Sepanir South Pars Unit 116 - Report

FINAL REPORT
Sepanir Oil & Gas Energy Engineering Company
South Pars Gas Field Development Phases 15 & 16 Onshore Facilities: HAZOP Report (Unit 116 Ethane Treatment and Drying)
Rev. 0 August 2008
Environmental Resources Management 21/F Lincoln House 979 Kings Road Taikoo Place Island East, Hong Kong Telephone: (852) 2271 3000 Facsimile: (852) 2723 5660 E-mail: post.hk@erm.com http://www.erm.com
FINAL REPORT
Sepanir Oil & Gas Energy Engineering Company
South Pars Gas Field Development Phases 15 & 16 Onshore Facilities: HAZOP Report (Unit 116 -Ethane Treatment and Drying)
Rev. 0 August 2008
For and on behalf of ERM-Hong Kong, Limited Prepared by: Position: Approved by: Signed: Date: Venkatesh S HAZOP Chairman Venkatesh S
______________________________ 08- Aug -2008 ________________________________
This report has been prepared by ERM-Hong Kong, Limited with all reasonable skill, care and diligence within the terms of the Contract with the client, incorporating our General Terms and Conditions of Business and taking account of the resources devoted to it by agreement with the client. We disclaim any responsibility to the client and others in respect of any matters outside the scope of the above. This report is confidential to the client and we accept no responsibility of whatsoever nature to third parties to whom this report, or any part thereof, is made known. Any such party relies on the report at their own risk.
CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1 1.1 1.2 1.3 2
INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE OF WORK BACKGROUND OBJECTIVES OF STUDY SCOPE OF STUDY OVERVIEW OF UNIT 116 ETHANE TREATMENT AND DRYING HAZOP BASIS AND REFERENCED DOCUMENTATION BASIS DOCUMENTATION HAZOP METHODOLOGY NODES FOR STUDY GUIDEWORDS/PARAMETERS RISK RANKING WORKSHEETS RECOMMENDATIONS HAZOP PREMISE HAZOP SESSIONS STUDY PERIOD STUDY TEAM CONCLUSIONS & FOLLOW UP SUMMARY OF HAZOP FINDINGS FOLLOW UP ACTIONS REFERENCES
1 1 1 2
5 6 6 6 7 7 7 8 8 8 9 10 10 10 11 11 16 18
3 3.1 3.2 4 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 5 5.1 5.2 6 6.1 6.2 7
ANNEXES ANNEX A ANNEX B ANNEX C ANNEX D ANNEX E ANNEX F ANNEX G ANNEX H RISK RANKING METHODOLOGY ATTENDANCE LIST NODE LIST HAZOP WORKSHEET RISK RANKING WORKSHEET DRAWING LIST HAZOP REVIEW ACTION SHEET HAZOP MASTER P&IDS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Environmental Resources Management (ERM), an independent HSE consultancy, was commissioned by Sepanir Oil & Gas Energy Engineering Company (Sepanir) to carry out a Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) study for the South Pars Gas Field Development Phases 15 & 16 Onshore Facilities. This report contains the details of the HAZOP study carried out in July 2008 for the Ethane Treatment and Drying (Unit 116). Reports for other units are produced separately. The Study for the Ethane Treatment and Drying (Unit 116) covered all the associated piping and instrument diagrams (P&IDs) in Unit 116 and was conducted in accordance with the project HAZOP procedure [1]. Vendor packages for which design were not finalized at the time of study will be reviewed by Sepanir later. The study involved representatives from the owner, Pars Oil & Gas Company (POGC); South Pars Gas Company (SPGC), the operating company; Sepanir Oil & Gas Energy Engineering Company (Sepanir),appointed the representative for performing the Engineering, Procurement and Construction (EPC) contract of the onshore facilities; joint venture of Sazeh Consultants and Nargan Engineers & Constructors (hereafter referred to as JV) , responsible for the engineering activities of completion of detailed design ; and Prosernat, the Licensor for this unit The objective of the HAZOP study was to identify and evaluate safety hazards and to identify operability problems which, although not hazardous, could compromise the plant's ability to achieve design intent and productivity and recommend further safeguards as required. During the sessions a total of 17 nodes were studied and a total of 50 recommendations were generated for resolution or further investigation. A summary of the study for Unit 116 is as follows: Number of P&IDs: 21 Number of nodes studied: 17 Number of recommendations: 50
Follow-up and close-out of all recommendations will be monitored by Sepanir through the HAZOP Review Action Sheet.
ERM RISK
SOUTH PARS GAS FIELD DEVELOPMENT PHASES 15 &16 ONSHORE FACILITIES
INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE OF WORK
1.1
BACKGROUND A consortium consisting of GHORB, IOEC, ISOICO and SAFF, led by GHORB is responsible for executing the South Pars Gas Field Development Phases 15 & 16 Project for Pars Oil & Gas Company (POGC) in IRAN, which includes offshore platforms, offshore and onshore pipelines and onshore facilities. GHORB is responsible for the execution of the onshore facilities. GHORB has appointed Sepanir Oil & Gas Energy Engineering Company (Sepanir) as its representative for performing the EPC contract of the onshore facilities. The engineering activities of the onshore facilities including FEED, Extended FEED and completion of detailed design is being undertaken by a joint venture of Nargan Engineers & Constructors and Sazeh Consultants (hereafter referred to as JV). MAPNA Group and Omran Sahel are responsible for the EPC of some utility units. The onshore facilities will be located on the Iranian coast of Persian Gulf in ASSALUYEH (approximately 270 km South East of Bandar Bushehr). The total capacity of Phases 15 & 16 onshore facilities is 2000 MMSCFD of reservoir fluid. Phase 15 & 16 onshore Complex will include processing units, utilities, offsites and infrastructure necessary to produce sales gas, gaseous ethane cut of petrochemical feedstock quality, commercial grade propane and butane for export and stabilized condensate. Environmental Resources Management (ERM), an independent HSE consultancy was commissioned to carry out a Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) study for the South Pars Oil & Gas Phases 15 & 16 Onshore Facilities. This report presents the details for the study carried out for Ethane Treatment and Drying (Unit 116) of the project, in July 2008. The HAZOP studies for the other units will be undertaken over the remaining period of 2008 and separate reports will be issued.
1.2
OBJECTIVES OF STUDY The objectives of the HAZOP study were to identify and evaluate safety hazards and to identify operability problems which, although not hazardous, could compromise the plant's ability to achieve design intent and productivity. In particular, the objectives of the study were to: Identify safety related hazards and operability problems related to the design and operation of the systems;
ERM RISK
Determine the seriousness of the consequences for the identified problems; Identify existing engineering and procedural safeguards that will reduce the consequences related to the hazards; Evaluate the adequacy of existing engineering and procedural safeguards; and Recommend additional safeguards and improvements, where necessary.
1.3
SCOPE OF STUDY The HAZOP study covered the following process units, utilities and offsites for the South Pars Gas Field Development Development Phases 15 &16 Onshore Facilities listed in Table 1.1Error! Reference source not found.
Table 1.1
Scope of HAZOP Study for South Pars Gas Fields Development Phase 15 &16 Onshore Facilities
A. Scope of HAZOP Study for Sazeh portion Process Unit 100 Reception facilities Unit 101 Gas Treating (Licensor Unit by Prosernat) Unit 102 MEG Regeneration and Injection Unit 103 Condensate Stabilisation Unit 104 Dehydration and Mercury Guard Unit 105 Ethane Recovery Unit 109 Sour Water Stripper Unit 110 Condensate Backup Stabilisation Unit 111 Propane Refrigeration Utilities / Offsites Unit 122 Fuel Gas Unit 143 Condensate Storage and Export Unit 145 Propane Refrigerant Storage Unit 146 Chemical Storage Unit 181/ 182/ 185/ 189 Utility Distribution Interconnecting and Distribution B. Scope of HAZOP Study for Nargan portion Process Unit 106 Export Gas Compression and Metering Unit 107 NGL Fractionation Unit 108 Sulphur Recovery & TGT Unit (Licensor Unit by Lurgi) Unit 113 C3/ C4 Caustic Regeneration Unit (Licensor Unit by Axens) Unit 114 Propane Treatment and Drying (Licensor Unit by Axens)
ERM RISK
Unit 115 Butane Treatment and Drying (Licensor Unit by Axens) Unit 116 Ethane Treatment and Drying (Licensor Unit by Prosernat) Utilities / Offsites Unit 140 Flare and Blowdown Unit 141 Utilities and Offsite Drains Unit 142 Burn Pit Unit 144 Sulphur Storage and Solidification Unit 147 Propane Storage Unit 148 Butane Storage and Export Unit 191 Utility Distribution Interconnecting and Distribution C. Scope of HAZOP Study for MAPNA (Utilities/Offsites) Unit 121 Steam Generation and Distribution Unit 123 Instrument and Service Air Unit 124 Nitrogen High purity nitrogen Plant Unit 125B Sea Water Storage Distribution and Outfall Effluent Reject to Sea Unit 126B Desalination Water Storage Unit 127 Water Polishing (Package) Unit 128 Potable Water Unit 129 Waste Effluent Disposal Unit 130 Firewater Unit 131 Diesel Unit 132 Cooling Water D. Scope of HAZOP Study for Omran Sahel (Utilities/Offsites) Unit 125A Seawater Intake Unit 126A Sea Water Desalination Package
The HAZOP Study covered all of the Process and Instrumentation Diagrams (P&IDs), as listed in Annex F. The list of drawings used for each study node is presented in the Node List in Annex C. For systems with similar configurations, only one system was reviewed as a representative case and therefore, the comments and actions will also be applicable for such similar systems. The following packages and other process system items were not covered in the current study and will be reviewed later by Sepanir. These are listed in Table 1.2. Table 1.2 Package/ Items requiring further review
Package /Item Relevant P&ID Nos Comments
ERM RISK
Package /Item Anti foam Package
Relevant P&ID Nos 1516-0116-0030-0121
Comments Vendor Package to reviewed later by Sepanir Vendor Package to reviewed later by Sepanir Vendor Package to reviewed later by Sepanir be
Filtration Package
1516-0116-0030-0121A
be
Regeneration Control System
Gas
Heat 1516-0116-0030-0105
be
ERM RISK
OVERVIEW OF UNIT 116 ETHANE TREATMENT AND DRYING The inlet feed gas to Ethane Treatment and Drying unit from Unit 105 is fed first to Feed Gas Knock out drum, liquid is collected and sent to drain. Overhead condensate feed gas is then routed to solvent absorber where MEA is used to absorb CO2. Sweet ethane from the top of solvent absorber is sent to the Treated Gas Knock-Out Drum. Wet sweet gas from the overhead of the Treated Gas Knock-out Drum and sent to the Dehydration Section and the knockedout solvent is sent to rich solvent MP flash drum. The wet sweet gas from ethane treatment section is cooled in ethane cooler to condense away the water in the wet gas to reduce the load on dryers. Cooled gas is sent to dryer inlet separator to separate out water. Saturated gas leaving the inlet separator is passed through molecular sieves dryers to reduce moisture content to about 0.1 ppm mol. At any one time, one bed is in adsorption mode and the other in regeneration mode. The dry gas exiting the bottom of the dryer is passed through dryer-after filter to remove any molecular sieves fines and sent for export to petrochemical plant. A slip stream of clean dry gas from the outlet of filer is used as regeneration gas. This gas is heated in the ethane regeneration heater and passes through the molecular sieve beds in the upward direction. Temperature control for regeneration to dryer is achieved through adjustment of fuel gas to furnace. The wet and hot regeneration gas is cooled against ambient air in regeneration air cooler and condensed liquid separated in the regeneration gas separator. The recovered gas is then routed to suction of regeneration gas compressor and sent back to the inlet of ethane cooler. Lean solvent is supplied from storage tank and pumped by sulfrex lean solvent transfer pump. This solvent is sent mainly to the solvent absorber with a small stream to flash gas absorber. The lean solvent enters the solvent absorber and leaves the solvent absorber bottom as rich solvent. This rich solvent is then sent to the bottom of the rich solvent MP flash drum. The gas flashed in MP flash drum are passed through flash gas absorber and sent to boilers. The knocked-out solvent from MP flash drum is sent via rich/lean solvent exchanger and sent to the regenerator column. Vapours from regenerator column overhead are sent to flare. The liquid from regenerator bottom exchanges heat with rich amine in rich/lean amine exchangers and further cooled in the lean solvent trim cooler. The cooled lean amine is sent to the solvent storage tank. Heat for regeneration in the regenerator is provided by reboilers with heat supplied by LP Steam Wash water system is provided to remove any amine carry-over to the overhead of the solvent absorber.
ERM RISK
HAZOP BASIS AND REFERENCED DOCUMENTATION
3.1
BASIS The basis for the study was primarily the P&IDs issued for review, marked-up with additional information, where applicable. The HAZOP Master P&IDs, with mark-ups indicating the Nodes, are presented in Annex H. In order for the team to fully understand the intent of the Section, a process description was given, and this was noted in the HAZOP software for each Node, see Annex C.
3.2
DOCUMENTATION The following documentation was also made available during the HAZOP study and used as reference during meetings: Process Description for each Unit ; Process and Instrument Diagrams (P&IDs); Process Flow Diagrams (PFDs); Material Flow Diagrams (MFDs); Cause and Effect Diagram; Equipment Process Datasheets; Unit Plot Plan and Overall Plot Plan; Flare Load Summary; Line List; Process Description for Safety System and Emergency Shutdown Philosophy
ERM RISK
HAZOP METHODOLOGY The HAZOP study was conducted in accordance with the project HAZOP Procedures [1], issued by ERM. The procedure is briefly explained in the following paragraphs.
4.1
NODES FOR STUDY Annex C includes a list of nodes and their description. The design conditions, the identification numbers of equipment involved in the node and the reference drawing numbers are also included in the node listing. Design comments/ P&ID corrections (if any) were marked-up on P&IDs but not recorded in HAZOP. The Nodes are marked on the Master drawing, presented in Annex H.
4.2
GUIDEWORDS/PARAMETERS The guidewords and parameters used for the study are presented in Table 4.1. Each node was considered in detail to identify any potential problems in safety or operations that may arise due to deviations in the process parameters. The Causes and Consequences of each deviation were identified and the HAZOP team then evaluated the adequacy of existing safeguards, and where necessary, additional safeguards recommended as Actions.
Table 4.1
HAZOP Guidewords/ Parameters and Related Deviations

Deviations No/Low Flow More/High Flow Reverse/Misdirected Flow Less/Low Pressure High Pressure Less/Low Temperature High Temperature Low Level Guide Word No/Low More/High Reverse Less/Low More/High Less/Low High Low Parameter Flow Flow Flow Pressure Pressure Temperature Temperature Level Includes loss of level, interface low level and loss of interface level Includes interface high level Includes vacuum Comment
High Level Contamination/ Composition Change Start-up/ Shutdown /Maintenance Hazards
High As well as Others
Level Composition
ERM RISK
Deviations Utility Failure
Guide Word Others
Parameter
Comment Includes air, power, cooling water, nitrogen etc.
Others
4.3
RISK RANKING A simple risk ranking approach was proposed to be adopted to rank those hazardous scenarios where the parties had differing views on the adequacy of safeguards or the need for additional safeguards. Details of the risk ranking procedures are included in Annex A. However, since there was agreement on safeguards for all the points, no risk ranking was required to be carried out. Hence risk ranking was not done for Unit 116.
4.4
WORKSHEETS The session proceedings were recorded using PHA-Pro 7 [2] developed by Dyadem Corporation. The records were projected on a screen for comment and agreement by the team members during the sessions. For this study, a full recording approach was adopted for all guidewords/deviations listed in Table 4.1 whereby every deviation considered by team was recorded even when no significant causes or consequences were found. For guideword others, however, recording by exception was adopted (i.e. where an entry is recorded only when the team makes a recommendation or the issue is considered significant). The completed worksheets are included in Annex D.
4.5
RECOMMENDATIONS A number of recommendations were identified during the HAZOP study, which, in the team's opinion, will improve the safety or the operability of the facility. A list of recommendations is included in Section 6.
A dedicated form with all HAZOP recommendations is attached in Annex G. This form will be used by JV to fill in the agreed resolution.
ERM RISK
4.6
HAZOP PREMISE Some assumptions were made regarding the basis of design and these were generally agreed by the HAZOP study team. The main items are listed below: In case of a parallel train (i.e. identical equipment), the study was conducted on one train only. Similarly, in case of parallel equipment (with duty and standby/spare equipment) inside the train, the study was conducted for one set of equipment. The actions from this study will therefore apply for such parallel systems as well. The study has however, considered the impact of simultaneous operation of parallel systems including the control requirements and the effect of trip of one system on the other. A single check valve was deemed to be an acceptable safeguard against reverse flow, unless the team felt that failure of the valve would lead to unacceptable consequences, or the differential pressure is so high that leakage would be inevitable. Equipment/machinery was assumed to be designed, manufactured, and inspected with no defect. Rupture of equipment was not considered except for tube rupture/ seal leak. Plant was assumed to be well maintained.
ERM RISK
HAZOP SESSIONS
5.1
STUDY PERIOD The HAZOP Study for Reception Facilities (Unit 116) of South Pars Gas Field Development Phase 15 & 16 Onshore Facilities was held over a period of 3 days between 21st July 2008 and 24th July 2008, 22nd /23rd July 2008 with presence of Licensor, Prosernat at Nargan Consultants Office in Tehran, Iran.
5.2
STUDY TEAM The HAZOP team comprised a multidisciplinary team of personnel involved with the project and having adequate experience of design, instrumentation, operations, maintenance, safety and loss prevention. Representatives from Pars Oil & Gas Company (POGC), South Pars Gas Company (SPGC), Sepanir Oil & Gas Energy Engineering Company, joint venture of Sazeh Consultants and Nargan Engineers & Constructors (JV), and Prosernat participated in the HAZOP sessions, which were chaired by an independent consultant from ERM. The details (names, company and discipline) of the HAZOP team members who attended the HAZOP sessions are presented in Annex B.
ERM RISK
10
CONCLUSIONS & FOLLOW UP
6.1
SUMMARY OF HAZOP FINDINGS During the sessions, a total of 50 recommendations, as listed in Table 5.2, were identified for resolution or further investigation. Each recommendation can be classified according to the following categories: Hardware Change Scenario to be mitigated by appropriate equipment, piping, valves - block valve, check valve, safety valve etc. Minor Change Scenario to be mitigated by appropriate instrument set-point, alarm, procedural changes or other minor changes etc. Design Confirmation Scenario to be mitigated by confirming the design basis, appropriate control schemes, design philosophy Review Further study/review required on design basis, design/ operating philosophy and examine if further mitigation or protection is required.
A summary of the HAZOP recommendations under these categories is included in Table 6.1, while details are included in Table 6.2. Some recommendations were also reviewed with Licensor, Prosernat, and their comments were recorded and included in Table 6.2 below. Table 6.1 HAZOP Recommendations Summary forEthane Treatment and Drying (Unit 116)
Recommendation type (1) Hardware change - block valves, check valves, PZV and other significant hardwares (2) Software alarms or minor actions/procedural changes (3) Design confirmation relief valve basis/other design aspects (4) Review - further study/ review required Count 4 16 12 18
Table 6. 2
List of Recommendations for Reception Facilities (Unit 116)

Recommendations (HAZOP) 1. Review the provision of high level alarm with LT-0161 on solvent absorber bottom 2. Operating procedure to include chemical cleaning of the system prior to start-up. Place(s) Used Consequences : 2.1.2.1, 2.4.2.1, 2.8.2.1 Consequences : 2.10.1.1, 4.13.1.1, 5.13.1.1, 7.10.1.1 Licensor Comment Actio n By JV Recom. Categories 4
JV
ERM RISK
11
Recommendations (HAZOP) 3. Operating procedure to include proper cleaning and wetting of the column before opening for maintenance. 4. Note 13 on P&ID 114 to be modified to reflect the FG connection is for start-up pressurisation, cold circulation and hot circulation (till gas is introduced) 5. Review the requirement of amine removal facilities in the boiler area in Unit 121
Place(s) Used Consequences : 5.15.1.1 Consequences : 4.1.5.2
Licensor Comment
Actio n By JV
Recom. Categories 2
JV
Consequences : 4.3.1.2, 4.8.4.1, 4.11.1.2, 7.2.2.1 Consequences : 4.3.1.2, 4.8.4.1 As per Licensor, increasing the height between packed bed and demister in C-113 will not help much. The configuration suggested is to provide no pockets and a knock-out drum at boiler inlet. Material of knockout drum should be SS 316L As per Licensor, the bypass valve (PV0182A/B) configuration should be such that both the sides of bypass valves are free draining to the main line. Note should be added to P&ID 1516-116-00300115
JV
6. Review the possibility of increasing the height of C-113 between the packed bed and demister to act as a knock-out drum.
JV
7. Check the consistency of requirements of steam tracing upstream and downstream of PV-0182A
Consequences : 4.16.1.1
JV
If KOD is provided as per suggestion against Item 18, steam tracing of line to boilers may not be required. 8. Review the necessity of extra PSV with adequate capacity on reflux drum if the regenerator PSVs (PSV-0201A/B) cannot protect reflux drum in case of air cooler failure 9. Review if the provision of check valve at the inlet of reflux to the regenerator column C-112 is required 10. Review the backpressure for PV-0221 as presently it is connected to MP flare. 11. Operating manual to address the steps for start-up and maintenance procedures in order to avoid toxic gas release to the atmosphere. Consequences : 5.2.4.1, 5.7.1.1, 5.9.1.1, 5.12.3.1 Consequences : 5.6.3.1 Consequences : 5.6.5.1 Consequences : 5.15.2.1 JV 4
JV
JV JV
4 2
ERM RISK
12
Recommendations (HAZOP) 12. Operating manual to address warming up procedures for reboiler E-112 13. Ensure that pipe downstream of LV0212 is designed for two-phase flow. 14. The protection of the tank against gas breakthrough and fire case needs to be reviewed by JV with Vendor
Place(s) Used Consequences : 5.15.3.1, 6.16.1.1 Consequences : 6.3.2.1 Consequences : 5.8.4.2, 6.4.1.1
Licensor Comment
Actio n By JV
Recom. Categories 2
JV As per Licensor, if PSV is sized for fire case, gas blowby should normally be taken care of. Since the pressure available for blowby is very low, Licensor has not considered blowby case. However, this needs to be reviewed by JV and tank Vendor. JV
3 4
15. Provide independent transmitter with low low flow alarm with interlock to close SDV-0007 16. Operating procedure to include seal maintenance using cold condensate in solvent storage tank. 17. Operating procedures to include use of condensate in the tank 18. Confirm the vent line of sump drum D117 is sized for gas blowby (assuming maximum drain valve size and maximum pressure u/s) , maximum liquid inflow (for flashing gas and blocked condition)and vaporisation(if any) 19. Confirm the max. allowable temp in the drain header (based on drain piping design)and this may be mentioned in the operating procedure 20. Procedure to govern operation for sump drum draining
Consequences : 7.1.3.2 Consequences : 7.5.5.1 Consequences : 7.8.4.1 Consequences : 10.4.1.1, 10.4.2.1, 10.4.3.1, 10.8.1.1 Consequences : 6.13.3.3, 6.13.5.2, 10.6.1.1 Consequences : 10.8.1.1 Consequences : 10.14.2.1
JV
JV
JV JV
2 3
JV
JV JV
2 3
21. Ensure the coating material is compatible with the maximum operating temp of the sump drum.(eg steam-out condition) 22. Operating procedure to strip amine through the use of live steam and sampling before evacuation 23. Bypass valve for fuel gas rotameter FG-0101 to be made CSC 24. Review relocation of RO-0091 to downstream of bypass junction. 25. Procedures for skimming/draining to be included in operating manual. 26. Operating procedure to include procedures for diverting ethane to export gas line.
Consequences : 10.14.3.1 Consequences : 11.4.1.1 Consequences : 11.4.1.1 Consequences : 11.5.1.1 Consequences : 1.8.3.1
JV
JV JV JV JV
2 4 2 2
ERM RISK
13
Recommendations (HAZOP) 27. Possibility of relocating FIC-0172 and relevant valves and instrumentations to downstream dehydration section to be reviewed during detailed engineering stage
Place(s) Used Consequences : 1.4.2.1, 1.8.5.1
Licensor Comment Licensor agrees to relocate control valve FV-0172 downstream of dehydration section but wants to keep flow indication FI0172 at present location As per licensor, since there is no blockage in between solvent absorber and D-112 and PSV of solvent absorber is sized to take care of fire in D-112. Hence, there is no necessity of providing a separate relief valve for D-112.
Actio n By JV
Recom. Categories 4
28. Review the requirement of installing a PSV on D-112 overhead for fire case during detailed engineering
JV
29. Review the start-up procedure after relocation of FIC-0172 30. Review the requirement of two independent PAHH-0281 A and B. One PAHH in the common header shall serve the purpose. 31. Review the actuation of FV-0183 by HV instead of FIC-0183.
Consequences : 3.16.1.1 Consequences : 12.1.4.1 Licensor have no objection in using one PAHH on the common discharge header of P-124A/B LIcensor agrees to the use of HV instead of FIC-0183 for start-up
JV JV
4 4
JV
32. Confirm that sequence logic is implemented is such a way that sequence control confirms the position of each valve at the end of each step before proceeding to next step. Sequence failure alarm will be generated in this case
JV
33. Review the requirement of strengthening of molecular sieve support for blowdown case when the flow through molecular sieve will be higher than the design flow rate. Drier vendor may be informed in this regard 34. Confirm that loading and unloading procedure is in place to carryout loading and unloading of molecular sieve to / from driers. Also enough provision (like space for handling loading / unloading equipment) need to be ensured to facilitate loading and unloading 35. Review provision for isolation of vent by single ball valve in the ethane filter (under filter vender scope). This may be decided based on project specification 36. Consider specifying the 2" ball valve in the vent line on ethane filter as CSC type
JV
JV
JV
JV
ERM RISK
14
Recommendations (HAZOP) 37. Consider closing the regeneration compressor suction SDV after a certain time delay of actuating compressor trip due to any reason. This may be confirmed based on compressor vendor requirement 38. Consider deleting hydrocarbon skimming facilities along with skimming drum D-116.and associated piping
Place(s) Used Consequences : 16.14.1.1
Licensor Comment
Actio n By JV
Recom. Categories 4
Skimming drum can be deleted. However, Licensor will review this internally and revert. As per experience in Phase 4 and 5, the skimming facilities are not used. Licensor can agree to delete fuel gas connection provided purging with nitrogen is done prior to connecting the drum to flare during start-up. Licensor will review internally according to existing standards.The sequence of operation for taking the vessel for maintenance is to be provided to the Licensor by Licensee. Licensor can agree to delete cold condensate connection provided external water washing system is provided in the plant. Licensor will review internally according to existing standards. The sequence of operation for taking the vessel for maintenance is to be provided to the Licensor by Licensee.
JV
39. Review the deletion of fuel gas connection to the drum so that the drum floats with flare header which has relevant protection like continuous sweeping.
JV
40. Cold condensate is provided for washing of drum prior to maintenance. Utility points are provided for connecting utility water hoses. Consider deleting hard-piped connection for cold condensate,
JV
ERM RISK
15
Recommendations (HAZOP) 41. Consider deleting the fuel gas connection to D-116. The drum can float with flare,.
Place(s) Used Consequences : 11.4.1.1
Licensor Comment Licensor can agree to delete fuel gas connection provided purging with nitrogen is done prior to connecting the drum to flare during start-up. Licensor will review internally according to existing standards.The sequence of operation for taking the vessel for maintenance is to be provided to the Licensor by Licensee. Action suggested by Licensor
Actio n By JV
Recom. Categories 3
42. On pump P-115 discharge, there are 2 drain lines provided (without any isolation valve in between). The drain line (3/4"-AM.116.100103-B03N-N) may be deleted. 43. Delete SDV-0001/0002 on seawater line to E-101 and replaced by manual isolation valve. 44. Delete SDV-0005 on ethane dryer inlet separator as SDV-0022 is also provided on the same line 45. Provide high and low pressure alarm for PIC-0046 46. For SDV-0087A/B, it should be made fail close (FC)
JV
Consequences : 14.1.4.1, 14.1.5.1 Consequences : 14.1.8.1 Consequences : 14.5.2.1 Consequences : 16.13.2.1, 17.1.2.2, 17.13.2.1 Consequences : 14.5.2.1 Consequences : 14.14.1.1 Consequences : 15.6.1.1 Consequences : 16.2.2.1
JV
JV
JV
JV
47. Provide high and low pressure alarm for PI-0026 on D-101 overhead 48. Check the suitability of seawater outlet line design pressure for tube leak case in E-101 49. Operating procedures to include manual operation to be done under close supervision. 50. The vent on ethane oily water flash drum D-104 to flare should be sized for gas breakthrough case.
JV JV
2 3
JV
JV
Note: Place(s) Used 2.1.2.1 means Node 2, Deviation 1, Cause 2, Consequence 1. See HAZOP worksheets in Annex D for further details.
6.2
FOLLOW UP ACTIONS Proper follow-up and close-out of all recommendations will be monitored through the HAZOP Study Action & Response sheets. These Action &
ERM RISK SOUTH PARS GAS FIELD DEVELOPMENT PHASES 15 &16 ONSHORE FACILITIES
16
Response sheets filled with the agreed resolution will be issued as a separate HAZOP Action and Response Report by JV.
ERM RISK
17
REFERENCES The following documents were referenced during the preparation of this report: (1) ERM-Hong Kong, Ltd., South Pars Gas Field Development Phases 15 &16 Onshore Facilities- HAZOP Procedure (April 2008, Rev, 2). (2) Dyadem International Ltd PHA Pro 7.0 - HAZOP Recording Software.
ERM RISK
18
Annex A
Risk Ranking Methodology
Unit 116 Ethane Treatment and Drying
Risk Ranking Metholodogy
A.1
RISK RANKING The team may adopt a simple risk ranking approach to rank those hazards scenarios where the parties have differing views on the adequacy of safe guards or the need for additional safeguards. Risk is a function of severity and likelihood and the methodology for the risk ranking is described in the following paragraphs
A.1.1
Severity Three parameters are considered for the severity, namely Health and Safety, Environmental Impact and Economical Losses as shown in Table A.1
Table A.1
Hazard Severity Level in terms of Health and Safety, Environment Impact and Economical Loss
Severity Health and Safety Economic Losses Environmental Impact
S1
Minor injury
Minimal equipment damage, < 1 day loss of production
Release with no agency notification or permit violation.
S2
Serious permanent injury to one or more persons, death to one person
Major equipment Release which results in damage, >1 to <7 days agency notification or permit loss of production notification
S3
Death to several people (1 to 5 fatalities)
Severe equipment damage, >7 to <30 days loss of production
Significant release with offsite impact.
S4
Catastrophic (more than 5 fatalities)/Offsite fatality
Total destruction of some process areas, > 1 month loss of production
Significant release with serious long term off-site impact
Table A.2 below shows the guidelines for assigning the severity of safety consequences.
ERM Risk Annex A
1/7
South Pars Gas Field Development Phases 15 &16 Onshore Facilities
Table A.2
Guidelines for assigning Safety Consequence Severity

Fluids Moderate (Seal leak/Small piping leak) S2 S3 S3 Large (Rupture pipe/equipment) S3 S3/S4 S3/S4 of
Sweet Gas Sour Gas Flashing liquids : C3/C4/liquid or liquids handled above boiling points Evaporating liquid
S2
S3
A.1.2
Likelihood The likelihood of the unwanted scenarios (i.e. outcome scenario such as fire or explosion causing fatality or a toxic leak causing fatality) will depend on the frequency of the initiating event (W), operator exposure probability (A) (for safety consequences) and enabling factor (E) that makes the hazardous situation develop to the undesired consequence.
A.1.3
Frequency of Initiating Event (W) The frequency of initiating event is classified into 3 categories as follows:

W1: Very Low ( may occur about 1 time per 30 years or over the plant life) W2: Low ( may occur about 1 time per 10 years) W3: High (may occur about 1 time per year)
As part of the frequency of demand analysis or following the consequence assessment, the provision of other safeguards for the specific demand/ consequence scenario will also be reviewed. For each such safeguard identified, also called Independent Protection Layer (IPL), a risk reduction factor will be determined. This risk reduction factor may be applied to the originally identified frequency of demand. The study takes credit for the independent protection layers (IPL) that mitigate the likelihood or consequence. A reduction factor of 10 will reduce W by one level while a reduction factor of 100 will reduce W by two levels. Table A.3 shows the rule set for the frequency of demand and Table A.4 shows the rule set for Independent Protective Layer (IPL).
ERM Risk Annex A 2/7 South Pars Gas Field Development Phases 15 &16 Onshore Facilities
Table A.3
Rule Set for Frequency of Demand

Scenario Initiating Event Frequency (per year) >1.E-01 >1.E-00 (OREDA, 7.9E-01 Frequency of Demand (W) W2 W3 W3
Control loop failure Analyser failure Pump Failure Loss of Flow conservatively W3) Positive Displacement (OREDA) Reciprocating (OREDA)
Pump
Trip
1.1E-00
W3
Compressor
Trip
2.1.E-00
W3
Single Mechanical Pump Seal Leak Double Mechanical Pump Seal Leak with announcement Canned/Magnetic Drive Pump Leak Loss of electrical power General Utility Failure Heat Exch. tube leak
1.E-01 1.E-02
W2 W1
1.E-02 1.E-01 1.E-01 1.E-02
W1 W2 W2 W1 (<100 tubes) W2 (>100 tubes)
Operator Failure (if considered in the analysis) W3 Under stress, emergency, action performed more than once a quarter. Unstressed, action performed more than once a quarter. Under stress, emergency, action performed once/Qtr. or less Unstressed, action performed once/Qtr. or less W2 W2 W1
ERM Risk Annex A
3/7
Table A.4
Rule Set for Independent Protective Layer

Risk Reduction Factor 100 10 100 1000 10 10 to 100 (Based on actual operating experience with similar device) 0 10
Independent Protection Layer Pressure Relief Device (mechanical safety trip) SIS - SIL 1 SIS - SIL 2 SIS - SIL 3 BPCS, when independent of initiating event Internal mechanical safety trips that are independent of the SIS or BPCS
Operator response under high stress, average training Operator response to Alarms with procedures, low stress, recognized event and least 5 minutes to respond. Double Check Valves designed for the hazardous scenario Single Check valve Dikes when capable of mitigating the initiating event. This is an IPL only for environmental events.
10
0 100
A.1.4
Exposure Probability (Applicable to safety consequences only) Exposure probability accounts for the frequency of and exposure time of an operator in the hazardous zone. It is calculated by determining the length of time in the area occupied by an operator during a normal working period. A0 (100% presence) will be selected when the persons are likely to be present at the time of the hazardous situation, e.g. the demand occurs during local manual start or the hazardous situation may occur after the persons have arrived on the scene to investigate a developing abnormal situation or during startup or maintenance when persons are present near the source of hazard. A default A1 (10% chance of presence) will be selected if the person is not
ERM Risk Annex A
4/7
always present as it is expected during normal operations that operators will take rounds about couple of times during a shift. A.1.5 Enabling Factor An enabling event is an event or condition that makes possible another event, it must be present for the scenario to develop, even if not directly triggering the scenario (i.e. probability of ignition, etc.). Table A.5 below shows the rule set for enabling event. Table A.5 Rule Set for Ignition as Enabling Factor
Ordinary Hydrocarbons Release (Kg) Probability of Ignition 1.0E-02 Risk Reduction Factor E2 Easily Ignitable* Probability of Ignition 1.0E-01 Risk Reduction Factor E1
Minor leak / seal leak (< 1ton) Major leak (1 to 10 ton) Large leak (> 10 ton)
1.0E-01
E1
E0
E0
E0
Notes: * Hydrogen, Acetylene, Ethylene, Ethylene Oxide, Propylene Oxide (above BP), Butadiene
Rule Set for Equipment Failure (considered as Enabling Factor or as part of consequence assessment) Probability of vessel or pipeline failure due to overpressure will be determined as follows:
1.5 to 2 times man allowable working pressure: flange gasket leaking be assumed > 2 times working pressure: rupture will be assumed
Probability of vessel or pipeline failure due to significant design temperature exceedance: 10% Rule Set for Fatality Probability for toxic release (considered as Enabling Factor)
ERM Risk Annex A 5/7 South Pars Gas Field Development Phases 15 &16 Onshore Facilities
For toxic release, depending on the size of the leak and concentration, fatality probability of 10% or 100% may be considered. The overall likelihood (L) of the outcome consequence is calculated as follows: Likelihood (L) = Initiating event (W) x Exposure probability (A) x Enabling factor (E) x Risk reduction due to IPL (IPL) The overall likelihood (L) of the outcome consequences can be classified into 4 categories as follows:

L1 : Extremely unlikely to occur in a plants lifetime( < 1 in 1000 years) L2 : Unlikely to occur in a plants lifetime ( < 1 in 100 years) L3 : One incident in a plants lifetime (about 1 in 30 years) L4 : Several incidents in a plants lifetime ( > 1 in 10 years)
A.1.6
Risk Ranking Matrix A qualitative risk ranking of each of the consequence scenario is carried out using the Risk Ranking Matrix as shown in Table A.6. Where L denotes Low risk (i.e. Acceptable risk), M1 and M2 denote Medium risk (tolerable if ALARP) and safeguards may be required to reduce the gap by 1 and 2 levels respectively; H1 and H2 denote High risk (i.e. maybe considered as unacceptable risk) that needs to be reduced by 1 and 2 levels respectively to reach the ALARP region or 3 and 4 levels to reduce to acceptable level. Table A.7 shows the typical likelihood levels assuming default A1 and E0 values with different IPLs credit taken.
Table A.6
Risk Ranking Matrix Severity S1 L4 M1 L L L S2 M2 M1 L L

6/7
S3 H1 M2 M1 L
S4 H2 H1 M2 M1
Likelihood
ERM Risk Annex A
L1
L2
L3
Table A.7
Typical Likelihood Levels assuming Operator Exposure (A1) and Enabling Factor (E0).
Initiating Event Frequency W1 A E IPL=0 IPL =10 IPL =100
A1 (10%) A1 (10%) A1 (10%)
E0 (100%) E0 (100%) E0 (100%)
L2
L1
L1
W2
L3
L2
L1
W3
L4
L3
L2
It may be noted that the above approach for risk ranking is consistent with the approach for SIL determination as per IEC 61511. The above approach is easier to adopt/follow as it starts with initiating events which can be easily identified by the team. This approach also provides traceability with regard to how the outcome frequency is derived by considering enabling factors, instead of the team being asked to directly assign a likelihood value.
ERM Risk Annex A
7/7
Annex B
Attendance List
Unit 116 Ethane Treatment and Drying Team Members Subhash Chander Tandon Ronnie Lim Abbas Tarangar Hamidreza Pourkarim Younes Fallah Nasim Amirghasemi Hamid Kalatjari Khodadad Kamali Ahmad Khaviari Massoud Sadra Hamid Doroodi Arnaud Grison Antoine Carite Hussein Salehi Reza Salipi Masumeh Zarei Naser Fallah Masoume Zendehdel ERM ERM Sepanir Sepanir Sepanir Nargan Sazeh POGC Sepanir Sepanir POGC Prosernat Prosernat Sazeh SPGC Nargan Nargan Nargan Company
Attendance Title HAZOP facilitator HAZOP scribe Process Engineer Process Engineer Instrument Engineer Process Engineer Process Process Safety Safety Advisor Instrument Engineer Process Director Process Engineer Process Engineer Process Engineer Instrument Engineer Project Engineer Process Engineer Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present Present 1. 21/07/2008 Present Present Present 2. 23/07/2008 Present Present Present Partial Present Present 3. 24/07/2008 Present Present Present Partial Present Present
ERM Risk Annex B
1/1
Annex C
Node List

Nodes 1. Feed gas inlet and KOD upto feed gas filter inlet including filter bypass Node Description/ Design Intent Feed Gas from Unit 105 is routed to Feed Gas KO Drum 116-D-111. The liquid collected in the feed gas KO Drum is removed at the bottom and sent to drain. The condensate free gas is lead to solvent absorber (116-C-111). 2. Solvent absorber bottom upto solvent flash drum The rich solvent from solvent absorber 116C-111 bottom is sent to rich solvent MP flash drum (116-D-113), where it enters at the bottom.
Node List
Design/ Operating Conditions Feed Gas KO Drum Design Pressure/ Design Temp : 39 barg/ 85 degC Equipment ID 116-D-111 ( Feed Gas KO drum) Drawings P&ID 1516-116-00300111 Rev O P&ID 1516-116-00300112 Rev O P&ID 1516-116-00300101 Rev 3 Solvent Absorber Design Pressure/ Design Temp : 39 barg/FV/ 85 degC Rich Solvent MP flash drum Design Pressure/ Design Temp : 14 barg/FV/ 5degC(min)/ 85 deg C(max) 116-C-111 (Solvent Absorber), 116-D-113 (Rich Solvent MP Flash Drum) P&ID 1516-116-00300112 Rev O P&ID 1516-116-00300114 Rev O Comment
3. Solvent absorber top circuit including treated gas KOD and upto solvent flash drum inlet
Sweet ethane from the top of solvent absorber (116-C-111) is routed to treated gas KOD (116-D-112). From treated gas KOD, the sweet gas is withdrawn from top and sent to Dehydration Section whereas the knocked-out solvent is sent to rich solvent MP flash drum (116-D-113) and it enters at the top of D-113.
Solvent Absorber Design Pressure/ Design Temp : 39 barg/FV/ 85 degC Treated Gas KO drum Design Pressure/Design Temp : 39 barg/FV/85 degC Rich Solvent MP flash drum Design Pressure/ Design Temp : 14 barg/FV/ 5degC(min)/ 85 deg C(max)
116-C-111 (Solvent Absorber), 116-D-112 (Treated gas KO drum), 116D-113 (Rich Solvent MP flash Drum)
P&ID 1516-116-00300112 Rev O P&ID 1516-116-00300113 Rev O P&ID 1516-116-00300114 Rev O
4. Solvent flash drum and absorber top [upto reflux inlet] and bottom circuits[upto tank inlet]
The gases flashed in 116-D-113 are passed through flash gas absorber 116-C-113 and sent to boilers. The knocked-out solvent from 116-D-113 bottom is sent via rich /lean solvent exchanger 116-E-111 to the top of solvent regenerator 116-C-112.
Rich solvent MP Flash drum Design Pressure/ Design temp : 14 barg/ FV/ 5degC(min)/ 85degC(max) Rich/Lean amine solvent exchanger Design Pressure/ design temp : 14.4 barg/ 6.5barg+FV/ 131 degC/ 142 degC
116-D-113 (Rich Solvent MP flash drum), 116E-111 (Rich/lean amine solvent exchanger)
P&ID 1516-116-00300114 Rev O P&ID 1516-116-00300115 Rev O P&ID 1516-116-00300116 Rev O P&ID 1516-116-00300122 Rev O
5. Regenerator top circuit including reflux
Vapours from solvent regenerator 116-C112 are routed to regenerator overhead condenser 116-A-111. The overhead gas from D-114 is sent to flare. Condensed liquid together with acid gas is sent to reflux drum 116-D-114. Liquid from reflux drum bottom is pumped via reflux pumps 116-P112A/B. to solvent regenerator 116-C-112. The pumps are also provided with min flow bypass.
Solvent Regenerator Design Pressure/ Design temp : 5.3 barg/ FV/ 5 deg C(min)/ 142 deg C(max) Regenerator Overhead Condenser Design Pressure/ Design Temp : 5 barg + FV/ 132 degC Reflux Pump Design Capacity/ Shut-off pressure : 11.8 m3/hr/ 10.7 barg Reflux Drum Design Pressure/ Design Temp : 5 barg+ Fv/ 5degC(min)/ 105 degC(max)
116-C-112 (Solvent Regenerato r), 116-A111 (Regenerat or Overhead Condenser) , 116-P112A/B (Reflux Pumps), 116-D-114 (Reflux Drum)
P&ID 1516-116-00300116 Rev O P&ID 1516-116-00300118 Rev O
6. Regenerator bottom circuit including reboiler
The lean solvent from regenerator bottom exchanges heat with rich amine in rich/lean amine exchangers 116-E-111. The cooled lean amine is pumped by solvent circulation pumps 116-P-122A/B to solvent storage tank 116-T-111 via lean solvent air cooler 116-A-112.The heat for regeneration is provided by the regenerator reboiler 116-E-
Solvent Regenerator Design Pressure/ Design temp : 5.3 barg/ FV/ 5 deg C(min)/ 142 deg C(max) Regenerator Reboiler shell side design
116-C-112 (Solvent Regenerato r), 116-E112 (Regenerat or Reboiler),
P&ID 1516-116-00300115 Rev O P&ID 1516-116-00300116 Rev O P&ID 1516-116-00300117 Rev O
ERM Risk Annex C
1/4

Nodes Node Description/ Design Intent 112 which is a thermosyphon reboiler with heat supplied from LP steam which is desuperheated in desuperheater 116-X-111 before being sent to reboiler. The condensate exits reboiler is sent to LP condensate drum 116-D-115. The condensate from LP condensate drum is pumped to battery limit using LP condensate pumps, 116-P-114A/B. The steam flash in D-115 is sent to solvent regenerator 115-C112.
Node List
Design/ Operating Conditions pressure/design temperature : 5.3barg/FV/142 degC; tubeside Design Pressure/ Design temp : 8/FV/ 270 degC Equipment ID 116-P114A/B (LP condensate pumps), 116-D115(LP condensate drum), 116X-111 (desuperhe ater), 116P-122A/B (Solvent Circulation Pump) Drawings P&ID 1516-116-00300120 Rev O Comment
LP condensate Pump Design Capacity/ Shutoff pressure : 19 m3/hr/ 17 barg Circulation pump Design Capacity / Shut-off pressure : 154.4m3/hr/ 9.4 barg
LP Condensate Drum Design Pressure/ Design Temp : 8 barg+ Fv/ 5degC(min)/ 270 degC(max)
7. Lean storage tank and pumping system
Lean solvent from storage tank 116-T-111 is pumped by lean solvent HP pumps 116-P111A/B. anti foam is injected at the suction of the pumps in the common line at pump suction. The major part of lean amine solvent goes to solvent absorber 116-C-111, where the lean solvent enter the solvent absorber 116-C-111 above the top bed. A part of pump discharge is sent to flash gas absorber 116-C-113. the pumps are provided with min flow circulation .Provision is made to sent lean amine to rich solvent MP flash drum 116-D-113 for startup purposes.The loss of solvent in the system is made up from Unit 146
Solvent Absorber Design Pressure/ Design Temp : 39 barg/FV/ 85 degC Rich MP Flash Drum Design Pressure/ Design Temp: 14 barg/FV/ 5 degC (min)/ 85 degC (max) Flash Gas Absorber Design Pressure/ Design Temp : 14/FV/ 5degC(min)/ 85 degC(max) Solvent Storage Tank Design Pressure/ Design Temp: full of liq. / 5 degC(min)/ 85 deg C(max) Lean Solvent HP Pump Design Capacity/ Shutoff Pressure :
116-C-111 (Solvent Absorber), 116-D-113 (Rich Solvent MP flash Drum), 116-C-113 (flash Gas Absorber), 116-T-111 (solvent Storage Tank), 116P-111A/B (Lean Solvent HP pump)
P&ID 1516-116-00300112 Rev O P&ID 1516-116-00300114 Rev O P&ID 1516-116-00300120 Rev O P&ID 1516-116-00300101 Rev 3
8. Anti foam package
P&ID 1516-116-00300112 Rev O P&ID 1516-116-00300116 Rev O P&ID 1516-116-00300120 Rev O P&ID 1516-116-00300121 Rev O
Vendor Package
9. Filtration package
P&ID 1516-116-00300120 Rev O P&ID 1516-116-00300121A Rev O
Vendor Package
10. Sump drum
Amine from the boot of Hydrocarbon skim drum D-116 is routed to solvent sump drum D-117. The drum is provided with nitrogen connection, condensate connection, steam connection and flare connection.
Solvent Sump Drum Design Pressure/ Design Temp : 3.5 barg/FV/5degC(min)/ 190degC(max) Solvent Sump Pump Design Capacity/ Shutoff pressure : 8 m3/hr
116-D-117 (Solvent Sump Drum), 116-P115(solvent Sump Pump) 116-D-116 (Hydrocarb
P&ID 1516-116-00300122 Rev O P&ID 1516-116-00300123 Rev O
11. Hydrocarbon skim drum
Skimmed oil from rich solvent flash drum D113, Solvent absorber C-111, reflux drum D-
Hydrocarbon Skim Drum Design Pressure/
P&ID 1516-116-00300114 Rev O
ERM Risk Annex C
2/4

Nodes Node Description/ Design Intent 114 are routed to hydrocarbon skim drum D116. In the skim drum, the oil is sent to drain and amine solution to solvent sump drums. The drum is provided with nitrogen connection and flare connection 12. Sulfrex lean transfer pumps Lean solvent from storage tank 116-T-111 is pumped by sulfrex lean solvent transfer 116P-124A/B and sent to Unit 114. This node also includes rich solvent from Unit 114 to 116-D-113. Also, water coming from Unit 114 to reflux drum in Unit 116 is included (to be finalised by Licensor) 13. Water wash loop Condensate from battery limit is sent along with discharge of water wash pump P113A/B to solvent absorber C-111. Wash water is collected from the chimney tray (tray no 1) in the solvent absorber and sent to suction of wash water pumps. The purpose of providing wash water is to remove any amine carry-over to the overhead of solvent absorber. Wet gas from ethane treatment section of Unit 116 is cooled in ethane cooler, E-101, by seawater . This is done to condense the water in the wet gas stream in order to reduce the load on driers. Cooled gas is routed to drier inlet separator to separate the condensed water. Separated water can be routed either to ethane treatment or to sour water stripper feed drum.
Node List
Design/ Operating Conditions Design Temp : 3.5 barg/FV/5degC(min)/8 5 degC(max) Equipment ID on Skim Drum) Drawings P&ID 1516-116-00300118 Rev O P&ID 1516-116-00300123 Rev O Sulfrex lean solvent Transfer Pump design capacity/ shut-off Pressure : 5.5 m3/hr/ 41.9 barg (to be confirmed by Vendor) 116-P124A/B (Sulfrex lean Solvent Transfer Pumps) 116-P113A/B (Wash water pumps) P&ID 1516-116-00300124 Rev O P&ID 1516-116-00300114 Rev O Comment
Water Wash Pumps Design Capacity/ Shut off Pressure: 4.5 m3/hr/ 44.2 barg
P&ID 1516-116-00300112 Rev O P&ID 1516-116-00300114 Rev O
14. Wet gas inlet to driers inlet separator including separator
Ethane Cooler Shell side Design Pressure/ Design temp : 39barg/FV/ 46degC(min)/ 85 degC(max); tube side design pressure/ design temp : 39 barg/ 85 deg C Ethane Dryer Inlet Separator Design Pressure/ Design Temp : 39barg/FV/ -46 deg C/ 85 degC
116-E-101 (Ethane Cooler), 116-D-101 (Ethane Dryer Inlet Separator)
P&ID 1516-116-00300101 Rev 3 P&ID 1516-116-00300102 Rev 3
15. Treated gas from separator to export line to petrochemical inlet including molecular sieve driers
Saturated gas is routed through the molecular sieve driers to reduce the moisture content to about 0.1 ppm mole. Gas is dried in one out of two driers. At any time one bed is in adsorption mode and one in regeneration mode. Normal adsorption time is about 12 hours. The dry gas exiting the bottom of driers is passed through drier after filters to remove molecular sieve fines before sending it for export to petrochemical plant or sent to ethane regeneration cycle.. A slipstream of the clean dry gas from the outlet of filters 116-F-101A/B is used as regeneration gas . The gas heated to about 280 degC in the ethane regeneration heater 116-H-101 and passes through the molecular sieve beds in the upward direction. Temperature control for regeneration to drier is by adjusting the fuel gas to furnace. The wet and hot regen gas in cooled against ambient air in regeneration gas air cooler 116-A-01. Water thus condensed is separated in regeneration gas separator 116-D-103. The recovered gas is then routed to suction of regeneration gas compressor. The liquid bottom of 116-D-103 is sent to ethane oily water flash drum ,116D-104 During cooling step ramp down, main burner of regeneration furnace is in service. After ramp-down, main burner is switched off The regeneration gas bypasses the furnace and flows through driers in the upward direction. In standby time, regeneration gas stream bypass furnace, dryers and air coolers and is routed directly to the regeneration gas separator
Ethane Driers Design Pressure/ Design Temp : 39 barg/ -46 degC/ 315 degC Ethane filter design pressure/ Design temp :39 barg/ 46degC(min)/ 85degC(max)
116-D102A/B (Ethane Dryer), 116-F101A/B (Ethane Filter)
P&ID 1516-116-00300102 Rev 3 P&ID 1516-116-00300103 Rev 3 P&ID 1516-116-00300104 Rev 3
16. Regeneration gas from dried gas outlet to regeneration compressor inlet, including cooling step after the regeneration of driers
Ethane Regeneration Heater Design Pressure/ Design Temp. : 39 barg/ -29 degC/ 315 degC Ethane Dryers Design Pressure/ Design Temp : 39 barg/ -46 degC/ 315 degC Ethane Regeneration Gas Cooler Design Pressure/ Design Temp. : 39 barg/ -46 degC(min)/ 315degC (max) Regeneration Gas Separator Design Pressure/ Design Temp : 39 barg/ 46degC(min)/ 236 deg C(max)
116-H-101 (Ethane Regenerati on Heater), 116-D102A/B (Ethane Dryer), 116-A-101 (Ethane Regenerati on Gas Cooler), 116-D-103 (Regenerati on Gas Separator), 116-D-104 (Ethane Oily Flash Drum)
P&ID 1516-116-00300103 Rev 3 P&ID 1516-116-00300104 Rev 3 P&ID 1516-116-00300105 Rev 3 P&ID 1516-116-00300106 Rev 3
17. Regeneration compressor discharge to
Regeneration gases after cooling in the regeneration gas air cooler during the
Driers regeneration compressor capacity
116-K101A/B(Eth
P&ID 1516-116-00300105 Rev 3
Regeneration gas compressor 116-K-
ERM Risk Annex C
3/4

Nodes wet gas inlet Node Description/ Design Intent regeneration step are routed to regeneration gas compressor. Compressed regen gas is fed back to the wet gas at the inlet of ethane cooler E-101.
Node List
Design/ Operating Conditions 4t/h, design pressure and temperature 39barg, -46/100degC Equipment ID ane Regenerati on compressor ) Drawings P&ID 1516-116-00300106 Rev 3 P&ID 1516-116-00300101 Rev 3 Comment 101A and 116-K-101B are identical. HAZOP is done for compressor A, observations and recommendations are also applicable to compressor B
ERM Risk Annex C
4/4
Annex D
HAZOP Worksheet
Unit 116
Node: 1. Feed gas inlet and KOD upto feed gas filter inlet including filter bypass Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0111 Rev O; P&ID 1516-116-0030-0112 Rev O; P&ID 1516-116-0030-0101 Rev 3 Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards
South Pars Gas Field Development Phase 15 and 16
Actions
Action By
1. No/ Less Flow up to feed gas KOD
1. Reduction of supply from Unit 105
1.1. Less feed to Dehydration Section
1.1.1. Low pressure alarm PAL-0151 provided at inlet of feed gas KOD, D-111 1.1.2. PALL-0152 with interlock SD-203 to shutdown unit 116
2. SDV-0011/ESDV-0012 fails close (Train 2) 3. SDV-0012/ESDV-0014 fails close (Train 1) 2. No/ Less Flow on top of feed gas KOD 1. Plugging of demister in KOD (D-111)
2.1. Less feed to Unit 116 leading to loss of production 3.1. Less feed to Unit 116 leading to loss of production 1.1. Low flow to solvent absorber affecting downstream units 1.2. High pressure upstream of KOD (D-111)
2.1.1. Limit switch provided on SDV-0011/ESDV-0012 3.1.1. Limit switch provided on SDV-0012/ESDV-0014 1.1.1. Low flow alarm FAL-0172 over on top D-112 outlet 1.2.1. For safeguards, Refer to HAZOP of Unit 105 2.1.1. Low flow alarm FAL-0172 over on top D-112 outlet 2.1.2. Limit switches provided on BDV-0155
2. Malfunction of BDV-0155 in open position 3. FIC-0172 malfunctions and closes FV0172
2.1. Reduction in flow to absorber
3.1. No flow to dehydration section and higher pressure in upstream units
3.1.1. Safeguard provided in upstream Unit 105 3.1.2. High pressure alarm PAH-0151 provided at inlet of feed gas KOD, D-111 3.1.3. High pressure alarm PAH-0172 provided on overhead of D-112 3.1.4. PIC-0172 will relieve excess pressure to flare
3. No/ Less Flow on bottom feed gas KOD
1. LIC-0153 malfunctions and closes LV0153 2. SDV-0157 malfunctions and closes
1.1. Rise in level in D-111, leading to carry-over of liquid HC with gas to solvent absorber 2.1. Same as Conseq 1.1
1.1.1. High high level alarm LAHH-0152 with interlock SD-205 which will shutdown unit. 2.1.1. Limit switch provided on SDV-0157 2.1.2. High level alarm LAH-0153 provided on D-111 2.1.3. High high level alarm LAHH-0152 with interlock SD-205 which will shutdown unit.
4. More/High Flow up to Feed Gas KOD
1. More supply from upstream unit
1.1. Higher pressure in KOD may lead to failure
1.1.1. For protection against overpressure. Refer to Unit 105 1.1.2. PIC-0172 will relieve excess pressure to flare
2. FIC-0172 malfunctions and opens FV0172 fully
2.1. More flow to dehydration units, leading to less pressure in the unit and column upset.
2.1.1. Low pressure alarm PAL-0172 provided on overhead of D-112 2.1.2. CV of FV-0172 is provided with a maximum clamp
27. Possibility of relocating FIC-0172 and relevant valves and instrumentations to downstream dehydration section to be reviewed during detailed engineering stage
JV
3. Malfunction of BDV-0155 in open position 5. More/High Flow on top of Feed Gas KOD 6. More/High Flow on bottom of Feed Gas KOD 1. No significant issue identified 1. LC-0153 malfunctions and opens LIC0153
3.1. More flow through feed gas KOD and loss of gas to flare. Marginally lower pressure in the drum
3.1.1. Limit switches provided on BDV-0155
1.1. Loss of level in KOD leading to gas breakthrough and causing high pressure and consequential failure in sump drum of Unit 107 2.1. Same as Conseq. 1.1 3.1. Same as Conseq. 1.1 1.1. Possible reverse flow from absorber C-111 to feed gas KO drum, which may lead to damage of demister in feed gas KO drum 1.1. High pressure upstream of KOD (D-111)
1.1.1. Independent level transmitter LT-0151 with low low level alarm LALL-0151 with interlock to close the SDV-0157 1.1.2. Refer to HAZOP of Unit 107, Sump drum
2. Inadvertent opening of bypass of LV0153 3. Inadvertent opening of drain valve 7. Reverse/Misdirected Flow 8. More/High Pressure 1. Depressurising feed gas KO drum
3.1.1. First isolation valve in drain lines is CSC 1.1.1. NRV provided at inlet of absorber
1. Plugging of demister in KOD (D-111)
1.1.1. For safeguards, Refer to HAZOP of Unit 105 1.1.2. High pressure alarm PAH-0151 provided at inlet of Feed Gas KO Drum D-111
2. More supply from upstream unit 3. Non-receipt of supply by downstream consumers (petrochemical plant)
2.1. Refer to Node 1, Deviation 4, Cause 1 3.1. Higher pressure in Unit 116 and upstream unit (Unit 105) 3.1.1. Refer to HAZOP discussion in Unit 105 3.1.2. PIC-0172 will relieve to flare (capacity of one train) 3.1.3. High pressure alarm PAH-0172 provided on D-112 overhead 26. Operating procedure to include procedures for diverting ethane to export gas line.
JV
4. LC-00153 malfunctions and opens LV0153 5. FIC-0172 malfunctions and closes FV0172
4.1. Refer to Node 1, Deviation 6 , Cause 1 5.1. Refer to Node 1, Deviation 2, Cause 3 27. Possibility of relocating FIC-0172 and relevant valves and instrumentations to downstream dehydration section to be reviewed during detailed engineering stage 1 of 43 ERM
JV
Unit 116
Node: 1. Feed gas inlet and KOD upto feed gas filter inlet including filter bypass Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0111 Rev O; P&ID 1516-116-0030-0112 Rev O; P&ID 1516-116-0030-0101 Rev 3 Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards
Actions
Action By
6. External fire 9. Low Pressure 1. FIC-0172 malfunctions and opens FV0172 fully 2. Malfunction of BDV-0155 in open position 3. PIC-0172 malfunctions and opens PV0172 fully 4. Low pressure from upstream Unit (Unit 105) 10. More/High Temperature 1. High temperature from Upstream unit 105 2. External Fire : refer to discussion under High Pressure 11. Low Temperature 12. More/High Level 13. Low/Less Level 14. Composition Change 15. Contamination 16. Start-up/Shutdown/ Maintenance Hazards/ Requirement 17. Utility Failure 1. Low temperature from upstream unit 105 1. LIC-0153 malfunctions and closes LV0153 1. Refer to Node 1, Deviation 6 1. Change in composition from upstream 1. Corrosion material 1. No issue identified
6.1. Overpressurisation of KOD leading to rupture 1.1. Refer to Node 1, Deviation 4, Cause 2 2.1. Refer to Node 1, Deviation 2, Cause 2 3.1. Loss of pressure to downstream section 4.1. Refer to Node 1, Deviation 1, Cause 1 1.1. Upset and loss in performance in absorber C-111
6.1.1. PSV-0155 is designed for fire case
3.1.1. Low pressure alarm PAL-0151 provided at inlet of feed gas KOD, D-111
1.1.1. High temp. alarm TAH-0161 provided at inlet of absorber C-111
1.1. No significant consequences 1.1. Refer to Node 1, Deviation 3, Cause 1
1.1. Off spec product 1.1. Foaming in solvent absorber leading to upset
1.1.1. Frequent sampling in Unit 105 1.1.1. Antifoam injection facilities provided
1. Instrument Air Failure : SDV-0011, SDV-0012, ESDV-0012, ESDV-0014, SDV-0157, LV-0153 are FC type. BDV0155 is FO type. These are found be in order.
18. Others
1. No new issue
2 of 43
ERM
Unit 116
Node: 2. Solvent absorber bottom upto solvent flash drum Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0112 Rev O; P&ID 1516-116-0030-0114 Rev O Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards
Actions
Action By
1. No/ Less flow
1. SDV-0161 closed inadvertently
1.1. Level increase at bottom of absorber. This may lead to potential carry-over of amine with gas to downstream and also potential overpressure in the absorber
1.1.1. High level alarm LAH-0163 provided on absorber 1.1.2. Treated gas KO drum D-112 provided to take care of carry-over. 1.1.3. Limit switch provided on SDV-0161 1.1.4. Low level alarm LAL-0181 provided in D-113 1.1.5. Low low level LALL-0182 with interlock I-323 closes SDV-0183, closes LV0181 and activates I-328 (closes SDV-0201)
1.2. Loss of flash gas in MP flash drum. Possibility of low pressure in MP flash drum 2. LIC-0163 on solvent absorber malfunctions and closes LV-0163 2.1. Same as Conseq. 1.1
1.2.1. Low pressure alarm PAL-0182A/B provided on outlet of Flash Gas Absorber 1.2.2. Fuel Gas make-up provided through PIC-0183 which operates PV-0183 2.1.1. Treated gas KO drum D-112 provided to take care of carry-over. 2.1.2. Bypass provided for LV-0163 2.1.3. Low level alarm LAL-0181 provided in D-113 2.1.4. Low low level LALL-0182 with interlock I-323 closes SDV-0183, closes LV0181 and activates I-328 (closes SDV-0201) 1. Review the provision of high level alarm with LT-0161 on solvent absorber bottom
JV
2. More Flow
1. LIC-0163 on solvent absorber malfunctions and opens fully LV-0163
1.1. Level decrease at bottom of absorber. This may lead to gas breakthrough to MP flash Drum causing high pressure. This will also lead to lower pressure in the absorber, leading to poor performance of absorber
1.1.1. Independent low low level LALL-0161 provided on absorber with interlock I314 will close SDV-0161 1.1.2. PV-0182B will relieve to flare 1.1.3. High pressure alarm PAH-0182A/B provided on the outlet of absorber 1.1.4. High high pressure alarm PAHH-0181 with interlock SD-207 to shutdown the unit 1.1.5. PSV-0181A/B designed to take care of gas breakthrough case.
2. Inadvertent opening of drain line upstream SDV-0161
2.1. Loss of level in C-111 leading to gas breakthrough to sump drum. Loss of gas to flare. Low temperature in sump drum D117 may lead to failure
2.1.1. The drain valve to sump drum is CSC 2.1.2. Independent low low level LALL-0161 provided on absorber with interlock I314 will close SDV-0161 2.1.3. Low level alarm LAL-0163 provided on absorber 2.1.4. Material of sump drum D-117 is suitable for low temperature caused by flashing 2.1.5. High level alarm LAH-0261/262 provided on sump drum 2.1.6. Sump drum is connected to the flare
2.2. Reduction in flow of amine to MP flash drum and may result in low pressure and level in the MP flash drum
2.2.1. Low level alarm LAL-0181 provided in D-113 2.2.2. Low low level LALL-0182 with interlock I-323 closes SDV-0183, closes LV0181 and activates I-328 (closes SDV-0201) 2.2.3. Low pressure alarm PAL-0182A/B provided on outlet of Flash Gas Absorber 2.2.4. Fuel Gas make-up provided through PIC-0183 which operates PV-0183
3. Reverse/Misdirected Flow 4. High Pressure
1. No issue identified 1. SDV-0161 closed inadvertently 1.1. Level increase at bottom of absorber. This may lead to potential carry-over of amine with gas to downstream and also potential overpressure in the absorber 1.1.1. High level alarm LAH-0163 provided on absorber 1.1.2. Treated gas KO drum D-112 provided to take care of carry-over. 1.1.3. Low level alarm LAL-0181 provided in D-113 1.1.4. Low low level LALL-0182 with interlock I-323 closes SDV-0183, closes LV0181 and activates I-328 (closes SDV-0201) 1.1.5. Limit switch provided on SDV-0161 2. LIC-0163 on solvent absorber malfunctions and closes LV-0163 2.1. Same as Conseq. 1.1 2.1.1. Treated gas KO drum D-112 provided to take care of carry-over. 2.1.2. Bypass provided for LV-0163 2.1.3. Low level alarm LAL-0181 provided in D-113 2.1.4. Low low level LALL-0182 with interlock I-323 closes SDV-0183, closes LV0181 and activates I-328 (closes SDV-0201) 3. External fire 3.1. Overpressurisation of absorber leading to rupture 1.1. Loss of flash gas in MP flash drum. Possibility of low 3.1.1. PSV-0161 is designed for fire case 1.1.1. Low pressure alarm PAL-0182A/B provided on outlet of Flash Gas Absorber 3 of 43 ERM 1. Review the provision of high level alarm with LT-0161 on solvent absorber bottom
JV
5. Low Pressure
Unit 116
Actions
Action By
pressure in MP flash drum 2. LIC-0163 on solvent absorber malfunctions and opens fully LV-0163 2.1. Level decrease at bottom of absorber. This may lead to gas breakthrough to MP flash Drum causing high pressure. This will also lead to lower pressure in the absorber, leading to poor performance of absorber
1.1.2. Fuel Gas make-up provided through PIC-0183 which operates PV-0183 2.1.1. Independent low low level LALL-0161 provided on absorber with interlock I314 will close SDV-0161 2.1.2. PV-0182B will relieve to flare 2.1.3. High pressure alarm PAH-0182A/B provided on the outlet of absorber 2.1.4. High high pressure alarm PAHH-0181 with interlock to shutdown the unit 2.1.5. PSV-0181A/B designed to take care of gas breakthrough case.
3. Bypass of LV-0163 open inadevertently
3.1. Same as Conseq. 2.1
3.1.1. Low level alarm LAL-0163 provided on absorber bottom 3.1.2. Independent low low level LALL-0161 provided on absorber with interlock I314 will close SDV-0161 3.1.3. PV-0182B will relieve to flare 3.1.4. High pressure alarm PAH-0182A/B provided on the outlet of absorber 3.1.5. High high pressure alarm PAHH-0181 with interlock to shutdown the unit 3.1.6. PSV-0181A/B designed to take care of gas breakthrough case.
4.1. Reduction in flow of amine to MP flash drum and may result in low pressure and level in the MP flash drum. Gas breakthrough to sump drum D-117
4.1.1. Low level alarm LAL-0181 provided in D-113 4.1.2. Low low level LALL-0182 with interlock I-323 closes SDV-0183, closes LV0181 and activates I-328 (closes SDV-0201) 4.1.3. Low pressure alarm PAL-0182A/B provided on outlet of Flash Gas Absorber 4.1.4. Fuel Gas make-up provided through PIC-0183 which operates PV-0183 4.1.5. Material of sump drum D-117 is suitable for low temperature caused by flashing 4.1.6. High level alarm LAH-0261/262 provided on sump drum 4.1.7. Sump drum is connected to the flare
6. More Temperature
1. Refer to Node 1, Deviation 10 2. High lean amine temperature. This will be discussed in later nodes 3. Change in composition of gas (high CO2 content) 3.1. No significant consequence. 1.1. No significant consequence. 2.1. No significant consequence. 1.1. Level increase at bottom of absorber. This may lead to potential carry-over of amine with gas to downstream and also potential overpressure in the absorber 1.1.1. Limit switch provided on SDV-0161 1.1.2. High level alarm LAH-0163 provided on absorber 1.1.3. Low level alarm LAL-0181 provided in D-113 1.1.4. Low low level LALL-0182 with interlock I-323 closes SDV-0183, closes LV0181 and activates I-328 (closes SDV-0201) 1.1.5. Treated gas KO drum D-112 provided to take care of carry-over. 2. LIC-0163 on solvent absorber malfunctions and closes LV-0163 2.1. Same as Conseq. 1.1 2.1.1. Treated gas KO drum D-112 provided to take care of carry-over. 2.1.2. Bypass provided for LV-0163 2.1.3. Low level alarm LAL-0181 provided in D-113 2.1.4. Low low level LALL-0182 with interlock I-323 closes SDV-0183, closes LV0181 and activates I-328 (closes SDV-0201) 1. Review the provision of high level alarm with LT-0161 on solvent absorber bottom
JV
7. Less Temperature
1. Low temperature from upstream 2. Change in composition of gas (low CO2 content)
8. High Level
9. Low Level
1.1.1. Independent low low level LALL-0161 provided on absorber with interlock I314 will close SDV-0161 1.1.2. PV-0182B will relieve to flare 1.1.3. High pressure alarm PAH-0182A/B provided on the outlet of absorber 1.1.4. High high pressure alarm PAHH-0181 with interlock to shutdown the unit 1.1.5. PSV-0181A/B designed to take care of gas breakthrough case. 4 of 43 ERM
Unit 116
Actions
Action By
2.1. Loss of level in C-111 leading to gas breakthrough to sump drum. Loss of gas to flare. Low temperature in sump drum may lead to failure
2.1.1. The drain valve to sump drum is CSC 2.1.2. Independent low low level LALL-0161 provided on absorber with interlock I314 will close SDV-0161 2.1.3. Low level alarm LAL-0163 provided on absorber 2.1.4. Material of sump drum D-117 is suitable for low temperature caused by flashing 2.1.5. High level alarm LAH-0261/262 provided on sump drum 2.1.6. Sump drum is connected to the flare
10. Contamination/ Additional Phase 11. Composition change/ Loss of phase 12. Startup/Shutdown/Maintenance Hazards 13. Utility Failure
1. Corrosion material (iron sulphide) present in the pipeline and degraded amine 1. No issue identified 1. No issue identified
1.1. This may lead to foaming and carry-over of amine to D-112
1.1.1. Filtration package is provided to remove any iron sulphide particles 1.1.2. Antifoam injection facilities provided.
2. Operating procedure to include chemical cleaning of the system prior to start-up.
JV
1. Instrument air failure : SDV-0161 and LV-0163 are FC type. These are found to be in order
14. Others
1. Corrosion due to CO2
1.1. Reduction in thickness and contamination of solvent leading to poor performance and failure
1.1.1. General : Material has been selected as per corrosion service with NACE material and SS-316L cladding where applicable. PWHT is also considered for this service.
5 of 43
ERM
Unit 116
Node: 3. Solvent absorber top circuit including treated gas KOD and upto solvent flash drum inlet Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0112 Rev O; P&ID 1516-116-0030-0113 Rev O; P&ID 1516-116-0030-0114 Rev O Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards
Actions
Action By
1. No/ Less flow of absorber overhead to inlet of treated gas KOD 2. No/ Less flow from overhead of D-112 to Dehydration Section
1. BDV-0173 fails open
1.1. Low flow of sweet gas to Dehydration Section and loss of gas to flare. Low pressure in the unit will affect the performance of absorber. 1.1. No flow to dehydration section and higher pressure in upstream units
1.1.1. Limit switch provided on BDV-0173 1.1.2. Low pressure alarm PAL-0172 provided on overhead of D-112 1.1.1. Safeguard provided in upstream Unit 105 1.1.2. High pressure alarm PAH-0172 provided on overhead of D-112 1.1.3. PIC-0172 will relieve excess pressure to flare 1.1.4. High pressure alarm PAH-0151 at inlet of feed gas KOD.D-111
1. FIC-0172 malfunction and closes FV0172
2. PIC-0172 malfunctions and opens PV0172 fully
2.1. Low flow of gas to Dehydration Section and loss of gas to flare. Low pressure in the unit will affect the performance of absorber.
2.1.1. Low pressure alarm PAL-0151 at inlet of feed gas KOD.D-111 2.1.2. Low low pressure PALL-0152 at inlet of feed gas KOD with interlock SD-203 which will shutdown unit 2.1.3. Safeguard provided in upstream Unit 105
3. SDV-0004 fails close
3.1. Same as Conseq 1.1
3.1.1. Safeguard provided in upstream Unit 105 3.1.2. High pressure alarm PAH-0172 provided on overhead of D-112 3.1.3. Low flow alarm FAL-0172 provided on overhead of D-112 3.1.4. PIC-0172 will relieve excess pressure to flare 3.1.5. High pressure alarm PAH-0151 at inlet of feed gas KOD.D-111
4. Non-receipt of supply by petrochemical consumers
4.1. Refer to Node 1, Deviation 8, Cause 3
4.1.1. Refer to HAZOP discussion in Unit 105 4.1.2. Low flow alarm FAL-0172 provided on overhead of D-112 4.1.3. PIC-0172 will relieve to flare 4.1.4. High pressure alarm PAH-0172 provided on D-112 overhead
3. No/ Less flow of rich solvent from the bottom of KOD to rich solvent MP flash drum D-113
1. Malfunction of SDV-0172
1.1. High level in D-112 leading to carry-over of amine to dehydration section
1.1.1. Limit switch provided on SDV-0172 1.1.2. KOD provided in dehydration section to take care of carry-over 1.1.3. High level alarm LAH-0171 on D-112 1.1.4. High high level alarm LAHH-0172 provided on D-112
2. LIC-0171 malfunctions and closes LV0171 3. Inadvertent opening of drain line upstream SDV-0172`
2.1.1. High high level alarm LAHH-0172 provided on D-112 2.1.2. KOD provided in dehydration section to take care of carry-over
3.1. Loss of level in D-112 leading to gas breakthrough to sump drum. Loss of gas to flare. Low temperature in sump drum may lead to failure
3.1.1. The drain valve to sump drum is CSC 3.1.2. Low level alarm LAL-0171 provided on D-112 3.1.3. Independent low low level LALL-0172 provided on D-112 with interlock I-319 which will close SDV-0172. 3.1.4. Material of sump drum D-117 is suitable for low temperature caused by flashing 3.1.5. High level alarm LAH-0261/262 provided on sump drum 3.1.6. Sump drum is connected to the flare
4. More Flow of absorber overhead to inlet of treated gas KOD
1. FIC-0172 malfunction and open FV0172 fully 2. PIC-0172 malfunctions and open PV0037 fully
1.1. More flow from absorber causing low pressure in the absorber. Upset in absorber column 2.1. More flow from absorber causing low pressure in the absorber. Upset in absorber column and loss of gas to flare
1.1.1. Online analysers AI-0171 (CO2) and AI-0172(Total S) provided on outlet overhead line of D-112 2.1.1. Online analysers AI-0171 (CO2) and AI-0172(Total S) provided on outlet overhead line of D-112 2.1.2. High flow alarm FAH-0036 provided on outlet overhead line of D-112 2.1.3. Online analysers AI-0171 (CO2) and AI-0172(Total S) provided on outlet overhead line of D-112
5. More Flow from overhead of D-112 to Dehydration section
1. FIC-0172 malfunction and open FV0172 fully 2. PIC-0172 malfunctions and open PV0037 fully
1.1. More flow from absorber causing low pressure in the absorber. Upset in absorber column 2.1. More flow from absorber causing low pressure in the absorber. Upset in absorber column and loss of gas to flare
1.1.1. Online analysers AI-0171 (CO2) and AI-0172(Total S) provided on outlet overhead line of D-112 2.1.1. Online analysers AI-0171 (CO2) and AI-0172(Total S) provided on outlet overhead line of D-112 2.1.2. High flow alarm FAH-0172 provided on outlet overhead line of D-112
3. More withdrawal by downstream consumers
3.1. More flow from absorber causing low pressure in the absorber. Upset in absorber column
3.1.1. Online analysers AI-0171 (CO2) and AI-0172(Total S) provided on outlet overhead line of D-112 6 of 43 ERM
Unit 116
Actions
Action By
3.1.2. High flow alarm FAH-0172 provided on outlet overhead line of D-112 3.1.3. Low pressure alarm PAL-0172 provided on outlet overhead line of D-112 6. More flow of rich solvent from the bottom of KOD to rich solvent MP flash drum D-113 1. LIC-0171 malfunctions and opens LV0171 fully 1.1. Loss of level in D-112 leading to gas breakthrough to rich solvent MP flash drum causing overpressure and failure of D113 1.1.1. Independent low low level LALL-0172 provided on D-112 with interlock I-319 which will close SDV-0172. 1.1.2. PSV-0181A/B sized for gas breakthrough. 1.1.3. PV-0182B will relieve excess pressure to flare 1.1.4. High pressure alarm PAH-0182A/B provided on C-113 overhead 1.1.5. High High pressure alarm PAHH-0181 with interlock SD-207 to shutdown the unit 2. Inadvertent opening of drain line upstream SDV-0172 2.1. Loss of level in D-112 leading to gas breakthrough to sump drum. Loss of gas to flare. Low temperature in sump drum may lead to failure 2.1.1. Low level alarm LAL-0171 provided on D-112 2.1.2. Independent low low level LALL-0172 provided on D-112 with interlock I-319 which will close SDV-0172. 2.1.3. Material of sump drum D-117 is suitable for low temperature caused by flashing 2.1.4. High level alarm LAH-0261/262 provided on sump drum 2.1.5. The drain valve to sump drum is CSC 2.1.6. Sump drum is connected to the flare 7. Reverse/Misdirected Flow 8. High Pressure 1. No significant issue identified 1. Refer to Node 3, Deviation 2, Causes 1, 3 and 4 2. High pressure from upstream 3. External fire on D-112 2.1. Refer to Node 1, Deviation 4, Cause 1 3.1. Overpressure in D-112 leading to rupture and fire. 3.1.1. None identified 28. Review the requirement of installing a PSV on D-112 overhead for fire case during detailed engineering
JV
9. Low Pressure
1. PIC-0172 malfunctions and opens PV0172 fully 2. BDV-0036 fails open 3. FIC-0172 malfunction and open FV0172 fully
1.1. Refer to Node 3, Deviation 2, Cause 2 2.1. Refer to Node 3, Deviation 1, Cause 1 3.1. More flow from absorber causing low pressure in the absorber. Upset in absorber column 3.1.1. Online analysers AI-0171 (CO2) and AI-0172(Total S) provided on outlet overhead line of D-112 3.1.2. Low pressure alarm PAL-0151 provided in inlet to feed gas KOD D-111 3.1.3. Low pressure alarm PAL-0172 provided on D-112 overhead
4. More withdrawal by downstream consumers
4.1. More flow from absorber causing low pressure in the absorber. Upset in absorber column
4.1.1. Online analysers AI-0171 (CO2) and AI-0172(Total S) provided on outlet overhead line of D-112 4.1.2. High flow alarm FAH-0036 provided on outlet overhead line of D-112 4.1.3. Low pressure alarm PAL-00172 provided on outlet overhead line of D-112
10. More Temperature 11. Less Temperature
1. High lean amine temperature. This will be discussed in later nodes 1. Inadvertent opening of drain line upstream SDV-0172 1.1. Loss of level in D-112 leading to gas breakthrough to sump drum. Loss of gas to flare. Low temperature in sump drum may lead to failure 1.1.1. The drain valve to sump drum is CSC 1.1.2. Low level alarm LAL-0171 provided on D-112 1.1.3. Independent low low level LALL-0172 provided on D-112 with interlock I-319 which will close SDV-0172. 1.1.4. Material of sump drum D-117 is suitable for low temperature caused by flashing 1.1.5. High level alarm LAH-0261/262 provided on sump drum 1.1.6. Sump drum is connected to the flare 2. Low flow of feed gas 2.1. Lower temperature however with no significant consequence 1.1. High level in D-112 leading to carry-over of amine to dehydration section 1.1.1. Limit switch provided on SDV-0172 1.1.2. High level alarm LAH-0171 on D-112 7 of 43 ERM
12. High Level
1. Malfunction of SDV-0172
Unit 116
Actions
Action By
1.1.3. KOD is provided in dehydration section to take care of carry-over 1.1.4. High high level alarm LAHH-0172 provided on D-112 2. LIC-0171 malfunctions and closes LV0171 13. Low Level 1. Inadvertent opening of drain line upstream SDV-0172` 2.1. Same as Conseq. 1.1 2.1.1. High high level alarm LAHH-0172 provided on D-112 2.1.2. KOD is provided in dehydration section to take care of carry-over 1.1. Loss of level in D-112 leading to gas breakthrough to sump drum. Loss of gas to flare. Low temperature in sump drum may lead to failure 1.1.1. Low level alarm LAL-0171 provided on D-112 1.1.2. Independent low low level LALL-0172 provided on D-112 with interlock I-319 which will close SDV-0172. 1.1.3. Material of sump drum D-117 is suitable for low temperature caused by flashing 1.1.4. High level alarm LAH-0261/262 provided on sump drum 1.1.5. The drain valve to sump drum is CSC 1.1.6. Sump drum is connected to the flare 2. LIC-0171 malfunctions and opens LV0171 fully 2.1. Loss of level in D-112 leading to gas breakthrough to rich solvent MP flash drum causing overpressure and failure of D113 2.1.1. PSV-0181A/B sized for gas breakthrough. 2.1.2. High pressure alarm PAH-0182A/B provided on C-113 overhead 2.1.3. High High pressure alarm PAHH-0181 with interlock SD-207 to shutdown the unit 14. Contamination/ Additional Phase 15. Composition change/ Loss of phase 16. Startup/Shutdown/Maintenance Hazards 17. Utility Failure 1. Carry-over of amine to Dehydration Section. This will be discussed in dehydration section HAZOP 1. No issue identified 1. Relocation of FIC-0172 1.1. No significant consequence 29. Review the start-up procedure after relocation of FIC-0172
JV
1. Instrument Air failure : FV-0172, PV0172, LV-0171 and SDV-0172, SDV-0004 are FC type BDV-0173 is FO type These were found to be in order
18. Others
1. No issue identified
8 of 43
ERM
Unit 116
Node: 4. Solvent flash drum and absorber top [upto reflux inlet] and bottom circuits[upto tank inlet] Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0114 Rev O; P&ID 1516-116-0030-0115 Rev O; P&ID 1516-116-0030-0116 Rev O; P&ID 1516-116-0030-0122 Rev O Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards
Actions
Action By
1. No/ Less flow of flash gas to boiler from C-113 overhead
1. PIC-0182A malfunctions and closes PV-0182A
1.1. No flow of flash gas to boilers. 1.2. High pressure in upstream D-113 and C-113
1.1.1. Boiler have alternate sources of fuel gas. Moreover, the amount of flash gas is very low compared to main fuel gas. 1.2.1. High pressure alarm PAH-0182B on absorber overhead line 1.2.2. PV-0182B will relieve to flare and is sized for full flow 1.2.3. High high pressure alarm PAHH-0181 with interlock SD-207 which will shutdown the unit 1.2.4. PSV-0181A/B provided on MP flash Drum
1.3. Less CO2/HC desorption from amine leading to prevailing flash in the downstream heat exchangers and associated piping corrosion
1.3.1. High pressure alarm PAH-0182B on absorber overhead line 1.3.2. High high pressure alarm PAHH-0181 with interlock SD-207 which will shutdown the unit 1.3.3. PSV-0181A/B provided on MP flash Drum sized for gas breakthrough
2. PIC-0182B malfunctions and opens PV-0182B
2.1. No gas supply to boilers. Low pressure in the drum and absorber
2.1.1. Boiler have alternate sources of fuel gas. Moreover, the amount of flash gas is very low compared to main fuel gas. 2.1.2. Low pressure alarm PAL-0182A provided at outlet of flash gas absorber 2.1.3. PIC-0183 will try to maintain pressure , however fuel gas will be lost to flare 2.1.4. High flow alarm FAH-0181 is provided at outlet of flash gas absorber
3. Non-receipt of fuel gas by boilers
3.1. Higher pressure in the system will cause process upset in the unit.
3.1.1. High pressure alarm PAH-0182A on absorber overhead line 3.1.2. High pressure alarm PAH-0182B on absorber overhead line 3.1.3. PV-0182B will relieve to flare and is sized for full flow. 3.1.4. High high pressure alarm PAHH-0181 with interlock SD-207 which will shutdown the unit 3.1.5. PSV-0181A/B provided on MP flash Drum
4. Stainer blockage upstream E-111
4.1. High level in Rich solvent MP flash drum
4.1.1. High level alarm LAH-0181 provided on MP flash drum 4.1.2. High high level alarm LAHH-0183 will cause total unit shutdown
4.2. Loss of cooling of lean amine. Refer to Node 6, Deviation 10 Cause 2, Conseq 2 5. No flow of fuel gas when demanded due to PIC-0183 malfunction which closes PV-0183 5.1. During cold circulation, loss of pressure will not facilitate circulation. This will lead to delay in start-up.
4.2.1. 5.1.1. Nitrogen injection to top of C-112 through PV-0201. 5.1.2. Low pressure alarm PAL-0182A provided at outlet of flash gas absorber 5.1.3. Low pressure alarm PAL-0182B provided at outlet of flash gas absorber
5.2. During hot circulation, loss of driving force in the cold side of exchangers E-111 will cause the hot stream not being cooled enough. This may lead to higher temperature in the storage tank and high temperature in outlet of exchanger E-111. This may occur for a short period of time and therefore no significant impact 6. ESDV-0008/SDV-0007 fails closed 2. No/ Less flow of amine from bottom of D-113 via exchanger E-111 to solvent regenerator C-112 1. SDV-0183 closes 6.1. Same as Node 4, Deviation 1, Cause 1 1.1. No flow of rich amine to solvent regenerator C-112. This will upset the regenerator and level will build up in D-113.
5.2.1. High temperature alarm TAH-0192 downstream of exchanger E-111 5.2.2. Block-and-bypass arrangement has been provided for PV-0183
4. Note 13 on P&ID 114 to be modified to reflect the FG connection is for start-up pressurisation, cold circulation and hot circulation (till gas is introduced)
JV
1.1.1. Limit switch provided on SDV-0183 1.1.2. High level alarm LAH-0181 provided on MP flash drum 1.1.3. High high level alarm LAHH-0183 will cause total unit shutdown
1.2. Possible overpressure in MP flash drum
1.2.1. High pressure alarm PAH-0182A/B provided on the outlet of absorber 1.2.2. High high pressure alarm PAHH-0181 with interlock to shutdown the unit 1.2.3. PSV-0181A/B designed to take care of gas breakthrough case.
1.3. Possible carry-over of amine to boilers
2. LIC-0181malfunctions and closes LV0181on inlet to solvent regenerator 3. Loss of pressure in drum D-113
2.1. Same as Cause 1 3.1. Same as Cause 1
2.1.1. High high level alarm LAHH-0183 will cause total unit shutdown 3.1.1. Low pressure alarm PAL-0182A/B on the overhead of absorber 3.1.2. PV-0183 will try to maintain pressure in D-113 9 of 43 ERM
Unit 116
Actions
Action By
3. More Flow of flash gas to boiler from overhead of D-113
1. PIC-0182A malfunctions and opens PV-0182A fully
1.1. Initially flowrate will increase, however, this component is a small amount compared to total fuel to boiler. Hence, no significant impact on boiler 1.2. Pressure drop in the flash drum leading to potential carryover.
1.1.1. Boiler has its own fuel gas control system
1.2.1. High flow alarm FAH-0181 provided on overhead of absorber 1.2.2. Low pressure alarm PAL-0182B provided on overhead of flash gas absorber 1.2.3. Demister provided on flash gas absorber C-1113 1.2.4. PV-0183 will try to maintain pressure in D-113
5. Review the requirement of amine removal facilities in the boiler area in Unit 121 6. Review the possibility of increasing the height of C-113 between the packed bed and demister to act as a knock-out drum.
JV
JV
4. More flow of amine from bottom of D-113 via exchangers E-111 to solvent regenerator C-112
1. LIC-0181malfunctions and opens LV0181fully on inlet to solvent regenerator
1.1. Loss of level and pressure in D-113. Potential Gas breakthrough to solvent regenerator upsetting the performance of solvent regenerator. Possible overpressurisation of solvent regenerator may lead to failure.
1.1.1. Low low level alarm LALL-0182 on D-113 with interlock I-323 will close SDV0183 and LV-0181 and SDV-0183 1.1.2. High high pressure alarm PAHH-0203 on C-112 overhead with interlock I-320 which will close FV-0211, SDV-0183, LV-0181 and SDV-0183 1.1.3. PSV-0201A/B on C-112 overhead is sized to take care of gas breakthrough
1.2. Potential two-phase in exchangers may lead to pressurepulsation and vibration which may lead to mechanical damage to exchangers 5. More flow of gas to flare 6. Reverse/Misdirected Flow 1. Refer to discussion in Deviation 1, Cause 3 1. Low pressure in D-113. 1.1. Possibility of reverse flow of fuel gas from boiler area. No significant consequences
1.2.1. Low low level alarm LALL-0182 on D-113 with interlock I-323 will close SDV0183 and LV-0181 and SDV-0183
1.1.1. Check valve provided. 1.1.2. PV-0182A will close in case of low pressure 1.1.3. PV-0183 will open and try to maintain the pressure
7. High Pressure
1. PIC-0182A malfunctions and closes PV-0182A
1.1. High pressure in upstream D-113 and C-113
1.1.1. High pressure alarm PAH-0182B on absorber overhead line 1.1.2. PV-0182B will relieve to flare and is sized for full flow. 1.1.3. High high pressure alarm PAHH-0181 with interlock SD-207 which will shutdown the unit 1.1.4. PSV-0181A/B provided on MP flash Drum
2. Non-receipt of flash gas by boilers
2.1. Higher pressure in the system will cause process upset in the unit.
2.1.1. High pressure alarm PAH-0182A on absorber overhead line 2.1.2. High pressure alarm PAH-0182B on absorber overhead line 2.1.3. PV-0182B will relieve to flare and is sized for full flow. 2.1.4. High high pressure alarm PAHH-0181 with interlock SD-207 which will shutdown the unit 2.1.5. PSV-0181A/B provided on MP flash Drum
4.1.1. Independent low low level LALL-0161 provided on absorber with interlock I314 will close SDV-0161 4.1.2. Low low level LALL-0182 with interlock I-323 closes SDV-0183, closes LV0181 and activates I-328 (closes SDV-0201) 4.1.3. PV-0182B will relieve to flare 4.1.4. High pressure alarm PAH-0182A/B provided on the outlet of absorber 4.1.5. High high pressure alarm PAHH-0181 with interlock to shutdown the unit 4.1.6. PSV-0181A/B designed to take care of gas breakthrough case.
5. LIC-0171 malfunctions and opens LV0171 fully
5.1. Loss of level in D-112 leading to gas breakthrough to rich solvent MP flash drum causing overpressure and failure of D113
5.1.1. PSV-0181A/B sized for gas breakthrough. 5.1.2. High pressure alarm PAH-0182A/B provided on C-113 overhead 5.1.3. High High pressure alarm PAHH-0181 with interlock to shutdown the unit
6. ESDV-0008/SDV-0007 fails closed 7. Foaming in amine absorber
6.1. Same as Node 4, Deviation 1, Cause 1 7.1. Overpressurisation and carry-over of liquid 7.1.1. Antifoam injection facilities provided 10 of 43 ERM
Unit 116
Actions
Action By
7.1.2. PV-0182B will relieve to flare 7.1.3. High pressure alarm PAH-0182A/B provided on the outlet of absorber 7.1.4. High high pressure alarm PAHH-0181 with interlock SD-207 to shutdown the unit 7.1.5. PSV-0181A/B designed to take care of gas breakthrough case. 8. External fire in D-113 8. Low Pressure 1. SDV-0161 closed inadvertently 8.1. Overpressure in drum D-113 leading to rupture and fire. 1.1. Loss of flash gas in MP flash drum. Possibility of low pressure in MP flash drum 2.1. Reduction in flow of amine to MP flash drum and may results in low pressure and level in the MP flash drum 8.1.1. PSV-0181A/B designed to take care of fire case 1.1.1. Low pressure alarm PAL-0182A/B provided on outlet of Flash Gas Absorber 1.1.2. Fuel Gas make-up provided through PIC-0183 which operates PV-0183 2.1.1. Low level alarm LAL-0181 provided in D-113 2.1.2. Low low level LALL-0182 with interlock I-323 closes SDV-0183, closes LV0181 and activates I-328 (closes SDV-0201) 2.1.3. Low pressure alarm PAL-0182A/B provided on outlet of Flash Gas Absorber 2.1.4. Fuel Gas make-up provided through PIC-0183 which operates PV-0183 3. PIC-0182B malfunctions and opens PV-0182B 3.1. No gas supply to boilers. Low pressure in the drum and absorber 3.1.1. Boiler have alternate sources of fuel gas. Moreover, the amount of flash gas is very low compared to main fuel gas. 3.1.2. Low pressure alarm PAL-0182A provided at outlet of flash gas absorber 3.1.3. PIC-0183 will try to maintain pressure , however fuel gas will be lost to flare 3.1.4. High flow alarm FAH-0181 is provided at outlet of flash gas absorber 4. PIC-0182A malfunctions and opens PV-0182A fully 4.1. Pressure drop in the flash drum leading to potential carryover. 4.1.1. High flow alarm FAH-0181 provided on overhead of absorber 4.1.2. Low pressure alarm PAL-0182B provided at outlet of flash gas absorber 4.1.3. PIC-0183 will try to maintain pressure , however fuel gas will be lost to flare 4.1.4. Demister on Flash Gas absorber C-113 provided 5. LIC-0181 malfunctions and opens LV0181fully on inlet to solvent regenerator 5.1. Loss of level and pressure in D-113. Potential Gas breakthrough to solvent regenerator upsetting the performance of solvent regenerator. Possible overpressurisation of solvent regenerator may lead to failure. 5.1.1. Low low level LALL-0182 with interlock I-323 closes SDV-0183, closes LV0181 and activates I-328 (closes SDV-0201) 5.1.2. High high pressure alarm PAHH-0203 on C-112 overhead with interlock I-320 which will close FV-0211, SDV-0183, LV-0181 and SDV-0183 5.1.3. PSV-0201A/B on C-112 overhead is sized to take care of gas breakthrough 9. More Temperature 1. High heat to rich amine in the lean/rich solvent exchanger (eg due to low rich amine flow. high lean amine temp from regenerator , etc) 2. Solar heating in the blocked liquid portion 10. Less Temperature 1. Low heat to rich amine in the lean/rich solvent exchanger (eg due to high rich amine flow, low lean amine temp from regenerator , etc) 1. SDV-0183 closes 1.1. Prevailing flashing in the exchangers leading to pressurepulsation and vibration leading to mechanical failure or damage of exchangers 2.1. Overpressurisation and failure of line and exchanger 1.1. Inadequate regeneration leading to CO2 slippage to the lean amine may lead to corrosion in the bottom section of regenerator 1.1. No flow of rich amine to solvent regenerator C-112. This will upset the regenerator and level will build up in D-113. 1.1.1. High temperature alarm TAH-0192 at inlet of solvent regenerator 5. Review the requirement of amine removal facilities in the boiler area in Unit 121 6. Review the possibility of increasing the height of C-113 between the packed bed and demister to act as a knock-out drum.
JV
JV
2.1.1. TSV-0191 provided. 1.1.1. Low temperature alarm TAL-0191 at inlet of solvent regenerator 1.1.2. Reboiler E-112 maybe able to compensate for reduction in temperature
11. High Level
1.2. Possible carry-over of amine to boilers
5. Review the requirement of amine removal facilities in the boiler area in Unit 121
JV
2. LIC-0181 malfunctions and closes LV0181 on inlet to solvent regenerator 3. Loss of pressure in drum D-113 4. Malfunction of FIC-0243 which opens FV-0243 5. LIC-0163 on solvent absorber
2.1. Same as Cause 1 3.1. Same as Cause 1 4.1. Same as Cause 1, however since this quantity is very low, consequence may not be significant 5.1. Level increases at MP flash drum. Potential for gas
2.1.1. High high level alarm LAHH-0183 will cause total unit shutdown 3.1.1. Low pressure alarm PAL-0182A/B on the overhead of absorber
5.1.1. LIC-0181 will control level in D-113 11 of 43 ERM
Unit 116
Actions
Action By
malfunctions and open fully LV-0163
breakthrough
5.1.2. High level alarm LAH-0181 provided at MP flash drum 5.1.3. High high level alarm LAHH-0183 provided at MP flash drum 5.1.4. PV-0182B will relieve to flare 5.1.5. High pressure alarm PAH-0182A/B provided on the outlet of absorber 5.1.6. High high pressure alarm PAHH-0181 with interlock to shutdown the unit 5.1.7. PSV-0181A/B designed to take care of gas breakthrough case.
12. Low Level
2. LIC-0163 on solvent absorber malfunctions and close fully LV-0163 or SDV-0161 fails close
2.1. Level decreases at MP flash drum.
2.1.1. LIC-0181 will control level in D-113 2.1.2. Low level alarm LAL-0181 provided at MP flash drum 2.1.3. Low low level LALL-0182 with interlock I-323 closes SDV-0183, closes LV0181 and activates I-328 (closes SDV-0201)
3.1. Loss of level in D-113 leading to amine loss and gas breakthrough to sump drum
3.1.1. Low level alarm LAL-0181 provided in D-113 3.1.2. Low low level alarm LALL-0182 provided in D-103 3.1.3. Material of sump drum D-117 is suitable for low temperature caused by flashing 3.1.4. High level alarm LAH-0261/262 provided on sump drum 3.1.5. The drain valve to sump drum is CSC 3.1.6. Sump drum is connected to the flare
4. Operator forgetting to close the valve after skimming 13. Contamination/ Additional Phase 14. Composition change/ Loss of phase 15. Startup/Shutdown/Maintenance Hazards 16. Utility Failure 1. Corrosion material (iron sulphide) present in the pipeline 1. Any change in concentration of amine or CO2 content in amine. 1. No issue identified
4.1. Loss of level in D-113 leading to gas blowby to the skimming drum. 1.1. This may lead to foaming and carry-over of amine to D-112 1.1. This will affect the performance of absorber
4.1.1. Skimming drum D-116 is lined up to flare 1.1.1. Filtration package is provided to remove any iron sulphide particles 1.1.1. Periodic analysis of amine solution 2. Operating procedure to include chemical cleaning of the system prior to start-up.
JV
1. Steam tracing failure
1.1. Possible corrosion due to condensation
1.1.1. Line are free draining towards C-113.
7. Check the consistency of requirements of steam tracing upstream and downstream of PV0182A
JV
2. Instrument air failure : PV-0183, PV0182A, SDV-0183, SDV-0007 , ESDV0008 and LV-0181 are fail close type PV-0182B and BDV-0181 are fail open type. These were found to be in order 17. Others 1. No new issue identified
12 of 43
ERM
Unit 116
Node: 5. Regenerator top circuit including reflux Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0116 Rev O; P&ID 1516-116-0030-0118 Rev O Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards
Actions
Action By
1. No/ Less flow on C-112 overhead up to inlet of D114
1. Steam failure to reboiler
1.1. Less flow of vapour from the overhead. Low level in reflux drum and loss of reflux. Upset in Unit 116. Potential damage of reflux pump P-112A/B 1.2. No stripping leading to column upset, affecting unit performance. Unit will be shutdown.
1.1.1. Low level alarm LAL-0221 on reflux drum 1.1.2. Low low level alarm LALL-0222 on reflux drum provided with interlock I-331 which will trip reflux pumps
2. PIC-0221 malfunctions and closes PV0221 2. No/Less Flow in the bottom of D-114 to reflux in the column C-112 1. Tripping of reflux Pump P-112A/B
2.1. No flow and high pressure in the column and reflux drum D-114. This will affect regenerator performance and less stripping 1.1. High level in D-114 leading to carry-over of amine from regenerator column overhead to D-114.
2.1.1. High high pressure alarm PAHH-0203 at column overhead 2.1.2. PSV-0202A/B sized for blocked outlet case. 1.1.1. High level alarm LAH-0221 on reflux drum D-114 1.1.2. High high level alarm LAHH-0222 on reflux drum D-114 1.1.3. Low flow alarm FAL-0223 provided at pump discharge 1.1.4. Low low flow alarm FALL-0221 with interlock I-332 which will autostart of the spare pump P-112A/B and stop running pump 1.1.5. Spare pump provided with auto-start facilities 1.1.6. Pump running indication provided
1.2. Upset in regenerator leading to carry-over of amine to D114
1.2.1. High temperature alarm TAH-0201 provided on regenerator overhead 1.2.2. High pressure alarm PAH-0081A/B provided on D-114 overhead 1.2.3. High high pressure alarm PAHH-0203 on C-112 overhead with interlock I-320 which will close FV-0211, SDV-0183, LV-0181 and SDV-0183 1.2.4. Low low flow alarm FALL-0221 with interlock I-332 which will autostart of the spare pump P-112A/B and stop running pump 1.2.5. PSV-0201A/B provided on regenerator column
2. LIC-0221 malfunctions and close LV0221
2.1. Same as Cause 1
2.1.1. High high level alarm LAHH-0222 on reflux drum D-114 2.1.2. Low flow alarm FAL-0223 provided at pump discharge. (low flow alarm may not sound as it is dependent on setpoint and valve opening/closing time)
2.2. Potential damage to pump
2.2.1. Min flow bypass FIC-0223 provided 2.2.2. Low flow alarm FAL-0223 provided at pump discharge. (low flow alarm may not sound as it is dependent on setpoint and valve opening/closing time) 2.2.3. Low low flow alarm FALL-0221 with interlock I-332 which will autostart of the spare pump P-112A/B and stop running pump
3. Inadvertent opening of drain valves
3.1. Loss of level in D-113 and possible damage to the pump and upset in regenerator column
3.1.1. Low level alarm LAL-0221 on reflux drum 3.1.2. Low low level alarm LALL-0222 on reflux drum provided with interlock I-331 which will trip reflux pumps 3.1.3. Low flow alarm FAL-0223 provided at pump discharge. 3.1.4. Low low flow alarm FALL-0221 with interlock I-332 which will autostart of the spare pump P-112A/B and stop running pump 3.1.5. Drain valve is CSC
3.2. Gas breakthrough to sump drum
3.2.1. Low level alarm LAL-0221 on reflux drum 3.2.2. Low low level alarm LALL-0222 on reflux drum provided with interlock I-331 which will trip reflux pumps 3.2.3. Material of sump drum D-117 is suitable for low temperature caused by flashing 3.2.4. High level alarm LAH-0261/262 provided on sump drum 3.2.5. The drain valve to sump drum is CSC 3.2.6. Sump drum is connected to the flare
4. Tripping of overhead condenser 116-A111
4.1. Low level in reflux drum and high pressure and high temperature in drum and column. There will be 25% natural draft in air coolers
4.1.1. Low level alarm LAL-0221 on reflux drum 4.1.2. Low low level alarm LALL-0222 on reflux drum provided with interlock I-331 which will trip reflux pumps 4.1.3. High pressure alarm PAH-0221A provided on D-114 overhead
8. Review the necessity of extra PSV with adequate capacity on reflux drum if the regenerator PSVs (PSV-0201A/B) cannot protect reflux drum in case of air cooler failure
JV
13 of 43
ERM
Unit 116
Actions
Action By
4.1.4. High high pressure alarm PAHH-0203 on C-112 overhead with interlock I-320 which will close FV-0211, SDV-0183, LV-0181 and SDV-0183 4.1.5. PSV-0201A/B provided on regenerator column 3. More Flow on C-112 overhead up to inlet of D114 1. FIC-0211/TIC-0201 malfunctions and open FV-0211 fully 1.1. More vapour flow to overhead causing increasing temperature and pressure. Also, level will increase in reflux drum. Potential carry-over of amine to reflux drum 1.1.1. High level alarm LAH-0221 on reflux drum D-114 1.1.2. High high level alarm LAHH-0222 on reflux drum D-114 1.1.3. High high pressure alarm PAHH-0203 on C-112 overhead with interlock I-320 which will close FV-0211, SDV-0183, LV-0181 and SDV-0183 1.1.4. High pressure differential alarm PDAH-0202 on regenerator bottom 1.1.5. PSV-0201A/B provided on regenerator column 2. Inadvertent opening of live steam valve by operator 2.1. High temperature and pressure in the regenerator column. Potential carry-over of amine to reflux drum 2.1.1. Live steam injection valve is CSC. 2.1.2. High temp. alarm TIC-0201 on regenerator overhead 2.1.3. TIC-0201 will maintain steam temperature 2.1.4. High high pressure alarm PAHH-0203 on C-112 overhead with interlock I-320 which will close FV-0211, SDV-0183, LV-0181 and SDV-0183 2.1.5. PSV-0201A/B provided on regenerator column 3. PIC-0201 malfunctions and opens PV0201 fully 4. More Flow of overhead from D-114 to flare 5. More Flow in the bottom of D-114 to reflux in the column C-112 1. PIC-0221 malfunctions and opens PV0221 fully 1. LIC-0221 malfunctions and opens LV0221 fully 3.1. Slightly higher pressure in the regenerator column. Also, it can lead to marginal lower temperature. 1.1. Low pressure in D-114 and C-112.. No significant consequence. 1.1. More reflux will cause loss of level in reflux drum D-114 and may damage the pumps P-112A/B. Low temperature and pressure in the top of regenerator column leading to upset in the column and increased entrainment to reflux drum and reflux trays in the column 3.1.1. High pressure alarm PAH-0221 on overhead of reflux drum 3.1.2. PSV-0201A/B provided on regenerator column 1.1.1. Low pressure alarm PAL-0201 provided on C-112 1.1.2. PIC-0201 will try to maintain pressure of C-112 1.1.1. Low low level alarm LALL-0222 on reflux drum provided with interlock I-331 which will trip reflux pumps 1.1.2. Low temp. alarm TAL-0201 provided on regenerator overhead 1.1.3. Low pressure alarm PAL-0221 on regenerator overhead 1.1.4. PV-0221 will reduce flow to flare to maintain pressure. 1.1.5. Reboiler will try to make up for temperature in the column 1.2. Flooding of column leading to poor performance 2. Malfunction of HIC-0221 and open HV0221 2.1. Loss of level in D-114 and may lead to gas breakthrough to Sour water (WS) network 1.2.1. High pressure differential PDAH-0202 provided across the column 2.1.1. High flow alarm FAH-0223 provided at pump discharge 2.1.2. Low level alarm LAL-0221 on reflux drum 2.1.3. Low low level alarm LALL-0222 on reflux drum provided with interlock I-331 which will trip reflux pumps 6. Reverse/Misdirected Flow 1. Failure of nitrogen supply 1.1. Possible reverse flow of C-112 overhead vapours to nitrogen header causing contamination of nitrogen. This may cause severe problems in the nitrogen hose stations 2.1. Overhead vapours and liquid may backflow into condensate supply header causing contamination 3.1. Reverse flow from column to reflux drum via min flow line. 1.1.1. NRV provided downstream of PV-0201
2. Failure of cold condensate supply to reflux drum 3. Tripping of pump P-112A/B
2.1.1. NRV, double block and blind provided in cold condensate supply line 3.1.1. Spare pump provided with auto-start facilities 3.1.2. Pump running indication provided 9. Review if the provision of check valve at the inlet of reflux to the regenerator column C-112 is required
JV
4. Failure of SL supply.
4.1. Possible reverse flow from C-112 to steam header via live steam valve causing contamination of steam. 5.1. Reverse flow of gas to D-114 and C-112 as peak backpresssure is 1.7 barg which is higher than reflux drum D114 pressure 1.1. Low level in reflux drum and high pressure and high temperature in drum and column. There will be 25% natural draft in air coolers
4.1.1. NRV provided near injection point 4.1.2. Live steam valve is CSC 5.1.1. None identified 10. Review the backpressure for PV-0221 as presently it is connected to MP flare. 8. Review the necessity of extra PSV with adequate capacity on reflux drum if the regenerator PSVs (PSV-0201A/B) cannot protect reflux drum in case of air cooler failure
JV
5. Peak overpressure of flare
7. High Pressure
1.1.1. Low level alarm LAL-0221 on reflux drum 1.1.2. Low low level alarm LALL-0222 on reflux drum provided with interlock I-331 which will trip reflux pumps 1.1.3. High high pressure alarm PAHH-0203 on C-112 overhead with interlock I-320 which will close FV-0211, SDV-0183, LV-0181 and SDV-0183 1.1.4. PSV-0201A/B provided on regenerator column
JV
14 of 43
ERM
Unit 116
Actions
Action By
2. PIC-0221 malfunctions and closes PV0221 3. PIC-0201 malfunctions and opens PV0201 fully
2.1. Refer to Node 5, Deviation 1, Cause 2 3.1. High pressure in the regenerator leading to upset in performance 3.1.1. High high pressure alarm PAHH-0203 on C-112 overhead with interlock I-320 which will close FV-0211, SDV-0183, LV-0181 and SDV-0183 3.1.2. PSV-0201A/B provided on regenerator column
4. FIC-0211/TIC-0201 malfunctions and open FV-0211 fully
4.1. More vapour flow to overhead causing increasing temperature and pressure. Also, level will increase in reflux drum. Potential carry-over of amine to reflux drum
4.1.1. High level alarm LAH-0221 on reflux drum D-114 4.1.2. High high level alarm LAHH-0222 on reflux drum D-114 4.1.3. High high pressure alarm PAHH-0203 on C-112 overhead with interlock I-320 which will close FV-0211, SDV-0183, LV-0181 and SDV-0183 4.1.4. High pressure differential alarm PDAH-0202 on regenerator bottom 4.1.5. PSV-0201A/B provided on regenerator column
5. Gas breakthrough due to loss of level in flash drum
5.1. Overpressure in regenerator C-112 which will affect the regenerator performance.
5.1.1. High high pressure alarm PAHH-0203 on C-112 overhead with interlock I-320 which will close FV-0211, SDV-0183, LV-0181 and SDV-0183 5.1.2. PSV-0201A/B on C-112 overhead is sized to take care of gas breakthrough
6. External fire on D-114 8. Low Pressure 1. PIC-0221 malfunctions and opens PV0221 fully 2. Inadvertent opening of drain valves
6.1. Overpressure in drum D-114 leading to rupture, fire and release of toxic gas to atmosphere 1.1. Loss in pressure in reflux drum and regenerator leading to poor performance of regenerator. Loss of gas to flare 2.1. Loss of level in D-114 and possible damage to the pump and upset in regenerator column
6.1.1. PSV-0201A/B designed to take care of fire case 1.1.1. PV-0201 will open and try to maintain pressure in regenerator column 1.1.2. Low pressure alarm PAL-0201 provided on regenerator column overhead 2.1.1. Drain valve is CSC 2.1.2. Low level alarm LAL-0221 on reflux drum 2.1.3. Low low level alarm LALL-0222 on reflux drum provided with interlock I-331 which will trip reflux pumps 2.1.4. Low flow alarm FAL-0223 provided at pump discharge. 2.1.5. Low low flow alarm FALL-0221 with interlock I-332 which will autostart of the spare pump P-112A/B and stop running pump
2.2.1. The drain valve to sump drum is CSC 2.2.2. Low level alarm LAL-0221 on reflux drum 2.2.3. Low low level alarm LALL-0222 on reflux drum provided with interlock I-331 which will trip reflux pumps 2.2.4. High level alarm LAH-0261/262 provided on sump drum 2.2.5. Sump drum is connected to the flare
3. FIC-0211/TIC-0201 malfunctions and closes FV-0211
3.1. Less flow of vapour from the overhead. Low level in reflux drum and loss of reflux. Upset in Unit 116. Potential damage of reflux pump P-112A/B 4.1. Low pressure in the regenerator column. No significant consequence
3.1.1. Low level alarm LAL-0221 on reflux drum 3.1.2. Low low level alarm LALL-0222 on reflux drum provided with interlock I-331 which will trip reflux pumps 4.1.1. Low low level alarm LALL-0202 on regenerator with interlock I-325 which will trips P-122A/B, close SDV-0201 and close SDV-0183 4.1.2. Low pressure alarm PAL-0201 provided on regenerator overhead 4.1.3. PV-0201 will open and try to maintain pressure in regenerator.
4. LIC-0201 malfunctions and open LV0201 fully
4.2. Gas blowby to storage tank causing rupture of the tank
4.2.1. Low low level alarm LALL-0202 on regenerator with interlock I-325 which will trips P-122A/B, close SDV-0201 and close SDV-0183 4.2.2. PSV-0241 provide on T-111
14. The protection of the tank against gas breakthrough and fire case needs to be reviewed by JV with Vendor 8. Review the necessity of extra PSV with adequate capacity on reflux drum if the regenerator PSVs (PSV-0201A/B) cannot protect reflux drum in case of air cooler failure
JV
9. More Temperature
1.1. Low level in reflux drum and high pressure and high temperature in drum and column. There will be 25% natural draft in air coolers
1.1.1. Low level alarm LAL-0221 on reflux drum 1.1.2. Low low level alarm LALL-0222 on reflux drum provided with interlock I-331 which will trip reflux pumps 1.1.3. PV-0221 provided which will relieve acid gas to flare 1.1.4. High pressure alarm PAH-0221 provided on D-114 overhead 1.1.5. High high pressure alarm PAHH-0203 on C-112 overhead with interlock I-320 which will close FV-0211, SDV-0183, LV-0181 and SDV-0183 1.1.6. PSV-0201A/B provided on regenerator column 15 of 43 ERM
JV
Unit 116
Actions
Action By
2. TIC-0211 malfunctions and closes TV0211
2.1. High temperature of SL leading to degradation of DEA.
2.1.1. High temperature alarm TAH-0202/0204 at upstream/downstream of reboiler E-112. 2.1.2. TIC-0201 will try to maintain temperature
3. Inadvertent opening of live steam valve by operator
3.1. High temperature and pressure in the absorber column. Potential carry-over of amine to reflux drum
3.1.1. Live steam injection valve is CSC. 3.1.2. High temp. alarm TIC-0201 on absorber overhead 3.1.3. High high pressure alarm PAHH-0203 on C-112 overhead with interlock I-320 which will close FV-0211, SDV-0183, LV-0181 and SDV-0183 3.1.4. TIC-0201 will try to maintain temperature
4. TIC-0201/FIC-0211 malfunctions and open FV-0211
4.1. Same as Conseq 2.1
4.1.1. High temperature alarm TAH-0202/0204 at upstream/downstream of reboiler E-112. 4.1.2. High high pressure alarm PAHH-0203 on C-112 overhead with interlock I-320 which will close FV-0211, SDV-0183, LV-0181 and SDV-0183 4.1.3. PSV-0201A/B provided on regenerator column
10. Less Temperature
1. TIC-0211 malfunctions and open TV0211 2. Steam failure to reboiler (eg TIC-0201 or FIC-0211 malfunction and close FV0211)
1.1. Lower temperature of SL which may cause poor reboiling. No significant impact as size of condensate line is 2" whereas steam line is 20" 2.1. Less flow of vapour from the overhead. Low level in reflux drum and loss of reflux. Upset in Unit 116. Potential damage of reflux pump P-112A/B 2.1.1. Low level alarm LAL-0221 on reflux drum 2.1.2. Low low level alarm LALL-0222 on reflux drum provided with interlock I-331 which will trip reflux pumps 2.1.3. Low pressure alarm PAL-0201 2.1.4. Low temperature alarm TAL-0202/0204 at upstream/downstream of reboiler E-112.
3. LIC-0221 malfunctions and opens LV0221 fully 11. High Level 1. Tripping of reflux Pump P-112A/B
3.1. Refer to Node 5, Deviation 5 Cause 1 1.1. High level in D-114 leading to carry-over of amine to flare as well as from regenerator column overhead to D-114. 1.1.1. High level alarm LAH-0221 on reflux drum D-114 1.1.2. High high level alarm LAHH-0222 on reflux drum D-114 1.1.3. Low flow alarm FAL-0223 provided at pump discharge 1.1.4. Low low flow alarm FALL-0221 with interlock I-332 which will autostart of the spare pump P-112A/B and stop running pump 1.1.5. Demister provided in D-114 1.1.6. Spare pump provided with autostart facilities 1.1.7. Pump running indication provided 1.2. Upset in regenerator leading to carry-over of amine to D114 1.2.1. High temperature alarm TAH-0201 provided on regenerator overhead 1.2.2. High pressure alarm PAH-0221 provided on D-114 overhead 1.2.3. High high pressure alarm PAHH-0203 on C-112 overhead with interlock I-320 which will close FV-0211, SDV-0183, LV-0181 and SDV-0183 1.2.4. Low low flow alarm FALL-0221 with interlock I-332 which will autostart of the spare pump P-112A/B and stop running pump
2.1.1. High high level alarm LAHH-0222 on reflux drum D-114 2.1.2. Low flow alarm FAL-0223 provided at pump discharge. (low flow alarm may not sound as it is dependent on setpoint and valve opening/closing time)
2.2. Potential damage to pump P-112A/B
2.2.1. Min flow FIC-0223 provided 2.2.2. Low flow alarm FAL-0223 provided at pump discharge 2.2.3. Low low flow FALL-0221 with interlock I-332 to trip pumps P-112A/B
3. FIC-0211/TIC-0201 malfunctions and open FV-0211 fully
3.1. More vapour flow to overhead causing level reduction in regeneration column bottom. Also, level will increase in reflux drum.
3.1.1. High level alarm LAH-0221 on reflux drum D-114 3.1.2. High high level alarm LAHH-0222 on reflux drum D-114 3.1.3. High high pressure alarm PAHH-0203 on C-112 overhead with interlock I-320 which will close FV-0211, SDV-0183, LV-0181 and SDV-0183 3.1.4. High pressure differential alarm PDAH-0202 on regenerator bottom
4. Inadvertent opening of cold condensate
4.1. High level in reflux drum and loss of solution strength of
4.1.1. Blocks and blind provided on cold condensate line 16 of 43 ERM
Unit 116
Actions
Action By
line 12. Low Level 1. Steam failure to reboiler 2. Inadvertent opening of drain valves
DEA. 1.1. Refer to Node 5, Deviation 10, Cause 2 2.1. Loss of level in D-114 and possible damage to the pump and upset in regenerator column
4.1.2. Rota-meter FG-0221 provided on cold condensate line to reflux drum
2.1.1. Drain valve is CSC 2.1.2. Low level alarm LAL-0221 on reflux drum 2.1.3. Low low level alarm LALL-0222 on reflux drum provided with interlock I-331 which will trip reflux pumps
3.1. Low level in reflux drum and high pressure and high temperature in drum and column. There will be 25% natural draft in air coolers 4.1. More reflux will cause loss in level in reflux drum D-114 and may damage the pumps P-112A/B. Upset of column
3.1.1. Low level alarm LAL-0221 on reflux drum 3.1.2. Low low level alarm LALL-0222 on reflux drum provided with interlock I-331 which will trip reflux pumps 4.1.1. Low low level alarm LALL-0222 on reflux drum provided with interlock I-331 which will trip reflux pumps
8. Review the necessity of extra PSV with adequate capacity on reflux drum if the regenerator PSVs (PSV-0201A/B) cannot protect reflux drum in case of air cooler failure
JV
4. LIC-0221 malfunctions and opens LV0221 fully 5. Refer to Node 5, Deviation 5, Cause 2. 13. Contamination/ Additional Phase 14. Composition change/ Loss of phase 15. Startup/Shutdown/Maintenance Hazards 1. Corrosion material (iron sulphide) present in the pipeline 1. Inadvertent opening of cold condensate line 1. During shutdown, iron sulphide may cause ignition when exposed to air 2. For maintenance, air ingress in the system 3. Improper warming up 4. Vacuum formation during shut-down
1.1. This may lead to foaming and carry-over of amine to D114. 1.1. Refer to Node 5Devi, ation 11, Cause 4 1.1. Fire leading to equipment damage
1.1.1. Filtration package is provided to remove any iron sulphide particles 1.1.2. Provision for injection of antifoam
JV
1.1.1. None identified
3. Operating procedure to include proper cleaning and wetting of the column before opening for maintenance. 11. Operating manual to address the steps for start-up and maintenance procedures in order to avoid toxic gas release to the atmosphere. 12. Operating manual to address warming up procedures for reboiler E-112
JV
2.1. Formation of polythionic acid leading to corrosion
2.1.1. Nitrogen purge provided
JV
3.1. Thermal shock may cause leakage through joints (eg flanges etc) 4.1. Possible collapse of equipment and loss of containment. This may lead to environmental problems.
3.1.1. None identified 4.1.1. Regenerator and reflux drum are designed for full vacuum. 4.1.2. Nitrogen purge provided
JV
16. Utility Failure
1. Instrument air failure : PV-0221 , SDV0083 and ESDV-0081 are FC type LV-0221, FV-0223 and PV-0221 are FO type These are found to be in order 2. Power Failure : During power failure, fans and pumps will trip. refer to relevant discussions in this node. 3. Cold condensate failure : 4. Steam failure 5. Nitrogen failure 3.1. Refer to Node 5, Deviation 9, Cause 2 4.1. Refer to Node 5, Deviation 10, Cause 2 5.1. Refer to Node 5, Deviation 6, Cause 1
17. Others
1. No new issues
17 of 43
ERM
Unit 116
Node: 6. Regenerator bottom circuit including reboiler Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0115 Rev O; P&ID 1516-116-0030-0116 Rev O; P&ID 1516-116-0030-0117 Rev O; P&ID 1516-116-0030-0120 Rev O Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards
Actions
Action By
1. No/ Less flow from Column bottom to solvent storage tank via 116-E111
1.1. Increase in level in Regenerator bottom may lead to level higher than inlet and outlet for reboiler E-112 in the regenerator column. This will cause loss of thermosyphoning and hence vapourisation in the regenerator. Amine carry-over to reflux drum 1.2. Low heat to rich amine in the lean/rich solvent exchanger
1.1.1. High high level alarm LAHH-0202 on regenerator 1.1.2. High level alarm LAH-0221 on reflux drum D-114 1.1.3. High high level alarm LAHH-0222 on reflux drum D-114 1.2.1. Low temperature alarm low TAL-0191 provided on rich amine outlet of E-111 1.2.2. Reboiler will try to compensate for duty
1.3. Potential damage to Pump P-122A/B
1.3.1. Min flow FIC-0231 provided 1.3.2. Low flow alarm FAL-0231 provided on pump discharge 1.3.3. Low Low flow FALL-0232 provided with interlock I-327 which will trip P-122A/B
2. SDV-0201 closed at column bottom
2.1. Same as conseq. 1.1
2.1.1. Limit switch provided on SDV-0201 2.1.2. High level alarm LAH-0201 on regenerator 2.1.3. Refer to safeguards for Consequence 1.1
2.2.1. Limit switch provided on SDV-0201 2.2.2. Refer to safeguards for Consequence 1.2
2.3.1. Limit switch provided on SDV-0201 2.3.2. Refer to safeguards for Consequence 1.3
3. Pump P-122 trips
3.1. Level build-up in regenerator and low level in storage tank.
3.1.1. High level alarm LAH-0201 on regenerator 3.1.2. High high level alarm LAHH-0202 on regenerator 3.1.3. Low flow alarm FAL-0231 on pump discharge 3.1.4. Low Low flow FALL-0232 provided with interlock I-327 which will trip P-122A/B 3.1.5. Low level alarm LAL-0241 on storage tank 3.1.6. Low low level LALL-0242 on storage tank with interlock SD-204 which will shutdown unit 3.1.7. Spare pump with auto-start facilities 3.1.8. Pump running indication
4. Strainer blockage of E-111 2. No/ Less flow of steam to E-112 1. Steam failure to reboiler
4.1. Same as Conseq 1.1 1.1. Refer to Node 5, Deviation 10, Cause 2 1.2. No condensation of steam. No supply to condensate drum D-115 causing low level in condensate drum and potential damage to condensate pumps P-114A/B 1.2.1. LIC-0212 will maintain level in condensate drum 1.2.2. Min flow bypass FIC-0213 1.2.3. Low level alarm LAL-0212 in condensate drum 1.2.4. Low low level alarm LALL-0211 in condensate drum with interlock I-329 which will trip pumps P-114A/B
2. TIC-0211 malfunction and closes TV0211 3. No/ Less flow of condensate from D-115 to LP condensate system 1. Tripping of pump P-114A/B
2.1. No significant impact of SL flow to E-112 and leads to higher steam temperature 1.1. Increase in level in D-115 which may cause blockage in reboiler tubes reducing the surface area available for reboiling affecting the performance of reboiler
2.1.1. High temp alarm TAH-0211 provided on steam to E-112. 1.1.1. High level alarm LAH-0212 on D-115 1.1.2. High high level alarm LAHH-0211 on D-115 1.1.3. Spare pump provided with autostart facilities 1.1.4. Pump running indication provided
2. LIC-0212 malfunctions and closes LV0212
2.1. Same as Conseq. 1.1 and also vapour locking in the pipe downstream LV-0212 2.2. Potential damage to pump P-114A/B
2.1.1. High high level alarm LAHH-0211 on D-115 2.2.1. Min flow FIC-0213 provided 2.2.2. Low flow alarm FAL-0213 provided 2.2.3. Low Low flow FALL-0214 provided with interlock I-330 which will trip P-114A/B
13. Ensure that pipe downstream of LV-0212 is designed for two-phase flow.
JV
3. FIC-0213 malfunctions and opens FV0213 fully 4. Non-receipt of condensate in LP steam Condensate (Unit 121)
3.1. No significant consequences 4.1. Same as Conseq 1.1
18 of 43
ERM
Unit 116
Actions
Action By JV
4. More Flow from Column bottom to solvent storage tank via 116-E-111 and 116-A-112
1. LIC-0201 malfunctions and open LV0201
1.1. More supply of solvent to storage tank. Also level in regenerator bottoms goes down may lead to gas breakthrough to storage tank leading to high pressure and possible rupture of the tank. Also, overheating of the rich side of exchanger E-111 may occur. Less cooling of lean side of exchangers. 1.2. Potential damage to pump P-122A/B
1.1.1. High temperature alarm TAH-0193 at the outlet of E-111 1.1.2. PSV-0241 provided (sizing and type to be decided by Tank Vendor) 1.1.3. Low low level alarm LALL-0202 provided at bottom of regenerator will close SDV-0201 1.2.1. Low low level alarm LALL-0202 provided at bottom of regenerator will trip pumps P-122A/B
14. The protection of the tank against gas breakthrough and fire case needs to be reviewed by JV with Vendor
5. More flow of steam to E-102 6. More flow of condensate from D-115 to LP condensate system
1. FIC-0211/TIC-0201 malfunctions and open FV-0211 fully 1. LIC-0212 malfunctions and opens LV0212 fully
1.1. Refer to Node 5, Deviation 3, Cause 1 1.1. This will lead to lower level in D-115 and potential pump P114A/B damage. Potential hammering in the line downstream LV-0212 may cause failure. 1.1.1. Low level alarm LAL-0212 in condensate drum 1.1.2. Low low level alarm LALL-0211 in condensate drum with interlock I-329 which will trip pumps P-114A/B 1.1.3. Anchoring and sliding support provided for piping downstream LV-0212
7. Reverse/Misdirected Flow
1. Pump P-114A/B trips
1.1. Possibility of reverse flow from condensate header to condensate drum through pumps and min flow line
1.1.1. Check valve provided at LV-0212 1.1.2. Check valve provided at pump discharge 1.1.3. Spare pump provided with autostart facilities 1.1.4. Pump running indication provided
2. Failure of cold condensate to desuperheater 8. High Pressure 1. FIC-0211/TIC-0201 malfunctions and open FV-0211 fully 2. LIC-0201 malfunctions and open LV0201 9. Low Pressure 1. Refer to discussion on Node 5, Deviation 10, Cause 2 2. Tripping of P-122A/B 10. More Temperature 1. Refer to discussion on Node 5, Deviation 9 2. No flow of rich amine to rich/lean solvent exchangers
2.1. This will lead to reverse flow of steam to condensate header. 1.1. Refer to Node 5, Deviation 9, Cause 4 2.1. Refer to Node 6, Deviation 4, Cause 1
2.1.1. Check valve provided
2.1. Low pressure downstream of P-122A/B. No flow to solvent storage tank. Refer to Node 6, Deviation 1, Cause 3.
2.1. No cooling of lean solvent stream. This will lead to increased load on air cooler A-112 and also causing high temperature in the storage tank which may lead to failure. 2.2. High pressure in rich amine side due to blockage may lead to failure of rich/lean solvent heat exchangers.
2.1.1. High temperature alarm TAH-0193 at the outlet of E-111
2.2.1. TSV-00191 provided on E-111 respectively 3.1.1. High temp alarm TAH-0231 at outlet of air cooler 3.1.2. Tank design temperature is higher than maximum inlet temperature to air cooler.
3. Air cooler A-112 trips
3.1. High temp of lean amine to storage tank
11. Less Temperature 12. High Level
1. Refer to discussion on Node 5, Deviation 10 1. LIC-0201 malfunctions and close LV0201 2. SDV-0201 closed at column bottom 3. Tripping of pump P-122 A/B 4. FIC-0211/TIC-0201 malfunctions and open FV-0211 fully 1.1. Refer to Node 6, Deviation 1, Cause 1, Conseq. 1 2.1. Refer to Node 6, Deviation 1, Cause 2, Conseq. 1 3.1. High level in regenerator. Refer to Node 6, Deviation 1, Cause 3 4.1. Refer to Node 5, Deviation 9, Cause 4 4.1.1. LIC-0212 will try to control level 4.1.2. High level alarm LAH-0212 provided on D-115 4.1.3. High high level alarm LAHH-0211 provided on D-115 5. Stainer Blockage 6. Refer to Node 6, Deviation 3 5.1. Refer to Node 6, Deviation 1, Cause 4
13. Low Level
1. Steam failure to reboiler 2. LIC-0201 malfunctions and open LV0201
1.1. Refer to Node 6, Deviation 2, Cause 1, Conseq. 2 2.1. Refer to Node 6, Deviation 4, Cause 1
19 of 43
ERM
Unit 116
Actions
Action By
3. Inadvertent opening of drain line upstream of SDV-0201
3.1. Loss of level in C-112 to sump drum leading to pump damage P-122A/B and gas blowby to storage tank leading to overpressure and rupture
3.1.1. The drain valve to sump drum is CSC 3.1.2. Low level alarm LAL-0201 provided on regenerator bottom 3.1.3. Low low level alarm LALL-0202 with interlock to trip pumps and close SDV0201.
3.3. Potential over-temperature of underground piping which will cause piping failure 4. LIC-0212 malfunctions and opens LV00212 fully 5. Inadvertent opening of condensate drum drain valve 4.1. Refer to Node 6, Deviation 6, Cause 1 5.1. Low level in D-115 and potential damage of pump P114A/B
3.3.1. Drain Valve to sump drum is CSC
19. Confirm the max. allowable temp in the drain header (based on drain piping design)and this may be mentioned in the operating procedure
JV
5.1.1. Drain valves are CSC 5.1.2. Low level alarm LAL-0212 provided on D-115 5.1.3. Low low level alarm LALL-0211 with interlock I-329 to trip pump P-114A/B
5.2. Potential over-temperature of underground piping which will cause piping failure
5.2.1. Drain Valve to sump drum is CSC 5.2.2. Sea water injection provided for cooling which must be used in any case for hot draining 1.1.1. Sampling of lean amine upstream and downstream of exchanger E-111.
JV
14. Contamination/ Additional Phase
1. Gasket failure in E-111
1.1. Rich amine going to lean amine side. This will lead to higher CO2 content in storage tank and pressurisation of tank. Contamination of tank content will lead to lower absorption of CO2 in the absorber. .
2. Refer to discussion under Node 5, Deviation 13 15. Composition change/ Loss of phase 1. Same as discussed under Deviation 14, Cause 1 2. Same as discussed under Deviation 14, Cause 2 16. Startup/Shutdown/Maintenance Hazards 17. Utility Failure 1. Improper warming up 1.1. Thermal shock may cause leakage through joints (eg flanges etc) 1.1.1. None identified 12. Operating manual to address warming up procedures for reboiler E-112
JV
1. Instrument air failure : SDV-0201 , LV0201 , FV-0211, TV-0211 are FC type FV-0213 is FO type These are found to be in order 2. Power Failure 2.1. This will lead to tripping of pump P-114 A/B. Refer to Node 6, Deviation 3, Cause 1 2.2. This will lead to tripping of A-112. Refer to Node 6, Deviation 10, Cause 3 2.3. This will lead to tripping of pump P-122 A/B. Refer to Node 6, Deviation 1, Cause 3 3. Refer to Node 5, Deviation 16, Cause 3, 4 and 5
18. Others
1. No new issues identified
20 of 43
ERM
Unit 116
Node: 7. Lean storage tank and pumping system Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0112 Rev O; P&ID 1516-116-0030-0114 Rev O; P&ID 1516-116-0030-0120 Rev O; P&ID 1516-116-0030-0101 Rev 3 Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards
Actions
Action By
1. No/ Less flow
1. Pump P-111 trips
1.1. No flow of solvent to solvent absorber/ flash gas absorber leading to offspec product
1.1.1. Low flow alarm FAL-0241 on discharge of pump 1.1.2. Low flow alarm FAL-0243 on discharge of pump 1.1.3. Low low flow FALL-0246 with interlock SD-203 will shutdown the unit. 1.1.4. Low low flow FALL-0242 with interlock I-308 start standby pump and trip running pump 1.1.5. Spare pump provided with auto-start facilities 1.1.6. Pump running indication provided.
1.2. Level in tank increases
1.2.1. High level alarm LAH-0241 provided on storage tank 1.2.2. Overflow line provided on tank with seal leg and syphon breaker
2. FIC-0241 malfunctions and closes FV0241
2.1. No flow of solvent to solvent absorber leading to offspec product
2.1.1. Low low flow FALL-0246 with interlock SD-203 will shutdown the unit. 2.1.2. Low flow alarm FAL-0245 provided on pump discharge 2.1.3. Low low flow FALL-0242 with interlock I-308 start standby pump and trip running pump
2.2. Level in tank increases
2.2.1. High level alarm LAH-0241 provided on storage tank 2.2.2. Overflow line provided on tank with seal leg and syphon breaker
2.3. Lower flow through Pump P-111 A/B which may lead to pump damage
2.3.1. Min flow FIC-0245 provided for pump P-101A/B 2.3.2. Low low flow FALL-0242 with interlock I-308 start standby pump and trip running pump. Refer to Note 4 in P&ID 1516-116-0030-0120
3. FIC-0243 malfunctions and closes FV0243
3.1. No flow of solvent to flash gas absorber. No significant impact on pump since it is a 2" line (main line is 10") 3.2. Increase in CO2 content and hence flash gas shall not be routed to boilers 3.2.1. None identified 4.1.1. Pump P-111A/B will be able to handle the min flow bypass (min flow for pump approximately 15%) whereas pump design capacity above normal flow will match this. 5.1.1. Low flow alarm FAL-0241 on discharge of pump 5.1.2. Low low flow FALL-0246 with interlock SD-203 will shutdown the unit. 5.1.3. Low low flow FALL-0242 with interlock I-308 start standby pump and trip running pump 5.2. Level in tank increases 5.2.1. High level alarm LAH-0241 provided on storage tank 5.2.2. Overflow line provided on tank with seal leg and syphon breaker 5.3. Lower flow through Pump P-111 A/B which may lead to pump damage 5.3.1. Min flow FIC-0245 provided for pump P-111A/B 5.3.2. Low low flow FALL-0242 with interlock I-308 start standby pump and trip running pump. Refer to Note 4 in P&ID 1516-116-0030-0120 6.1.1. Low level alarm LAL-0241 provided on storage tank 6.1.2. Low low level alarm LALL-0242 with interlock SD-204 which will shutdown unit 1.1.1. Knock-out drum D-112 provided 1.1.2. High pressure differential alarm PDAH-0163 provided across solvent absorber column 1.2.1. Overload trip provided on pump P-111A/B motor 2.1.1. Refer to HAZOP of Unit 121 5. Review the requirement of amine removal facilities in the boiler area in Unit 121
JV
15. Provide independent transmitter with low low flow alarm with interlock to close SDV-0007
JV
4. FIC-0245 malfunctions and opens FV0245 5. SDV-0162 fails close
4.1. Less flow to solvent absorber causing offspec product
5.1. No flow of solvent to solvent absorber leading to offspec product
6. Low level of solvent storage tank
6.1. Possible damage of pump P-111A/B and no flow to solvent absorber and flash gas absorber leading to offspec product 1.1. More flow to solvent absorber may lead to carry-over of solvent and flooding of column
2. More Flow
1. FIC-0241malfunctions and opens FV0241 fully
1.2. Overloading and damage to pump motor (P-111A/B) 2. FIC-0243 malfunctions and opens FV0243 fully 3. FIC-0245 malfunctions and closes FV0245 fully 4. FIC-0183 malfunctions and opens FV0183 fully 2.1. Carry-over of amine with flash gas to boilers. 3.1. No significant consequence 4.1. High level in D-113 leading to carry-over to boilers 4.2. Overloading and damage to pump motor (P-111A/B) 4.3. Lower flow of lean amine to absorber affecting the performance
4.2.1. Overload trip provided on pump P-111A/B motor 4.3.1. Low level alarm LAL-0241 provided on storage tank 4.3.2. Low low level alarm LALL-0242 with interlock SD-204 which will shutdown unit 4.3.3. Low flow alarm FAL-0241 21 of 43 ERM 31. Review the actuation of FV-0183 by HV instead of FIC-0183.
JV
Unit 116
Actions
Action By
4.3.4. High flow alarm FAH-245 provided at pump discharge 4.3.5. FALL-0246 with interlock SD-203 which shutdown unit 3. Reverse/Misdirected Flow 1. Pump P-111A/B trips 1.1. Reverse flow from solvent absorber C-111 causing pressurisation of tank 1.2. Reverse flow from flash gas absorber C-113 causing pressurisation of tank 1.3. Reverse flow of gas from solvent absorber to flash gas absorber causing pressurisation of flash gas absorber 1.1.1. Check valve provided 1.1.2. SDV-0162 will close upon pump trip via interlock I-304 1.2.1. Check valve provided 1.3.1. Two check valves provided 1.3.2. PV-0182 B will relieve excess pressure to flare. 1.3.3. PSV-0181A/B provided on D-113 2. Makeup pump of Unit 146 not running and makeup lined up 3. Tripping of antifoam pump P-117 4. High Pressure 1. Pump P-111A/B trips 2. LIC-0201 malfunctions and open LV0201 3. PCV-0242 A/B/C opens 4. FIC-0243 malfunctions and close FV0243 5. FIC-0241 malfunctions and close FV0241 2.1. Reverse flow from tank to solvent make-up line. 3.1. Reverse flow of solvent to antifoam tank T-102 causing overflow of tank. 1.1. Refer to Node 7, Deviation 3, Cause 1 2.1. Refer to Node 6, Deviation 4, Cause 1 3.1. High pressure in the tank may lead to damage 4.1. High pressure upstream of FV-0243 and low pressure downstream of FV-0243. However, no significant consequences since it is a 1 1/2" line (main line is 8") 5.1. High pressure upstream of FV-0241 and low pressure downstream of FV-0241. This may lead to pump damage. Also, this may result in off spec products 5.1.1. Min flow bypass FIC-0245 provided 5.1.2. Low flow alarm FAL-0245 provided on pump discharge 5.1.3. Low low flow FALL-0246 with interlock SD-203 will shutdown the unit. 5.1.4. Low low flow FALL-0242 with interlock I-308 start standby pump and trip running pump 6. SDV-0162 fails to close position 6.1. Same as Cause 5 6.1.1. Limit switch provided on SDV-0162 6.1.2. Min flow bypass FIC-0245 provided 6.1.3. Low flow alarm FAL-0245 provided on pump discharge 6.1.4. Low low flow FALL-0246 with interlock SD-203 will shutdown the unit. 6.1.5. Low low flow FALL-0242 with interlock I-308 start standby pump and trip running pump 5. Low Pressure 1. FIC-0243 malfunctions and close FV0243 2. FIC-0241 malfunctions and close FV0241 1.1. High pressure upstream of FV-0243 and low pressure downstream of FV-0243. However, no significant consequences since it is a 1 1/2" line (main line is 8") 2.1. High pressure upstream of FV-0241 and low pressure downstream of FV-0241. This may lead to pump damage. Also, this may result in off spec products 2.1.1. Min flow bypass FIC-0245 provided 2.1.2. Low flow alarm FAL-0245 provided on pump discharge 2.1.3. Low low flow FALL-0246 with interlock SD-203 will shutdown the unit. 2.1.4. Low low flow FALL-0242 with interlock I-308 start standby pump and trip running pump 3. SDV-0162 fails to close position 3.1. Same as Node 7, Deviation 4, Cause 5 3.1.1. Limit switch provided on SDV-0162 3.1.2. Refer to safeguards for NOde 7, Deviation 4, Cause 5 4. PCV-0242 fails close / Nitrogen failiure 4.1. This may lead to vacuum formation in the tank leading to rupture of the tank. Loss of level indication on LT-0241 (bubbling type) 5.1. Tank may get depressurised and ingress of air may take place which will degrade the solvent. 4.1.1. PSV-0241 provided for vacuum breaking 3.1.1. PSV-0241 provided on tank 2.1.1. NRV provided at makeup pump discharge 3.1.1. Check valve provided at pump discharge.
5. Loss of seal in tank
16. Operating procedure to include seal maintenance using cold condensate in solvent storage tank.
JV
6. More Temperature 7. Less Temperature 8. High Level
1. Refer to Node 6, Deviation 10 1. Refer to Node 6, Deviation 11 1. Pump P-111 trips 1.1. Refer to Node 7, Deviation 1, Cause 1, Conseq. 2 22 of 43 ERM
Unit 116
Actions
Action By
2. SDV-0162 fails close 3. FIC -0241 malfunctions and closes FV0241 4. Inadvertent opening of cold condensate valve 5. Inadvertent opening of solvent makeup line 9. Low Level 1. Inadvertent opening of drain valves
2.1. Refer to Node 7, Deviation 1, Cause 5 3.1. Refer to Node 7, Deviation 1, Cause 2, Conseq. 2 4.1. This will lead to high level in the tank , diluting the solvent solution. This will affect the performance of absorber 5.1. High level in the tank which may lead to overflow 4.1.1. Two isolation valves provided 5.1.1. Overflow line provided with a seal leg and siphon breaker 5.1.2. Two isolation valves provided 1.1. Low level in the tank leading to pump damage 1.1.1. Low level alarm LAL-0241 provided on tank 1.1.2. Low low level LALL-0242 provided on tank with interlock SD-204 which will shutdown unit. 17. Operating procedures to include use of condensate in the tank
JV
2. Loss of make-up from Unit 146 3. Foaming
2.1. Since it is intermittent service, no significant consequence 3.1. Loss of level in the tank leading to pump damage and no supply to solvent absorber/ flash gas absorber 3.1.1. Anti-foam injection provided in pump suction, absorber and regenerator. 3.1.2. Low level alarm LAL-0241 provided on tank 3.1.3. Low low level LALL-0242 provided on tank with interlock SD-204 which will shutdown unit.
10. Contamination/ Additional Phase 11. Composition change/ Loss of phase
1. Corrosion material (iron sulphide) present in the pipeline and degraded amine 1. Increased CO2 content of lean amine due to improper regeneration 2. Changing lean amine concentration due to improper fresh DEA or cold condensate makeup.
1.1. This may lead to foaming and carry-over of amine to D114. 1.1. Absorption performance will be affected 2.1. Absorption performance will be affected
1.1.1. Filtration package is provided to remove any iron sulphide particles 1.1.2. Provision for injection of antifoam 1.1.1. Sampling of amine solution for CO2 content 2.1.1. Sampling of amine solution for concentration 2.1.2. Double isolation valves provided for cold condensate and fresh DEA makeup.
JV
12. Startup/Shutdown/Maintenance Hazards 13. Utility Failure
1. No issue
1. Instrument Air failure : FV-0241, FV0243 and SDV-0162 and FV-0183, and are FC type FV-0245 is FO type These have been found to be in order 2. Power failure : 3. Cold condensate failure 2.1. Pump P-111A/B trip. Refer to Deviation 1, Cause 1 3.1. Difficult to adjust solution concentration. This is intermittent service , hence no significant consequence 3.1.1. None identified
14. Others
1. No new issue
23 of 43
ERM
Unit 116
Node: 8. Anti foam package Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0112 Rev O; P&ID 1516-116-0030-0116 Rev O; P&ID 1516-116-0030-0120 Rev O; P&ID 1516-116-0030-0121 Rev O Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards
Actions
Action By
1. Others
1. Vendor Package
24 of 43
ERM
Unit 116
Node: 9. Filtration package Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0120 Rev O; P&ID 1516-116-0030-0121A Rev O Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards
Actions
Action By
1. Others
1. Vendor Package
25 of 43
ERM
Unit 116
Node: 10. Sump drum Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0122 Rev O; P&ID 1516-116-0030-0123 Rev O Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards
Actions
Action By
1. No/ Less flow
1. Sump drum used for collecting any drains during equipment maintenance. It is transferred when High Level is reached in the drum. This is intermittent operation and hence flow deviation not considered 1. This is intermittent operation and hence flow deviation not considered 1. Sump Pump P-115 trips 2. Pump discharge routed wrongly 1. Gas Blowby thru drain line from connected equipment 1.1. Potential back flow from solvent filtration unit 2.1. Potential contamination and upset. Solvent filtration unit can get contaminated with amine drains. 1.1. Potential overpressure causing possible rupture of drum 1.1.1. Check valve provided d/s of pump min. flow tapping 2.1.1. Procedure for sampling of content in sump drum and routing to appropriate destination. Sampling connection provided at pump discharge 1.1.1. Sump drum vent open to flare through CSO valve . Drum designed for 3.5 barg and full vacuum 18. Confirm the vent line of sump drum D-117 is sized for gas blowby (assuming maximum drain valve size and maximum pressure u/s) , maximum liquid inflow (for flashing gas and blocked condition)and vaporisation(if any) 18. Confirm the vent line of sump drum D-117 is sized for gas blowby (assuming maximum drain valve size and maximum pressure u/s) , maximum liquid inflow (for flashing gas and blocked condition)and vaporisation(if any) 18. Confirm the vent line of sump drum D-117 is sized for gas blowby (assuming maximum drain valve size and maximum pressure u/s) , maximum liquid inflow (for flashing gas and blocked condition)and vaporisation(if any)
JV
2. More Flow 3. Reverse/Misdirected Flow
4. High Pressure
2. Vaporisation of liquid in the sump drum due to live steam (live steam provided mainly for stripping of CO2 from amine)
2.1. Potential overpressure causing possible rupture of drum
2.1.1. Sump drum vent open to flare through CSO valve . Drum designed for 3.5 barg and full vacuum 2.1.2. RO-0261 provided in the steam line to restrict steam flow
JV
3. Flash gas due to draining of amine from high pressure sources
3.1. Potential overpressure causing possible rupture of drum
3.1.1. Sump drum vent open to flare through CSO valve . Drum designed for 3.5 barg and full vacuum
JV
4. Flare back pressure high
4.1. Pump discharge piping will be subjected to shut-off pressure. Also under high back pressure, lighter elements will not get flashed and lead to carry over to storage tank
4.1.1. Drum and flare header have the same design pressure. Piping is designed for max shut-off pressure of pump 4.1.2. Operating procedures addresses the issue of evacuation of sump drum under high flare backpressure.
5. Low Pressure
1. Drum is floating with flare header. During pump-out, liquid displacement will lead to lower pressure in the sump drum 2. Live steam stopped
1.1. Flare gas will back up into the sump drum. No significant consequence forseen since flare header is kept under positive pressure through purge of the header 2.1. Condensation resulting in vacuum formation 2.1.1. Drum is floating with flare and flare gas will back up into the sump drum 2.1.2. Drum is designed for full vacuum.
6. More Temperature
1. High temp liquid drained from u/s equipment.
1.1. High temp material may cause damage to the buried piping coating and wrapping, although piping material itself is designed for same pressure as upstream up to the isolation valve at drum inlet (although CSO valve is provided ) 1.1. Potential impact on pumping due to low temperature (Higher viscosity may exceed pump motor load).
1.1.1. Procedure to drain liquid only after cooling. Drain drum designed for 210 deg C 1.1.2. All drains are CSC 1.1.1. Procedure to govern transfer from the sump drum 1.1.2. Pump is designed to tranfer liquid at 5 deg C. This design temperature is compatible with drum D-117 design temp. 1.1.1. LI-0262 with high level alarm provided
JV
7. Less Temperature
1. Liquid may be at low temperature due to pressure letdown during draining.
8. High Level
1. Liquid drained from u/s equipment without ensuring sump drum has sufficient capacity to hold the drain liquid - Misoperation
1.1. Potential overfilling and overpressure. Carry over of liquid to flare
18. Confirm the vent line of sump drum D-117 is sized for gas blowby (assuming maximum drain valve size and maximum pressure u/s) , maximum liquid inflow (for flashing gas and blocked condition)and vaporisation(if any) 20. Procedure to govern draining operation for sump drum
JV
1.1.2. LI-0261 with high level alarm provided 1.1.3. Sump drum vent open to flare through CSO valve . Drum designed for 3.5 barg 1.1.4. Sump pump P-115 provided to empty out sump drum content 2. Level build up in the drum due to pump unavailable or interruption in transfer 3. Cold condensate valve open 2.1. Same as Cause 1 3.1. Same as Deviation 8, Cause 1,Conseq. 1.1
JV
40. Cold condensate is provided for washing of drum prior to maintenance. Utility points are provided for connecting utility water hoses. Consider deleting hard-piped connection for cold condensate, 1.1.1. Low level alarm LAL-0262 on sump drum
JV
9. Low Level
1. Normally low level is expected. Pump
1.1. Potential damage to pump
26 of 43
ERM
Unit 116
Node: 10. Sump drum Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0122 Rev O; P&ID 1516-116-0030-0123 Rev O Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards
Actions
Action By
continues to runs even when the liquid has been transferred 10. Contamination/ Additional Phase 1. Debris, sludge, salt etc from HC drains 1.1. This may accumulate in the sump drum or affect draw-off by pump. Also this poses potential maintenance hazard since accumulation of sludge is difficult to be removed 1.2. Contamination of amine cycle after the pumping-out by HC, solid particle etc. 11. Composition change/ Loss of phase 1. Liquid in this sump drum is a mixture of amine and water. No provision for separation in the sump drum. Transfer based on sampling. No new issue 1. Maintenance of sump drum to remove sludge. See discussion in Contamination/Additional Phase 1. Electric Power Failure. 2. Cold condensate failure 3. LP steam failure 4. Fuel gas failure 14. Others 1. Corrosion in P-115 discharge piping . Under stagnant condition, presence of water with CO2 may lead to corrosion(piping is CS + 3mm CA) 2. Internal coating fails at high temperature. 3. Evacuation of sump drum 1.1. Pump P-115 trips. Refer to Node 10, Deviation 3, Cause 1 2.1. Intermittent operation 3.1. Intermittent operation 4.1. Intermittent operation 1.1. Potential pipe leak
1.1.2. Independent low low level LALL-0261 provided on sump pump with interlock I333 will trip pump 1.1.1. 2" utility connection provided for sludge removal by fluidization but this may get plugged 1.1.2. Procedures for maintenance, including purging, steam-out, etc 1.2.1. Sampling connection provided 1.2.2. Discharge of sump pump is sent to filtration package
1.1.1. Periodic monitoring. 1.1.2. Procedure to drain the piping after transfer
42. On pump P-115 discharge, there are 2 drain lines provided (without any isolation valve in between). The drain line (3/4"-AM.116.100103B03N-N) may be deleted. 21. Ensure the coating material is compatible with the maximum operating temp of the sump drum.(eg steam-out condition) 22. Operating procedure to strip amine through the use of live steam and sampling before evacuation 39. Review the deletion of fuel gas connection to the drum so that the drum floats with flare header which has relevant protection like continuous sweeping.
JV
2.1. Corrosion leading to damage to the drum
JV
3.1. Possibility of contamination of amine due to high CO2 content 4.1. Constant loss of fuel gas to flare and blanketing is not achieved.
JV
4. Improper blanketing of sump drum
JV
27 of 43
ERM
Unit 116
Node: 11. Hydrocarbon skim drum Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0114 Rev O; P&ID 1516-116-0030-0118 Rev O; P&ID 1516-116-0030-0123 Rev O Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards
Actions
Action By
1. No/ Less flow
1. Hydrocarbon skim drum used for collecting any HC drains during equipment maintenance. It is transferred when High Level is reached in the drum. This is intermittent operation and hence flow deviation not considered 1. This is intermittent operation and hence flow deviation not considered 1. Reverse flow from absorber and treated gas KOD to reflux drum D-114 , rich solvent flash drum D-113 and from flash drum D-113 to reflux drum D-114. Also, skimming drum to reflux drum during transfer case. 1. Fuel gas by pass open 1.1. Pressurisation of respective equipment 1.1.1. NRV provided for each stream to prevent backflow.
2. More Flow 3. Reverse/Misdirected Flow
4. High Pressure
1.1. Pressurisation of D-116 and loss of fuel gas to flare.
1.1.1. Connection to flare provided 1.1.2. Operating procedure for draining.
23. Bypass valve for fuel gas rotameter FG-0101 to be made CSC 24. Review relocation of RO-0091 to downstream of bypass junction. 41. Consider deleting the fuel gas connection to D-116. The drum can float with flare,.
JV
JV
JV
2. Gas blowby from u/s high pressure section during skimming 5. Low Pressure 1. Wrong procedure adopted during draining. Flare valve and fuel gas valve closed 1. Not applicable 1. Not applicable 1. Excessive skimming from upstream equipments 1. No issue identified 1. Refer to Node 11, Deviation 8 , Cause 1 1. No issue identified 1. No issue identified
2.1. Pressurisation of D-116 and loss of gas to flare
2.1.1. Operating procedure for draining. 2.1.2. Connection to flare provided
1.1. Possible vacuum formation in the drum.
1.1.1. Drum is designed for full vacuum
25. Procedures for skimming/draining to be included in operating manual.
JV
6. More Temperature 7. Less Temperature 8. High Level 9. Low Level 10. Contamination/ Additional Phase 11. Composition change/ Loss of phase 12. Startup/Shutdown/Maintenance Hazards 13. Utility Failure 14. Others
1.1. Amine coming along with skimmed oil, increasing level in D-116 and leading to carry-over of skimmed material to flare.
1.1.1. High level alarm LAH-0271 provided on drum
1. Fuel gas failure 1. No liquid HC condensation
1.1. Difficulty in draining. 1.1. Skimming facilities will not be useful
1.1.1. Draining by elevation differences assisted by flare gas. 38. Consider deleting hydrocarbon skimming facilities along with skimming drum D-116.and associated piping
JV
28 of 43
ERM
Unit 116
Node: 12. Sulfrex lean transfer pumps Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0124 Rev O; P&ID 1516-116-0030-0114 Rev O Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards
Actions
Action By
1. No/ Less flow of lean solvent
1. No level in tank T-111
1.1. Damage to pump P-116/124A/B and no supply of lean solvent to Unit 114 2.1. No supply of lean solvent to Unit 114 which will affect the process in Unit 114 3.1. Possible damage to pumps P-124A/B 4.1. No supply of lean solvent to Unit 114 and high pressure upstream of ESDV-00281/SDV-0281
1.1.1. Low level LAL-0241 provided on tank 1.1.2. Low low level LALL-0242 provided on tank with interlock to trip unit 2.1.1. Spare pump provided 2.1.2. Pump running indication provided 3.1.1. Drain valves are CSC 4.1.1. Limit switch provided on ESDV-0281/SDV-0281 4.1.2. High high pressure PAHH-0281A/B with interlock I-348 to trip pumps 4.1.3. PSV-0281A/B provided 30. Review the requirement of two independent PAHH-0281 A and B. One PAHH in the common header shall serve the purpose.
JV
2. Sulfrex lean solvent transfer pump P124A/B trips 3. Inadvertent opening of drain lines 4. ESDV-0281 closes/ SDV-0281 closes
5. Inadvertent reduction of speed of motor due to malfunction of flow control from Unit 114 6. Non-receipt by Unit 114
5.1. No supply of lean solvent to Unit 114 leading to process upset 6.1. High pressure in the header and possible damage to the pumps 1.1. No return of rich solvent leading to process upset in unit 114 1.1. More supply of lean solvent of Unit 114. No significant consequence. 1.1. No significant consequence
5.1.1. Spare pump provided
6.1.1. High high pressure PAHH-0281A/B with interlock I-348 to trip pumps 6.1.2. PSV-0281A/B provided 1.1.1. Limit switch is provided for SDV-0184/ESDV-0181 1.1.2. Refer to HAZOP of Unit 114
2. No Flow of rich solvent in the return stream from Unit 114 3. More Flow of lean solvent 4. More Flow of rich solvent in the return stream from Unit 114 5. Reverse/Misdirected Flow
1. SDV-0184/ ESDV-0181 closes
1. Inadvertent increase of speed of motor due to malfunction of flow control from Unit 114 1. Failure of control in Unit 114
1. Pump P-124A/B trip
1.1. Backflow of lean solvent and propane from Unit 114 to T111 which may overpressurise and damage tank T-111 2.1. Possible contamination in Unit 114
1.1.1. Check valve provided at pump discharge 1.1.2. Refer to HAZOP of Unit 114 2.1.1. Check valve provided
2. Reverse flow of rich amine from Unit 116 to Unit 114 in case of depressurisation of Unit 114 6. High Pressure 1. ESDV-0281 /SDV-0281 closes 2. Stoppage of supply by Unit 114 3. Propane breakthrough from Unit 114 to Flash Drum in Unit 116 7. Low Pressure 1. Tripping of pump
1.1. Refer to Node 12, Deviation 1, Cause 4 2.1. Same as above 3.1. Overpressurisation of flash drum may lead to failure. 3.1.1. Refer to HAZOP of Unit 114 3.1.2. For safeguards, refer to Node 4, Deviation 7, Cause 4 1.1. No pressure in pump discharge leading to loss of supply to Unit 114. 1.1. Supply of hot lean amine to Unit 114 may cause upset in the unit 1.1.1. Spare pump provided 1.1.2. Pump running indication provided 1.1.1. High temp alarm TAH-0231provided at inlet of tank T-111.
8. More Temperature 9. Less Temperature 10. High Level 11. Low Level 12. Contamination/ Additional Phase 13. Composition change/ Loss of phase 14. Startup/Shutdown/Maintenance Hazards 15. Utility Failure 16. Others
1. High lean amine temperature in storage tank 1. Not applicable in this node 1. Not applicable in this node 1. Not applicable in this node 1. Refer to Node 7, Deviation 14 1. Propane breakthrough from Unit 114 to Flash Drum in Unit 116 1. No new issue
1.1. Refer to Deviation 6, Cause 3 on this node
1. Power failure 1. No issue identified
1.1. Pump trip : Refer to Deviation 5, Cause 1 of this node
29 of 43
ERM
Unit 116
Node: 13. Water wash loop Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0112 Rev O; P&ID 1516-116-0030-0114 Rev O Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards
Actions
Action By
1. No/ Less flow
1. Water wash pump P-113 A/B trips
1.1. No removal of carried-over amine which will affect the downstream unit
1.1.1. Pump running indication 1.1.2. Spare pump provided 1.1.3. Low flow alarm FAL-0161 provided at discharge of pump 1.1.4. Low low flow alarm FALL-0163 with interlock I-335 to trip both pump P-113A/B
2. Low level in solvent absorber top section (chimney tray)
2.1. Possible damage to pumps and loss of circulation will lead to no removal of carried-over amine. This will affect downstream units 3.1. Build-up of level in chimney tray of solvent absorber top section leading to carry-over to downstream unit.
2.1.1. Low level alarm LAL-0162 on top section of solvent absorber 2.1.2. Low low level alarm LALL-0164 on top section of solvent absorber with interlock I-359 which will trip both wash water pumps P-113A/B 3.1.1. High pressure differential alarm PDAH-0164 provided across top section of solvent absorber 3.1.2. KOD D-112 provided at downstream of solvent absorber (C-111) top outlet
3. LIC-0162 malfunctions and closes LV0162
4. SDV-0163 fails closed
4.1.1. Limit switch provided on SDV-0163 4.1.2. High level alarm LAH-0162 provided on top section of solvent absorber 4.1.3. High pressure differential alarm PDAH-0164 provided across top section of solvent absorber 4.1.4. KOD D-112 provided at downstream of solvent absorber (C-111) top outlet
5. Inadvertent closure of globe valve at the common discharge of pump P-113A/B
5.1. No flow to solvent absorber leading to loss of circulation. This will lead to carry-over
5.1.1. Low level alarm LAL-0162 on top section of solvent absorber 5.1.2. Low low level alarm LALL-0164 on top section of solvent absorber with interlock I-359 which will trip both wash water pumps P-113A/B 5.2.1. Lines are designed for shut-off pressure. 5.2.2. Low flow alarm FAL-0161 provided at discharge of pump 5.2.3. Low low flow FALL-0163 provided on pump discharge with interlock I-335 will trip both pumps
5.2. High pressure upstream of the globe valve may cause damage to the pump and pipeline
6. Malfunction of FIC-0162 closing FV0162
6.1. Loss of makeup water leading to drop in level, increasing concentration of amine in wash water and drop in performance of the column
6.1.1. Periodic sampling 6.1.2. Bypass provided for FV-0162 6.1.3. Low level alarm LAL-0162 on top section of solvent absorber 6.1.4. Low low level alarm LALL-0164 on top section of solvent absorber with interlock I-359 which will trip both wash water pumps P-113A/B
2. More Flow
1.1. More flow to rich solvent MP flash drum. The level in chimney tray 1 will be lost and this will cause damage to wash water pumps P-113A/B. Possibility of gas breakthrough to rich solvent MP flash drum
1.1.1. Low low level alarm LALL-0164 on top section of solvent absorber with interlock I-359 which will trip both wash water pumps P-113A/B 1.1.2. PIC-0182B will relieve to flare. 1.1.3. High pressure alarm PAH-0182A/B 1.1.4. High high pressure PAHH-0181 with interlock to shutdown the unit through SD-207. 1.1.5. PSV-0181A/B on flash drum are sized for gas breakthrough.
2. Inadvertent opening of drain line at pump suction
2.1. Low level in top section of solvent absorber. This can cause damage to pumps
2.1.1. Drain valve is CSC 2.1.2. Low level alarm LAL-0162 on top section of solvent absorber 2.1.3. Low low level alarm LALL-0164 on top section of solvent absorber with interlock I-359 which will trip both wash water pumps P-113A/B
2.2. Possible gas breakthrough to sump drum and overpressurisation of sump drum and underground drain line. Refer to Node 10, Deviation 4 , Cause 1 3. Malfunction of FIC-0162 and opens FV0162 fully 3. Reverse/Misdirected Flow 1. Failure of antifoam package pump (101-U-101) 2. Low cold condensate header pressure 3.1. Increase in level in chimney tray may lead to carry-over of liquid to D-112. Also, there is a possibility of liquid overflowing to bed below from the chimney tray. 1.1. Reverse flow of gas/liquid to antifoam package causing damage to the package 2.1. Contamination of cold condensate header by reverse from absorber. Possible gas breakthrough may cause rupture of cold condensate header 1.1. Refer to Node 13, Deviation 1, Cause 5 30 of 43 ERM 3.1.1. High level alarm LAH-0162 provided on absorber top section
1.1.1. Check valve provided at injection point. 2.1.1. Check valve provided at condensate makeup line near the injection point. 2.1.2. Design pressure of cold condensate header is 42 barg.
4. High Pressure
1. Inadvertent closure of globe valve at the common discharge of pump P-113A/B
Unit 116
Node: 13. Water wash loop Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0112 Rev O; P&ID 1516-116-0030-0114 Rev O Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards
Actions
Action By
2. Refer to Node 3, Deviation 8, Cause 2 5. Low Pressure 1. Refer to Node 3, Deviation 9 2. Refer to Node 13, No/Less Flow 6. More Temperature 7. Less Temperature 8. High Level 9. Low Level 10. Contamination/ Additional Phase 11. Composition change/ Loss of phase 12. Startup/Shutdown/Maintenance Hazards 13. Utility Failure 1. Refer to Node 4, Deviation 9, Cause 1 1. Refer to Node 3, Deviation 11 1. Refer to Discussion in Deviation 1, Cause 3 and 4 1. Inadvertent opening of drain line at pump suction 1. No issue identified 1. Loss of makeup water 1. No issue identified
2.1.
2.1.1. Design pressure of wash water system is equal or above the design pressure of solvent absorber C-111.
1. Instrument air failure : LV-0162, SDV0163 and FCV-0162 are FC type These were found to be in order 2. Cold condensate failure 3. Power failure 2.1. Refer to Node 13, Deviation 1, Cause 6 3.1. Pump P-113 trips. Refer to Node 13, Deviation 1, Cause 1 1.1. Cavitation in wash water pump leading to damage. 1.1.1. High presssure differential alarm PDAH-0164 provided across solvent absorber top section. 1.1.2. Antifoam injection provided at the inlet of wash water to solvent absorber.
14. Others
1. Foaming on the top section of solvent absorber
31 of 43
ERM
Unit 116
Node: 14. Wet gas inlet to driers inlet separator including separator Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0101 Rev 3; P&ID 1516-116-0030-0102 Rev 3 Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards
Actions
Action By
1. No/ Less flow
1. No/ less flow of feed wet gas from upstream
1.1. No effect on molecular sieve driers. Regeneration gas is taken from the drier outlet. Hence disruption in wet gas inlet will also lead to disruption in regeneration gas flow through heater (Regeneration compressor may trip in this due to loss of suction etc). Regenerator sequence may trip due to low flow. Possible damage to heater coils 1.2. The outlet temperature of sea water will reduce due to loss of heat exchange across E-101. No significant consequence
1.1.1. Low flow alarm FAL-0003 provided at E-101 outlet 1.1.2. Low low flow alarm FALL-0050 provided at inlet to heater with interlock I-342 which will trip heater H-101 1.1.3. Anti surge control and safeguarding system for compressor K-101A/B
2.1. Same as Node 14, Deviation 1 Cause 1
2.1.1. Anti surge control and safeguarding system for compressor K-101A/B 2.1.2. Low low flow alarm FALL-0050 provided at inlet to heater with interlock I-342 which will trip heater H-101 2.1.3. Low flow alarm FAL-0003 provided at E-101 outlet 2.1.4. Limit switch provided on SDV-0004
2.2. High pressure upstream of SDV-0004 3. Plugging of exchanger E-101 tube side 3.1. No/Less flow of seawater resulting in high gas temperature and affect the performance of driers 3.2. High temperature of seawater return 3.3. Same as Node 13, Deviation 1 Cause 1 4. SDV-0001 on seawater inlet to E-101 fails close 5. SDV-0002 on seawater outlet line fails close 6. LIC-0022 malfunctions and closes LV0022 7. SDV-0022 fails close 4.1. No flow of seawater to E-101 leading to higher temperature on ethane outlet due to loss of heat exchange 5.1. Blocked outlet on seawater side of E-101 causing overpressure and potential failure. Higher temperature on ethane outlet 6.1. Increase in level in D-101 leading to carry-over of wet gas to ethane drier D-102A/B 7.1. Same as Node 14, Deviation 1, Cause 6
2.2.1. For other safeguards, refer to HAZOP discussion in Node 3 3.1.1. High temperature alarm TAH-0003 provided on outlet of E-101 3.2.1. High temp alarm TAH-0002 provided on seawater return line.
4.1.1. High temperature alarm TAL-0003 provided on outlet of E-101 5.1.1. High temperature alarm TAL-0003 provided on outlet of E-101 5.1.2. TSV-0002 provided on seawater return line upstream of SDV-0002 6.1.1. High high level alarm LAHH-0023 with interlock SD-203 which will shutdown Unit 116 7.1.1. High level alarm LAH-0022 provided on D-101 7.1.2. Limit switch provided on SDV-0022 7.1.3. High high level alarm LAHH-0023 with interlock SD-203 which will shutdown Unit 116
43. Delete SDV-0001/0002 on seawater line to E-101 and replaced by manual isolation valve. 43. Delete SDV-0001/0002 on seawater line to E-101 and replaced by manual isolation valve.
JV
JV
8.1. Same as Node 14, Deviation 1, Cause 6
44. Delete SDV-0005 on ethane dryer inlet separator as SDV-0022 is also provided on the same line
JV
9. Stoppage of receipt by Sour water stripper. 10. Failure of BDV-0028 on drier inlet separator
9.1. Same as Node 14, Deviation 1, Cause 6 10.1. Loss of flow to driers associated by loss of gas to flare. Loss of flow to petrochemical consumers 10.1.1. Limit switch provided on BDV-0028 10.1.2. PIC-0046 will maintain pressure. 10.1.3. Blowdown rate from BDV-0028 is about 15%as compared to total inlet gas flow.
2. More Flow
1. More demand from downstream or more flow from upstream
1.1. Depending on the stage of adsorption bed in the drier, if the drier bed is fresh, the bed may be depleted faster than normal and moisture content in the outlet gas may remain same. However if the bed is at the end of adsorption cycle, increase in flow may lead to breakthrough of moisture from the drier. 1.2. Increase in pressure drop across the molecular sieve which may lead to bed displacement / breaking of molecular sieve leading to channeling across the bed. This may affect the bed adsorption efficiency
1.1.1. High flow alarm FAH-0003 provided on E-101 outlet 1.1.2. Moisture analyser provided on each bed with high moisture content alarm (AI0034A/B) 1.1.3. Moisture analyser provided at the outlet of drier filter with high moisture content alarm (AI-0044) 1.2.1. High differential pressure alarm provided across the drier beds with PDI0034A/B 1.2.2. High flow alarm FAH-0003 provided on E-101 outlet 1.2.3. Moisture analyser provided on each bed with high moisture content alarm (AI0034A/B) 1.2.4. Moisture analyser provided at the outlet of drier filter with high moisture content alarm (AI-0044)
1.3. Temperature of sea water will increase. Possible environmental problem and sedimentation problem. 2. LIC-0022 malfunctions and opens LV2.1. More flow to sour water stripper causing loss of level in D-
1.3.1. High temp alarm TAH-0002 provided on seawater return line 2.1.1. Refer to HAZOP of Unit 109, Sour water stripper 32 of 43 ERM
Unit 116
Actions
Action By
0022 fully 3. Inadvertent opening of drain line upstream of SDV-0022
101 and gas breakthrough to sour water Stripper 3.1. Possible loss of level and gas breakthrough to Unit 107 sump drum
2.1.2. Low low level alarm LALL-0024 with interlock I-345 which will close SDV-0022 3.1.1. Refer to HAZOP of Unit 107. 3.1.2. Low level alarm LAL-0022 provided on D-101 3.1.3. Low low level alarm LALL-0024 with interlock I-345 which will close SDV-0022
4. Inadvertent opening of isolation valve from D-101 bottom to ethane treatment 3. Reverse/Misdirected Flow 1. Misdirected flow due to BDV-0028 on drier inlet separator malfunctions to open during normal operation 2. Inadvertent opening of isolation valve from D-101 bottom to ethane treatment 4. High Pressure 1. External fire on drier inlet separator 2. High pressure from upstream section
4.1. Loss of flow to Unit 109. No significant consequence, 1.1. Loss of flow to downstream. Refer Node 13, Deviation 1, Cause 1 2.1. Possible reverse flow from MP flash drum to Unit 109 causing upset in Unit 109 1.1. Overpressurization of drier inlet separator 2.1. High discharge of regeneration compressor which may lead to damage to compressor.
4.1.1. LIC-0022 will maintain level.
2.1.1. Refer to HAZOP of Unit 109 2.1.2. NRV provided at inlet to MP flash drum. 1.1.1. Relief valve provided on drier inlet separator sized for fire case 2.1.1. High high pressure alarm PAHH-0085A/ B with interlock I-351 B will intiate compressor shutdown 2.1.2. High pressure alarm PAH-0086A/B provided on K-101 discharge (anti-surge control) 2.1.3. PIC-0172 provided on D-112 overhead will relieve excess upstream pressure to flare.
5. Low Pressure
1. Refer to Deviation 1, Cause 10 2. Low pressure from upstream 2.1. Performance of drier will be affected and reduction of supply to petrochemical consumers 2.1.1. PIC-0046 will try to maintain pressure 45. Provide high and low pressure alarm for PIC0046 47. Provide high and low pressure alarm for PI0026 on D-101 overhead 2.2. Low suction to regenerator compressor 2.2.1. Low pressure alarm PAL-0082A/B provided on compressor suction 2.2.2. Low low pressure PALL-0084A/B will trip compressor
6. More Temperature
1. More temperature of wet gas from upstream section
1.1. Temperature of wet gas will increase at the outlet of E-101. The adsorption efficiency of molecular sieve will reduce (corresponding to increase in temperature). This may lead to higher moisture content at the outlet of drier system
1.1.1. High temperature alarm TAH-0003 provided at the inlet of drier inlet separator 1.1.2. Moisture analyser provided on each bed with high moisture content alarm (AI0034A/B) 1.1.3. Moisture analyser provided at the outlet of drier filter with high moisture content alarm (AI-0044)
1.2. Temperature of sea water will increase. Possible environmental problem and sedimentation problem. 7. Less Temperature 1. Low temperature of wet gas from upstream section 2. Excessive cooling in E-101 1.1. Potential hydrate formation
1.2.1. High temp alarm TAH-0002 provided on seawater return line 1.1.1. Low temp alarm TAL-0003 provided on outlet of E-101 1.1.2. Exchanger bypass provided for temperature adjustment
2.1. Potential hydrate formation
2.1.1. Low temp alarm TAL-0003 provided on outlet of E-101 2.1.2. Exchanger bypass provided for temperature adjustment
8. High Level
1. Malfunction of LIC-0022 to close LV0022 on the liquid outlet of drier inlet separator
1.1. Liquid will accumulate in drier inlet separator followed by carryover to molecular sieve.
1.1.1. High level alarm LAH-0022 provided on D-101 1.1.2. High high level alarm LAHH-0023 provided on D-101 with interlock SD-203 which will trip dehydration section and initate SD-205 and SD-206 which will close SDV-0004.
2. SDV-0022 fails close 9. Low Level 1. Malfunction of LIC-0022 to open LV0022 on the liquid outlet of drier inlet separator fully 1. Amine entrainment from upstream with the wet gas
2.1. Refer to Node 14, Deviation 1, Cause 7 1.1. Refer to Deviation 14, Deviation 2, Cause 2
10. Contamination/ Additional Phase
1.1. Amine entrainment with wet gas to molecular sieve may lead to permanent deactivation of molecular sieve
1.1.1. Drier inlet separator provided to remove amine including other liquid from the wet gas 1.1.2. Alumina or silica guard provided at the top of molecular sieve to adsorb traces of amine
2. Carryover of corrosion product with the wet gas 11. Composition change/ Loss of phase 1. No issue identified
2.1. Possibility of scaling in E-101 . Also there can be deposition of corrosion product on molecular sieve
2.1.1. High differential pressure alarm provided across the drier beds with PDI0034A/B
33 of 43
ERM
Unit 116
Actions
Action By
1. No issue identified
1. Instrument Air failure : SDV-0004, SDV-0001, SDV-0002, SDV-0005, SDV0022 and LV-0022 are FC type BDV-0028 is FO type. These were found to be in order
14. Others
1. Tube rupture in exchanger E-101
1.1. Gas will leak into seawater side pressurising sea water header and causing damage.
1.1.1. Design pressure of shell and tube side is same (39barg)
48. Check the suitability of seawater outlet line design pressure for tube leak case in E-101
34 of 43
ERM
Unit 116
Node: 15. Treated gas from separator to export line to petrochemical inlet including molecular sieve driers Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0102 Rev 3; P&ID 1516-116-0030-0103 Rev 3; P&ID 1516-116-0030-0104 Rev 3 Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards
Actions
Action By JV
1. No/ Less flow
1. Any of the drier inlet/outlet KVs fails and remains in close position when the bed switch over from standby mode to adsorption mode
1.1. No through put. Loss of supply to petrochemical consumers.
32. Confirm that sequence logic is implemented is such a way that sequence control confirms the position of each valve at the end of each step before proceeding to next step. Sequence failure alarm will be generated in this case 1.2.1. Design pressure of drier section and upstream section unit of Unit 116 are same (39 barg) 1.2.2. PIC-0172 will try to maintain pressure 1.2.3. KV failure alarm UA-0056 provided in Dryers Control System 1.2.4. Limit switches provided on all KVs
1.2. Increase in pressure of section upstream of KV including shell side of E-101. This will lead to loss of gas to flare through PIC-0069.
1.3. Regeneration sequence will stop. 1.4. Compressor will have low/no flow and lead to mechanical damage. 2. Plugging of ethane filtter 2.1. Back pressure in the drier section and upstream will increase associated by loss of dried gas flow to downstream unit. Low supply to petrochemical consumers
1.3.1. Low flow alarm FAL-0045 provided on outlet of ethane filter. 1.4.1. Anti-surge control provided 1.4.2. Low low pressure PAHH-0084A/B with interlock I-351A will trip compressor 2.1.1. High differential pressure alarm PDAH-0042 provided on each drier 2.1.2. Standby filter provided 2.1.3. Design pressure of drier section and upstream section unit of Unit 116 are same (39 barg)
2.2. Low flow to regeneration cycle leading to tripping of regeneration cycle
2.2.1. Low low flow FALL-0050 provided at heater inlet with interlock I-342 which will trip heater 2.2.2. Low flow alarm FAL-0045 provided on outlet of ethane filter.
2.3. Compressor will have low/no flow and lead to mechanical damage. 3. Plugging of demister pad in drier inlet separator 4. PIC-0046/FIC-0046 malfunction which close FV-0046 3.1. Same as No/ Less Flow, Cause 2 4.1. No supply to petrochemical consumers 4.2. Pressure rise in dehydration section
2.3.1. Refer to Cause 1, Conseq. 1.4 3.1.1. Inspection of demister every turnaround
4.2.1. PIC-0172 will relieve to flare (50% of capacity) 4.2.2. Refer to HAZOP of unit 105.
5. ESDV-0045/0046 fails close
5.1.1. Limit switch es provided for ESDV-0045/0046 5.1.2. For other safeguards, refer to Cause 4
2. More Flow
1. PIC-0046/FIC-0046 malfunction which opens FV-0046 fully
1.1. More flow to petrochemical consumers and less pressure in the unit. Refer to Node 14, Deviation 5, Cause 2, Conseq. 1 1.2. Low pressure in compressor suction. Refer to Node 15, Deviation 1, Cause 4, Conseq 1.
2. BDV-0028 fails open
2.1. Loss of gas to flare 2.2. Pressure drop in driers
2.1.1. Limit switch provided on BDV-0028 2.2.1. Limit switch provided on BDV-0028 2.2.2. PIC-0046 will try to maintain pressure
2.3. Low flow to petrochemical consumers . 3. BDV-0036A/B fails open 3. Reverse/Misdirected Flow 1. BDV-0036A/B malfunctions to open during the operation when bed is in line 3.1. Same As Cause 2 1.1. Loss of gas flow to flare. The flow of gas through the molecular sieve will increase which may lead to displacement of molecular sieve. This may also affect the molecular sieve support due to higher pressure drop 1.2. If BDV opens during the regeneration mode, this may lead to flaring of high temperature gases to flare header. Also this may lead to loss of suction to regeneration gas compressor leading to compressor surging
2.3.1. Limit switch provided on BDV-0028 3.1.1. Limit switches provided on BDV-0036A/B 1.1.1. High differential pressure alarm PDAH-0034A/B provided on each drier 1.1.2. Limit switch provided on BDV-0036A/B. 33. Review the requirement of strengthening of molecular sieve support for blowdown case when the flow through molecular sieve will be higher than the design flow rate. Drier vendor may be informed in this regard
JV
1.2.1. Flare header is designed for 270degC 1.2.2. Anti-surge control provided for regeneration gas compressor 1.2.3. Interlock (I-351) provided to trip regeneration gas compressor on very low suction pressure 1.2.4. Limit switch provided on BDV-0036A/B.
1.3. Possible low temperature in the drier
1.3.1. Drier is designed for -46degC
35 of 43
ERM
Unit 116
Node: 15. Treated gas from separator to export line to petrochemical inlet including molecular sieve driers Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0102 Rev 3; P&ID 1516-116-0030-0103 Rev 3; P&ID 1516-116-0030-0104 Rev 3 Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards
Actions
Action By
2. Any of the inlet or outlet KV of drier remains in open position when switching from adsorption mode to regeneration mode
2.1. Possibility of sending dried gas / wet gas to the regeneration gas compressor. This will also restrict the flow of regeneration gas through the regeneration gas furnace. Possible damage to furnace coil due to overheating
2.1.1. Low flow alarm FAL-0045 provided in the regeneration gas line from dried gas outlet 2.1.2. FIC-0045 will try to maintain flow in the regeneration gas line from dried gas outlet 2.1.3. Interlock I-342 provided to trip furnace on very low flow at the inlet of furnace 2.1.4. Valve position alarm UA-0056 provided on Dryers control system.
3. Vent valve downstream of ethane filter left open due to operator error 4. High Pressure 1. Refer causes for No/ less flow 2. External fire on drier 3. External fire on drier ethane filter 5. Low Pressure 1. Refer to Node 15, Deviation 3, Cause 1, Consqe 2 2. Refer to Node 14, Deviation 1, Cause 1 3. Refer to Node 15, Deviation 2, Cause 1 6. More Temperature 1. Manual misoperation- Operator tries to bring the bed in line without sufficient cooling
3.1. Loss of gas to flare. Considering the size of vent valve, no sginificant consequence
2.1. Overpressurization of drier 3.1. Overpressurization of drier after filter
2.1.1. Relief valve provided on drier sized for fire case 3.1.1. Relief valve provided on filter sized for fire case
1.1. Drier downstream piping can be subjected to high pressure and high temperature (piping class is D01 which is not designed for 39barg at 280degC which is the temperature of bed during regeneration). Possible damage to downstream piping and equipment. This will also lead to thermal shock to molecular sieves and damage
1.1.1. High temp alarm at TI-0031 provided on outlet of ethane regeneration line to gas cooler
49. Operating procedures to include manual operation to be done under close supervision.
7. Less Temperature
1. Refer to Deviation 3, Cause 1, Consequence 1.3 2. Low feed temperature 2.1. No significant consequence
8. High Level 9. Low Level 10. Contamination/ Additional Phase
1. Not applicable in this node 1. Not applicable in this node 1. Molecular sieve fines carry-over 2. Drier bed not regenerated fully and taken into service 1.1. It may damage compressor and loss of molecular sieves. Consumers may be affected. 2.1. After some time, the bed will be saturated and it will send wet gas to consumers. Regeneration also will be affected. 1.1.1. Filter provided downstream of driers 2.1.1. Moisture analyser with high alarm AI-0044 provided at outlet of filter 2.1.2. Moisture analyser with high alarm AI-0034A/B provided on drier
11. Composition change/ Loss of phase 12. Startup/Shutdown/Maintenance Hazards
1. No new issue 1. Loading and unloading of molecular sieve 1.1. Handling hazard 34. Confirm that loading and unloading procedure is in place to carryout loading and unloading of molecular sieve to / from driers. Also enough provision (like space for handling loading / unloading equipment) need to be ensured to facilitate loading and unloading 1.1.1. None identified
JV
13. Utility Failure
1. Power Failure 2. Instrument Air Failure : FV-0046, ESDV-0045 and ESDV-0046 are FC type These were found to be in order
1.1. Shutdown of dehydration section.
14. Others
1. Single ball valve on the vent line of ethane filter
1.1. Possibility of valve passing leading to HC leak to atmosphere
35. Review provision for isolation of vent by single ball valve in the ethane filter (under filter vender scope). This may be decided based on project specification 36. Consider specifying the 2" ball valve in the vent line on ethane filter as CSC type
JV
JV
36 of 43
ERM
Unit 116
Node: 16. Regeneration gas from dried gas outlet to regeneration compressor inlet, including cooling step after the regeneration of driers Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0103 Rev 3; P&ID 1516-116-0030-0104 Rev 3; P&ID 1516-116-0030-0105 Rev 3; P&ID 1516-116-0030-0106 Rev 3 Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards
Actions
Action By
1. No/ Less flow
1. Malfunction of FIC-0045 to close FV0045 during regeneration
1.1. Loss of regeneration cycle leading to incomplete regeneration of drier bed. If the bed is taken in line at this stage (after cooling step), moisture may slip with the dry gas to downstream consumers 1.2. Loss of flow through heater may lead to overheating of heater coil leading to coil damage. Possible damage to furnace refractory due to high temperature
1.1.1. Moisture analyser provided on each bed with high moisture content alarm (AI0034A/B/C)
1.2.1. Low low flow FALL-0050 provided at inlet of heater with interlock I-342 which will activate heater standby mode and trip dryer control system 1.2.2. High skin temperature alarm provided with TI-0051 1.2.3. High temperature alarm TAH-0053 provided at outlet of heater 1.2.4. High high temperature alarm TAHH-0052 provided at heater outlet with interlock I-342 will activate heater standby mode and trip dryer control system
1.3. Loss of suction to regeneration gas compressor leading to compressor damage due to surging
1.3.1. Anti-surge control provided for regeneration compressor 1.3.2. Low pressure alarm PAL-0082A/B provided on compressor suction 1.3.3. Low flow alarm FAL-0082A/B on compressor suction 1.3.4. Low low pressure PALL-0084A/B provided at compressor suction with interlock I-351 which will trip compressor and closes SDV-0081A/B and SDV-0087 A/B
2. KV-0050 stuck close
2.1. Same as No/ Less Flow Consequence 1.1, 1.2, 1.3
2.1.1. Valve position alarm UA-0056 provided in dryer control system 2.1.2. For other safeguards, refer to discussion in Cause 1, Conseq 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3
3. Regeneration gas inlet KV-0039A/B to drier stuck close
3.2. Possible overheating in tube leading to potential overpressure and rupture in tube of heater
3.2.1. Low low flow FALL-0050 provided at inlet of heater with interlock I-342 which will activate heater standby mode and trip dryer control system 3.2.2. High skin temperature alarm provided with TI-0051 3.2.3. High temperature alarm TAH-0053 provided at outlet of heater 3.2.4. High high temperature alarm TAHH-0052 provided at heater outlet with interlock I-342 will activate heater standby mode and trip dryer control system 3.2.5. PSV-0051A/B provided at outlet of heater.
4. Regeneration gas outlet KV-0032A/B to drier stuck close
4.2. Possible overpressure of drier beds and heater
4.2.1. PSV-0051A/B provided at outlet of heater. 4.2.2. Low low flow FALL-0050 provided at inlet of heater with interlock I-342 which will activate heater standby mode and trip dryer control system 4.2.3. High skin temperature alarm provided with TI-0051 4.2.4. High temperature alarm TAH-0053 provided at outlet of heater 4.2.5. High high temperature alarm TAHH-0052 provided at heater outlet with interlock I-342 will activate heater standby mode and trip dryer control system 4.2.6. Temperature control TRC-0054 provided at the outlet of heater to maintain the temperature at heater outlet
5. XV-0061 at the inlet of air cooler malfunctions to close 6. SDV-0081A/B malfunctions to close at the compressor suction
5.1. Same as No/ Less Flow Consequence 1.1, 1.2, 1.3 6.1. Same as No/ Less Flow Consequence 1.1, 1.2, 1.3. However in this case, anti-surge control will not provide protection to compressor 7.1. Same as No/ Less Flow Consequence 1.1, 1.2, 1.3. However in this case, anti-surge control will not provide protection to compressor 6.1.1. PIC-0069 will try to maintain pressure by relieving to flare and maintain regeneration cycle 6.1.2. Limit switch provided on SDV-0081A/B 7.1.1. Differential pressure gauge PDG-0083A/B provided across regeneration gas compressor suction strainer 7.1.2. PIC-0069 will try to maintain pressure by relieving to flare and maintain regeneration cycle 7.1.3. For other safeguards, refer to safeguards for Deviation 1, Cause 3. 37 of 43 ERM
7. Plugging of regeneration gas compressor suction strainer
Unit 116
Actions
Action By
8.1. High level in D-103 leading to potential liquid carry over
8.1.1. High High level LAHH-0066 provided on D-103 with interlock I-356 which will trip both compressors and closes SDV-0081A/B and SDV-0087A/B 8.1.2. High level alarm LAH-0065 provided on D-103 8.1.3. Limit switch provided on SDV-0065
9. LIC-0065 malfunctions and closes LV0065 10. SDV-0076 fails close
9.1. Same as Cause 8 10.1. High level in D-104 leading to potential liquid carry over to flare
9.1.1. High High level LAHH-0066 provided on D-103 with interlock I-356 which will trip both compressors and closes SDV-0081A/B and SDV-0087A/B 10.1.1. High level alarm LAH-0073 provided on D-104 10.1.2. Independent high level alarm LAH-0076 10.1.3. Limit switch provided on SDV-0076.
11. LIC-0073 malfunctions and closes LV0073 12. Plugging of ethane filtter
11.1. Same as Cause 10 12.1. Back pressure in the drier section and upstream will increase associated by loss of dried gas flow to downstream unit. Low supply to petrochemical consumers 12.2. Low flow to regeneration cycle leading to tripping of regeneration cycle
11.1.1. Independent high level alarm LAH-0076 12.1.1. High differential pressure alarm PDAH-0042 provided on each drier 12.1.2. Standby filter provided 12.2.1. Low low flow FALL-0050 provided at heater inlet with interlock I-342 which will trip heater 12.2.2. Low flow alarm FAL-0045 provided on outlet of ethane filter.
12.3. Compressor will have low/no flow and lead to mechanical damage. 13. BDV-0055 malfunctions and opens fully 14. BDV-0036A/B malfunctions and opens fully 13.1. Reduction in regen gas flow to the bed and loss of gas to flare. This may lead to improper and insufficient regeneration. 14.1. Depressurisation of beds which will affect the regeneration and possible damage to beds. Loss of gas to flare and reduction in regen gas to regeneration cycle. 14.2. Potential freezing in bed which will lead to improper regeneration. 15. KV-0048 closure during cooling step 15.1. Improper cooling of driers
12.3.1. Refer to Node 15, Cause 1, Conseq. 1.4 13.1.1. Limit switch provided on BDV-0055 14.1.1. Limit switch provided on BDV-0036A/B
14.2.1. Limit switch provided on BDV-0036A/B 15.1.1. Valve postion alarm UA-0056 provided on dryer control system. 15.1.2. High temperature alarm TAH-0031 provided on regeneration gas outlet which does not permit the dryer control system to switch the bed to adsorption automatically.
15.2. Loss of suction to regeneration gas compressor leading to compressor damage due to surging. Refer to Cause 1, Conseq 1.3 16. KV-0063 and XV-0064 closes during the standby time 17. KV-0048 opens during heating mode 16.1. Loss of suction to regeneration gas compressor leading to compressor damage due to surging. Refer to Cause 1, Conseq 1.3 17.1. Low flow resulting in high temperature in Heater 16.1.1. Valve postion alarm UA-0056 provided on dryer control system.
17.1.1. Low low flow FALL-0050 provided at inlet of heater with interlock I-342 which will activate heater standby mode and trip dryer control system 17.1.2. High skin temperature alarm provided with TI-0051 17.1.3. High temperature alarm TAH-0053 provided at outlet of heater 17.1.4. High high temperature alarm TAHH-0052 provided at heater outlet with interlock I-342 will activate heater standby mode and trip dryer control system 17.1.5. Temperature control TRC-0054 provided at the outlet of heater to maintain the temperature at heater outlet
17.2. Less temperature of regen stream to drier leading to improper regeneration. 18. KV-0063 opens during heating mode 18.1. Refer to Deviation 1, Cause 17, Conseq 17.1 18.2. Less flow of gas to drier leading to improper regeneration 2. More Flow 1. Malfunction of FIC-0045 to open FV0045 more during regeneration 1.1. Possibility of decrease in temperature at the outlet of heater. This may lead to regeneration at lower temperature. Regeneration may be less efficient
17.2.1. Low temp alarm TAL-0031 provided on regeneration gas outlet from dryer 17.2.2. Moisture analyser AI-0034 A/B with high alarm provided on dryer
18.2.1. Moisture analyser AI-0034 A/B with high alarm provided on dryer 1.1.1. Temperature control TRC-0054 provided at the outlet of heater to maintain the temperature at heater outlet 1.1.2. Low temperature alarm provided with TRC-0054 at heater outlet 38 of 43 ERM
Unit 116
Actions
Action By
1.2. More flow to compressor suction may lead to high pressure in compressor suction including regen gas separator. If the furnace is able to accommodate the higher flow by increasing the firing in the furnace, temperature at the suction of compressor may increase due to limitation of capacity of regeneration gas air cooler
1.2.1. High pressure alarm PAH-0082A/B provided at compressor suction 1.2.2. High flow alarm FAH-0082A/B provided at the compressor suction 1.2.3. High temperature alarm TAH-0064 provided at the outlet of air cooler 1.2.4. About 20% design margin provided for regeneration gas air cooler 1.2.5. Pressure control provided on regen gas separator through PIC-0069
2.1. Loss of level in D-103 leading to potential gas breakthrough to D-104 causing overpressurisation and damage
2.1.1. Low low level LALL-0066 provided at D-103 with interlock I-347 which will close SDV-0065 and SDV-0076 2.1.2. Vent with CSO valve provided on D-104
50. The vent on ethane oily water flash drum D104 to flare should be sized for gas breakthrough case.
3. LIC-0073 malfunctions and opens LV0073 fully 4. Anti-surge valve malfunctions to open during normal operation
3.1. Possible backflow from flare header and flare gas going to open drain 4.1. More flow leading to build up of pressure in the compressor suction 4.2. Loss of flow through heater leading to overheating of coil and failure
3.1.1. Low low level LALL-0077 provided at D-104 with interlock I-349 which will close LV-0073 and SDV-0076 4.1.1. Compressor suction and discharge designed for 39barg 4.1.2. Pressure control provided on regen gas separator through PIC-0069 4.2.1. High high temperature alarm TAHH-0052 provided at heater outlet with interlock I-342 will activate heater standby mode and trip dryer control system 4.2.2. Pressure control provided on regen gas separator through PIC-0069 4.2.3. High temperature alarm TAH-0053 provided at outlet of heater 4.2.4. High skin temperature alarm provided with TI-0051 4.2.5. Low low flow FALL-0050 provided at inlet of heater with interlock I-342 which will activate heater standby mode and trip dryer control system
3. Reverse/Misdirected Flow
1. Regeneration gas compressor trips
1.1. Back flow of wet gas from inlet of E-101 through anti-surge to the suction
1.1.1. Check valve provided at the compressor discharge upstream of the point where it joins the wet gas line 1.1.2. Interlock (I-352A/B) provided to close the compressor discharge SDV on trip signal of compressor
2. Inlet or outlet KV of drier stuck open during regeneration step
2.1. Possibility of sending dried gas / wet gas to the regeneration gas compressor. This will also restrict the flow of regeneration gas through the regeneration gas furnace. Possible damage to furnace coil due to overheating
2.1.1. Low flow alarm provided with FIC-0045 in the regeneration gas line from dried gas outlet 2.1.2. Low low flow FALL-0050 provided at inlet of heater with interlock I-342 which will activate heater standby mode and trip dryer control system 3.1.1. Limit switch provided on BDV-0055 3.2.1. Limit switch provided on BDV-0055 3.2.2. Flare header is designed for 270degC. RO-0055 provided which will reduce temperature by reducing pressure within design condition. 1.1.1. Relief valve provided on regen gas separator sized for fire case 2.1.1. Low low flow FALL-0050 provided at inlet of heater with interlock I-342 which will activate heater standby mode and trip dryer control system 2.1.2. Safety valve provided at outlet of heater sized for blocked outlet case
3. BDV-0055 at outlet of heater malfunctions to open during normal operation
3.1. Loss of regeneration gas flow (about 400t/h) to flare associated by decrease in regen gas flow through drier beds 3.2. Possibility of sending high temperature gases to flare header (temperature at the outlet of heater is about 280 degC)
4. High Pressure
1. External fire on regen gas separator 2. Continued heating in the furnace coil in case of disruption at the outlet of heater due to any reason
1.1. Overpressurization of regen gas separator 2.1. Overpressurization of furnace coil including the piping / equipment upstream of disruption point
3. Regeneration gas inlet KV-0039A/B to drier stuck close 4. Regeneration gas outlet KV-0032A/B to drier stuck close 5. XV-0061 malfunctions and closes 6. SDV-0081A/B malfunctions to close at the compressor suction 7. Plugging of regeneration gas compressor suction filter 8. Regeneration gas compressor trips 5. Low Pressure 1. PIC-0069 malfunctions and open PV0069 fully
3.1. Refer to Deiviation 1, Cause 3, Conseq 3.2 4.1. Refer to Deiviation 1, Cause 4, Conseq 3.2 5.1. Refer to Deviation 1, Cause 5 6.1. Refer to Deviation 1, Cause 6 7.1. Refer to Deviation 1, Cause 7 8.1. Refer to Deviation 3, Cause 1 1.1. Potential loss of pressure in the suction of regeneration gas compressor. Possible damage to compressor due to surging 1.1.1. Low pressure alarm PAL-0082A/B provided on compressor suction 1.1.2. Anti-surge control provided for regeneration gas compressor 39 of 43 ERM
Unit 116
Actions
Action By
1.1.3. Low low pressure PALL-0084A/B provided at pump suction with interlock I351 which will trip compressor and closes SDV-0081A/B and SDV-0087 A/B 2. Malfunction of FIC-0045 to close FV0045 during regeneration 3. BDV-0055 malfunctions and opens fully 4. BDV-0036A/B malfunctions and opens fully 6. More Temperature 1. TRC-0054 malfunctions to increase fuel gas firing to furnace when not required or any other reason leading to increased firing when not required 2.1. 2. Refer to Deviation 1, Cause 1, Conseq 1.3 3.1. 2. Refer to Deviation 1, Cause 13 4.1. 2. Refer to Deviation 1, Cause 14 1.1. Possible damage to heater coil and downstream piping / equipment due to high temperature 1.1.1. High skin temperature alarm TAH-0051 provided on heater 1.1.2. High temperature alarm provided with TI-0053 at the outlet of heater 1.1.3. High high temperature alarm TAHH-0052 provided at heater outlet with interlock I-342 will activate heater standby mode and trip dryer control system 1.1.4. Downstream piping and equipment including regeneration gas air cooler is designed for 315degC 1.2. Possible damage to molecular sieve due to high temperature 1.2.1. High high temperature alarm TAHH-0052 provided at heater outlet with interlock I-342 will activate heater standby mode and trip dryer control system 1.2.2. High temperature alarm provided with TI-0053 at the outlet of heater 1.3. There is a possibility of increase in temperature at the outlet of air cooler and hence at the suction of regeneration gas compressor. Possible damage to compressor due to high temperature operation 1.3.1. High high temperature alarm TAHH-0052 provided at heater outlet with interlock I-342 will activate heater standby mode and trip dryer control system 1.3.2. High temperature alarm TAH-0053 provided at the outlet of heater 1.3.3. High temperature alarm TAH-0064 provided at the outlet of air cooler 1.3.4. Design temp of D-103 is 236 deg C (this is taking into account 20% natural circulation of A-101) 2. Regen gas air cooler fan trips 3. Malfunction of FIC-0045 to close FV0045 during regeneration 4. KV-0050 stuck close 5. Regeneration gas inlet KV-0039A/B to drier stuck close 6. Regeneration gas outlet KV-0032A/B to drier stuck close 7. XV-0061 at the inlet of air cooler malfunctions to close 8. SDV-0081A/B malfunctions to close at the compressor suction 9. Plugging of regeneration gas compressor suction filter 10. KV-0063 in the bypass line of regeneration system opens during regeneration mode 11. Low flow of regen gas during cooling 2.1. Same as More Temperature, Consequence 1.3 3.1. Refer to Deviation 1, Cause 1, Conseq 1.2 4.1. Refer to Deviation 1, Cause 2 5.1. Refer to Deviation 1, Cause 3 6.1. Refer to Deviation 1, Cause 4 7.1. Refer to Deviation 1, Cause 5 8.1. Refer to Deviation 1, Cause 6 9.1. Refer to Deviation 1, Cause 7 10.1. Refer to Deivation 1, Cause 16 2.1.1. Regen gas separator is designed for 236degC
11.1. Improper cooling may cause high temperature
11.1.1. High temperature alarm TAH-0031 provided on regeneration gas outlet which does not permit the dryer control system to switch the bed to adsorption automatically. 1.1.1. Temperature control TRC-0054 provided at the outlet of heater to maintain the temperature at heater outlet 1.1.2. Low temperature alarm provided with TRC-0054 at heater outlet
7. Less Temperature
1. TRC-0054 malfunctions to decrease fuel gas firing to furnace when not required or heater trips due to any reason during regeneration 2. BDV-0036A/B malfunctions and opens fully 3. Malfunction of FIC-0045 to open FV0045 more during regeneration 4. High flow of regen gas during cooling
1.1. Lower temperature of regen gas to drier may lead to incomplete drying of beds. Possibility of moisture breakthrough when drier bed is taken in line for adsorption 2.1. Refer to Deivation 1, Cause 14 3.1. Refer to Deviation 2, Cause 1, Conseq 1.1 4.1. No significant consequence 1.1. Normally the build up of level is very slow, however if liquid level continues to build up, it may lead to liquid carryover to regeneration gas compressor leading to compressor damage
8. High Level
1. Malfunction of LIC-0065 to close LV0065 when required to open or LV-0065 stuck close
1.1.1. High High level LAHH-0066 provided on D-103 with interlock I-356 which will trip both compressors and closes SDV-0081A/B and SDV-0087A/B 40 of 43 ERM
Unit 116
Actions
Action By
2. SDV-0065 malfunctions to close in the bottom outlet line of regen gas separator
2.1. Normally the build up of level is very slow, however if liquid level continues to build up, it may lead to liquid carryover to regeneration gas compressor leading to compressor damage
2.1.1. High High level LAHH-0066 provided on D-103 with interlock I-356 which will trip both compressors and closes SDV-0081A/B and SDV-0087A/B 2.1.2. High level alarm LAH-0065 provided 2.1.3. LImit switch provided on SDV-0065
3. SDV-0076 fails close 4. LIC-0073 malfunctions and closes LV0073 9. Low Level 1. Malfunction of LIC-0065 to open LV0065 more than required
3.1. Refer to Deviation 1, Cause 10 4.1. Refer to Deviation 1, Cause 11 1.1. Possibility of depleting level in regen gas separator followed by gas blowby to sour water stripper feed surge drum which is designed at more lower pressure as compared to operating pressure of regen gas separator. Potential vessel failure lead to loss of containment 2.1. Refer to Deviation 2, Cause 3 3.1. Loss of level in D-103 and leads to gas breakthrough to open drain 3.1.1. Drain valve is CSC 3.1.2. Low level alarm LAL-0065 provided on D-103 3.1.3. Low low level alarm LALL-0067 provided with interlock I-347 which closes SDV-0065 1.1.1. Low low level LALL-0067 with interlock I-347 which will close SDV-0065 and LV-0065
2. LIC-0073 malfunctions and opens LV0073 3. Inadvertent opening of drain valve at outlet of D-103
4. Inadvertent opening of drain valve at outlet of D-104
4.1. Loss of level in D-104 and leads to gas breakthrough to open drain
4.1.1. Drain valve is CSC 4.1.2. Low level alarm LAL-0073 provided on D-104 4.1.3. Low low level alarm LALL-0077 provided on D-104 with interlock I-349 which will closes SDV-0076.
4.2. Back flow from flare header to open drain. Refer to Deviation 2, Cause 3 10. Contamination/ Additional Phase 1. Higher content of CO2 in the wet gas from upstream section 1.1. Since the regen gas is combined with the feed to dehydration section, there is a possibiilty of adsorption of CO2 on the molecular sieve(this needs to be confirmed) and desorbed during regeneration step. Gradually CO2 may build up in the system to significant level and this may lead to corrosion in the pipe and vessel 1.1.1. CO2 analyser AI-0171 with high alarm provided on overhead of D-112
11. Composition change/ Loss of phase 12. Startup/Shutdown/Maintenance Hazards 13. Utility Failure
1. No specific issue 1. Maintenance on one drier bed 1.1. Unit will not be available to operate if one of the bed is under maintenance 1.1. Refer to air cooler fan trip 1.2. Compressor motor trip. 1.3. All KVs will stay in the last position 2. Instrument air failure: PV-0069, LV0073, LV-0065, XV-0063, XV-0064, SDV0081A/B. SDV-0065 and SDV-0076 are FC type BDV-0036A/B, BDV-0055 and ,SDV0087A/B are FO type SDV-0087A/B are found not to be in order. 2.1. 46. For SDV-0087A/B, it should be made fail close (FC)
JV
1. Electric power failure,
14. Others
1. Trip of compressor due to any reason
1.1. Interlock leading to trip of compressor also close suction and discharge SDVs of compressor. However the anti-surge line for compressor is joining upstream of suction SDV. This may lead to compressor damage due to coast down surge
37. Consider closing the regeneration compressor suction SDV after a certain time delay of actuating compressor trip due to any reason. This may be confirmed based on compressor vendor requirement
JV
41 of 43
ERM
Unit 116
Node: 17. Regeneration compressor discharge to wet gas inlet Drawings: P&ID1516-116-0030-0105 Rev 3; P&ID 1516-116-0030-0101 Rev 3; P&ID 1516-116-0030-0106 Rev 3 Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards
Actions
Action By
1. No/ Less flow
1. Regeneration gas compressor trips
1.1. The flow through the regeneration heater will reduce / stop. Gradually pressure at the suction of compressor will build up to the pressure at the outlet of drier. However furnace is likely to tripped due to loss of flow before operator action takes place 2.1. Same as Deviation 1, Consequence 1.1 2.2. High pressure / high temperature at the compressor discharge. Potential for compressor damage due to overpressure
1.1.1. Regeneration compressor trip alarm provided on DCS 1.1.2. PIC-0069 provided which will try to maintain pressure and regeneration flow.
2. Inadevertent SDV-0087A/B closure
2.2.1. Limit switch provided on SDV-0087A/B 2.2.2. Anti-surge control provided for regeneration gas compressor 2.2.3. High high temperature TAHH-0085A/B provided on compressor discharge with interlock I-351A/B to trip compressor 2.2.4. High high pressure PAHH-0085A/B provided on compressor discharge with interlock I-351A/B to trip compressor 2.2.5. Relief valve provided on compressor discharge sized for blocked outlet case
46. For SDV-0087A/B, it should be made fail close (FC)
JV
3. Anti-surge valve malfunctions to open during normal operation
3.1. Same as No/ Less Flow Consequence 1.1 3.2. Build up of pressure in the compressor suction 3.2.1. Compressor suction and discharge designed for 39barg 3.2.2. Pressure control provided on regen gas separator through PIC-0069 3.3. Loss of flow through heater leading to overheating of coil and failure 3.3.1. High high temperature alarm TAHH-0052 provided at heater outlet with interlock I-342 will activate heater standby mode and trip dryer control system 3.3.2. High temperature alarm TAH-0053 provided at outlet of heater 3.3.3. High skin temperature alarm provided with TI-0051 3.3.4. Low low flow FALL-0050 provided at inlet of heater with interlock I-342 which will activate heater standby mode and trip dryer control system
4. Refer to discussion in Node 16, Deviation 1 (No/Less Flow) 5. BDV-0089 malfunctions to open during normal operation 5.1. Loss of regeneration gas to flare followed by increase in flow through compressor (sized for 5.7 t/hr) 5.2. Low pressure at compressor discharge 2. More Flow 3. Reverse/Misdirected Flow 1. No issue identified 1. BDV-0089 malfunctions to open during normal operation 2. Regeneration gas compressor trips 1.1. Low pressure in compressor discharge may lead to reverse flow from wet gas to compressor 2.1. Back flow of wet gas from inlet of E-101 through anti-surge to the suction 1.1.1. Check valve provided at the compressor discharge upstream of the point where it joins the wet gas line 2.1.1. Check valve provided at the compressor discharge upstream of the point where it joins the wet gas line 2.1.2. Interlock (I-352A/B) provided to close the compressor discharge SDV0087A/B on trip signal of compressor 4. High Pressure 5. Low Pressure 1. Refer to Deviation 1, Cause 2 1. Compressor trip. Refer to Deviation 1, Cause 1 2. BDV-0089 malfunctions to open during normal operation, refer to Deviation 1, Cause 5, Consequence 5.2 6. More Temperature 1. More temp in upstream. Refer to Deviation 6 in Node 16. 1.1. More temp in compressor discharge 1.1.1. High high temperature TAHH-0085A/B provided at compressor discharge with interlock I-351A/B to trip compressor 1.1.2. High temp alarmTAH-0086A/B provided in anti-surge control and safeguarding 2. Inadvertent closure of SDV-0087A/B at compressor discharge 7. Less Temperature 8. High Level 9. Low Level 10. Contamination/ Additional Phase 1. Low temp at compressor suction 1. Not applicable 1. Not applicable 1. No issue in this node 2.1. Refer to Deviation 1, Cause 2, Conseq 2.2 1.1. No significant consequence 5.1.1. Limit Switch provided on BDV-0089 5.2.1. Low pressure alarm PAL-0086A/B provided in anti-surge control and safeguarding system
42 of 43
ERM
Unit 116
Node: 17. Regeneration compressor discharge to wet gas inlet Drawings: P&ID1516-116-0030-0105 Rev 3; P&ID 1516-116-0030-0101 Rev 3; P&ID 1516-116-0030-0106 Rev 3 Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards
Actions
Action By
11. Composition change/ Loss of phase 12. Startup/Shutdown/Maintenance Hazards 13. Utility Failure
1. No new issue 1. No new issue
1. Power failure 2. Instrument air failure : SDV-0087A/B, FV-0082A/B, BDV-0089 are FO type Failure position of SDV-0087A/B is not in order
1.1. Compressor trips. Refer to Deivation 1, Cause 1 2.1. 46. For SDV-0087A/B, it should be made fail close (FC)
JV
14. Others
1. No new issue
43 of 43
ERM
Annex E
Risk Ranking Worksheet
Unit 116 Ethane Treatment and Dryer
Risk Ranking Worksheet
No Risk Ranking was done for Unit 116
ERM Risk Annex E
1 of 1
South Par Gas Field Development Phases 15 & 16 Onshore Facilities
Annex F
Drawing List

Drawing P&ID 1516-116-0030-0101 Rev 3 P&ID 1516-116-0030-0102 Rev 3 P&ID 1516-116-0030-0103 Rev 3 P&ID 1516-116-0030-0104 Rev 3 P&ID 1516-116-0030-0105 Rev 3 P&ID 1516-116-0030-0106 Rev 3 P&ID 1516-116-0030-0107 Rev 3 P&ID 1516-116-0030-0111 Rev O P&ID 1516-116-0030-0112 Rev O P&ID 1516-116-0030-0113 Rev O P&ID 1516-116-0030-0114 Rev O P&ID 1516-116-0030-0115 Rev O P&ID 1516-116-0030-0116 Rev O P&ID 1516-116-0030-0117 Rev O P&ID 1516-116-0030-0118 Rev O P&ID 1516-116-0030-0120 Rev O P&ID 1516-116-0030-0121A Rev O P&ID 1516-116-0030-0121 Rev O P&ID 1516-116-0030-0122 Rev O P&ID 1516-116-0030-0123 Rev O P&ID 1516-116-0030-0124 Rev O Wet Gas chilling Dryer Inlet Separator Molecular Sieve Driers Ethane Regeneration Heater Regeneration Gas Piping Driers Regeneration Compressor Regeneration Gas Heat Control System Feed Gas KO drum Solvent Absorber Treated Gas KO Drum Solvent Flash Drum and Flash Drum Absorber Rich/Lean Solvent Exchanger Solvent Regenerator Solvent Reboiler Condensate System Solvent Regenerator Reflux Section Lean Solvent Storage and Pump Filtration Package Anti Foam Package Sump Drum Hydrocarbon Sump Drum Sulfrex Lean Solvent Transfer Pump Description
Drawing List
Place(s) Used Nodes: 1, 7, 14 Nodes: 14, 15 Nodes: 15, 16 Nodes: 15, 16 Nodes: 16 Nodes: 16 Comment Process Drawing Reviewed Process Drawing Reviewed Process Drawing Reviewed Process Drawing Reviewed Process Drawing Reviewed Process Drawing Reviewed Vendor Package To be reviewed later Nodes: 1 Nodes: 1, 2, 3, 7, 8, 13 Nodes: 3 Nodes: 2, 3, 4, 7, 11, 12, 13 Nodes: 4, 6 Nodes: 4, 5, 6, 8 Nodes: 6 Nodes: 5, 11 Nodes: 6, 7, 8, 9 Nodes: 9 Nodes: 8 Nodes: 4, 10 Nodes: 10, 11 Nodes: 12 Process Drawing Reviewed Process Drawing Reviewed Process Drawing Reviewed Process Drawing Reviewed Process Drawing Reviewed Process Drawing Reviewed Process Drawing Reviewed Process Drawing Reviewed Process Drawing Reviewed Vendor Package to be reviewed later Vendor Package to be reviewed later Process Drawing Reviewed Process Drawing Reviewed Process Drawing Reviewed
ERM Risk Annex F
1/1
Annex G
HAZOP Review Action Sheet
Unit 116 Ethane Treatment and Drying Action By: JV
HAZOP Review Action Sheet Date: 1. 21/07/2008; 2. 23/07/2008; 3. 24/07/2008
Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0111 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0101 Rev 3, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0112 Rev O Node: 1. Feed gas inlet and KOD upto feed gas filter inlet including filter bypass Deviation: 4. More/High Flow up to Feed Gas KOD Cause: 2. FIC-0172 malfunctions and opens FV-0172 fully Consequence: 2.1. More flow to dehydration units, leading to less pressure in the unit and column upset. Safeguard: 2.1.1. Low pressure alarm PAL-0172 provided on overhead of D-112; 2.1.2. CV of FV-0172 is provided with a maximum clamp Recommendations (HAZOP): 27. Possibility of relocating FIC-0172 and relevant valves and instrumentations to downstream dehydration section to be reviewed during detailed engineering stage Initial Response:
Company Comments on Initial Response:
Final Resolution:
Date:
ERM Risk Annex G
1 of 73
Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0111 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0101 Rev 3, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0112 Rev O Node: 1. Feed gas inlet and KOD upto feed gas filter inlet including filter bypass Deviation: 8. More/High Pressure Cause: 3. Non-receipt of supply by downstream consumers (petrochemical plant) Consequence: 3.1. Higher pressure in Unit 116 and upstream unit (Unit 105) Safeguard: 3.1.1. Refer to HAZOP discussion in Unit 105; 3.1.2. PIC-0172 will relieve to flare (capacity of one train); 3.1.3. High pressure alarm PAH-0172 provided on D-112 overhead Recommendations (HAZOP): 26. Operating procedure to include procedures for diverting ethane to export gas line. Initial Response:
Final Resolution:
Date:
ERM Risk Annex G
2 of 73
Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0111 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0101 Rev 3, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0112 Rev O Node: 1. Feed gas inlet and KOD upto feed gas filter inlet including filter bypass Deviation: 8. More/High Pressure Cause: 5. FIC-0172 malfunctions and closes FV-0172 Consequence: 5.1. Refer to Node 1, Deviation 2, Cause 3 Safeguard: Recommendations (HAZOP): 27. Possibility of relocating FIC-0172 and relevant valves and instrumentations to downstream dehydration section to be reviewed during detailed engineering stage Initial Response:
Final Resolution:
Date:
ERM Risk Annex G
3 of 73
Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0112 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0114 Rev O Node: 2. Solvent absorber bottom upto solvent flash drum Deviation: 1. No/ Less flow Cause: 2. LIC-0163 on solvent absorber malfunctions and closes LV-0163 Consequence: 2.1. Same as Conseq. 1.1 Safeguard: 2.1.1. Treated gas KO drum D-112 provided to take care of carry-over.; 2.1.2. Bypass provided for LV-0163; 2.1.3. Low level alarm LAL0181 provided in D-113; 2.1.4. Low low level LALL-0182 with interlock I-323 closes SDV-0183, closes LV-0181 and activates I-328 (closes SDV0201) Recommendations (HAZOP): 1. Review the provision of high level alarm with LT-0161 on solvent absorber bottom Initial Response:
Final Resolution:
Date:
ERM Risk Annex G
4 of 73
Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0112 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0114 Rev O Node: 2. Solvent absorber bottom upto solvent flash drum Deviation: 4. High Pressure Cause: 2. LIC-0163 on solvent absorber malfunctions and closes LV-0163 Consequence: 2.1. Same as Conseq. 1.1 Safeguard: 2.1.1. Treated gas KO drum D-112 provided to take care of carry-over.; 2.1.2. Bypass provided for LV-0163; 2.1.3. Low level alarm LAL0181 provided in D-113; 2.1.4. Low low level LALL-0182 with interlock I-323 closes SDV-0183, closes LV-0181 and activates I-328 (closes SDV0201) Recommendations (HAZOP): 1. Review the provision of high level alarm with LT-0161 on solvent absorber bottom Initial Response:
Final Resolution:
Date:
ERM Risk Annex G
5 of 73
Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0112 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0114 Rev O Node: 2. Solvent absorber bottom upto solvent flash drum Deviation: 8. High Level Cause: 2. LIC-0163 on solvent absorber malfunctions and closes LV-0163 Consequence: 2.1. Same as Conseq. 1.1 Safeguard: 2.1.1. Treated gas KO drum D-112 provided to take care of carry-over.; 2.1.2. Bypass provided for LV-0163; 2.1.3. Low level alarm LAL0181 provided in D-113; 2.1.4. Low low level LALL-0182 with interlock I-323 closes SDV-0183, closes LV-0181 and activates I-328 (closes SDV0201) Recommendations (HAZOP): 1. Review the provision of high level alarm with LT-0161 on solvent absorber bottom Initial Response:
Final Resolution:
Date:
ERM Risk Annex G
6 of 73
Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0101 Rev 3, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0112 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0114 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0115 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0116 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0118 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0120 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0122 Rev O Node: 2. Solvent absorber bottom upto solvent flash drum Deviation: 10. Contamination/ Additional Phase Cause: 1. Corrosion material (iron sulphide) present in the pipeline and degraded amine Consequence: 1.1. This may lead to foaming and carry-over of amine to D-112 Safeguard: 1.1.1. Filtration package is provided to remove any iron sulphide particles; 1.1.2. Antifoam injection facilities provided. Recommendations (HAZOP): 2. Operating procedure to include chemical cleaning of the system prior to start-up. Initial Response:
Final Resolution:
Date:
ERM Risk Annex G
7 of 73
Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0112 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0113 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0114 Rev O Node: 3. Solvent absorber top circuit including treated gas KOD and upto solvent flash drum inlet Deviation: 8. High Pressure Cause: 3. External fire on D-112 Consequence: 3.1. Overpressure in D-112 leading to rupture and fire. Safeguard: 3.1.1. None identified Recommendations (HAZOP): 28. Review the requirement of installing a PSV on D-112 overhead for fire case during detailed engineering Initial Response:
Final Resolution:
Date:
ERM Risk Annex G
8 of 73
Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0112 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0113 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0114 Rev O Node: 3. Solvent absorber top circuit including treated gas KOD and upto solvent flash drum inlet Deviation: 16. Start-up/Shutdown/Maintenance Hazards Cause: 1. Relocation of FIC-0172 Consequence: 1.1. No significant consequence Safeguard: Recommendations (HAZOP): 29. Review the start-up procedure after relocation of FIC-0172 Initial Response:
Final Resolution:
Date:
ERM Risk Annex G
9 of 73
Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0114 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0115 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0116 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0122 Rev O Node: 4. Solvent flash drum and absorber top [upto reflux inlet] and bottom circuits[upto tank inlet] Deviation: 1. No/ Less flow of flash gas to boiler from C-113 overhead Cause: 5. No flow of fuel gas when demanded due to PIC-0183 malfunction which closes PV-0183 Consequence: 5.2. During hot circulation, loss of driving force in the cold side of exchangers E-111 will cause the hot stream not being cooled enough. This may lead to higher temperature in the storage tank and high temperature in outlet of exchanger E-111. This may occur for a short period of time and therefore no significant impact Safeguard: 5.2.1. High temperature alarm TAH-0192 downstream of exchanger E-111; 5.2.2. Block-and-bypass arrangement has been provided for PV-0183 Recommendations (HAZOP): 4. Note 13 on P&ID 114 to be modified to reflect the FG connection is for start-up pressurisation, cold circulation and hot circulation (till gas is introduced) Initial Response:
Final Resolution:
Date:
ERM Risk Annex G
10 of 73
Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0101 Rev 3, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0112 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0114 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0115 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0116 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0120 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0122 Rev O Node: 4. Solvent flash drum and absorber top [upto reflux inlet] and bottom circuits[upto tank inlet] Deviation: 3. More Flow of flash gas to boiler from overhead of D-113 Cause: 1. PIC-0182A malfunctions and opens PV-0182A fully Consequence: 1.2. Pressure drop in the flash drum leading to potential carry-over. Safeguard: 1.2.1. High flow alarm FAH-0181 provided on overhead of absorber; 1.2.2. Low pressure alarm PAL-0182B provided on overhead of flash gas absorber; 1.2.3. Demister provided on flash gas absorber C-1113; 1.2.4. PV-0183 will try to maintain pressure in D-113 Recommendations (HAZOP): 5. Review the requirement of amine removal facilities in the boiler area in Unit 121 Initial Response:
Final Resolution:
Date:
ERM Risk Annex G
11 of 73
Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0114 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0115 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0116 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0122 Rev O Node: 4. Solvent flash drum and absorber top [upto reflux inlet] and bottom circuits[upto tank inlet] Deviation: 3. More Flow of flash gas to boiler from overhead of D-113 Cause: 1. PIC-0182A malfunctions and opens PV-0182A fully Consequence: 1.2. Pressure drop in the flash drum leading to potential carry-over. Safeguard: 1.2.1. High flow alarm FAH-0181 provided on overhead of absorber; 1.2.2. Low pressure alarm PAL-0182B provided on overhead of flash gas absorber; 1.2.3. Demister provided on flash gas absorber C-1113; 1.2.4. PV-0183 will try to maintain pressure in D-113 Recommendations (HAZOP): 6. Review the possibility of increasing the height of C-113 between the packed bed and demister to act as a knock-out drum. Initial Response:
Final Resolution:
Date:
ERM Risk Annex G
12 of 73
Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0101 Rev 3, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0112 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0114 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0115 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0116 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0120 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0122 Rev O Node: 4. Solvent flash drum and absorber top [upto reflux inlet] and bottom circuits[upto tank inlet] Deviation: 8. Low Pressure Cause: 4. PIC-0182A malfunctions and opens PV-0182A fully Consequence: 4.1. Pressure drop in the flash drum leading to potential carry-over. Safeguard: 4.1.1. High flow alarm FAH-0181 provided on overhead of absorber; 4.1.2. Low pressure alarm PAL-0182B provided at outlet of flash gas absorber; 4.1.3. PIC-0183 will try to maintain pressure, however fuel gas will be lost to flare; 4.1.4. Demister on Flash Gas absorber C-113 provided Recommendations (HAZOP): 5. Review the requirement of amine removal facilities in the boiler area in Unit 121 Initial Response:
Final Resolution:
Date:
ERM Risk Annex G
13 of 73
Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0114 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0115 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0116 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0122 Rev O Node: 4. Solvent flash drum and absorber top [upto reflux inlet] and bottom circuits[upto tank inlet] Deviation: 8. Low Pressure Cause: 4. PIC-0182A malfunctions and opens PV-0182A fully Consequence: 4.1. Pressure drop in the flash drum leading to potential carry-over. Safeguard: 4.1.1. High flow alarm FAH-0181 provided on overhead of absorber; 4.1.2. Low pressure alarm PAL-0182B provided at outlet of flash gas absorber; 4.1.3. PIC-0183 will try to maintain pressure, however fuel gas will be lost to flare; 4.1.4. Demister on Flash Gas absorber C-113 provided Recommendations (HAZOP): 6. Review the possibility of increasing the height of C-113 between the packed bed and demister to act as a knock-out drum. Initial Response:
Final Resolution:
Date:
ERM Risk Annex G
14 of 73
Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0101 Rev 3, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0112 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0114 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0115 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0116 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0120 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0122 Rev O Node: 4. Solvent flash drum and absorber top [upto reflux inlet] and bottom circuits[upto tank inlet] Deviation: 11. High Level Cause: 1. SDV-0183 closes Consequence: 1.2. Possible carry-over of amine to boilers Safeguard: 1.2.1. Limit switch provided on SDV-0183; 1.2.2. High level alarm LAH-0181 provided on MP flash drum; 1.2.3. High high level alarm LAHH-0183 will cause total unit shutdown Recommendations (HAZOP): 5. Review the requirement of amine removal facilities in the boiler area in Unit 121 Initial Response:
Final Resolution:
Date:
ERM Risk Annex G
15 of 73
Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0101 Rev 3, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0112 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0114 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0115 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0116 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0118 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0120 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0122 Rev O Node: 4. Solvent flash drum and absorber top [upto reflux inlet] and bottom circuits[upto tank inlet] Deviation: 13. Contamination/ Additional Phase Cause: 1. Corrosion material (iron sulphide) present in the pipeline Consequence: 1.1. This may lead to foaming and carry-over of amine to D-112 Safeguard: 1.1.1. Filtration package is provided to remove any iron sulphide particles Recommendations (HAZOP): 2. Operating procedure to include chemical cleaning of the system prior to start-up. Initial Response:
Final Resolution:
Date:
ERM Risk Annex G
16 of 73
Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0114 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0115 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0116 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0122 Rev O Node: 4. Solvent flash drum and absorber top [upto reflux inlet] and bottom circuits[upto tank inlet] Deviation: 16. Utility Failure Cause: 1. Steam tracing failure Consequence: 1.1. Possible corrosion due to condensation Safeguard: 1.1.1. Lines are free draining towards C-113. Recommendations (HAZOP): 7. Check the consistency of requirements of steam tracing upstream and downstream of PV-0182A Initial Response:
Final Resolution:
Date:
ERM Risk Annex G
17 of 73
Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0116 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0118 Rev O Node: 5. Regenerator top circuit including reflux Deviation: 2. No/Less Flow in the bottom of D-114 to reflux in the column C-112 Cause: 4. Tripping of overhead condenser 116-A-111 Consequence: 4.1. Low level in reflux drum and high pressure and high temperature in drum and column. There will be 25% natural draft in air coolers Safeguard: 4.1.1. Low level alarm LAL-0221 on reflux drum; 4.1.2. Low low level alarm LALL-0222 on reflux drum provided with interlock I-331 which will trip reflux pumps; 4.1.3. High pressure alarm PAH-0221A provided on D-114 overhead; 4.1.4. High high pressure alarm PAHH-0203 on C-112 overhead with interlock I-320 which will close FV-0211, SDV-0183, LV-0181 and SDV-0183; 4.1.5. PSV-0201A/B provided on regenerator column Recommendations (HAZOP): 8. Review the necessity of extra PSV with adequate capacity on reflux drum if the regenerator PSVs (PSV-0201A/B) cannot protect reflux drum in case of air cooler failure Initial Response:
Final Resolution:
Date:
ERM Risk Annex G
18 of 73
Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0116 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0118 Rev O Node: 5. Regenerator top circuit including reflux Deviation: 6. Reverse/Misdirected Flow Cause: 3. Tripping of pump P-112A/B Consequence: 3.1. Reverse flow from column to reflux drum via min flow line. Safeguard: 3.1.1. Spare pump provided with auto-start facilities; 3.1.2. Pump running indication provided Recommendations (HAZOP): 9. Review if the provision of check valve at the inlet of reflux to the regenerator column C-112 is required Initial Response:
Final Resolution:
Date:
ERM Risk Annex G
19 of 73
Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0116 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0118 Rev O Node: 5. Regenerator top circuit including reflux Deviation: 6. Reverse/Misdirected Flow Cause: 5. Peak overpressure of flare Consequence: 5.1. Reverse flow of gas to D-114 and C-112 as peak backpresssure is 1.7 barg which is higher than reflux drum D-114 pressure Safeguard: 5.1.1. None identified Recommendations (HAZOP): 10. Review the backpressure for PV-0221 as presently it is connected to MP flare. Initial Response:
Final Resolution:
Date:
ERM Risk Annex G
20 of 73
Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0116 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0118 Rev O Node: 5. Regenerator top circuit including reflux Deviation: 7. High Pressure Cause: 1. Tripping of overhead condenser 116-A-111 Consequence: 1.1. Low level in reflux drum and high pressure and high temperature in drum and column. There will be 25% natural draft in air coolers Safeguard: 1.1.1. Low level alarm LAL-0221 on reflux drum; 1.1.2. Low low level alarm LALL-0222 on reflux drum provided with interlock I-331 which will trip reflux pumps; 1.1.3. High high pressure alarm PAHH-0203 on C-112 overhead with interlock I-320 which will close FV-0211, SDV-0183, LV0181 and SDV-0183; 1.1.4. PSV-0201A/B provided on regenerator column Recommendations (HAZOP): 8. Review the necessity of extra PSV with adequate capacity on reflux drum if the regenerator PSVs (PSV-0201A/B) cannot protect reflux drum in case of air cooler failure Initial Response:
Final Resolution:
Date:
ERM Risk Annex G
21 of 73
Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0115 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0116 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0117 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0118 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0120 Rev O Node: 5. Regenerator top circuit including reflux Deviation: 8. Low Pressure Cause: 4. LIC-0201 malfunctions and open LV-0201 fully Consequence: 4.2. Gas blowby to storage tank causing rupture of the tank Safeguard: 4.2.1. Low low level alarm LALL-0202 on regenerator with interlock I-325 which will trips P-122A/B, close SDV-0201 and close SDV0183; 4.2.2. PSV-0241 provide on T-111 Recommendations (HAZOP): 14. The protection of the tank against gas breakthrough and fire case needs to be reviewed by JV with Vendor Initial Response:
Final Resolution:
Date:
ERM Risk Annex G
22 of 73
Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0116 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0118 Rev O Node: 5. Regenerator top circuit including reflux Deviation: 9. More Temperature Cause: 1. Tripping of overhead condenser 116-A-111 Consequence: 1.1. Low level in reflux drum and high pressure and high temperature in drum and column. There will be 25% natural draft in air coolers Safeguard: 1.1.1. Low level alarm LAL-0221 on reflux drum; 1.1.2. Low low level alarm LALL-0222 on reflux drum provided with interlock I-331 which will trip reflux pumps; 1.1.3. PV-0221 provided which will relieve acid gas to flare; 1.1.4. High pressure alarm PAH-0221 provided on D-114 overhead; 1.1.5. High high pressure alarm PAHH-0203 on C-112 overhead with interlock I-320 which will close FV-0211, SDV-0183, LV-0181 and SDV-0183; 1.1.6. PSV-0201A/B provided on regenerator column Recommendations (HAZOP): 8. Review the necessity of extra PSV with adequate capacity on reflux drum if the regenerator PSVs (PSV-0201A/B) cannot protect reflux drum in case of air cooler failure Initial Response:
Final Resolution:
Date:
ERM Risk Annex G
23 of 73
Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0116 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0118 Rev O Node: 5. Regenerator top circuit including reflux Deviation: 12. Low Level Cause: 3. Tripping of overhead condenser 116-A-111 Consequence: 3.1. Low level in reflux drum and high pressure and high temperature in drum and column. There will be 25% natural draft in air coolers Safeguard: 3.1.1. Low level alarm LAL-0221 on reflux drum; 3.1.2. Low low level alarm LALL-0222 on reflux drum provided with interlock I-331 which will trip reflux pumps Recommendations (HAZOP): 8. Review the necessity of extra PSV with adequate capacity on reflux drum if the regenerator PSVs (PSV-0201A/B) cannot protect reflux drum in case of air cooler failure Initial Response:
Final Resolution:
Date:
ERM Risk Annex G
24 of 73
Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0101 Rev 3, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0112 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0114 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0115 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0116 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0118 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0120 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0122 Rev O Node: 5. Regenerator top circuit including reflux Deviation: 13. Contamination/ Additional Phase Cause: 1. Corrosion material (iron sulphide) present in the pipeline Consequence: 1.1. This may lead to foaming and carry-over of amine to D-114. Safeguard: 1.1.1. Filtration package is provided to remove any iron sulphide particles; 1.1.2. Provision for injection of antifoam Recommendations (HAZOP): 2. Operating procedure to include chemical cleaning of the system prior to start-up. Initial Response:
Final Resolution:
Date:
ERM Risk Annex G
25 of 73
Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0116 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0118 Rev O Node: 5. Regenerator top circuit including reflux Deviation: 15. Start-up/Shutdown/Maintenance Hazards Cause: 1. During shutdown, iron sulphide may cause ignition when exposed to air Consequence: 1.1. Fire leading to equipment damage Safeguard: 1.1.1. None identified Recommendations (HAZOP): 3. Operating procedure to include proper cleaning and wetting of the column before opening for maintenance. Initial Response:
Final Resolution:
Date:
ERM Risk Annex G
26 of 73
Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0116 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0118 Rev O Node: 5. Regenerator top circuit including reflux Deviation: 15. Start-up/Shutdown/Maintenance Hazards Cause: 2. For maintenance, air ingress in the system Consequence: 2.1. Formation of polythionic acid leading to corrosion Safeguard: 2.1.1. Nitrogen purge provided Recommendations (HAZOP): 11. Operating manual to address the steps for start-up and maintenance procedures in order to avoid toxic gas release to the atmosphere. Initial Response:
Final Resolution:
Date:
ERM Risk Annex G
27 of 73
Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0115 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0116 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0117 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0118 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0120 Rev O Node: 5. Regenerator top circuit including reflux Deviation: 15. Start-up/Shutdown/Maintenance Hazards Cause: 3. Improper warming up Consequence: 3.1. Thermal shock may cause leakage through joints (eg flanges etc) Safeguard: 3.1.1. None identified Recommendations (HAZOP): 12. Operating manual to address warming up procedures for reboiler E-112 Initial Response:
Final Resolution:
Date:
ERM Risk Annex G
28 of 73
Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0115 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0116 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0117 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0120 Rev O Node: 6. Regenerator bottom circuit including reboiler Deviation: 3. No/ Less flow of condensate from D-115 to LP condensate system Cause: 2. LIC-0212 malfunctions and closes LV-0212 Consequence: 2.1. Same as Conseq. 1.1 and also vapour locking in the pipe downstream LV-0212 Safeguard: 2.1.1. High high level alarm LAHH-0211 on D-115 Recommendations (HAZOP): 13. Ensure that pipe downstream of LV-0212 is designed for two-phase flow. Initial Response:
Final Resolution:
Date:
ERM Risk Annex G
29 of 73
Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0115 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0116 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0117 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0118 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0120 Rev O Node: 6. Regenerator bottom circuit including reboiler Deviation: 4. More Flow from Column bottom to solvent storage tank via 116-E-111 and 116-A-112 Cause: 1. LIC-0201 malfunctions and open LV-0201 Consequence: 1.1. More supply of solvent to storage tank. Also level in regenerator bottoms goes down may lead to gas breakthrough to storage tank leading to high pressure and possible rupture of the tank. Also, overheating of the rich side of exchanger E-111 may occur. Less cooling of lean side of exchangers. Safeguard: 1.1.1. High temperature alarm TAH-0193 at the outlet of E-111; 1.1.2. PSV-0241 provided (sizing and type to be decided by Tank Vendor); 1.1.3. Low low level alarm LALL-0202 provided at bottom of regenerator will close SDV-0201 Recommendations (HAZOP): 14. The protection of the tank against gas breakthrough and fire case needs to be reviewed by JV with Vendor Initial Response:
Final Resolution:
Date:
ERM Risk Annex G
30 of 73
Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0115 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0116 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0117 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0120 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0122 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0123 Rev O Node: 6. Regenerator bottom circuit including reboiler Deviation: 13. Low Level Cause: 3. Inadvertent opening of drain line upstream of SDV-0201 Consequence: 3.3. Potential over-temperature of underground piping which will cause piping failure Safeguard: 3.3.1. Drain Valve to sump drum is CSC Recommendations (HAZOP): 19. Confirm the max. allowable temp in the drain header (based on drain piping design)and this may be mentioned in the operating procedure Initial Response:
Final Resolution:
Date:
ERM Risk Annex G
31 of 73
Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0115 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0116 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0117 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0120 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0122 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0123 Rev O Node: 6. Regenerator bottom circuit including reboiler Deviation: 13. Low Level Cause: 5. Inadvertent opening of condensate drum drain valve Consequence: 5.2. Potential over-temperature of underground piping which will cause piping failure Safeguard: 5.2.1. Drain Valve to sump drum is CSC; 5.2.2. Sea water injection provided for cooling which must be used in any case for hot draining Recommendations (HAZOP): 19. Confirm the max. allowable temp in the drain header (based on drain piping design)and this may be mentioned in the operating procedure Initial Response:
Final Resolution:
Date:
ERM Risk Annex G
32 of 73
Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0115 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0116 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0117 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0118 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0120 Rev O Node: 6. Regenerator bottom circuit including reboiler Deviation: 16. Start-up/Shutdown/Maintenance Hazards Cause: 1. Improper warming up Consequence: 1.1. Thermal shock may cause leakage through joints (eg flanges etc) Safeguard: 1.1.1. None identified Recommendations (HAZOP): 12. Operating manual to address warming up procedures for reboiler E-112 Initial Response:
Final Resolution:
Date:
ERM Risk Annex G
33 of 73
Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0101 Rev 3, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0112 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0114 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0120 Rev O Node: 7. Lean storage tank and pumping system Deviation: 1. No/ Less flow Cause: 3. FIC-0243 malfunctions and closes FV-0243 Consequence: 3.2. Increase in CO2 content and hence flash gas shall not be routed to boilers Safeguard: 3.2.1. None identified Recommendations (HAZOP): 15. Provide independent transmitter with low low flow alarm with interlock to close SDV-0007 Initial Response:
Final Resolution:
Date:
ERM Risk Annex G
34 of 73
Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0101 Rev 3, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0112 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0114 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0115 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0116 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0120 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0122 Rev O Node: 7. Lean storage tank and pumping system Deviation: 2. More Flow Cause: 2. FIC-0243 malfunctions and opens FV-0243 fully Consequence: 2.1. Carry-over of amine with flash gas to boilers. Safeguard: 2.1.1. Refer to HAZOP of Unit 121 Recommendations (HAZOP): 5. Review the requirement of amine removal facilities in the boiler area in Unit 121 Initial Response:
Final Resolution:
Date:
ERM Risk Annex G
35 of 73
Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0101 Rev 3, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0112 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0114 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0120 Rev O Node: 7. Lean storage tank and pumping system Deviation: 2. More Flow Cause: 4. FIC-0183 malfunctions and opens FV-0183 fully Consequence: 4.3. Lower flow of lean amine to absorber affecting the performance Safeguard: 4.3.1. Low level alarm LAL-0241 provided on storage tank; 4.3.2. Low low level alarm LALL-0242 with interlock SD-204 which will shutdown unit; 4.3.3. Low flow alarm FAL-0241; 4.3.4. High flow alarm FAH-245 provided at pump discharge; 4.3.5. FALL-0246 with interlock SD-203 which shutdown unit Recommendations (HAZOP): 31. Review the actuation of FV-0183 by HV instead of FIC-0183. Initial Response:
Final Resolution:
Date:
ERM Risk Annex G
36 of 73
Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0101 Rev 3, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0112 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0114 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0120 Rev O Node: 7. Lean storage tank and pumping system Deviation: 5. Low Pressure Cause: 5. Loss of seal in tank Consequence: 5.1. Tank may get depressurised and ingress of air may take place which will degrade the solvent. Safeguard: 5.1.1. None identified Recommendations (HAZOP): 16. Operating procedure to include seal maintenance using cold condensate in solvent storage tank. Initial Response:
Final Resolution:
Date:
ERM Risk Annex G
37 of 73
Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0101 Rev 3, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0112 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0114 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0120 Rev O Node: 7. Lean storage tank and pumping system Deviation: 8. High Level Cause: 4. Inadvertent opening of cold condensate valve Consequence: 4.1. This will lead to high level in the tank , diluting the solvent solution. This will affect the performance of absorber Safeguard: 4.1.1. Two isolation valves provided Recommendations (HAZOP): 17. Operating procedures to include use of condensate in the tank Initial Response:
Final Resolution:
Date:
ERM Risk Annex G
38 of 73
Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0101 Rev 3, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0112 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0114 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0115 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0116 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0118 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0120 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0122 Rev O Node: 7. Lean storage tank and pumping system Deviation: 10. Contamination/ Additional Phase Cause: 1. Corrosion material (iron sulphide) present in the pipeline and degraded amine Consequence: 1.1. This may lead to foaming and carry-over of amine to D-114. Safeguard: 1.1.1. Filtration package is provided to remove any iron sulphide particles; 1.1.2. Provision for injection of antifoam Recommendations (HAZOP): 2. Operating procedure to include chemical cleaning of the system prior to start-up. Initial Response:
Final Resolution:
Date:
ERM Risk Annex G
39 of 73
Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0122 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0123 Rev O Node: 10. Sump drum Deviation: 4. High Pressure Cause: 1. Gas Blowby thru drain line from connected equipment Consequence: 1.1. Potential overpressure causing possible rupture of drum Safeguard: 1.1.1. Sump drum vent open to flare through CSO valve . Drum designed for 3.5 barg and full vacuum Recommendations (HAZOP): 18. Confirm the vent line of sump drum D-117 is sized for gas blowby (assuming maximum drain valve size and maximum pressure u/s) , maximum liquid inflow (for flashing gas and blocked condition)and vaporisation(if any) Initial Response:
Final Resolution:
Date:
ERM Risk Annex G
40 of 73
Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0122 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0123 Rev O Node: 10. Sump drum Deviation: 4. High Pressure Cause: 2. Vaporisation of liquid in the sump drum due to live steam (live steam provided mainly for stripping of CO2 from amine) Consequence: 2.1. Potential overpressure causing possible rupture of drum Safeguard: 2.1.1. Sump drum vent open to flare through CSO valve. Drum designed for 3.5 barg and full vacuum; 2.1.2. RO-0261 provided in the steam line to restrict steam flow Recommendations (HAZOP): 18. Confirm the vent line of sump drum D-117 is sized for gas blowby (assuming maximum drain valve size and maximum pressure u/s) , maximum liquid inflow (for flashing gas and blocked condition)and vaporisation(if any) Initial Response:
Final Resolution:
Date:
ERM Risk Annex G
41 of 73
Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0122 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0123 Rev O Node: 10. Sump drum Deviation: 4. High Pressure Cause: 3. Flash gas due to draining of amine from high pressure sources Consequence: 3.1. Potential overpressure causing possible rupture of drum Safeguard: 3.1.1. Sump drum vent open to flare through CSO valve. Drum designed for 3.5 barg and full vacuum Recommendations (HAZOP): 18. Confirm the vent line of sump drum D-117 is sized for gas blowby (assuming maximum drain valve size and maximum pressure u/s) , maximum liquid inflow (for flashing gas and blocked condition)and vaporisation(if any) Initial Response:
Final Resolution:
Date:
ERM Risk Annex G
42 of 73
Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0115 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0116 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0117 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0120 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0122 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0123 Rev O Node: 10. Sump drum Deviation: 6. More Temperature Cause: 1. High temp liquid drained from u/s equipment. Consequence: 1.1. High temp material may cause damage to the buried piping coating and wrapping, although piping material itself is designed for same pressure as upstream up to the isolation valve at drum inlet (although CSO valve is provided ) Safeguard: 1.1.1. Procedure to drain liquid only after cooling. Drain drum designed for 210 deg C; 1.1.2. All drains are CSC Recommendations (HAZOP): 19. Confirm the max. allowable temp in the drain header (based on drain piping design)and this may be mentioned in the operating procedure Initial Response:
Final Resolution:
Date:
ERM Risk Annex G
43 of 73
Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0122 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0123 Rev O Node: 10. Sump drum Deviation: 8. High Level Cause: 1. Liquid drained from u/s equipment without ensuring sump drum has sufficient capacity to hold the drain liquid - Misoperation Consequence: 1.1. Potential overfilling and overpressure. Carry over of liquid to flare Safeguard: 1.1.1. LI-0262 with high level alarm provided; 1.1.2. LI-0261 with high level alarm provided; 1.1.3. Sump drum vent open to flare through CSO valve. Drum designed for 3.5 barg; 1.1.4. Sump pump P-115 provided to empty out sump drum content Recommendations (HAZOP): 18. Confirm the vent line of sump drum D-117 is sized for gas blowby (assuming maximum drain valve size and maximum pressure u/s) , maximum liquid inflow (for flashing gas and blocked condition)and vaporisation(if any) Initial Response:
Final Resolution:
Date:
ERM Risk Annex G
44 of 73
Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0122 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0123 Rev O Node: 10. Sump drum Deviation: 8. High Level Cause: 1. Liquid drained from u/s equipment without ensuring sump drum has sufficient capacity to hold the drain liquid - Misoperation Consequence: 1.1. Potential overfilling and overpressure. Carry over of liquid to flare Safeguard: 1.1.1. LI-0262 with high level alarm provided; 1.1.2. LI-0261 with high level alarm provided; 1.1.3. Sump drum vent open to flare through CSO valve. Drum designed for 3.5 barg; 1.1.4. Sump pump P-115 provided to empty out sump drum content Recommendations (HAZOP): 20. Procedure to govern draining operation for sump drum Initial Response:
Final Resolution:
Date:
ERM Risk Annex G
45 of 73
Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0122 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0123 Rev O Node: 10. Sump drum Deviation: 8. High Level Cause: 3. Cold condensate valve open Consequence: 3.1. Same as Deviation 8, Cause 1,Conseq. 1.1 Safeguard: Recommendations (HAZOP): 40. Cold condensate is provided for washing of drum prior to maintenance. Utility points are provided for connecting utility water hoses. Consider deleting hard-piped connection for cold condensate, Initial Response:
Final Resolution:
Date:
ERM Risk Annex G
46 of 73
Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0122 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0123 Rev O Node: 10. Sump drum Deviation: 14. Others Cause: 1. Corrosion in P-115 discharge piping. Under stagnant condition, presence of water with CO2 may lead to corrosion(piping is CS + 3mm CA) Consequence: 1.1. Potential pipe leak Safeguard: 1.1.1. Periodic monitoring. 1.1.2. Procedure to drain the piping after transfer Recommendations (HAZOP): 42. On pump P-115 discharge, there are 2 drain lines provided (without any isolation valve in between). The drain line (3/4"-AM.116.100103-B03N-N) may be deleted. Initial Response:
Final Resolution:
Date:
ERM Risk Annex G
47 of 73
Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0122 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0123 Rev O Node: 10. Sump drum Deviation: 14. Others Cause: 2. Internal coating fails at high temperature. Consequence: 2.1. Corrosion leading to damage to the drum Safeguard: 2.1.1. None identified Recommendations (HAZOP): 21. Ensure the coating material is compatible with the maximum operating temp of the sump drum.(eg steam-out condition) Initial Response:
Final Resolution:
Date:
ERM Risk Annex G
48 of 73
Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0122 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0123 Rev O Node: 10. Sump drum Deviation: 14. Others Cause: 3. Evacuation of sump drum Consequence: 3.1. Possibility of contamination of amine due to high CO2 content Safeguard: 3.1.1. None identified Recommendations (HAZOP): 22. Operating procedure to strip amine through the use of live steam and sampling before evacuation Initial Response:
Final Resolution:
Date:
ERM Risk Annex G
49 of 73
Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0122 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0123 Rev O Node: 10. Sump drum Deviation: 14. Others Cause: 4. Improper blanketing of sump drum Consequence: 4.1. Constant loss of fuel gas to flare and blanketing is not achieved. Safeguard: 4.1.1. None identified Recommendations (HAZOP): 39. Review the deletion of fuel gas connection to the drum so that the drum floats with flare header which has relevant protection like continuous sweeping. Initial Response:
Final Resolution:
Date:
ERM Risk Annex G
50 of 73
Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0114 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0118 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0123 Rev O Node: 11. Hydrocarbon skim drum Deviation: 4. High Pressure Cause: 1. Fuel gas by pass open Consequence: 1.1. Pressurisation of D-116 and loss of fuel gas to flare. Safeguard: 1.1.1. Connection to flare provided; 1.1.2. Operating procedure for draining. Recommendations (HAZOP): 23. Bypass valve for fuel gas rotameter FG-0101 to be made CSC Initial Response:
Final Resolution:
Date:
ERM Risk Annex G
51 of 73
Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0114 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0118 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0123 Rev O Node: 11. Hydrocarbon skim drum Deviation: 4. High Pressure Cause: 1. Fuel gas by pass open Consequence: 1.1. Pressurisation of D-116 and loss of fuel gas to flare. Safeguard: 1.1.1. Connection to flare provided; 1.1.2. Operating procedure for draining. Recommendations (HAZOP): 24. Review relocation of RO-0091 to downstream of bypass junction. Initial Response:
Final Resolution:
Date:
ERM Risk Annex G
52 of 73
Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0114 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0118 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0123 Rev O Node: 11. Hydrocarbon skim drum Deviation: 4. High Pressure Cause: 1. Fuel gas by pass open Consequence: 1.1. Pressurisation of D-116 and loss of fuel gas to flare. Safeguard: 1.1.1. Connection to flare provided; 1.1.2. Operating procedure for draining. Recommendations (HAZOP): 41. Consider deleting the fuel gas connection to D-116. The drum can float with flare. Initial Response:
Final Resolution:
Date:
ERM Risk Annex G
53 of 73
Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0114 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0118 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0123 Rev O Node: 11. Hydrocarbon skim drum Deviation: 5. Low Pressure Cause: 1. Wrong procedure adopted during draining. Flare valve and fuel gas valve closed Consequence: 1.1. Possible vacuum formation in the drum. Safeguard: 1.1.1. Drum is designed for full vacuum Recommendations (HAZOP): 25. Procedures for skimming/draining to be included in operating manual. Initial Response:
Final Resolution:
Date:
ERM Risk Annex G
54 of 73
Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0114 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0118 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0123 Rev O Node: 11. Hydrocarbon skim drum Deviation: 14. Others Cause: 1. No liquid HC condensation Consequence: 1.1. Skimming facilities will not be useful Safeguard: Recommendations (HAZOP): 38. Consider deleting hydrocarbon skimming facilities along with skimming drum D-116.and associated piping Initial Response:
Final Resolution:
Date:
ERM Risk Annex G
55 of 73
Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0114 Rev O, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0124 Rev O Node: 12. Sulfrex lean transfer pumps Deviation: 1. No/ Less flow of lean solvent Cause: 4. ESDV-0281 closes/ SDV-0281 closes Consequence: 4.1. No supply of lean solvent to Unit 114 and high pressure upstream of ESDV-00281/SDV-0281 Safeguard: 4.1.1. Limit switch provided on ESDV-0281/SDV-0281; 4.1.2. High high pressure PAHH-0281A/B with interlock I-348 to trip pumps; 4.1.3. PSV-0281A/B provided Recommendations (HAZOP): 30. Review the requirement of two independent PAHH-0281 A and B. One PAHH in the common header shall serve the purpose. Initial Response:
Final Resolution:
Date:
ERM Risk Annex G
56 of 73
Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0101 Rev 3, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0102 Rev 3 Node: 14. Wet gas inlet to driers inlet separator including separator Deviation: 1. No/ Less flow Cause: 4. SDV-0001 on seawater inlet to E-101 fails close Consequence: 4.1. No flow of seawater to E-101 leading to higher temperature on ethane outlet due to loss of heat exchange Safeguard: 4.1.1. High temperature alarm TAL-0003 provided on outlet of E-101 Recommendations (HAZOP): 43. Delete SDV-0001/0002 on seawater line to E-101 and replaced by manual isolation valve. Initial Response:
Final Resolution:
Date:
ERM Risk Annex G
57 of 73
Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0101 Rev 3, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0102 Rev 3 Node: 14. Wet gas inlet to driers inlet separator including separator Deviation: 1. No/ Less flow Cause: 5. SDV-0002 on seawater outlet line fails close Consequence: 5.1. Blocked outlet on seawater side of E-101 causing overpressure and potential failure. Higher temperature on ethane outlet Safeguard: 5.1.1. High temperature alarm TAL-0003 provided on outlet of E-101; 5.1.2. TSV-0002 provided on seawater return line upstream of SDV-0002 Recommendations (HAZOP): 43. Delete SDV-0001/0002 on seawater line to E-101 and replaced by manual isolation valve. Initial Response:
Final Resolution:
Date:
ERM Risk Annex G
58 of 73
Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0101 Rev 3, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0102 Rev 3 Node: 14. Wet gas inlet to driers inlet separator including separator Deviation: 1. No/ Less flow Cause: 8. SDV-0005 fails close Consequence: 8.1. Same as Node 14, Deviation 1, Cause 6 Safeguard: Recommendations (HAZOP): 44. Delete SDV-0005 on ethane dryer inlet separator as SDV-0022 is also provided on the same line Initial Response:
Final Resolution:
Date:
ERM Risk Annex G
59 of 73
Unit 116 Ethane Treatment and Drying Action By:
Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0101 Rev 3, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0102 Rev 3 Node: 14. Wet gas inlet to driers inlet separator including separator Deviation: 5. Low Pressure Cause: 2. Low pressure from upstream Consequence: 2.1. Performance of drier will be affected and reduction of supply to petrochemical consumers Safeguard: 2.1.1. PIC-0046 will try to maintain pressure Recommendations (HAZOP): 45. Provide high and low pressure alarm for PIC-0046 Initial Response:
Final Resolution:
Date:
ERM Risk Annex G
60 of 73
Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0101 Rev 3, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0102 Rev 3 Node: 14. Wet gas inlet to driers inlet separator including separator Deviation: 5. Low Pressure Cause: 2. Low pressure from upstream Consequence: 2.1. Performance of drier will be affected and reduction of supply to petrochemical consumers Safeguard: 2.1.1. PIC-0046 will try to maintain pressure Recommendations (HAZOP): 47. Provide high and low pressure alarm for PI-0026 on D-101 overhead Initial Response:
Final Resolution:
Date:
ERM Risk Annex G
61 of 73
Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0101 Rev 3, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0102 Rev 3 Node: 14. Wet gas inlet to driers inlet separator including separator Deviation: 14. Others Cause: 1. Tube rupture in exchanger E-101 Consequence: 1.1. Gas will leak into seawater side pressurising sea water header and causing damage. Safeguard: 1.1.1. Design pressure of shell and tube side is same (39barg) Recommendations (HAZOP): 48. Check the suitability of seawater outlet line design pressure for tube leak case in E-101 Initial Response:
Final Resolution:
Date:
ERM Risk Annex G
62 of 73
Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0102 Rev 3, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0103 Rev 3, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0104 Rev 3 Node: 15. Treated gas from separator to export line to petrochemical inlet including molecular sieve driers Deviation: 1. No/ Less flow Cause: 1. Any of the drier inlet/outlet KVs fails and remains in close position when the bed switch over from standby mode to adsorption mode Consequence: 1.1. No through put. Loss of supply to petrochemical consumers. Safeguard: Recommendations (HAZOP): 32. Confirm that sequence logic is implemented is such a way that sequence control confirms the position of each valve at the end of each step before proceeding to next step. Sequence failure alarm will be generated in this case Initial Response:
Final Resolution:
Date:
ERM Risk Annex G
63 of 73
Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0102 Rev 3, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0103 Rev 3, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0104 Rev 3 Node: 15. Treated gas from separator to export line to petrochemical inlet including molecular sieve driers Deviation: 3. Reverse/Misdirected Flow Cause: 1. BDV-0036A/B malfunctions to open during the operation when bed is in line Consequence: 1.1. Loss of gas flow to flare. The flow of gas through the molecular sieve will increase which may lead to displacement of molecular sieve. This may also affect the molecular sieve support due to higher pressure drop Safeguard: 1.1.1. High differential pressure alarm PDAH-0034A/B provided on each drier; 1.1.2. Limit switch provided on BDV-0036A/B. Recommendations (HAZOP): 33. Review the requirement of strengthening of molecular sieve support for blowdown case when the flow through molecular sieve will be higher than the design flow rate. Drier vendor may be informed in this regard Initial Response:
Final Resolution:
Date:
ERM Risk Annex G
64 of 73
Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0102 Rev 3, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0103 Rev 3, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0104 Rev 3 Node: 15. Treated gas from separator to export line to petrochemical inlet including molecular sieve driers Deviation: 6. More Temperature Cause: 1. Manual misoperation- Operator tries to bring the bed in line without sufficient cooling Consequence: 1.1. Drier downstream piping can be subjected to high pressure and high temperature (piping class is D01 which is not designed for 39barg at 280degC which is the temperature of bed during regeneration). Possible damage to downstream piping and equipment. This will also lead to thermal shock to molecular sieves and damage Safeguard: 1.1.1. High temp alarm at TI-0031 provided on outlet of ethane regeneration line to gas cooler Recommendations (HAZOP): 49. Operating procedures to include manual operation to be done under close supervision. Initial Response:
Final Resolution:
Date:
ERM Risk Annex G
65 of 73
Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0102 Rev 3, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0103 Rev 3, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0104 Rev 3 Node: 15. Treated gas from separator to export line to petrochemical inlet including molecular sieve driers Deviation: 12. Start-up/Shutdown/Maintenance Hazards Cause: 1. Loading and unloading of molecular sieve Consequence: 1.1. Handling hazard Safeguard: Recommendations (HAZOP): 34. Confirm that loading and unloading procedure is in place to carryout loading and unloading of molecular sieve to / from driers. Also enough provision (like space for handling loading / unloading equipment) need to be ensured to facilitate loading and unloading Initial Response:
Final Resolution:
Date:
ERM Risk Annex G
66 of 73
Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0102 Rev 3, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0103 Rev 3, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0104 Rev 3 Node: 15. Treated gas from separator to export line to petrochemical inlet including molecular sieve driers Deviation: 14. Others Cause: 1. Single ball valve on the vent line of ethane filter Consequence: 1.1. Possibility of valve passing leading to HC leak to atmosphere Safeguard: Recommendations (HAZOP): 35. Review provision for isolation of vent by single ball valve in the ethane filter (under filter vender scope). This may be decided based on project specification Initial Response:
Final Resolution:
Date:
ERM Risk Annex G
67 of 73
Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0102 Rev 3, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0103 Rev 3, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0104 Rev 3 Node: 15. Treated gas from separator to export line to petrochemical inlet including molecular sieve driers Deviation: 14. Others Cause: 1. Single ball valve on the vent line of ethane filter Consequence: 1.1. Possibility of valve passing leading to HC leak to atmosphere Safeguard: Recommendations (HAZOP): 36. Consider specifying the 2" ball valve in the vent line on ethane filter as CSC type Initial Response:
Final Resolution:
Date:
ERM Risk Annex G
68 of 73
Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0103 Rev 3, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0104 Rev 3, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0105 Rev 3, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0106 Rev 3 Node: 16. Regeneration gas from dried gas outlet to regeneration compressor inlet, including cooling step after the regeneration of driers Deviation: 2. More Flow Cause: 2. LIC-0065 malfunctions and opens LV-0065 fully Consequence: 2.1. Loss of level in D-103 leading to potential gas breakthrough to D-104 causing overpressurisation and damage Safeguard: 2.1.1. Low low level LALL-0066 provided at D-103 with interlock I-347 which will close SDV-0065 and SDV-0076; 2.1.2. Vent with CSO valve provided on D-104 Recommendations (HAZOP): 50. The vent on ethane oily water flash drum D-104 to flare should be sized for gas breakthrough case. Initial Response:
Final Resolution:
Date:
ERM Risk Annex G
69 of 73
Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0103 Rev 3, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0104 Rev 3, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0105 Rev 3, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0106 Rev 3, (Unnamed) Node: 16. Regeneration gas from dried gas outlet to regeneration compressor inlet, including cooling step after the regeneration of driers Deviation: 13. Utility Failure Cause: 2. Instrument air failure: PV-0069, LV-0073, LV-0065, XV-0063, XV-0064, SDV-0081A/B. SDV-0065 and SDV-0076 are FC type BDV-0036A/B, BDV-0055 and ,SDV-0087A/B are FO type SDV-0087A/B are found not to be in order. Consequence: 2.1. Safeguard: Recommendations (HAZOP): 46. For SDV-0087A/B, it should be made fail close (FC) Initial Response:
Final Resolution:
Date:
ERM Risk Annex G
70 of 73
Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0103 Rev 3, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0104 Rev 3, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0105 Rev 3, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0106 Rev 3 Node: 16. Regeneration gas from dried gas outlet to regeneration compressor inlet, including cooling step after the regeneration of driers Deviation: 14. Others Cause: 1. Trip of compressor due to any reason Consequence: 1.1. Interlock leading to trip of compressor also close suction and discharge SDVs of compressor. However the anti-surge line for compressor is joining upstream of suction SDV. This may lead to compressor damage due to coast down surge Safeguard: Recommendations (HAZOP): 37. Consider closing the regeneration compressor suction SDV after a certain time delay of actuating compressor trip due to any reason. This may be confirmed based on compressor vendor requirement Initial Response:
Final Resolution:
Date:
ERM Risk Annex G
71 of 73
Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0103 Rev 3, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0104 Rev 3, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0105 Rev 3, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0106 Rev 3, Node: 17. Regeneration compressor discharge to wet gas inlet Deviation: 1. No/ Less flow Cause: 2. Inadvertent SDV-0087A/B closure Consequence: 2.2. High pressure / high temperature at the compressor discharge. Potential for compressor damage due to overpressure Safeguard: 2.2.1. Limit switch provided on SDV-0087A/B; 2.2.2. Anti-surge control provided for regeneration gas compressor ; 2.2.3. High high temperature TAHH-0085A/B provided on compressor discharge with interlock I-351A/B to trip compressor; 2.2.4. High high pressure PAHH-0085A/B provided on compressor discharge with interlock I-351A/B to trip compressor; 2.2.5. Relief valve provided on compressor discharge sized for blocked outlet case Recommendations (HAZOP): 46. For SDV-0087A/B, it should be made fail close (FC) Initial Response:
Final Resolution:
Date:
ERM Risk Annex G
72 of 73
Drawings: P&ID 1516-116-0030-0103 Rev 3, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0104 Rev 3, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0105 Rev 3, P&ID 1516-116-0030-0106 Rev 3, Node: 17. Regeneration compressor discharge to wet gas inlet Deviation: 13. Utility Failure Cause: 2. Instrument air failure : SDV-0087A/B, FV-0082A/B, BDV-0089 are FO type Failure position of SDV-0087A/B is not in order Consequence: 2.1. Safeguard: Recommendations (HAZOP): 46. For SDV-0087A/B, it should be made fail close (FC) Initial Response:
Final Resolution:
Date:
ERM Risk Annex G
73 of 73
Annex H
HAZOP Master P&IDs

Sepanir South Pars Unit 116 - Report

Transféré par

Informations du document

Description originale:

Titre original

Copyright

Formats disponibles

Partager ce document

Partager ou intégrer le document

Options de partage

Avez-vous trouvé ce document utile ?

Ce contenu est-il inapproprié ?

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

Sepanir South Pars Unit 116 - Report

Transféré par

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

FINAL REPORT

Sepanir Oil & Gas Energy Engineering Company

Sepanir Oil & Gas Energy Engineering Company

______________________________ 08- Aug -2008 ________________________________

1 1.1 1.2 1.3 2

SOUTH PARS GAS FIELD DEVELOPMENT PHASES 15 &16 ONSHORE FACILITIES

INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE OF WORK

SOUTH PARS GAS FIELD DEVELOPMENT PHASES 15 &16 ONSHORE FACILITIES

SOUTH PARS GAS FIELD DEVELOPMENT PHASES 15 &16 ONSHORE FACILITIES

SOUTH PARS GAS FIELD DEVELOPMENT PHASES 15 &16 ONSHORE FACILITIES

Package /Item Anti foam Package

Relevant P&ID Nos 1516-0116-0030-0121

Regeneration Control System

SOUTH PARS GAS FIELD DEVELOPMENT PHASES 15 &16 ONSHORE FACILITIES

SOUTH PARS GAS FIELD DEVELOPMENT PHASES 15 &16 ONSHORE FACILITIES

HAZOP BASIS AND REFERENCED DOCUMENTATION

SOUTH PARS GAS FIELD DEVELOPMENT PHASES 15 &16 ONSHORE FACILITIES

HAZOP Guidewords/ Parameters and Related Deviations

High Level Contamination/ Composition Change Start-up/ Shutdown /Maintenance Hazards

High As well as Others

SOUTH PARS GAS FIELD DEVELOPMENT PHASES 15 &16 ONSHORE FACILITIES

Deviations Utility Failure

Guide Word Others

Comment Includes air, power, cooling water, nitrogen etc.

SOUTH PARS GAS FIELD DEVELOPMENT PHASES 15 &16 ONSHORE FACILITIES

SOUTH PARS GAS FIELD DEVELOPMENT PHASES 15 &16 ONSHORE FACILITIES

SOUTH PARS GAS FIELD DEVELOPMENT PHASES 15 &16 ONSHORE FACILITIES

CONCLUSIONS & FOLLOW UP

List of Recommendations for Reception Facilities (Unit 116)

SOUTH PARS GAS FIELD DEVELOPMENT PHASES 15 &16 ONSHORE FACILITIES

Place(s) Used Consequences : 5.15.1.1 Consequences : 4.1.5.2

SOUTH PARS GAS FIELD DEVELOPMENT PHASES 15 &16 ONSHORE FACILITIES

SOUTH PARS GAS FIELD DEVELOPMENT PHASES 15 &16 ONSHORE FACILITIES

Place(s) Used Consequences : 1.4.2.1, 1.8.5.1

SOUTH PARS GAS FIELD DEVELOPMENT PHASES 15 &16 ONSHORE FACILITIES

Place(s) Used Consequences : 16.14.1.1

SOUTH PARS GAS FIELD DEVELOPMENT PHASES 15 &16 ONSHORE FACILITIES

Place(s) Used Consequences : 11.4.1.1

SOUTH PARS GAS FIELD DEVELOPMENT PHASES 15 &16 ONSHORE FACILITIES

SOUTH PARS GAS FIELD DEVELOPMENT PHASES 15 &16 ONSHORE FACILITIES

Risk Ranking Methodology

Unit 116 Ethane Treatment and Drying

Risk Ranking Metholodogy

Minimal equipment damage, < 1 day loss of production

Release with no agency notification or permit violation.

Serious permanent injury to one or more persons, death to one person

Death to several people (1 to 5 fatalities)

Severe equipment damage, >7 to <30 days loss of production

Significant release with offsite impact.

Catastrophic (more than 5 fatalities)/Offsite fatality

Total destruction of some process areas, > 1 month loss of production

Significant release with serious long term off-site impact

ERM Risk Annex A

South Pars Gas Field Development Phases 15 &16 Onshore Facilities

Unit 116 Ethane Treatment and Drying

Risk Ranking Metholodogy

Guidelines for assigning Safety Consequence Severity

Unit 116 Ethane Treatment and Drying

Risk Ranking Metholodogy

Rule Set for Frequency of Demand

1.E-02 1.E-01 1.E-01 1.E-02

W1 W2 W2 W1 (<100 tubes) W2 (>100 tubes)

08- Aug -2008 __