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The US Fed has cut its interest rate almost to zero (0.25%). Soon the BoJ too cut
its rate to 0.1%. The question is whether the zero rate regime can arrest the
economic de-growth? Is it really a useful tool the central banks can use to derive
the desired result? The Fed has already begun an aggressive plan of Quantitative
Easing (QE) that has doubled the size of its balance sheet in just two months of
time span. As of now, banks are still hoarding on the cash and credit flow is yet to
resume supporting the demand.
Seriously speaking, this is a perilous and precarious situation. After exhausting all
the conventional measures to stimulate the economic growth being failed, the Fed
is left with fewer options now. Japan which has been living with almost zero rate
regimes for almost a decade recently cut its rate to 0.1%. So, what else the
governments or central banks can do to bring the economy on the track? In this
report, we will try to discuss what are the unconventional measures that can be
taken to shore up the economy growth and whether they are effective at all?
Deepak Tiwari
Research Analyst
deepakt@arthamoney.com
T: + 91 22 4063 3007
Designing the new fiscal stimulus program which may amount to US $ 700
billion to over 1 trillion.
Restoring and rebuilding confidence of consumers, investors and
business.
Chalking out quite extensive and tougher regulations for banks (limiting
their risk taking abilities and overall banking operations), consumer lending
and investments.
Creating more jobs. It will be a major challenge for him because already in
2008, over 1.7 million jobs have been lost and it’s expected that it will
touch 4 million in the coming year pegging the unemployment rate to over
9%.
Announcing new economic legislations where the primary focus should be
on doing whatever is necessary to get the economy going again.
Ensuring balance sheet cleaning up of banks and consistently increasing
funding for them.
Addressing the energy issue.
The “Change” Mr. Obama will bring in will definitely change the mind-sets of
regulators and great American lifestyle. It’s expected that the new regime will do
whatever is necessary to stabilize the financial sector and get credit flowing once
again. The previous $700 billion bailout was very badly handled. Now it’s yet to see
how the Mr. Obama and his retinue would handle the next stimulus package. We
expect that the primary focus would be on spending on investments that offer long-
term benefits in addition to the short-term benefit of stabilizing the economy. The
media reports suggest that Mr. Obama has made his first priority to sign an
economic recovery package with significant focus on infrastructure projects to help
boost jobs aiming at 3 million job creations over a couple of years.
No doubt, few things will change for forever. Americans wont like to bank just upon
credit lines and will start saving for the future. It is pertinent to mention that in US,
the savings rate is in negative for several years. And the banks too will be more
prudent and cautious in their lending policies.
Under Quantitative Easing (QE), the central banks inject commercial banks with
excess liquidity to promote private lending, leaving them with large stocks of
excess reserves, and therefore little risk of a liquidity shortage. It also involves
reducing the reserve requirements and buying treasury bonds for cash to offset
the reduction of money supply in the private sectors due to the collapse of credit
through "open" market operations. Moreover they buy asset-backed securities,
equities, and extend the terms of its commercial paper purchasing operation.
The Bank of Japan’s QE policy was introduced in March 2001 and terminated in
March 2005. The policy was introduced with the intention to open-up a new
possibility for further monetary easing when the interest rate was already as low as
zero. The policy was unprecedented and was an ambitious experiment by itself.
The effectiveness of it has been a point of great controversy since its introduction.
How does the increase in the CAB affect interest rates and other asset prices
viz. equity, government and corporate bonds? The short-term interest rates are
theoretically expected to decrease in response to an increase of the CAB.
Similarly, stock prices would rise and the yen would depreciate. However, the
influence on interest rates and stock prices largely has not been realized. The main
reason is that there was no room for short-term interest rate to decline. For the
exchange rate, the Japanese yen actually depreciated from 116.44 yen/$ to 133.89
yen/$ (between February 2001 and February 2002), but this is mainly because of
the economic recovery of the US and the instability of the Japanese financial
system. Furthermore, it is noted that the depreciation of yen would end deflation
but it is costly to Japan.
How does the policy affect the depository institutions? Theoretically, the
portfolio rebalance effect exists. In general, financial institutions consider the
changes of interest rates and construct their optimal portfolios by increasing or
decreasing loans, bonds, stocks, and other assets. When the short-term interest
rate drops, banks expect to increase their lending activities. However, the interest
rate seemed not to have a strong influence on banks' behaviors. The reason is that
the interest rate in Japan was near zero, and Japanese financial institutions could
not increase their risk-taking because they had large (non- performing loans)
NPAs. Thus, the portfolio rebalance effect was not realized.
1. Research reports by MIHIRA, Tsuyoshi (Toyo University), YAMASAWA, Nariyasu (Atomi University),
SEITANI, Haruki and SAITO, Jun (Economic and Social Research Institute). 2. International Journal of
Business, Winter 2006 by Kurihara, Yutaka
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