r. I1 , v.r (4p1 '.; .1:'(.;o I r .turrned to the Tuchiiical Intclliigence Depot but .. t /.,' tt :i r, c ;..ll r'e!jrted to Sixth Army Heedfcquarters as Dre of tl Ord.ri.C!, le .:s, ;)ar'Lc'iPa ',n i.nrin the -Lnemrv Ecq;ip..ent and ''ate-riel Iistructli_; tra'ii ri:, progzL.; Or; 3,-be, upn baling reaease-d fu . the h:' hoipitaJ, ; r -ti,;:,rt..:d :,c ixth Arny7r to assis+, wi.h the training
rnc. Tceam No. .ll r:f' ..u..rt.r::-er erequirlent w,;re rceccv..;red by S/Sgt William J, Pcts, I-vt ri;rd raI. tre; -end rvt 'i.li.ar iatkins oi Quarterr naster Telm NT,,o 6, As most of th se had n: Int.el]_iier, e value, they were turned r, -:r ts, lo salVel' ;.rits aSl for disposition. During April,
i1' Cpt t{ rnaii's
'

pro .ra-j

a.s pj'.r't

Oi:dn

irJ

't;yies

Pvt Xatkins Signl:.

.,':s relievw.d of duty with this team. Teaim N'. 1 (T/3 Lotz, Pfc Anderson) found that areas re-

cently evacuated by the enem'y yielded only smnall ramouilts of Signal

equipment. Therc(f'ore, in Ju:ne, Pf^ Anderson reoGurned -o the Technical Inte].ligence Depjt, Yanila, and T/3 LDtz was sent to Sixth Armry Ho:-dqu:rrters a, Sign4l T'eam No, 1 in th:- Enenmy Equipment and Materiel Instruzcivn program. Close of' Operti-ns on Lu.on Sixth Army operations in central and northe-rn Luzon during TMay moved slowly but sttadily forwrard East of f'anila, where the enemy

-. strongly entrench--d, their r sistarmce was stubborn. as

0'aJwa Dg.rns,

Ipo and wili.chi contrr-ll.cd' the Iianila water supply, vrere secured

intact, hwvrever, a'd 'the Japanese fP rccs here, as well. as in Southern Luzon, were e:ncircled Ind redtllci.d to renar.nts by June. In the north, Bsgui.3 fell, and though the Japs stage;d strong counter-attaoks against United States f-rces along the Villla Verde Trail, they ivere;pusherd bl.ck froni their cave positions along Balete Iidge, and Baletc Pass its:elf was taken.
At th(e bugi.lning -if Juln,) the Cag;-yan Valley Was the only large area in Luzrn remniaiing in :rnemy hands. A cormbined American and

Philippine f)rce cl)s-ed in on Jpmarri,

'et the northern end of the

Cagayan Vae-lluy aInd secured the tomn without opposition on 21 June.

iveanmrhil.e Sixth Arry forces hadl ma.de pincer drives from Balete ~ass at the southern end :f t+he Valley n)rtlhwest atong IIighway No. L[ and northeast along Highway N.. 5. On 26Tuwie, near A]cala,
Sixth 5rmw's 37th Division made co-ntact with leading elements of

HISTOTlY OF TECH1INTCAL TIT"LLTJ'TNCE, the 511th PFrachute Tnlfantry which htd advanced south along Hi'jhway No. 5 fC,ll(..in an airb(.rnc invasi)nln nc(,r r.parri. This Juncti, n effP:ctivoly secureo. the cntire len-th of the Ca-ay.n valley. ?roLm then t :; th.. clr!sre of the tuzo n operation, which by the end of the -w;r, f.Fihtin7 consisted mainly w.as terrnillnt...l in liquidatin,; p wvkets of cnir.ry rcsist"nce which had been bypassed.

85

HISTORYL

OF
, i

,TC

T .TI T -j-

rv>^

T 1PE ki VIiL

';S<U? '_.:'it' k iLLPLrr' . ECA.

rcc.: t
.,s t.c 'i-xh
.rir

r.!
'l. h:.d e-rn

--

w)v 191!V 1umst

..- s:L ned the Luz:,n operati.on and their

full eflorts were needed to be focused to the north, the task of clean.r.i ot,t thle Jap:'..ese resistance in the South.ern FPhilippines was dele:!.ted to Ei'ri:th 'rmv (26 December 19LL). ThovT.'h sor:e of the islands had bl->n ini . l>77 inv-aded by Sixth Army -- Sa.,a.r, 'iarinduque -- all of t+hese had to be cleared of 3aps ('taps, Incls 16 and 17 ). in LyteC, FighthiAr-y had a fine base ror future operation.
j'Tindoro,

The Solthern Philippine Campaicn sonsisted of landing operation after landint ope~ati n, some asa nrst little oip-oition, s:ie ag,-inst fanatical stan?.as byc tehe ene ,v. One characteristic st-od out- each island corsi.ste.A of a series of p-'l'os ard cave stroric7 points: each censi sted of the sare rrim and ,ruoellinr dig~,io, or burninrg out of the enety wi F':b troops fi--hti n forwa Ld by inc'es 'ailnst the mud and terrain on r._ny occasions. The fi'htinz -:eveo. intbo a routine ed of destr cti..on andl the crr beca;.e to kill until the ill of the energv to res:ist hacl been ttterl: broken. Duri.ng the followin-7 months, Japanese were ullshed pack in all sections -nd the Japanese supply lines ;.-ec Clt, ;f.rci-.-T t. ei .y to live of'f the land. 1Iowever, the Ja-ancse thn-.- u ~:ad..liy . i deq..:le.dtird a well .orzarized and well intai:rateo force n tin e ir~1-r'areas, n!ainteining a o coord- Inat-ed anl orderl reir ent bac; intc thie !our.ta-ns.
Rec._itll The

tl -in of Tc'-r'inal II1tel'- ieci. sdm'.::is rati :Lrn of

nec,''-ni

rornizati-on -iith Ei-Thth Army

Intel inee1ce " it;h Eight. Army was somewhriat di.i'erent t:an with I xt'rmy, .r Circular 138, Headquarters, Eighth Arnry, dited 13 L._V .;, -rectsi tnat echnical Intelligence

teams att-chled to that. leadJquartes wculd be olaced dircectly under the adriiiJstra'-ve, operatirra! and t+,e6,jical contrrol of the chiefs of their -espec::,. _vc scrv:.ces. vi,?n attaLched to un.ics in the field, the teams worker: n t,d.er a '.d -'.-erm cornt:olied by th. service chiefs of the units to vvhici a.t-tac'.ier%. Close coordinlatlon was maintained Arith G-2 of' the Alzvr.

'36

Th-e i.,;hth 'r:ay T-chnical Ibt lli'-cnc Coordinator, Lt Col Julian, coordinatcl. Tcchnical TAeclli-onco activitcs with the chiefs of services anli .ct-ld as an 'dvisor iin T.chnic71. 'rntcllirZ-ncc mattcrs. Corrcspondenc- bctwc.;:n 7ifhth 'rli.r andr C,-2, UT.q.SO.S, and the Command ing Officcr, !;250t.h Technical Intclli-:.nc.: C,-mpny, waTs .ruted by G-2 channcls thr,!u,'h the Technical Tntelli!encc Coo-rdinators, 7ighth '.rmy. mn Addition to the r f:ular field technical raports and m.rnthly activitos rep'.rts, this circular 'also pr-,vidcd f-)r th- sub-rissi':n of ton-day ictivit::s rreTrts by each tc.rn. Technical repo:rts pprrnvcd by chiefs r.f s-rvic-s w.'r..: puli shed in the Eihth 'rmy mrrchnical Tntellir.:incc Bullettin. Since ihrtth ',n rprat-i.ns w-r smnll,'r in sc7?oe than those rf the Sixth rm7, thcy n-ccs:'itqt,[ c; r T.chi.ic 1nI.+,llir -nc^ ncrs .nncl. "ith S'xth 'ryr, th:. t nd.ncv h-i breen, as the ,po-rrtirn nro!r:-sscid in Lzzpon, t;rcili:-vc th.e T _ch iical Intelli-cncc units from tmpora~r duty ,ith '- .. :~ivrisins and to attach the. t+-ccr-;:. u : Tn the S;!uthcrn hilippir,.-.s this 7-7s d.inc t-: . l.css extent, fr,r frequently it a rcgim:ntal -was necrssary to, c,,:lit --n7, o s;.n.lc divisi n -or cven c. mbat tecam to each ,,:pzr ti n. --hen nercssar-y, th-, n-rwb-r o'f unit ncrsrnnlel wias cut. by 'i...i..--ntin. , c,:rtein scrvic .s but this iws hold t,' a rininur: s- 'as norvt t- . impnir the f::'firicncy of the unit. lth-uh n"-! tr"inin:: .ror7rarm vs crricd n by the Tcchnical Intelli-,nc': tc"-s wvith Ei hth A.;ry, c,-nsiderable informr.tinn was passod -n t- the tr,;ops in the form of reorts -.n nc~;~ rquipent recovered. Tnfnrmation c-ric-rnin, con m:!rus-e rf rines, nnd dfcscrintinns ^.f imprevicd mines and ont'1 r Ordninc,: ot' ir.neliato combat i-oortancc, were dissominnatd. Equipromnt forr trai.nri mT ,urnc.srs 1iaS a7lso madc ,vailablc to Division units.

87

1 HISTORY OF TE'CL'i CtL INT T! IEvFCE

Victor 3 --

Palarvan:

l].st Division

The Technical Intellirence urits, r. stead of beinRg desigratcd by nl-,mbers, ,rere identified according to the operation in vwhicii th-ev participated tlrou-hout the Southern Philippines campaign, Since ,,h.e assignmrent of personnel on temporarT, d'oty to tilh Arr/.zs :.as a oreroicative of the Armies thenlselvos, and s.rInce Ei.hth irny had a definite policy of mobility for Tecn ic:al Intelligence personnel, there was considerable reshufl'.ling of teans under Eighth Army control. The reor-nanized Technical Intelliarnece Unit No. 1 was again redistributed by Eign+'-l ^Army and its personnel assigned to the various Victor opcrations. A Technical Intelli.gence Unit composed of one officer and two enlisted men was placed on temnporary drty with the li1st Di.visi3n Lor the V-3 operation against Palawan, Philippine Islands (ifaps, Irncls 16 and 17). Personnel of the Unit werc: Capt. Robert J. Ingrahm, T/3 Carl R, (Complete roster of the Simmons and Pfc. Walter E. Hawkins. Southern Philippines campaign is included in incl 3). On the morrin, of 28 Febr;ary, 19L5, the Unit landed on Palawan with the 186th Re:iniental Combat Team of the 4lst Division. Serviceable, standard items of captured eq lipmert recovered, irxludirq grenerator sets, lathes and radio repair parts. wiere turned over t.o the tactical units for immediate use. The balanee of' the equipment was shipped to Headquarters Eighth Arr: for inventory ai:d shipmdnt to the Unite-ld States .rmy' Technical Intclligence Depot. Information on the ty'pes of booby traps found was given to the Task Force Intelligence officer.

88

HISTORY 0F T7CHT'ICAL INTELLIGENCE

Victor
-- Zmb;,an,a

r:2.ina

.,:

T, iSion

t': L.-1 ' "n. ....LJ rT lw,al waIs stagin2 for a As t '!e, C ch::"_cl that op7t.':-;.4 ; :- s:,ld cr.r'"_ .Lr. .'i .- . .. r -' ' . :,?.7.: . cn
i 't :' ~{1Mindl~,r ~1O i't :7v1 1 .:;1I*-,,7, :1 O|,fl~ . \.?. ?:!,; Zr . . (lban personnel fi th2s T .::, ;?':-;

..
.rC'L_ ..L.l. _

....
-.

t t' : , ]2 .. ?'l.

,:t.
? -&

Ln .'-.,:aiLnst
1]

2nS Lt (.r"nl'
T/5 .~i.Lli-u: li. [.:c

, ;.-iLr

%,

-.. as if

Ivory

pvt Janes 1'r Stephens

rd.f cal It- tei'iigence Tom:i ,

1st Lt Travis L. B:nwden Ordnance. Intell.ience Capt Ernest V. Cameron Signal Intelligence Team 1st Lt George P. Ford A week was spent in preparation for embarkition, and on 6 m..arch the group boarded afn 'LST and depan.: odMfter an uneventful trip, they arriv.;c on the scene of the empending acti ,n on the morning of 10 Ma.rch.. Tne bom'bnrdment that fol.iyOved was texrrific9 Finally, at H plus 4, the Unit l.anddd on Red Bcach under enemy shell and mortar fire which cnntinued throuhout the day. The Technical Intelligence Unit set up its headquarters on Zamboanga' and proceeded to cover all the areas taken by the combat troops., The operation was one in which the supporting units of artillery, mortar and dive bombers played the more important part, with the infantry cccupyiLng areas after they have been thoroughly shelled and bombed. The Japs uxploited every possible ameans to supply their troops with weapons andi improvised every conceivable item that could be made l)ca.lly,, This operation yielded a considerable quantity of old and many new weapons never seen before. 'ore n.nd more automotive equipment was captured as the enemy was driven int(j the interior wrhere the reads were impassable, This equpipliernt, when captured in serviceable condition, was turned over to PCAU to aid in supplying and processthe civilians. Team

89

HIfISTORY Or TE':,'NICAL INJtEIGENCE Ground mines were extensively employed in this area and were made from every available material. Tncludec were wooden box mines, type 93 mines, artillery, shells rif-ed as mincs, Navy depth charges, torpedo war heads ar6 a new marine mine, As a ?raat deal of this was Navy eqliipiment, the Nav!l Yobile Explosives Investigation Unit No. 1 was called in to identify and examine it. Lt Ford found that the Japaresc type 97 portable wireless telephone set could receive signals clearly from Ur. S. frequency modulated SCR-610 end 9CR-300 sots at distances of 2 300 to in the past had fre3000 yards. This was import:nt, as nCass"r.s quently been sent in the clear on these two sets. The List Division Signal officer, the. 0C-2, and the Division artillery were given t'his information. Lt Bowden made trips to all installations held by U. S. troops but very little Yedical equipmenrt of technical interest was found. A Filipino doctor stated that the Japarese had taken everything of medical vulue into the hills. On the morning of 13 !Larch, as Lt Sowden was proceeding to a guerrilla aid sta:tion zweith t:ro guerrillas and a driver in a weapons carrier, a Japancse machine run opened fire from the side of the road. Lt Brwden an: the driver were both hit. The party proceeded on fo t back to Headquarters where t'ie injured were admitted to the 133rd Gen.ral Hospital. By the end of 'arch only mopping up operations remained on Zamboanga, and on 31 March the Unit embarked with the Sulu-'hite force for an operation on Sanea and Bonqa Islands of the Sulu Archipelago, (Lap Incl 17) Philippine Islands. With this landing, certain members of the Unit had made three D-Day amphibious landings in a little over one month. No great stocks of equipment were found on this operation and ver, few new items of eq'iprrent. It was noted, thou-h, that some of +he equiprent taken was of Germran manufacture and some of it had been made in the United States. As no new it::ms of el.lipment were being employed by the ememy, the Technical Intelligence TUnit returned to the hlst Division Headquarters, Zamboanga, on 26 April. During Rkay, Lt Yelchor and T/5's Ivory and Moore secured no new Chemical fWarfare items in this area, but did recover some interesting older types of equipment

90

HISTORY OF TECTNIC.L INTELTIIS';CE At the and. of bay, Technical Intelliyence personnel who participated on this operation, returned to the Technical Intelligence Depot with the exception of tvTo ofi'ic.; Capt, Cameron spent the early part of June in the office o( , ':k rdnance Officer, Eifghth Army Headquarters, assisting in the e;;taeblj.ihrrent of a future operational prDcedure for Eighth Arr:.y Ordrns;ce Technical
Intelligence Teams, ITpon te-r.inatnti)n of this terr;prary duty he

returned to X Corps Headquartsrs to supervise3 Corps Technical Intelligence t ams arnd to take -,ver as Corps Ordnance Technical Intelligernce 3fficrr and as officer in charge of Ordnance Team No. 6. In early July, Capt. Ford reported i.n to Headquarters Eighth Army for staff work with the Chief Signal Officer. This included, alon, with othecr work, preparing a chart showing Japanese electrical Signal instrulrents with the onrercan counterparts.
Victor 1 -Panay -Negros: 4Oth Infantry Division

The Techrical Intelligence Unit attaclhed to the 4Oth Infantry Division for the Panay operation (.Yaps, Incl 16 .and17) landed with the combat troops of the Division on D-Day, 18 March, at H plus thirty minutes. Personel of this Unit were: C.'JS Intelligence team Sgt Harvey Bylsma Pvt Homer Blankenship Engineer Intclligence Team 1st Lt d;illiam Purnell Ordnance Intelligence Team Pvt Nick P. Vannucci Quartermaster Int-lli-encc Team Capt Kenneth H. Bowman Signal Intelligence Team S/Sgt John P. Kost

91

HISTORY OF TECHNICAL I)TV.LLTGEFCE Operations were carried onin the vicinity of Iloilo City. Little ene-y equipment of Intelligcncc value was recovered in this operation, and only a few dumps with convontional ite-ms of Japanese equipment were uncovered. The Japs, as they evacuated the city of Iloilo, took :q!:iprert that was of value with ther and burned the re;st. The lo:-ge warehouses alone the docks were bare, with the exception of fertilizer and empty beer bottles, Mumerous radios, which wars. of Aneric-,n commercial make and which had been destroyed beyond repair, were found in the Oapanese radio station. A Jap microphone and one radio, a few phonograph records and an electrodynarmic speaker were recovered from this station. S/Sgt Kost, the only man assigned to Signal Intelligence with the 40th Division, received help during Lay from Signal Team No. 7, regularly with the 24th Division, but little additional Signal equipment was recoverEd as most of the equipment left behind by the retreating enemy had either been destroyed by them or by U. S. heavy rmort~t and artillery barrages. In the town of Tigbauan, Capt Bowman (4Y) found a small supply room in a ruined chapel. Afew pieces of cnlisted men's clothing were collected, togethcr with mixed amnunition and printed matter. There had been a small garrison of Japanese there, and only a limited amount of supplies, other than foodstuffs, was left, The IlOth Division, hay ni s,-cu;red Paroay, shifted its attention to ending the Japanese occupation of Ne7rom Philippine Islands. The Technical Intelli?-:nre Unit with the vision also followed thro'gzh on this operation, which opened 2y March, On Negros, as on Panay, the enemy made little use of aeavyr Engineer equip:rent, and small Enrineer items of Ja.anese ma'-c wcre virtually non-existent. The largest e:nemy damp secured up to the end of April contained only one Enrineer itrem of tc chnical valbie, a company size water filtering plant. Lt Purncll was Enginecr ciefjic'r on this operation, with the rest of his team as-3i nead to the 24th Division. M!uch of this equi:mert, both All ed and enemy, recovered on this operation was turned over to the combat troops. Included were American-mr,,d gasoline motors, electr.c generators, lathes, planers, shapers, tools, auto parts, auto tires, gasoline driven ro-d rollers and tractors. Sgt Bylsma and Pvt Blankenship found practically all Chemical diarfare m..te!?ial encotnrntered on Negros destroyed or damaged. As correctly reported by this, as wiell as other teams, in the Philippines the Japanese were apparently unprepared to successfully conduct or defend themselves against chemical warfare. 92

HISTORY OF TC;f{NI]C. L I.'TELLjiq 'CE E Although most of .'i'e -. cdl.v-.dual Japanesn observ-d carried gas masks i (probably due to tho eC.i :tii,= V V'sc rf i:its 1UnitAed ;:pmh >rls by States troops), the;.r She',, rs wt;r' rot t,.proofed.
In th.w Dum,,v.:u-.e scctGc Io located sonme.: h '2u,.-rtr:o, st'r t=:v,; -;
qianitn+i.s of C1.?s., It hcl.n1.t.
'n

Grifr-rn Ccros Ca-t tcwm3n ,c'-'" ..- thl t.lb i,-.aLi

:.';:. .r. W j v:'. rpacks,

i/'. rrri

rain co..:ts atd r. t t..r' : , Nco it-'s cls-)l.iTn i-nk tr"ck writh aui:Li:
contairKr, conpr: sse'

ai ": :'~
o

-:,a,:~,

'-t
'

a:i!n

.'na'i-n.
an o

C7c

ct
'ft

^le: cIrop 'enr r;?i r

*.o auipment
s-upl 'r off

.vcze a

zak..-. a&'d

'a -

=Xi

i -n;kE.i'aO

::'r.[r;w;aileil.,

Tier2 ',v3rc' no lrc7T c--ncentrations of s,.3. e.. a' .n the ;s:,1nd, and ev-on in tnc c vas !sed. as c'~erz,3'c:

points, suprliel w-re scant; orpaniz:.d sU,]. ly P a? chc -, the land, confis atir? foo :surlii.

n.d ir aiso-2o'r.
or.
:nd s from

As no atteript at
liaairn, thc. nti.Ves.

W CV:e-tr'tl

By t:he end -f June all iicchniic.l rnti,:l1:aence activities for the V-1 op.ration hId hben concluded, ard '11 purs:mncl, except Pvt Vannuc -, .ho was trar-7fc'-"J to H :araquari'ers X Coris for assignment +o Or'lna:.( ,: 'iac.:m No, 6% ha.d rztvrne!' to the. Technical IntCel i:'enc. XDept.
Victor 2 -Cebut: Americal. Iilfantr, Division

A Tcc'ini-al Intcllignc_ Unit was att.achncd to thc Amcrical Division oin 1' !arch. P-rsoin,'l in tine new U.init were: CWS Intcll:i.zer ce Team Capt Robert Ingrahm Engincer Inte:l.. igenco Team 1st Lt Jomn F. Keane Pvt Christoher !J. Tamer Ordnrancr Intelligence Tear 1st Lt qIrady J. Bell, Jr. QluartcrmiwstctT/Sgt, Eugene F. Rlossi

Intellig;enc

Team

Si rnal Intelliienc T/3 Donald R. Borchers

Tean

93

HISTORY ,F T'~TfC:I:I

L INTELLIGENCE

Emb2rkln! with the D:ivision, the Unit r:-ached Cebu, Philippine Islands, ('aps, Incl 16 and 17) on D-Day, 26 }arch. The landinr was made at Tal say, from wvl'rc the tronps moved in to capture Cebu City. Hcr.--, Division Headquarters was established. Capt In!7rahl-m, r,,S, investigated the Japanese r;~,nition used against l'nit.t;d ;tates troops which was reported tc .iv off a grecnish, na;iatoi;r s: lke. -n'tornation :)n the .as h:.d been given to th_ Div:Lsi.,r, 0-2. Th.: invest;. t, J i,.-.dict zi that no toxic gasses were bei.,? used and the fincings were disseminated to the t.roops to l.lay any fears conccrn.,;! the p;,ssibiiity of the cney's use of such agents. 'o lar-e supplies of Chemical Warfare materitl were found. Items recovered included improvise d ibolotov coct.ils, preslnmably for use ag-.inst U. S. tanks, and -ight suits of light-?.1ei-ht ruberized protective clothing. As severUl irprovised weapons and types of explosives were encountered, Lt B:.ll of Ordr!ance, made a rep)rt to the Division G-2 rugirding iriprovised b )mros -and demolition charges that were being used in destroying glns. Some of these were foumd on Japanese who werc ateminptinc to irfiltrete to A.Gric'n artillery positions. Areport was also made on an im.provised 130nimr! iaortar. The mortar was apparently a field expcdient devised t:~ use the ammunition left behind when la.rce qlantities of weapons were t::kcn from Cebu to reirnforce Leyte. Though no nrsw Ordnarc;v eq-;iplrcnt was reccvered, fo,,rte',n very high frucqency directior::l radio trans'it.ers having the same frequency banns as the Unites Sta-tes VT fuzes were captured near Cebu City, Thesc sets w-reo inspected by T/3 Borchers (Signal) and arran-emcnts made in conJi-nction with the Ordnance and Si!nal officers of Eichh irmyrr 'Ieadquartc'rs to have the radios tosti d in the field witil aztual Aif.firi.n to sec if VT fuzes could be activated by iaavcs froin these sets, since this woultd provw. an effective counter-measure against UTnite St-tes weapons. Towards the er!d of~ay, L t Bell was transferred to Headquarters X Corps to coor'inate Ordnance Technical. Intelligence activities in the I.iind:.nao area. Lt Keane and Pvt Tamner, Enginecr Team No. 7, also ropo',ted on the number .nd variety of enemy improvised mines. In addition, two landinr field lights with ,enerators mounted on trucks, recovered intact were shipped to the Technical Intelii;encc Depot minus the generators and trucks which wer:- put to use by Division Ordnance. 9)4

HISTORY OF 7TCHNITr

.L INTFLiIGENCE

The tactical situation by the end of ,lay had reached the point where the enemy had retrceated north to the hills, leaving the bulk of their equipment in caves alone' th road. Tl'his equipment was also secured. During the latter part of the month the team also made an extensive reconnaissnmce of the ftcilities in captured areas on Cebu and submitted reports, including one on a cement plant which was found inoporativ, because of' lack of certain mechanical parts y for the power pli =nt. The team then travelled to Nezros, located necess.ry parts at a su 2 plant, an-T :-.s ne-otiating for a loan :'.r of these parts when thev we'e recalled to Ei-hth Army Headquarters. The project was ther-efore turned over t) and completed by Capt In grahm. Neither T/Sgt liossi, Quartermazster, nor T/3 Borchers, Signal, fo nd large stores of material and eauipDrlent. Yo new items were recovered and most standard items, w;ihicl were of no technical value, wer'e turned over lo the division for its use -- in particular to the Si-mncl Dpoct to be i'sed ,a parts in constructing the division broadc stin~ station, .,VD. Nameplates, as in all cases where eq;.ipmo.nt was t-rned nver to the troops, were forwarded to the Un ited Statos "Army Technical Int.:lience Depot. The enenly, withdra-wing steadily, destroyed all supplies left behind, and it waes roted by the end of J..y that their stocks of materiel were becornin- critical, consisting by then mainly of small arms ammunition, and foodstuffs, principally rice and sugar. By the end of June all personnel present on this operation were returned to the Technical InrAtll.jence Depot with the exception of thr'ee men: Lt Keane, trarsferred to ::.ssis[t Lt Col J'llian at Eighth Arra- Headquarters: T/3 Borchers, who was retained to clear up the unfinished ';ore for the Unit, and who was then assigned to staff wvor the Chief Sin:l Officer at Eighth Army: and Lt l ,sitvh Belil who was trnsferrcd to X Corps Headquarters to take charge of a combined Ordnarce Team No. 6 which operated in the Seran.,ani Bay area of h`indanao d,-rin- July with the 2S!th Division.

95

HISTORY OF TRC`;]:C:L IfiTELLIGENCE

Victor 5 --

.ind.n;o;

X Corps,

31st and 2Lth Divisions

to X Corps for t.h

The followini T'echnical Intel.igence personnel were assigned \Victor 5 oper,.tion:

GCS I;t elli

ecnce Team Sgt Paul R. Going

Capt iilliam J. Roberts Engin-cer Int<,ll T/Sct John G. Barkowski Pvt Philip Zarahn
i

aence Tearn

Tc. 8 (part) Pfc Edward Burnstein

Ordnance Intelliaence Team ITo. 6 (part) T/3 Carl R. Sirmons

Pfc !,'orton H. R-)sen ,uart,. .rr .,ster Intelliq.. nc,;Tecm

Efc Joseph F. Pollack

Pvt Jean 0. Gornzales Pvt Thoodore D. Lillis

Pvt Bertrarr L. Leslie

Sinl:al Intelligence Team No. 7 Lt Col Erle H. Julian

T/5 Bruce A. Harding

1st Lt Alcide Santilli

Pfc tlaltcr E. Hawkins

These three officers and twelve enlis-..ed men, representing all

services except the Ledical Corps, landed. at Parang, Iindanao, second largest island in the Philippines (i.aps, Incl 16 and 17), on 18 April 19L.5 and. from there proceeded to the X Corps area, where

they reported to the 0r-2. As reconnaissance of the area resulted in the recovcry of little mrr.aterial of Intelligence valLe in the 31st Division area, only four men functioned.with that Division, while the emaining eleven operated with the 2hth Division around Davao. Prior to the outbreak of the war this area had been the center of Japanese colonization in the Philippines a/nd the laraest number of Japanese in the Islands still lived there. A large Japanese storage dump was located. The materiel, which was distributed amon- five huts apparently used as living qlarters, consisted of rice, ammunition cmd Signal Equipment, the last bdinr b7,ried in shallow caves. Quantit-ies of fond and clothing
were found btr Pvts Gonzales, Lillis and Leslie and wcre turned

over to PCr!rWU and Quartermaster Salvage.

96

HISTORY OF TECHTICAL INTFELIGE

NCE

Turned over to tie Surgeon, X Corps; in this same operation, were four to five tons of captur~ed medic l supplies for distribution to various hospital units for use for civilians and prisoners of war. Of much practical use ,rere twvo complete water purification units mounted on 1! ton trucks. This captured equipment was used by troops in X Corns and was shi,.ped to the Tchnical Intr-lligence Depot aftaer it was no longer needed. T/Sgt Barkowski and Pvts Burnstcin and Zarahn (Lt Purnell, officer in charge of this team was on duty writh the lOth Division) recovcred several n'ev E~ngineer itemis, some interesting improvised equipment, and a considerable quantity of standard materiel. Some of thLs equipmcnt was put into irmediate operations, while all mines and explosives were collected and later dcstroyed by Ordnance authorities since they constituted a hazard to surrounding personnel and materiel. As the Division moved forward i.< Southeastern Mindanao during June, fewer land mr nes and sirmilar devices were encol!nterid. Ilike.rise, enemy fortificatinns antl defense systems showed a tendency toward hasty construction. It was apparent the enemy did rot anticipate a retreat of sunh depth: however, they showed appreciation of terrain End utilized it to the best advantage. T/3 Simmons and Pfcs Pollack and Rosen, operating in the Davao area, fol-nd quantities of Ordnance equipment. As in all other sectors, the Japs showed a marked ability at improvising weapons from other cannibalized equ:ipraent. eortars c pable of firing standard 75mm and i.7" artillery proj ctiles were made from lengths of Ias pipe. In one secto'r, twenty of these projectiles were fired at Unitec'] St-:te:s troops and could be seen tumbling through the air as they approached -- though none exploded. The Japs also improvised land mines armed with bomb fuzes, hand grenades made from hiollow wooden blocks wrapped with wire, and others made from gas pipe. Thay used United States ration cans filled with picric acid, obtained from dismantled aerial bombs, to scatter around and utnder equipment. Fifty rocket motors for launching 60kg gcneral purpose bombs were located within the 24thn Division perimeter at Devao. Lt Col Julian, Lt Santilli, T/5 X-lrding and ifc Hawkins, Signal, operated in and around Dav.o and in the Midsayap sector. In the latter place, pigeon comrunications were discovered and turned over to the 31st Sinal Company. Later, a considerable quantity of Signal, especially r:.da-r, equipment was located. An entire multiple transmitter installation, discovered in a cave in the Davao area, wos oxarinod and photo:raphed. The enemy, evidently placing considerable importance on the destruction of this equipment, sent back infiltration parties who were able to demolish the entire installation.

97

HISTORY OF TECHiIC'iL INTELLI1ENCE The Si-nal team sc coilected Ja.panese secret documents bearing information on )reoosed disposition cf Japanese forces in Central Mindanao in the event of .namri-car; invasion. These documents were inmm.ecdiately turnerd over to the 19th Regimental Combat Team and thrnce to ATIS. By the end of June the Technic:.l Intclligenc Unit on the V-5 operation was bcin? disb'-ndc:. Lt Col Julian returned to Eighth Armr Heaiqlart;-rs; T/3 Simmons joined Capt Cameron from the List Division on Ordnance TSlam 'No. 6: Pfcs Pollack and Rosen joined Lt Bell from the Victor 2 operation and Pvt Vannucci from the Victor 1 operation and all of them transferred to X Corps Headquarters as Ordnrnce Team No. 6: the rest of the Technical Intclligence personnel on the Victor 5 operation, except Lt Santilli and Pfc Hawkins, rctuirned to the Technical Intelligence Depot. Dutri:-g the remaining time they se, ved with the 2l4th Division, Lt Santilli and Pfc iawkins recovered no enemy Signal dumps, though they found an appreciable quantity of Sixnal equipment scattered througnout the sector. Four items, including a Japanese radiosonde, were turned over to th.' United States troops for immediate use. Examinati ,n of a Japarnese telephone central near Davao disclosed maps and documents which were appr:.ised with minimum delay. An accompanying map showing the wire lines of the sector was translated, together with m:arking tags from incoming lines. Three radio cave install' t'ons in tnis area had to be walled up for tactical protection. One was inspected by Lt Santilli and Pfc Hawkins prior to its being blovw'; up be an Intelligence and Reconnaissancec squad. Japs had already burned it out and it was still partially burning when inspected. The second cave was walled up 'with several Japs still operating inside. The third was hastily reported with incompleta information, but rwas walled up before a complete survey could be made. Upon termination of' service with X Corp at the end of June, Lt Santilli and Pfc Ha-;rkins were assigned to staff work with the Chief Signal Officer at Eighth Army. Lt Bell. Pfcs Pollack and Rosen and Pvt Vannucci, who formed Ordnance T a.) No. 6 with X Corps Headqlarters, found that the Japanese on Mv;indanao had by this time little equipmient. It had been withdrawn to other islands in the Philippines where United States troops had attacked and also, quantities had been depleted because of the distances involved in resupply. Consequently, little equipnmernt of new design or with new modifications was recovered by this team.

98

HISTORY OF TECHNIC,L INTELIGENCE Quantiti.:s of Uaoanese 'i-munition wrec de.-troyed by 24th Division troips because of its d2ngcr'-)s condition arid because of the possibility of be+lhg reca pturtd by the enclrry. Howevcr,
Ordnance To !). ) f i spected and, re;-novid for storage such 'muniti-i -j wras rcFqulrerd for tactical problerms sponsored by the

.:ar and Navy Depart>:-

ts.

Oth r itcms r covercd in this area inclvuded: 4 type 96, 25 mrn sinpgl m-ount, nuval 7uns w/36h0 rounls of shells 1 typJl 95, 7-5 :rmi rpntain guon (inoperr:.tive) complete w/sight 28 motor vehicles (rcDpoired .rd turned over to the
2 type 10, 1 Oerlikon 1 type 99, 9 weapons, Philippint Army) 12 c;i !45 caliber D. P. naval runs type 20 Air-. shell (modified for use as a hand grenade) 81 mrm rmortar (turned over to Eighth Arimr for training purposes) variius culiber, from: 6.5 mi ri.fles to 13.2 mm

2 1 3 1 1 1

r.achine cannon turned in to 310 Ordnance Cormpuny Depot) tpecs 11 and 96, 6.5 rin liIhit machine guns type 89, 50 mm grfnade discherger type 38, 6.5 mmrrifles type 39, 7.7,mrn heavy rachine gun type 92 recciver type 93, 13.2 r;mi machine carnon w/tripod

99

HISTORY OF fH:`If, I CST INTELLIIG1JFCE

H'APBTER XI

Tl:;' 5250th,J.:T. Iir arch --

September 1945

IIea-iquarters 52..th' T chnical Intelligence Ccmnosite Company,

Separ-..? (Prcvisicnal) and] the United States .'rry T echnical Intelligence D'pt--t arrived at Janlla, Pilsipm ne Islands, from Finschafen, iHe-w rf-uinea, on 26 a;rch 1915. ajor .i'anley, Commandc.nc Offij.cer of the Co:.pany, had preceded the organization forward, arrivlr in an-.la iarch tno select a site for the Headcuarters. Srec.:fications rfr the loca.tion vwere that it contain housing, mess-;In, and recreational fac.ii.ties for a-;-.-roxir'atUeiy 90 officers anld 2. eizlisted men (72 Technical Intelligence tears), .svrell as shon. space :cr ana.lysi:s laboratories for each of the six serrices; ror..o fcr the si-.ping anc'. receiving derartnment, an,! sufi. ic._iernt grcv:.nd space for a motor pool and an Ordnance area for heavy eull.or.en-'. This is typical o.,. the .ray in which 'rn'1 7a+ion locations ,'ere selected in the city of Yan'.la after its capnt:re' T.hile drivring about the city looking i'or a suitable lcca-ior, jaj<Jo]Tanley spotted two large warehcuses on ton of a hih.., had. to circl.e twsrenty-five miles arcmcnd to find a br1df:;e to cross to the area. The place he had found turlned out to be ideal. It was a 500 by
1,000 foot area "Blue print of Derot, Incl 22) four and a half miles east of do-rtown T ani.la, sufficiently re.imoved frcm +,he dust and traffic of the destroyed city to afford p;rivacy. Situated in San Juan TIeirhlts, a cr.,iet resi.'ential. district, the grounds were on one of the highest elevations in i.anila. The tzwo three-story vl.arenhc.a.ses, owned '.-y the Oriental Print;.ng

Co, atny, were unoccunied, and adequa'ely housed the analysis laboratories, the shi.p-;ing and receiving section, the enlisted men's and certain of the officer's quarters. ii nrivate home nearby, which tioned for a general of the United States ererthees, everything wrorked out smoothly. T"nen the general found' out there would be a traffic of captured guvns, tanks, ancd other heavy equippreviously had been occuiped by a Ja-'aneso general, looled like an e:czell.ent officers cltb and quarters', but had already been requisi-

ment beirv, shipped, in and out of the Denot cl.ose by, 1he relincquished the house and tool: another he preferred in another nrart of tomn.

100

HTSTOi.Y OF T:L.CIINICAL INTEL,LT;GEtNCE into an ,ttractive officers club and 1'; .crr:3tiin club 26 x 72 feet, had to 1len' and. washin, facilities for as ;:hu.ro 26 x 30 feet in the mrtor pool, a ,.rage

The houlse wasa c ivcr ;.n enlist. quarters. construct.;J, as w.ll be enl.stt.i rllen, l atrines, an- an oit !::.,r t' :;:t :tr.

?iitn appr val o' th-e ,Nar Department, a phto':;raphic laboratory ! was later constc' ;te to- han]dle the require!,ints of the analysis he processin? of ph::.tographs taken by t':: is. sectioris ;rand fi. . the 72 TI'echlical IttetL]iiEnce te:us at that time assigned tD tue ti.] pre-lp'rticrn .f the reauired number {)f copies for 5250th, 'rld a burden on existing forwardi- -i t,- time v'r Dia.rt,..ent, were sj. i;,rg.. The that they were unable to carry the 1 'ad. theater f'-cilities .f the Technical Intelli ence Phuotoraphic Laboratory became one lar:,.est in the the;.tc.rI, Frior to corrpleti-n .-f unloadin7. the shipn on which Depot Jreadquarters had arrived wns movled t) a.nther ] ocati .n and struck an oneny nine, damra.;in$ thre hol..' r:nta!inint nuch imp ;rtant shop cquipmr.nt. This ship, car:ry'in- b':th records and personal p.ear, wa.s n- L raiso, :,rla Lso.:ie o)f the material salva-md until the lber. followi ni Oc-t I".'-:.n arrival at r'nila, the vari us secti:rs. were assi. ned " space, ana c- ,rence constr'1cti:n ',f neos..sar.y facilit es. with corn struction .. r Collectian and analvsis 'wer. corn+tinue '. c:,nc.rntly ,omen personnel from despite the l-s, r-f the equipnment from tie siip. the onalysis sections ,f the Dec'ot weo-e p icled durini - the maj or .: t ia l ter :bh.w;,.en, who was named as.sistant . portion o:f' lay under peni.n' the comCleti,:n cf all ,r..,il.t-y ,lnnir -'aj,i conw'any cnrl,manl]er 1 Van Jlyack, reanrvnile, continuw:cd as adc.nin.,t construct-'ion pr-.jects. istrative ,f.iic er.

Ship;in!_ and iLecfivin.-; Secti.:n

LeeceC-pts of' :.ntry .:qipment at the Depot) in ia.nil a consisted of a stea-.ty flr,-;i ..f capture.I :Lr.at.ri.cl fror. T'chr.ic,:.l nt-llr-tl:ence Field Ur:its, frl.nr the -svLisi nal TechnicL Intl]..i 1.i.ce Depots in hil.Lp)ine bases, and. Luzon, fro: ri-.>._dquarters rTi.hath Airmy, 'ro)n_, fr'om cens :.rship Jetach;.ents. Then trhe I.ab:ra.tory work was ayain in f'l11 swin-, arranfemments .ri shipments of f cmn:rl.ete I with i .rt Cemr.:and f *'- t:e ianulin rere c Stal;:-diin. operatinz pr cap tureO, msateriel. t, the United States. ce.dure f.ir tne shipF Ln6 of Intelli ,ene sarp-)les, as worked out by

101

HIST3rY CO 'iCTcIn7TIC:TI IITVIIIGW-TCE t.ajor Y:anlcy in conjurction ^.ith Chiefs of Services, Hpeadquarters, ,7F;'S,:C, wvra r, m,, into elf'ect at Lthe T chnical Intelligence Depot, and initial shiprents from the I anila area to the United States were accomp.ished. :ncl.uded in these shit rents v,-re many new types of equim-,ment not -previously analyzed.` as vell.l as large shipments for training !.:r-,>oses. In ac.rcorchance v.ith tar Denartnent Circular- No. 13, 11 January 19h5, re-zarrinT. thle slimVent of capt,-.red mateeial to the United States for Inte..ll!igen:ce -ur-ocss, reroorts were mace to the theater cormi:ander i.rnOeJia.1'elr upon reovery of the first, second and third iteml: of Jan-anese grolvnd force equ:rm -,lent not previously carptured, so that this inforra'-.i on r'ight be cabled to Wash in'ton. As set forth1 :in the ritish'ica r. t of 15 Noveber 19)14 concern.in, ce-pturcd. uan.nese Cro l d 7Ior-es equ-ipment and C 1 Technical i..se.rc-;, shipments were al.so r.aC.e i'rect to Tritish destinations u-lcn notif.'cation by the DIrector of i..litary Intelligence, >3ritishll ar Off'ice, thrc-gh t'-e Com-andin, Gfner.al, e.rmy Service "Forces, Information Disse:iina-ted to Troops Thr'ch..1~,'out th;is oeriod Teclhnical Intelhig.ncee i.'?.formation was disseninaUed to srubordinate cocrrhands tiercurh the media of the "G-2 lr.eekl-y iRe-ort,:' ed2tede and rublished by the AC of S, G-2, Sixth Army, andc th'-e "'"echnca..l InteIte.igence Bulletin," published by G-2, -iglith Army. Technical Intelligence units in the field had access to similar puiblicatieons origJrat!-n, -w.ith anc distributed by the various ccr-ps G.2 sections. Z-7.abora-le dis-lay-s of rerressn.tative articles of Jal;anese equilroent writ.h accompanying descript.ive reading matter, were pr-?rared by ail analysis section chiefs a7d set up at the Technical Intelligence Depot. Later, this complete displa- was move dodi. to .'7ES'-'.C HeaCquarters (oictures of thLis disrlay are shovm in Incl 23). A perrmanent display of Japanese Ordnance was _iso placed at Grnance He.oe,'e.rters, 9.lT-~ ,A as requested by Ge neral .Iolman, Chief Ordnance Officer. i.'... AIP:AC; another permanent exhibit of Ja.anese eqa.irment, consisting of 33 pieces of Ordnance equipment and 17 piec-s of q'uartermastcr equir-ent, iras issued to tlhe .lth Commrriand fcr a rrominent disAi; play requested by the Cc/'m;3anrd__ Goneral. of the unit,; and a third rr sinilar exhlibit wras assermbled a't C- >:. Al1so indicative of th the t.in' aid given to troops were the thirty spec.ai Orcdnance kits 1,serl dclring a training orogran instituted by eplacement Co:-mand. These kits, rwhlich vwere of considerabl.e ho(nt in fTriliarizing the troops .with Japanese infantry 102

HISTORY OF TiECIIIT.CAL rearpons, contained

NTJI'TLTIGETTTCE

the followving itenms: 2 - 7.7 rr'rif es 1 - 81 .nm mortar I mumna mortar

1 - 7.7

hm heavy I:G

1 - 7.7 mr.light '( 6 - 6.5 .n rif'les

L.ajor Talcott C. -f'-fir-.-.ight On 20 1April 19-!, :ajor talcct-t C. "FainwTrrihbt vrho had been with the 525Oth as an offi.ze.r 5n chlr m bloth ir: the field and at the , edical Analysis Labcrator?-, die LCroj:! heart attack. The success of the Technical Int.lligence rission in the Pacific Theatre, particularly as pertained to thl rimedical field, -:as to a great extent due to his oitstanding professional kmowled-e and ability as a soldier. OGerations in thie P'o.ilfr-pznes P2egin to Close Dy the enc' of May 19k4, r.'eclmical Intclligence had. secured a compreheinsive anc fairly det-iled Kiro:led'-e of all teclhnical developments used by the enermy in the i iip-r--ne caa=r-^ign. '.Thatever the Jdpenese h.ad. developed that was ne:: equ-iptment and techniques in
hald been secured, studied, analyzed -ande thla' information dissem-

inated to United States troops. Iliantities of enemy equipment had been captured and were bein7 shinmecd to the Unitecd States for training eurposes, '..Though the, Battle of the Phiiieoines continued and thousands of Japs still remained scattered throughout the Islands, to all i-:t,ents andc nurecses the mission of Technical
Intelligence -- that is, field -rlth the troorps -cf the men ooerating directly in the :rs drawi.ng to a close. Durin: the fol-

lowing two months, u-nits .:ere gradual'!r -ithdcravm from the field, returned to headquarters, and stc ed f.cr the Blacklist Operations. With the"official" concliusion of the Thilie-pine camraign in July, a survey of the rc:su3lts of Technical Intell.gencc activities from 27 I.a-rch 19!;5, :-;he, li-,he Unite+r States ',rmy Technical Intelligence Depot was established in anila, to July 19.5, indicated that 952 new items of Inte.lliCre.nce signifi.cance had been recovered in the PhilipDine Islanmds campaign., DuLring the sane period, over h,000 namaeplates andz reproductions were shipped to the Ground Industry Section, i.ilitarr Intellig,ence Service, Wrashington, Al.so, 2l[[ technical rerorts wer- submitted by the ana-Jlysis sections of the Depot; these covered a wide variety of both new and nreviously reported Japanlese materie,l of all branches of servi ce and were

103

II'STO)rt.Y (I" ZC7

C.

...... i

-C F,,'YES,
; C,

published as apr.vc'rod ' y th,.? chiefs of services, New Persom-nel Join ',""!tl

In June AFF''.C for'rarded to iL.,'S 1?'.AC the require:ments of Sixth Airmy for Technical ln'tcl igoncr. units for the coming operation. Five t-'yoe "^." MUnit:-, ?voe type ")"' Units, one Field Depot Unit -a total of 52 Co:c'.._cers a.no 107 enl2.sted ren wrould be needed for comni.ng. .. xth. .Xrmy o-eraticns. (Pa-,e 1h of Tncl 1 to Incl 2h : def:nes cor;-osi.tion of verious ,,nits). These requirerments wrere incorporated in the logist-ical instructions issueU by 1LFPAC. Ant.cipatl..n thle ClOilpic and Coronet Operations on the Japanese mainland, seven-ty additional officers anc. one hundred arnd t,,entyfive en.ist.ti men were requisitioned fro-m the ..r Derarrtment for a Technical Intll.igence dutyr in this theater. These figures covered only preliminary'Sixth Arr.y recoairements. The company wvras also augrio-lted 1 Julr., by the arrival from New GCuinea cf ETeLeacq-tr-ners an id'.>adoluarters Det-,ch'..ent, 98th Qluartermaster Battalion. The corna.ding officer, '.aajcr Ja.meos n. Collie. was rmladc Deputy Co i;-ander of thn 5250 tl. ;...l Tcc'. Tntell'ignce Coimanar under l.fajor i;.anley. The r-uarterimister .Rattalion also furnished of fice personnel dl:'ing th'Is .z riod, and was responsible for the ccmrpnny acli:n-stration. WTith the return of Tec'hn'.cal irntellge"_nce personnel to the Depot in the ensuing mo.ntls, an e-'tensive training 'progrmm as a refreslher course for t,.is mrl'soIinn1r. and as an orientation ccurse for the- new Technical Int'ellim-nco erso:.mel arriving in thc theater was establish.ed at the Depot under tihe direction of the senior field officer of each service. The course, based upon -?ractical es-ericnce in the field, incluc'ed lectures, charts, and a compl'te disnlay of enc,',-t equipi:,ent. The seiven-day progr';i, which preparzd Technical Int-:l.ie-.nce persor-nrl for future onerations, vras opened 1.8 August _i.ith an .introd'.uctoryadcdress by '.raor ma.nley and vwas received v.Jith enthusiasm (schedule of classes is shoVmn in Tncl 25). Classes 1iure at-;,ended by .. personnel present a-,; Depot except L the those needed for section .or., The redical, Ordnance, and OCh?.n-cal. larfare analysis section held s1u:,-l-.-ncntary specialist training progra:-s for their nren acnd certain nersonnrl also attended a weak-Qon- a:rnmunition ccurse at
lHIT

iro. ",

loh

A't the -nrd of -;!.r renuest -7as mar!, to fi.Tthhat authority be ? grantcd .ifor a Tchnical I ntclli.,ernce pass ',o be authorized for issue by'AFI'AC to all Tecl'rc?'1. Irrt -' rnce officers orprat-ing in the nlig Pacific t ... ar. e. ;u t':ctrity !ras granted, Cae.1 Officers of 5?O0th wver.-; issuier.C ocncal Inteliiconce passes vr: ich ccnsidera'ly expeditecd thieir orL0.

Con so] id&tiln of

11 T'chnical Intel-.1lnce .^ tiviJties r.eco-memnnded c

For so7:' m.onths past, both; Col F.auv-, 0(-2 ij,,..",S, ancd ajor "anl.ey, i'cordina-tor of Tochnicai Ilntolligei.ce, .;rg,:d -ha. consolthe idation of all Tccl-hnical Inteli .- cnce activit:..:_s u!n-der one coordinatinri cor:i,.'iend at' .

G:.:

Shortly aftr th acih.i;-at ionr cf Tte( tates Ar+: Forces, Pacific, (.7P:I'. ) b-.ew h'. diraf'ed (25 iay !?i.~) ' z. comnplete l,!an for operati.on of Tocl~nic~l -t,..:.j ,-nce umcncr tha-t 'hladquarters and had subrm:it-'t~c it, tothl- cr ;,rith a .ro-'csedf a.tll . .entsto provide f.or all' '-rersno -n. t . thi t.e on ic. a:,ec: service with the 5250thl Technic.tl in-tll i-jlc-c Coi,?-ny. .,Assum;ing tja..t . soe.:ara-ie. area corr.a-nd :oIl nue course of ti.me be form) d for o'era'-ions r-:ithi.n the Philipoines and southwrard (t is caire into effect 7 June w:-lhen headqu.arters acliinistration :mas charn.ed fro. US;UI!OS to UTnited 5t.ates A1 rnir Forces restrn PJacific (.....:,.;')), a nd pointing out that additiolnal armies col.J.ng uLmder i'itC tha.t r;cuicd bje totally u:nfmaniliar vrith Technical intelligence as established in S,'2A, th-~r recor, ended that to ini.m'.ze confusion delay and d-u,].ication of effort, cantralizc.ed control under 2l':IC be establ:,.i s - d.. .Lhir rcco -,--da`-:
on an Cn .. or:: 3.'v enmeirzcd poln. '3
cUtire

-'on -rs '-t

.-. ora..r.

core..hns v.e SCa.l.e, scln~e) vh,~nl? b+:.e sm. riee 'vTrA

v .later shelved br-. v-as aeo'tied 'en thle atoli.c cnC: s::d.ei.lv ;.aS abrua-t+.i y rer. , m -.

incdustri !, scientil'ic and tecn.mcl.o7ical resources of the Ja-paness E:,ire -rere opened for, invesitiation, centrali;-ed control not on 'fo -e TUnite;d St-'ies Aty but Ifor all Allied -Tad',quarters or h wras mrnndatory.

-05

HIITORY

'S'7TUC'I. I T LT'JIG'TC T(

End of thc "-'ar

Friday evo:>:;.:.:t, lO :u._ust l4L), around 2100 hours, the Y:anila radio station, ,:'T broadccst tha.t it 1-ac becn "tuncfficially" ' arrouneecl th-; t l i- '.... anese Ironrwrial Govormlen't hac indicated they -oullc3.d c-t, tlj. Tictps.r ac c tC ' -t'b rrTs. Aitet r the long wait Saturday nighlt, 1. 'u:ust, tl:- '"'r.s of' thle iapanese surren dor -vas officially confir'med in 'I' -ni.a -u,,w,-7 " :rnrff 19 Aurust. Ive,-y -:!,-ni that haa. bD:n mate for th-IiicL-i:nding Olynpic Operan tionl -uas sus-rnduc1 . Th.le rrnics m.a-,e a rn4'id shi:-t of weight from combat fcrce to ar:-? o- occl.. .tion. Technical Intetlio.^.nc i.Tn-t.s ''wr? erted to move to Japan .c 23 August, naccssittt,.ne; a~r -rO1OmC2i;+e an,,L troeendous turnover of personn;:!il. PracticIly .1 al 1cersonnel in th; field. warre ordered iiriedi::tIeoy into th Unl.ited States Arnrr~ Tcchnical Intelligence Drot.* At the s-rae tiMle arngorents- ere ade to attach adcditional ... persornnel to the 52l50th so that more teams could. be organized. Thirty-eiLrTht ne- cf-ificeors and 8 enlisted ren from: -all branches of service joined t ',h e ,rg-... zat;.cn ;urir7 tlhe crurse of the month. All. Techn:ical Intelligence units werers ready to move out on the dotes set by Ge ' eu-'ecd and. trained and a" .oadclu.arters.

a.jor construction projects finished dclririAugust were ne-w n. enlisted mon airnd officer mess halls and t-rc 'obLi1.din-rs ori'in.all intended- fmr the i:edical analvsis secti,on. Cro rded conditions i.n thie enlist-dc. ,neon's nd o:fficers' quarters caused by the additional npeisonnel reo:orting in fromn the field rere .l _ri_.;d by --oveying ar.rroximately 5O0 enlisted .en into the sectir:n. rhich formerly served as a poss hall and by using the I cdical analsi..s building as additionrl officers quarters. With the suc'den :;-ove to Japan, thle enlarged .L;ica lI.boratory was no'. needed, end c3nstruction of a stor,-Le -wr.rhbouse P-r th. Signal. anal--sis section was delayed p-ending d:cocisicn on the future st-.turs c thle lUnited States AIrmy Tec'-hnical Int -11iienco Dre-oot in the Fh -.i-pine sector. ' The movament of a raijcrity cf f'ield u nits to -inec or.,:-nizzstions eliminated qalarteri.ng.. of . rso...el as a problem- by th-e end of .'uglsst, Prclirinary plans .for coorcdin-.t:ion of scientific investigations and Tedhnica.l Intcll- gence ..n connection r-ith ul.imate operations were discussed at a confe.rancri held early in the rmocnth vwith the Srecial Scientific Cnsultant from the irar Department, the Pacific ,ara"rar e Board, and -the Office of the Counter-Intelligence, GHO.

lo6

HISTORY '

TECTrIICAL IiTTEi T Ii:jCE

The recor.-:endaticn t}hat had been made earlier in l.'ay by Col Sauve and Lt Col Ia nley(recenttly prcr-ooted) to G-2, General Teadqu.arters that the 525Cth Technical Tntellignnce Composite Companyr, SaSarate (?Prvisiornal), at that time under the control of J7L'TESP;AC should be attached to GTQO for operational control, again came to the fore. , recor-Ien-;la.tion from Chief Engineer, GiQ, to G-2, GHQ, advising the same set-up, kept the matter open, and at another conference, wiath G-2 and Chief Engineer, G!-TQ, in the latter part of August, it becamne increasingly evident that Technical Intelligence -vouldbe able to operate much more effectively out of higher headceuaters. It wras decided that no action could be taken inreodiately but that GHQ w-ould arrive at a definite decisition

in the matter. Little was done about Japanese material at this tire, as it was anticipated that all be met more satisfactorily in Japan ahd that Japanese ratcrial in the Ai7ES?AC area would disposition. in the Philippines requirements could the problem of be one of local

Few; bookings vwere placed -withPort Cormland because of a tendency of services involved to stop all shipments until clarification fror .raslhington of material recquired, due to the change caused by the surrender of Japan. Lt Col i:anlcey submritted to G-2, GI-O, a draft of recommended regulations to prccode USAFi:FE Circul.ar 83, 1l!4h, on the disposition of captured enemy -materialin the Pacific theater, The draft cot-ained a recommendation for retention of various items as souvenirs by individual soldiers since hostilities had been termrinated. T. I. Personnel Depart for {Occuwation of Ja-)an Personnel from ten Field Units and Field Depot Unit were assigned from 5250th to Sixth and Eighth Armies during August as part of the occupation forces for Japan (Blacklist operation) This split betwee:n both Armies the T.I. units originally intended for Sixth Army alone.

107

HIST01YT Or' TC}IP'IC:L INTELI: IGENCE

Fiav- type "A" bUnits .. re formed and placed on orders as follows: c Field Field Field Field Airr- (de.aJ ;.cld T anila 4 Seb Unit iTo. 2, 1 Corys, Sixth ;irn.,y (departed J'anila Unit 3, 1 Cor!s, Si.th Ar.ly ( 5o. " Unit ;Io. 4, ;(' Corps, Eighth Ar:iy ( " " Field Unit No. 5, X-VL Corps, Ei:-hth A-rmy ( "
Unit INo. 1, '1(,i-'th

45)
20 Son 45) 28 .ur 45) 28 Lug 45)

2lug 45) 25

Field D)cpot Ulit i.. 71 wars- crctLi-.cd ,nd assigned to Sixth Army Ieadquartcrs, depalrting i a-.-ila 1! ocptcenbcr 3.195. Five tpeTJ
Field Field Field Field Unit Unit Unit ;Jniub

' Un-.ts
No. 52, i!o. 5:3, I",. 5L, li. lCols,

;'c:i:c forricd and placed on ord;rs:

I Corps, Sixth Army ( " _X Cors, Eighth Army ( " AIV Corns, EiJlty Arrm- ( " TIX Eighth Army ( " " s shcin in Incl. 3). 30_Aug hS) 25" ug 5) 25 ug 45) 2h Aug 45)

Ficld Unit To. 5,1, I Corse, 3ixthL Army (departed ,ianila 29 J:ug hS)
"

(A roster of pcrscnncl of these field units comprising a total of 53

officers and 100 enlisted reon, Technical IntclligE7ncc target objective folders woer published and distributed to the Units as they left the Depot as well as to all corps and divisions under S:ixth A'rmy. These fold.rs ou-F,lined by areas various targets of in-l,ercst to Technical mncl Tcchlnological Intelligence on the Islands of Janan. FIcr:ls for reporting on Janancse industrial installations v-er- also distributed to the tCarns. Upon tlLc d-a:z.rture of Tnajcr Ceollit and It V-n '.'yc(lk on o!orations, Capt fl. 3ha; TTilliar I[fi wtrs ahTpointcd Cxocut1:;v. officer of the 5250th. Lst Lt THorb!:rt J. Jubeliror (l-atcr nrormloted to Captain) wa.s arn-ji.nted sunply officcr, and 1st Lt Ed-in K-;.rtz w-.s a:lCintdd assistant adcninistrative and :oCss officer. Lt Col. Er:rin Ji.Sullo reported early in Septcmber' to take charge of the Si.-gm'l n.:lysis Section; 'he was also clect.d p rcsidont of the officers club upon the departure of 1 Maj er Harry E. Carnos tc the United Stat(s. EquipL)rlent and Tnf,:r-:n.tien

.ith the w'ar on&d,<.d the quantity of new capture.d cnerny cquipment receivecd at the Depot durinr the rmcnth was ncrligiblo. 'nalysis of cnony equiprent at thle Tm;aila de-pct had ceasred by S3pte;'lbebr, exccpt for clearing up 58. reports alrcady undor vray.

108

IIIS'iRY OF T1iCtII1CU;L INT1I,L IGENCE equipnont on hanre was dispscd cf as soon as possible, In th_ monthl cf 'u-ust 19h.,030 pounds of enecr.y material were shippied. to the UIriit;cd Sta.tu(s by watcr; 2,020 nounds by air; and 15C il)'.cuncs by .'rrr c:,_urier s:ervice. YTfatcr bookings during, the same pIriod a;clolMts to '?77850 poulnds, Air ship:icnt ,:i' :enemy Ordnar.c: riateria'. , : .::i.it:.rry Iatell.igcncc Sorv-.ce, (fIqS) 1 Uni.ted States Arr.ny Forc :;s 'Turopcan Theater, Paris, France, left tlafila 5 August. '1To hundred tJwenty-eight photographs of capture enmiy ,:raterrial vmrc fcrx:'r.rdud tc 1lap and Photo Division, (,IS), WIashingtonr, D. C., an( 283 namerplate.i s and riscollaneous rubbings wer sent to Grcund Industry Section, .9S, during the sa,.oe period.
'll

Tcnty-nrlc cC-opies cf colpilaticn on Ja.ancso cconomic data from the S.1,nal Secti.n werc sub:i.ttcd to the Office of the Assistant Chief of St-:.'f, G G-2, ,F.'L ,SP:'C,fcr further distribution to Sixth and Eighth .ArrJies, mld additi.:ns to the Ja -:ancso Chemical VWarfaro Notebook v-cre se:nt to tiCe nrintoers. Ordnnricc m. iteriol which hzd b,:,n ca-pturcd aboard the Japanese hospital ship "Tachibana !l.ru" vas turned over to the United States kAr.ry T:,chnical I nrSplligernce Dnpot t. be invontcried, photographed, rclcrto.d, and rctaicrlcd in st,-crgc vrwith its original packaging, pending rocospt of instructi:.ns frclm the Cor;nandor-in-Chief, Army Forces Pacific. It was hold ocr -Use by the *"arCrir-es Branch, AFPArC, in po.ssible v crines trials. c1' Troops that had seized the hospital' ship, h-wcv(,r, hMd baen al:l-Arwed to souvenir much of the equiprment before Technical Intelligence was notified. Equipm.ent s.lvaged (I;.ctcgraphs, Incl 26) inclldes: 27 bayen:ts 56 typc 8') 50 .vL-:renade dischargers 1 ty.e. 10 50 i':r flare discharger 257 type 38 6.5 rn-. riflcs 2 tyrpc 93 field light range finders 1 tpe 93 tripod bar light range finders 4 t%:1,c 92 70 r.an battnlicin guns (incorplete) 13 I:ounts f or heavy machine guns 22 sparc barrels for heavy machine guns 4 rargc, drurls for 70 r~i battalion guns 35 tyIp 96 6.5 r r light nachino guns 73 i'agazincs for light machine guns 4 clip- lcaders 62 spatre barrels for light michine guns .14 type 92 7.7 rn heavy machine guns 9 anti-aircraft adapters

109

,l'.,STOrY 01

TMCHNICAL INTE;LLIGENCE

This Ordnance minatericl was peckc and mar'eed as enemy ;'edical equipr:ent with packa es anl b xes markedc with lare Redl Crnsses. The '70 r.; b'.ttali :n -iuns were disasseiabel an, packed in b-xes beari.nr tLhe .'e ]. C>-ss. T'h rifles wer,., packedt in straw matting bundles containin .' fr'r. f ur to ten rifles with each bundle labele1 with a .e Cr -s

5250th Or';ero

ta

;tky:

In -ubrittin'; a reprrt (17 September 194h) on the disposition cf pers )nnel :,'retsent twith the 525Oth Tcohr:ical. Intelli ~ ence rP.,-)any a;;rilabl:-.fr the ccml.l,-ti-n -f Japan, C31 Sauve' and Lt C^l 'anley a :-.in ur ,eJ the centralization of Technical Intelli 'ence a-'rinistratimn under Gener-l lHea,'quarters (Incl 27). Subsequjently, a series :L' c.inferences were hel' wi th Col 17falter S. ,.'f?, G-2 Sectiron, GHQ, reLative to the tr;;nsfer of the 5250th for direct a: :inistrati an und-er GHQ. 'ecor:enJati .ns include. prop sed directive t-) be i:;sue 1 by GiiQ when thlt h, adquarters s.o-ulrl assure -tirect rcsp:nsibility fo-r 'ecimical In telli -once in the ?acific theater. C-l Woo lteft sh rtly th.:il'rbf [,r for G.:neral T-ea,!quarters Advance in 1 Japan. Finall aj;r-::,val fcr reassi -nm:i.nt -!f trfhe 5250th Technical Intellicence Cormnp;ny to GHQ and, c):)ri.ination :) a:Ll scientific, technical, and. technl -~ical]. Int,.lli -ence undler G-!Q was ,ivcn .y t General R.K. Sutherland Chief' 'f Staff GHrQ aFKi.C (GO 337 ,~ 369, H2, 20 an' 30 Nover.ber 1945 Incl 28 .n: 29).

Col .. wa;s alpiiltel C ,r 1 rinatar of 'v'ar Dep.artmelnt Intelli.gence Tar-ets .fTl1) un:.ner a;j:r ':?ncral Charles A. villou7hby, 0-2, ,,FiAC; Lt C1.Dalvi' S. Tait ~vas a;i,-).nted, C:r.iinat)r of all Techrnical Tntelli:-ence: a.n- Lt, Col anley continue-' as Cr:,n"in-i Officer )f the 5250th Technical Into . :li ence Colmpany, which, in a: 'iiti-n t:, its normal functions, w3:s t- be resr onsible fa:r the Uninted States Airrmy Technical Intelligencc Clenter unlJr `,-2, GHQ, SCA . Thne TD:chnical Tntellipence Center was t:- ?pr:wvi.le h'-usir-:, -messing an;d- recreati n acc-ci.J.ati.ns f;r officer, enliste ', rivili3n, innl visitino f rei 'n :-,ersonnel for all Technical Intelli. ence within the theater.
;,cti n was taken t-, cl se ,!vm the Unite! St.:ttes fAri2y Technical Intelli -ence cJ at, I-nila, and ta transfer it, t-.:<-th!r wlrith the 5250th T:chnical Intellilence C;,tl:any, t:o okyo. N-o new analysis of enemry equipment was lunlertaken. i), new equin':.e t was shi-Fed in from the fiel:-7. l1. pers,-nnel remainin.rl in the fie] I rep:'rtel in to the Dep:)t. .11 salvaue :.ateri:l was dispose .if in acc'orlance with theater policy. All enermy equiprmeiet .:n han;i ws shi. -e!l to the United States. ,Accounts ,f Shippin- an:, teceivin- were cl: se 1 Oct ber 1945.

110

HISTORY OF' TECiNTIC L INTELLIGENCE New adjusted service ratings as of 2 Septcmber 1.945 were turned in t-L Ht,dquartcrs, .'.?L1SPiAC, 'and shortly thereafter non frcn the C:-1 pany cli;,ible f:r release frcn the A'rmy under the point systen wore returned to the United States. ,^dditicnal personnel required t(; take their place i-,ith the :rganizaticn wore requisiticned, (Dates of joininc and departing fron the organization for all personnel of 5250th are included in Incl 9.) In Octaber, pecr verbal orders -fLt Ccl ITanley, all analysis secticns cf the Depoct wore closed and -re-.ared for shinnent. Deoot headquarters, ,lOss, surly, and shi-;??inC and receiving secticn reclained e-on until just befcre the ccr.rpany depparted. On 1.5 October Lt Ccl Trtnl.ey was sent to Tckyo to imalo necesstry arrangeonents fir the rlcvo:eent of the 5250th Technical Intelli:o-ncc Cllnpany to Ja;an. On 18 October :i ;-vclient ordors wore sent by radiogran from GHQ .;FD.'.C, ,DVAI' T CE (in T-kyc), dir:2ctin- that the crgalizaticn be n; ved fith ATIS fr-.rl Tlanila to Tokyo, with 60 days rations and organio transportation. (Incl 29). ;Authcrity fcr ncvel.eont havinr boon cobtainod, sup-?lies were drawn, a rceting cf officers vas held, instructins ware received, and per:onnel were alerted. On 6 Ncvr.lbor 33 officers cf the 5250th left for Tckyo on the ship, "Kinkad" and on 9 Nov-rmber the balance of the personnel of the 5250th Tecmhnical Intclliiunce Corpany rmn--d t.ith all crganic
equipment -n the "Frxancis Ogden" -- tine of arrival in Tokyo, 20

Ncvember 19h5,

i11

HISTOiLY OF TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE

CHA

T ER

TECHNiFTCAT, INTFLL!:GS32NCl, CETTER: E October -- November 19'5

JAPAN

A.t Col lanley had florim to Tokyo before the 5250th Technical IntellP~;nce Comrany sa.ild f-om l':-u'.u.la. to ;nake prelininary arransemtn :n.s 7or iie trani'er of the unit to Japan. G-2, C;TTQ; directed tiat a United .t,tat!es ,rrmy Tchnical Intelligenc' i be o stbabl:;shcd r.t 'okro .;rserai No.. 1, Shimoju . kyo: TI'he Cclter vas 'tc h,-2 -ad:inistered ,: by the 52rotij r'e .zi a'a Intel.linz e wi'-,mp.ay- Y.'anley T Lt Col
as Commnncti:;n:
0f' cer

Thu IiLperial Japanese Government was notified through the

Central Liaison Office, Tol-yo (memorandum AG 601 (19 Oct h5)

GD, Subject: Acqu::.s~ition (of Certain Facilities of Tokyo Arsenal No. 1, datied 19 October 1945) that buiidings 255, 2635 269, 276, 395, h75, L8.L andt the .pen ar-eas aljaccnt to these buildings of the .Arsenal wouuld be "-ml.; available inizlediately for occupancy by an agency of General Hesdcuarers of the Supreme Commander for the all.ield lwers'' (CH 2, SCAi)i The IrrTperial Japanese Government was di rected that all items of sup,-ies, cqu.ipment, furnituire, furn.ishinrs and fixtureas wouli rumain in the buil din.s until a representative of General H-cxdqaleriers ,o the Sunreme Commander for the Allied owers designated the items rE:qlired for use by the Allied P

Forces and those items which mi'ht be rem,.,ved.

It was further directed th-tt the Imperial Japanese Government make rnecessary arrany:.emrnnts to have a representative of their office at building 395 at 10CC , 20 Oczcober i945; for a mceting with the :-eprasentative of' Gerne-al Headquarters of the Supreme Comnlan ler for the Allied Fowers, The detcils pertainin. to the work to be accornilshed C and the iJnstallation cf tthe facilities referr'ed to above would. be "colrmlunicatedl t) your representative at thae tmr.me", Lt C;)1 Yr.anley met with the Japanese representatives at the Arsenal 20 Oc-ober and directed them as to the installation of batthing, samitary, messing and other facilities which would be required and directed that buildin-s and ,rounds requisitioned

112

HISTORY 01' TECHNIC1,L INTELLIGENC E

would( be thoroughly cle:.menc prior to occupancy by the 5250th Technical Intelli fence Com.,any, Description of the Ars-nal T.kyo Arsenal No. 1 turned over for use as The p.,rtion )f' the Unit(:d Sta-tes Army Technical Intelligence Center, comprised eir;ht buildings (iicturis andRlucprints .f Depot, Incls 28 and 29) with a totl if 157,949 square feet floor space, and a ground area 1000 by 1500 feet square. The main builtding, which ha-' formerly been used as the administration centcr for the T:ky,. .Arsenal, was takn over for adminOne 3-story building was istration hcactquarters for the 5250th.
use.i for the shippino( and r(eceivin.7 scti:)n, for company supply,

andi for the c mbin(-; 'irmy-Navy library of the Washingt.,n Document Center, Ad.vance. One 2-story building was converted into laboratories and offices for the six analysis secti:Dns .f the Comnpany. One builidin7, part of which was 5 sturies high, was usedr for mess hall, quarters, -cnd recreation center for officers, and a similar buildin.7 wiras desi nato.d for similar use f: r enlisted l men, A larcye wareh.use was utilize as gara-e and mrltor pool, where all vehicles coulr . be stmrtA indiors. The seventh building was a theater f-r c)mr.pany perslnnel. .nother building, wvhich housed tw scientific laboratories with testing equipment intact, was taken -ver in al.iiitin t': the seven previously requisitioned and wras available f r use by technical personnel for analysis of Intelli;,ence samples ol Japanese materiel. Transfer -of the 5250th t~ GHQ Upon his return t-;IMi.nila, Lt Col Mtanley apyointecd Lt C:-l Sullo, I:aj rs .adiai-,n and Hirst, and Ca'.pt Shaw as forward echelon t. fly t::, T ky.,to comrlete arrnletemnnts f-r the arrival of the Cornpany, They arrivel 26 October supervised the clearance 'f the bu.lldings ant har' the premises set up so that when the ships with the bi:lance :.f the C-.nmpony aboard docked in Tokyo Bay the Pirsenal was renl.-y for'occupaency. Lt After the C-,ommy sailed from 'Manila, C:' 1r!anl.ey flew Chave, Assistant Coordinator of to Tokyo, lea.vingm Capt V.ary i,, Technical Intelligeince, an-. Lt Edwin A, Kurtz, Assistant Pdcrinistrative Officer, as rear echelon for the org.anization, They follwe,? 22 Noverber, In a c.)nfercnce with G-l, G-2, and G-3, GHQ, in regard to
the transfer -ofthe Technical Intlligence Com.any frcrm AFWESPAC

to GHQ, it

had been recon:mendel that the personnel be assigned to 113

HISTORY OF TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE GHQ, Special Troops, and it was suggested as desirable to preserve the entity of the organization in its name, "!'5250th", the number assigned it under the orders establishing the organization as a "Separate, (Provisional)" Company under USASOSs AFPAC assigned the company to Special Troops, General Headquarters, Supreme Command for the Allied Powers, upon their departure frc;a i.sanila. Gernera. Orders 337, General Headquarters,. Army Forces Pacific, dated 20 Novemnber 1945, established the 5250th Technical Intelligence Company as a theater overhead installation and stated that grades and ratings would be authorized by separate communication. General Order 369, same headquarters, dated 30 Nov 45, dissolved the 5250th Technical Intelligence Composite Company, Separate (Provisional), By let+er order AG 32K03 (2 Nowv 4) GA, General Headquarters, United States Army Forces, Pacific, Sib.ieet- Allotment of Theater Overhead Giades ond Strength) dated 29 November 1945, allotment of theater overhead grades and ratings was made to the 5250th Te^hnical Intelligenre Company as follows: Officers: Col ]. Lt Col 3 IMajor 10 Capt 23 1st Lt 4O 2d Lt 13 Total 90

Warrant Officers: CWO: Enlisted 1st 1 1

iven

1 (grades as shown): 3d 17 4th 35 5th 46 6th 48 7th 10 170 261

2d 12

Aggregato Occupation Instructions No. 2

Occupation Instructions No. 2, Office of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, dated 25 September 1915, outlined to the occupation forces for Japan the general instructions governing the collection and disposition of enemy equipment of the Japanese armed forces. This was the broad outline. The disposition of enemy equipment collected for Intelligence purposes was governed by later directives. 114

HISTORY, OF TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE General Orders No. 9 General Orders No. 9, General Head.quarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Subject: Japanese Military Intelligonce Targets, dated 2 October 1945 (Incl 32) designated the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, GHQ, to coordinate end supervise th(. exploitation of military intelligence targets in Japan and Kort.a. Under this General Order, the exploitation of targets and objectives included coordination and utilization of certain genral and technical Intelligence agencies: the 5250th Technical Intelligence Company, including the United States Army Technical Intelligence Depot and field unit personnel; Translator Interpreter Service (TIS, a revised ATIS organization) Combin'd Document Center and field detachments; special staff sections responsible for the technical Supervision of their respective Technical sections in the 5250th, including laboiatory and field teamns Air Corps and Na.Vy technical units analogous to the 5250th Technical Intelligence Company; and special technical missions, national end foreign. Coordinating control and supervision over the various agencies interested in Technical Itelligence investigations were exercised through normal command and staff channels. These agencies included special staff sections of AFPP&C Armies, separate Corps, Commander in Chief of the Pacific, Far Eastern Air Forces, United States Army Strategic Air Force, Allied agencies, nnd speci'al missions represented in Japan and Korea. Each of these agencies designated plenary representatives to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, rHQ, who operated under his control and whose mission was to coordinate and supervise Technical Tntelligence activities to prevent competitive duplication of offo)rt. Technical Intelligence in the Pacific theater was designed e to accomplish th foll:wing objectives: First, the exploitation of materiel, including the examination and evaluation of available enemy materiel and deduction, from this evaluation, of the state if Japanese resources for war. Intelligence so obtained
was exploited for the reciprocal benefit of the United States

and llied Armed Forces. This included examination of Japanese facilities which might be involved in the production of materiel for war and the provision of trained personnel to assist the chiefs of services (Ground, Naval and Air) in the supervision of the collection, safeguarding and evacuation of captured enemy equipment for Intelligence study and for tactical and training purposes. 115

HISTORY OF TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE Second objrctive of Techn.cal. Intel.li:~ence in the Pacific was nr.L,-)ed providlLng t.r-aned. the exploit.lti ol %: d.cIw:Ierst . T'is dV .:I:~.:tr...renecly Jc;&u. ants;, circlAa "g personnel. t, s-";c:r 7
accessioll reuL'.c, t..a.t ~s 1S5:,3 lf docu.ients re=eived,

to

author?.zod agencies; extrao.t.-n g Intelligence needed for security and cnntrol by means of frap,mentary translations or photostats; selectS ng militiry, t.r:hr.icni cit'nltif:Lc and general documents for United S ah!- st .:et;ainirng to cl''rent targae; books trans-nis.sion to- ,h-c It eaz-n and the specifz -interests puhlie.1 b-i' the War ard 1aall;. foczsizg all fi.el1d agenc-es pf of speciarlisv agen..iLe. anA, f, '-:,'' .s J for document activity. the Groaund, ava/' and Air *' Thirdl Ibject_ve f Tcernla in c-ielLgence was trhe exploitation .. of Order of Battle Intelligence and -elated subjects: this involved lists of all regulcar units (Ground; Naval and Air) lists of code names and nuilmers T/O''s and T,'E's of all tLes of units; lists of divisions, lbrigado.s and mIajor -nits of Grw-3 Na-'ai and Air Forces by components 5 strength, arman.nt, etc; lisL.s of recruiting districts and Navy officers and their and uni.ts trained therein; lists of comrnands, including direct:-ries of transfers and promoti.ns, biographies and service records; hist-,ries of major units; investigations of recruiting and training systems, of Home Guard and Volunteer Defense Units; investigations of military police, t gether with records of special and secret service organizations, (Tokumu Kikian); investigations of military intelligence agenc es, including histories, operations, etc; and, finally, reports on military societies.

,Armyr

Fourth objective cf Technical Intelligence was exploitation of historical records and Dfficial reports of the Japanese General Staff (Ground, Naval and Air). This included the organization of Japan for war, the preparations for the War of 1941, compaigns in the Southwest Pacific Area from 19)42 to 1944, campaigns in the Philippines from 1941 to 1942, second campaign in the Philippines in 1945, campaigns in the Pacific islands from 1941 to 1945, and campaigns in other areas from

1941 to 1945
For effective coordination, the foll-.,wing policy provisions were enf -rced!
To prevent compotitive duplication, all foreign and national techniclal rmssl ns3 upon arrival reere registered with the Assistant Chief nof Staff; G*-2, tHL-), who not-.1fied the occupation authorities concelned; G-2, GHQ, conducted all liaison with the Japanese Governmental aurhorities relative to the operation )f technical missions, dtlegatirig such liaison as was required to occupation force commanders; since Intelligence targets were geographically distributed, the occupation force commanders wvere responsible for the coordination

116

HISTORY OF TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE of expl.)itation .)f targets within their territorial Jurisdiction, operating through subordinate conmmanders or staffs to prevent competitive duplications. To expedite the conduct of these investigations, G-2, GHQ, was authorized to corrospond directly with the heads of the varimus interested agencies previously Ymentimned or their representatives on technical details, and direct correspondence between plenary representatives and the heads of the agencie s they represented was authorized. To protect Intelligence materiel and records available in only limited numbers against exploitation by a single research agency and to make these items accessible to other Intelligence agencies their removal had to be cleared through the occupation force commander. The principle of reciprocal exchange of reports applying to all field technical agencies, all reports of Technical Intelligence relating to investigations in Japan and Korea were cleared through the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, GHQ, prior to their being dispatched to locations outside the area. War Department Intelli-gence Target Section The War Department Intelligence Target Section (WDIT) was established under the provisions of General Orders No.9, 2 October 1945 and General Orders No.15, 9 November 1945, to exercise coordinating control and supervision over the exploitation of military and civilian Intelligence targets of interdepartmental and international concern in Japan and Korea. Col Walter S. Wood, appointed chief of WDIT, coordinated, supervised and established policy for the activities -f the technical, civilian and military subsections of WDIT and their relations with all other agencies. Operating under Col Wcod, was the Technical Intelligence cection, headed by Lt Col javid S. Tait, which was responsible for Technical Intelli-ence of all descripti)ns in the Pacific Theater. This section coordinated the activities of the Chiefs of Services of AFPAC, the U. S. Special Technical Kissions, the Foreign Technical Missions, made arrangements concerning trie exploitation of tarjets of Technical Intelligence interest, and saw that proper technical personnel were assigned to complete the reports. Operating within the Technical Intellingence Section weregl U.S. Army Technical Intelligence Center (5250th Technical Intelligence Co.); Collection and Reports Sub-Sectimn, which coordinated the reports submitted with War and Navy Department Intelligence targets; Translator & Interpreter Service (2,000 personnel), charged with the translation and publication of all Japanese dccurents and with the furnishing of translator and interpreter personnel; Washington Document Center 117

HISTORY OF TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE (ADVON) which selected and shipped all Japanese documents to the United States; and War Department Intelligence Collection Committ (ADVON), created by the Joint Chiefs of Staffs, which advised the Theater concerning the transmittal to Washington of Intelligence information.
Included in the U.S. and Forei.,n Technical Missi'ns coordinated

under the Technical Intelligence Section were the following agencies: Naval Technical Mission to Japan, Economic and Scientific Section, British Staff Section, United States Strategic Bomb Survey, Japanese Antiaircraft and Seacoast Artillery Research Board, Air Technical Intelligence Group (Far Eastern Air Forces), British Amphibious Mission, U,S. Naval Shipping Control Authority for Japanese Merchant Marine and Austrialian Scientific Mission. Temporary passes from the Office of the Supreme Commnander for the Allied Powers, Military Intelligence Section, were issued to authorized personnel in accordance with provisions of General Order No.9 to permit the bearer to enter any restricted area in Japan or Korea South of 38 degrees north latitude for purposes of Technical Intelligence. Agencies furnished weekly a list of targets to be visited, notifying WDIT at least 48 hours in advance so that the local commander of the area and Translator and Interpreter Service could be notified. All requests on the Japanese G)vernment were funneled through WDIT. Upon completion of target investigation, report was submitted to WDIT. Technical Intelligence Instruction No.1 Lt Col Tait, when he was assigned at GHQ, AFPAC, in Manila, had strongly favored coordination of Technical Intelligence when Col Sauve and Lt Col Manley had first proposed it in writing in May 1945. As Coordinator of Technical Intelligence under Col Wood at Tokyo, Lt Col Tait drew up Technical Intelligence Instruction No.1, Oeneral Headquarters. Nilitary Intelligence Section, General Staff, dated 20 November 19L5,that laid the foundation for the coordination of all Technical Intelligence activities relative to the occupation of Japan. Under this directive, the fAo.l:wing policies prevailed!

118

HISTORY OF TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE The United States Army Technical Intelligence Center served as headquarters f'r the 5250th Technical Intelligence Company. As field units )f the 5250th comileted their work with Armies, Corps and Divisions, they were recalled to the Center for re-assigonment under G-2. Special investigators temporarily attached to chiefs of services and other agencies could also be assigned to the organization for administration while in the theater. Chiefs of services and )ther Intelligence agencies prepared plans for the exploitation of military Intelligence targets in their designated fields and filed these plans with G-2 for coordination with other agencies at least 48 hours in advance of execution. The plans listed the names of personnel involved, stated the transportation and equipment required, and presented a brief outline of contemplated procedure. To assist in the investigations, additional qualified personnel, as well as transportation and-equipmenit, could be requested from the 5250th through G-2 Operations (Major Henry V. Hall) on WDIT Form No.1, Photographers from the Ph,:t-grsph Laboratry that had 'een established at the Technical Intelligence Depot in Manila and reestablished at the Technical In-elligence Center in Tokyo, could also be requested to accompany investigators on field trips. G-2 assumed responsibility for notifying other interested agencies; arranged with the occupation forces the details of billeting and transportation; notified, through its Japanese Liaison Section, the Japanese authorities involved; and, when desired, arranged for prrliminary interviews with Japanese officials that often materially expedited the investigations. All interested a-encies maintained a cl';se liaison with G-2 and were held responsible for becoming familiar with the records and rept)rts of Intelligence investigation maintained in the Technical Intelligence Subsection of WDIT so that unnecessary duplication of effort co)uld be avoided, Documents necess :ry to complete investigations were evacuated through TIS to the Washington Document Center (Advarnce) Library at the Technical Intelligence Center. Samples of new or modified material or equipment which was to be evacuated were handled as follows: When practicable, the investigator personally evacuated the item to the Technical Intelligence Center. If this were not adviseable, he made arrangements with Division G-2 for packing and shipping the equipment, and notified the Technical Intelligence Center that it had been sent. If shipment were delayed, he notified the Division G-2, who was responsible for safe4Eh9

HISTORY OF TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE guarding it until such time as the appropriate agency could arrange shipment to the Tochnical Intelli;ence Center, where further study of the material coull be made at one of the analysis laboratories. If shipmonrt were inadvisable, the investigator completed such study and photographs as were ncessary and arranged with the Division G-2 for the security of the item. In all cases, final disposition was requested from the War Department and effected by Technical Intellicence Center personnel. Upon completion' of the investigation, it was necessary that a report be submitted. T) insure its adequacy, the Chief of Service specifically indicated in his ortekrs to the investigating personnel the questions he desired answered. The report was mimeographed and distributed by the Technical Intelligence Center.

Activities of Technical Intclli7ence Teams in the Field At the time of concluding the writing of this history of Technical Intelli ence, not all repirts of the teams in the field had been received at 5250th Headquarters. Th-se available, h wever, indicate the conditions encountered in Japan, the copeuration that was given by the conquered pe)ple, the j-:bs that were assigned Technical Intelligence teams in the occupied country, and the type of information that could be secured. Assigned to Sixth Army were the followig Technical Intelligence units (personnel are included in operations roster, Incl 3): Field Unit No.1............. Headquarters, Sixth Army Field Unit No.2 ............. Corps X
Field Unit Noe3 ............ I Corps Field Unit No.51 ........... Corps I

Field Unit N,52 ............ Corps I Field Depot Unit N.71 ...... eadquarters, Sixth Army H Field Unit No.1 Headquarters Sixth Army Field Unit No.1 was assigned to Headquarters, Sixth Army, where they investigated the Civilian Defense Corps at Tsuruga, Fukui Prefecture, on the n :rthern coast of Honshu.- Investigation showed that the Corps, which was organized along lines similar to many agencies in the United States, apparently was not successful in accomplishing its mission due to a lack of facilities, equipment mid management.

120

HiLSTORY OF TECHNIC1AL INTELLIGENCE Hircshima an&r Kure, Honshu, Japan Field Unit No.2 was place:1 on temporary duty with X Corps, and assigned VOCG on operations with the 41st Infantry Division. Since the Unit was only all wcdc two jeeps in the first echelon of X Corps, 1st Lt Cyril L. Martin, ?Acdical officer for the unit, was left in charge of a detail to bring up a 1-f-on truck and trailer with the second echelon. The :th(r men from the Unit remaining behind with him on Mindanao, Phili-ppine Islands, were: Cpl Robert E. Jones, CWS; Pfe Rudy G. Colby, CE; T/5 Nick P. Vannucci, Ord; and T/4 Estill C. Picklesimer, Simnal Corps. The first cch::lon arrived. at Hirer, Honshu, Japan, 7 October 1945, with specific targ-rts accessible, Army Ordnance Supply Depot at Hiroshima and Kure Naval. Base and Ordnance Arsenal at Kure (}Yap Incl. 33). The branch office of the Tokyo Electric Company was not located and was believed to have been destroyed by bombing, and six other targets listed for investigaticn also could n.,t be located. Police and Japanese officials stated they hal not heard of any Df these installations in Hiroehima. 2d Lt Robert E. Cleary, Jr., anrd Pfc Ralph H. Spevack of the Chemical Warfare Team of this unit, recovered a new type decontaminator for dry mix in the Hiroshima -rrmy Ordchance Deptt. Major William 0. Farnam, Jr., and T/5 William C. Carrett, Engineer Teml, rccoverel a new item, a small jack harmner, which was reported and returned to the Technical Intelligence Center. As requested by 41st Infantry Division, this searched several caves near Kure, but no items f' Technical Intelligence value were recovered. Capt Edward Nowakowski and T/5 Kenneth I. Moore, Ordnance, checked the caves near Kure with the Enqineer Team, but also failed to recover any equipment of Intelligence value. 1At the Kure Naval Arsenal a new mobile 20 cm rocket launcher was recovered. At the Hir)shima Army Ordnance Supply De-.ot, new items found included: 15 cm horse-drawn morrtar; 37 mm anti-tank mun (the gun was on a mount similar to type 1, 47 rmm AT run); and an amphibious tank (destroyed), which the Japanese claimed was the only one existing in Japan (manufacturer unknown, but tank was madle in Saanmi, near Toky'o). Quantities of items contain(ed in another target were received from the 41st Division. 2d Lt Anthony G. Coppola and S/S2t Wiilliam J. Poss, Quartermaster Team, recovered a Japanese potato peeling machine in working condition at officers quarters, Kure.

121

fHISTORY OF TTECHNICAL INTE.LI'GENCE

1st L+

found they ware ,'i no '::

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-,

operatedt vr th I Corps in the SouthF ejsr IL1i 3, 5S arld 52 ts n: tempora:ry du.ty to the 25th ',1--:Ld T-:n.i 'Th3. t Central. H:nh1 .rea! i: 5eFtenbo-or aw:tinrg :lllcont To the Nagoya cy.y DLvi.s::. n, spn' Infri Tf,.cy -:iu'vied ..a-e tb.hat ncMnTh, a..'er being sector (i,<p I:lc] 33) ,ath rr ald L;t.'s in -c;.ies N,),ya iarbir, . T..o wf delayed snme 20 da-s Dt, .e unit attemptad to visit all The v:u.nie ,)f w#orc was heaTr, bL;t targets uf inportance before the Divisi on lestruciGon teams destroyed the equliprenG,;

rViS Team No,:3, (1st Lt Char.les F, Melchor, Jrc, Stt Carl H. Johns.n, vt' Ch.larles 'a', Poth.' ilv.,svtizatecd .ll ChcricsalJ Warfare targets r:I.cn was _b-truned in each case from listel f )r the N,'aj ,a area. Irn.. detilel ij.ntcrr'qation throuvlh Japanese .nmuerpreters oz factory mana.ers and from physical ins-:ecotimos of the factories. A list of targets n was as f-llows: investigated and inforationl obtainel therefrrm in the cock area of Nag;oya, was Niss.an Chemi cal Plant, l cmter. the Nissa- Chenmical Industrial Co,,Ltd., .',f found to be a brancll rplant cC,3iste-d of bulk manupr.o&duct:i ,7 with m!ai.n ffi::cr3 in 'Iokyr.' N' chemical factiire of fulrlIr sli .uric ac.c0 a W; uiJer ph )sphlaoe n at t.':.s p'.ar,, an-d F.tandcl.r me-',hods of ins car.ier resarci-c. T.le pi.nt was only slih1;.ly dar:aged dust,;,al .,hrn;h .. rcre. usi.., j e durirn h:ostilit.ties tsnd at the ti:.ie if invastiiation was continuing operatioll f.)r the :rolu.cbwion if suiLhburic acld. Tckai Scida Co!iany wvas forme-rly 1)catod adjacent to the Nissan FPlat, but had been t .tallj.y dec'.toyed daring hos-tilities. Chemicaln No furth,' infrinati n concernin-' this plant could be obtained. , throulgh listed as a target on available maps Tokai Sodiumn CD. of Nagoya in the vicinIty .jf Nissan Cheirani-l. Plant, was reported by Nissan. plant offi.cials who were interro-atLd to have mosved to another part of Japan prior to hostilities. A search of the surrounding area a,.;arently conffirmed this report.

122

HISTORY OF TECHNIC.L INTFLLIGE2CE Yaha-i Flactro-Chonical Plant and Showa Suda Plant, located in the dock area of Na.,ora, combinled during hostilities under joint mana-a:Eent for the -rY...ucti-n Ai bulk cher.icals. Standard processes were use I for the manufacture -. all chemicals and no apparent chemical f research ha'l been .:rwas bein-z condlucted. VWith very little plant da::ia-e sustained during h:stilities, i.roduction was being continued. Sakura Gum Co., Ltd., Naoya Branch (formerly Dai Ni. on Cellophane Plant), was 1.cntc north of NanL ya ! Castle, Nagoya. Wartime products were rubber tubes for airrlane :asolino hose, rubber tubing for airp:lane hizh pressure hydraulic hcse, and sheet cellophane. Equipment from the secti 'n which manufactured rubber tubes had been moved to other i~lants. The colli,,hane plant, v..iich was destroyed by bombing, was rebuilt and resumed1. the manufacture of cello,;hane around 1 December 1945. In stu.lary, it was apioarent that these large chemical industial S(,lants were enc ag.ed only in the manufacture 'f intermediate products and n.t in the i;rD.uctin of finished war materiel, which was accomplished in other plants. Evidently these plants were not char.ged with the res'-onsibility "f chenical research, since the only laboratories encountered were fo)r 'ro.uction control. The primary responsibility of these plaits in wartime seoiamed to be quantity production of essentially the saume chemicals which had been produced in peacetime. Only one member ,f Enineer Team No.3 was still assigned to field duty by 9 November, The other tw' menibers, 2d Lt Wendell S. Webster an:l T/3 Arnold F. iVellensiek, had been relieved of duty with T.I. Unit NJ.3 and ha-' been assigncd t; the 11th 'Replacement Depot for return to the United States. Only member of the .iedcical iemt l.ft by the midlle of November was 1st Lt Henry T. Zclechosky. i'fc Ira A Davidson of this team had transferred to the 11th Replaccomelnt De!? t for return to the United States. Capt Robert L. Henry, Jr., reorted. to the Replacement Depot,
leaving T/4 Roecrt Vi.Grubbs and Pfc Joseph F. Pollack without an

officer in charge cf the Ordnance Team. 1st Lt ihil:io- C. Anderson, upon the dep.arture of T/5 J:hn M. Devlin for the Rel lacement Depot, continued as the only member of the Quartermaster Teal. He also acted as officer in charge of the Field Unit. The Signal Teamn (2,^1 Lt John H. L-tz, S/Sit Max A. Bratt, (who reporte. to the Replacement Depot 17 Nwvember, and S/Sgt Robert H. Groom) c-vered the Naoroya Aircraft Plotting Center, made a complete 123

HISTORY OF TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE

inventory of all Jy,%ancr'se Si!nal tar.,ets listed in target folder f r the 25th Irfantry Division area, an,' slipi-,ed important items to the Teclhnicl Intelli ence Center, T-ky' Tnvesti-7ation J.t .-Sb, Hnnshu.

Fiel(d Unit Noo.51, on temporary .luty to 33r! Infantry Division of I Coiri:s, arrivf" in K be, [Honshu, (rMap Ircl 33) 25 'e1ternberO The first il.:qrussionn was that Kobe was cornpltecly ruined, but later more tho)rouh irspections le.l to the rec-,very of considerable information and iateriel. The CWS Team composed .f 2d Lt Robrt C. Payant, Sft Harvey J. Bylsrna, and Cpjl Homer Blankcnship, investij,-ated the Cavalry School durmp at IHimeji (Mai-, Incl 33), and recoverec the follwing items in the quantities inlicated: 3 16 10 8 20 10 boxes ..... HCM fran-ible sroke rrenades boxes ..... tye 94 substitute smoke candles b~xes ...... ty e 94 srall smoke candles (A) b:,xes...... ty,e 94 flbatijn? sroke cardles (B) boxes...... 50 mn smoke shells for type 89 grenade discharger bxes ...... franrible vomiting ras grenades e 91 'rrny -as masks

10 b xes ......olired smoke cndles c

30............ ty

Other tari-ets investi.:ateol by this team includedc: Nisshin Millin- Co.,Ltd,, Kobe; NTa:aoka Kuchus:ai Manufacturing Company, Kobe; Nil,-in Dur.lo:, Rubber Comnany, Kobe; Sanyo Chemicmal Factory, Timeji; Hineji Cavalry School, Himeji; Ko)be Fort Def'ense Garrison, K)be; /Mitsui vV/areh:)use No. 324, Kobe; Koyosed Factory, Tokaraiuka 1Cap, nclb. 33; .Nati nal Bearinrg 'Works, Takarazuka; Ja,:anese Iirmcji Arny Disci:linary Barracks, Himeji. The Engineer Tear.m, comi;osed of Capt VWilliam C. Gohrinp, T/4 Alvin J. Orville, and. Pvt James W. Stephen, found no Enginser equipment, with the exception of small hand tools located at the 4th Infontry Replacement Unit, Osaka Division, Himeji, Japan. This sai:ie team, investigatin. the Kobe Shipbuilding Plant of Mitsubishi, Heavy Industries, Ltd. 3 Chome 'WadasakichoHyogoku, Kobe, Honshu, funnd the plant had- not been damaged. during the war and was at the time of investim atimn capable of full production. The plant's main production during war and.peace time had been shipbuilding and

124

HISTORY OF TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE the fabeication of steel and iron wipes and railroad rails. Operations at the plant at the tine of report consisted of minor repaitrs on six r.erchant cargo ships of fron 850 to 6800 gross tons. Other targets investigated by this team were: Osakokikoi, a:raasaki, Seikosho KK; Nichio Seiko KK; Sumitomo Zinzoku Seisakusho; Koyo KK; Oriental Steamship Cot.qpany; Tao Kinzuko To-yo KK; Tokyo Electric Company; Kobe Shipbuilding Plant; 4th Infantry Replacement Unit. The Or-lnance Team was composed of Capt Nelson J. Sweet, officer in char-e of the entire unit, T/5 Richard E. Reynolds, and ifc. Jamles E. Unruh. Wvith the initial impression that Kobe was completely ruined and that factory targets were nil, Capt Sweet at first planned for the Ordnance Team to start 1 October insl ecting equipment turned in by the Japanese Army. Further investigation led to an insiection of the Kobe Steel Works. The plant mana:er, who was interviewed and who acted as a GTuide thr-ugh the factory 'seemed very co-oerative and answered all questions that were askedJ?". The Kobe Steel dorks ha., first been bo:;led 18 Earch 1945, but little damage was sustaincd by the tank and tank gun sections of the factory. It was bombed again on 5 June 1945 and severe damage was wrought, although attempts w<cre made to keep up the tank and igun production. All work steptped on 5 July as the Feople would no longer go t) work for fear of being bombed. :ccordin, to factory officials, there was a shortage of steel, but labor problems kept the production at low figure. The plant was -overnment controlled, and even the officials (apiarently) were not well informed as to where or how the sun and tanks were used. Reort on Himeji Cavalry School (Tanks) The same Ordnance Team investigated the Himeji Cavalry Tank School the proving ground at Himeji, (piay, Incl 33) where three tanks were found of a type different from any other recovered to that (late. The tanks had no gmeans of being identified other than by a nar.meplate that did not give complete information. All tanks were in fairly good condition, although two showed signs of possible sabotage: the wires from the instrument panel had been torn out from one, and a namieplate had been removed from another. It was thought that the tank mi Lht have been m:ade by Mitsubishi as the Kobe Steel Works were making the gun and shipping it to that firm. 125

HTSTURY O(,i TECHNICAL, IPTELIG

1YENCE

Arr~.r7ei.ierits aer- rvi.lre '. thp, ,rd...ci>sion G--2 to pick up the resporlsk-hle ,,a,arnle Off'.tf cr5 n e '.. ic. anl- .nn of the sc,Uoci. in r1: .orler to ,ola-in .r, n..:)'fe _?f'o)l) C a :, r. It, taui: and to 1Lv; experi.enced .'. personne'-io rput h;e -tanks in: ruinl n r, u.oc-, .rhotoiraphs were taken and wveie ,ab,3 .'Li'cd wlthca t l, rt

o-ri-d.

Report on Amxi':;n.ti;,n 1.rr Kobe Anti-. iirat. "

efences

COapt S .c-;t'(i-: !r:n.(,e '''a. s a3 eror. d eo ,n -;,he 5amiiiunl.tion availil..]_,> l,)r lKf-bu a. ....i .rrLlf r availab1 was ..... i r,:ten.,. Ak ;'l___ ,-*.m. h a .].i~.lnl u.-)n stored in a i;erCehouse .illt i',o1";l -: )eie L, in KO:be. An inrventory of the buil lin- :.:scluse,' tlhe o'. vln : l 436 runs.. ... ._ c r,. b:'Imb aivurniti-n c,lm, /s aLa. -. tion n ...... 8 ? 4 r'o.trs .. 213I. r'.lI. ........ 7 c .;, susi-: Llte a

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A SO-second nachoriculI tinc f-cze wvr.ts also di.scovered in the ammuniti n areh.u Ise. i,,: s t.lly ht th:,t tAis fLz,z rt manunfactured in Toky~o in 195, ,was r.l::: .ficl a crol -f .the tyr.e 9: fuze. L Osaka 'ir Sti n in tho K be lo-t A-ency were invrstiratc; by this Ordnance personnel,

The T;)kI-D Electric Corniarny

The Si: nal Team f Unit Ni>51, composed D)f 1st Lt, Jarecs W. Elkins, :: T/S2;t iL'ario JLa Conata_, anc T/' Edrocnd E. I.nna, investL,.ated the Tjkyo Electric Coli,. any, a subsi(ilary of General Electric of Now York, Bef-)re the outbreak :.f hostil.ities, the Kobe branch engaged in manufacture of comr.ercial raiiri;ceivers, ele+c la:ps andl other electrical a,,ppliances. Durin,: the war, -, he rlai,at ,as operated under strict goverrniient conrD)l and. was allowed to make only tlarine ralio sets, Approximately O150 pE.ople were em.l- ,ed at the factory. Of these, approxiimately 107 were Jacan.ese scho:l b-ys and( the rest were adults employed in the office as clerlcs ;lld. typioet$ The plant had n t been in pro(cuction since 5 Jure 1.945, which was attributable tl the fact th-at the water and. electric: su ,ply to the Kobe area had been detiilished, ancg because there was no l:on-ur a demand for .'arine radio sets. The plant was aboldt, forty percent destroyed, with the receiver buil.din;- c .r pletely :?emi:lishe,! and facilities in the rest of the plant heavily danmag'ed.

126

HISTORY OF' TLCT1NICI,L INTELLIUGENCE

,The Him&-ji Ca,alry School anl! the !th Replacement Unit of the Kobe D'fens2,, Divlsi.,n were'~ als; iiispectod by the 'ream,.

Eield Unit ',T-)5,5. Field Unit bin.5 2 the third Technical lnJelligonce Unit attached 'j - t''e!-:ber 19L5 at Wakayi.lua, Honsh;l, proceeded to I C -ris,. lane: Incl 33). ,ay', the f-tllain- day t, Csaka ( r The Cheni al Warfare Team, composed of 1st Lt Victor Del Guercio, irnsected the following S'-t G.r-cen ', Dulckett, and Cpi Ralph Cn setrr, tarcets: Nissh) & Co,, Ltd. This ilant was a truas;portation agency for delivery of raw mraterials to mranufactur.rs, anlcd id not hancdle cheidicals. ,MitsubishiCco., Ltd.,, were dealers in fond ani other essential materials for civilians, and h-nd1l.ed n' chem!.icals.

Nipl_:on So:ida Comn,,any had its office in Osaka,its factories in HokuThis crm.pany was a manufacturer of riku District in Northwc-st Honshu. chemicals, but its plant was outside the Unit's area of operati'ns. a womlesale h-use in chemicals, was lestroyed by air raid. Yamada & Cz. Miki & C!., Ltdl. w ere wh lesale idealers in rphcnol dyes. At the Naruo Naval iiir Base. so-le Cheraical Jarfare itemis were found, and some of these were new items C4.S eqgi,,prent was also fiomnd at the Takeda PharmaThe Kitajima iowider i.:a-azinc Stored much ceutical Ind.ustries, Ltd, Chemical Waramnrunition, includrin? somle CheroiicaJl 'iarfarc equipment. fare equi!ment was l1'catec at Tezukaya!na Girls High School, and much at the Uenos'-ib.a A:im;unition tlant. CJS an-munition was stred

New Chemical ~i"arfare itemls which were recovered were: a.cas-proof buildin c-'ntainin;f t ree col:ective protectors; type 1, I..Ddel 1,
Si-nal smoke canle, type 3, m:,del 1, Mark 27, 60 kg incendiary rocket bomb; n].l incendiary-candle; and a tear gas ,renad e.

1st Lt J')hn E, Harmls, T/4 R-er W, Sheroodl, andi Fvt B.G, Mala-rmuth, Enfincer Tea:m f rr the Unit, ilnsnectec the followin- targets: Oki Denki K,K. demolished beyond recornition by fire bombs; Nip-:on Seitetsu KK.
destroyed, a lar;,e supply of steel on hand in the yards ; KIubta Tekkosha KK. was in excellent cortlition, rea(dy for peacetime production Osaka Seisa Zoki KK, located in of 13-ton tractors and dleisel engines. the Nankai Buildin-r, Osaka City, iianufactured machinery, weapons and armnunition; Sekimuchi YKikai Seisakusho KK, in Osaka City, ha,- bout 90% of its area destroyedc by fire bombs,. This team locatedl near Sakai (r.ap, Incl 33) twenty-three carry

all scrapers with a capacity of abult ei:ht cubic yarls.

127

HISTORY OF TECHNICAL INTFLLIGsENCE

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Eiitil hrmy Trech;nmical Intell-iu-'rl", Fieldt TJn-ii;s

Iio:s2..ned trJ Eji-t iAirmy weIe -vhe follDwin Tenhnical Intelliyrence units (persmorlnei are nclu:dud n oerat s rter,

HISTORY OF TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE F3.eld Field FIlel d Field 7ield Uni.t No.,4 .. ,. .. XI Corps Un,.t tNo, 53 .. ,,. XI Corps Urit No. 5,......... XIV Corps Un;it lNho, 5154 ,,,,,XIV Corps Unit No, 55 Corns C~...X

Field Unit No., 4 and No. 53, borh assigned to XI Corps in the Tokyo area, coolc:rated cisely vrrith each o'the-?r ,jder the dir.ection of Yia.jor Jaroslav :. Iz-1&', who also served as officer in charge of Ordnance wrLth Unit No, 4, They arrived in Yoko1hama (.lapi Tnc]. 33) 12 Septenber 19-5, tracked dovn assigned targets and during the course of this work encountered a nunber of new installaticrns, At the Tolkyo Ordlance S';ocrly Depot, Col Matsumato supplied the ih.uits w-ith a mnan showing the location of branch '!qhen asked, he also infcrmed them that depots under their control, the nonle of the organizati.on in char-ge of all Japanese Ordnance activities (in the Japanese 'rmy this included Engineer, Chemical Warfare, Signal and C)rdnance) vwas the A.,irmy Ordnance Arsenal Adrnir1istrative Headquarters, vwith Lt Gen Kan in charge; The equ:ivalen, to the U.S, Medigagency with its headcl?...rters at Yoga in Tocal Corp)s w s a separ.te kyo, while the equivalent to the UiJS. Quartcrmasctra- Corps -was small enough so that it was run as a Staff" Section of Inoperial Headquarters. The units established direct lia.ison T'i th the Army Ordnance Administrativo Headquarters through a Japanese staff officer of their Technical De3partront, From hini the units recuivred a list, in Japanese, of all stanldard items of equipnleCnt, and a list of the Experimental Stations or Prcving Grounds and their specialtics in the XI Corps area. Ex)erim.ental Sta.tions at Koi.'.unj i On 21 Scotember a trip vwas arranged to the Fxeorimnental Station at Kokubun-i, (,)ap), 1IC1 3D) inside vwhose walls there vaer five of the ten sta.,iolns- Fperi'nmntal StVation -1i (mlachine gunsj artillery, rocket and arlmunit'ion r1'eS:L'cl); ixporiOnta Station :'3 (Engino,!r equipment
rkesearch); Expe:rimr-ntal Stati.tn ;': 5 gnral. equipment res;,arch); Experi-

mental Station ;,:8(rma, natriE .eseat. c' , and Exp c-rimental Station No. 2 (fire control and ;pt-ca.ci instrzm:ltss); which had be-n moved to warehouses at Ko!unbunji from Kogmnci whoen Ai-n .rie.an troops occupied that area. The co:Ti-!le:te in:3tJ.l]ation at KeO1bunji was also by this time under rigid guard by Americal Division troops, The trip to Kokubunjl was arrsa.ged so that the he-ds of tilhe various departments iwere present hen the Technicicol Intelligence unit arriyed, U. S, personnel attending were: i!ajor Jaroslav V, Klimn, officer in charge of UTnit #1,a; Cat rtWlllard C, Hc1l.o-w.ay, officer in charge of Unit i'53; 1st It A.lcido Santilli, Signal Corps officer of Unit Y#53; and Ensign Gibson from ,,IU (Navy).

129

HISTORY OF TLCHMICAL INTEILIGENCE After a gene~rl instruction, each officer separated from the Proup an.-I jnvrstagaed i3 spe-,.a'ity Statii-n No.5 (Sinl. Curps) was vaisi^*d by Lt Santilli,

Station No.5 (raw nateru.V:- ) was invres.iLr:tted by all personreo. The ,i,.ssi or: th .. cf ; v:- s 'to .- tat',a , a'. l types t of raw rI:.atC.l L... )r use by -Joe -. :P;A %-1.i'( wal- s-o),,T1Tn-. ed br '. ' Technivcal 'n:K.-" l:-'mce :-:fi'c_.rc ?:esml ~ '.tbat, if deaiited information , abolat ,;oes..'es v;er :J r,;i ' ,,, hra.'o c]ifi led pcrson.a?i. oe sent to interviR: ,.( ens:'lls.e rnu a._-.icbl.- Mi~e-mi8rnhilce, a tr.einiminary interview
was held th.,e C.::i.e, il:-, the o)r,~snic c'ierLL3stfry le)al.i cf general e t. affairs, arnd an officer from

Station Nr),3 was vi.sid Gibson. Capt H:)ilovray Fre. 'ar

bjy .M.j K.ima, Calt. Holloway, and Ensign a scpalate report on %his Station.

.Maj Vli.ma and Ei:.szir.O bsn visitedl Station No.2, (fire control equipment a.lr oi ol.y. . .r.cnr .yy loc(lte- at Koganei, Many new items of fire cn-:..;. lw:,; observe i and the ;arehousos were placed under e sLiples c, uld be taken. Another I.nt,.lli;ren:; guard until Tetiil c officer v'as .nim: trie'Ae1d, but as.oi fror. some inforlnat,.on about fungus ;rrowth on lenri s and a few eaaLm-atrions of tihe Stations activities, little infor.-a.tion coul-d be obtarined, The last placc examinel. was !Fxperimnental Station No.l (machinery, 7uns, azrti.;le-y, rockets, ammrunition), where nmny Ordnance items of Technical Intellirence interesr, were found, Inciujed were the following: 15 12 75 75 crm cm cm cm mun (no type had been set) A'A *rmn. ape 3 A.A ;.un, t-'-ye lh recoJless guns
iA

90 raim recoiless guns

75 riii hand r ocket lauIncher 90 r:m hanc' rnocket la;nmcher T',Us 57 mrm AT (anti..rymal 75 .;m ,2T :n 'LG 6.. eter sec) 75 'ii, &.T :,un (c.,py of ez-rran KYK, 75 im'i tank gun) The M.ajor Gener,,1 and meimers of his staff were interviewed, and it was found that this statLon (id 'the basic research and design on small arms, ar ,llehr, rockers and a;nminiiona The a.ctual prooffiringr was done at Fu!,fsu (for rsmall arms) and Ichi prefecture. In addition to specific data on various weapons, the following general infolrmation was obtained: Some liaison wa mafintained with the Germans, but not the free exchangc expected. For instz-nce, the Japanesa tepe 9,m88 mm gun,

130

T HI.TORY OF j7'',.NrTCAL TI'T1',

n direct conry of the T'i]' T' 1i8 Grim1r 8, wa,13 ccni3d *rom a gun captured in China "nd wrls nl(t c;btain.;od frol tiv rnns Thl no7zlc dasign on roclCets .-rls or:ainu .1...-v/ Gcrm .n, bt vr'., ,cdif:iid bty the Jaaznese.
The Ja't:!n;. c :ivredi tjllu)b, and recoill mneclhlanisms for 7?5 mrn WK. .. gun, PAR 3! CO( mmnl '.[f un, -red PAR hO 7( mTi' 7un, plus the German r) PAK hl, ?../., t"-wc b,':r, .:,:, i rr' Il;hcn ^.sl<kd -,r-v thbv did nct adopt thmrn, t ::3,"d, ".1. C,'ls3:rcr r.t: rn(.:: ;rcduictien f .cilities." The ;.:ci :ls lcun r-s_ r, ch v-.ws st'rtcd by the J- anise, when they hC.'e'l f Lthb r.i,, a-::ll t-,', blt was net, orursuud rtil the
GovI'Irn.ri 011. O
.S

nn

srd .ctur~ls

-rI.nd. rl-vwins.

In gliral1, mo t i pmr;int Ih-d b(een rijnrvC.w frocm the experimental stitions aLt 'bhtr..ret : .. T' i. lu.ite; mv:dce their inv,-:stig-.aticn, 2nd was at th'.t tirce u,(l:c.r the control cf JT:n..nece Tvrelfth Army Heatdqua.rters, ThroCu, C ls D'; st n li.'_->2 1ir,:-ct nLs. was established with n the v rcivs st-Lff crTr Co c.fficers c. 12th .Army to ascertain the lccA'ti.cn cf "1L it...mns cf oei. - 'cnt cf T.chnica.l Tntcll.igcncc interest in the nr,_a. ":.r; ra:ult, L ;:'y i-\tems cf nov: o'uinrmont wore discovered, includiiq 7T m7 r-c i.:Ks -rlns, I rlmr-::cket launchers, models of new trne -t'm Su' s, a.' ozin!.u ... ... b1u . .1 Ava. lable standa-rd items and dr..-vr.-iicl'n-t typos cf Ja.annose e oqu:. -'ient in vw' ch the U. S. War e..p .rtr cjlt 'ws _n'terfost2e, .-cre-: lcc-.tcd I.nd .nbn] tss 0. ; arrancrinents for thl.`s :..r; ccmplctcd 't " se:parate m.U:tiLng be'twecen the vari.Lus cff c .rIs cf ;,-.chl scrv. c; frim tho Tchnical Int.elligence Units and frrlm the J,-a.n.Doe 'RicrClfiti a'rny. -rrnged th!te Arry OCrdnncne 'dvlinistr :ti-;n Bur.eau ';tl 1T .arf-i.rC ]heomica-rl and 'j .'TT rue-r.Is.ont-tives to be csccrt<,d to x.xre:.rir:mental ,,t't.ti-n ''6 (C.S3 Ruscerch I ab-.rat-:ry;r) and Exm0ri-ri?.ntal. St..tiocn 117 (F;undare-l entol Ph-rs c'l 1 Rt.e.earch Jabrortcrrr), both t Olkub:. Ituch ir',.re! .t .n (f dvc].r lr'cllt, rose-irch o.nd Tcchln. c"- ' Ilnt . ' Cnci .:lntr.t was uncuero: d.
fo'lr Ordd'ne:nc,

;rii3p; as

&gnal,,

II. di't n t.o til4 .... ison ir. ny -sta.bl"sheld, Lt Ccl Tait, at that tU-ra Cih .f Cenf.t,.-l J. .iaison S.cticn, G-2 4HO (AFi'C), r-.de t .b)aw iw further the f.ci :.ti.:s of h:is s ct-i n v " if c-nt-cts vrcr; requir;d .:i.tih aly !:ar.-i cul] r Ja.e ' fri'cup.,
T.ward t'he .nd "; S-:r.t..rber, j I'[li .a attundod a meting at An-tJ.-Ajrcraft (cr:innd F ' lr(' -dc:a.r.ters tc disc s the IIistcry of s te 15 cm AL gun .:ith the drsicners rrngc.ents -ore made for rr. the- Ja- ancse to turnl c''r to h m ccmplete. ile::]e prints on this gun and. on thu )!O clm r _ckAt ;li.h -was a.t th tt, ti.m under devrclcpment, He alo;c rece::ivd charts sho.wring, in Jnpancso the characteristics of all standard prcxeillenmt pwcders manufa:ctur_.ed by the Japaneseo

131

J!ISTORY OF TECHI TICfL IN'EI,LIGENCE

Other Ii.sta.ll+ti
-ns

Investi ,'te'

The )WTTei c2:. IeJ. l:.-ieYnc untis with XI CDri.s collected ... lar :e Ulai',zi l.. -f ecujipr-nt at the f.ll:Jir r installations which they inves. :l:, t .

Konishi Ph:;t-o:;;
cfre8~i1

hr
/0 ,A

C,; manufacL'.r-c aerial camaeras .phto cheimicals

t FVl -

a,

er .K

'j

i:hysics Dc;car.m rnt, UJIiv!.'sity of T'kio; Inteii- -once -,ntcrest r'-cover-edj Jyuja Or nance diareh:)use:

no equinient of

st-'r_: l amrunition,. all Quartermaster supplies.

OJiku Aikrabane iArrrmy Cli,thiir! ;.areh:use:

Itabashi i.rscnal-

sall.l arrms and cm rmnition. rec.nv(crted. to clothing marnufacture.

Gas mask factory in To-kyo:

Tokyo .rsnal ',.. 1: pr : luce amr..unitin, -fuzes, this was the install]atl:,n latr t'ki.;n wver as the TechnicalIntellieali e Center. Tokyo A rsrnal iN),2: c2,nstriction r.aterial auJnunition. Fact .ry, Tokyo Arsenal No.2: explosives.

Oji Factory -;f' Itabaz.shi Yoko:suka }Na val Arsenal

rL;iay Che;lical Sarfare Scho)-l Teluvisior

(NTarash:.no): imnpFrtant fcr C.:'S Intelligence. irector inter-

L&Lbo)rat;ry,- Japan Broad1castin7 Company: vievved but little information secured.

Korakuen Stailuu'l: o-n th- -iain .roa6. in Urawa (Lap, Incl 33), 30 AA rr.ns with af.mruniti n, searchli:ht, etc. reco!vereId.
To-kyo Shibawva (forrierly L'atsuda): (Kanara;a, Ka'wesaki).

Tokyo Shibaura e(l1atsudca): ra'io tules (Kana;:awa, Sumitomo Commnrunication C'cm)pny (TTamaawa, Fuji Communicatim)n Corp1any (KanaslId, Warehouses, Imperial Guard Grmunds.

Kawasaki),

Kanaa.'raw)

Kaiagawa).

ILISTORY OF TECHINIC L INTELLIG(ENCE Hino ilrrorel Car CI,,: neiw type arm.lored half-track manufacturing plant; not operating. Tama Gun Pow.3er F'acto.ry: n't o,-:ratin;: }.'ayeda Heavy 2?acYhicrr floats. o;'. C .: L t extensive sur,lies of explosives; rmarufacture I dluc!?;s, mines;veeiing
L, rt;iln

[to I:aint an," Lacqu,-r C;). Tokyo l;atanabe :Sebtai Co.: Nippin Airp'lanto Fact-)ry:

nrit operating.

lpaer marmnfacturin-. air-frames and. floats. vitamin manufacturing.

Tokyo Tanabe Iharmaceutical Co.: Shimada Aluminuml Co pa,.ny: Akamnatsu Wed1 Co,:

airplane -as tanks.

Jmohair.
in prdlucti)n. Navy 40 k;r. FS smoke generat rs. scrap, refininj;.

Dai Nilmpiin Bicycle Co.: Toakiki MTachinery Co.: Tokyo Mletal Refining Ce,. Toku.shiboschin:

bearin- an;l brushing manufacturing.

type 94, 8rir, pistols and 12.7rmn type 1 aircraft Thuoko Gyo Cs., Lt. L: which ap lroximately 100 were in the assembly 4gachine iuns, It'
sh ,p. Sanyo Machinery C.)F: turret lathes.

Tana Suipply Offire: comprised ap-:roximately 100 builcdings; loading stati)n for lan-rl inos and artillery ammunition. Knle,gafuchi Tractor Msrnufacturin., Co.: -lant in Soka: manufacturel 90 h., . caterpillar tractors.

cril';r, brass, bronBe alloys.

Storate area near Soka (Mlap, Incl 33): fr bar steel, lumber, plaster, -aint, lubricantsj electrical sup:,plies, automotive parts.

133

HISTORY OF T.CHI'1NCAL, I!NT1EThLLICENCE Narimasu 'irfi el: cl .thin,;-. containel special purjose veh-:.cle, explosives,

Great Japan Fcrtili-cr C ): vit.i.ildns, con'iensedl fe., Tokyo Su 3 liarr honsecs #23, '". > Un i.t je ; mretc:}r :loi;'1CJ ,.u L.'_-; ],Jy j'/, Puirii S' nr:

pills. and

iLi.suP. ~sted

. n zh..J -~.~a. la rzt.

;.;:uti ~lwtsiar Gv

ri). %11Wes4;L. ate

be0 sent t) :;.F

ChiLa:. E..'ipj Incl 33); qulnti--;y of Engineer En- ine.r Suijly r cquC:i pmalnt as we lIl as sosin Crcdnarlc equipment; inventory ficial;S, Yvas malde ly a :.nr ,f
Chofu Air Strip: nleu items ,f cl'thin;.

Koza Su'pnly Dump:

Or !nance items.

St. Luke's Hrspital: taken -,ver by 42nc Geniral Hospital V!aval Medical C 11oee:. Tokyo Chanty Hosl-itJ;; tra.ine-d Oaganese NIaval officers: o-er-ated Naval l:..,ical College.

Imperial Institute of Infectious"Disease3s ,ry Naval Hospital: invent

Showa Tsen Hospital:

taken.

civilian.

lti Tokyo irmxy Airfield:

Sur)ply Hqs.: ,::iC.l pyr-,technics.

rese-arch conducted; papers translated,

Ichinoiiiya Gas Factory:

r.ustar;'

JtaS

-as bombs, blastinr caps; large amounts of p-rD.-luCed; hal gpas -rotected equipment.

Sonniko Te:el Co.' dyes, smlall tools. Matsushita Dry Battery C0.: dry batteries - hl,O0,000 in 194b. Chigoski Radar Installations: S:ina-, Bagani Arsenal: OrInance equipment.

now Ordnanc'e equipment.

134

IISTORY' OF TE'C{IIHITCL INTELLIGCENCE Fvuttsu ! rsrenal: q!lii,.l:ent was thorou.hllly an(t systematically d!estroyed by thl( Jlys; -)me nwr ammunition frunc,.

Hiratsuka IJava. ArLr: nal:

1 f' ur, c(la, k r rm an ' small quantities of prrintinrt papur and bullk ill'redionts frr -;hotoch<.dcac.sl; of nruch technical interest from powder analysis stal diJ, in-t.

Kokabunji lPrn.vin' GI::'mims;

?, !: su:'IlvY )if Siftnnal equipment including

some now .teOvlo(l,42, ts; docu ents of this equipment,

MIatsushita 'ry Battery C, -Csaka Factory: prjoducing flashlight batteries, but c:ul:.l Tro-!uce qulito a nIm.ber of other types, Sixth Mlilitary Laboratory, Okuba: ;arfare rCscarch. {7as bombs, projectiles; Chemical

Seventh Lilitary Laboratory, Okuba: fundiamental physical research; docurment on un.crvater bar es for transpolrtin7 munitions and fuel translated anr. f-)rwar:led to Naval authorities; information scur,:i o-jn hOmm rocket with built-in granpc selectnr- s-urmlmry: DI' projects ldl.ertaken (translation by GHQ) socu.r.o'. Vitamin Factory: mostly burne(:; inoperative; few supplies secured. Lt.,: f:ru-s f:,r civilian use (reconverted).

Nippin Gun Lvvrler C .,

Army Meodical Suppl.ly Hq. at Yo-:ca: obltaine' information on supplies; TI. Unit su-reste. an investi:.ation be iaade of a considerable quantity. -f silver bullion, nolJ, platinur., foil and wires in safe- un!ler (unarmel ) Jaanese Tuarcls. Japoanese liceno:r (En,-ineer) Scho-,l ?.t Yatsudo (T.iap, Incl 33): considerable quantity of neaw En-ineer equipment; all precision instruncnts and rec-!rds dispCseIL of before U.S. entry into
Jas n.

Showa-Fertilizer Co.: Kawasaki:

Kan:se:

parent compary of a syndicate consisting YarnUfacture2ls of sulfate of ammonia, liquid amr:,)nia, nitric acid.

of the followinr:

limo-nitr)-?enf

calcium carbide.

HIeLSTORY OF TECT,.1.ICAL INTELLIGENCE

O!citsu: Tateyaliwa: Hirt:

Shiojlr-i: Chichilbu;
K)um[ ,i

p .tissium chlloride, potassium nitrate, potassium chl-:ricle, ., i- )ta3s:lJm chl-rate, solium cyanid.e. rt. ~,fi'-a:.. abbaso.vs, fene-e-all,'ys.
fone-ci.,roe,
oir-

1;atsluTrtc::

elc ctral]ytic irin

Y.koham.a:
O:iachi: Kitak.t... Toyarla:

alll-in
Su.uic

-rahite electrles, caustic soda,

acid.

-lur;idnum,i artificial graphite, a:luii1 nm aluJina, aluriilun,.

11.All prsonlnel of Field Unit I:1,J scre<7ned' equipr.ent, e.dctdd from the above-listed tar.ets and mriarke i-e as of Technicil Intelinvesti ated no Then the tarrets were first lirence intere-st. d.ecisicn as t-) wareth.use ssace ac' bee(n l']e (The Technical Intelli- ence Depot did n.:t arrive until later), andu nine -f tne heavier equi.pient -was roved. At that ti-ne it was estirated that appr 'citmately

six --. 'ton truck I< a!ls of srrioll

ment were re.,a,

equip.rent plus various autoiotive equip-

ff.r T;I, anoLlysiso nlinc-r schn-cl is Seize-I

Jaanlese jrry n

Within a wreFlek after 'lan-1ndin, t Yokohan.a, and after imich scrambling, and Units NJoc 1-,. NTo, 53 anrI. secured a il the two Enri.neer Team.!s o.f _' . il ite;n. lben they obtained a lead from a Jap tent fPull i' -En....nlcr lieutenant -ecner'i wh-*hch led the t+.eals to the Japanese Arry lEnglneer School (their Fort Beivoei-r), at Matsudo (.~'ap~ Incl 33) about fifteen miles N. E, of Tolryo1st Lt Clinton 0. otter, T,/3 Jaires 'V,. Ellyette, and T/3 Elsworth P. Paris, EnAL;nerer Team .f Unit. No, 4, mr)nvced in qrd took the place 'irranenments were intact., comxipiete with personnel and equipmen',,o made with the officer in char!-e for *che Japanese to inventory the and.wi;h -the .exception that no precisicn instruments, equlmenll, blue pri:ts, or office papers could be found (in one- powder factory
136

HISTORY OF TECiiNICAL IWTE;LIGENCE

nthe pile of ashes where their a Japarncse ca-tajn showed the ta.m 1s were burLle ), a lar-e quan-tity of equipmnent was esser.iblcd recorat the ,chkj, l Usirn t;- .. i:cilt1kies available at the School, Lt Fotter and his team en *arcA( :n res..torch -)f sc-,e It.ims, art,4 efcre the end of October 1 t!sn ?n rner ui.rment recovered. By that time all subnitt;c.r ce l.ss Ca;,'a].iiy ivisi',n and were mcrmb.rs -:f -r'hI ri;toac ,.' m:,vc I-tcc i;h.e Ist awaitin- ;,r,'ers i:(r shi rent to the Uriitedl Stats for (ischarge from
the

, . rmy.
Cait :i..llarc CO Hi_'_l oway, T/3 Charles .', Jerkirs, anrl Pfc Philip

Zarahn, mei:,bels of En--ine-r Te.;. ., 53, t:- k ovcr, anCd the two enlisteo men hauen d othFr Ern ineer iteizs fromn Chiha irto the School where all En-ineer equipTnent was st, re - . erniinj shippini instructions ' from the 525Sth. After the Unit :i States Arr..y Technical Intelli-ence Depot arrived
E' ir-st, Jr., .fficer in char--e -if the in To1kyr, 1.aj r Charles Engineer Analysis Suctir\n at the TI. Center, anrd T/3 Jenkins, moved the equilrment col].ecte-1 to tole T,-ky- frsenal.

Cpharanthin, Druul

ui:os

. T:, Cre TubuerculDrsis, Is Rocoverec

The lelm TtSiical "f Unit Lo,l, 1st Lt John B. C. Liudlimran and .ratin -,f Ja~aiiese medical T/5 iNorm n T. Geron, reLi rtel' an inlt,_r.o pers,)nnel ccnnected wvith the T: .k-/o Institute for Infections Diseases.

This prelirmnairy inrvesti-atiorn was relative to cepharanthin, Japanese- 4evel:t,-l ru., .Intelli: cnce Cr,-pzany, 'Cepharrarntthine t hac

Special instructions issued to Lt .ud-.!irnan by the 5250th Technical

" te 15 iil,Ust 1945, read1 'A drug called 1. .een riorte' efiective in -this cdisease (tuber-

culosis).

Lore;

sipecific ic

forration is needei on this subject".

ITh. follwinri articles wvere forar.ed by air to the >edeical Analysis Section, 52S0th Technical Intelli.:ence Company, by Lt. u( d miran 1. 2,
".

10 -rams crystcalline alkaloids, total alkaloi'ds from "Ste-. containing hi:h percentage of 'cepharanthin phania Cepha rantha", 1500 tabletseach containing 0OJ,.1w.
100 ampules, each containin, O.I.mr;.

"Cepharanthin"
"Cepharanthin", fcr

injection. 137

HTMTO`2'Y' 01V' TI'Cl. INIC.L IITVTL:T.LINTNCF

100 a.' u. 3, injoct2. r.

each c:.'ntainin- 0,2,m;;. "Cepharanthin" for

5.

One v-liu ;,, i92ta ;es, by Sillji Hasse'-ara, entitled, .'..Ct'. i. t .y cf Cephararithin'' , in J , .apnese One i. , by Shbuji iinsse-?wLLa, entitled "Eyper4 r:jlci:+: .l. .'L2.i Cli:,,ic] SL'r,5:. iC3 on C:.)hI ranthin a;rainst Tuoer'; i, l . - , L:,,r- sy , and w'l;cing, Chugh", in German, r

6.

7.

(nAe zti caes, 13 c reortin3, fravorable results in use of cepnarrllithin arrainst ;ulinrry tuberculsie, in
J apar- ,;e : One article, 3 -yrCos, reijortin:, favoirLabls, results in the use :)f Ci,,haranthin a. rinst whoopin7 couzh, in Japanese

8. 9.

Onr article, 3 axes, repcrtin-' favorable ruesllts in the use of cep-haraulhin azainst asthma, in Japanese. a profess )r at the Imperial the r'ircct-r of the FundaP'ioneer in the research consultant fo)r the

1 Lt kud 'il.an an! '[T/5 :rer;:n intervicwed Institute 'If Infectious -isease; Tokyr, and!D mental Insti.tutc for Chcurmtb:repy, Ichikawa, on the ,ru ,; L sur-on--captain, tuberculosis

Japajese. 'Jtaval

`,,:lical

Co,le

Tl:,;

an! a-.roxi.atoly ten Japanese

civilian Lt
merit.,"

divi.led, soime bU!lievio.;

h-sicians in ;il

:Si,iI ons, th. -'u..~' '"us"l

on- these4 , opinion was sharply .

Iowuver, field ;inaiysis is ar.ba hDrein to estimate its i

udldirnan reTop-rte , ':It Ccl::haranthirn has the properties some

clai:: f'r it, it is of -reat ilorptanc: completely imipractical and no attemLrAt is

The pres dent of thu Naval MIT. ,ical College, Tohyo, aund his tuberculosis consultant 'vero inlterviewed by the Medical Teat of Unit No.l
at the ilaval ilelidicai C lla-e, Tokyo.

.e-i~ical Technical Intellli-ence Team NoJ, also reported on the "'Sta.dlard I-'rocedure in the Japoanese Navy for Treatmlont of Gonorrhea and Syphilis"'. This information was obtained. fr,:m Japanese Navy Medical ofLicers.
Larg;e Quantities of Ielical Equipment Rec.:vc-red

Jaj-anese equipment recovered b', the team is listed' below. WEne nf these items ha!. been PreviOusly reported bky Medical Technical

T iTST oTlR OF 'ITIrrCAT IFf TELLI GENCE 'P

Intel!i erjcF;, arnl al. ite)rs wore in servicea'le condition. nm acdi',itioalw2 cuamiti:.., ty of n3'r, eoul..ipet - - ablut t.e same number of itens -- was.3 a.l.s o iakex ;i the te.o., 1 ,at ha. not yet been inventoried at the tir:e of -- i .r rrp' :r':
a,;ir t s
?l .~sJ
i*, 3. .l~' .'..cr

kt-it
."7 '3

,3

;'. cte ibn ];.a tal'

Gas P ,rtr

t.-.L'
.

catory

le ti..f L",

fHyi po 'err..c -f.'_St, 1%r..s::.{,ic chest ......... .' Fiol. stcriJiz'er,ih st

.F,,l hr.n
rz,n

,al ciolir

iri chest

Ozor-le ienertor

Electr .meter, in cniest i7-r'r-o; 'a wter co)ntainer rarachute f ~r ab-;ve Lunl capacity retcr ."s aar:i er -7,,
.i.r-drp para.-,hute (suli li-s)

Iuo-r:,sclpDe for ilse with 3'5 zri car.era barmboo litter i-.rT. str,_n'th tester, in case

Blo-i, ..'- rr: kit r ss

Indlirect blood triansfusion set
Di.sper-nsjin Ikit, w'')

Reservoir for storiacrh -ui-o7 Ear and n.?se '--it, with case ijly :raih, wvrith case Eye chart case St'r r,.;tl-i,(n lassrs, c-se IH;c~dror.tter set

.i.cr scoIr,
l,%crsc

fo"ldin-,?

mei~.ur

e, f- 1

rX m; m ,s ,.

lecitz net type

ilcr(,sc

C,!e, type unilite:-.'nec

2 c.aliras, r case, fo:r use with fluor'scope, 'Army 2 c t:.&ras., 3.!lr; . in casc, for use with fluor-:scope, Navy Over 100 nev c.dri alred .e'iciflles 3s ,issorte1 :mnecJic2. cnerZca_.s issorteO scientific paers The- entirce -:crid) the latter half of Octobelr was spent by :f members of both Units No, L and NiJo 5[3 in evacuating, arranging to be evacuated, and consolidating selected items of Japanese equipment

139

H;h XUh7 oF vTEC['Lq[.":

2INELL'.E N(;2

of T'echnical Inte2lli -enee value,

These were collected in various

central 4 o.o;:lt-.t ns f.)r close c:)ntrol and r,.)re effict ive ,uarering to help preoecnu prerrmture (offi7cial:ly -rdered) dest,--uc:.io. T'lese places vwere: the Cherj.ical ,'Iri'are Scho ) at NtTra-, i.-:o wvrere equi-iruent was '.>.in;" :,rera:redCl f: r shiieenat by -nhe E-ih'th A,rry Cherlmical uf:f:].cc!, c.ile En 'ir,t :- Sch-:l .It Fta.,i-, w Lhre equ.ipr,,nt was bc -n' rn m;!vre1 t' i;he, Tuehn- C;al ]'-ni;elli r '.C e.nter Ie. otj recently establz 's.ledr tlj:. 'we cl.l:lc. Ln-te ].i','enee v arc oiouse at Ist Cacvalry D`ivisi :n ( ,iC, area; T:,i kyo 3) y Ye)'t; Akabane ;,.iimunition Depot. by ;i efnd~ of Oct-l-),r thie folo;in!, officers and enlisted men he from the tvo fielrl liruln , h! and 3] la haen iaede available on the poirnt syctem and had either left or were atbout to dei art for the United States: Field Unit

4N:. :

Cazt GeCorg-ce I Ford, SC Ca-t K ennel H., Bovarlrl, Q.C I,-t Lt Clintern 0, Q otter, CE
'r T. /T/. >, L d s ,J Xa, rr: ' ~, T/'3 Eiw SWl-th -. , Par-is CE

oi,

T/, Ja.:es ;., Ellyett', CE T/'5 Fralnk E, Browmn, Jr,, CWS i fc Juan O, Gonzales, Q.C Field Unit N,.,

53

Ca;:t fdrillard C. H )1ll. .raY, CE 1st Lt Nicholas Twvmsan, Ord

1st Lt Francis K. Switzer, CiS S/Jrt K.urtt 1[. Rlchiter, SC

Pfc i-iiillf Zarahn) CE

Field UniLts

an No:, nio.:

5 with XIV Corps

Techrlic1l Intell.i.cfnck Fiel.2 Uni'ts ho, 54S and No,5 were on temporary duty to 7i-V C ,rps HUcduarteri, wh ich landed at Shiogama,

Honslh't. (Lia 1 p, Incl 33), 16 anrd l'7 Setem i:er l-,lI;:, Htadquarters moved on the 1-7th. t :isnktai, n.lsl-lu. (Ma~p, Incl 33), and both units operated H
out of that area in the encuingr mont.hs, 2d Lt Robert Ao iorltius, Sgt V,'illiam N, Davidson, Pfc Carl C. Cureton, CIS Team No, 54, investi:,ated the Army and Navy Arsenals at

1J40

[Y[STORY OFi' TETINTCAL INTELIJIGENCE

ScprlJai, Liut f':cAln- nui_;lr nr, Ci'.S acil -1'iit aciid Fe.l:.Jj I'
and the :xjL; ;.":I '+1 a>:Le trerW tm .'r , nc,ed ,,a~s r n 3,' rathelr thi2: f 1 Cl.icU .,. f disI:ant:ll

mcnt.
1t,

Thle N-rt-J Arsenal had an ti of which had been

1e e(l

.ii'"'

re:ve

Both Ars4enals

.ivi. a ]s._i o.f tvhe main Or'namnc 'ui p's s(.

;
n-_ ,

Arsenal

2rd Lt l,'rk r1:

La, N',vy S.2s Or Lockri,'
h,.:L

.i;'-.lJ,
, .'
..
'

]it'ri

T,
-

fit-',

and Pce Frank

-t:,

-e
e 1-ip:.ent,

.z ated both Army and

s ;:1L -,"t -a:'ia .a

Iu-t .f.. r4 n.

1st Lit Henmy L. A^bh"ti-t.; 's/i Gerald C, whl.n t-heN j.nsoect.l -Che L't:ajo f Ci;.r'leos it, Tal.erle,l f:-, Navy ':rsc'na a-t l'i %"..... f und the pr':;cti -,n was 20C-i,ml shells, ty 99 2Mr. air'raf't. cann 'n, t l 13 .y.e 8ir-raft El cxicle 7.17n.m r-st of the a.ix I a-rh:;ch-,, flarcs, b,)rs .-lry -rrns, incn raachirin nachliryr f r theo l'l.rt ha,] bc::n r:iovnod under -round. TUp)n i.rs,:-ctic,; f the Sendai. Pranch ':f Tonk-o Arsenal, they foun)l mo.st ' f the ,.lint isASi e h een 2'.-m 'r .amr..tmiti.-; n nd fue w iti po1rder s.lie ,c;-in fron )ther sD7uces. A few t) a::s of a.n Ltit,n ,hured h ion. iu r se-:-ral r-)una's ol type 90 $Sk1r and t-" 1 _e f',cs iW0 f'J- uhese shells h.e tam3 also i uniri f : ur ty, e 2 rrii CA- re -sr ((lirecto-!rs) different fror;. thte tyTrc? 2 Navy AiiA cirect.rs pruv.oeusly rec,veredo These that c -;.iti:n, wi-ch tc-.t; now unCes packed0 fnr shipwere fourt. wcr: irn :,:'!

Tlo .h'.i. Tln!cee

hl-,-

cent, anc' tle

_5 aJ.rc..: afreo

tlh,r tw-) strippet( of

thh-:neters.

arfie'id o.uI 7.J.ie fwast of Senda.i, Orldnance Te.nJ No. 18 :Iercv y ca99 3ir-1 dua; l d.urio;se, pedres tal mou-nt, anmti-enL,, ' in i.-an',-t cauri,,n u V 9 51i v9i!r5 . was believed. that severaJ_ oi t'l. U ere. ,s rceir,terl i.n ,hu S1,ut,1ieltl htiil i-pine iFsl:7nds C.... ,, 1 L., ', ci ''.,'cn dc'stryCidt ft+ the s a.;,.e ai-rfeld they also ,-c) k aK -.. X:L abui? 1)00) r 'n1rms of r,;oGe 100, 68.rm, aru..unitia n and . a-hW orm(DLcalttYl ,c; fmuLes tyjJc' 100C rT;Loch, irNLCa.C.1 +tj.e,AA.
The l:S t f.gN Cays- i,. Oct 1:,er this csamor team .inspected. stock piles c C,: 1 Ctut! Jqarls L O)':n.ma'c-e. ;,d dertem!nI f If thiere were any ec;i.e1'i, ,'f TntlA'!.-rence alu ai; ;_ fao.lwi'ng points. h Ya] .. n.<L .. .:a, la.ata. A. kij, .n. ( ,_a /'ri In. 33). m

At an unuse-i

3 - HIa 40L',
Wl,,s st ,r-e]

5ml aircrf't cannon. This itemr at. 11th i.irb. orne Diviesion

.Vrt l erY- ACita, uni:nr the cn-rfol of, the S-L.'mtii Jdi.spo:szti. cn was given by -the r52tOth., due to arrive in Japan shortly.

141

HISTORY OF TECFAJICAL INTELLIGLNCE

1 - tye 3(), caliber 6._5mr rifle 1 - type 30, caii.ber 6.5nmi Cihbine 1 - 22 year type, c.lLber 7.,7;nrm rifle t t. enl( f Oct.)ber, .,kita irefecture had comm BY that '-,d the dostrucpla.tecl the: c 11ccti ml 'f .ll Ja'p,I-anese ee-.: ,iIenr. . .t.h.e ccl _tion "' c :-a . rc.fec ture timn ;f ar,mreuriiti -i.l iwat }. 1 a^laI..li zrt--:itlon ].0 riby; N;ize;,ber :-'f rll Ja:! a lncse .:ilent, elq . ar.e j eiJ ,3s ' ent at sea: Yai af'-,ta i r:i'ct-;ure haCG cll duwIln:! iadJ been star'ted on in thrce citiess -'n' .is-slition c oll-catcar.mlun: ti - ri The Si neal Toarm, 2.r L-.t Leslie R. I,'1Uich..mpD5 Jr,, S/Sgt Ll yl K. Pu.'hbrs; S/Szt R-thert A' T r'ictc.r, als) investigated the Naval "rs:n ll .lt Shio ,:a. ani! the Aiir.y Arsn.mal at SMn.-'ai, but foun 1 n : - -n:A!l equirlient, UTrn checkinil the r:-vernnent--o'wned raqio. statirin, JXQ, SonIai, they i :-un`' equij:ment '.f corinercial manufacture, but n,) ne.w develDpi; nts were nc:te.' Equiimeort w.as tolnd an' repsorts m-ere submitted o)n the Japcn Electric C>), Sl(nlai: tht Airf.rcc. rrA.. i. station near JirrimnacT.hi; .n a ra.i1: instal. t:i.l .n the island -f Kinkzza;l and the Naval fix&ed st.ti )n Ti[;iiE, n>ar 2O1o Technical Intel][i;-trnce Unit NoD 5 Tcchinical lntclligence Unit ine. 5 also larde. with HeadquarShortly after they arrived ters 1lV C. r-Ls ;-an rmve- on t. Sendale Ca&,t Ber,,l L, LIght, officer in ch rc.7 rof the Unit, returned to tht 'lUJitcu, States on the (i:.int systenr and ist Lt ferry L, White The tw:ar rlisted men, S/S,-:t G1::nn Lo I-iau,en andt T/4 t.!k )verr, Will:i;-a J, Sau(or, the balance -..f the Si.nal Tee.am that Capt LiP2ht ! has heae.e,, 3wNrc then tri;slerre for terp ..rary luty t. the 11th t a2ssist Airb:)rne DrLsi. n, XTV Cor:'s, wvhere they were -rcl7rer in co.lectin- _.ndi destr~yinT JapI:anese equipment 0 T/L Euvene 7rf. Fields, The Enn 4inefr Tear: (Lt Ferry L, 'hite, Ffc Hen:ry Ce.rs.an) werte Ied by thu X.V Csr-s Engineer Section to look for and make roe-orts on the location of iingj.neer construcInvc:stigatcion of a pontoon bridge dump at Iaition mat(.rials, Honshu, revealed that minat rials weLr+: used for an Engineer yachi, School anld were in poor conditiono Tnvestigation of the dump of Tollolu 129th Cors, Sendai, was made, but niatorials had been used for training iurposcs, and no n,,w itemas wlere discovered, By Novemnber, ].fc Carson had been relieved of assignment with the te-amr.

HISTORY OF Ti"C !iTCAL IT'TETLIGE!;'

,E

The COE'S Taram (2d Lt John A, Wagner, Ivt 'illi " imrocirl-) recoverc4,: cqui.Fm1it Unit anmd thc 2dt C'.airy Iei.mel t bivol'ac re-ports on t,,r:i.r i'nlitngs. Invustag tl.s S"ndai arca, ovr resulted in no P,;'

Syt Lovere D. Brormn, in thu 1224 Irlnantiy aes:i, =lcd sh)bm.tbed tr unis in the Ii:..C;..gs

Af'ter 'Ct.ln- '.,S dcSaOSiot.nlJn tCAi. .sittiL l;-i..-'J.rborne rjvi.sion in th,:! ;gLL;Cle of 3Cetobcr, th(, t: am irc:','est: .J - tl:e -rno-Ldy.a ,t Navarl Arsenal ana rocover:el it..s oI' Th'.'C; Tci:e.iJi=aeric- value froi, this arsenal and t'rom Shi:a.os'hizu Ci:i';D. _.i'rfield, These includeld: 4 Na-ry e oerimental tyeo #3 chlorine gas macks (16th ?!car model) 8 portable gas chamber tents 3 flame throrTer tanks, S-gun model gLas 3sr..yers (trackd trailer) By 10 Nov:-mber all members of thi s team, had been relieved of teaporary duty to rturn to their. pro-;er statior. Targ ets investi.-lt, 1Iby- the ' c.,dical Team) lst. Lt Harold .. , Jones and l fc Clifford E, Hiarralson, L.nluJ.eK; Japanese 2d Cavalry ReI-iment bi.vouac "area Ser:.di, th- Seri;:i Branch D.-pot n (V"ediical) at ITanakita, S-.ed.ai Army Hospjital #2 at 1Latsuda (iviyagiken), and the Yv.oac.t- .+ Ar.:y 'H-osp,ital at Yam.gata. Ordinnce equinient ol' Int, .ligcnce interest was identified T and sejregatud by the Or.inmance 'eam (lst Lt Kenneth L. (fardcrn , Jr,, T/' John R. Siallfwoos, i-fc Andren Nadas) working in con juattion with the 357th Orcl D.pot Co, at the followr.ing installeations: Sc:nldai ArmvI Arsenal, Nawival Arsenal at Shoog3ama and Matsushima, Shiras.axa Awmm.nitioll Dhmv?, YanLagata .lectrcoheaical Co, and the area o:1' thu 105th Regiliecnt a.t Fukushima (Iap Incl 33). New itenms recovered: 12, 7:Lrm ;1.gh e.x]losivwvc roul.i for Browning type gun 20) mi r., E, rou,'i for Ho 5 cannon : 201nm rr'Icticc round for tyipe 98 and 99 guns t: e 98 fuze for instantrneous or short delay action 70-mlrm. rockect launcher lig~ht 1:ersonnel ca.rier accommodating eight persons

143

HIISTORY O? T>',ZCHV!TC.I, INT!,LI(ENCE Unit No, 55 with IX Corps Durini Se tentber the OrInance

Tec;ni.cl Intolligence Unit No,) 55 was l.:i.aeJ on temporary

duty with Heariqplarters, IX Cor,,so

Teai., (lst It Ci.rLc's E., S'loo,

Ifc

nQ al

;J.. Linstedt.

Pfc 7vil-

lianal -I Kcnn:!Oy'1 was ~t,ir vhe'c to bhe P11st , viji'sT.cn, nd landed % witht them,1, 2:, S'.1 t ,ibbrI oI.G:r-,cLn Beach, Ao. c' T-!ornshtu .rap Incl. 33) O- 2, S;r..:.teiler tle: rr-i. or:el to t 32 ,1 Infantry Regi men't in Hir!aklre illp Inci 3:-, 3/ re tL:y investigated two armrnr:ics anld lllD(- l.:ritc i',rsion f Or- allce t'ei o, t sut nc new cquii:imcnt wri..: i.,oc ..tted, 2,'; 3.r,etTmber they relported to the 323rd Infaritry 1heg.ent where Lh-iy i.nvesi:,"ter the .Taaan Iron Smnd In) C),, anrd oth-.r knrwn st-.r: .ge pilce- of arms., Tney also reportedl toi. the ', ot Reglm;..nt to inspect a'mmuni tion of which disposition was being qlaIlU Ecarly in Oct))ob,-r anJthur Ord!lance Team of Unit No. 55 (Caopt Wvalter E. Swain, fL'c Ben T, Garcia;.. i:fc iorton HI, osen) was placed m)n ter 2)orary duty to the Chief Ordzianc- Offiicer, IX Cor;-,s, After arrivwl Lt Sai.yoro, ILokkcaido (/ar,., Incl 33), this tean or~ertae in tLe jsari a.rea wmrer an or, nanmce dump, encountere&. by the 77th iiiafanry Division, ;a.s reported to the tear. for insieecti.i"m The ilStLJ.1T.ia jn iwas -;rimarily an mvrmunition dump, an-d tth. small amount of r)r-clance equipment stored there was classlt'i.,.d as standlarl, The CYS Tearm (1st Lt John 1,4 Kapp, T/4 John L 0 Mooney, C1i BEuster B ntley)jenroute to lokkaiclo abcar-: the USS La ;orte, sent a wire to 7?th i-risioon to guard Nipp;on Soda Co,, manuflacturers rof war gass'es, -which wras liste-l in the target folder as at T1naklodatet (Yaap, Lr;cl 3.3) This ce.)m,:..T:ny was a number one

priority rati..ng according to War DeTpartment research

The tea: l t1:ndoi nd set u- at Saip.orc, Hokkaid.o with Headquar-ters IX Coris, 6 Oct),ober l!9i.5. 'rcviours investigation by
the Divit1lin A :rllaery Ee'.::la-t.ers indccated that the Npp:on

Sola c-), -was rtoF, n I-!;ck. -, b'out in Honhu of the To Io tear., resulte. i.n the iollowin.:;

,A recheck by members

Lt K-ap cnntaote 1 a 1 ethc.list mrinister who told him that a ,proiessor at ETa1kroda--e ColEkgt, would be an authority on chemical plults of military sirnific.:mcc This profess)r obliged them by 7uidinq the tc am to thi, fo:!llowing plants:

144L

HISTORY OF TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE Nissan Chmiccil Inl!ustrial Co,, Ltd,, Hakorate, mcmanuJ'cturers cf rsuj.ihuric acid Koatsu Kojrjyu Co., ILanufacturers of Oxygun and c;.lc.iurm su';hr ,phoshate Toyokoatsy Chiluncal Co,, a-t Sunogw'e, manufacturers
;' a:.] nllia sul!.i h.te and a:icnia a'as Konrtsuk!c')r-, C.,.~ at, s.soi-nchn, manlufa:t4arers of oxygen -l r'ac l.yline from calcium carbinde But none Df the abhcv.: plants manufactured war gases,

Further search n-l i nterrogation verified the previous report that the N4ipoIn Slda Comi',any vwis not, as indicated in the War Departrment ttrget f'lo]er, in Hakndate, but that it was in Honshu,
Investiga'ti n )f all other tarte.ts listed in the folder, and

inde:-end,;:!nty by the team, resulted in the many more Lti.sc.)wve recovwry of cornsi-. erable quantities of Chemical WIarfare materiel.
The Engineer Tnanr (2'1 R)bert E, Vrmnice, T/5 David L, Barker, Pfc Jam;s HII Rig-s) r .. ,rt-e1 that the lack of Engineer equip.ient ,vith the excl.:--ti)n f' building materials and the equipon HAkkA._d.,

ment for ha.ndlini, th-ni wa.s nrltable.

The unit also assisted in in-

vestigating certain industrial plants f-rthe purrose of rehabilitatioin. Awarls reccived by T, I, .']in of

25Oth

Awar's given to mien who served. with the 5250th Technical In-

telligence Compariny in the iacific Thleater are shown in Inclosure 3h,

And NSw.'W.,
The war is over and many in 7 DeTc(rber 1945, To-kyo, Japan, 1 the Army, !_nc].u-1ing men frorl the [250th, are going home -- and h.:-pi'ng to reach there by Christmas; Intclli zerce, anl espiecially that parvenue, in t-eace t.iL;, Technical Intellience. slips In'to bad reaiilte -- not only with the ordinary Ani.eic an Citizen rh.. c5 nsic:lers it a menace t^ U, So c.iplc macy, but what is much more peac.-intenti :)ne!',. internoatir..,nral t- the ,?oint with the United States Army itself, which has had a tentdencry to c'nsil.er that in )each time Intelligernce is,,,,super-

If' are nri-t to be the blind leading the blind, there we flu -us, should be a chance in that -policy.

145

HISTORY OF' TECHNICAL INTELIGNCE Technical sui.eri 'rity available to a nation will be the most detcrminato factor, next time, in dociling who is to win, who is s to lose. There is only one means of finding out the technical innovations of oth,.r niations - that is by an efficiently staffed, effectively o;.ratin' Technical Intelligence Depart ent. Next time we must bc one jury iheard, not one Jump, behind.

146