Marshalls Theory of Citizenship T.H.

Marshall is considered to be a pioneer and a father figure in explaining and developing the theory of citizenship. He was greatly influenced by the idea of citizenship and Leonard Hobhousess. Marshall, in his book Citizenship and Social Class explains the nature of Citizenship and it emergence in modern times. The three distinct and valuable features of these explanations are (i) The nature of citizenship: since the rise of the welfare state. (ii) An account of the emergence of citizenship in the modern nation-stage (iii) Sharp focus on the relationship between developments in the nature of citizenship and in the class system. The general understanding of citizenship in Marshall is entirely conventional. He says, firstly that citizenship is a status attached to full membership of a community, and secondly, that those who possess this status are equal with respect to the rights and duties associated with it. Marshall adds that different societies will attach different rights and duties to the status of citizens, for there is no universal principle which determines necessary rights and duties of citizenship in general. It is by going beyond the conventional idea that membership of a community is predominantly a political matter that Marshall is able to contribute to the study of citizenship. Marshall, in his theory of citizenship, explains that as capitalism evolves as a social system, and as the class structure develops within it, modern citizenship changes from being a system of rights. Marshall is able to advance this case by distinguishing between parts or elements of citizenship, and in doing so he offers a new characterization of citizenship which lends itself to an analysis of the relations between citizenship and society which is absent in other approaches.

Three distinct parts or elements of citizenship are identified by Marshall which may or may not be preent in any given constitution of citizenship: these are civil, political and social rights. It brought citizenship and capitalist class at war, because citizenship is based on the principle of equality and capitalism is based on inequality. Social citizenship attempted to reform capitalism through legislation. The gradual development of universal provisions for basic education, health and social security changed the nature of cash nexus between capital and labour. Legislation on minimum wages, hours of work, employment of children, working conditions, occupational safety and compensation of occupational accidents made the employees less vulnerable to the capitalist class. Thus, the conflict between the two seemed inevitable. But the problem, according to Marshall, is more complex. Between the rival demands of capitalist class for profit and the working class for welfare, the state through positive intervention and by reformulating its taxation and expenditure policies has been able to resolve the conflict between the two. The elements of citizenship distinguished by Marshall are defined in terms of specific sets of rights and the social institutions through which such rights are exercised. Marshalls approach indicates that rights are only meaningful in particular institutional contexts and are thus only realizable under specified material conditions. The civil element of citizenship is composed of the rights necessary for individual freedom, and the institution most directly associated with it is the rule of law and a system of courts. The political part of citizenship consists of the right to participate in the exercise of political power. Such rights are associated with parliamentary institutions. The social element of citizenship is made up of a right to the prevailing standard of life and

the social heritage of the society. These rights are significantly realized through the social services and the educational system. Marshall adds that the development of citizenship is not simply an outcome of the development of the state. According to Marshall, changes in the nature of citizenship are achieved through conflict between social institutions and possibly between social groups. These ideas are not fully developed in Marshalls discussion but they are widely held to be a real contribution that Marshall has made to the theory of citizenship. Where as Anthny Giddens views on citizenship Opines that class conflict and the expansion of state soereignty are the heart and soul of the idea, growth and development of citizenship. Class conflict, he said, has been the medium of extension of citizenship rights and the basis of the creation of developed economy, democracy and welfare state. Though the struggle for citizenship took many forms, yet, the most conspicuous form was the class conflict. First, it was a conflict between thebourgeoisies against the feudal privileges. Then, it was a struggle of the working classagainst the bourgeoisie. The outcome of these struggles was the ushering in of democracy granting of civil social, political and economic rights leading to the concept of welfare state. In corollary, it all led to the extension of citizenship. The economic and social rights, says Giddens, were not merely the extension of rights, but are an attempt to improve the worse consequences of the workercitizens lack of control over his working conditions and place. The forging of state sovereignty, according to Giddens, was a critical impetus to the remoulding of citizenship and for citizenship rights. The increase in the state administrative power led to the creation of new

aspirations and demands and to the development of institutions which were responsive to them. According to him, citizenship and democracy are both associated with the expansion of state sovereignty. The development of states sovereignty meant increasing administrative power to supervise the subject population and to collect and store information about them. Citizenship was the result of the greater reciprocity between the rulers and the ruled. Giddens calls this as two way expansion of power or dialectrics of control. According to Giddens, the social and economic rights cannot be regarded as a mere