No Glory But Victory The Triumph of the Army of the Potomac

Introduction It began with great promise, yet, tellingly, with even greater expectation: a grand army, a beloved general, and a brilliant plan to crush the rebellion. Instead of marching through northern Virginia to capture Richmond, Union forces traveled by sea in an attempt to outflank the Confederate army encamped within miles of Washington and reach the enemys capital first. In April 1862, the more than 100,000 man strong Army of the Potomac, commanded by the charismatic George B. McClellan landed on the peninsula between the York and James Rivers in Virginia and began their firstand many thought their lastcampaign. Some speculated that the Union would be restored by the Fourth of July. On such individual was Theodore Dodge. He was impressed by the strength and discipline of the organization to which he belonged: The Army of the Potomac. During the drive to Richmond, he pondered:

Where is there such another machine as the human body and where such a machine of machines as an Army? It is wonderful. You see a Regiment march up all order, every man in his place; they break ranks, all is confusion; one word and all is order again.One vast distinction there is between the component parts of an Army, i.e. Man, and an Army itself. The one is rendered comparatively unfit for service by any part being disabled, but how many blows can an Army suffer in the destruction of its numbers without apparent slack in the work of its machinery. Time would prove this idle musing both prophetic and tragically ironic: on the first day of Gettysburg, a bullet shattered Dodges right ankle, which caused his leg to be amputated and ended his active campaigning with the army, though not his military career. Like Dodge, the Army of the Potomac suffered greatly in its service to this country. The Peninsula Campaign ended in failure. Over the next 17 months, the army tried four times to capture Richmond by an overland march through Virginia from the north. In the process, it suffered many humiliating and bloody defeats. Men were needlessly sacrificed and there was no gain to offset the increasing despair that many soldiers felt; desertion was at an all time high. The Army of the Potomac came very close to breaking down entirely. As historian Brian K. Burton notes, Soldiers in the Civil War based much of their behavior on their generals. The commanding officer was very often idolized and greeted with warm cheers wherever he and his staff went. He was the ballast that kept an army together and inspired it to achieve in battle. The Army of the Potomac had five commanding officers, counting Ulysses S. Grant who as General-in-Chief of all the Union armies campaigned with the Army of the Potomac and essentially funneled his orders through George Meade. This attrition did not come about through battlefield injury, but was often the result of political demand after military failure. First, McClellan lost command and was replaced by Ambrose Burnside who quickly proved incompetent to lead such a huge force. His replacement, Fighting Joe Hooker did not prove much better nor did he remain in command for very long. In the summer of 1863, George Meade

took charge and remained its commander until the end of the war. Since the Potomac Army was very much a product of its home base, Washington, D.C., perhaps it was unavoidable that it would be one of the most politicized armies of the Civil War. Each general left his mark on the men and changed the Army of the Potomac in some fundamental way, sometimes for the worse. By the end of the war, the organization was completely transformed. The story of the Army of the Potomac is a grim one filled with tragic mistakes, unnecessary sacrifice, and just plain bad-luck. It is a story where ordinary men engage in countless acts of bravery in the fulfillment of their duty. This article traces that story and details the work of a number of historians who have recorded the deeds of this noble organization and sought to explain them to future generations. The Army of the Potomac is my army as much as any army ever belonged to the man that created it. George B. McClellan After the poor performance of the Union army at the Battle of Bull Run, the Secretary of War decided that a new general was needed to lead the forces in the east and protect Washington. The norths first battlefield hero, George B. McClellan, was summoned to the capital from his headquarters in western Virginia, where his recent victory secured that part of the state for the Union. With much industry and skill, McClellan built an impressive army, turning a demoralized band of men into a highly disciplined host bursting with martial might and pride. He deeply cared about his men, and they, in turned, revered him (affectionately calling him Little Mac) . In fact, many in Washington did, and, in short order, he was made commander of all the Union armies after General Winfield Scott, that great hero of the Mexican-American war, was forced to retire. Like many generals of that time, McClellan was photographed with his right hand thrust into the front of his uniform coata pose made famous by Napoleon Bonaparte. Journalists thought he did have a decidedly Napoleonic presence and began to call him the Young Napoleon. This was a very perceptive characterization. McClellan not only imitated Bonapartes martial pose, he wholly subscribed to the great generals conception of warfare as well. McClellan planned to end the rebellion in one great campaign conducted by one grand army: his Army of the Potomac would capture Richmond. McClellan thought that once Richmond was taken, the Confederacy would realize the futility of continuing the fight and a political compromise could be reached to restore the Union. This view greatly contrasted the one held by some powerful politicians in Washington. McClellan was very vocal about his position and often overstepped his bounds as a military commander to make political proclamations. As a result, a conflict developed between the general and the politicians in Washington, who also disagreed with the way that McClellan was conducting the war: they thought that he was moving too slowly. The army was ready to move, yet the commanding general did nothing with it except hold grand reviews and parades. The problem, however, was that McClellan was hesitant to move unless he was assured not only a victory, but one that would not destroy his army in the process. This prudence became detrimental when it was coupled with McClellans mistaken notion that the Confederate army outnumbered him and was also better equipped and organized, which was not true. As a result, when the Army of the Potomac finally began its first campaign, it was lead by a commander who was testing the patience of his superiors and did not have an accurate picture of the forces opposing him. The men in the ranks did not know this; they cheered him on and

looked forward to the coming fight in the York-James Peninsula. Despite many opportunities, the door to Richmond was wide open yet McClellan was too nervous to advance; the Army of the Potomac failed to secure their objective. Historians often speculate what would have happened if the Peninsula Campaign was a success. Some contend that the war would have ended exactly as McClellan anticipated: a compromised peace and the restoration of the Union. For his part in this, McClellan may have been elected President of the United States in the next election. It is just as credible to speculate that if Richmond was captured at this time, the Civil War still would have continued to be fought. For the divisions in the country ran very deep. The South was still capable of putting up a fight and the more radical element in the North would not have settled for a compromised peace. Each scenario is credible and raises many interesting possibilities; however, what actually did occur on this campaign had a very grave impact on the Army of the Potomac During the fighting outside the gates of Richmond, Robert E. Lee went from advisor to Confederate President Jefferson Davis to an active general in the field. He and his Army of Northern Virginia became a powerful enemy, one that, for a time, completely dominated and demoralized the Army of the Potomac. After his failure, McClellan lost his army. Washington decided that Richmond should be attacked from the north and gathered forces under General John Pope, which met with disaster, once again, at Bull Run. McClellan returned and managed to lead the Army of the Potomac to a victory of sorts at Antietam, though he again missed an opportunity to destroy Lees army. He was finally removed from command after he proved himself unwilling to seize the initiative and advance the Army of the Potomac to the gates of Richmond. The removal of McClellan greatly upset the army. As Robert Goldwaite Carter, a soldier in the 22nd Massachusetts Volunteers emphatically states: It was certainly a most dangerous moveand no act of the government ever tested the loyalty and devoted patriotism of the majority of our noble army to the last notch as the relieving of George B. McClellan at White Plains, Va., on November 7, 1862. The move shocked and angered the men who idolize the commanding general. They could not understand it. Some spoke of outright rebellion, evenly suggesting that if McClellan gave the nod, they would march on Washington. But, this was mostly the disgruntled rumblings of a small fraction of the Potomac Army. Most in the ranks steeled themselves against the increasingly cold weather, the poor rations, and an upcoming season that many would come to refer to as the Winter of Discontent. As one soldier recorded after watching McClellan leave, When the chief passed out of sight, the romance of the war was over for the Army of the Potomac. "Those men upon the ground! Those men, those men, those men!"Ambrose Burnside When offered commanded of the Army of the Potomac, Ambrose Burnside respectfully declined. He did not feel that he had the talent to finish what McClellan had started. In addition, he was good friends with the former commanding general and felt awkward about replacing him. While contemporaries as well as historians will readily admit his military incompetence to a man, few can find any fault with his character. His large, fine eyes, winning smile and cordial manners bespoke a frank, sincere and honorable character, remarked an officer who served with him.

The tragedy of Burnside, and ultimately the Army of the Potomac, was that he was a good man forced to assume a responsibility that was beyond his ability. Much of this pressure came from political necessity. Towards the end of 1862, according to historian Francis Augustn OReilly, Popular opinion throughout the North suddenly questioned Lincolns ability to handle the war. The contest appeared closer than the government in Washington had intimated. The administration needed a clear military victory in order to silence these critics, for if they become louder and more powerful, there was a very real chance that the war would end in a compromise, thus destroying the Union. No matter how hard he tried, Lincoln could not get McClellan to realize how important it was for him to mobilize the Army of the Potomac and engage the enemy. Politically, the general disagreed with his commander-in-chief. McClellan believed that the North should engage in a limited war; it should exert only enough force to get the Confederacy to the bargaining table. McClellan went as far to write a letter to the President where he advocated that neither confiscation of property, political executions of persons, and territorial organizations of states or forcible abolition of slavery should be contemplated for a moment. Because he held this position on how the war should be fought, McClellan was slow to enter an engagement: the Rebel army did not need to be destroyed, for such an attempt would greatly endanger his own Army of the Potomac. Rather, the enemy needed to realize that it had more to gain if it ceased its armed rebellion. As a result, he had let the wounded Army of Northern Virginia regroup and reorganize itself after Antietam, when a bold move could have destroyed it. Clearly, McClellan had overstepped his authority by strongly delivering such a dictate to the President and opposing the administrations view. In addition, the generals failure to bring conclusion to the battlefield further illustrated his unworthiness to command the Army of the Potomac. Lincoln hoped that Ambrose Burnside would be the man to get the job done. The President needed a swift, decisive victory, and Burnside had a reputation for action. When Burnside became its commander, the Army of the Potomac had the distinction of being the largest army yet assembled on the continent. It was divided into 68 brigades and 8 corps, with a total of 135,000 men in its ranks. Despite this martial might, Burnside faced a very grave strategic challenge. In order to accomplish the mission the President charged him with, he needed to lead the army in a winter campaign. Typically, armies at that time entered quarters during the winter months and did not engage in active campaigning. The weather of the season was brutal, often unpredictable; it turned unpaved roads into quagmires and caused streams and rivers to flood. After some deliberation, Burnside decided to attempt to slip past the right flank of Lees army by crossing the Rappahannock River at the town of Fredericksburg. The initial stages of the maneuver were executed with a great deal of speed and surprise; Lee was caught off guard. Unfortunately, Burnside had moved too quickly. Due to poor communication, the pontoons that were needed to cross the river were not ready in time. As a result, the army had to wait to cross the Rappahannock. Burnsides intention was thus rendered obvious and Lee moved quickly to concentrate his forces at Fredericksburg. While the Army of the Potomac waited, the Confederates built an impressive defensive position, greatly aided by a stone wall and sunken road that ran along the base of Maryes Heights south of town. Despite this, Burnside ordered the attack to commence once the pontoons finally arrived. Further poor communication and delay resulted in great slaughter. Close to 13,000 men had fallen, nearly 8,000 of those in front of the stone wall, which no man in the Army of the Potomac was able to reach. Night mercifully ended any more attempts. The men had performed nobly, but were sacrificed for nothing.

Ever mindful of his duty, Burnside resolved to continue the assault the next day, this time he would personally lead the charge. He was talked out of such a rash and pointless attack. Determined to succeed, he planned another maneuver to be executed as soon as the Army was once again in a fighting condition. Despite exceedingly poor morale, this assault began nearly a month later, on January 20th. The target was a ford north of Fredericksburg. The first stage of the campaign was successful and it looked as if the army would cross the ford unopposed. Unfortunately, bad luck halted the men in their tracks. A heavy rain drenched the countryside, turning the ground to mud. Once again, Burnside proved undeterred by a formable set-back. He ordered the men forward. They struggled for ever step, losing equipment, cannons, and horses along the way. The more they tried, the deeper in the mud they sank, and, in the end, the movement had to be halted. Morale sunk even lower. The men loudly condemned Burnside and longed for the return of McClellan. On January 25, 1863, Ambrose Burnside was removed from command and replace by Joseph Hooker. In his official report of the battle to Major General Henry Halleck, General-inChief of the nations armies, Burnside accepted full blame for the defeat at Fredericksburg: For the failure in the attack I am responsible...I decided to move from Warrenton onto this line rather against the opinion of the President, Secretary, and yourself, and that you have left the whole management in my hands, without giving me orders, makes me the more responsible. This report was also released to the press for the entire nation to read. In truth, Burnside could have placed some measure of the blame on several parties for the defeat, from many of his subordinate generals who failed to act to his commander-in-chief who asked him to launch an unprecedented winter campaign. A less steadfast, principled man may have done just that. Now there is Joe Hooker. He can fight. I think that is pretty well establishedbut whether he can keep tavern for a large army is not so sure. Abraham Lincoln After appointing Joe Hooker the next commanding general of the Army of the Potomac, President Lincoln wrote him a letter filled with advice and a challenge. He had heard that the general had loudly talked behind Burnsides back when the latter was in command of the Potomac Army. In addition, there was another verbal indiscretion that needed to be addressed. The President wrote: I have heard, in such a way to believe it, of your recently saying that both the Army and the Government needed a Dictator. Of course it was not for this, but in spite of it, that I have given you command. Only those generals who gain successes can set up dictators. What I ask of you is military success, and I will risk the dictatorship. The tone of the letter is chiding, supportive, and, ultimately, hopeful. At first, Hooker thought it was a bit harsh in places, but after time he fondly referred to it as such a letter as a father might write to his son. Dutifully, he meant to make the man who wrote it proud by achieving victory: the question wasnt if he would take Richmond, but when. Hooker knew all about being a warrior and was highly regarded for his bravery, as his nickname, Fighting Joe indicates. He was a graduate of West Point and brevetted captain for bravery at Monterey in the Mexican-American War. He had fought in all the big battles the Army of the Potomac had been in to at that point and was wounded at Antietam. Yet, for all his promise and bluster, Hooker failed his first test as commanding general at Chancellorsville.

The reasons behind this failure are a matter of debate and many have put forth various credible explanations. The most popular one being that he was so inebriated, he could not effectively command the army during a crucial stage in the battle. Counter to this theory is the speculation that Hooker, a well-known drinker, actually stopped cold-turkey when he assumed command and this proved a serve shock to his system. Another more favorable theory points to a blow to the head that struck him down and left him unconscious for thirty to forty minutes. A shell struck his headquarters and hurled part of a wooden porch pillar against him. This head trauma could explain his uncharacteristic indecisiveness. Whatever actually happened that day, the result forever tarnished Hookers name and reputation. This is unfortunate, because before Chancellorsville, he rebuilt and reorganized the battered Army of the Potomac. When appointing him, the President was uncertain of Hookers skills as an administrator. Lincoln hoped Hooker would be able to manage (or, keep tavern) over the Unions premier army. In this, the general exceed everybodys expectations. He made sure the men had enough to eat and decent camps. He also gave the Army of the Potomac the cavalry that it needed and deserved. McClellan had delegated the cavalry to a largely ineffective supportive role; Hooker completely reorganized this arm so that it would be able to effectively counter the ever present and formable Confederate cavalry. In addition, he began to look for new tactics to engage the enemy, after witnessing the futility of full-frontal assaults at Fredericksburg. Under his watchful eye, morale returned and the men looked forward to another campaign. On the eve of Chancellorsville, Robert Carter enthusiastically declared: The Army of the Potomac was never in a finer condition mentally, physically, or morally. It was a giant step forward. The humiliating defeat set the army back some, but it now stood on firmer ground than when it had hit rock bottom after Fredericksburg. The men were frustrated, some believing they belonged to a doomed army, yet they were determined to see the war through to the end. After Chancellorsville, Secretary of War Edwin Staton and Major General Halleck lost faith in Hooker but were hesitant to dismiss him from command for a variety of reasons, some of which were political. Instead, they purposely made it extremely difficult and frustrating for Hooker to do his job. Not known for his patience, Hooker eventually submitted a letter of resignation and Washington promptly accepted it. The order placing me in command of this army is received. As a soldier, I obey it, and to the utmost of my ability will execute it. George G. Meade George Gordon Meade assumed command of the Army of the Potomac at an extremely difficult time. According to one source, his first words after he had been informed of his promotion were, Well, Ive been tried and convicted without a hearing. I suppose I shall have to go to execution. Though it is doubtful that these were his actual words, they reflect the feelings of a man who has been called upon to complete an unenviable task. In late June 1863, the ranks of the Army of the Potomac were thinner than usual, the losses suffered at Chancellorsville had yet to be filled, a large number of short-term troops had taken their discharges and returned to their homes, and the severe heat had rendered many unfit for service. An even greater problem, however, was Robert E. Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia. They had crossed the Potomac River and were heading north into Pennsylvania. To counter this threat, the Army of the Potomac moved to meet it through grueling forced marches. Meade felt the army was too scattered and made every effort to concentrate his forces and lure the

enemy into attacking him. He made plans to form a defensive line at Pipe Creek, some 15 miles from Gettysburg along the Pennsylvania border. Though relatively unknown beyond his immediate command, Meade was a good choice to lead the men in the coming battle. A competent soldier who almost won the day at Fredericksburg, Meade was conservative and cautious, good traits to direct a defensive operation. His one negative was a temper that often flared out beyond his control, which could at times be a hindrance on the battlefield. As his aide, Theodore Lyman, put it, I dont know any gentleman, who, when he is wrathy, exercises less of Christian charity than my well-beloved Chief. The men learned of this command change on the march and did not take the news well. They were still fond of Hooker and saw that a major change such as this on the eve of a big, and many felt momentous battle, was a great test. What has Meade done? they angrily asked and shot back, Nothing! Despite these feelings, the great mass of troops marched on, determined to defeat the rebels. They had seen commanders come and go with such frequency that they were beginning to get used to it. Besides, added all together, the men who made the big decisions were not worth much. Throughout its history, the Army of the Potomac had felt that it had been let down by its leaders: the men felt superior to the genius of any commander yet appointed. In fact, the idol worship of the commanding general was over. This was plainly illustrated on the eve of the coming battle. Some officer had come up with the plan to evoke McClellans name to raise morale and steel the men for the fight. Up and down the line, the news spread that McClellan was coming with 60,000 men to once again lead them into battle. It was greeted with some cheers, but these quickly subsided. As one soldier records it: the hitherto inspiring name of Little Mac had lost its magical charmWhat a year before might have been most joyful intelligence to many (but not to all) of the rank and file, now called forth little or no enthusiasm in the thoroughly seasoned, much marched, but badly handled and worse fought body of veterans. They had come to the realization that it was in their own hands now. The Army of the Potomac had itself transformed from a rough group of volunteers awed by the romance of martial might to a professional organization grimly determined to triumph above the horrors of this war. Their victory at Gettysburg was the beginning of the end. The art of war is simple enough. Find out where your enemy is. Get at him as soon as you can. Strike him as hard as you can as often as you can, and keep moving on. Ulysses S. Grant The Battle of Gettysburg is regarded as the high-water mark of the Confederacy; it also marks a turning point for the Army of the Potomac. The change did not occur directly after that spectacular victory. Meade was hesitant to pursue the retreating Rebel forces. In his view, the army was greatly shattered by the three-day fight and needed time to heal. This delay brought much criticism upon him, including a message from Halleck that mentioned the President was disappointed that the General was unable to do more. While the eastern theater was relatively quiet for the six months after Gettysburg, much was occurring in the west. Ulysses S. Grant captured Vicksburg on July 4th 1863, the same day the Army of the Potomacs victory at Gettysburg became complete. Grant distinguished himself yet again by lifting the siege at Chattanooga that winter. The President now saw he had someone who

could be trusted with the grave responsibility of command. Grant was promoted to General-inChief of all the Union forces, replacing Halleck who was given the lesser title, Chief of Staff. Instead of directing all the armies from Washington, Grant decided to campaign with the Army of the Potomac, since it had the most important part to play in his planned offensiveand arguably the most difficult. Meade expected to be replaced by an officer closer to the new general-in-chief and suggested that perhaps he should resign. Grant surprised him by rejecting this. Thereafter, however, Meade exercised little control over the Army of the Potomac; Grant was clearly in charge, even the rank and file recognized this. On April 9, 1864, exactly one year prior to the day that Lee surrendered at Appomattox, Grant issued the following orders to Meade: Lees army will be your objective point. Wherever Lee goes, there you will go also. This was a clear departure from the usual on to Richmond plan. From this point to the end, the capture of the rebel capital was considered irrelevant; destroying the Southern ability to wage war became the new goal. This shift in priorities would forever change the character of the Army of the Potomac. For the next five months, the Army stayed in constant contact with its foes. It fought many big and bloody battles at such places as The Wilderness, The Bloody Angle, and The Carter. It faced slaughter once again at Cold Harbor, where close to 3,000 men were killed within twenty minutes of the assault. In the past, any one of those fights would have caused the commanding general to halt the offensive and retreat back to the safety of his base. Grant, however, pressed the Army ever forward and, in doing so, caused a fundamental change in its ranks. In the words of historian Bruce Catton: [The Army of the Potomac] had fought the hardest, longest, costliest battles ever seen on the American continent, and its casualties had been so heavy that it was not really the same army it had been in the spring; most of the veterans were gone now, and some of the most famous fighting units had ceased to exist, and in all of this wearing fighting there had been nothing that could be pointed to as a clear-cut victory. The Army of the Potomac had won no glory, and it had been chewed up almost beyond recognition. The gallant old Army of the Potomac; however, did survive. Its ranks endured one destructive blow after the other, both to its morale and its numbers. This resilient body of soldiers had witnessed humiliating defeat and was denied battlefield glory partly as a result of the changing nature of warfare. The rise of the rifled musket and the adherence to outdated tactics meant that every fight almost always favored the defender. In addition, it proved impossible to destroy an opposing army with one destructive blow, mostly due to poor roads and the lack of mobility. An attacker may succeed in capturing an objective, but to do so often meant that it was exhausted, out of supply, and shattered. In the time it took to regroup, the enemy was able to slip away and fight another day. Despite all that was stacked against it, the Army of the Potomac did not give up the fight. The machinery did slacken and, at times, it appeared that the whole structure would come tumbling down. The men in its ranks and their Commander-in-Chief President Lincoln never lost faith in their mission. Together, they faced every challenge and persevered. Their victory built the foundation of our Nations power. In the words of General Grant, whose achievements in the war led to his election to the presidency in 1868: It is probably well that we had the war when we did. We are better off now than we would have been without it, and have made more rapid progress than we otherwise should have made. Now our republic has shown itself capable of dealing with one of the greatest wars ever made, and our people have proven

themselves to be the most formidable in war of any nationality. But this war was a fearful lesson and should teach us the necessity of avoiding wars in the future. Wars produce many stories of fiction, some of which are told until they are believed to be true. Ulysses S. Grant After the Civil War there was great interest in preserving its memory, which is still very much with us today. Local newspapers and magazines published the personal recollections of individual soldiers, a series of books came out in which opposing commanders offered different points-of-view on the same campaign or battle, and the government undertook the monumental task of collecting the formal reports, both Union and Confederate, written during the course of the Civil War as well as orders and general correspondence, which was released in the multi-volume The War of the Rebellion: a Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies (http://cdl.library.cornell.edu/moa/browse.monographs/waro.html) and is now available online. Each year sees the publication of both historical analysis and first-hand accounts. This wealth of information is both a historians boon and curse. Human memory is faulty and sometimes individuals have recorded an event in a more pleasing light. The act of recording history is often filled with speculation, rough calculation, and, sometimes, plain error. This is especially true in the Civil War where stories of fiction have withstood the test of time for so long they have become accepted truth. Below, I detail a number of historians and their work on the Army of the Potomac. Stephen W. Sears Stephen W. Sears has focused most of his attention on the pre-Gettysburg Army of the Potomac and its first commander, George B. McClellan, writing a biography about the controversial commander as well as editing a selection of his letters. McClellan is a difficult subject; wide support for him still exists. Little Mac did do the Army of the Potomac some good, but his many shortcomings eclipse these accomplishments. Sears biography, George B. McClellan: The Young Napoleon details the general in all his many colors. It presents an in-depth, even-handed look at the events and influences that shaped the generals mind as well as the arrogance and pride that overshadowed all he had set out to achieve. Those searching for a deeper look inside the mind of McClellan will find all their questions answered in The Civil War Papers of George B. McClellan: Selected Correspondence, 18601865, edited by Mr. Sears. McClellan often pushed himself to the extremes of endurance. At the end of the day, he further limited his time to rest by writing letters, often to his trusted wife Ellen. In talking or writing to you, he declared to her, it is exactly as if I were communing with myselfyou are my alter ego These letters, written by a mind loosen by exhaustion and unguarded (at least in ones to his wife) are always candid, at times disturbing, and completely necessary to understanding McClellan. Controversies & Commanders: Dispatches from the Army of the Potomac offers an incisive portrait of the many political intrigues and infighting that afflicted the organization. It collects ten, well-written essays, each of which can be read in single sitting, on a variety of incidents, from the famous court-martial of Fitz John Porter to the revolt of certain generals in the Army of the Potomacs high command. One particularly striking essay attempts to redeem Fighting Joe Hooker, who has been scorned by history because of Chancellorsville. An often quoted account records Hookers explanation for the loss: I was not hurt by a shell, and I was not drunk. For

once I lost confidence in Hooker, and that is all there is to it. Sears persuasively argues that Hooker never said these words; rather they were recorded by someone with an interest in disgracing the general. Sears pulls no punches in these essays and often his conclusions point out the folly in conventional wisdom. Francis Augustn OReilly More than one veteran of Fredericksburg wrote home after the battle complaining of the inability of words to adequately explain the horror that confronted them the day they charged the stone wall at the base of Maryes Heights. In The Fredericksburg Campaign: Winter War on the Rappahannock, Francis Augustn OReilly details this horror and provides an authoritative account of the Army of the Potomacs Winter Campaign of 1862. Mr. OReilly concentrates on the actual mechanics of the Fredericksburg campaign, covering the strategy and tactics of each side as well as the actions of individual units on the battlefield. This focus on the battle harkens back to the way military history used to be written and does not follow the modern trend, which often attempts to place the conflict within its wider political and social context. As a result no event that occurred on the battlefield is generalized or glossed-over; readers are provided with a complete picture of the action and given a full understanding of why events unfolded as they did. Inside The Fredericksburg Campaign readers will find exhaustive, engaging detail. At times, it can get a bit overwhelming, especially when OReilly identifies the positions of units during the different phases of the battle. However, a host of clear, informative maps ensure that a reader never gets lost. In addition, the author possesses an intimate knowledge of the landscape and describes the lay of the land and its distinctive features with considerable skill. The real gems inside The Fredericksburg Campaign are the vast amount of first-hand accounts that OReilly seamlessly weaves into his narrative, which infuse it with a nail-biting intensity. Readers should be forewarned that what the soldiers faced is often described in graphic detail. This passage is representative of many found in the book: Northern soldiers braved the fire and proceeded toward the stone wall. Moments after starting, a shell exploded in Edward Crosss face. Shrapnel struck him in the chest, mouth, and forehead. The 5th New Hampshire ignored the colonels fall and rushed ahead. Another shell fragment smacked him in the leg. Cross spit out blood and sandand several teethand began to crawl off the field. A bullet punched the scabbard out of his hands and knocked Cross to the ground. Many men met the same fate as Edward Cross that day as unit after unit entered what one soldier called the open door to the house of death. At times, it can be painful to read how these brave men kept rushing forward, sacrificing themselves in the fulfillment of their duty that, in the end, lead to no gain for their army or their country. There was more to the Battle of Fredericksburg than the slaughter of the Army of the Potomac, as OReilly points out. It was a battle of many firsts: the first purposeful bombardment of an American city, the first urban street fighting in North America, and the first bridgehead landing under fire in U.S. military history. In addition, the Battle of Fredericksburg can be divided into two separate and distinct actions fought three miles apart from one another. Often, the dramatic fighting in front of the stone wall overshadows the action that occurred south of the town, which, in fact, was supposed to be the main thrust of the Federal army that day, the action in front of the stone wall a diversion. This assault, in which Meade attacked Stonewall Jackson, was initially a success and the battle could have been won if Meades advance was properly supported.

The Fredericksburg Campaign touches upon the thoughts and actions of the battles commanders, from Meade and Burnside to Lee, Jackson, and Longstreet, but, for the most part, they are not the central focus of the study. The Southern army, which spent much of the time hunkered behind the stone wall, fleetingly appears in the narrative as well. It is the heroic men of the Army of the Potomac that take center stage in this study for the burden of action was placed upon their shoulders. This extraordinary book should not be missed. Robert Goldwaite Carter and Theodore Ayrault Dodge One hailed from Maine and descended from a long line of soldiers, the other was born in Massachusetts to a family of some means. Both responded to the Presidents call, joined a Union army in need of men willing to fight, and were mustered into the ranks of the Army of the Potomac. Each proved remarkably articulate and left behind an exceptional first-hand account of his experience: Four Brothers in Blue by Robert Goldwaite Carter and On Campaign with the Army of the Potomac by Theodore Ayrault Dodge. Both volumes capture the full spectrum of life in the Army of the Potomac. Full of candor, each allows the reader to join the men during the strain of the march, the tedium and hilarity of camp life, and the shock of combat. More importantly, the thoughts and opinions of each man can be understood on a very personal level and, by extension, the feelings of the Army of the Potomac more fully experienced. Belonging as they did to the same organization, Carter and Dodge have much in common; however, in certain regards they are very different. Robert Goldwaite Carter entered the war as a private and served with three brothers in the Army of the Potomac. All saw action under its various commanders and fought on the battlefields of Bull Run, Antietam, Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, Gettysburg, the Wilderness, and Petersburg. One of his brothers graduated from West Point and witnessed the conflict that went on inside the Academy before the bombardment of Fort Sumter, as cadets from the South spoke loudly, and assuredly, of an upcoming war. Since the brothers served at different ranks and in different units within the Potomac Army, Four Brothers in Blue: Or Sunshine and Shadows of the War of the Rebellion, a Story of the Great Civil War from Bull Run to Appomattox details what occurred in the front lines as well as the headquarters tent. Although all four participate in the memoir, the story is mainly told by Robert Goldwaite Carter. After the war, Carter collected and transcribed the numerous letters that the brothers wrote to themselves and each other. He then organized and connected these into a coherent narrative. The book is divided into chapters, each starts with Carter describing the action or event, then interspaced within this are excerpts from the various letters. The effect is powerful. Carter is a gifted writer who captivates with his words, from his description of the force-march to Gettysburg, which he made with shoes a size too small, to the horror of Fredericksburg, where to survive he and his unit built a wall of dead Union soldiers to take cover behind. Carter is a true patriot and extremely proud of the part he played in putting down the rebellion. After reading this book, one will have a newfound respect for the brave men of the Army of the Potomac. Truly, they should not be forgotten. Theodore Ayrault Dodge was mustered into the 101st New York volunteers on February 13th 1862 and was appointed a first lieutenant. During his service, Dodge was committed to writing down his thoughts and experiences everyday. These journal entries were then sent to his parents on a regular basis, along with a letter. Often, these entries were letters in themselves. These have been collected and edited by historian Stephen W. Sears into On Campaign With the Army of the

Potomac: The Civil War Journal of Theodore Ayrault Dodge. Sears also provides a running narrative throughout the collection, which places the letters in their historical context and adds more detail to the events and people Dodge records. Dodge sees and experiences army life not only through the eyes of an officer, but also as one who is used to the finer things in life. He frequently mentions how conditions in the field are not like those at home, often in a light tone in order to get a laugh out of his intend audiencehis family. These descriptions provide an intimate, unguarded glimpse into what a Civil War officer ate how he slept, and what he did to break the monotony that often accompanied life in camp. Since Dodge made a point of writing every day, even if there was not much in particular to say, On Campaign With the Army of the Potomac offers an invaluable portrait of the day-to-day life of a soldier. In addition, because Dodge spoke German and French fluently, he was eventually moved to the 119th New York volunteers, which was mostly composed of Germans who did not speak English. His experiences with this unit highlight the multi-ethnic composition of the Army of the Potomac. Completely dedicated to his duty, Dodge was wounded three times, the last resulting in the amputation of his leg. He fought at Second Bull Run, Chancellorsville, and Gettysburg, but was spared Fredericksburg and the Mud March since his unit was part of the reserve. On Campaign with the Army of the Potomac also makes clear how some in the organization fought for restoration but not necessarily emancipation. Dodge, who was used to servants, did not think the Emancipation Proclamation would greatly aid the war effort. He also stayed loyal to General George B. McClellan to the end, wishing that Little Mac was there to lead them at Gettysburg. In these two particulars, he differs from Carter, which further illustrates the many, often conflicting, points-of-view held by the men within the Army of the Potomac. After the war, Dodge became a military historian and wrote many books on great commanders throughout the ages as well as a volume of the battle of Chancellorsville. From beginning to end, On Campaign with the Army of the Potomac reveals the thoughts of a man determined to steer the Union to victory however he can. I fight, Dodge wrote, Because having once gone into it, I will not back out. But, it is Dodges actions that speak louder than his words. He fought with bravery and was not afraid to get in harms way. His Civil War journal offers an eloquent, thoughtful account of life in the Army of the Potomac. Bruce Catton Every bookshelf should have at least one title by Bruce Catton on it. If there is room for only one, consider The American Heritage New History of the Civil War. This oversized volume, which is narrated by Mr. Catton, covers the war in its entirety. Its packed with photographs, pictures, and maps. In addition, the volume offers a birds-eye view of just about every major battle. This is accomplished by a beautifully drawn map of the landscape complete with men formed in battle-lines moving and fighting across it. At a glance, these maps provide a grand overview of the tactical situation during different phases of the battle. They also convey the terrible splendor of these battles, to which witnesses of the fights often attest. If theres room for more of Mr. Catton on the bookshelf, add his Army of the Potomac trilogy as well as his two-volume biography of Grant. In these, Catton performs what would be expected of a first-rate historian: consults tons of sources, deftly weaves first-hand accounts into his narrative, provides insightful analysis of people and events. However, the end result is completely singular and needs to be experience in order to be fully appreciated. Catton writes history thats more compelling than the fiction found inside any book on the bestseller list.

His three volumes on the Army of the Potomac: Mr. Lincoln's Army, Glory Road, and A Stillness at Appomattox leave no stone unturned in their portrayal, from favorite marching songs to the particular greeting the ranks had to welcome a pretty girl, from the quirks of the commanding general to his contribution to the war effort, from an key cavalry skirmish to the importance of a monstrous battle, Mr. Catton details every aspect of the Army of the Potomac in such a way that a reader may begin to feel as if he was privy to it all firsthand. All the more wonderful is that he does so in an extremely powerful, and engaging, writing style.

Works Consulted and Recommended Extraordinary Circumstances: The Seven Days Battles by Brian K. Burton (ISBN 0253339634) Mr. Lincoln's Army (Army of the Potomac Trilogy, Volume 1) by Bruce Catton (ISBN 0385043104) Glory Road (Army of the Potomac, Volume 2) by Bruce Catton (ISBN 0385041675) A Stillness at Appomattox (Army of the Potomac, Volume 3) by Bruce Catton (ISBN 0385044518) Grant Moves South by Bruce Catton (ISBN 0785812644) Grant Takes Command by Bruce Catton (ISBN 0785812636) The American Heritage New History of the Civil War Narrated by Bruce Catton (ISBN 1586631985) Four Brothers in Blue: Or Sunshine and Shadows of the War of the Rebellion, a Story of the Great Civil War from Bull Run to Appomattox by Robert Goldwaite Carter (ISBN 0806131853) On Campaign With the Army of the Potomac: The Civil War Journal of Theodore Ayrault Dodge by Theodore Ayrault Dodge (ISBN 0815410301) The Campaign of Chancellorsville by Theodore Ayrault Dodge (ISBN 0306809141) Not War but Murder: Cold Harbor 1864 by Ernest B. Furgurson (ISBN 0679781390) Chancellorsville 1863: The Souls of the Brave by Ernest B. Furgurson (ISBN 0679728317) Personal Memoirs: Ulysses S. Grant by Ulysses S. Grant (ISBN 0375752285) The Fredericksburg Campaign: Winter War on the Rappahannock by Francis Augustn O'Reilly (ISBN 0807128090) Abraham Lincoln: The Prairie Years and The War Years by Carl Sandburg (ISBN 0156027526) George B. McClellan: The Young Napoleon by Stephen W. Sears (ISBN 0306809133) To The Gates of Richmond : The Peninsula Campaign by Stephen W. Sears (ISBN 0618127135)

Controversies & Commanders: Dispatches from the Army of the Potomac by Stephen W. Sears (ISBN 0295867604) The Civil War Papers of George B. McClellan: Selected Correspondence, 1860-1865 Edited by Stephen W. Sears (ISBN 0306804719) Landscape Turned Red : The Battle of Antietam by Stephen W. Sears (ISBN 0395656680)