r

Carry on recruiting!
Why the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) dumped the'downturn' in a

'dash for growth'

and other party pieces I

ll

s"tidi ttew
tntrv

4*

Stunned SWP-ers on hearing the news of the TUC's decision nol to calla

,l
i !

general strike..

s)$l

>tTrotwatch

Carry on recruiting!
Why the Socialist Workers Party dumped tl" 'downturn'

tna
'dash for growth'
and other party pieces

Trotwatch

a Carry on recruitingl a The SWP and the'dash for growth, I

a Carry on recruitingl I The SWP and the'dash for growth, I

lntroduction
The text that follows makes no claim to be a complete or definitive study of the Socialist Workers Paty (SWP) and its forerunners. What it is, is a brief examination of some of the key elements that make up the SWP's allegedly 'rwolutionary' anti-capitalist politics and that inform its practice. The bulk

of our

argument concentrates on the party's analysis

of the 'labour

Researched and written byTrolwatch Jointly published by AK press andTrolwatch Printed by Clydeside Press First Edition October 1993

tsBN 1 873176 02 3 British Library cataloguing in publication Data

Catalogue listing available from the British Library
Correspondence to: TW, c/o Box NDF, 72 Radford Road, Hyson Green, Nottingham NG7 SFT
Trade Enquiries to: AK Distribution, 22 Lutton place, Edinburgh EH9 ?pE. phone/fax 1St 667 1507. For a complete catalogue of thousands of books, magazines and pamphlets;on anarchism, feminism, histoiy, philasopy, etc, fiction and non-fiction. from fanzines to graohic novels. send a LARGE SAE to
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movement' and on its understanding of the supposedly 'indispensable role' that 'The Pa4y' must perform for the proletariat in its struggles against capital and its u'orks. It begins by arguing that the SWP's abandonment of its 'dounturn' theory at the end of 1992 was part ofa conscious reorientation in the party's marketing strategy, in turn encouraged by a belief that it has now become possible for the SWP to break from the small-time leftist pack. Using as examples the recent struggles over pit closures, and the poll tax (and also the experience of the last Laborrr government in the 1970s) the pamphlet sets out to examine the reality of the SWP's 'critique' of the labour movement and of the bureaucrats that run it. It goes on to question the SWP's understanding of what constitutes a 'genuinely independent' working class movement. In doing so, it uncovers an organisation whose politics and practice negate its rhetorical claim to be 'rwolutionary'. Using as a primary source, the SWP's own writings, the pamphlet documents the miserably qnical behaviour of party apparachiks who are as ruthlessly self-serving. shamelessly opportunistic, recklessly inconsistent, and thoroughly unprincipled as the barons of the 'labour movement' they profess to oppose.

What follows should" we hope. be of interest militants everywhere. Read on... 'without illusions'.

to

revolutionary

Trotwatch
October 1993

Carry on recruitingl

The SWP and the'dash for

Srov*lls )

E:.rt

""

*.r",r,rtf ,o. t-!:"o r!: ="* orrg-iih,.

Gontents
Why the SWP dumped the 'downturn' in a 'dash for growth'
The struggle for hegemony How come the SWP has been able to grow?
1

4
7

Why the Socialist Workers Party dumped the 'downturn' in a 'dash for growth'
f the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) had been able to doubte I the size of its membership betbre lunchtime on wednesday october I 2lst 1992 - the day of the first massire weekday demonstration in suppoft of the miners in London - the partv would have been able to halt pit

The SWP, the TUC and the 'rank and file' A few days in October
Labour last time

9 10 19 20 26 29 33 38

The 'winter of discontent': the 'downturn' begins The party goes for growth: "All we have to do is recruit" The polltax: 'non-payment is dead... Long live non-payment' The 'problem' of the poll tax riots: Re-writing the Riot Act What's wrisng with the SWP?
Notes

the closure programme in its tracks and drive the crisis-racked Tory government from office that rery afternoon. At least. that was the view of the long-time leader of the SWp, Tony cliff, who in an inten'iew in ,socialist l.l/orker at the end of January
1993 asked readers to:

44

votc with Michael Heseltine. The government would have

collapsed.

"lmaginc had 15,000 members... and 30,000 supporters: the 21 October miners' demonstration could have been different. Instead ofrnarching round Hyde park, socialists could have taken 40 or 50.000 people to parliament. If that had happened, the Tory Mps uouldn't hare dared

if uc

The prospect is not unrealistic or romantic. The nunrber of socialists organised together is important in determining the outcome of the struggle."l Tony cliffs argument * that John Major's administration had sun'i'ed until the morning of october 22nd, only because the swp hadn't managed to sign up enough new recmits in the critical weeks before the demo tell us quite a lot about the currcnt political state-of-hcalth of the self-proclaimed .smallest mass party in the world'.

The portrayal. of two massive passive demonstrations around central London as evidence of the return of a confident, insurgent working class movemcnt ready and able to topple governments given thc right 'leadership'. would, of course, be unremarkable had it appeared in the pages of rhe Newsline, or any ofa dozen other tiny orthodox Trotskyistjournals. The interesting thing about cliffs statement is not so much that it,s

a Carry on recruitingl J

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The SWP and the'dash for

growth'l

lifted from the Alice in Wonderland school of 'marxist' analysis, but that it should come from the leader of a Trotsky-ish part-v. which has - for over a decade now - argued that rve are living in a 'political downturn': a time when low levels of confidence and consciousngss have spread a sense of pessimism throughout thc working class moveinent, critically undermining our class's ability to struggle cffectively. The belicf in the 'downtum' had dictated the politics and practice of the SWP ever since its adoption: it had been the very hallmark of the
group.

The theory had been conjured up, as the new Thatcher golernment took office. in the hope that it would prevent any real discussion of what had happened to so many of thc other theories the party had bcen promoting at
the time.

seems". In fact, in contrast rvith previous U-turns in party policy, thc enforcement of the 'new mood' secms to have met little serious resistance, even from those party apparachiks unconvinced by Cliffs rhetoric. Unless a breakaway gloup sets up a rival 'real-SWP' franchise to challenge the nerv Clifforthodoxy. the real scale of lhe schism may never be known. The dissidents - some of whom remain as officials within the partv's bureaucrary" - seem to have accepted 'disciplining'. It rvas the part)"s autumn Conference internal document The SWP and the Crisis of British Capitalivn. nidely reported in the left press, that first madc clcar the extent of the or,'crhaul the party cadre was to be
subjccted to:

The emergence of the 'dorvnturn' seemed to 'explain' why the parb-'s predictions - specifically aboul its own prospects for growth; and about the political impact of the 1974-9 Labour go\rnment on industrial struggle - had been so wildly inaccurate. or rather 'superseded by events'The partl'clung to the thcory throughout the cighties' unmoved by
inner-cit1 riots, a lear long miners' strike" or any other outbreaks of class warfare. Norv. suddenly, in thc autumn af 1992. that 'downturn' was declared over. and was immediately replaced by a dramatic 'upturn' dubbcd'the ncu mood'. The adoption of the 'dounturn' theory in the late 1970s predicated
a series of splits, expulsions and major ructions throughout the leadership of

"The Party... must change radically if i1 is to take advantage of the prcsent opportunities. "4 "Only a minority of the part_y is responsible for the successes of the past few wecks recruiting" selling mme papers etc. Many of this minorig are very rccent recruits to the parfy. Many more experienced comrades. scarred by the 1980s.

dominate

the branch meetings, wherc they act as

consen'ative block to shifting the partl'."5 This was quite something, coming from a party leadership responsible for so much of that 'scarring' in the first place. It was they who had enforced the new 'downturn'-ism which had 'damaged' so many of the previously optimistic cadre. in the first place. Now that cadre, rvhose enthusiasm had been smothered by the dictates of the Central Committee, were being attacked by that same leadership for not cheering up fast enough. It can be a tough place, Left-land. Cliffand his cohorts warned the cheerless that:

the SWP.

ofthe group's apparatus since the tough 'Leninisation'of thc Partl'following the momentous events of 1968-9. Clearly, the 'nerv optimism' uasn't immedialely and universally It
rvas the biggest shake-up

accepted in the higher echelons of the party. any morc than the 'downturn' had been before it. But the scale of the inner-party revolt is still unclear. A clutch of long standing cadre were expelled:. Phil Taylor and

"a mood of

theories... [was leading

pessimism... justified by half-thought out to] abstentionist political practice

Maureen Watson from Glasgow SWP, u'ere amongst a scattered group of long standing members kickcd out of thc pafty shortly after the November '92 National Conference - in thcir case after offrcials accused them of "bcing a secret faction. In SWP-speak... the equivalent of having impure thoughts."2 According to a rcport in thc used-to-bc 'lcft-wing' Labour ncwspaper T'rihune in early February, Cliff had taken to "denouncing publicly such lcading parry* figurcs as Pat Stack, Mike Gonzalez. and Colin Barkcr"3. Thc papcr wcnt on to suggcst that: "A split is imminent. it

accompanied by abstract pessimism in analysis of the period."6 So, the 'downturn' was history: just what did the 'new optimism' amount to?

The SWP leadership were now claiming that wc had entered a dramatically intensified period of class struggle - tlpified by the massive support for the miners' fight - that had shaken off the glum lethargy that had gripped the working class movement during the Thatcher decade. Now the biggest obstacle to the growth of the revolutionary party

a Cerry on reeruitingl a

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growth' -' The SWP and the'dash for--

was not the lercl of consciousness within the class, but the organisation, politics and practice of the revolutionary panl* itself. Hence, in the 'interests of the class', there was a clcar need to rewrite the Manifesto, ftlrther disenfranchise the membership, puge sections ofthe cadre, and intimidate and discredit 'secret' factions. 11 seems Mr Cliff had decidcd that Mr Kinnock had known a ferv things about hou'to run a political party after all. Cliffs opponents within the Part]'faced a difficult task in defending themseh,es against this offensive, not least because of the seriousness of the chargcs levcllcd against then: Because on!1" thd sma!! size of the SWP allowed the Tories to cling to power, and only the backwardness of some of the SWP's ou'n cadre had prevented the SWP's growth to the point of critical mass. it was, Cliff reasoned. actually the fault of SWP dissidents that the Tories have sun'ived this long. Gerry Healy would have been proud of such
rt ^-: ^r IUBTL

militants out of Rathcr than mass disillusionment driving Labour ---l ranks of thc Bolshcvik left. the traffic uas heavilY in thc Party and into thc the othcr direction. Signihcant nrunbers of lefl activists concluded from lhe experience of the Social Contract thal the problem with Labourisrn. $'as not ils capilalist politics, bul thc intcrnal functioning of its elcctoral machinc the fact that the 'left' base of thc Labour Party. lvas constantll' 'let down' by a 'right'leadership. Many lcl1ists .ittinetl thc Labour Party dclermined to rcform and 'democratise' the party's functioning, to prevent - as thel' saw it -' futurc
'betrayals' by an unreprcsentativc Parliamentary Pafi- and Cabinet.

course the discovery of the 'upturn' rvas like the discovery of the 'downturn' before it. based not on any analysis of thc complex realities of the c/a.s.s struggle, but on an understanding of thc changing needs of /&e party apparafr.s at different turning points in its history. For the 'downtum' theory to hold any credibilir-v- at the end of the 70s, the Party sirnply had to ignore any class struggle realities that didnt fit with the new orthodorl. The new 'upturn" was dealt vrith in exactly the same wav. For the SWP's spin-doctors, reality is a flexible commodity, to be moulded until it fits the needs of the parfl.o

Of

barons through thc rvay the pay squcezc had operatcd. the ccntre and right of the Pafi found itsclf losing ground to a rcgalvanised left-uing. that was able to 'x'in' significant organisational lictories. Their initial 'successcs'

Thc right of thc Labour Par!' werc badly disoricntated by thc failure of thc Contract and the pa1'. pglicv. It scemed to signal the end of thc post-War corporatist scttlcmcnl on u'hich thc wholc politics of Brilish Labourism had beCn based sincc 1945. Unablc to offcr an altcrnative ncw 'big idea' to takc its placc. and haring alicnatcd manr ol thc kcl rrnion

provcd a powcrful polc of attraction on thc left. Thc SWP dcvclopcd a ncw theory to cxplain the emergcnce of this recnritmcnt rir,'al. It didn't really fit nith any of ils other thcorics about the rclationship betu,ccn Labourisnt and class confidencc. but by nor+' few in the partl' sccmed in a mood to arguc. Thc theorr ivent as follou's: faccd by tlrc realities of an cconomic dorvnturn, many ntilitants $'crc looking to struggles arvay from thc rvorkplacc on which to focns. and rvere in thc proccss able to gcneralc an illusorv political upturn insidc thc Labour Parf.v-.

The struggle for hegemony

T h" timing of the party's 'dash for growth' has been influenced by its I assessment of the current weakness of its major opponents on the left,
and of thc opportunities this realignment in the balance of forces has opcned up for the SWP. During the depths of the 'donnfurn' in the early to mid+ighties, the party was eclipsed by the resurgence of the left within the Labour Party, particularly by the ernergence of the Bennite left. According to its own

"Wc havc thc paradox that a lowerirzg of rvorking class confidcncc and self-activit-v is producing a certain politicisation from rvirich the Labour Partl' benefits. People have to have some hope and thc very lack of self-conftdence
tends lo ovcrcornc somc of 1he profound cynicism towards the Labour Part-v produccd b,v the Wilson-Callaghan govcrnment
bctr,\'cen 1974 and 1979"7
.

theory of the 'radicalising experience' rvorkers rvould undergo seeing a Labour government at work, the IS/SWP should have thrived in t}te months
immediately following the 'class betrayals' of the Callaghan administration. In fact it lost outbadlv.

Thc thcory'$as tortuous and incohcrcnt, but thc SWP was right about one thing: thc Labour lcfl's 'succcsses' u,ere cntirel-v illgson. cvcn bv their olw ,miserablc rcformist standards. rvhilc thcy *'crc winning thc chairpersonship of important inncr-par5y sgb-corunittees. itt thc rcal rvorld the u'orkiug class wcre coming under a rclentless scrics of attacks as the ncw Thatclterite

a Carry on recruitingl a The SWp and the'dash for growth'a

governmenl went on the offsnsive. As Kinnock replaced Foot as Labour leader, ;rnd launched his own onslaught on 'extremism' in the party, follouing Labour's crushing defeat in the 1983 election, the ficticious ilature of the left's 'strength' became embarrasingly apparent. Within a few short years that 'lefl' had been all but routed - its taffered remnants deeply divided, and bercft of any sort of strategy with which to regain lost ground. Later in the 80s. the SWP lost out to another expression of 'Labour radicalism': the grand 'municipal socialist' experiment: as Livingstone,s

lt

C"rry on ,."ruitngl

t tn. SWp "ra th"'au"h frry:yf

grow?

How come the SWP has been able to

he SWP has norv probably overtakcn Militant to become the biggest 'far-lcft' organisation in the UK. Thcre arc a numbcr of reasons that help to explain how thc SWP has bccn able to can'c oul such a
dominant position.

grant-rich GLC, Derek Hatton's Liverpool fiefdom, and the 'socialist republics' of South Yorkshire and elsewhere sucked militants into the apparatus ofthe Labour Party. The sorry history of the those councils' 'resistance' to central
gor,mment's attacks on the social uage, during the rate capping and cuts battles. has left lillle in the way of a glorious legacy. That, combined with the inevitable rightward flight of so many of the kcy 'left-wing firebrand' leaders of that era (including Blunken, Hatton and Livingstone) has meant * that for the time being at least 'municipal socialist' strategies have little currcncy on the lcft. Many of the SWP's earlier rivals hdte gone the way of all flesh too.

SWP part-v bosses har,'e a clcar grasp of thc importance of marketing - and of luning, their product to u,hat thev hopc the punters might $ant to bu1'. As an earlicr critiquc of the partv succinctll put it: "The SWP hopes to maintain its student recruitment b_v- establishing itself as the most.. . rcsolute advocate ofrvhatevcr is popular".l0 And at the polytechnic, and on the picket line, the SWP's populist

of anti-Tory anger and simple economistic reformist 'class politics' will usuallv suppll the local branch a stream of nerv recn-rits particularly if the parf_v*'s PR managers spot u'hen il's time to abandon one bandwagon and sct offin pursuit of thc ncxt.
packaging
On the 'theoretical' Ievel. many of the key'political positions the 'IS-

The winding up

of the Communist

Party, and the collapsc (or'

fragmcntation) of other sizeable opponents from the 1970s - such as the Workers Revolutionary Party (WRP) or the International Marxist Group (IMG) - has helped to clcar much ground. Assessing its prospects, the party
obserr,ed:

tradition' has adopted sincc the 1950s have enabled it both to differentiate itself from many of its rivals. and dump nruch of the orthodox Trotskyite
baggage that has weighcd down so many

ofits opponcnts.
-

"We hav one advantage which we did not have in the early 1970s: the gradual disintcgration of the old Broad Lefts, the crisis of Stalinism and the reduction of the British Communist Parb- to ajoke organisation"s.

The earliest incarnation of the SWP. thc Sqcialist Review Group (SBG)u'as a tinl' organisation. cornprised of uround-5d-f,ilfGlll6J an life as a faction within 'the Club'. an cntryist Trotslqite group, opcrating n,ithin ' the Labour Partv in the late 1940s under the leadership of one Gerry.Healy.

Thc SWP's only serious mainstream rilal in the labour milieu still in business I'ith significant numbers, profile. rnoney and influence the Militant Tendency is clearly moving politically in the SWp's directions. lt's certain, that as part of its strugglc to assert political - if not organisational hcgemony ovcr the 'far left'" the SWP will begin to pile the pressure on Militant in the years running up to thc next election. seeking to poach its

mcmbcrs, and push it closer still.o

Three of the four main strands of British trotskrism - the IS/SWP tradition: the HcaMte SLL/WRP tradition; and the RSl/h{ilitant tradition havc their roots back in 'thc Club'11. The SRG parted companv from 'the Club'in 1950 after its leader, Tony Cliff. endorsed a'state capitalist' analysis of the Stalinist rcgimes olEastcrn Europe12. The 'heresy' of state capitalism, was not der,eloped by the Socialisl Rer,ierv Group, but its adoption bv Clifl and his supporters clcarlv helpcd mark thcm out from thc bulk of the Trotslq"ite camp, and * becausc it freed them from the obligation to 'critically dcfend' the Eastcrn Europcan rcgimcs - enablcd them to appear Icss implicatcd by the crimes of 'alrcady existing socialism'13. Secondly, while the rest of the British Trotskyite movement clung tenaciously 1o thc very lettcr of Trotslq,'s 'l'ransitional Progranunel4, forever' prcdicting the imminent final economic crisis of capitalism, the SWP de-

a Carry on recruitingl a The SWP and the'dash for growth'I

veloped

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The SWP and the'dash for

growth'I

counter-analysis

that avoided the pit-falls

of

orthodor

'catastrophism'. Clin and party co-theorist Kidron, dweloped the theory of the 'permanent arms econoruy' which sought to explain the late arrival of the post-War global economic crisis Trotslq' had predicted. This theory offered a 'marxist' explanation for the post-War boom, and again clearly separated the party from the crisis-obsessed Trotslg'ite morass1s. Thirdly. the party's decision that it would not battle for the British franchise of any of thc rival Fourth lnternationals. mcant it al'oided an entire history of crisis. split and implosion that for decades pre-occupied so many other outfits in Britain and around the world, destroying some and pushing others in unsellable political directionslo.

The SWP, the TUC and the 'rank and file'

he SWP claims that its supports a 'genuinely independent' working - one that is outside the control of either wing of the labour bureaucrary - but the reality of both the party's analysis and
class movemenl

practice tells a very diff'erent story

In fact the party has nearly as many conflicting positions on the failing in its 'duty to lead'. Other times the party argues that that bureaucracy has different interests to our own, and so can only fail to lead us. Sometimes the party urges workers to 'go beyond' the official union structures to run their orrn stmggles. Other times the party is certain that only loyalty to the TUC can
deliver victory.
trade union question as it does on the Labour Party. Sometimes the SWP attacks the bureaucracy for

Thc IS tradition thus avoided debilitating debates over, for

example, the 'revolutionary potential' of guerilla-ism, of Castro-ism, or of the Stalinist ruling parties of Eastern Europe. The IS tradition has had more than its fair sharc of splits. but has at lcast bcen ablc to contain them within one country, and none have seriously threatened the sun'ival of the parent
body.

Much of the SWP 'success' as a Trotpky-ish party is thcrcfore based on the distance that it has struck between itself and orthodox Trotskvi.vrz. Of equal lmportance to the party's astute relisionism is the practical position the SWP has chosen to adopt in relation to the official labour movement. From its earliest days, the SWP/IS has managed to combine a theoretical critique of the Labour Partl' and trade union officialdom, and an assertion of the need for complete political independence from it, with actual allegiance to bolh wings of the bureaucracl at every crunch point in the class struggle17. This has enabled the party to pose as a 'radical alternative' to the Labourist tradition, while at the same time keeping the putry organisationally and politically close enough to the bureaucracy to recruit from the milieu around it. An examination of the party's coverag of the pit closure battle, and of the last Labour government, exposes the reality of the
SWP's realpolitik.o

Whether 'rank and filism' or 'TUCism' is party flavour of the month depends entirely on what SWP bosses think the recruitment group
theyVe targetted wants to hear.

During the pit closure battle, the SWP faced a conllict of interests between different strands of its new marketing strategy. On the one hand, the logic of the party's 'upturn' optimism demanded the most left-u{ng and radical of the parfy*'s industrial strategies be adopted: militant 'rank and file' trade unionism. After all, if a newly confident workers' movement really ras charging back onto the offensive, then any party that didn't put on its best 'militant front' surely risked being left behind by thc troops it so desperately wanted to lead? But at the same time, because the pa{ leaders who'd dreamt up the new ad-campaign didn't really believe their own press, they feared that an

'overly-militant' brand profile risked isolating the party from the mass ('centrist vaciliation' as it is known by trade competitors) as the SWP struggled to remain both popular and palatable. This conflict of interests
produced an 'analysis'you could strain pasta through.o

recruitment pool they had set their sights on. As a result, the SWP's 'strategy for the miners' flailed about wildly

i t

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A few days in October

here was nothing tentative or cautious about the arrival of the SWP's upturn. It burst firll-blown onto the pages of the Part/s press in late -I r October 1992 without waming - and must have come as as big a shock to the rank and file membership of the party, as it did to its rivals on the left (who set about rubbishing the 'new optimism' with a mixture of incrcdulitr and thinly-disguised jealousy)18. In the early days of the pit closure battle the SWP's enthusiasm was uncontainable. "The government is left isolated and tottering"le, it proclaimed. With all the evangelism of the newly converted, the Party's Review declared that, following the two big miners' demos in London:

next election, or for John Smith to get his act together. This
was a much more accurate assessment than was held by many on the Ieft."22

Including, of course, the one held bv the SWP until about four weeks
previously. But then. as the Review reminded readers: "What a difference a month makes."23

More surprising still was the parly's decision to do-a-y'y'ews/ine, as the sa)'rng goes, and plaster demands for a TUC-led "General strike nou'!" all
over its front pages2a.Many other left outfits became understandably irritated

by the SWP's theft of their one Big Idea: particularly as throughout the
1984-5 Miners' Strike, the SWP refused to.'raise the demand', because, they

"Politics will not be the same again", and added: "The current struggle cannot simply be registered as another peak on the same scale. It represents the beginning of a period when politics will have to be calibrated,on an entirely different scale, judged according

then argued, the realities of class struggle

demand unrealisable2s.

in a 'downturn'

rendered the

to entirely different cri1eria... Of

course there will still be periods of greater and lesser activity, still defeats as well as victories, but they will takc placc at a

higher level of struggle.'2o The momentum of this new mood was almost unstoppable. The parry*'s halfhearted recruitment drile may have temporarily 'let the Tories offthe hook', but Major was still teetering, and the class on the march: "None of the likely outcomes of the current crisis, including the fall of the Tories and the return of a Labour government, are going to meet even the most elementary of [workers']
needs"21.

The party offered little analysis that might explain this switch, beyond the claim that the miners "would be fighting on a far more favourable political terrain than in 1984"26. This, of course, was a selfproving argument: because the party had declared things were now so much better on the class front, then battles would de facto k, fought on 'more favourable terrain'. No actual evidence was offered to support the assertion. The party made no attempt to analyse the strength of working c/ass forces within the huge cross-class 'popular front' against pit closures that briefly emerged in the autumn. The politics of that popular front - while it enjoyed the support of hundreds of thousands of proletarians - remained firmly in the control of tabloid editors, Labour front-benchers and rabid Tory racists like Churchill. In fact, if the miners battle was to be conducted in the same way it was last time, the terrain was going to be much more unfwourable than it

And, of course, having plumped for the 'upturn', the party - like the good scientific Leninists ftey are - had to retrospectively 'predict its arrival', by dumping embarrassing sections of their previous analysis that no longer fit. Bcing thc most conscious scction of thc class. the SWP's central contmittcc
nalurally:

in 1984-5. The material problems thal dogged the fight then, remained: massive coal stocks at power stations and pit heads; a govrnment prepared tG pay whatever-it-takes to wait out a strike; a battery of anti-worker legislation already in place and backed by a paramilitary nationally cowas

ordinated police strike breaking operation; and so on. But new factors had to
be added to the equation.

".., kncw llllrl thc fighl rv:ts conting. thnt thc tt'cll tll'itltgcr
irtt<J

billcrttors ittsiclc tltc rt'orkitt14 clitss rvottltl lt()l wltll lirr llte

The scale of unemployment and the depth of tlte recession have helped drive strike levels across the whole of industry down to a new fifty year low. Winning widespread 'solidarity action' in support of a miners' strike would prove even more difficult than it was nine years ago. Thousands
11

10

a Carry on recruitingl I The SWP and the'dash for growth't

of miners have left the industry since the Great Strike, and many many pits have closed. These days, British Coal * through a combination of bullying and blackmail - ensures there is no shortage of takers for 'voluntary'

'lt

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The SWP and the 'dash for growtl

*r

redundancy deals at pils earmarked for closure. Even many militant miners now believe they are working in an industry without a future.

The openly collaborationist Union of Democratic Mineworkers has in Nottinghamshire, and retains the allegiance of thousands of miners - despite the failures of its whole strategy and the 'betrayals' of the government. Even at the algriest of miners' demonstrations the arguments over the closure programme rarely moved beyond the issues of the 'unfair fixing' of markets; the 'thrcat' of coal imports; the 'foolishness' of mnning down 'Britain's own' coal resen'es. The important players in the battle proved not to be miners'flying pickets but back bench Tory 'rebels'.

flourished

Scargill became an even less 'militant' sounding leader than he rvas a right-uing of the TUC, far more commitlcd to a 'public sympathy' campaign. Yet Scargill came under no significant pressure from even isolated groups of miners, to launch a strile or pit-occupation campaign. There fuere few examples of even localised attempts to break from the NUM strategy. There were sporadic unofficial oneday strikes by small groups of workers in Octobcr, but sadly their emergence was short-lil.ed. The NUM's, and the RMT's, 'one day strike' strategy that followed only served to wear down militanry (as was intended) in a dwindling and drawn-out campaign of 'token stoppages': yet both union leaderships' got away with it
decade ago, much more conciliatory towards the

What rvere thcy up to'l: The 'neu' optimism' and morc militant phrase-mongering were adopted by the SWP for one reason alone: because thcy helped push the party's new and more aggressivc recruitment drive' The 'TUC-Geleral Strike ' line, underpimred by the 'ncw optinism'. managed to sound mllilant and provocative, without risking alienating pro-Labour miners and thcir supporters who might have been 'put olf by a more critical attack on the Labour bureaucracy. Despite all their 'vacillations'. not once during the autunln and winter did the rank and filist revolutionaries of the SWP (who are often dismissed as 'syndicalisl' by therr rivals) suggest that the miners needed 1o brcak from the NUM-TUC-Labour alliance and begin to escalate the stugglc under their direct control. if they werc to stand any chance of victory. And as the partv began drarving in more and more ncw recruil.s in the weeks that followed the closure announcelnent. it becamc ever ntore important not to advoeate anylhing that smaeked of pole nlial 'unpoprrlarity'. If the politics that the SWP claims to believe in comes into conflict with the party's ability to sign up recruil.s. it's time to wavc goodb-ve lo those ' lcss popular' political principles. The inevitable result is that, in times like these, the bigger the party bccomes, the more cautious and conservative its leadership will become with it. and the rnore timid its 'demands' - as the need to maintain stability and grovth takes precedence over the distractions ofpolitics. There was another major problem inherent in the adoption of the 'new optimism' that soon became apparcnt. How to suslain the momentum of an 'upturn' that - as tirne went by - rvas coming into increasing conllict u'ith
an uncoopcrative rcality. Option One was to stick with it regardless of the realitv-problem in thc hope ofbuoying up the menrbership by the sheer fervor of its evangelism - in the sry*le of the unlamented- Socialist LaboutlSa&g.i$Ll-L Option Two slorvty down in-the pages of was ro ler rhe 'upturn' pecter the par1,y's press. This would help lct the membership dorm gently and -mininfze the loss of disillusioned new rccmits whose Rapture had failed to

unchallenged by rank and file defiance. These are the kind of enormous problems that needed to be tackled head-on before the miners in combination with rail, public sector and other workers could even begin to take the action needed to effectively

repel the government's attacks. The puerile TUC-submissive politics propagated by the 'revolutionary' lefl, only served to confuse this situation: by focusing - not on the very real problems facing rank and file workers, or on the real nature of the 'trade union movement' - but on a spurious and irrelevant 'crisis of leadership' at the top of the rotten Labour bureaucracy. The notion that only the hesitanry of Norman Willis stood in the way of an
immediate general strike was as contemptable a piece of leftist ideology as
was absurd.

offiGiEitfl-it

matcrialise.

it

The SWP plumped for Option Two

began the job of retrospectively rcvising n'hat hcady days ofOctober.

l/

but rvith an added twist: it salts it saicl way back in the

The SWP leadership's particular varianl of this nonsense involved catching thc first plane to Fantasy Island: a land where the struggle was all bul won and wherc Willis would lead the storming of thc DTI - g,ivcn a bit
of cncouragcntcnt.

By making no direct referencc to its emphatic October claims. the party has avoided erplaining -rvhat's become of its 'upturn', or of analysing rvhy 'politics looks very much the same agatn'. This process is helped

12

13

a Carry on recruitingl a

The SWP and

the'dash for growth' I

Carry on recruitingl
masses"'

The SWP and the'dash for

growth'l

considerably by the parfy tradition of discouraging the menrbership from developing more than a fortnight's memory.

the SWP advances what it hopes will be more popular views - which il kno.-s are not only wrong' but
disasterously 1\'rong. "2e

At the beginning of the pi1 closurc battle, the SWP had offered what seemed to be a superficially radical critique of the functiori'of the trade
union burcaucracy - (but not. of coursc, of the ultimately anti-working class nature of trade uniomsrr).

$,hich proclaims itself to be the 'rnemory of the class' pretcnds to forget the entire history of thc labour movement:
So the parrv-

then

'Why \yon't union leaders call the action rve need? Why do union leaders and officials makc fiery speeches and sometimes lead strikcs, but then underminc militancy, and scll out
slrikes?", asked one .Sli" centrespread27.
The party's anslver was clear:

"The story of thc TUC's bchaviour sincc the pits crisis crupted in October of last -v-ear u'ould be laughable *ere it not
so tragic...".

In tact. the partv's theorists knou' it is neither ofthese things'

"...ltt the months since October- the TUC's carnpaign has

gone from the sublime to the ridiculous."

"'I'he double sided character of trade union leaders is no accident nor is it due to personal failings. It flows from their position in socicty."
the working class preciselv because of thcir nature. theit position in thc hierarchy of capitalist industrial relations. Worse, union lcadcrs are manipulative and dcltotts too. They cven pretend to bc on our
So leaders
side. the better to crush our resistance later:

But what's 'ridiculous' about thc TUC's attempts 1o smother

Gcneral strike

minsrs'

'fail'

of 1926? or in the Grcat slrikc in l9s4-5'l or at any point in 'ridiculous' to expect thent to do othenvise. But the SWP betrveen? I1's continued to 'criticisc' the TUC for letting the sidc dorvn. "The leaders of the Trade Union Congress are busily
engaged in throwing away the best opportunity that has come

resistance to the closures. When hal'e thev ever acted differently? During the

strugglc there uould be the dangcr thal workers could ignore and bypass union lcadcrs... They call action to bolster their position in negotiations, 1'e1 undcrmine action as soon as it thrcatens to get out of their

"If they never led or callcd

their way in a long tirne." so the TUC uere busy 'throwing away opportunities' to lead us into battle? Presumably. then, it's 'cowardice' and 'rvcakness' that holds them back, rather than 'function'?. The parfy-'s indignant outrage llas as confused as its
analysis:

control. "28.

with ncrv found optimism. u'hat position did the SWP adopt?: A declaration of the need for indcpcndcncc from a burcaucracy n'hich has diffcrent. intcrests to us * rlhich
So armed u'ith this understanding. and btzt.ing

onlv lcads us into struggle precisell" to derail our militancy? Hardly: morc a casc ol 'The TUC [lhat can't. won't and shouldn'tl rnusl call lhc action u'c necd to u'in'. Just as in the Great Strikc of 84/5. thcy fbrrcd lhll: ,lo opcrrll'clrll for rvorkcrs lo brcltk lroltt l,ltbottr itntl lltc ttttiotts tvottld ttol bc popttlitr ittttotUl tttilrtltttt rlttrkcrs So usrUl llrc c\r:usr lltill'l)itrl\ lllllsl llol losc lttttt'lt rrtllt lltc

" 'The TUC would urge all workers to seek the liervs of their employers on the position of their businesses in thc economy and to build a partnership for-iobs on their National Recovery* Day on 9 December'. What kind of policy is this'l Horv can the
TUC have a partnership with the Conlederation of British
Industry whose director gencral, Howard Davis, welcomed the
1.5 percent pav

"

limit?".

Of course, the real question here is holv much longer are the SWP going to

14

15

a Carry on recruitingl a

The SWP and the'dash for growth,

la

Carry

on recruitingl a

The SWP and

the'dash lor growth't

prctcnd to cxpcct thc TUC 1o do otheruise? What kind of policl uas reflected in thc National Recovery Day? A policy that clcarly dcmonstrales thc class loyalties of the Trade Union

SWP miner from Fricklcy:

"Scargill's credibility...

Congress: both

thc lcfl and right rvings of it. The

SWP's 'shock'.

disgusted at Scargill's role in this dispute

meanwhile, never let up for a minute:

"...1t is particularlv sad that the left udng of the TUC are as much involr.ed in blocking action as thc right"3o. Sad'/ Why's it'sad'? What Lhe hell else rvere they evcr going to do'l And why

with and defending Bill Jordan, going along with the TUC see someone with Scargill reputation coming behind Norman Willis, who he has previously attacked has raised the

is very low. Many people are - sharing a pladorm

to

anger"34.

docs SWP columnist Callinicos claim to bc morosc about something he's supposed to believe is inevitable?

Yet at the same time, in another party journal, Scargill had become an inspiring firebrand, who attacked the timidity of other leaders:
"...miners' leader Arthur Scargill ripped into Labour and TUC lcaders for not responding to the niners' Callu3s Because together,

By the beginning of January. even the SWP's patience nith the TUC
scemed to bc wearing a little thin. "Why won't the TUC lead the fightback?". askcd one page 3 cditorial.

"Whilc the TUC

dcla_vs"

tcns of thousands more workers -ioin the

dole and thousands more hospital bcds arc lost.

the trade unions to lead the fightback.

Dclal's also bring the risk that workers, who in October lookcd to will abandon hope or look

elscwhcrc...". it warned. "Wc cannot afford to rvait."

Was Str/ finally calling for a break from the bureaucrary? Not exactlv: "...The TUC must name the dav for real action."3t. ghe call had now been toned dorm to a demand for an'action day': exhortations to Willis to lead a 'general strike' uere novu nowhere to be seen). Meanwhile, the party's Reviev,altacked Arthur Scargill - for following thc SWP's advice:

supposcd to welcomc - like growing 'dissatisfaction' with thc TUC and the Labour Party. Workers' anger at the behaviour of trade union and Labour leaders can, of course, lead people off in reactionary, individualistic or defeatist directions, rather than 'radicalise' and empower them. What matters is the overall political atmosphere in which that resentment and dissaffection grows crucially on the lev'el of class combativity and confidence that exists. But if the SWP non' belierad that things uare going corkingly vell

the party has so many contradictory analyses to try to hold it tends to get confused about developments - wen those it's

on the class front, then surely they would welcome any fracturing in
workers' loyalty to the TUC as elidence of an 'upturn' in action? It's at this point that the true extent of the SWP's 'critique' of trade unionisrn, and of their supposed belief in the necessity for indepndent proletarian action
-becomes clear:

"lScargilll has prefered to rely on the chance of convincing Jimmy Knapp to back official action rather than taking the chancc of issuing a call for rank and file action and relying on rank and file actir,'ists to deliver it in
the face of opposition from the TUC'.32 Because of the contradictions inherent in its politics. the SWP were unable to dccidc from week to week if Scargill was still a 'good militant leader' or had become a 'bad bureaucrat' implicated in holding back the fight. Sometimes Arthur was reproached for "plapng down militancy and attacking mincrs rvho called for pit occupations and relying on the TUC gencral council, which has delivered nathing"33. Or, in the words of an

leadership has been so cowardly and appalling in recent months many socialists and militants have despaired of thcm eterleading a fight."
So explained the

"[Union leaders'] behaviour and that

of the Labour

April Review6, describing a development u'hich the party

clearly seemed to think was a bad thing. Other party members reprted
similar problems: "One of the things

noticed when

was handing out the

16

17

i l___-

;C"rry

"r,

,.*-tngl .

Th" SWP

t"d th. tltth f", Sr"*th'il,

Carry on recruitingl

The SWP and the'dash for growth' a

lS\VPl 'Start lhe Fighl Now' lcaflets $'hich $'ere arguing for 'IUC 1o call somc action. u'as that pcoplc ucrc looking to thc lcaflcl and lhc gcncral rcsponsc u'as 'uell ves" but pigs might fly'. Therc is an cvidcirt rvide dissatishction l'ith thc T'[JC and thc likclihood that thcy u'ill dclircr. no$ maltcr horv much prcssurc is put on thcm".37
prcssurc to bc put on thc

Again - a scnse of dissatisfaction thal. the SWP doss not scenl to approvc of. or scc c\cn as a potenlial/r'positir.c dcl'cloprncnt. An SV/P railtrorkcr commcntcd:

"Thc mosl cornmon qucstion hcrc is 'u'ln' do rvc nccd

Knapp'.)'lhcad of thc RM'f trarrsport u'orkers'unionl.'Wh.v do rvc nccd thcsc union officials'... Thcrc is c1'nicism about Ihc tradc union leadcrs and the argumcnt that thev can shift afler prcssurc fronr bclon is onc that I har,c not N'on."38

mortem on events was predictable cnaugh, even if it didn't explain why the party's 'upturn' had plateaued so quicklv. The miners had been: "Betrayed by the TUC and Labour"a2. They had been 'sold out', 'abandoned' and 'let down" by a leadership that should, and could, have done better As a result miners now felt demoralised, lulnerable and poweiless. of course. the swP felt no need to re-examine their politics in the light of this defeat. How could they possibly have known that an analysis that insisted that only the TUC could 'organisc thc action needed to win' might contribute to that demoralisation, when - to weryone's surprise Norman Willis decided not to call a Gencral Strike aftcr all? An Armthorpe miner, interviewed in Socialist Worker suggested that an alternative approach to the General council of the TUC might have produced better results: "A lot of lads were saying elen_ then [back in bctoberl we should have ripped the heads ofthose bastards"43. '

The SWP had given up on the pits battle by the end of April. Its post-

Overall, this sense of disillusionmcnt u'ith lhe old ordcr of trade unionism u'as clcarlv seen as a'\.er]'bad thing'. Of coursc. bccause of the marketing conllicts the part) faccd" al thc samc time it had 1o bc secn as a 'vcry good thing'too: "Thc block that tradc union lcaders uscd 1o put on action isn't ah'avs a block nor\' - iL makes people angr.v. I'r'c seen pcoplc rvho" only thc da,v bcforc" joincd thc union and arc nou' almost lvnching a union official"3e.
Struggles *'crc also becoming morc r,olal"ilc and unpredictable" and:

Labour last time

"lt will be a .get back for us if Labour loses the next election."

(SWR June 90, pl9)

"The defeat of Labour opens the door to the building of the party" (Tony Cliff, International Socialism, Summer 92" 'Prospects for Socialists', p76).

"... thc discnchantmcnt n'ith thc union lcadcrs also means therc arc less barriers to militant action s'hcn lhc strugglcs do
conrc"4o

+. o understand why the leadership of the SWP decided that the I 'downturn' ended so dramatically in the autumn of 1992, as a new and I exciting 'rrpto*', rich with porriUitity. took its place, it's necessary to
go back to the point where the SWP claim the 'downturn'began.

As thc SWP's attcntion u'andcrcd fronr lhc pits battle to thc fight against thc unoffrcial 1.5% public sector pal norm. the parh offcrcd some lessons from hislon.:

The SWP locate the origins of the downturn somewhere firring the period ofthe last Labour government - between 1974 and 1979. In essence, the party's position is this: During those five years, the powerful upsurge of worker militancy that had been so clearly visible throughout the early 1970s

"Can govcrnrncnl pa1' policics bc smashcd'l Workcrs havc prorcd tho can. bul not b1 w;riting for thc tradc union lcadcrs
to lcad thc fight.".a1

began

to

decline, ultimately paving

the way for the

emergence of

Thatcherism, following the collapse of the Callaghan government after the infamous Winter of Discontent.

18

19

r-_r

;;r sr"*th';1
expcrience had such a damaging impact on the fortuncs of thc class strugglc, because at the,same time ilseemcd to discredit so manv of thc idcas of class

thc corc of thc Contract. Anv cffcctivc political rcsponsc to thc Social Contract had to bcgin with an undcrstanding that working class intercsts wcrc indepcndcnt from and directly oppo.sed /o thosc of the 'lcft' capitalists u'ho ran thc Cabinet and thc unions. Any 'left' oppositidn to thc Social
Contract that saw' some sort of shared common interest betwecn the workers undcr attack. and the governmcnt and union bosses lcading the attack, could only leacl lo confusion, dcmoralisation and defeat. What was lacking as the class batfle against Healh became thc class battlc against Wilson and thcn Callaghan, wcre powcrful genuinely indcpendent proletarian l'oices. arguing that thc attacks oflabour wcre not the shccking 'betral'als' of 'degenerate' working class leadcrs. but the entircly predictable actions of a capitalist government committed to slashing the social n'agc and shifting thc balance of forccs dccisivcly back to capitalist
class.

struggle itsclf.

)
1

The Lahour-Ioyal left, including the IS/SWP. contributed (in howevcr small a way) to this confusion, and thc reactionary consequcnces it implied,
because they insistcd that wc should somchorv have cxpccted differcnt. That onc scction of our rnovemcnt - thc leadcrship - had attackcd thc othcr - its rank and filc. So thc SWP can blithelv assert thal:

What was lacking was the ernergencc of a minority movement within the rvorking class that saw the need to brcak from the Contract - not
simpl.v to rcturn to old style prc-corporatist tradc unionism the rvhole capitalist logic of the British labourist tradition.

"Unlike 1969. the 'Wintcr of Discontent' of 1979 was not part of a rising tide of class struggle or consciousness, but a receding one. The Labour Par[' broke the tendenry- which had been growing under the Heath govcrnment, when workers were beginning to challenge capitalist socie$ in action. Though this had been insullicient
altcrnative to electoral politics,

but to abandon
combative

Such

movemenl

built initially among the most

... Labour's success in

in 19'14 to pose an had been a developing forcc. holding back the u'orkers' movemerrt
it

opponents ofthe Social Contract in both the public and private sector. could have had a powerful impact on thc dircction of thc unrcst that culminated in the Winter of Discontcnt, which drovc Callaghan to dcfeat at thc polls. The

provided the background to the general election of May 1979, which the party lost badly."47.

legacy

of thc

experience

of 'Labour last time' could thcn have been

dramatically diffcrent.

And who uere the critical playcrs, rvho were able to turn workers' combative confidence into pessimistic resignation in such a short period of time?: "What made the difference whcn it came to the crunch rvas the attitude of thc trade union leaders - not the right winger u'ho had proved so incapable of holding the line in 1969-70 but the left rving. For these could persuade manl' militant rank-and-file activists to accept the government policy - at
least for the time being.".

of 1974-79 was so 'disorientating'. prcciscly man\. rvorkers, cven at thc hcight of Callaghan's aftacks on the class, continucd 1o cxpect betlcr'from Labour and the unions. Such illusions could only bc strcngthcncd and mainlaincd bv the voiccs ofthc Labour-loyal lcft who continued to express 'shock', 'surprisc' and 'disbelief as thc hammcr blorvs of Dcnnis Hcalcy's budgets raincd don'n on thc class. and as thc tradc union bureaucrac!' attempted to hold the line against massivc industrial action and so protect'thcir' govcrnmcnt. Er,cn as millions of pounds u'crc slashcd frolrr srrcccssivc prtblic cxpcnditurc budgcts. and thc four-phasc pay rcstrailrl prollriunnrc crrt dccp into working class living standards. thc lcft. irrcludirrg tlrc 'ilrdcpcndcnt' IS/SWP continucd to insist this uas'our' govcrnrncnl lfl), Thc last Labour Govcrnrncnl-'l'rndc Uniorr ptlcl ullcrly discrcditcd lhc rvholc notion of Labourilc corponrlisl socinlislrr lt nlno crporod lhe nntiAs
was, the erpeden ce
hec:au,se so

il

"The feeling among a growing minority of workers in 196974. that their class had thc ability and power to run society, bcgan to cvaporate. Therc rvas a gcncral rightward shift throughout society. This meant that even when thcre was a limited revival of struggle in 1977 and again *ith thc 'wintcr of discontent'in 1978-9, it did not lead to the sort of political gcncralisation thal had takcn placc bcforc."4.

w'orking class lol'irltics

ol' tlrc llrilish lnldc unron hrrreetrcrrcy,

"l'hc

But the party continue to argue that the return

ofa

nerv Labour governmcnt

22

23

a Carry on recruitingl a The SWP and the'dash for growth'a

is crucial

l. Carry on -recruitingl I | ----. --- ---------

The SWP and the 'dash

for grovtth' t

even one that "starts much ftirther to the right"

becausc:

"...the only decisive test is the test in practice therefore we

are for another Labour government...

We are for everJthing which weakens the

presnt

government and forces the Labour Party into a position where its policies and practice can be tested in the eyes of millions of
people."49

British capitalism. This has takcn placc -iust as thc public sector rnanual workcrs arc mounting thcir biggcst eler protcsts against lou pay... All thc props are being pulled out from the elaborate structures built up over four years to hoist profit ratcs at the
defying the elected goyernment is not just demagogl-: it exprcsscs thc very real fear of thc ruling class that they arc
losing control of events.
"52.

cxpcnsc of rvagcs. Thatchcr's ranting about 'strikc committccs

And what could we expect from a new Labour governmcnt: "...Labour will
act as thc agent ofcapital..."50.

That sounds a little bil like class stmggle doesn't it? So what was the
problem?:

Such comments are typical of the SWP's confused analysis of what the Labour Party reprcscnts. Fcarful ofupsetting its'anti-Tory' constitucncy. thc party continually disguise thc reality of the Labour tradition. Labour is never seen as having its tntn agenda. When, for example. Labour councils ruthlessly enforce poll tax budget cuts, the SWP will decry them for doing the "Tories' dirty work". Whcn Labour front bcnchers dcnouncc and attack strikcrs or riotcrs, thc party will attack them for "sounding like Tories". and so ott. When Labour is in govcrnmcnt attacking wagcs and tcaring into the wclfarc statc, it is said to "act as thc agent of capital", as if it was someho$' a[ onc rcmoved fron
thc rest ofthe capitalist class.

"Ho$'cver. thcre is one big difference between the struggle

now and then

ge

in

1973-1. As yet the level

of political

neralisalion is lower. In 1973-4^ all the struggles began to focus on a single achievable goal - the remol'al of the Heath government. Thc Labour opposition seemcd to providc some political alternativc

to wage control and the three da)'weck."53

This, of course^ Iocks the party into the closed circle of its own analysis: Workers look to the Labour PartY to defend working class interests' and cxpect an incoming Labour governmcnt in alliance with thc unions to defend and extend thc social rvage. The arrival of a Labour government marks the bcginning of an upturn in workers' confidencc. The inevitable 'betravals' and almost capitalist-like behaviour of the new Labour administralion will shatler workers' loyalty to Labour, allowing "the cmploying class to rctake the initiative" and thc Party to "stem thc tide"
"The only thing which can offset that is a rise in the level of the class struggle"51. So what did the SWP think was happening undcr the Callaghan-Healey government?: At the time, the-v suggested that:
of u'orkers' rcvolts.

under Heath

greater'political generalisation'the party identified as taking place - thc bigger rise in class consciousness - $as actually a rencwal of faith in thc Labour Party. Some generalisation... Now that that
So the

faith was scen lo be misplaced" confusing and uncertaing wcre grorving:

"Now there is no credible national political alternative to thc left oflabour, capable ofgrving a sense ofunified purpose to

Although the class is advancing, it is doing so in a fragmented manner, which again and again allows the employers to retake the initiative."sa
So the only thing that can preyent this is the outbreak of the kind of class struggle that. in the SWP's vierv, the very existence of a Labour government makcs impossible. Class resistance to Labour's programme will therefore bc compromised and confused, leading to disillusionment. a return of the Tories, and a profound sense of malaise on the left.

the man1, groups of workegs in struggle...

in scale thal which brought down Edward Heath in 1974. Thc immediatc causc of panic in high placcs had bccn thc lorrv drivcrs pickcts' succcss in bottling up lhc prolilablc hcnrl of

"The Labour government is now facing a crisis approaching

marxist analysis of the Labour

Hardly surprising then that the SWP try to keep their infallible Pafi. split down in its separate components.

24

25

lt
the Any genuine rise in the level of class struggle requires workers' and the trade union and Labour *oit iig class as a whole. breaking frce of 6out"ty and asserting direct control over the battle for their interests. A

Carry on recruitingt

. -. The SWP and the'dash f<>r growth' -:_::-;--1

'

Thc futurc is 'looking good':

"Thc SWP in Britain has lrugc opportunities

"

We are still too

part and parcel of the battle that sees thc barons of the labour movement as exercise of class power enemy. othenvise the impact of the Labour Party's v,ilt iertainTy be to depress the levcl of class strugglc' o

it also our paper to sprcad our ideas as widely as possible' But big battles on the we arc well placcd for the
means
horizon..."59

smalltodccidccvcnts.whichmcansrveneedtogrorvanduse

All in all:

for growth: "All we have to do is recruit"

The purtY goes
drive with a range he SWP has been promoting its new membership

to "The prospects for building a real rcvolutionary alternative Labour could not bc bcttcr."6o.
So. to'meet the challcnge" the SWP had to 'tnakc the change':

of

slogans:.thedashforgrowth'..theturntorecnlitment'"and.theopen party's.deteT]T,t::::: OoJ, p"rrp"",ive'. All of them illustrate the as quickly as possible' regardless of capture as many new members as it can. into thc palty wilh the kind of 'socialist' politics the recruits might bring

"The Socialist Workers Party made a sharp shift in the last threc months of 1992. That meant scrapping much of our

cxisting routine. Thc result has bcen

Uranihcs atrA
llin'ker."ol

mcglpe

grouth

substantiallv-fig-fie-

j0 ryI of salc--o!.gt Socialist

in

our

The SWP began claiming a tt'erybptship of=golnd, ,7 Q iL 93co - the br8'gcst me 1992.s5 which had risen to 8'590 bl Margh .Dcccmber almost ccrtainly inflatcd. parry has cver becn rnlTs*6iffiilTh-e*:Tgut.s.
of a party member are also the result of 'creative acclunting'. The 'definition' has been considerablY loosened:

them.

in preSeeming to draw parallels rvith thc growth of the Bolsheviks kind of party- do we need?' rcvolutionary Russia, onc sll'article - 'what quoted Lenin on the 1905 Rcvolution:
I

Socialisl "Today a member of the party is someone who sells prepared to defend the politics it contains'"57' I4/orkerand is

"'Open thc gatcs of the party. Qet rid of all the old habits' Form hundreds of circles and encourage them to work full
blast.

t I

"All wc have to do is rccruit more rvidely and boldly,

boldly and widelv"'62.

more

Sothesizeofthesolidcadrewillstillbcalotsmallcr'Evcnso'theparty
clearly is growing rapidly at present.

just a'good This growth. tlt" SWp claims. rcflects more than diffFerent. period, for the iurty, fhittgs" thc-v say. arc bccoming qualitatively that fne party is now' ciaimlng to bc on thc vcrgc of a major breakthrougtu political force: would transform it from piopaganda group to gcnuine
give the sort of "At the moment thc SWP is still too small to for thc lead which can providc a rcal lighting alternativc' but first time thcrc is a rurl possibilitv of growth which would allow it to do so."58

An intcrnal document produccd for members of the lrish SqP- the Social-isJ* new drive'-Ei[ftbs clcar just how l[g[c-ts--Voycm!n!..ls-\YM)." about the is: 'opcn' thc door lo thc Partr

"Wc must adapt to take the steps necessary to thoroughly implement 'Open Door' recruitment. Every non-member at a mecting must bc askcd to join thc SWM' This not only involves a call from the platform" but it means that everl member must havc on them membership cards and

26

a Carry on recruitingl )

The SWP and

the'dash for growth'1

li

;;;i;;
The

registration forms and must ask individually any non-member

at the meeting to-loin. The nature of the period has proved that numbers of nerv individuals rvill respond they're asked

if

poll tux:

directly: 'Do you want to join the SWM?'. Today's regular readers of the paper are lomorrow's recruits... People who make it plain that they won't ioin iust
nolv, and even more distant contacts, must be allocated to a member to drop off the paper every month. Sometimes someone is asked to join but refuses for the time being. Ask them if they will take papers for their friends. This is a good way of pulling people into a more organised relationship with
us...

'Non-payment is dead... Long live non-payment'

he roots of the SWP's currcnt 'period of growth' lie in poll tax struggle,

which

campaign, and, later of the Trafalgar Square poll tax

short ofincredible

considering the party's analysis

first of the

non-payment

riot - is little

/
Size,

The biggest danger we face is that we do not go after recruitment vigorously enough and miss opportunities that would significantly increase the size of the SWM. These steps. together with a determined political will from the branch leadership, wrll help properly implement the 'Open Door'
perspective."63

is no suggestion here that the ncw with even a single word of the minimal party principles printed every week in the paper. or know an$hing ahut any of
seems, i.s evcrything. There

it

rccruits need

to

agree

the party's perspectives or politics.

In one respect, the 'open door' policy, and the 'dash for growth'
ohliged the party to dump the 'downturn', regardless of the real statc of the

class struggle. After

all.

according

to bolshcvik logic, a real.

When campaigning against the poll tax got underway in late-1987, the SWP could only muster perfrrnctory interest. The party couldn't abstain entirely of course, because of the risk of passing up potential recruits, but the 'politics of the downhrrn' were clear here - low levels of class confidence in the rvorkplace meant there was no rcal hope of stopping the tax. Indeed there was a danger of the inevitable defeat further undermining workers' confidence, if unrealistic expectations ofvictory took hold. The party's first attempt at an analysis of the poll tax stmggle appeared towards the tail end of 1987, and centred on the need to 'forcc' labour movement leaders to lead a campaign around the twin slogans of 'Don't Pay!' and 'Don't Collect!'64. It didn't last long. The SWP's second and slighlly longer lasting - poll tax strategy, adopted in the Spring of 1988, was to launch a propaganda war against the idea of a community based non-payment campaign.

proper The analysis that they now offered was pretty crude.

'revolutionary parly' can only expect to grow dramatically in size in timcs of

mass class radicalisation. ln times of reaction and dcfcat. in timcs of 'downturn' in fact, a 'revolutionary party' can only really cxpect lo hold its
own.

The fact that the SWP was finding it possiblc to rccruil in droves therefore 'proved' that an 'upturn' had begun. Convincing. isn't il?.

In all its. propaganda the parS begln painting a picture of two starkly opposed approaches to class struggle: one, community based, was inevitably disorganised, weak and doomed. The other, action in workplace particularly trade union action - was collective, organised, powerful, and rich with possibility. Best of all, it took place at the point where proper working class struggles - indeed where proper working class people - were
to be found.

"There

is also the danger that community politics divert

people from the means to win, from the need to mobilise working ciass activity on a collective basis", explained the party's first and last poll tax pamphlet. uThe state machinery, through fines, stopping of wages and so on, can wear down

28

29

a Carry on recruitingl J
communif resistancc
uorkiug class."

The SWP and

the'dash for growth'l

lt

Carry

on recruitingl f The SWP and the'dash for growth'

a
1

if it

cannot tap thc strenglh

of

the

the Labour Pa.rty has, of course, demoraliscd and

disorientated thc

"Some mav deftr' the Tories norr'. But that number could bc whiltled au'a)'... Tlrc remaining activists uould slarl 1o blamc other individuals bitterly for not standing firtn."55 Dissidents within the SWP

twelvc campaign."6e. Noi of course that the SWP had spent the prwious had in any way monthJdemanding that the Labour Party 'lcad the fight', or that strategy contributed to the 'demoralisation' they now saw as.workplace failed"' action, being In the meantime the much advertised (by now) muted and opposition to non-payment, was advocated

in

this nor linc u'as adoptcd

b1'

thc Central Conunittcc following a:

I'ho have since left the partl*

sugg,cst that

uninspiring.

It

amounted

to little more than calls to top up forthcoming

becomes due

wage demands.

"decision to bend the stick hard against rhc Militant. For Militant thc call for non-pa1'mcnt becarne the bc-all and cndall and seemed to acquire almost religious significance. The
SW?'s policv was frarned in sectarian rcaction to this"66.

Workers involved can make sure their pay rise is enough to

cover the extra cost ofthe 1ax"70.

"A

new wave

of pay claims

this autumn'

when non-payment began in earnest and showed hundreds of thousands

involved and refusing to pay up, the party stood hrm and stuck the boot in:

This probably u'as a faclor - the need for the part]" to distinguish its identity in thc market placc in opposition to its rivals. but the party also sought. for a fel'rnonths at least. to dcfend its particular class analysis. which strcsscs the primacy cf tradc unionism and industrial strugglc. Even thc party's.fi"s/ analysis - u'hich allorved for the possibility of 'non-payment' - clearll" sau' it lri;clr as the outcorne of'non-callectiott by COuncil u'orkers. rather than aS :rn activc'forcc in its orvn right. And bscause such workplace action was highlr unlikely. mass non-pavment was a big non-starter. Tony Cliff later took thc part-v to task for adopting such a position not that he as lcader of the Central Committee was in an) way rcsponsible for it: "... $'e tend to lelescope processes. We can say that thc poll 1ar can't bc beaten without strike action, and as rvc don't havc that nou. thc campaign is doomcd. This is dtsastrous..."67.
Disastrous it was. The logic of the party's poll tax position obligcd it to 'talk down' community rcsistance just as it u'as bcginning to takc off. Thc pa(y

"... activists should recognise thal a majority of workers are likely to feel that they havc no choicc but to pay' ln Glasgorv up to a lhird ofpcople havc failcd to pay or are several months

inarrcars.T.n.othirdshavepaid.InLothianatleastfivcoutof six have paid. A similar pattern is likely in England and

Wales"71.

shortfall ln poll tax receipts across the region, which was forcing the council into expensive short-tcrm borrouing 10 col,er the massivc debt72. The SWP preferei to promote the 'Tory lie' that the cainpaign had crumblcd' - - . Md while Labour touncils across the countr]' despatched bills and . prepared to take non-payers to court, the parfy- concerned itself with the real issues, noting with alarm that:

The fact that this ll,as a complete and deliberate lie, based on figures concocted by Tory cenlral offrce to disguise the true scale of non-payment, did nothing to tcmpcr the swP's dctcrminalion to write-off the campaign. Othcr reporrs, quoting Lothian's own figures. highlighted a f25'5 million

first layed into the non-registration campaign:

weeks as offrcials in Glasgow and Edinburgh startcd llreatcning people with f50 fincs". rcmitrding pcoplc that.
"Itlhe alternative to this is organiscd working class action."68.

"...resistance has collapsed cornplctely

in lhc last three

"There's also the danger that blunting a fight to sink the poll tax now..." [ic Labour leaders 'rcfusing to fight'] ""' could elentually turn the anger against the Tories into a sense of resignation, costing Labour the elcction."

in the As a recruitment pitch, the strategy was hopeless' and was dropped

By the autumn. the partv

r,l'as losing interest:

"Thc official capitulation by

lateSpringoflgg0:overnighttt'.swpbecamcpassionateadvocatesofthe
31

30

r---I a Carry on recruitingl J

The SWP and the'dash for

growth''

i.

Carry on recruitingl

The SWP and the 'dash for growth'___

,,

collcctir,c class potvcr of communitv bascd non-payment:

--l

"Thc Tories. thc councils and the courls arc desperately trling to crack rcsislancc. Thev are shaken by the continuing
huge scalc of non-pavmcnt."73.

The 'problem' of the poll tax riats Re-writing the Riot Act
strations that preceded it caused the party particular problems. Partly because of their vioient nature, and partly irecause they took place outside the confines of the trade union movement'
concluded following'disturbances' in Lambeth, London.

he Trafalgar Square poll tax riot and the violent town hall demon-

Though not as shakcn of coursc as the Central Committee of thc SWP' "Scarc tactics arcn't ctrough to break non-paycrs... Councils

hal'e two ltys to try to get the unpaid tax. Both can
fought'74.
There rvas no more insistence

be

"The Tories and the police are to blame for the violence", it

tiut:

The party didn't'condemn' the violence but pointed out: "...the vast majoritV of dimonstrations saw no violence at all. The violence occurred
where police and local councils provoked it."78. So there was no point in getting 'over-excited': there were only a few isolated hot spots, and they were the fault of inappropriate policing. This was also the party's initial response to the Trafalgar Square

"... unless thc campaign is organised and focused on thc

pou'er of u'orkers to stop thc tax therc is a dangcr. Thc Torics can sit tight and rvatch thc resistancc slorvly crumblc a\+'ay"75'

Socialist lI'ilrker began to bc hlled with court and bailiff bustingicports - and thc partv began rccruiting hcavily" furthcr fucling its

The pages

of

riot: with all the condescending concern of an Islington social worker, Sociqlist Worker appealed for sympathy for the rioters' plight: "No wonder they fightback" explained it's'what we think' column. The miseries and
deprivations of Thatcher's Britain had led to the troubles.

ncrv enthusiasm.

The part-l''s 'demands' on the labour bureaucracy

throughout:

continued

"That is why 200,000 people filled with bitterness and anger

protested."

"Labour councils are incrcasingly taking thc lcad in thc ttsc of brutal methods to enforcc poll tax paynent... Irrslcad of rnobilising thc bailiffs Labour coutcils should bc organising resistance to the Tory tax"76.

"That is why. when a peacefirl sitdown demonstration outside the 16 foot high gates of Downing Street was attacked by police, tens ofthousands fought back." Adding: "Of coutse, no socialist believes rioting will beat the poll tax, but neither should any condemn the howl of rage

And the parlr' remaincd concerned that Labour's complicitv rvith thc poll
tax" would damagc it.

which filled the fashionable West End last Saturday."

alread-v-

order to trim the poll tax bills. This has thc cffcct of immcdiately conccntrating attcntion on *'hat thc council docs or docs not spcnd. not thc .vears of cuts in Torl ftinding."77.
The partv u,cre clearll' rvorried

"... Labour councils are

in thc proccss of planning

cuLs in

The party did suggest, though, that iflabour leaders had done their duty and ied some 'proper resistance' to the poll ta}L malte we could have
avoided such scenes ofdisorder altogether:

"Ifl-abour leaders are

so worried about that anger, they should

t[at sonte of the alti-Iory angcr at council Labour's lva,Y * w'hich thef sa\l as utrt/using tather cutbacks miglrt come 'political thany,idening and cleepening thc stmgglc. So tttuch fior thc SWP's . independcuce' frotn Labour...
32

organise a campaign to beat the Tories instead ofjust standing by and hoprng to reap the electoral bcnefit."7e

In fact, the whole of the SWP's initial response to the events of March 31st,

33

a Carry on recruitingl t The

SWP and

the'dash for growth' I

tt I "

ttt. cerrv on recruitina! a The SWP and the'dash for grow-' -

l,

was extremely defensive. The party seemed to expect a strong backlash against the riot to make itself felt in those sections of the labour movement
the SWP wants to remain closest to. The Central Committee's first approach was, as a result, a damagc limitation excrcise that hoped to minimise the 'negative impact' of the riot by playng r.rp police antagonism, and playing dov,n offensive action on the part ofthe rioters: "Police violence caused the riot". screamed Str{"s centre page headline the weck following March 3lst.

"It rvas police

violence which turned the massile peaceful march into a

battleground" it began. "Newspaper reports have dcscribed 'bloodv mob rule' gripping the heart ofLondon, but many ofthe facts they bury in thcir report show who was really to blame,"8o. When faced with examples of direct unmediated class confrontation with the police and offices of the local State, the manrist revolutionaries of the SWP immediately looked round for someone to 'blame' for thcir
outbreak.

campaign. The SWP exploited the crumbling of Militant's prwious poll hegemony on the left, ruthlesslY' iutuny of the smaller left groups simply had no point of connection with events external to the 'British labour movement' and had little chance of benefitting from them. The advice, from groups such as Socialist Organjoin the iser that rioters should put down their paving slabs and instead to 'offer a lead' Labour Party so they could put pressure on Nonnan willis against the Tories, was unlikely to find many takers' Nor, at the other 'extreme" were criticisms by The Leninist of the coppers-narks in Militant for failing to have "taken the lead in throwing up UaiilcaOes against charges by mounted police and speeding cop wagons." Instead of preparing to'nante names' and denouncing the rioting mob to TV news crews. the leaders of Militant should - apparently:

'ta"

"have distributed makeshift weapons, eg iron railings and broken up paving stones' Using thcir stervards, walkie-talkies and other communication equipment, they should have coordinated the thousands willing and able to fight back against
police tenor."82

Even the, by now, poll-tax-disinterested Revolutionary Communist Party were able to work out that the issue of 'who threw the first punch' was as if scarcely the basis on which to assess the class value of the riot somehow police and demonstrators began the day with equally clcan

cop1tooks.81

Kind of a case of: "why won't Militant fight the coppers?". suggesting that Militant should co-ordinate street fighting, is a bit like calting on the Pope to give out wine flavoured condoms at Comrnunion. ln both cases it's
something that's against their religion. As the weeks went by, and support for the riot became increasingly politically chic, the swP turned up the volume. "The Trafalgar square demo on 31 March was the high point so far of the battle against the tax"83'

and that's what forced a major re-write of the party's riot story.

What the party certainly didn't expect was an influx of new members in the weeks and months that followed - but that's what they got,

While, clearly, broad sections of what passes for the 'labour movement' were shocked and appalled by the riot, there was a much smaller 'militant minority' (the very people the party hopes to identi$ and recruit) that felt angered, exhilarated, enthused and empowered by the riot. The party had, once agaiq misread the mood, and so adopted a more combative. upbeat analysis, to get back in step. It's worth pointing out here that the party's recruitment success story (relative to that of their opponents), was greatly helped by the truly
dismal quality of so many of their rivals' positions: For the Militant Tendency the poll tax riot was an unmitigated disaster. The repercussions of their public pledge to 'name names' and shop rioters to the police and courts, wounded them severely and cost clearly in tenns of recruits. and forced them onto the defensil'e for the rest of the

I rn. party still remained dismayed by Labour's inabitity to see how helpful I tn" tiot had been for it. In the opinion polls, Labour "held an unheard of I Z+.5 Der cent lead the week after the Trafalgar Square riot... Then Kinnock I lori.t"a people should pay their poll tax, and Labour's lead fetl ten points." I tour emphasisl IAs time went by, the 'riot' the party had blamed on the police,
became ever more venerated, and the non-payment campaign which the party had written off before it had even started" became ever nrore crucial' ih"r" *.r. still occasional glitches - times when the party forgot its poll tax cnthusiasm for a week or two: "In November 1990, there was "...no obvious national focus for those who want to fight the Tories... For socialists, this lack of focus can sometimes be very frustrating."8a. But when Thatcher

34

35

a Carry on recruitingl J The SWP and the'dash for growth,r

stepped down as Tory party leader a few weeks later, the SWp quickly re-

SWP is even claiming to have been stuck into the poll tax fight fro.m day
one:

membered the tidal wave

demise:

of class resistance that had brought about her

"Above all. the poll tax proved her downfall.

All the Tory

leadcrship candidates distanced themsclves from the poll tax... because thev know it's highly unpopular and unworkable. The protests culminating in the Trafalgar Square riot in the spring and the continued high levels of non-payment are proof of
this. "85.

"From the start the campaign was 'tainted' by Socialist llorkers. Militqnts and even anarchists, while official trade union and Labour leaders had nothing to do with it"s.
Despite, of course, the best efforts of the SWP to hand control of the struggle

to them. Once protests against the pit closure prograrnme began in late
1992, however, the party revised the significance of the poll tax campaign down again, reducing its importance to the impact it had had on workplace battles.

By the summer of the follorving year, the line was retrospectively refined still further: "After 3l March last year, Thatcher,s days were numbcred."s6.
Not, you remember, that any socialist ever believed that rioting would beat thc poll tax, let alone destroy a prime

didn't the party congratulate',he boys in blue.in Ths Met for taking her out? A more serious problem for the party was the clash between its claim of victory and its dismissal of the power of community based class action.

very unexpected was the Trafalgar square riot that fatally wounded Thatcher, and if it was the police who were responsible for ths riot why implication:

if it

"... even though resistance to the poll tax was not based on the workplace, victory had an important effect on industrial relations... [The Tories] have not dared to a major national union in a national strike since the poll tax... Unlike the poll tax, the movement is now one of the organised working class even i{ as yet, the level of industrial action
remains low."es

If riots and non-payment had been the key to crushing the poll tax, mood of popular rebellion - like that over the poll tax nearly that surely had important implications for the party's class analysis for its three years ago * to one which is sharper and more class insistence that only industrially based class action could ever win struggles? based."9o. And what of the party's equal insistence that only Willis and Kinnock could deliver the action needed to win? - the poll tax victory was So the riots and the non-paynent campaign the party claimed at the time won in the face of outright opposition and, artack from every level of the toppled Thatcher, weren't after all, real class struggles at all, but populist labour bureaucrary. from trade union office, to local Labour town hall. all precursors to the return of 'real class politics'. So whal felled Thatcher? the way up to the walworth Rd party headquarters. If workers could win The poll tax campaign should have been an awkward and victories outside and against the confines of the British labour movement, unsettling experience for a bolshevik party such as the SWp. how could the part-v persist with its loyalty to Labour, especially as "...the
idea of Neil Kinnock calling a dernonstration on ani'thing is laughable."87. The SWP rose to the challenge of a thorough going and rigorous re-

"Alrcady this year, the anger has shifted much more from a

revival of combative rvorking class action'. Eventually. 'resilient non

payment and riots

examination of its politics in characteristic British Bolshevik style: It denied thc existence of any contradictions... and carried on recruiting. For the SWP the baftle against the poll 1ax began as a communityfocused irrelevance. doomed by its inevitable failure only to demonstrate the depth of the downturn. Later that community resistanm became the .cutting edge a slow

In proclaiming it a resoundin] victory, the pa4y was undermining not only the basis of its own class analysis, but was coming into direct conflict with its own downturn theory, at the very moment when (by its own industrial
criteria) the theory was at its most plausible yet: at the moment when strikes and stoppages acnlss industry had just hit their lowest levels for fifty years. That it was something of a 'success' stoppages is a testament not the party only to the agile opportunism of the swp, but to the miserable state of genuine revolutionary politics in this country.o

in the

streets brought down Thatchcr'. These days, the

36
of

37

t-l

Carry on iecruitingl

The SWP and the'daeh for growth'

What's wrong with the SWP?

hc rcal problern is not. of course- that thc SWP changes its mind so muclr. Ullimateh'. thc issuc is not the partv's inconsislenc.y. lf thc SWP dccided to stick lith jvst rnc,rsl of its analvses. it would only cnd up bcing consistently, wnng. The fired tablcts-of-stonc Trotskf ism of the WRP.\'ex,sline is no lcss anti-prolctarian. The real issucs hcre coucem the molivatior behind thc complctc political llcxibiliry that the SWP have chosen to adopt: the pntc'e.s.ses by rvhich partl policr is revised and presented: and lhe implications that that has for thc Bolshevik analvsis of the rclationship betrvecn partv and class lhal the SWP claims to defend.

and is paying dividends

in terms of numerical growth. At

recent miners''

1I I

demos, SW sellers have been dishing out membership application forms as readily as their 'TUC-must-act' leaflets. The SWP has been able to recruit so strongly precisely because it demands so little politically from its new members - beyond a dislike of the

Tory government and a belief

in 'some-sort-of-socialism'. As the party politics at 'rank and file' level become ever more continues to grow, and its diluted and confused, it increases the need for the party's leaders to tighten
and centralise political control, the better

to

'defend' the party's

'revolutionary' ideas. A corollary ofthis, is that it encourages the rank and file to accept their status as increasingly excluded from the processes of the party's
politics.

The SWP sa) the] scck to model themselvcs on thc Russian

Bolshcvik Parh. and on thc organisational idcas der,eloped bl Lcnin in the lears bcfore and aflcr the October l9l7 revolution (but most especially on his post- I 905 formulations). It is. the-v" arguc. the unevenness of class consciousness, thc limits of spontancih- and the rcquircmcnts of thc revolutionan' evcnt itsclf. that dcmand onc solution: the intenention of a vanguardist marxist parS'. able to 'cmbod1" and 'cxprcss' the most militant aspirations of the proletariat

Yet. there are few immediate dangers for the party managers. The reason that such a massive influx of members as the SWP has engineered in
recent months does not threaten the political or organisational stability of the party is that the couple ofthousand new recruits have no real ability to influence the functioning of the organisation. The party is structured precisely with this in mind.

through a pcrmanenl political leadership. Any othcr approach to the rn'olutionary project is dismissed as 'pure spontaneism'. Exactll' u'hat l-cnin had in mind whcn he describcd the proletariat as unablc o[ moving bc1'ond a '1radc union consciousness' or of devcloping rewtlutionary consciousncss Ihrough its own actir,e struggles against capitalism, is still
argucd ovcr to this dav- elen amongst Leninists. Yet, q'hen it comes to the poll tax or the pits battle. it's this bclief in tlre centrality of 'the party' - the primary importance of 'the party' as an in,stilution - and lhc overriding nccd to renew and increasc thc mcmbcrship of that part-v that dictates thc SWP's politics. lt's the panv*-first-and-last

Committee, made up of in the regionsel. Now there is no forum between the local branch level and the Central Committee, leaving 'Conference' as the full extent of party 'democrary':
representatives from the branches

ln 1991, the SWP abolished its National

"When was the last time a motion or slate to conference was opposed? The CC [Central Committee] usually stays the same or changes by one member. Most of the changes to its composition are made between Conferences. None of the CC's

numerous decisions made over

the preceding year

are

nrcntalih that encourages the SWP leadcrship to treat its 'matcrialist marxist anah'sis' as just so rnuch adr,ertising copy. During the early days of the poll tax battle. if anyone was incapable of moving beyond a 'lrade union consciousness'. it u'as the party burcaucrats of the SWP.

challenged or brought to account. Even the Pre-Conference bulletins contain littlq disageement. "e2 The SWP operates a ban on permanent factions, permitting them only in the rnn-up to Conference, and permits no form of horizontal organisational between members to cut across the topdown verrical hierarchy of the party.

left groups see devout-orthodoxy and adherence to the letter of Trotsky's tcachings as a guarantor ofcvcntual growth. Such fundamcntalism has rvorked on occasion in thc past for othcr groups - thc SLL/WRP for one. Currcntlv. thc 'say an)"thing' stratcgv of thc SWP sccms thc morc succcssful
Some

The politics of the new recruits are pretty much irrelevanl. The paty's line is handed dorvn through the pages of the party's press from the Central Committee via the editors of the different journals. The branch
cadre organise and deploy the new troops and orchestrate their activity. The

38

39

i f
I-

Carry

on recruitingl .

The

SWp and the,dash fo,

_-l

gro*thii:1

a Carry on recruitingl

The SWP and the'dash for growth'

bulk of thc q'ork inr,olvcs simph' sclling thc party's iournals. lt docsn't matter either if the longelity of most of lhe new membcrs is short, as long as nrore rccruits arc constantll- being picked up to take lhe place of the dropouts. The SWP work on the expectation of a high through-put of members.

undcrstand the bureaucrats self-obsession. The central apporochiks who run thc party. bclicvc the building of thc SWP Io bc the solc guarantcc of future u'orking class interests. The intcrcsts of the party and the class arc seen as more than just s1'nonvmous. The intcrest of the partv l,r the intcrest of the
class.

There is nothing 'sharneftrl' or'surprising' about such thoroughly q'nical and mauipulativc practicc. It ma1, harrc nothing to do rvith the gcnuine rq'olulionan politics of prolctarian sclf-activity - but it's easy to

discussion is set by the Central Committee. The agenda's at national events... are set by the CC or its appointees and are never challenged... Pre-Conference bulletins come out only once a year. Members can only express their views through Conference and Council to the whole of the parly indirectly."e4

The parfy may claim that: "[T]here should be no hierarchy inside a revolutionary party"s. What they mean is not that everyone has an equal
ability to help shape the direction of the party, but they everyone should be encouraged to 'value' and accept their place in the pecking order: the meritocracy. Those factory bosses who, these days, eat in the same canteen as their production line workers, often use the same argument. It's what Mr Major has in mind when he talks of a 'classless' Britain. In reality, a Leninist party simply reproduces and institutionalises existing capitalist power relations inside a supposedly 'rwolutionary' organisation: between leaders and led; order givers and order takers; between specialists and acquiescent and largely powerless par{y workers. And that elitist power relationship is extended to include the relationship
between the party and class.

In thc longcr term the current

dangerous:

"dash

for growth' could provc more

scventies and thc

"One should rcmember lhe examples of the WRp in thc carh, Militant in the early eighties. Bccausc thcy

rverc rccruiling and their influence was growing. thcir mcmbcrs refused lo conducl anv sort of sclf crilicisnr. C)f
corlrse the chickens came homc lo roost in the cnd.',93

"There are people who through knowledge, experience and

Thc excitement of sceing the part\ begin finally to 'gcl somc$'hcrc' clcarly does pLrt pressure on lhc cadrc al all levels of thc parh nor to risk a loss of momcntum bv raising auk*'ard qucstions. or criticising aspccts of the part-\"s conduct. Dissen| frustration and porver strugglcs u'ithin the apparatus arc pushed bencath the surface, oftcn to cxplodc all lhc morc r,iolcntlv latcr- normalh,aftcr that nen'momentum has pcakcd. The SWP's advocacl of 'rank and hlc control' does not cxtcnd to thc functioning of thc SWP. but the leadcrship are not averse 10 prctending it docs. 'Rank and hlc' w'orkers nral'* n'hcn thc SWP is fccling cspccialll' ntilitant be seen as capable of running thcir ou.n strike cornmittces. and challcnging capitalism at thc point ofproduction. but thosc are not idcas it sccks to bring into the pafi. 'Socialism from belou": but not rvithin thc SWp machinc.
Thc continual rcappraisal of thc swP's politics is carricd out not bry lhe mass of the organisation. but b1 the part-l's political specialists, in and around the Ccntral Committce.

ability to deliver have shown themselves capable of leading. But they are not all knowing. On the contrary, they make
mistakes because they are constantly facing new situations and new problems."e6

And where does the self-activity of the working class figure in all this?:

uReal leaders are

not infallible but are

capable of

recognising. admitting to and learning from mistakes." [The SWP 'admit mistakes'?: Surely some mistake? Edl "This can only be done by learning constantly from the working class and by testing its theories and actions in practice. The ability to do so gives revolutionaries the right to lead inside the party and the class."97
/

So it's the very ability of those leaders to be wrong, to havc to lcarn 'constantly./roz the working class' that gives them the 'right' to lcad lhal class, and that proves them to be in advance ofit?

"'Ihcre is rcal dcbale u'ithin the SWP. but thc framcu'ork for

40

41

a Carry on recruitingl a The SWP and the'dash for growth, I

So,

Carry on recruitingl

The SWP and the'dash for growth'a

for instance, the SWP's utter failure to grasp the class realities of

associatcd with Cliff and Co's seeming infallibility: the

poll tax struggle

- its attack on non-palrrnent, its insistence on the need for Kinnock's leadership. its late conr.'ersion to the politics of rioting - only sen'es to confinn the SWP's fitness to lead. And rvhat about challenging the
'mistakes' of those leaders: "Thosc arguing against the part-v (CC) face the problem that if they were to rvin the argument in the branch, they rvould have to change the line of the party nationally. No one knorvs how to do this quickl,v. efficicntly and uithout causing great embarrassmcnt 1o the partl'. So the opposition is disarmed of the

"Surely, the argument goes, if the party is a working class party and the memory of the class, then should not workers learn from it, not the other way round?"

"The problem with Yiewing the working class as passive recipients of the party's knowledge is that it is elitist and begs the question ofwho teaches the teachers".
Indeed it does, but the SWP doesn't have much of an answer for that one. They say that:

will to *.in from the start..."e8

revolutionary organisation can knorv if its strateg.y and tactics are correct: if the membership can cnticize thcm and demand change if they do not rvork in practicc. "se But it is frouncd upon in reality: "Saving the CC [Central Committcel has too much power is

In principle, of

course, "...there

is only one way thc

leadership

of

"ln reality that relationship between party and class is fluid, open and depends of the party learning from the real lived
a

experiences of the class."toz

to

misundcrstand rvhat dcmocratic ccntralism

is

about...

spending time consulting thc members as to whethcr this or that initiative is correct would incl'itablv mcan missing opportunities and turning the organisation into a debating

But the SWP, like dozens cf other outfits, claims for itself a pre-established 'right' to lead the class into revolt and then revolution. It claims it party contains, or will contain, the most class conscious rvorkers, and that its Central Committee the most class conscious mem|grs of the party. It allows no possibility of new, alternative" non-party, non-Bolshevik forms of organisation being established by a class in struggle; and argues its worsc mistakes, its backwardness, its opportunism, onlv reinforce its 'right' to
rule.

club."lm What ls depressing is the ease with which thev generally get away with it: that rank and file members of the pafi accept violent changes of line on the
say so of

The SWP see the party-class relationship as most defirlitely

not fluid.

fxed'

pafi

full-timers:

The SWP is set to become probably the biggest, most influential and most prominent organisation on what claims to be the British
revolutionary left. Yet, even a crusory study of the antics of the party revcals the realiff of that 'revolutionary' character. o

"r{rl amazing feature revolutionary militants who constantlv challenge authority in the outside world is the often unthinking acceptance the whims the party ieadership."lol

of

of

of

The membership of the SWP is certainly not a homogeneous mass of unthinking automatons. Any vct. most of that membership, for example, mutely acccpted the party leadership's bewildering series of poll tax U-turns, or its mcirc rccent discovery of the 'upturn' u"ithout dissension or complaint. The party pretends to recognise at least one of the problems

42

43

, a Carry on recruiting! a The SWp and the'dash L_ _

Notes

tor grovvtn,

lt

Carry

on recruiting! t

The SWP and

the'dash for growth'a

SWZg Jan 93. o10 see Republican Marxist Bultetin Feb 93, journal of the Revolutionary Group, a kind of 'external faction' of the SWp ^Denrocratic r Tribune 12 February 93, p12. stack later suggested that clifls attack on him had been nothing more'than "a joke" aboutthefactthat he had been in the US at the time of the central committee's "unanimous and swift" decision to "raise the general strike slogan", and so had been unable to vote for it, see'Letters', Tribune 26 February 93, p10 + swP Pre-conferenee lnternal Bulletin 7992 quoted in workers power, Feb
93 p14

1 2

events (which they hadn't) and that Cliff had agreed with his analysis all along (which he hadn't). 14 Trotsky's Transitional Programme, a document that was part-analysis,

part-Manifesto,

and part-handbook, was written to guide the

Fourth

5 swP Pre-conference

e swb Pre-conference

30 93, p14

lnternal Bulletin 7992 quoted in socr'a/'sf ouilook Jan lnternal Bulletin 1g92 quoted

I rhe Militant rendency underwent a'split'in

'entryism', see rrofwatch lssue

Bulletin Feb 93 7 SR, Jan/Feb 1981, p3-4 8 SWR. June 90. p'l9

in

Republican Marxist

lnternational that he launched at the end of the 1930s. While every prediction Trotsky made in the document was subsequently proved completely wrong, orthodox Trotskyist groups still tend to treat the text as a kind of extended Ten Commandments. 15 Though it's fair to say that "...the Permanent Arms Economy theory was originally introduced as a stop-gap to explain the temporary delay to the arrival of the big slump. As the slump continually failed to arrive the SWP... gradually elaborated the notion into a full scale theory.", 'Decadance: the theory of decline or the decline of theory?', Aufheben 2, p39 16 ni its foundation, the SRG decided to apply for Fl membership, but were rebuffed because of their state capitalist theory. They didn't pursue matters. See, for example, Callaghan p91. 17 6n its formation in isso the SRG became an entryist tendency within the

Labour Party, a position it maintained for the next fifteen years, until it formallywithdrewfrom Labour's ranks in 1965. See, forexample, Callaghan. 1991 over the questicn of
recent

maneuverings of Militant see lrofwatch Two. fu As soon as fhis pub c/oses... the British Left explained, chus Aguirre and M-o Klonsky (Estate of Prunella Kaur) p10

one. For more on the more

The socialist Labour LeagueMorkers Revorutionary party; and the Revolutionary socialist League/Militant rendency are the'two ot-ner distinct traditions with roots back in 'the club'whose descendants are still operating
today. The other newer fourth strand in British rrotskyist history, the lnternational Maxist Group (lMG) tradition, crystalised in the 1960s, though
obviously some of its founders had been active in left politics before then. l' see, for example, 'lnternational Socialists,, British Trotskyism, John C^allaghan (Basil Blackwell) p90 ro rhis has not been without its own problems though. The collapse of Stalinism in Eastern Europe presented enormous problems for the whole of the Trotskyite left, the SWP included. while many groups concruded that the colapse of the Berrin wail and the threatened 'restoration' of capitalism in east, was an enormo'rs threat to the world proletariat, the sWp - keen to stress its state-capitalist credentials - tended to go the other extreme. Because the regimes thai were being overthrown were capitalist regimes, they reasoned, the popular protest

11

t)

18 "A travesty of Leninism", was Workers Power's verdict on the new optimism of the SWP. "ln reality all you have to do to join [the party] is hate the Tories, not be racist or sexist, and part with 50p". Declaring the party guilty of 'bureaucratic centralism', WP berate the SWP for making a 'break with Leninism': "We see no alternative strategy mapped out for the class by the SWP, except more of the same, and, of course, ioin the SWP'." Workers Power's counter response to such anti-Leninist nonsense was unambiguous: "Join Workers Power" (all quotes, Workers Power, Feb 93, p14). Socialist Outlook was more straightforwardly jealous of the SWP's success. While noting the dangers of recruiting "on an alarmingly flimsy political basis", their 'Boom or Bust' article admitted. "The SWP's enviable ability to attract new support proves that its propaganda does strike a chord, especially among students and white-collar trade unionists." Drawing parallels with the super-optimism of the WRP in the '1970s, "minus of course the overpowering stench of corruption", the article, rather sulkily, concludecl: "lt is a high risk strategy which could yet prove a costly mistake." (Socr'afsf Outlook, Jan 30 93, p14). "Since the SWP is not a democratic organisBtion, but a sort of piety-fuelled cult in politics, then structured, democratic dissent or debate
was not possible", explained Sos'a/rsf Organiser. "...the
widespread

movements

consciously socialist. "Trotsky is smiling, and Stalin is dead,,, concluded Cliff in one key article in the party Review (Dec 89, p14) As if somehow Trotsky,s 193g predictions of the fate awaiting the Russian regime had been vinditated by

that 'toppled them' were objectively anti-capitalist, if

not

resistance arhongst SWP members to 'the turn"' was unlikely to have an impact on the future of the party. There was, of course, an alternative to thc "quasi-Stalinist organisational structures of the SWP", and, surprisingly, thrt turned out to be Socia/ist Organisels own "democratic organisation. thr Alliance for Workers' Liberty". (Socia/isf Organiser, 18 Feb 93, p7) t9 sH/, 24 oct 92, p3

44

45

a Carry on recruitingl a The SWp and the,dash for growth, J

22 sR Nov 92 ps wn"n the swp tarks about 'the ref its arways refering to groups it sees as to the right of itself. so when the swp talks about the
19 tn, November 1992, pplA-11 21 SR. l.Jov 92 o12

a Carry on recruitingl I The SWP and the'dash 52

1979, p8 s3 ibid 9! inia

f<>r

growth'l

Chris Harman, SWP contribution to IMG's Socr'a/ist Chaltenge, 25 Jan

33

28 st4/Nov T 92a-g ll now Soq'a/rsf rs fhe Socra/lst Workers party, p12 30 All quotes SW' Dec J' SWJan 9 93. o3 S 92, p4 Camment, Alex Callinicos 32 sR Feb 93 o6'
SR April

26 st4/oct 17 92 27 sw Nov 7 92

strike

failings of 'the left', it's talking about the politics of the New stafesman and Ken Livingstone. similarly, when the RCp talks distainfully about ,the |eft,, it means groups like the SWp... z" SR Nov 92 o3 24 see for example, SW24 Oct 92 zo How socialist is the sociatist workers pafty, a pamphret by wirdcat, includes a detailed expos6 of the swp's politici during the 1gg4-5 miners,
oS

55 "[r]he swP hal orog bv

months" (Soct'a/isf Review Dec 92, p9)

lfo0=Iernbers

,900_,"1[]9:'!E$ru!l

57 sWP 1992 Conference Report, quoted inWorkers Power Feb 93 p14

58 SR Dec 92, p9 59 SR March 93, p19 60 SR, March 93, p10

93

o7

:: ls 58; 'Rounitable discussion', spring 1993, p66 oo SWApril 10

93. o5 From 'Polities and the class str-uggle - a roundtable discussion' [with membersl, lnternational Socr'alsm Sg, Spring 1993, p66 38 ioia pal ll^ iOia The SWp tends to advocate 'lobbying,, rather than 'lynching, 40 sR Aoril 93 o9 41 su/Feb 2o 9'3 o8 a2 swMav 8 93 o5

19 snAprile3, pe r/

6t SR, Jan 93, p4 62 SW, Jan 10 93, p10 63 Making the 'turn to recruitmenf, Socialist Workers Movement briefing leaflet, 1993 64 see, eg, SWDec 19 1gg2 65 Socr'alsfs and the struggte against the pottfax (SWP pamphlet), p8 66 Demoeratic Centralism within the SWP, by three members of Southampton SWP, 1991 67 Conference 1988 Report, St4/ 19 Nov 88, p'1 1 68 st'tzzotn Aug 1988, p16 6e st4/ '1 5 october 1 988, p16 70 sw 19 Aug 89, p1

swp

71 swzq Mar 9o 72 see, for example, Organise!, magazine of the Anarchist Communist 73 st4/. 25 Aug 90, p7 7a swzg sept 90, p16 75 st'yg sept 89, p1
Federation, Feb-April 90, p16

a3 ibid

for example, | 55, summer g2; 'Prospects for socialists /s _s_ee,

German, /S 57, Winter

and 'can there be

g2

- an interview with rony criff,

76 sulg Sept 90, p5 77 swn, Mar 90, p4-5 78 sw17 Mar 90, p5

revolution

-ts&tv--9)ilf,-&- Gluckstein (BookmEiks, 1988]*th; \ruid-eFbf-nisconieFt - --

tn the aOO-pagC=BLUz !!_e- Lapg-ur party _ a Marxist

in Britainz', tinosey

79 All quotes SW, April 7 9a, p4

8o inia
-

45

merits a mere five paiagraiJh-s.

16 swR, June 90, p.t9 n'^.10" Labour Party - a Marxist History, criff and Gruckstein (Bookmarks)
fne Hre Last Time: 'f9 suzR, June 90 o19 5o inia 51 inia

o'182

The crisis: sociat Conitracf or socr'a/s m, Tony cliff (pluto press, 1925),

ll

P944

1968

and

After, Chris Harman (Bookmark

s)

p275

see Editorial, Living Marxism, May 1990, p4-6. The RCP had their own problems of course. Namely to explain how a movement they had written-off as the concern only of the moaning middle classes of Middle England could have delivered such an enthusiastic class riot to the streets of London. They didn't do, a very good job... 82 The Leninist, June 8 90, p1 83 st4/ 15 sept 90, p5 84 swR, Nov 90, p4 85 st4/R, Dec 90, p3 86 swR, July/Aug 91, p3 87 stlzg Nov 90, p1o

81

46

47

a Carry on recruitingl a
88 sW8 Mav 93
o9

The SWp and the'dash for growth,

sR, Dec 92, 91 see'SWP 1991 Pre-Conference Documents,; quoted in A tragedy left: Socialist Worker and its sp/ifs (Alliance for Workers' Liberty) p49 92 Democratic centralism witnin tie st4/p, dissidents in soutnimpton

1l S* Nov 92, The rise of resistance, p13 90 p8

of

the

22 yl,, ro
sT ioid
ibid

s3 ioia 94 dissidents in Southampton SWp,

991

swp,

1991
p11

we need a revotutionary party, Lindsey German (SWp)

98 dissidents in Southampton SWp, 1991 99 Party and Class, Chris Harman (Bookmarks) p3
1oo

101 'p"[o6patic Centralism:

failures, (ACF) p8
102

A tragedy of the teft, p47 Why we

a p,arty for bureaucrats,; Marxism and

its

nie,ea

a revolutionary parly ppg-9

Abbreviations:

SWP Sl4/ SR /S lS SRG

S'n"/R

Socialist Workers party Soclaf'sf Worker, the SWp's weekly newspaper Socra/sf Review; the party,s montfrty review Soclai,sf Vy'arker Review: pi.evious titte of SR, until September 1gg1 lnternational Socialism; SWp,s quarterly theoretical journal lnternational Socialists; previous name of SWp Socialist Review Group; previous name of lS

48

"The SWP is
set to become

probably the

WHYWON'T

biggest, most

influential, and

IH=''l"?ffi
PROLETARIAT?
Artist's impression of final pre-insurrectionary issue of Socialist Worker

most prominent

organisation on what claims to

be the

British

revolutionary left. '[et, even a cursory

study of the antics rcf the party reveals the

reality of that orevolutionary' character."

ffi
EiIffiH t2.95
rsBN 1 873176 02 3

and

Trotwatch