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ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY GRADUATE SCHOOL

Ethical Theories
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS IN NURSING ETHICS

SUBMITTED TO: VILMA L. COMODA, RN, MAN

SUBMITTED BY: CENON FRANCIS C. ARMADA, RN JHOANNA E. DE CASTRO, RN CHRISTINE JUDE T. DE GUZMAN, RN KRISTA ANNE F. DORMITORIO, RN JONI S. PURAY, RN

JULY 1, 2011

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Objectives Ethics and Morality Introduction Two Views of Ethics Ethical Theories Teleological, Ethical Theory/ ConsequentialismFocus on Ends, Goals and Consequences Varieties of Consequentialism Types of Utilitarianism Deontology Hisorical Origins Deontological Ethical Theories Natural Law Kantian Ethics Prima Facie Duties Virtue Ethics Strengths of Virtue Ethics Limitations of Virtue Ethics Implication , Application and Conclusion Divine Command Theory Definition Possible Advantages of Divine Command Theory Persistent Problem: Euthyphro Dilemma Response to Euthyphro Dilemma Conclusion: Religion, Morality and the Good Life Ethics of Care 84 Definition Ethic of Care vs. Ethic of Justice Issues of Ethic of Care Conclusion: Critical Evaluation of Care Ethics

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8 9 21 30 30 33 33 39 47 54 62 63 66 67 67 67 70 73 82

84 86 88 93

OBJECTIVES The groups comprehensive discussion on ethical theories aims to achieve the following cognitive, affective and psychomotor objectives: COGNITIVE Acknowledge the nurses background on theories of ethics; Enhance such knowledge through delving deeper into the subject; and Present the pros and cons of and the criticisms made against such theories and relate them to the world of health care. AFFECTIVE Evaluate the ethical theories in accordance to ones own convictions, and Inculcate the importance of discernment in every instance that requires decision-making to arrive at a morally-sound judgment. PSYCHOMOTOR Encourage internalization of the essentiality of ethical theories and

utilization of such as grounds for decision-making; and Initiate active group participation through sharing of dilemmas

encountered in the health care setting and the decisions made and identify which theories were evidently used.

ETHICS AND MORALITY INTRODUCTION We make many ethical decisions everyday, but we usually do not think if we make decisions on the basis of a particular theory or principle. We choose, prize and act upon our values, but ethics involves more reflection and argument. The word ethics comes from the Greek word ethos, meaning character. Morals comes from the Latin word moralis, meaning custom or manner. Both words mean custom (i.e. fundamental ways of conduct that are not only customary, but also right). Being moral often implies that a person lives within a clear-cut set of personal or religious dogmas. Ethics implies transparency, public accountability, or taking a stand for or against certain public issues. Every public organization has its code of ethics so that people can hold the organization to account, if necessary. Clearly, ethics has become an important way of life in a postmodern society that does not acknowledge any fixed point of reference. TWO VIEWS OF ETHICS There are two different ways of viewing ethics: normative and descriptive. Normative, or prescriptive, ethics is to do with norms and prescriptions: how people should live and behave. Codes of conduct or ethics stem from the basis of normative ethics. The descriptive, or scientific, study of ethics has come to the fore since the advent of the social sciences. Socrates (496-399 BC) was condemned to death for his (too) rigorous pursuit of finding out what people thought and meant by words like

justice and virtue, and could therefore be called a social scientist. The studies of sociologists, anthropologists and psychologists describe what people actually do, uncovering areas of personal and societal behavior. As an example, the constraints by Victorian society on sexual matters were uncovered to a large extent by sociologists who studied peoples actual behavior, not only what they said they did. Once such evidence becomes public, taboos about behavior no longer remain taboo, and some particular behaviors pass into the area of norms. Once the majority of people think or behave in a new form, laws have to be created to accommodate this new behavior. This in turn leads to codes that state how people ought to or should behave in certain circumstances. The difference between descriptive and normative aspects of ethics is particularly evident in health care. The medical model tends to be concerned with the scientific and descriptive aspects of care. This model analyzes illnesses, studies stress in relation to illness, divides people into classes and compares diseases within the social classes with the aim of curing disease. It is concerned with the description of ethical behavior. This model has enabled the proliferation of high technology in medical care. The question then becomes if the ends have justified the means. There will never be clearcut conclusions because the means of one group are the ends of another. Thus the heart of ethics is concerned with goodness, justice and truth, and how these interrelate with each other, and with behavior between people. Nurses have generally concerned themselves more with the normative than the descriptive aspects of health care. They have always been involved with wider issues of health, such as the significance and meaning of suffering and death and the role and

purpose of caring and compassion. It is notable that in the field of care for dying people nurses have largely led the way. The table below sets out the two approaches to ethics. Two Approaches to Ethics NORMATIVE (prescriptive) (what we should do) Mainly used by philosophers DESCRIPTIVE (what we actually do) Mainly used by sociologists,

psychologists, anthropologists Emphasis is on making Emphasis is on observation of behaviour

recommendations for behavior

In health care: Pursues: o The concept of health o The significance of human suffering o Rights of patients o Dimensions of caring o Concepts, compassion, etc. o Meaning of death. such as

In health care: Pursues: Psychology of illness Physiology of stress Social pleasures in chronic disease.

commitment,

Deciding whether a patient ought to receive particular care

Describing how the treatment is

best given

Nurses have also been prominent in the care of people with mental illness and learning difficulties, and in other specialist care for people with long-term illnesses. It is important to be aware of these differences, not for the sake of argument but for the complimentarity of certain aspects of care and for how each pursuit can help the other in giving the best possible holistic care.

ETHICAL THEORIES The test of a useful theory of ethics is its ability to make sense of the world and provide guidance about how to act in it. Theories of ethics abound, and no single ethical theory has managed to capture and explain all the important elements of the moral world to the satisfaction of all or even most people. There are many ways to classify theories of ethics. Some theories are classical, implying a rich historical tradition and concern with the good life or how to achieve the good life. Examples of classical theories of ethics are hedonism (pleasure is the sole good of human life), and stoicism (indifference to pleasure or pain). Other theories of ethics are considered modern in that they apply philosophical analysis to ethical conduct In order to find out the meaning of terms or statements that appear in theories. Examples of modern analytical theories of ethics are naturalism (moral judgments are true or false and can be reduced to a concept of natural science), emotivism (moral judgments cannot be verified or falsified by scientific procedures; they are simply judgments about ones feelings) and intuitionism (people know the meaning of our moral terms and principles because we see them in human experience and can grasp their significance as intuitive act).

Another way to classify theories of ethics is to consider them western or eastern. Western theories of ethics are based on European or American philosophies, and are often influenced by Judaeo-Christian systems of beliefs. Examples of western theories of ethics are utilitarianism, naturalism, formalism and pragmatism. Eastern theories of ethics are based on Asian, Indian or Arabic philosophies, and may also be influenced by religious systems of belief. One example of an eastern theory of ethics is Confucianism. In its earliest form, Confucianism was a system of ethical precepts for the proper management of society. It viewed the human being as essentially a social creature, bound to others by jen, a term often interpreted as sympathy or human benevolence. Jen is expressed through the five relations sovereign and subject, parent and child, elder and younger sibling, husband and wife, and friend and friend. Of these relations, filial piety or hsiao is emphasized. The relations function smoothly by adhering to a combination of etiquette and ritual. Correct product proceeds not through compulsion, but through a sense of virtue developed by observing suitable models of ethical behavior. Other theories of ethics are derived from Buddhism, Hinduism and Islam. Buddhist ethics directs devotees of Buddha to refrain from killing, stealing, lying, sexual misconduct and use of intoxicants. Devotees are also urged to cultivate the virtues of friendliness (to disarm hostility), compassion (to remove the suffering of others), sympathetic joy (to rejoice in the success of others), and equanimity (to be even-handed with regard to the actions of others). Buddhists responses to contemporary ethical issues in healthcare are based on the Buddhist view of the universe, the nature of humanity and belief in impermanence. Hindu ethics emphasizes principles of righteous

conduct and the doctrine of transmigration where, at physical death, the soul (or self) is carried to another body in which it flourishes or suffers according to previous behavior. The three aims of life for the Hindu are to achieve dharma (adherence to religious and ethical norms in order to ensure happier rebirth), artha (building up wealth for the benefit of oneself and ones family) and kama (seeking pleasure and the satisfaction of personal desires). Virtues such as honesty, hospitality and generosity are also encouraged. Islamic ethics are likewise based on religious teachings. The five essential religious and moral duties of Muslims are to: (1) profess faith in God (or Allah) (2) worship five times daily, facing toward Mecca (3) give alms or charity to those in need (4) fast during the ninth month of the Muslim year (5) make a pilgrimage to Mecca at least once during ones lifetime. Muslims are also urged to refrain from drinking wine, touching or eating pork, gambling, usury (lending money at an excessive rate of interest), fraud, slander, and the making of images. Muslims believe that life is a gift of God and the human body is given to serve God. Therefore, human life is respected and suicide, homicide, and torture of the body in any form is prohibited. One additional way to classify theories of ethics is to consider them consequential or nonconsequential. Consequential theories are those theories that look at the consequences of acts. They claim that an action is right to the extent that it produces good consequences and wrong to the extent that it produces bad consequences. Utilitarianism is an example of a consequential ethical theory because it

claims that an action is right if it tends to produce the greatest balance of value over disvalue. If an action does not do this, it is considered to be wrong. Nonconsequential theories, on the other hand, are those theories that maintain that certain acts are right and others are wrong because they have or do not have rightmaking characteristics. Deontology is a type of nonconsequential theory that considers actions to be right based on laws or rules regarding duties or obligations (such as keeping promises, telling the truth, etc.) independent of their consequences or outcomes. One of the most prominent forms of deontology is Kants theory of ethics, which holds that an action is right if it is done from duty and can be willed to be universal law for everyone. TELEOLOGICAL ETHICAL THEORY/CONSEQUENTIALISM FOCUS ON ENDS, GOALS AND CONSEQUENCES The word "teleology" is derived from the Greek word telos that means "ends. On the other hand, the term "consequentialism" was coined by G. E. M. Anscombe in her essay "Modern Moral Philosophy" in 1958, to describe what she saw as the central error of certain moral theories, such as those propounded by Mill and Sidgwick. Since then, the term has become common in English-language ethical theory. Consequentialism refers to those moral theories which hold that

the consequences of one's conduct are the true basis for any judgement about the morality of that conduct. Thus, from a consequentialist standpoint, a morally right act (or omission) is one that will produce a good outcome, or consequence. This view is often expressed as the aphorism "The ends justify the means". This theory was applied, for instance, when it was argued that HIV tests could be done when blood samples were

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taken for any other tests, to gauge the level of infection in the population as a whole. The end of a statistical certainty (and possible approach to care or cure) justified the means of taking blood for this purpose without persons consent or knowledge. Consequentialism is usually understood as distinct from deontology, in that deontology derives the rightness or wrongness of one's conduct from the character of the behavior itself rather than the outcomes of the conduct. It is also distinguished from virtue ethics, which focuses on the character of the agent rather than on the nature or consequences of the act (or omission) itself. The difference between these three approaches to morality tends to lie more in the way moral dilemmas are approached than in the moral conclusions reached. For example, a consequentialist may argue that lying is wrong because of the negative consequences produced by lyingthough a consequentialist may allow that certain foreseeable consequences might make lying acceptable. A deontologist might argue that lying is always wrong, regardless of any potential "good" that might come from lying. A virtue ethicist, however, would focus less on lying in any particular instance and instead consider what a decision to tell a lie or not tell a lie said about one's character and moral behavior. VARIETIES OF CONSEQUENTIALISM 1. Ethical Altruism The term "altruism" (initially derived from the Latin alter meaning "other") was coined by Auguste Comte, the French founder of Positivism, in order to describe his ethical doctrine, which he summed up in the phrase: "Live for others". In

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more general terms, altruism is a selfless concern for the welfare of others (although its common usage does not necessarily entail any ethical obligation). Ethical altruism can be seen as a consequentialist ethic which prescribes that an individual takes actions that have the best consequences for everyone except for himself. James Fisher, in his article "Ethics" in the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, states the altruist dictum as: "An action is morally right if the consequences of that action are more favorable than unfavorable to everyone except the agent." Altruism may be seen as similar to utilitarianism, however an essential difference is that the latter prescribes acts that maximize good consequences for all of society, while altruism prescribes maximizing good consequences for everyone except the actor. Arguably, however, since the rest of society will almost always outnumber the utilitarian, a genuine utilitarian will inevitably end up practicing altruism or a form of altruism. Criticisms Friedrich Nietzsche held that the idea that to treat others as more important than oneself is degrading and demeaning to the self. He also believed that the idea that others have a higher value than oneself hinders the individual's pursuit of selfdevelopment, excellence, and creativity. However, he did assert a "duty" to help those who are weaker than oneself. David Kelley, discussing Ayn Rand's views, says that "there is no rational ground for asserting that sacrificing yourself in order to serve others is morally superior to pursuing your own (long-term, rational) self-interest. Altruism ultimately depends on non-rational rationales, on mysticism in some form..." Furthermore, he holds that there is a danger of the state enforcing that moral ideal: "If self-sacrifice is an ideal - if service

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to others is the highest, most honorable course of action - why not force people to act accordingly?" He believes this can ultimately result in the state forcing everyone into a collectivist political system. Norwegian eco-philosopher Arne Naess argues that environmental action based upon altruism or service of the other stems from a shrunken "egoic" concept of the self. Self-actualization will result, he argues, in the recovery of an "ecological self", in which actions formerly seen as altruistic are in reality a form of enlightened self-interest. 2. Ethical Egoism Egoism is derived from the Latin word, ego, which when translated to English, means I. Ethical egoism can be understood as a consequentialist theory according to which the consequences for the individual agent are taken to matter more than any other result. Egoism and altruism both contrast with ethical utilitarianism, which holds that a moral agent should treat one's self (also known as the subject) with no higher regard than one has for others (as egoism does, by elevating self-interests and "the self" to a status not granted to others), but that one also should not (as altruism does) sacrifice one's own interests to help others' interests, so long as one's own interests (i.e. one's own desires or well-being) are substantially equivalent to the others' interests and well-being. Egoism, utilitarianism, and altruism are all forms of consequentialism, but egoism and altruism contrast with utilitarianism, in that egoism and altruism are both agent-focused forms of consequentialism (i.e. subject-focused or subjective), but utilitarianism is called agent-neutral (i.e. objective and impartial) as it does not treat the subject's (i.e. the self's, i.e. the moral "agent's") own interests as being more or less important than the interests, desires, or well-being of others.

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Ethical egoism does not, however, require moral agents to harm the interests and well-being of others when making moral deliberation; e.g. what is in an agent's selfinterest may be incidentally detrimental, beneficial, or neutral in its effect on others. Individualism allows for others' interest and well-being to be disregarded or not, as long as what is chosen is efficacious in satisfying the self-interest of the agent. Nor does ethical egoism necessarily entail that, in pursuing self-interest, one ought always to do what one wants to do; e.g. in the long term, the fulfillment of short-term desires may prove detrimental to the self. Fleeting pleasure, then, takes a back seat to protracted eudaimonia. In the words of James Rachels, "Ethical egoism endorses selfishness, but it doesn't endorse foolishness." Ethical egoism is sometimes the philosophical basis for support

of libertarianism or individualist anarchism, although these can also be based on altruistic motivations. These are political positions based partly on a belief that individuals should not coercively prevent others from exercising freedom of action. Criticisms According to amoralism, the meta-ethical view that nothing is moral or immoral, there is nothing wrong with egoism, but there is nothing ethical about it. One can simply adopt rational egoism and completely drop morality as a superfluous attribute of the egoism. Some contend that ethical egoism is intuitively implausible. Ethical egoism has also been alleged as the basis for immorality. Thomas Jefferson writes in a 1814 letter to Thomas Law:

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Self-interest, or rather self-love, or egoism, has been more plausibly substituted as the basis of morality. But I consider our relations with others as constituting the boundaries of morality. With ourselves, we stand on the ground of identity, not of relation, which last, requiring two subjects, excludes self-love confined to a single one. To ourselves, in strict language, we can owe no duties, obligation requiring also two parties. Self-love, therefore, is no part of morality. Indeed, it is exactly its counterpart. Ethical egoism is opposed not only by altruist philosophers; it is also at odds with the majority of religion. Most religions hold that ethical egoism is the product of a lack of genuine spirituality and shows an individual's submersion in greed. Religious egoism is a derivative of egoism, whereby religion is used to validate one's self-interest. In The Moral Point of View, Kurt Baier objects that ethical egoism provides no moral basis for the resolution of conflicts of interest, which, in his opinion, form the only vindication for a moral code. Were this an ideal world, one in which interests and purposes never jarred, its inhabitants would have no need of a specified set of ethics, according to Baier. This, however, is not an "ideal world." Baier believes that ethical egoism fails to provide the moral guidance and arbitration that it necessitates. Far from resolving conflicts of interest, claimed Baier, ethical egoism all too often spawns them. Baiers is also part of a team of philosophers who hold that ethical egoism is paradoxical, implying that to do what is in one's best interests can be both wrong and right in ethical terms. Although a successful pursuit of self-interest may be viewed as a moral victory, it could also be dubbed immoral if it prevents another person from executing what is in his best interests.

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3. Hedonism The term "hedonism" is derived from the Greek hedone meaning simply "pleasure". In common language, Hedonism has come to mean devotion to pleasure as a way of life, especially to the pleasures of the senses, and is synonymous with sensualism, libertinism, debauchery and dissipation. Hedonism is the philosophy that pleasure is the most important pursuit of mankind, and the only thing that is good for an individual. Hedonists, therefore, strive to maximize their total pleasure (the net of any pleasure less any pain or suffering). They believe that pleasure is the only good in life, and pain is the only evil, and our life's goal should be to maximize pleasure and minimize pain. Psychological Hedonism is the view that humans are psychologically

constructed in such a way that we exclusively desire pleasure. Ethical Hedonism, on the other hand, is the view that our fundamental moral obligation is to maximize pleasure or happiness. It is the normative claim that we should always act so as to produce our own pleasure. Hedonism usually presupposes an individualist stance, and is associated with Egoism (the claim that individuals should always seek their own good in all things). Epicureanism is a more moderate approach (which still seeks to maximize happiness, but which defines happiness more as a state of tranquillity than pleasure). A similar but more altruistic approach results in utilitarianism, the position that the moral worth of any action is determined by its contribution to overall utility in maximizing happiness or pleasure as summed among all people.

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The Paradox of Hedonism (also called the Pleasure Paradox), points out that pleasure and happiness are strange phenomena that do not obey normal principles, in that they cannot be acquired directly, only indirectly and we often fail to attain pleasures if we deliberately seek them. Criticisms Hedonism has been criticized by a number of modern authors and philosophers. G.E. Moore argued that hedonists commit the naturalistic fallacy which is committed whenever a philosopher attempts to prove a claim about ethics by appealing to a definition of the term "good" in terms of one or more natural properties (such as "pleasant", "more evolved", "desired", etc.). Arthur N. Prior defined it as the assumption that because some quality or combination of qualities invariably and necessarily accompanies the quality of goodness, or is invariably and necessarily accompanied by it, or both, this quality or combination of qualities is identical with goodness. If, for example, it is believed that whatever is pleasant is and must be good, or that whatever is good is and must be pleasant, or both, it is committing the naturalistic fallacy to infer from this that goodness and pleasantness are one and the same quality. The naturalistic fallacy is the assumption that because the words 'good' and, say, 'pleasant' necessarily describe the same objects, they must attribute the same quality to them. Ayn Rand, widely read as a modern proponent of ethical egoism, rejected ethical hedonism: To take "whatever makes one happy" as a guide to action means: to be guided by nothing but one's emotional whims. Emotions are not tools of cognition. . . . This is

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the fallacy inherent in hedonism in any variant of ethical hedonism, personal or social, individual or collective. "Happiness" can properly be the purpose of ethics,

but not the standard. The task of ethics is to define man's proper code of values and thus to give him the means of achieving happiness. To declare, as the ethical hedonists do, that "the proper value is whatever gives you pleasure" is to declare that "the proper value is whatever you happen to value" which is an act of intellectual and philosophical abdication, an act which merely proclaims the futility of ethics and invites all men to play it deuces wild. 4. Asceticism The term "asceticism" derives from the Greek askesis (meaning "practice", "training" or "exercise"), and it was originally associated with any form of disciplined practice. In ancient Greek society, warriors and athletes often applied the discipline of askesis to attain optimal bodily fitness and grace. Asceticism describes a lifestyle characterized by voluntary abstinence from various sorts of worldly pleasures (especially sexual activity, the consumption of alcohol and the accumulation of property and wealth), often with the aim of pursuing religious or spiritual goals. In ancient Greek philosophy, the adherents of cynicism and stoicism adopted the practice of mastering desire and passion, as to some extent did Epicureanism. Diametrically opposed to asceticism is hedonism, the philosophy that pleasure is the most important pursuit of mankind. The justification behind asceticism is usually that spiritual and

religious goals are impeded by indulgence in pleasures of the flesh, although it does not

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necessarily hold that the enjoyment of life is bad in itself. Thus, ascetic practices are not usually regarded as virtuous as such, merely a means towards a mind-body transformation, or a purification of the body which enables connection with the Divine and the cultivation of inner peace. It aims to achieve freedom

from compulsions and temptations, bringing about peacefulness of mind and an increase in clarity and power of thought. A distinction is sometimes drawn between "otherworldly" asceticism (which is practiced by people, such as monks or hermits, who withdraw from the world in order to live an ascetic life) and "worldly" Asceticism (which refers to people, such as the Quaker and Amish sects, who live ascetic lives but do not withdraw from the world). 5. Act and Rule Consequentialism Consequentialist moral systems are usually differentiated into act-

consequentialism and rule-consequentialism. The former, act-consequentialism, argues that the morality of any action is dependent upon its consequences. Thus, the most moral action is the one which leads to the best consequences. The latter, rule-consequentialism, argues that focusing only on the consequences of the action in question can lead people to committing outrageous actions when they foresee good consequences. Thus, rule-consequentialists add the following provision: imagine that an action were to become a general rule - if the following of such a rule would result in bad consequences, then it should be avoided even if it would lead to good consequences in this one instance. This has very obvious similarities to Kant's categorical imperative, a deontological moral principle.

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Rule-consequentialism can lead to a person performing actions which, taken alone, may lead to bad consequences. It is argued, however, that the overall situation is that there will be more good than bad when people follow the rules derived from consequentialist considerations. For example, one of the objections to euthanasia is that allowing such an exception to the moral rule "do not kill" would lead to a weakening of a rule which has generally positive consequences - even though in such instances following the rule leads to negative consequences. Criticism One of the most common objections to rule-consequentialism is that it is incoherent, because it is based on the consequentialist principle that what we should be concerned with is maximizing the good, but then it tells us not to act to maximize the good, but to follow rules (even in cases where we know that breaking the rule could produce better results). Brad Hooker avoided this objection by not basing his form of ruleconsequentialism on the ideal of maximizing the good. He writes: "the best argument for rule-consequentialism is not that it derives from an overarching commitment to maximize the good. The best argument for ruleconsequentialism is that it does a better job than its rivals of matching and tying together our moral convictions, as well as offering us help with our moral disagreements and uncertainties." Derek Parfit described Brad Hooker's book on rule-consequentialism Ideal Code, Real World as the "best statement and defence, so far, of one of the most important moral theories."

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6. Negative Consequentialism Most consequentialist theories focus on promoting some sort of good

consequences. However, one could equally well lay out a consequentialist theory that focuses solely on minimizing bad consequences. Of course, the maximization of good consequences could in practice also involve the minimization of bad consequences, but the promotion of good consequences is usually of primary import. One major difference between these two approaches is the agent's responsibility. Positive consequentialism demands that we bring about good states of affairs, whereas negative consequentialism may only require that we avoid bad ones. A more strenuous version of negative consequentialism may actually require active intervention, but only to prevent harm from being done. An alternative theory (using the example of negative utilitarianism) is that some consider the reduction of suffering (for the disadvantaged) to be more valuable than increased pleasure (for the affluent or luxurious). 7. Utilitarianism Utilitarianism, also called utilism, is more commonly known as the "The greater good" argument; the belief that the right course of action is the one that maximizes the overall "good" of the situation. It is the idea that the moral worth of an action is determined solely by its usefulness in maximizing utility as summed among all sentient beings. It is thus a form of consequentialism, meaning that the moral worth of an action is determined by its outcome. The most influential contributors to this theory are considered to be Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill. Utilitarianism was described by Bentham as "the greatest happiness or greatest felicity principle". Utility, the good to be maximized, has been defined by various thinkers

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as happiness or pleasure (versus suffering or pain),

although

preference

utilitarians

define it as the satisfaction of preferences. It may be described as a life stance, with happiness or pleasure being of ultimate importance. Utilitarianism can be characterized as a quantitative and reductionist approach to ethics. It is a type of naturalism. It can be contrasted with deontological ethics (which do not regard the consequences of an act as a determinant of its moral worth) and virtue ethics (which focuses on character), as well as with other varieties of consequentialism. In general usage, the term utilitarian refers to a somewhat narrow economic or pragmatic viewpoint. Philosophical utilitarianism, however, is a much broader view that encompasses all aspects of people's life. Both rule utilitarianism and act utilitarianism are teleological (from the Greek telos for "end", "purpose", or "goal") meaning that they are consequential, however Bentham's act utilitarianism is primarily absolutist, even though it is much more free than theories such as those put forward by Immanuel Kant. This means that in all acts require "felicific calculus" to achieve "the greatest pleasure for the greatest number." Therefore, there are definite rules and codes as to what the person must do in each situation to benefit the most people. The hedonic calculus is what Bentham thought all people must do before deciding the utility of the certain act in question. It is dependent on:

Its intensity. Its duration. Its certainty or uncertainty. Its propinquity, or remoteness.

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Its fecundity, or the chance it has of being followed by similar sensations: that is, pleasures, if it is pleasure: pains, if it is pain.

Its purity, or the chance it has of not being followed by, sensations of the opposite kind: that is, pain, if it is pleasure: pleasure, if it is pain.

Its extent (the number of people who are affected by it).

However, Mill's rule utilitarianism is much more relative in that he encourages people to do acts that are pleasurable to themselves as long as they are what he calls a "higher pleasure" for example, the arts like literature, poetry, the opera. However, the meta-ethics of rule utilitarianism can be questioned as they are much more absolutist, since Mill is absolute in what he values as a higher pleasure. Types of Utilitarianism a. Act vs Rule Utilitarianism Act utilitarianism states that, when faced with a choice, we must first consider the likely consequences of potential actions and, from that, choose to do what we believe will generate the most pleasure. The rule utilitarian, on the other hand, begins by looking at potential rules of action. To determine whether a rule should be followed, he or she looks at what would happen if it were constantly followed. If adherence to the rule produces more happiness than otherwise, it is a rule that morally must be followed at all times. The distinction between act and rule utilitarianism is therefore based on a difference about the proper object of consequential calculation specific to a case or generalized to rules. Also to achieve the greater good for the most amount of people. Rule utilitarianism has been criticized for advocating general rules that, in some specific circumstances, clearly decrease happiness if followed. Never to kill another

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human being may seem to be a good rule, but it could make self-defense against malevolent aggressors very difficult. Rule utilitarians add, however, that there are general exception rules that allow the breaking of other rules if such rule-breaking increases happiness, one example being self-defense. Critics argue that this reduces rule utilitarianism to act utilitarianism and makes rules meaningless. Rule utilitarians retort that rules in the legal system (i.e., laws) that regulate such situations are not meaningless. Self-defense is legally justified, while murder is not. However, within rule utilitarianism there is a distinction between the strictness and absolutism of this particular branch of utilitarianism. Strong Rule Utilitarianism is an absolutist theory, which frames strict rules that apply for all people and all time and may never be broken. John Stuart Mill proposed Weak Rule utilitarianism, which posits that, although rules should be framed on previous examples that benefit society, it is possible, under specific circumstances, to do what produces the greatest happiness and break that rule. An example would be the Gestapo asking where your Jewish neighbours were; a strong rule utilitarian might say the "Do not lie" rule must never be broken, whereas a weak rule utilitarian would argue that to lie would produce the most happiness. Rule utilitarianism should not be confused with heuristics (rules of thumb), but many act utilitarians agree that it makes sense to formulate certain rules of thumb to follow if they find themselves in a situation whose consequences are difficult, costly or time-consuming to calculate exactly. If the consequences can be calculated relatively clearly and without much doubt, however, the rules of thumb can be ignored.

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Collapse of rule utilitarianism into act utilitarianism It has been argued that rule utilitarianism collapses into act utilitarianism, because for any given rule, in the case where breaking the rule produces more utility, the rule can be sophisticated by the addition of a sub-rule that handles cases like the exception. This process holds for all cases of exceptions, and so the rules have as many sub-rules as there are exceptional cases, which, in the end, makes an agent seek out whatever outcome produces the maximum utility. b. Two-level Utilitarianism Two-level utilitarianism states that one should normally use 'intuitive moral thinking, in the form of rule utilitarianism, because it usually maximizes happiness. However there are some times when we must ascend to a higher critical level of reflection in order to decide what to do, and must think as an act utilitarian would. Richard Hare supported this theory with his concept of the Archangel, which holds that if we were all archangels we could be act utilitarians all the time as we would be able to perfectly predict consequences. However we are closer to proles in that we are frequently biased and unable to foresee all possible consequence of our actions, and thus we require moral guidelines. When these principles clash we must attempt to think like an archangel to choose the right course of action. c. Motive Utilitarianism Motive utilitarianism, first developed by Robert Adams (Journal of Philosophy, 1976), can be viewed either as a hybrid between act and rule or as a unique approach all on its own terms. The motive approach attempts to deal realistically with how human beings actually function psychologically. We are indeed passionate, emotional

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creatures, we do much better with positive goals than with negative prohibitions, we long to be taken seriously, and so on and so forth. Motive utilitarianism proposes that our initial moral task be to inculcate within ourselves and others the skills, inclinations, and mental focuses that are likely to be most useful (or in less perfectionist terms, merely highly useful) across the spectrum of real-world situations we are likely to face, rather than the hypothetical situations seemingly so common in philosophical publications. Indeed, motive utilitarianism can even be seen as a response to this unofficial rule against textured real-world examples. For example, similar to the 80-20 rule in business and entrepreneurship, we might be able to most improve the future prospects of all sentient creatures if we do a large number of activities in open partnerships with others, rather than a few perfect things done sneakily. Two examples of motive utilitarianism in practice might be a gay person coming out of the closet and a politician publicly breaking with a war. In both cases, there is likely to be an initial surge of power and confidence, as well as a transitional period in which one is likely to be losing old friends before making new friends, and unpredictably so on both counts. Another example might be a doctor who is a skilled diagnostician. Such a physician is likely to spend most of their serious study time or continuing education time on current research, direct skills for running a successful practice, etc., and only occasionally return to first principlesthat is, only occasionally do something as an interesting study in biochemistry, and then as much as a hobby as anything else.

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d. Negative Utilitarianism Most utilitarian theories deal with producing the greatest amount of good for the greatest number of people. Negative utilitarianism (NU) requires us to promote the least amount of evil or harm, or to prevent the greatest amount of suffering for the greatest number. Proponents like Karl Popper, Christoph Fehige and Clark Wolf argue that this is a more effective ethical formula, since, they contend, the greatest harms are more consequential than the greatest goods. Karl Popper also referred to an epistemological argument: It adds to clarity in the fields of ethics, if we formulate our demands negatively, i.e., if we demand the elimination of suffering rather than the promotion of happiness. e. Average vs Total Utilitarianism Total utilitarianism advocates measuring the utility of a population based on the total utility of its members. According to Derek Parfit, this type of utilitarianism falls victim to the Repugnant Conclusion, whereby large numbers of people with very low but non-negative utility values can be seen as a better goal than a population of a less extreme size living in comfort. In other words, according to the theory, it is a moral good to breed more people on the world for as long as total happiness rises. Average utilitarianism, on the other hand, advocates measuring the utility of a population based on the average utility of that population. It avoids Parfit's repugnant conclusion, but causes other problems like the mere addition paradox. For example, bringing a moderately happy person in a very happy world would be seen as an immoral act; aside from this, the theory implies that it would be a moral good to eliminate all people whose happiness is below average, as this would raise the average happiness.

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Most utilitarians consider this type of argument as flawed or merely hypothetical, however, since a real-world society allowing the non-consensual elimination of people would inevitably create severe amounts of suffering and unhappiness. f. Preference Utilitarianism Preference utilitarianism is a particular type of utilitarianism which defines the good to be maximized as the fulfilment of persons preferences. Like any utilitarian theory, preference utilitarianism claims that the right thing to do is that which produces the best consequences; when defined in terms of preference satisfaction, the best consequences can include things other than pure hedonism, like reputation or rationality. Preference utilitarianism is favored by the modern utilitarian philosopher Peter Singer, who was influenced by R.M. Hare. Criticisms Utilitarianism has been criticized as being too simplistic and unable to adequately cope with the complexities of real-life situations. Utilitarianism requires us to do whatever act will bring about the greatest good, even if that means doing something we would otherwise consider immoral. If we can bring about a good, then, according to utilitarian theory, we are required to do that action. However, there are some goods that can be achieved only through means that most of us would consider wrong. For instance, there may be times when a patient asks that her family not be informed of her diagnosis or prognosis because the patient does not want to worry them and fears the disruption in their lives that such information would bring. Yet it may seem that the family could provide valuable support

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for the patient. In fact you may know this particular family well enough to know that telling them about the patients illness would bring more support and hence greater wellbeing to the patient than not telling. By utilitarian reasoning, it would be not just acceptable, but required, that you disclose this information to the family. However, respecting patient confidentiality is an important element of patient care. Even if you were right in your assessment of the situation, most clinicians would agree that it is absolutely wrong to disclose patient information without patients consent. Thus, following utilitarian reasoning could put one in a situation in which breaking ethical standards is required. This is a strong indictment of utilitarianism. One way that utilitarians have addressed this problem is to adopt a rule-utilitarian stance. In this formulation of utilitarianism, instead of deciding what action will bring about the greatest good in each situation, rule-utilitarians advocate following a set of rules that are designed so that in most situations following them will produce the greatest amount of good overall. In the foregoing example, a rule-utilitarian would reply that, in general, disclosing confidential patient information would bring about more harm than good and therefore one should always follow the general rule of maintain confidentiality. True calculations of happiness are impossible. Another criticism of utilitarianism is that in practice it is impossible for an individual or even a group to accurately calculate all the pleasure and freedom from pain that any specific act will entail. For one thing, we can never be completely sure that our actions will produce their intended results. Second, even if they do produce the desired outcome, how can we foresee all the implications of these actions and assess

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the effects they will have on all people, however remotely connected to the act or its outcome? In considering the total calculation of pleasure and pain, it is imperative to account for all people who will be affected by the action both now and in the future. Some acts will have implications for large groups of people over great spans of time. Then, too, there is the cumulative effect to be considered. Critics argue that these are not all within the ability of the utilitarian theorist to foresee when determining what consequences a particular action will have. Supporters of utilitarianism generally reply to this criticism by pointing out that even though not all consequences are foreseeable, the major ones are. For most situations, most of the time, a reasonable enough calculation can be made. Utilitarianism does not consider issues of distributive justice. Utilitarianism only requires that happiness be maximized, not that there be any sense of fairness regarding who gets to be happy. In the general formulation of utilitarianism, it is equally as legitimate to make rich people happy by buying them yachts as it is to make poor people happy by buying them homes. In health care, this would mean there is no rationale for distributing resources other than to make sure that the resources do some good. Most people feel that there should be some consideration given to benefiting the least well off in society before adding resources for those who already have access to a basic minimum of health care. There have been suggestions for changes to basic utilitarian theory to address this concern, but there is no agreement about them and for someone who is really committed to utilitarianism, this issue may not be a concern. The only good in utilitarian theory is the maximization of pleasure and freedom from pain. Fairness is not a basic

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good, but may be considered a lower-level good if, in general, promoting fairness also promotes pleasure and freedom from pain. So a utilitarian would argue that if this is the case, if fairness or justice is generally a method of increasing happiness, then it is a suitable goal and can be made a criterion for distributing health care resources, not because justice or fairness is good in and of itself, but because promoting it will promote happiness in general.

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DEONTOLOGY HISTORICAL ORIGIN The historical origin of this particular moral theory can be traced back to the early beginning of human civilization, at a time when the word of the chief, or the king was given unconditionally and without invitation to appeal on the basis of consequences (Solomon and Greene, 1999). The commands of the one with power or in authority are something that are taken and obeyed without any further question and objection. Once the commands and orders are given and handed out from above, everyone else below is expected to follow unconditionally. Obedience is something absolute or categorical. When C. D. Broad first used the term "deontological" in the way that is relevant here, he contrasted the term with "teleological", where "teleological" theories are those that are concerned with outcomes or consequences. Broad's main concern was distinguishing the positions that different ethical theories took on the relationship between values and right action. He wrote: [Theories] which hold that there is some special connection between [Moral Obligation and Moral Value]....might take the following forms. The concepts of obligation are fundamental and the concepts of value are definable in terms of them. Thus it might be held that the notion of fittingness is fundamental, and that "X is intrinsically good" means that it is fitting for every rational being to desire X. Such theories might be called Deontological. The concepts of value are fundamental, and the concepts of obligation are definable in terms of them. Such theories may be called Teleological. E.g., it might be held that "X is a right action" means that X is likely to produce consequences which are at least as good as those of any other action open to the agent at the time.
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WHAT IS DEONTOLOGY? Deontological ethics or deontology (from Greek the word deon, which means "obligation or duty" is an approach to ethics that determines goodness or rightness from examining acts, rather than third-party consequences of the act as in consequentialism, or the intentions of the person doing the act as in virtue ethics. Deontologists look at rules and duties. For example, the act may be considered the right thing to do even if it produces a bad consequence, if it follows the rule that one should do unto others as they would have done unto them, and even if the person who does the act lacks virtue and had a bad intention in doing the act. According to deontology, we have a duty to act in a way that does those things that are inherently good as acts ("truth-telling" for example), or follow an objectively obligatory rule (as in rule utilitarianism). For deontologists, the ends or consequences of our actions are not important in and of themselves, and our intentions are not important in and of themselves. Utilitarianism conceives the moral life in terms of intrinsic value and means to ends. Deontologists, by contrast, argue that moral standards exist independently of utilitarian ends and that the moral life is wrongly conceived in terms of means and ends. An act or rule is right, they maintain, in so far as it satisfies the demands of some overriding (nonutilitarian) principle or principles of obligation. For example, suppose someone defames anothers character and thereby damages that persons reputation and career. The action is defamation, and the damage is a consequence of the defamation. This consequence is separable from the action. Deontologists believe that

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defamation can be wrong even if social utility is maximized by the action (Beauchamp, 1991) Deontologists urge us to consider that such actions are morally wrong not because of their consequences but rather because the action type- the class of action expresses a moral violation. Some deontologists even argue that consequences are irrelevant to moral evaluations; An act is right if and only if it conforms to the relevant moral obligation; and it is wrong if and only if it violates the relevant moral obligation. In this interpretation, the fact that a type of action generally brings about good consequences is insignificant. Many deontological theories are not readily

distinguishable from consequentialism, however, because they hold only that some features of some actions other than their consequences determine their rightness or wrongness, and that moral rightness is, at least in part, independent of a conception of goodness. Deontologists maintain that utilitarianism also presupposes a greater capacity to predict and control future outcomes than human beings generally possess, and that the centrality of prediction of outcomes in the utilitarian theory distorts that moral life. We can be confident neither of our ultimate goals nor of the means that will get us there, they maintain. Rather, we unpredictably encounter others claims, interests, and rights and so do not initiate acts for good ends. Our obligations primarily derive from the rights of others: paying debts, raising children, voluntarily making commitments, and the like. Promises must be kept and debts must be paid because such actions form ones obligation, not because of the consequences of such actions (Beauchamp,1991).

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DEONTOLOGICAL ETHICAL THEORIES A. NATURAL LAW Historical Origin The use of natural law, in its various incarnations, has varied widely through its history. There are a number of different theories of natural law, differing from each other with respect to the role that morality plays in determining the authority of legal norms. According to Fernandez (2007), the natural law theory is a part of a long tradition that can be said to have its origin in the thoughts of the earliest philosophers dating back in ancient times. By virtue of its historical development, natural law ethics can be called by several names. Some call it Thomistic Ethics, in as much as it was made popular by St. Thomas Aquinas during the medieval period. Others call it Scholastic Ethics after the brilliant moral teachings of a group of scholars, known as Scholastics or Schoolmen. Others label it as Christian Ethics, or more particularly Catholic ethics in so far as it has become the most influential moral teaching of the Catholic Church, as is evident in her ethical pronouncements and positions on contemporary ethical issues such as abortion, contraception, euthanasia, genetic engineering and reproductive technology. Still others would label it as Objective Ethics, precisely because of its central tenet which states that there is an objective moral standard that we ought to follow regardless of our personal opinion of what constitutes right and wrong. According to Beauchamp (1991), the doctrine of natural rights has a long history, stretching back at least to ancient Greece. The Stoics understood natural law as an ideal or standard fixed by nature, binding on all persons, and taking precedence over the particular laws and standards created by human social conventions. In many texts

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of Greek Philosophy, natural right or law was contrasted with conventional rights or law. Philosophers such as Plato opposed a conventionalism that made human arrangements the measure and final source of authority in political and legal matters. Nature or the natural order was thought to contain normative standards, and by reference to these standards, one could determine whether laws adopted by city-states were unjust, or at least not perfectly just. This theory of natural law allegedly provides standards against which the laws and policies of particular states are properly measured. These standards also constitute the foundation of rights and moral obligation. This theory is based on a distinction between laws of nature and natural laws. The former are descriptive statements derived from scientific knowledge or universal regularities in nature, whereas the latter are prescriptive statements derived from philosophical knowledge of the essential properties of human nature. In this theory, natural laws do not empirically describe behavior but rather delineate the behavior that is morally appropriate for a human being. Activities proper to a human differ from what is to be expected from other creatures in so far as their natures differ, and their natures differ because they possess different essences with different potentialities. Natural law stipulate which natural potentialities ought to be actualized, and these stipulation become moral action guides. For example, suicide is wrong in the Thomistic tradition because it violates a natural inclination to live; to commit suicide is to act against the laws of nature. A second tradition of natural rights asserts that all human beings have rights in a hypothetical state of nature that exists prior to the formation of a political state. These rights provide the foundation of a legitimate contract or political arrangement. This maneuver allowed the traditional idea

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of a fixed natural law, knowable by reason, to be wedded to a social contract theory that included a strong account of natural rights as political protections( Beauchamp, 1991). The Contribution of the Stoics Pojman (2005) states as cited by Fernandez (2007), the early Stoics believed that human beings have within them a divine spark (logos spermatikos- the rational seed) that enables them to discover the essential eternal laws that governed the whole cosmos that are necessary in the attainment of individual happiness and social harmony. The Stoics equated nature with laws and reason and taught that what was important was to live a life according to nature. They called this wisdom. By this, the Stoics seemed to mean the recognition that everything happens according to a certain laws, a necessity. The wise person knows that things must be as they are and achieves happiness and a sense of purpose by learning how to accept the necessities of things and events. Moreover, the Stoics conceived the whole of the universe as governed by certain immutable laws that exhibit rationality. Nothing in the world, therefore, happens by chance. Everything has its own end or purpose- a reason for its own being. The Aristotelian Influence For Aristotle, everything that exists in nature serves some particular and specific purpose and that we can never fully understand a thing until we understand what it is for. Ellin (1995) emphasizes as it was cited by Fernandez (2007) that the central idea is that we can learn by nature what we ought to do and not do because nature intends that certain things be done or not done. Furthermore, for Aristotle, every individual substance has an intrinsic nature or principle of operation, which is dynamic, teleological and specific. He holds that the purpose of any fully developed entity is to be

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itself. Self-realization or actualization then is the very reason or purpose of anything that came to be or simply the reason for being. The Thomistic Interpretation Saint Thomas Aquinas held that the universe is teleological, that is, governed by purpose or ends. The angelic doctor believed that movement towards an end characterizes everything in nature and everything in it, including people and their institutions. The natural law as expounded by Aquinas is nothing but a participation of the eternal law in this context is the particularity of the eternal law in the human person. In so far as God has a plan or purpose for all things, both animate and inanimate objects, so then He is said to have set up the nature of the human person in such a way that all his actions should take. Basic Natural Human Tendencies or Inclinations that are present in all of us: 1. Self-Preservation or survival Man has to preserve himself in existence 2. Propagation of our Species To unite sexually to produce offspring for the continuance of the next generation of the human race 3. To live in Peace and in Harmony with Other Men Just and fair dealings with others 4. To Seek for Truth and Knowledge of the Good To use his will and intellect to know the truth and seek the good, including his highest good, which is eternal happiness with God

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Secular Interpretations: Cicero Natural law need not be viewed as having divine or supernatural origin. Cicero taught that morality is based on the concept of a cosmic order which is the ground of objective moral laws. For him, nature is looked upon as the rational and animating force of all things. Following the flow of nature through the exercise of our reason we can discover the fundamental laws of the universe and direct ourselves in consonance with these laws. Derivative Principles from Natural Law 1. The Principle of Double Effect It is a moral principle that provides us an idea that certain acts will have two effects, one good and the other bad. This principle applies to a situation in which a good and an evil effect will result from an act with a good or noble cause or intention/motive. 2. The Principle of Totality It refers to the view that a part exists for the good of the whole. Under this principle, each person has a natural right to live and to continue in existence anything that will obstruct or put in jeopardy that natural basic drive and tendency goes against what is considered good. It is therefore morally justified for anyone to do whatever is necessary to protect that right, provided no unjust harm is done to others. Here, the preservation of the whole is more important than the conservation of the part. 3. The Principle of Stewardship It implies that all life comes from God, the supreme creator and maker of all and that no individual person could claim that he or she is the owner of anything in the world and that of his or her own body. We humans are only given the power to take good care

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of creation and do not have sole authority to do whatever we want. It is therefore morally wrong to commit actions such as suicide and euthanasia since stewardship entails proper protections and responsible care of what the creator has given. 4. The Principle of the Inviolability of Life It believes that human life is of infinite value as it is a sacred and precious gift from the Almighty Creator. Its worth outweighs everything in the world. It can never be sacrificed by whatever means or for whatever reasons. Moreover, this principle gives every life, no matter how it is lived, an equal worth and dignity to every other. This means that the life of a criminal is as important as the life of an upright person. 5. The Principle of Forfeiture It states that it is morally permissible to defend oneself even to the point of taking another life. There are cases when a persons life is threatened by the presence of an aggressor. The person who is in mortal danger is innocent. The innocent person whose life is placed at risk by an intruder can apply the principle of forfeiture as an act of selfdefense. Natural Law and Contraception A clear and concrete application of the natural law theory is the Roman Catholic opposition to contraception. It is argued that the conception of a baby is the natural purpose of the sexual act. That act may also be enjoyable which, at the same time, may strengthen the relationship between the couple. But positive these things may be, they arise in the context of an act, which has an essential purpose the conception of children. Thus, in view of this specific and particular natural purpose of the act, anything that deliberately and willfully frustrates the natural outcome must be viewed as ethically

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wrong. Every sexual act should at least be open to the possibility of conceiving a child. Anything that is outside of it is always morally unjustified. In the same respect, any other form of sexual intercourse that does not lead, or at least not open to the possibility of conception like anal and oral intercourse, masturbation, homosexuality and the like are considered to be morally wrong. All these acts are simply against nature. They are known as sexual perversions.

B. KANTIAN ETHICS Historical Origin If one tries to scan the entire history of ethical philosophy, perhaps one cannot find a more avid defender of deontological theory in modern times that the great German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), a philosopher whose remarkable contributions to the history of philosophical thought put him on the same level with the greatest of the greats among the worlds foremost thinkers (Fernandez, 2007). According to Beauchamp (1991), it is almost universally agreed that Kant is the greatest philosopher to emerge in German philosophy. In order to combat skeptical challenges to traditional moral thinking, Kant developed a highly original philosophical framework. The goal of philosophical ethics, he thought, is to establish the ultimate basis for the validity of moral rules. In his writings, Kant tried to show that this ultimate basis rests in pure reason, not in intuition, conscience or the production of utility. Morality, as he saw it, provides a rational framework of principles and rules that guides and places obligations on everyone, entirely apart from each individuals personal goals and interests: Moral rules apply universally, and rules qualify as universally acceptable

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only when no rational agent can reject them. The roots of morality, then, are principles of reason that all rational agents possess in common. Kant sought to show, in his terminology, that pure reason is practical- that reason unaided can be and should be a motive to will. Kant seems to have thought, as have many philosophers since Plato, that reason can be in conflict with desire. When this occurs, reason can resist and subject desire to its control (whether a person wants to follow reason or not), which conclusively shows that individuals are not simply at the mercy of a clash of desires, Kant saw us as creatures with the power to resist desire, with the freedom to do so, and with the capacity to determine our lives solely by rational considerations, and this is what we must do if we are to act ethically. Practical reason, then, is the capacity to act from reason, and Kant tried to establish the ultimate basis for validity of moral rules of obligation in pure reason, not in intuition, conscience or utility. Immanuel Kant Immanuel Kant (April 1724 12 February 1804) was a German philosopher from Knigsberg, writing Prussia (today Kaliningradof Russia), researching, and at the end lecturing and of the 18th

on philosophy and anthropology during

Century Enlightenment. At the time, there were major successes and advances in physical science (for example, Isaac Newton, Robert Boyle) using reason and logic. But this stood in sharp contrast to the skepticism and lack of agreement or progress in empiricist philosophy. Kants magnum opus, the Critique of Pure Reason, aimed to unite reason with experience to move beyond what he took to be failures of traditional philosophy and metaphysics. He hoped to end an age of speculation where objects outside

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experience were used to support what he saw as futile theories, while opposing the skepticism and idealism of thinkers such as Descartes, Berkeley and Hume. He said that it always remains a scandal of philosophy and universal human reason that the existence of things outside us ... should have to be assumed merely on faith, and that if it occurs to anyone to doubt it, we should be unable to answer him with a satisfactory proof. Kant proposed a Copernican Revolution, saying that 'Up to now it has been assumed that all our cognition must conform to the objects; but ...let us once try whether we do not get farther with the problems of metaphysics by assuming that the objects must conform to our cognition'. Kant published other important works on religion, law, aesthetics, astronomy and history. These included the Critique of Practical Reason (Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, 1788), which deals with ethics, and the Critique of Judgment (Kritik der Urteilskraft, 1790), which looks at aesthetics and teleology. He aimed to resolve disputes between empirical and rationalist approaches. The former asserted that all knowledge comes through experience: the latter maintained that reason and innate ideas were prior. Kant argued that experience is purely subjective without first being processed by pure reason. He also said that using reason without applying it to experience will only lead to theoretical illusions. The free and proper exercise of reason by the individual was both a theme of the Enlightenment, and of Kant's approaches to the various problems of philosophy. His ideas influenced many thinkers in Germany during his lifetime. He settled, and moved philosophy beyond, the debate between the rationalists and empiricists. The philosophers Fichte, Schelling, Hegel and Schopenhauer amended and developed the

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Kantian system, thus bringing about various forms of German idealism. He is seen as a major figure in the history and development of philosophy. German and European thinking progressed after his time, and his influence still inspires philosophical work today. The Good Will: The Heart of Kantian Ethics Immanuel Kant's theory of ethics is considered deontological for several different reasons. First, Kant argues that to act in the morally right way, people must act from duty (deon). Second, Kant argued that it was not the consequences of actions that make them right or wrong but the motives of the person who carries out the action. Nothing in the world- indeed nothing even beyond the world- can possibly be conceived which could be called good without qualification except good will. Intelligence, wit, judgment, and the other talents of the mind, however they may be named, or courage, resoluteness, and perseverance as qualities of temperament, are doubtless in many respects good and desirable. But they can become extremely bad and harmful if the will, which is to make use of these gifts of nature and which in its special constitution is called character, is not good. It is the same with the gifts of fortune. Power, riches, honor, even health, general well-being and the contentment with ones condition which is called happiness, make for pride and even arrogance if there is not a good will to correct their influence on the mind and on its principles of action so as to make it universally conformable to its end. Some qualities seem to be conducive to this good will and can facilitate its action, but, in spite of that, they have no intrinsic unconditional worth. They rather presuppose a good will, which limits the high esteem which one otherwise rightly has for them and prevents their being held to be absolutely

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good. Moderation in emotions and passions, self-control and calm deliberation not only are good in many respects but even seem to constitute a part of the inner worth of the person. But however unconditionally they were esteemed by the ancients, they are far from being good without qualification. For without the principle of a good will they can become extremely bad, and the coolness of a villain makes him not only far more dangerous but also more directly abominable in our eyes that he would have seemed without it (Beauchamp, 1991). Kant's argument that to act in the morally right way, one must act from duty begins with an argument that the highest good must be both good in itself, and good without qualification. Something is 'good in itself' when it is intrinsically good, and 'good without qualification' when the addition of that thing never makes a situation ethically worse. Kant then argues that those things that are usually thought to be good, such as intelligence, perseverance and pleasure, fail to be either intrinsically good or good without qualification. Pleasure, for example, appears to not be good without qualification, because when people take pleasure in watching someone suffering, this seems to make the situation ethically worse. According to Fernandez (2007), Kant claims that what makes an act right/good and wrong/bad does not depend on its results or consequences, since all these are simply beyond ones control, hence a matter of luck or accident. Thus, the consequences of actions are entirely out of our hands. Hence, for him, morality as the sole and exclusive domain of rational beings should be something of which one should have total control. If one is indeed fully accountable of his action and conduct, then chance or luck should be taken out of the equation. This, he believes, can only be

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achieved by appealing to some universal rational ethical principle- an ethical principle that is in the form of a maxim that guides human actions at all times and in all situations. Solomon and Greene (1999) stated as cited by Fernandez (2007), here, the center of Kants ethical philosophy is his primary emphasis on the importance of reason and the unqualified rational nature of moral principles. Such a philosophy is indeed a strict, hardheaded, and uncompromising view of morality. At the outset of Kants brilliant philosophical work, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals published in 1785, he writes: Nothing can be called good without qualification except a good will. A person who has a good will, or rather who acts in good will means doing an act with the right intentions or motives which is in accordance with the right maxims or principles, doing ones duty or obligation for its own sake rather for personal gain or self-interest. In Kant, morality is primarily, if not solely, a matter of motive or intention and not a matter of what one can gain or achieve in acting. If ones motive in doing an act is good and noble, regardless of its consequences or results, then it is good and thus ones conduct is morally praise worthy. One ought to be congratulated for doing the right thing. As far as the ethics of Kant is concerned, that is all that matters. According the Beauchamp (1991), the good will is not good because of what it effects or accomplishes or because of its adequacy to achieve some proposed end; it is good only because of its willing, i.e., it is good of itself. And, regarded for itself, it is to be esteemed incomparably higher than anything which could be brought about by it in favor of any inclination or even of the sum total of all inclinations. Even if it should happen

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that, by a particularly unfortunate fate or by the niggardly provision of a step motherly nature, this will should be wholly lacking in power to accomplish its purpose and if even the greatest effort should not avail it to achieve anything of its end, and if there remained only the good will (not as a mere wish but as the summoning of all the means in our power), it would sparkle like a jewel in its own right, as something that had its full worth in itself. Usefulness or fruitlessness can neither diminish nor augment this worth. Key Principles of Kantian Ethics 1. Obligation and Not Inclination As cited by Fernandez (2007), the only act that is worthy to be called moral is an act that is done not out of inclination but one that is done out of duty. Doing ones duty is doing something that one is not inclined or willing to do, but that he or she does it because he or she recognizes that he or she ought to do it (Popkin and Stroll, 1993). There is an obligation that exists and he or she must fulfill it. For Kant, to be a good person is to act from a sense of duty alone. Persons should be motivated by a sense of moral obligation and not by any other reasons. Only then one can truly say that he or she is acting morally and deserves to be called a moral person. 2. Pleasure is Subordinate to Duty Kant believes that happiness has nothing to do with making an act good. According to Wall (2003) as cited by Fernandez (2007), if being a good person, according to Kant, requires us to do what is right out from a sense of duty or moral obligation, our duties cannot simply promote pleasure and the avoidance of pain as the utilitarians claim, since that would make right actions depend upon its consequences, on how well they satisfy our desires. And if the consequences of our actions are the

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ones that give them moral worth, then morality becomes contingent to something outside itself. In that case, morality would become not an end in itself but just a means to an end that would leave us without a stable and firm foundation. 3. Categorical Imperative The Universality Principle Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law. According to this formulation, the essence of morality lies in acting on the basis of an impersonal principle that is valid for every person, including oneself (Falikowski, 2004). Maxims that cannot be universalized or applied to all without exception on a consistent basis are immoral. The Principle of Ends (Respect for Persons) So act so as to treat humanity whether in your own person or that of any other always as an end and never as a means only. The other formulation of the categorical imperative concerns for the dignity of persons. Oftentimes it is referred to as Principle of Ends or Principle of Humanity. For Kant every human being has a supreme worth and profound dignity due to the fact the he is a rational agent. This means that because of the ability to think one is able to decide what particular goals to pursue and generally what one wants to do with his life. Ones essential dignity therefore mainly lies on the persons capacity to determine his own destiny or end as a self-directed and conscious being. Hence, as a self-conscious and self-determining creature, the person as an end can never be subjected to any form of manipulation and

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exploitation as if he is just any other object that can be used to serve some other ends rather than as an end in himself. C. PRIMA FACIE DUTIES Historical Origin Kant argued that universalizing moral maxims requires that they be absolutely binding in all circumstances. If it is wrong to lie, then, according to him, it is always wrong to lie, no matter what the circumstances. He also believed that because morality is based on reason, there could never be conflict between moral duties. Moral philosophers, while agreeing with Kant that moral duties or maxims are universal, disagree that they are also absolute. Moral duties are prima facie rather than absolute. Prima facie duties that may on occasion be overridden by stronger moral claims (Boss, 1999). Moral philosophers have with increasing frequency come to regard all obligations and rights not as absolute standards but as strong moral demands that may be validly overridden when they compete with other principles. Pluralistic deontologists affirm more than one basic rule or principle. The most widely discussed pluralistic theory is that of W.D Ross, who begins where he sees Kants system failing. Ross objects to Kants absolutism, that is, the idea that moral rules are categorical imperatives admitting of no exceptions. Morality is full of categorical moral rules for Kant. It follows from his theory that we should never infringe on them, even if we have what seems to be a good moral reason to act otherwise- as when we need to lie to protect someone in danger. Kant has brilliant ideas about building a moral system. But what happens, Ross asks, if we try to implement these ideas by thinking through a moral decision in a particular

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situation? The overarching problem is how to handle conflicting obligations that give incompatible directives, both of which cannot be fulfilled. For example, I have promised to take my children on a long anticipated trip, but now find that if I do so, as promised, I cannot assist my sick mother in the hospital, who desperately needs me to help her make decisions with her doctor. Sometimes, the conflict arises from a single moral rule rather than from two different rules in conflict, as, for example, when one has made two promises. Suppose I long ago promised my children that I would take them on the trip, but also long ago promised my mother that I would always assist her in making crucial decisions with her doctor. The philosophical problem here is how I can resolve these conflicts: to what form of judgment, overarching rule or part of a theory can I appeal? Ross thinks that Kant, because he makes all the rules absolute, makes an answer impossible, because we are required to do the impossible. Kant, in fact, admits as much, because he says a pure principle cannot resolve moral problems in particular circumstances. I cannot both take my children on a trip and help my mother in the hospital at the same time; yet Kant seems to require me to do both. Ross sets out to resolve this problem, but finds that to do so he has to surmount Kants absolutistic framework. In his writings, Ross contends that there are several basic and irreducible moral principles that express prima facie obligations. Our promises create obligations of fidelity, wrongful actions create obligations of reparation and the generous gifts of our friends create obligations of gratitude.Ross defend several additional obligations as well, including obligations to self-improvement, nonmaleficence, beneficence, and justice. According to Ross, we intuit our general obligations; but we do not intuit what is right in a particular situation, because there reasoning is required. He argues that we

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must find the greatest obligation in any circumstance by finding the greatest balance of right over wrong in that circumstance (Beauchamp, 1991). Sir William David Ross Sir (William) David Ross KBE (15 April 1877 5 May 1971) was

a Scottish philosopher, known for work in ethics. His best known work is The Right and the Good (1930), and he is perhaps best in known response for developing Moore's

a pluralist, deontological form

of intuitionist ethics

to G.E.

intuitionism. However, Ross also critically edited and translated a number of Aristotle's works, and wrote on Greek philosophy. William David Ross was born in Thurso, Caithness in the north of Scotland. He spent most of his first six years as a child in southern India. He was educated at the Royal High School, Edinburgh and the University of Edinburgh. In 1895, he gained a first class MA degree in classics. He completed his studies at Balliol College, Oxford and gained a lectureship at Oriel College in 1900, followed by a fellowship in 1902. Ross joined the army in 1915. During World War I he worked in the Ministry of munitions and was a major on the special list. He received the Order of the British Empire in 1918 in recognition of his service during the war, and was knighted in 1938.[1] Ross was White's Professor of Moral Philosophy (19231928), Provost of Oriel College, Oxford (19291947), Vice-Chancellor of the University of Oxford from 1941 to 1944 and Pro-Vice-Chancellor(19441947). He was president of the Aristotelian Society from 1939 to 1940. Duties are Prima Facie

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According to W.D Ross, moral duties cannot be absolute, because there are particular situations in which they come into conflict. The moral duty of non-maleficence, for example may conflict with the moral duty to keep a promise when keeping that promise may result in death or injury. Because duties are context bound the particular circumstances and possible consequences will affect which moral duties are most important in any given situation. Unlike Kant, Ross also believed that consequences matter when applying moral principles. Moral duties, however, cannot be overridden by non-moral duties or considerations such as obeying the law, financial success, or getting good grades in college. When there is a conflict between moral and non-moral duties, we ought to do what is morally right (Boss, 1999) SEVEN PRIMA FACIE DUTIES 1. Future Looking Duties Beneficence The duty to do good acts to promote happiness Non-maleficence The duty to do no harm and to prevent harm 2. Duties Based on Past Obligations Fidelity Duties arising from past commitments and promises Reparation Duties that stem from past harms to others Gratitude Duties based on past favors and unearned services

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3. Ongoing Duties Self-improvement The duty to improve our knowledge and virtue Justice The duty to give each person equal consideration Applying the Prima Facie Duties How do we use this approach when faced with a situation of moral choice? In the simplest cases, if we have had a decent moral upbringing, we can simply see what moral rule is relevant and apply it. If you are carrying a heavy load into a building and a passerby holds the door open for you, you can see immediately that an expression of gratitude is in order. (You are directly applying the relevant prima facie duty where it is applicable and discovering your actual duty in the circumstances.) If you are an able-bodied passer-by not carrying anything yourself and you notice someone trying to carry a heavy load into a building, you might see immediately that you ought to hold the door open for him or her. (You would be directly applying the prima facie duty of beneficence.) A normal ten-year-old may observe a neighbor childs toy and be tempted to add it to her collection, but she sees that doing so, even if she could get away with it, would violate the principle of non- injury (it would in a way harm the neighbor child to make off with her toy), justice (it would improperly distribute benefits), and non-parasitism (it would be doing unto others as she would not want any other to do to her). She can

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perhaps see that these three prima facie duties dictate her not taking the neighbor childs toy. Her actual duty is not to take the toy. Every prima facie duty is general but has exceptions. In the simpler cases, prima facie duties directly guide us to choose our actual or concrete duty, what we should do here and now, in the particular case at hand. When Prima Facie Duties Conflict Suppose you observe an elderly neighbor collapse with what might be a heart attack. You are a block away from the nearest phone from which you could call for help. A childs bike is close at hand and no one but you and the collapsed elderly person is around. One or more duties seem to say "take the bike and go call for help," while others seems to say "taking the bike is wrong." On the "don't take" side are justice and non-injury (it seems unjust to the owner of the bike and an injury to him or her). On the "take" side lies harm-prevention. It is widely known that people die from heart attacks that are not treated quickly. (Note that this seems to be a case of harm-prevention rather than beneficence in the strict sense.) The solution might be to recognize that in this circumstance, harm-prevention takes priority over what on the surface looks like injustice and injury. So the actual duty is probably to take the bike and get help. Besides, it should not be difficult to make up the temporary bike loss to its owner, that is, there might be an actual duty of reparation. The point is that prima facie duties by themselves are often not enough to determine what we should do. We have to see which prima facie duties have priority in the situation we face, and which do not.

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Priority Rules Besides the basic prima facie duties, there are also priority rules that can give us guidance when the basic prima facie duties seem to give conflicting guidance. For example, other things equal, it is more important to avoid injury than to do positive good. In fact, 1) Non-injury normally overrides other prima facie duties. Moreover, 2) Fidelity normally overrides Beneficence. For example, keeping contracts (which falls under Fidelity) normally overrides random acts of kindness. Beneficence, non-injury, harm-prevention, and self-improvement in relation to lasting positive qualities such as knowledge, moral character, and skill often override any conflicting prima facie duty we might think we have to give each other (or ourselves) short-term pleasure or avoid causing each other (or ourselves) short-term pain. Thus, persons cannot be educated or mature without occasional discomfort or the pain that comes with admitting truths we might prefer to deny, yet we gain from such sometimes unpleasant experiences in our ability to cope with difficulty, in moral goodness, and in wisdom. However, according to this view, not only is no prima facie duty is without exception, but also no priority rule is without exception. You just have to see or recognize the exception when it occurs.

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VIRTUE ETHICS

A BRIEF HISTORY OF VIRTUE ETHICS The origin of virtue ethics is generally associated with the ancient Greeks, most notably Plato and Aristotle. When people practice virtue ethics, they do not use universal rules or principles to guide their actions. Since the time of Aristotle (384322BCE), virtues, arte in Greek, have referred to excellences of character (Pence, 2000). For the ancient Greeks, ethics was viewed as a component of politics and the focus was very much on protecting states. Deontic notions had not been conceptualized in ancient Greece, thus ethics was not concerned with moral obligation. Instead, Aristotle was concerned with questions such as What sort of people do we have to be if we are to live the good life? (Armstrong, 2007).

A Brief History : Aristotle Aristotle was born in Stagira, a Greek colony north of Athens. He spent most of his child hood in Macedonia, where his father, Nichomachus, was a court physician and scholar. Unlike his forerunners, Socrates and Plato, Aristotle had fondness for luxury and wealth, owned several slaves, and hobnobbed with the rich and powerful. A true renaissance man, Aristotle was a scientist, philosopher, logician, poet, and psychologist who wrote hundreds of works, including poems, treatises, and books. In Nicomachean Ethics, is one of Aristotles best-known works (Boss, 1999).

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In the book, he argues that the good life--- the life of virtue--- is the most important activity of the human race. In addition, the unique function of humans is reasoning and thus virtue involves living according to reason. VIRTUE ETHICS Aristotle was one of the most influential thinkers on virtue ethics. Virtue ethics deals with questions, such as what sort of person must I be? and what makes an individual a good or virtuous person?, rather than what is right or good to do? virtues are thought of as purposive dispositions and character traits that are developed throughout life (Mappes & DeGrazia, 2001). Virtue ethics emphasizes right being over right action. The sort of people we are constitutes the heart of our moral life. More important than the rules or principles we follow is our character. Virtue ethics, however, is not an alternative to ethical theories that stress right conduct, such as utilitarianism and deontological theories. Rather, virtue ethics and theories of right action complement each other (Boss, 1999). An ethics of virtue turns on an assessment of moral traits that establish a persons moral character. In the theatre, for example, certain traits of actors and actresses may give them a distinct character on stage (i.e., a distinct quality in acting). On some occasions, their performance will be better than others, but this fluctuation will not change their virtue or character as performers and will not alter traits that mark their performances (Beauchamp, 1991). Rather than centering on what is right and wrong, virtue ethics is based on the excellence of ones character and considerations of what sort of person one wants to become (Butts & Rich, 2005).

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The Greek Philosopher Aristotle (384-322 B.C.E.) uses a goal oriented approach and view of the good life to develop a virtue ethics based on the distinctive function of human beings. He assumes that all human beings have a basic function or purpose and that a good person is one who is successful at accomplishing it. The key to living the good life, according to Aristotle, is developing certain virtues, such as practical wisdom, courage, and generosity. Thus, his approach to moral good and bad is often called virtue ethics. Many people would intuitively agree that virtues help people to live well. Thus, the basic ethical insight associated with virtue ethics is that the virtues help persons to achieve well-being or to live the good life. The additional ethical idea that makes Aristotles virtue ethics distinctive is that there is a basic human function and that the virtues help us to accomplish that function (Birsch, 2002). Virtue Ethics, Well-Being and Reasoning Aristotle perceives that the end, goal, or purpose for an action is always something that is good or that appears to be good --- Eudaimonia, translated as happiness which means well-being, or flourishing. Happiness is the usual translation, but is considered misleading because it usually implies pleasure. He rejects the life of pleasure and asserts that the ultimate end is a well-lived life. The well-lived life includes not only pleasure and happiness but also health, longevity, achievement, moral excellence, knowledge, wisdom, among all other qualities. Therefore, the ultimate end and purpose for a human being is what we call well-being. Aristotle supposes human well-being is related to the fundamental or characteristic function of human beings. Just as a good flute player or sculptor is one who

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successfully fulfills the distinctive function of a flute player or sculptor, a good human being is one who fulfills the sole function of a human being only he can do. According to Birsch (2002), human function is connected to the capacity of humans that he thinks no other living thing possesses--- the ability to reason. The ultimate good of human beings is well-being, which is realized through excellence in the function that is characteristic to human beings. That function is reasoning or acting in accordance with a rational principle. Human well-being or a well-lived life will be achieved through excellence in reasoning or successfully acting in accordance with rational principles. To determine if a person had achieved well-being, the persons complete character or life would have to be examined. Aristotle would look for excellence in reasoning displayed in all the aspects of character and life. This excellence is not possible unless an individual possesses the virtues.

The Concept of Virtue The rule of virtue can be compared to the Pole Star which commands the homage of the multitude of Stars without leaving its place. Confucius, The Anaclets, book 4:4 A virtue is an admirable character trait or disposition to habitually act in a manner that benefits ourselves and others (Boss, 1999). It is through the respect and concern for the well-being of others and of themselves that a person becomes virtuous. Virtues are character persona that advocates the goodness and well-being of virtuous persons.

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Intellectual and Moral Virtues Aristotle divided virtues into two broad categories: Intellectual and Moral virtues. The intellectual virtues are cultivated through growth and experience; the moral virtues through habit. There are five intellectual virtues according to Aristotle namely, art (knowledge and skill in arts, that allows a person to create exceptional material things), knowledge (acquiring knowledge that deals with things that are universal, essential, and eternal), practical wisdom (excellence in discernment on the means of accomplishing a good end that is, the ability to make sound judgments), philosophic wisdom (knowledge of the ultimate things) and comprehension (understanding). These intellectual virtues are vital to

excellence in reasoning, and excellence in reasoning is central to well-being. Intellectual virtue is coupled with knowledge and wisdom, but Aristotle claims that moral virtue is related to actions and emotions or passions that accompany them. An excess, a deficit, or an intermediate amount of emotion accompanies action. An overindulgence or an insufficiency in the amount of passion may interfere with acting rationally and choosing the ethical action. The virtuous person feels a temperate quantity of emotion in many situations and decides on the mean concerning actions.

Doctrine of the Mean The moral virtues are related to feeling a moderate amount of emotion and acting based on the mean. Each virtue is a mean between two vices that involve feeling excess and deficit amounts of emotion and acting inappropriately. The mean for each virtue is

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unique for each situation and each person; in other words, the mean is not always the exact average (Butts & Rich, 2005). Moral virtues customarily involve emotions and actions wherein extremes on the both sides of the emotion are wrong. A coward feels too much fear and not enough confidence while the rash person feels too little fear and too much confidence, both are considered unethical or irrational. Courage, the mean of the two vices, involves feeling a temperate amount of fear and confidence; which in turn, advances a person to act in a rational way. Other examples of virtues are temperance, prudence, generosity, honesty, amiability and so on and so forth. But not every action nor every passion constitutes a mean; for some have names that already imply badness, e.g. spite, envy, and in the case of actions adultery, theft, murder; for all of these and suchlike things imply by their names that they are themselves bad, and not excesses or deficiencies of them. Moral virtues are traits of character concerned with choice that involve moderation in action and emotion; this moderation is determined by a rational principle as discovered by a person of practical wisdom. Therefore, the intellectual virtue of practical reason and the moral virtues are closely related. The origin of action is choice, and the source of choice is desire and reasoning connected to achieving some goal or end. Virtuous action depends on practical wisdom guiding our choices and controlling our emotions (Birsch, 2002).

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The Ethical Person Unlike other theories, the ethical standard in virtue ethics will not be a rule or principle that designates ethical actions. Instead, the ethical standard will be an individual who embodies the virtues and does not possess the vices. The ethical standard will be a person who is living the good life. This person can be an actual virtuous individual or a nonexistent ideal person. To obtain well-being, one must strive to acquire the virtues, eliminate the vices, and be like the model or the ideal person. The ethical person possesses intellectual virtues; He or she is wise, knowledgeable, and capable of understanding. Many Greek Philosophers presumed that a wise, knowledgeable and understanding person was living a better life than a foolish and ignorant individual. Knowledge enables persons live better lives because it opens up more opportunities and helps persons make better judgment when it comes to decisions. Practical wisdom, lets the virtuous person to make effective and fulfilling decisions and judgments and to act in appropriate ways. Understanding will enable the virtuous person to judge correctly, which will lead to a better life than that of someone who does so incorrectly. Aside from having the intellectual virtues, an ethical person must also have the moral virtues. The person does not allow excesses and deficiencies of emotion and passion to interfere with reasoning well or to lead to intemperate actions; and does not have the vices.

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Being a good person entails more than mere action. First, people must be aware of what they are doing. This relates to the intellectual virtue, knowledge. Second, they must choose the action because it is virtuous and choose it as an end in itself. This relates to practical wisdom. Third, the action must be the expression of their character and must be accompanied by the proper feeling or emotion. This relates to moral virtue. Good people know what they are doing and choose to feel or do something because it is virtuous. Their actions flow from their character, and their emotions do not interfere with being virtuous. The good person has achieved well-being. Aristotle thought that being a good person and obtaining well-being would only be possible in the presence of certain other factors, such as health, longevity, some degree of material prosperity, and living in a flourishing city. Without these things, we would not really be able to live good lives. Whether there actually are or are not people who fit the description, anyone can strive to become a good person by trying to become more like Aristotles model person. The closer one approximates the good person, the better one is (Birsch, 2005). The ethical person does not need to follow general rules or evaluate individual actions because they have developed a good character and good habits. They act ethically in a spontaneous way, which is a product of character (Birsch, 2002). When virtuous people are faced with complex moral dilemmas, they will choose the right course of action because doing the right thing comes from a developed character. Aristotle believed that in order for moral character to be developed, an individual must make a personal effort through training and routine practice (Butts & Rich, 2005).

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Strengths of Virtue Ethics 1. An Ethical Theory that is Not Simplistic

Unlike other theories that oversimplifies ethics, it is regarded that it is a strength of virtue ethics to be comprehensive and complex in nature. It does not distort ethics by oversimplifying it. Other theories would plainly toss out abstract principles on duties and rights but the complexity of virtue ethics is concerned in a much deeper sense--- the totality of the persons character and his entire life in all its aspects. 2. A Practical Ethical Theory

A person simply needs to find a good person and emulate him or her. It is not unusual that we look up to people we idolize and we strive to be like. These people were regarded as good people because they all lived the good life, such as Jesus Christ, Mother Teresa, Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King Jr., and of course, for the nursing profession, Florence Nightingale. This is a conventional practice and one that is presumably practical. One needs only to study the models life, and try to imitate his or her virtuous character. 3. A Theory Consistent with Human Nature

Being a virtuous person will help an individual accomplish the basic human function successfully. Likewise, it is common to our human nature to think and reason, to strive for excellence and to aim at a good life, which are basically the aims of this theory. 4. A Theory that Goes Beyond Pure Duty and Rights-based Ethics

It is but a challenge to the individual to rise above ordinary moral demands and to work toward creating a society wherein it is easy to be virtuous and live the good life. It centers on the person and what it means to be human and not just on morality that is

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based on actions taken as consequences of duty and obligation. Virtue ethics teaches us to be moral individuals who do not simply follow rules but deliberately choose virtuous acts because it is an end in itself.

Limitations of Virtue Ethics 1. The Incompleteness of Virtue Ethics

According to Boss (1999), virtue ethics has been criticized for its lack of coherence as a bag-of-virtues approach. This criticism is based on a misunderstanding of the nature of virtue itself. Virtue ethicists do not mean virtue to imply a list of unrelated character traits, but rather a unity of character --- a unity that most of us are still striving to grasp and achieve. Aristotles ethical theory of virtue does not name moral guidelines. It has been said that a successful ethical theory must help us solve ethical problems, but contrary, virtue ethics provides only minimal guidelines about what actions should not be performed. Moreover, moral virtues impart no specific principles and rules related to actions either. Virtue ethics provide no objective guidance about the proper amount of feeling when it comes to moral virtues since the mean which one is supposed to deliberately choose, is relative to the individual. There can be no effective moral guidelines for virtue ethics unless a moral person can be identified, studied, and used as a moral model. The problem is that we are uncertain whom to use as our model person. Aristotle had one vision of the moral person; perhaps he would have identified Socrates. A modern philosopher might reject Socrates, however, and name someone else.

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In general, Aristotle has not provided us with ethical guidelines that are adequate to help us solve many moral problems. Therefore, in the light of its inability to completely satisfy the criterion which states that an ethical theory must help us solve problems, virtue ethics fail on this regard and is thereby, not an entirely successful ethical theory. 2. Moral Luck and Partiality

The ability to be a good person should be completely in the control of the moral agent, is a basic assumption many philosophers would certainly claim; and on this matter, virtue ethics is seriously. Aristotles view that an ethical life contains a variety of components, some of which are beyond the moral agents control is one of the questionable elements in his theory. Well-being requires health, a reasonably long life and living in a healthy society. All those mentioned requirements are completely beyond the control of the agent. If the well-being of the individual depends on these factors, then an element of luck enters the moral realm. Another problem with the theory is that it does not consider persons as moral equals. It has been stipulated that reasoning well and being virtuous depend on opportunity and education. People who lack opportunities and who may be poorly educated will not be the moral equals of those who have more opportunities and are well educated, unless they can develop virtuous habits through other means, such as acquiring informal education or imitating ethical persons. It is also believed that a person who suffers from a physical or mental disability is morally inferior to a person without such a condition. People with serious mental defects

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will not have the same opportunities for knowledge and practical wisdom and therefore will be thwarted in achieving well-being. Similarly, people with serious physical disabilities will not be able to achieve the full degree of well-being and therefore are morally inferior than a person who is not physically challenged. 3. The Fundamental Human Function

Early on the discussion, we found out that according to Aristotle, there is the existence of a basic human function because of his assumption that everything has a basic function. The notion that virtue ethics is appropriate because it is congruent with the fundamental human function is debatable because there are no compelling reasons to accept the position that everything has a distinctive function. Even if a person did accept the notion of a basic human function, he or she might not agree with Aristotle that the function was being rational. Aristotle claims that the basic human function must be related to whatever it is that only humans possess, and he thinks that humans alone are rational. Rationality might not be the exclusive possession of human beings (Birsch, 2002). Furthermore, since there is no common ground that leads us to believe that reasoning is a distinctive human function, it is the right of others to reject the idea and propose another such that of the devout Christians who firmly believe that the fundamental human purpose is to love God and other human beings.

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Implication, Application and Conclusion On a personal note, I daresay that virtue ethics is above the other theories when it comes to the fact that when it comes to being good, it goes beyond the act itself but emphasizes that being moral persons by being virtuous is an end in itself. It is by far the best argument of this theory that we do good not because we are bound by duty, rights or obligation but because it is in our character to do so. True enough that virtue ethics is not very helpful on specific and concrete ethical situations, but it redeems itself when it comes to the general notion and wider horizons of our existence, of what should we strive to achieve and become, for us to life the good life. Admittedly, we are aware that there is no single theory that offers neither the complete truth nor the perfect solution to situations involving moral and ethical issues. Nevertheless, we can utilize a number of theories combined to serve as comprehensive tools for analyzing and deciding on ethical dilemmas we face specially in the work arena for nurses, where the greatest issues of ethical problems arise. Furthermore, it is our responsibility as rational beings to apply moral theory to real-life situations, not as specific solutions but as guides to understanding and decision-making.

Watch your thoughts; they become words. Watch your words; they become actions. Watch your actions; they become habits. Watch your habits; they become your character. Watch your character; it becomes your destiny. ~ Frank Outlaw

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DIVINE COMMAND THEORY DEFINITION The name divine command theory can be used to refer to any one of a family of related ethical theories. What these theories have in common is that they take Gods will to be the foundation of ethics. According to divine command theory, things are morally good or bad, or morally obligatory, permissible, or prohibited, solely because of Gods will or commands. Philosophers both past and present have sought to defend theories of ethics that are grounded in a theistic framework. Roughly, Divine Command Theory is the view that morality is somehow dependent upon God, and that moral obligation consists in obedience to Gods commands. Divine Command Theory includes the claim that morality is ultimately based on the commands or character of God, and that the morally right action is the one that God commands or requires. The specific content of these divine commands varies according to the particular religion and the particular views of the individual divine command theorist, but all versions of the theory hold in common the claim that morality and moral obligations ultimately depend on God.

POSSIBLE ADVANTAGES OF DIVINE COMMAND THEORY An apparent advantage of Divine Command Theory is that it provides an objective metaphysical foundation for morality. For those committed to the existence of objective moral truths, such truths seem to fit well within a theistic framework. That is, if the origin of the universe is a personal moral being, then the existence of objective moral truths are at home, so to speak, in the universe. By contrast, if the origin of the

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universe is non-moral, then the existence of such truths becomes philosophically perplexing, because it is unclear how moral properties can come into existence via nonmoral origins. Given the metaphysical insight that ex nihilo, nihilo fit, the resulting claim is that out of the non-moral, nothing moral comes. Objective moral properties stick out due to a lack of naturalness of fit in an entirely naturalistic universe. This perspective assumes that objective moral properties exist. Not only does Divine Command Theory provide a metaphysical basis for morality, but according to many it also gives us a good answer to the question, why be moral? William Lane Craig argues that this is an advantage of a view of ethics that is grounded in God. On theism, we are held accountable for our actions by God. Those who do evil will be punished, and those who live morally upstanding lives will be vindicated and even rewarded. Good, in the end, triumphs over evil. Justice will win out. Moreover, on a theistic view of ethics, we have a reason to act in ways that run counter to our self-interest, because such actions of self-sacrifice have deep significance and merit within a theistic framework. On Divine Command Theory it is therefore rational to sacrifice my own well-being for the well-being of my children, my friends, and even complete strangers, because God approves of and even commands such acts of selfsacrifice. An important objection to the foregoing points is that there is something inadequate about a punishment and reward orientation of moral motivation. That is, one might argue that if the motive for being moral on Divine Command Theory is to merely avoid punishment and perhaps gain eternal bliss, then this is less than ideal as an account of moral motivation, because it is a mark of moral immaturity. Should we not

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instead seek to live moral lives in community with others because we value them and desire their happiness? In response to this, advocates of Divine Command Theory may offer different accounts of moral motivation, agreeing that a moral motivation based solely on reward and punishment is inadequate. For example, perhaps the reason to be moral is that God designed human beings to be constituted in such a way that being moral is a necessary condition for human flourishing. Some might object that this is overly egoistic, but at any rate it seems less objectionable than the motivation to be moral provided by the mere desire to avoid punishment. Augustine (see Kent, 2001) develops a view along these lines. Augustine begins with the notion that ethics is the pursuit of the supreme good, which provides the happiness that all humans seek. He then claims that the way to obtain this happiness is to love the right objects, that is, those that are worthy of our love, in the right way. In order to do this, we must love God, and then we will be able to love our friends, physical objects, and everything else in the right way and in the right amount. On Augustines view, love of God helps us to orient our other loves in the proper way, proportional to their value. However, even if these points in defense of Divine Command Theory are thought to be satisfactory, there is another problem looming for the view that was famously discussed by Plato over two thousand years ago. Another advantage according to Immanuel Kant, who has traditionally not been seen as an advocate of Divine Command Theory, in his Critique of Practical Reason, claims that morality requires faith in God and an afterlife. According to Kant, we must believe that God exists because the requirements of morality are too much for us to bear. We must believe that there is a God who will help us satisfy the demands of the

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moral law. With such a belief, we have the hope that we will be able to live moral lives. Moreover, Kant argues that there is not the slightest ground in the moral law for a necessary connection between the morality and proportionate happiness of a being who belongs to the world as one of its parts and is thus dependent on it. However, if there is a God and an afterlife where the righteous are rewarded with happiness and justice obtains, this problem goes away. That is, being moral does not guarantee happiness, so we must believe in a God who will reward the morally righteous with happiness. Kant does not employ the concept of moral faith as an argument for Divine Command Theory, but a contemporary advocate could argue along Kantian lines that these advantages do accrue to this view of morality.

PERSISTENT PROBLEM: THE EUTHYPHRO DILEMMA The dialogue between Socrates and Euthyphro is nearly omnipresent in philosophical discussions of the relationship between God and ethics. In this dialogue, written by Plato , who was a student of Socrates, Euthyphro and Socrates encounter each other in the kings court. Charges have been brought against Socrates by Miletus, who claims that Socrates is guilty of corrupting the youth of Athens by leading them away from belief in the proper gods. In the course of their conversation, Socrates is surprised to discover that Euthyphro is prosecuting his own father for the murder of a servant. Euthyphros family is upset with him because of this, and they believe that what he is doingprosecuting his own fatheris impious. Euthyphro maintains that his family fails to understand the divine attitude to his action. This then sets the stage for a discussion of the nature of piety between Socrates and Euthyphro. In this discussion,

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Socrates asks Euthyphro the now philosophically famous question that he and any divine command theorist must consider: Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?. For discussion purposes, it will be useful to rephrase Socrates question. Socrates can be understood as asking Does God command this particular action because it is morally right, or is it morally right because God commands it? It is in answering this question that the divine command theorist encounters a difficulty. A defender of Divine Command Theory might respond that an action is morally right because God commands it. However, the implication of this response is that if God commanded that we inflict suffering on others for fun, then doing so would be morally right. We would be obligated to do so, because God commanded it. This is because, on Divine Command Theory, the reason that inflicting such suffering is wrong is that God commands us not to do it. However, if God commanded us to inflict such suffering, doing so would become the morally right thing to do. The problem for this response to Socrates question, then, is that Gods commands and therefore the foundations of morality become arbitrary, which then allows for morally reprehensible actions to become morally obligatory. Most advocates of Divine Command Theory do not want to be stuck with the implication that cruelty could possibly be morally right, nor do they want to accept the implication that the foundations of morality are arbitrary. So, a divine command theorist might avoid this problem of arbitrariness by opting for a different answer to Socrates question, and say that for any particular action that God commands, He commands it because it is morally right. By taking this route, the divine command theorist avoids

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having to accept that inflicting suffering on others for fun could be a morally right action. More generally, he avoids the arbitrariness that plagues any Divine Command Theory which includes the claim that an action is right solely because God commands it. However, two new problems now arise. If God commands a particular action because it is morally right, then ethics no longer depends on God in the way that Divine Command Theorists maintain. God is no longer the author of ethics, but rather a mere recognizer of right and wrong. As such, God no longer serves as the foundation of ethics. Moreover, it now seems that God has become subject to an external moral law, and is no longer sovereign. John Arthur (2005) puts the point this way: If God approves kindness because it is a virtue and hates the Nazis because they were evil, then it seems that God discovers morality rather than inventing it God is no longer sovereign over the entire universe, but rather is subject to a moral law external to himself. The notion that God is subject to an external moral law is also a problem for theists who hold that in the great chain of being, God is at the top. Here, there is a moral law external to and higher than God, and this is a consequence that many divine command theorists would want to reject. Hence, the advocate of a Divine Command Theory of ethics faces a dilemma: morality either rests on arbitrary foundations, or God is not the source of ethics and is subject to an external moral law, both of which allegedly compromise his supreme moral and metaphysical status.

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RESPONSES TO THE EUTHYPHRO DILEMMA A. Bite the Bullet One possible response to the Euthyphro Dilemma is to simply accept that if God does command cruelty, then inflicting it upon others would be morally obligatory. In Super 4 Libros Sententiarum, William of Ockham states that the actions which we call theft and adultery would be obligatory for us if God commanded us to do them. Most people find this to be an unacceptable view of moral obligation, on the grounds that any theory of ethics that leaves open the possibility that such actions are morally praiseworthy is fatally flawed. However, as Robert Adams (1987) points out, a full understanding of Ockhams view here would emphasize that it is a mere logical possibility that God could command adultery or cruelty, and not a real possibility. That is, even if it is logically possible that God could command cruelty, it is not something that God will do, given his character in the actual world. Given this, Ockham himself was surely not prepared to inflict suffering on others if God commanded it. Even with this proviso, however, many reject this type of response to the Euthyphro Dilemma. B. Human Nature Another response to the Euthyphro Dilemma which is intended to avoid the problem of arbitrariness is discussed by Clark and Poortenga (2003), drawing upon the moral theory of Thomas Aquinas. If we conceive of the good life for human beings as consisting in activities and character qualities that fulfill us, then the good life will depend upon our nature, as human beings. Given human nature, some activities and character traits will fulfill us, and some will not. For example, neither drinking gasoline nor lying nor committing adultery will help us to function properly and so be fulfilled, as

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human beings. God created us with a certain nature. Once He has done this, He cannot arbitrarily decide what is good or bad for us, what will help or hinder us from functioning properly. God could have created us differently. That is, it is possible that He could have made us to thrive and be fulfilled by ingesting gasoline, lying, and committing adultery. But, according to Aquinas, He did no such thing. We must live lives marked by a love for God and other people, if we want to be fulfilled as human beings. The defender of this type of response to the Euthyphro Dilemma, to avoid the charge of arbitrariness, should explain why God created us with the nature that we possess, rather than some other nature. What grounded this decision? A satisfactory answer will include the claim that there is something valuable about human beings and the nature that we possess that grounded Gods decision, but it is incumbent upon the proponent of this response to defend this claim. C. Alstons Advice In his Some Suggestions for Divine Command Theorists, William Alston (1990) offers some advice to advocates of Divine Command Theory, which Alston believes will make the view as philosophically strong as it can be. Alston formulates the Euthyphro dilemma as a question regarding which of the two following statements a divine command theorist should accept: 1. We ought to love one another because God commands us to do so. or 2. God commands us to love one another because that is what we ought to do.

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Alstons argument is that if we interpret these statements correctly, a theist can in fact grasp both horns of this putative dilemma. One problem with opting for number 1 in the above dilemma is that it becomes difficult if not impossible to conceive of God as morally good, because if the standards of moral goodness are set by Gods commands, then the claim God is morally good is equivalent to God obeys His own commands. But this trivialization is not what we mean when we assert that God is morally good. Alston argues that a divine command theorist can avoid this problem by conceiving of Gods moral goodness as something distinct from conformity to moral obligations, and so as something distinct from conformity to divine commands. Alston summarizes his argument for this claim as follows: a necessary condition of the truth that S ought to do A is at least the metaphysical possibility that S does not do A. On this view, moral obligations attach to all human beings, even those so saintly as to totally lack any tendency, in the ordinary sense of that term, to do other than what it is morally good to do. And no moral obligations attach to God, assuming, as we are here, that God is essentially perfectly good. Thus divine commands can be constitutive of moral obligations for those beings who have them without it being the case that Gods goodness consists in His obeying His own commands, or, indeed, consists in any relation whatsoever of God to His commands (p. 315). Alston concludes that Divine Command Theory survives the first horn of the dilemma. However, in so doing, perhaps the theory is delivered a fatal blow by the dilemmas second horn. If the divine command theorist holds that God commands us to love our neighbor because it is morally good that we should do so, then moral

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goodness is independent of Gods will and moral facts stand over God, so to speak, insofar as God is now subject to such facts. Hence, God is no longer absolutely sovereign. One response is to say that God is subject to moral principles in the same way that He is subject to logical principles, which nearly all agree does not compromise his sovereignty (See The Omnipotence Objection below). Alston prefers a different option, however, and argues that we can think of God himself as the supreme standard of goodness. God does not consult some independent Platonic realm where the objective principles of goodness exist, but rather God just acts according to his necessarily good character. But is not arbitrariness still present, insofar as it seems that it is arbitrary to take a particular individual as the standard of goodness, without reference to the individuals conformity to general principles of goodness? In response, Alston points out that there must be a stopping point for any explanation. That is, sooner or later, when we are seeking an answer to the question By virtue of what does good supervene on these characteristics? we ultimately reach either a general principle or an individual paradigm. And Alstons view is that it is no more arbitrary to invoke God as the supreme moral standard than it is to invoke some supreme moral principle. That is, the claim that good supervenes on God is no more arbitrary than the claim that it supervenes on some Platonic principle. D. Modified Divine Command Theory Robert Adams (1987) has offered a modified version of the Divine Command Theory, which a defender of the theory can appropriate in response to the Euthyphro Dilemma. Adams argues that a modified divine command theorist wants to saythat an act is wrong if and only if it is contrary to Gods will or commands (assuming God

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loves us). Moreover, Adams claims that the following is a necessary truth: Any action is ethically wrong if and only if it is contrary to the commands of a loving God. On this modification of Divine Command Theory, actions, and perhaps intentions and individuals, possess the property of ethical wrongness, and this property is an objective property. That is, an action such as torturing someone for fun is ethically wrong, irrespective of whether anyone actually believes that it is wrong, and it is wrong because it is contrary to the commands of a loving God. One could agree with this modification of Divine Command Theory, but disagree with the claim that it is a necessary truth that any action is ethically wrong if and only if it is contrary to the commands of a loving God. One might hold that this claim is a contingent truth, that is, that in the actual world, being contrary to the commands of a loving God is what constitutes ethical wrongness, but that there are other possible worlds in which ethical wrongness is not identified with being contrary to the commands of a loving God. It should be pointed out that for the theist who wants to argue from the existence of objective moral properties back to the existence of God, Adams stronger claim, namely, that an action is wrong if and only if it goes against the commands of a loving God, should be taken as a necessary truth, rather than a contingent one. At any rate, whichever option a modified divine command theorist chooses, the modification at issue is aimed at avoiding both horns of the Euthyphro Dilemma. The first horn of the dilemma posed by Socrates to Euthyphro is that if an act is morally right because God commands it, then morality becomes arbitrary. Given this, we could be morally obligated to inflict cruelty upon others. The Modified Divine Command Theory avoids this problem, because morality is not based on the mere commands of God, but

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is rooted in the unchanging omnibenevolent nature of God. Hence, morality is not arbitrary nor would God command cruelty for its own sake, because Gods nature is fixed and unchanging, and to do so would violate it. It is not possible for a loving God to command cruelty for its own sake. The Modified Divine Command Theory is also thought to avoid the second horn of the Euthyphro Dilemma. God is the source of morality, because morality is grounded in the character of God. Moreover, God is not subject to a moral law that exists external to him. On the Modified Divine Command Theory, the moral law is a feature of Gods nature. Given that the moral law exists internal to God, in this sense, God is not subject to an external moral law, but rather is that moral law. God therefore retains his supreme moral and metaphysical status. Morality, for the modified divine command theorist, is ultimately grounded in the perfect nature of God.

MORE OBJECTIONS TO THE DIVINE COMMAND THEORY a. The Omnipotence Objection An implication of the Modified Divine Command Theory is that God would not, and indeed cannot, command cruelty for its own sake. Some would argue that this implication is inconsistent with the belief that God is omnipotent. How could there be anything that an all-powerful being cannot do? In his discussion of the omnipotence of God, Thomas Aquinas responds to this understanding of omnipotence, and argues that it is misguided. Aquinas argues that we must consider the precise meaning of all when we say that God can do all things (First Part, Question 25, Article 3). For Aquinas, to say that God can do all things is to

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say that he can do all things that are possible, and not those that are impossible. For example, God cannot make a round corner, because this is absolutely impossible. Since a round corner is a contradiction in terms, it is better to say that making a round corner cannot be done, rather than God cannot make such a thing. This response, however, is insufficient for the issue at hand, namely, that on a Modified Divine Command Theory, God would not and cannot command cruelty for its own sake. There is no logical contradiction in terms here, as there is in the case of the round corner. Aquinas offers a further response to this sort of challenge to Gods omnipotence. His view is that to sin is to fall short of a perfect action; which is repugnant to omnipotence (Ibid). For Aquinas, there is something about the nature of sin (a category in which commanding cruelty for its own sake would fall) that is contrary to omnipotence. Hence, that God cannot do immoral actions is not a limit on his power, but rather it is entailed by his omnipotence. Aquinas view is that God cannot command cruelty because he is omnipotent. b. The Omnibenevolence Objection On Divine Command Theory, it problematically appears that Gods goodness consists in God doing whatever he wills to do. This problem has been given voice by Leibniz (1951), and has recently been discussed by Quinn (1978), Wierenga (1989), Alston (1989), and Wainright (2005). The problem is this: if what it means for an action to be morally required is that it be commanded by God, then Gods doing what he is obligated to do is equivalent to his doing what he commands himself to do. This, however, is incoherent. While it makes sense to conceive of God as forming an intention to do an action, or judging that it would be good to do an action, the notion that

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he commands himself to do an action is incoherent. Moreover, on Divine Command Theory, God could not be seen as possessing moral virtues, because a moral virtue would be a disposition to do an action that God commands. This is also incoherent. In response, divine command theorists have argued that they can still make sense of Gods goodness, by pointing out that he possesses traits which are good as distinguished from being morally obligatory. For example, God may be disposed to love human beings, treat them with compassion, and deal with them fairly. These dispositions are good, even if they are not grounded in a disposition to obey God. And if we take these dispositions to be essential to Gods nature, that is, if they are possessed by God in every possible world in which God exists, then, as Wierenga (1989) points out, while it is still the case that whatever God does is good, the range of whatever God were to do includes no actions for which God would not be praiseworthy (p. 222). Wainright (2005) explains further that while it is true that the moral obligatoriness of truth telling could not have been Gods reason for commanding it, the claim that God does not have moral reasons for commanding it does not follow. This is because the moral goodness of truth telling is a sufficient reason for God to command it. Once God does command it, truth telling is not only morally good, but it also becomes morally obligatory, on Divine Command Theory. c. The Autonomy Objection The idea that to be morally mature, one must freely decide which moral principles will govern ones life serves as an objection to Divine Command Theory, because on the theory it is not our own wills that govern our moral lives, but the will of God. We are no longer self-legislating beings in the moral realm, but instead followers of a moral law

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imposed on us from the outside. In this sense, autonomy is incompatible with Divine Command Theory, insofar as on the theory we do not impose the moral law upon ourselves. However, Adams (1999) argues that Divine Command Theory and moral responsibility are compatible, because we are responsible for obeying or not obeying Gods commands, correctly understanding and applying them, and adopting a selfcritical stance with respect to what God has commanded us to do. Given this, we are autonomous because we must rely on our own independent judgments about Gods goodness and what moral laws are in consistent with Gods commands. Additionally, it seems that a divine command theorist can still say that we impose the moral law on ourselves by our agreeing to subject ourselves to it once we come to understand it, even if it ultimately is grounded in Gods commands. d. The Pluralism Objection The last objection to note is that given the variety and number of religions in the world, how does the divine command theorist know which (putatively) divine commands to follow? The religions of the world often give conflicting accounts of the nature and content of the commands of God. Moreover, even if such a person believes that his religion is correct, there remains a plurality of understandings within religious traditions with respect to what God commands us to do. In response, some of the issues raised above regarding autonomy are relevant. A divine command theorist must decide for herself, based on the available evidence, which understanding of the divine to adopt and which understanding of divine commands within his particular tradition he finds to be the most compelling. This is similar to the activity and deliberation of a secular moralist who must also decide for herself, among a plurality of moral traditions and

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interpretations within those traditions, which moral principles to adopt and allow to govern his life. This takes us into another problem for divine command theory, namely, that it is only those who follow the correct religion, and the correct interpretation of that religion, that are moral, which seems highly problematic. However, Divine Command Theory is consistent with the belief that numerous religions contain moral truth, and that we can come to know our moral obligations apart from revelation, tradition, and religious practice. For example, a divine command theorist could grant that a philosophical naturalist may come to see that beneficence is intrinsically good through a rational insight into the necessary character of reality (see Austin, 2003). It is consistent with Divine Command Theory that we can come to see our obligations in this and many other ways, and not merely through a religious text, religious experience, or religious tradition.

CONCLUSION: RELIGION, MORALITY, AND THE GOOD LIFE In his A Just Society (2004), Michael Boylan argues that we must engage in selfanalysis for the purpose of both constructing and implementing a personal plan of life that is coherent, comprehensive, and good. In this activity, we must recognize that there are many types of values by which we live, including but not limited to religious, ethical, and aesthetic values. Of particular interest in this context is Boylans discussion of Gods command to Abraham to kill Isaac. Here we have a conflict between the religious and the ethical. Boylan notes that in the story, Abraham does not kill Isaac, but if he had his community must judge him to be a murderer. The reason for this is that Abrahams community does not know whether the command to kill Isaac was a legitimate divine

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command, or some delusion of Abrahams. So, this community must depend upon the ethical prohibition against murder when evaluating Abrahams actions. Boylans position contrasts with Kierkegaards, who is generally interpreted as believing that Abrahams action is justified by a suspension of the ethical, so that in this case the religious trumps the ethical. However, in such disputes, Boylan argues that when the commands of religion (or the values of aesthetics) clash with the demands of morality, in a just society morality should win the day.

Regardless of what one makes of this, when evaluating the philosophical merits and drawbacks of Divine Command Theory, one should take a broad perspective and consider the possible connections between the theory and other religious and moral issues, as well as the relevant aesthetic, epistemic, and metaphysical questions, in order to develop a personal plan of life that is coherent, comprehensive, and good.

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ETHIC OF CARE DEFINITION The ethic of care is a distinct theoretical approach developed by feminists in the second half of the twentieth century. It represents an alternative to moral theories such as Kantian ethics and utilitarianism. In contrast to these moral theories, ethic of care centers on personal relations and communal ties. While consequentialist and deontological ethical theories emphasize universal standards and impartiality, ethic of care emphasize the importance of relationships (Held, 2006). INTRODUCTION The ethic of care is a theory widely used by nurses; it is under the broad scope of feminist approach to ethics which originated from the Kohlberg-Gilligan debate. According to Tong (1997), to a greater or lesser degree, all feminist approaches to ethics are filtered through the lens of gender. This means that feminist ethics is specifically focused on evaluating ethically related situations in terms of how these situations affect women. The concept of feminist ethics tends to have a political connotation and addresses the patterns of womens oppression as this oppression is perpetrated by dominant social groups, especially powerful men. Accordingly, Feminist Ethics is an attempt to revise, reformulate, or rethink traditional ethics to the extent it depreciates or devalues women's moral experience. Among others, feminist philosopher Alison Jaggar blames traditional ethics for letting women down in five related ways. First, it shows less concern for women as opposed to men's issues and interests. Second, traditional ethics views as trivial the moral issues that arise in the so-called private world, the realm in which women do housework and

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take care of children, the infirm, and the elderly. Third, it implies that, in general, women are not as morally mature or deep as men. Fourth, traditional ethics overrates culturally masculine traits like independence, autonomy, intellect, will, wariness, hierarchy, domination, culture, transcendence, product, asceticism, war, and death, while it underrates culturally feminine traits like interdependence, community, connection, sharing, emotion, body, trust, absence of hierarchy, nature, immanence, process, joy, peace, and life. Fifth, and finally, it favors male ways of moral reasoning that emphasize rules, rights, universality, and impartiality over female ways of moral reasoning that emphasize relationships, responsibilities, particularity, and partiality (Jaggar, Feminist Ethics, 1992). Moreover, the ethic of care is also distinguished as a critical theory, sometimes referred to as critical social theory, which is a broad term that identifies theories and worldviews that address the domination perpetuated by specific powerful groups of people and the resulting oppression of other specific groups of people. Critical theories are somewhat different from traditional theories because the purpose of critical theories is to promote human emancipation (Bohman, 2005). Specifically, the purpose of using critical theories is to liberate human beings from the circumstances that enslave them. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND In the 1970s and 80s, feminist writers began to question the assumptions behind many of the traditional ethical theories. Carol Gilligans work in moral psychology (A Different Voice, 1982) challenged "justice-based" approaches to moral discussion: "...men tend to embrace an ethic of rights using quasi-legal terminology and impartial principles women tend to affirm an ethic of care that centers on responsiveness in an

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interconnected network of needs, care, and prevention of harm. Taking care of others is the core notion." ETHIC OF CARE VERSUS ETHIC OF JUSTICE An ethic of care is grounded in the moral experiences of women and feminist ethics. One of the founders of the ethic of care was American ethicist and psychologist Carol Gilligan. Gilligan was a student of developmental psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg and developed her moral theory in contrast to her mentor's theory of stages of moral development. This concept of human maturity measures, and is used to assess progress along the following stages: Stage Goal Stage 1: Obedience to authority Pre-conventional Stage 2: Nice behavior in exchange for future favors Stage 3: Live up to others' expectations Conventional Stage 4: Follow rules to maintain social order Stage 5: Adhere to social contract when it is valid PostStage 6: Personal moral system based on abstract conventional principles In citing Gilligan from her book In a Different Voice, she believed that Kohlbergs model must be wrong. Measuring progress by it resulted in boys being found to be more morally mature than girls, and this held for adult men and women as
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well. This was not an objective scale of moral development, Gilligan argued. It displayed a particularly masculine perspective on morality, founded on justice and abstract duties or obligations. She also stated that Kohlberg's founding study consisted of largely male participants. Gilligan offered a different feminist perspective: men and women have tendencies to view morality in different terms with women emphasizing empathy and compassion over the notions of morality that are advantaged by Kohlberg's scale. This ethic of care theory then gradually evolved into an approach to ethics that gained popularity because of the debate about the differences in womens and mens approaches to moral reasoning. An ethic of care emphasizes the importance of traditionally feminine traits such as love, compassion, sympathy, and concern about the well-being of other people. While an ethic of justice is being based on duty, fairness, impartiality, or objective principles similar to the values that were popularized during the Enlightenment era. MEN AND WOMEN THINK DIFFERENTLY To better understand why there is the existence of different conflicting views, it is essential to look onto the difference between men and women. Even before, thinkers had raised questions such as: Are women's feminine traits the product of nature/biology or are they instead the outcome of social conditioning? Are moral virtues as well as gender traits connected with one's affective as well as cognitive capacities, indeed with one's physiology and psychology? It is important to note however, that even before, there are traditional assumptions between male-female differences. Men are stereotyped as rational,

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whereas women as emotional; man is superior and women are inferior. Aristotle even had his view that women have the good ability to obey, thus they are more suited to be followers. However, according to him, women cant formulate original reasons thus they are not suited to become leaders. Kant, on the other hand, regarded women as having no sense of civil personality. Theyre biologically and mentally unsuited to take part in public life. Hence a womans place, rather, is in the home. Nevertheless, Rousseau said that men and women are different and neither is superior. Yet there are differences, according to him, men are made most suited to take part in public affairs; and women are more suited to private and domestic concerns. Naturally, the initial reaction of feminists is to deny such differences altogether. However, recently they acknowledge that there are indeed differences between men and women. Nevertheless, they insist that women are by no means inferior to men. Women, too, are perfectly well suited to take part in public affairs and they know how to exercise command and authority. ACCOUNTS FOR SUCH DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SEXES Undeniably, there is a difference in the socialization of boys and girls in general. Women are socialized more for home; whereas men are socialized more for impersonal cooperation and competition in the public arena. This general structure results to psychological difference: women are more attracted than men to the values of the nuclear family. Psychologists Carol Gilligan and Lawrence Kohlberg (and Freud, much earlier) discovered some evidence that males and females reason differently when confronted with moral problems. Their results are as follows. Female ethical perspectives are more: personal, partial, private natural, feeling, compassionate,

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concrete, as they are more inclined to responsibility, relationship, and solidarity. Whereas, male ethical perspectives are: impersonal, impartial, public, contractual, individual, as they are generally inclined to reason, fairness, rights, and autonomy. MORE ON ETHIC OF CARE In essence, the female (ethic of care) is concerned most of all with the concrete individuals who are affected as well as the importance of negotiation, dialogue, compassion, and maintaining relationships. In contrast, the male (ethic of justice) is most concerned with abstracting from the particular circumstances to universal moral laws, duties, or rights and much less interested in compromising and thinking in terms of the individuals affected. The natural prejudice in how people care more about some people as compared to others is acknowledged in an ethic of care. Also, the role of emotions in moral reasoning and behavior is accepted as being necessary and natural compliment to rational thinking. This point distinguishes an ethic of care from an ethic of justice and duty-based ethics that emphasize the supremacy of reason and minimize the importance of emotion in guiding moral reasoning and the moral nature of ones relationship (Butts & Rich, 2008). The approaches to ethics that we have seen, all assume that ethics should be impartial and that, consequently, any special relationships that one may have with particular individuals such as relatives, friends, or ones employee should be set aside when determining what one ought to do. Some utilitarian, have claimed that a stranger and your parent both are drowning and you could save only one of them, and if saving the stranger would produce more utility than saving your parent, then you would have a

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moral obligation to save the stranger and let your parent drown. Such a conclusion, many people have argued, is perverse and mistaken. In such a situation, the special relationship of love and caring that you have with your parents gives you a special obligation to care for them in a way that overrides obligations that you may have towards the strangers. This view, that we have an obligation to exercise special care toward those particular persons with whom we have valuable close relationships, particularly relationship of dependency, is a key concept in an ethic of care, an approach to ethics that many feminist ethicists have recently advanced. Carol Gilligan says that a morality of care rests on an understanding of relationships as response to another in their terms. According to this care view of ethics, the moral task is not to follow universal and impartial moral principles, but, instead, to attend to and respond to the good of particular concrete person with whom we are in a valuable and close relationship. Thus an ethic of care emphasizes two moral demands: 1. We each exist in a web of relationships and should preserve and nurture those concrete and valuable relationships we have with specific persons. 2. We each should exercise special care for those with whom we are concretely related by attending to their particular needs, values, desires, and concrete well being as seen from their own personal perspective, and by responding positively to these needs, values, desires, and concrete well being, particularly of those who are vulnerable and dependent on our care. It is important not to restrict the notion of concrete relationships between two individuals or to relationships between an individual and a specific group. Many advocates of an ethic of care have noted that an ethic of care should also encompass

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the larger systems of relationships that make up concrete communities. An ethic of care, therefore can be seen as encompassing the kinds of obligations that a so called communitarian ethic advocates. A communitarian ethic is an ethic that sees concrete communities and communal relationships as having a fundamental value that should be preserved and maintained. What is important in a communitarian ethic is not the isolated individual, but the community within which individual discover who they are by seeing themselves as integral parts of a larger community with its traditions, culture, practices and history. The concrete relationships that make up a particular community, then, should be preserved and nurtured just as much as the more interpersonal relationships that sprung up between people. An ethic of care can be based on the claim that the identity of the self who I am is based on the relationships the self has with other selves. It is also important in this context to distinguish different forms of caring: caring after someone, and caring for someone. The kind of caring demanded by an ethic of care is the kind expressed by the phrase caring for someone. ISSUES ON ETHIC OF CARE There are important issues to consider as far as the ethic of care is concerned. One is that not all relationships have value and so not all would generate the duties of care. Relationships in which one person attempts to dominate, oppress, or harm another, relationships that are characterized by hatred, violence disrespect and viciousness, and relationships that are characterized by injustice, exploitation, and harm to others lack the value that an ethic of care requires. An ethic of care does not obligate us to maintain and nurture such relationships. On the other hand, relationships that

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exhibit the virtues of compassion, concern, love, friendship, and loyalty do have the kind of value that an ethic of care requires and an ethic of care implies that such relationships should be maintained and nurtured. Another one is the importance of recognizing the demands of caring are sometimes in conflict with the demands of justice. Consider two examples. Suppose, first, that one of the employees whom a female head nurse supervises is a friend of hers. Suppose that one day she catches her friend stealing medicines from the emergency cart. Should she turn in her friend as hospital policy requires or should she say nothing in order to protect her friend? Or suppose, second, that a female head nurse is supervising several people, one of whom is a close friend of hers. Suppose that she must recommend one of these subordinates for promotion to a particularly desirable position. Should she recommend her friend simply because she is her friend, or should she be impartial and follow company policy by recommending the subordinate who is most qualified even if this means passing over her friend? Clearly, in each of these cases, justice would require that the manager not favor her friend. The demands of an ethic of care would seem to require that the manager favor her friend for the sake of their friendship. How should conflict of this sort be resolved? There is no fixed rule that can resolve all such conflicts. One can imagine situations in which the head nurses obligations of justice toward the hospital would clearly override the obligations she has towards her friend. One can imagine situations in which the head nurses obligations toward her friend override her obligation toward the hospital but although no fixed rule can resolve all conflicts between the demands of

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caring and the requirements of justice, nevertheless, some guidelines can be helpful in resolving such conflicts. Consider that when the head nurse was hired, she voluntarily agreed to accept the position of head nurse along with the duties and privileges that would define her role as a manager. Among the duties she promised to carry out is the duty to protect the resources of the company and to abide by the company policy. The head nurse, therefore, betrays her relationships with the people to whom she made these promises if she now shows favoritism toward her friend in violation of the company policies she voluntarily agreed to uphold. CONCLUSION: CRITICAL EVALUATION OF CARE ETHICS While the ethic of care theory strongly advocates preserving and nurturing those concrete and valuable relationships we have with specific persons, it can painstakingly degenerate into unjust favoritism. Moreover, excess of care can result in self-neglect or burnout. Demands of Ethic of care can lead to burn-out. In demanding to exercise caring for patients, children, parents, siblings, spouses, lovers, friends, and other members of the community, an ethic of care seems to demand that nurses sacrifice their own needs and desires to care for the well-being of others. However, proponents of caring can respond that an adequate view of caring will balance caring for the caregiver with caring for others. Also the delivery of care tends to be more compelling at the level of individual than of institutional morality. This approach may even have possible conflicts with other values, more importantly with utility instead of hiring the most qualified applicant, you might be hiring your useless and incompetent brother-in-law. Conclusion: Constructive Evaluation of Care Ethics

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The advantage of an ethic of care, however, is that it forces us nurses to focus on the moral value of being partial toward those concrete persons with whom we have special and valuable relationships. It reminds us of the importance of responding to such persons, including patients, as particular individuals with characteristics that demand a response to them that we do not extend to others. In these respects, an ethic of care provides an important corrective to the other approaches to ethics that emphasize impartiality and universality. An ethic of care, with its focus on partiality and particularity, is an important reminder of an aspect of morality that cannot be ignored.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY:

BOOK SOURCES Armstrong, A. (2007). Nursing ethics: A virtue-based approach. New York: Palgrave Macmillan Beauchamp, T. (1991). Philosophical Ethics: An Introduction to Moral Philosophy Second Edition. New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc.. Beauchamp, & Childress. (2001). Principles of Biomedical Ethics. 5 th ed. Oxford University Press. Birsch, D. (2002). Ethical Insights: A Brief Introduction Second Edition. New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc. Bosek, Marcia Sue Dewolf and Savage, Teresa A. The Ethical Component of Nursing Education: Integrating Ethics into Clinical Experience. Philadelphia: Lippincott Williams & Wilkins. 2007.. pp. 4-6.

Boss, J. (1999). Analyzing Moral Issues. California: Mayfield Publishing House. Butts, J., & Rich, K. (2005). Nursing ethics. Across the curriculum and into practice. New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc. Butts, J., & Rich, K. (2008). Nursing Ethics Across the Curriculum and Into Practice. 2nd ed. Massachusetts: Jones and Bartlett Publishers, Inc. Fernandez, A. (2007). Bioethics for Contemporary Health Care Professionals. MS Lopez Printing and Publshing. Fry, Sara T. and Johnstone, Megan J. Ethics in Nursing Practice: A Guide to Ethical Decision Making. Singapore: Blackwell Publishing. 2008. pp. 20-2.

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Gilligan, C. (1982). In A Different Voice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Hare, John. 1997. The Moral Gap: Kantian Ethics, Human Limits, and Gods Assistance. New York: Oxford University Press. Held, V. (2006). The Ethics of Care: Personal, Political, Global. Oxford University Press. Jaggar, A. (1992). Feminist Politics and Human Nature. Totowa, NJ.: Allenheld. Kent, Bonnie. Augustines Ethics. 2001. In The Cambridge Companion to Augustine. Edited by Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann. New York: Cambridge University Press: 205-233. Ladd, J. (1965). Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of Justice. MacMillan Publishing Company LaFollante, H. (2007). The Practice of Ethics. Blackwell Publishing. Rostankowski, C. (1985). Ethics Theory and Practice. Prentice Hall, Inc. Mappes, T., & Degrazia, D. (2001). Biomedical Ethics. New York: McGraw Hill, Inc. Murphy, Mark. Divine Command, Divine Will, and Moral Obligation. Faith and Philosophy 15 (1998): 3-27 Nuyen, R. T. 1998. Is Kant a Divine Command Theorist? History of Philosophy Quarterly 15: 441-453. Pence, G. (2000). Classic cases in medical ethics: Accounts of cases that have shaped medical ethics, with philosophical, legal, and historical backgrounds. New York: McGraw-Hill Quinn, Philip L. 1978. Divine Commands and Moral Requirements. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

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Seedhouse, David. Ethics: The Heart of Health Care (3rd ed.). Singapore: John Wiley & Sons. 2009. pp. 19-20. Thompson, Ian E., Melea, Kath M. et al. Nursing Ethics (5th ed.). UK: Churchill Livingston Elsevier. 2006. pp. 336, 350-4. Tong, R. (1997). Feminist approaches to bioethics: Theoretical reflections and practical applications. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Tschudin, Verena. Ethics in Nursing (3rd ed.). China: Elsevier Science Limited. 2003. pp. 45-8 White, J. (2009). Contemporary Moral Problems. Thomson Wadsworth- Thomson Learning. Wood, A. (2008). Kantian Ethics. Cambridge University Press. ONLINE SOURCES http://en.wikipedia.org http://plato.stanford.edu http://www.scribd.com http://www.spiritus-temporis.com http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org http://www.philosophybasics.com Bohman, J. (2005). Critical theory. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.). The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. Retrieved June 29, 2011 from http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2005 Prima Facie. 2011. In Merriam Webster.com. Retrieved June 26, 2011, from http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/prima+facie?show=0&t=1309241386

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CURICCULUM VITAE

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Name: Cenon Francis C. Armada

Birthday: October 5, 1989

Sex: Male

Nationality: Filipino

Religion: Christianity (Roman Catholic)

Home Address: 17 Knight Alley St., Royal Valley Subd., Davao City

Email Address: cenon_armada@yahoo.com.ph

Educational Attainment:

College: Ateneo de Davao University

Secondary: Ateneo de Davao University

Primary: The Good Shepherd College of Science and Technology

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Name: Jhoanna E. de Castro

Birthday: December 9, 1989

Sex: Female

Nationality: Filipino

Religion: Christianity (Roman Catholic)

Home Address: 27 Camellia Avenue, Ladislawa Village,

Buhangin, Davao City

Email Address: jh0anna_0726@yahoo.com

Educational Attainment:

College: Ateneo de Davao University

Secondary: Stella Maris Academy of Davao

Primary: Professor Herman Gmeiner School - Holy Cross of Davao College

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Name: Christine Jude de Guzman

Birthday: January 2, 1990

Sex: Female

Nationality: Filipino

Religion: Christianity (Roman Catholic)

Home Address: 31 Old Airport Road, Sasa, Davao City

Email Address: christine_jude25@yahoo.com

Educational Attainment:

College: Ateneo de Davao University

Secondary: Assumption College of Davao

Primary: Assumption College of Davao

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Name: Krista Anne F. Dormitorio

Birthday: July 12, 1989

Sex: Female

Nationality: Filipino

Religion: Roman Catholic

Home Address: Datu Abeng St. Calinan, Davao City

Email Address: choco_knots2004@yahoo.com

Educational Attainment:

College:

Bachelor of Science in Nursing

Secondary

Holy Cross College of Calinan (2006)

Primary

Holy Cross College of Calinan (2002)

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Name: Joni Sapra Puray

Birthday: August 2, 1989

Age: 21 years old

Civil Status: Single

Religion: Christianity (Roman Catholic in Denomination)

Home Address: Block 17 Lot 16 Rosal Street IWHA Village, Dumoy, Davao City

Contact number: (082) 291-2713

Educational Attainment:

Elementary: Ateneo de Davao University

High School: Ateneo de Davao University

College: Ateneo de Davao University Batch 2010

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