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Journal of Operations Management 24 (2005) 2752 www.elsevier.
com/locate/jom
Suppliersupplier relationships in the buyersupplier triad: Building theories from eight case studies
Zhaohui Wu a,*, Thomas Y. Choi b
a
Department of Management, College of Business, Oregon State University, 200 Bexell Hall, Corvallis, OR 97331-2603, USA b Department of Supply Chain Management, W.P. Carey School of Business, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ 85287-4706, USA
Received 1 March 2002; received in revised form 1 December 2004; accepted 1 February 2005 Available online 6 June 2005
Abstract Many researchers have studied how the buying company manages its relationship with suppliers (i.e. buyersupplier relationship). Extending this genre of study, researchers have recently shown interest in investigating how the buying company manages relationships between the suppliers (i.e. suppliersupplier relationship). In other words, just as the relationship with the suppliers does, the relationships between suppliers have strategic implications for the buyer. We present in this study eight cases that describe suppliersupplier relationship dynamics. Using theory building through case studies, we identify ve archetypes of suppliersupplier relationships. Each type of relationship is a unique conguration of the relational characteristics. We also present working propositions that associate the antecedent conditions that lead to these archetypes and eventual performance implications. # 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Suppliersupplier relationships; Buyersupplier relationships; Supply chain management; Archetypes; Operations strategy; Case studies
How a buying company manages its relationship(s) with suppliers has interested many researchers (e.g. Ellram and Hendrick, 1995; Heide and John, 1990; Helper, 1991; Holm et al., 1999; Youssef, 1992). These studies have focused on how a buyer establishes different types of relationship with the suppliers. Further, the researchers have begun considering how a buyer also establishes different types of relationship
* Corresponding author. E-mail address: Zhaohui.Wu@bus.oregonstate.edu (Z. Wu).
between the suppliers (Choi et al., 2002; Kamath and Liker, 1994). In some situations, suppliers are asked to work together; in others, they are expected to keep away from each other (Asanuma, 1985; Funk, 1993). Simply, the relationship between the suppliers matters to the buyer in how it inuences and correlates to future business success. However, past studies omit a systematic consideration of the suppliersupplier relationship based on empirical data. Using a grounded theory-building approach, we collected and analyzed the qualitative
0272-6963/$ see front matter # 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.jom.2005.02.001
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Z. Wu, T.Y. Choi / Journal of Operations Management 24 (2005) 2752
data from eight cases involving a buyer and its suppliers. We identied ve archetypes of supplier supplier relationship and built working propositions. In this paper, we will rst review the literature of buyersupplier relationships and suppliersupplier relationships. We will then discuss how we collected the case data and made our analysis. Next, we present within-case descriptions, followed by cross-case comparisons. Following the analysis, we present the archetypes, delineate the key propositions, and conclude with a discussion.
1. Literature review 1.1. Buyersupplier relationship The extant literature on buyersupplier relationship explores the vertical relationship between a buyer and suppliers (Ellram and Hendrick, 1995; Helper, 1991) or between a manufacturer and its distributors (Anderson and Narus, 1990). This dyadic, one-rm versus the-other framework offers a parsimonious abstraction of the inter-rm relationship. In general, the dyadic relationship of a buyer and the supplier has been characterized in the literature in terms of cooperative versus competitive relationships (Choi et al., 2002). The cooperative relationship emphasizes the state of openness and collaboration between a buyer and a supplier; the competitive relationship focuses more on the practice of information guarding and arms-length relationship. On the one hand, a cooperative relationship leads the buyer and suppliers to consider each other as strategic partners and work toward a common goal (Hahn et al., 1990; Hartley et al., 1997). On the other hand, a buyer and supplier engage in competitive relationship because they are concerned about their own economic risks. Whenever a transaction occurs between a buyer and a supplier, both parties are necessarily concerned about the potential risks associated with the transaction and what that might mean to their relationship (Pilkington, 1999; Walker and Poppo, 1991; Walker and Weber, 1987; Williamson, 1979). Helper (1991) pointed out how the buyersupplier relationship in the U.S. automobile was rst dominated by the cooperative relationship, subsequently moved to competitive relationship, and then reverted back to the
cooperative relationship. Other studies corroborated her assertions about how, in recent years, more buying rms in the United States have favored cooperative relationships with their key suppliers (Cusumano and Takeishi, 1991; Heide and John, 1990; Kerwin, 1998). This historic backdrop is quite understandable, given that the level of outsourcing to suppliers has increased in recent years and, consequently, the buying companies have placed increased importance on the relationship with suppliers. Likewise, a remarkable progress has been made in the buyersupplier relationship studies over the past two decades (Carter et al., 1998). We have seen research evolve from reporting anecdotal best practices to using sophisticated case studies (Burnes and New, 1997; Ellram and Edis-Owen, 1996) and statistical methods (Anderson and Narus, 1990; Monczka et al., 1998). The researchers studying buyersupplier relationships have sought theoretical support from other disciplines such as a political economy framework (Stern and Reve, 1980), social network research (Gulati, 1998; Holm et al., 1999) and complexity theory (Choi et al., 2001). One signicant trend that has been emerging from all these advanced studies is that the buyersupplier relationship context should move beyond the traditional dyadic context and begin to consider more complex dynamics of relational networks. As a rst step, a few researchers (e.g. Olsen and Ellram, 1997; Smith and LaageHellman, 1992) have proposed expanding the dyadic buyersupplier relationship studies to a triadic context, where buyersuppliersupplier relational dynamics can be considered. 1.2. Suppliersupplier relationship Our research found the rst explicit reference to the suppliersupplier relationship from the work of Asanuma (1985). He explained, using anecdotal evidence, how some Japanese buying companies bring competing suppliers to work together in some situations, while in some other situations they keep the suppliers away from each other to promote competition. Later, Kamath and Liker (1994) pointed out how some Japanese automakers bring together competing suppliers not for collaboration but for competition. The buying companies would invite two groups of guest engineers from two different suppliers to
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compete side-by-side to see who could come up with a better design. Such anecdotal evidence points to the importance of considering suppliersupplier relationships. Accordingly, there have been studies that investigated the dynamics of multiple suppliers and their implications to the buyer. For instance, some researchers have discussed the buyers sourcing strategy involving dual sources or parallel sources (e.g. Richardson, 1993). Among implications, these studies found that a dyadic relational link between a buyer and a supplier operates differently when there are two or more competing suppliers involved in the relationship. At a casual glance, then, it may appear that the suppliers in the buyersuppliersupplier triad necessarily entail a straightforward competing relationship, i.e. a relationship between two suppliers who simply compete as the market prescribes. However, scholars have recognized that this relationship can be much more complex. Competition typically entails something much more than a rivalry between suppliers (Dyer, 1996; Fujimoto, 1999; Harryson, 1997; Kamath and Liker, 1994; Miyashita and Russell, 1994). For example, when negotiating for a new contract, a buyer can bring together two competing suppliers to collaborate and develop the initial broadbased terms of the contract, but then separately negotiate with each supplier for the detailed terms (Asanuma, 1994). Two suppliers can be pressured to collaborate on various projects and yet are expected to compete against each other. Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1996) described this type of competing and cooperating relationship as coopetition. Later, Choi et al. (2002) included coopetitive relationship as one of the three theoretical types of suppliersupplier relationship. They discussed the challenges the buying company typically faces when managing the relationship between two competing suppliers. For instance, Cross (1995) illustrated a situation where British Petroleum (BP) faced difculty because its suppliers were reluctant to work together, even though their working together was imperative to meeting their commitments. Choi et al. (2002) tried to grasp the complex dynamics of suppliersupplier relationship by proposing three theoretical relational types: cooperative, competitive and co-opetitive. The objective of their study was to theoretically capture the relational
characteristics between competing suppliers and how contingent aspects of these characteristics affect the buying companys performance. At the same time, they called for more empirical studies to develop a deeper understanding of the suppliersupplier relationship. In essence, our study is a response to their call. We took an inductive mode of collecting data (e.g. Eisenhardt, 1989) and conducted an empirical study based on real-world cases to investigate how these relational dynamics play out in practice.
2. Methods Our objective was to investigate and build theories of suppliersupplier relationship. We rst tried to empirically classify suppliersupplier relationships, and then to build propositions that capture supplier supplier relationship dynamics. Classication has been recognized as a way to build theories, often referenced as the conguration method (Bailey, 1994; Doty and Glick, 1994). Researchers in the operations management have begun using such methods to understand complex organizational phenomena (e.g. Boyer et al., 2000; Bozarth and McDermott, 1998). Further, the propositions we derive will be grounded in empirical evidence and show relationships among the emergent constructs. Consequently, our study adopted the grounded theory building approach (e.g. Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Strauss and Corbin, 1990). More specically, the principles of theory building based on case studies were adopted (Eisenhardt, 1989; McCutcheon and Meridith, 1993; Miles and Huberman, 1994; Yin, 1994). Since we were exploring a relatively new research area, study of cases was deemed appropriate (McCutcheon and Meridith, 1993; Yin, 1994). The case study data were collected throughout the year 2001. Interviewees came from the buying rms as well as their supplier rms. Getting the data from multiple sources gave us the opportunity to triangulate the information we were collecting (Eisenhardt, 1989; Miles and Huberman, 1994). Usually several rounds of interviews were conducted through site visits or telephone calls, the time it took for one interview generally ranged from 45 minutes to 2 hours. Unclear answers were claried through email or in follow-up questions in subsequent rounds.
30 Table 1 Overview of sample rms Buyer company Coach Flip-Flop Buyer company prole
Products or services purchased Peripheral electronic components Specialized molding parts
Product or service characteristics Production material Buyer-designed Production material Buyer designed Supplier-designed production process Production material Buyer designed Supplier-designed production process Service process owned by the suppliers Commodity items Capital equipment Supplier-designed Capital equipment Supplier-designed Transportation service Standard service, little customisation Production material Buyer designed Supplier-designed production process
Number of suppliers considered 2 2
Number of interviews with buyer 6 4
Number of interviews with suppliers 0a 0a
Major micro-processor manufacturer Assembler of telecommunications products Major system manufacturer in aerospace industry Telecommunications equipment manufacturer and service provider Micro-controller producer Major US automaker Major pharmaceutical company Provider of semiconductor packaging and testing
Hands-off
Machined components
14
Mediator
Logistics services
Organizer Plotter Puppeteer
Testing equipment Vehicle tooling systems Package delivery services Substrates
9 2 2
3 3 3
1 3 1
Risk-minimizer
a In these cases, the buyer refused to provide the names of the suppliers due to their condentiality agreement with the suppliers. In return, we were offered opportunity to interview more people from the buying rm to collect data on suppliers.
Table 1 offers an overview of the rms that were included in our study. Per request from these companies, ctitious names are used to ensure anonymity. We tried to use a name that captures some aspect of the relational dynamics unique to that particular buying company and its suppliersupplier relationship arrangements. 2.1. Sampling We adopted a theoretical sampling method (Eisenhardt, 1989; McCutcheon and Meridith, 1993; Miles and Huberman, 1994). First, we set out to select companies with leading purchasing practices so that the propositions will have practical value for other companies. We identied these leading companies from Purchasing Today, Fortune and The Wall Street
Journal. Eighteen companies were initially selected and contacted. Eight companies were eventually used for this study. The nal selection was made based on the types of product that the company purchased, as discussed in the next paragraph. Eisenhardt (1989) recommended about seven cases as being ideal for theory-building purposes, if less, the study might suffer from lack of generalizability, but if too many, the researchers would not be able to process the qualitative data. Because case-based studies generally lack external validity (Eisenhardt, 1989; McCutcheon and Meridith, 1993), we wanted to include a wide spectrum of product purchases in our study. To accomplish this, we used a well-known purchasing product matrix (Kraljic, 1983; Olsen and Ellram, 1997). We selected products to ll all four quadrants of the matrix.
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Fig. 1. Product sampling based on purchasing matrix.
Furthermore, to address the issue of external validity, we wanted to include at least a few service purchase items. Also, in order to increase variance in the data, we selected cases that clearly fell into one of the four quadrants in the purchasing matrix. Fig. 1 illustrates the purchasing matrix and shows the names of the eight product items, which represent eight cases. The strategic importance dimension refers to whether the purchase accounts for a signicant expenditure of a company and to what extent the purchased component would affect the production of the companys end product. The supply risk dimension refers to the availability of supply sources that can be easily switched. For instance, testing equipment cost about half a million dollars a piece, and there were only nine potential suppliers in the world. Therefore, testing equipment was placed in the strategic items category. Also, for package delivery services, there were ample potential suppliers for this item (e.g. low switching cost), and the total dollar spent by the buying company on this service was low. Therefore, it was placed under the non-critical items category. 2.2. Data collection A semi-structured interview tool was developed largely based on the tool used in the case study research by Choi and Hong (2002); we had obtained a copy in 2000 prior to its publication in 2002. Their study, like ours, focused on relational issues within a supply network. Our interview tool is attached at the end of this paper (see Appendix A). This interview tool stipulates a triadic relational context. We asked the buyer to identify at least two suppliers, because that is the minimum number
required to study a triadic relational context. Therefore, our unit of reference is the buyersupplier supplier triad, and our unit of analysis is supplier supplier dyad in a given triad. The two suppliers were initially chosen based on the following two criteria: (1) they needed to be competitors in the same market niche (e.g. they have similar production capability and product offerings) and (2) they had to be major suppliers to the buying company in terms of the dollars spent. We also allowed the data collection to move beyond the two suppliers when the situation naturally led us to consider multiple suppliers (e.g. the suppliersupplier dynamics could not be fully understood unless multiple suppliers were considered). As will be discussed further, there were in fact two cases where multiple suppliers were considered (see Table 1). The rst point of contact at the buying company had the title of purchasing director, VP of purchasing or manufacturing director. We explained initially the research objectives and discussed the purchasing contexts of the products that we had in mind. If the identied product and purchasing scenario t the research context, the director would then be interviewed. He/she then introduced the purchasing manager(s) who directly managed the identied products and associated suppliers. These purchasing managers were typically in charge of supplier selection, price negotiations and maintaining the relationship with the suppliers. After that, we asked the purchasing managers to introduce other relevant people in the buying company. These people were often mentioned in the interviews and also had intimate knowledge of the identied suppliers or particular issues (e.g. buyer, on-site quality engineer). The purchasing managers also introduced to us the contacts at the supplier companies. All interviews were recorded and transcribed into a written document. These documents were subsequently sent back to the interviewees to check for accuracy. The informants in the supply companies included account managers in sales, business owners and/or VP of operations. These people were identied by the informants at the buying company as having intimate knowledge of the product being supplied and its ` market vis-a-vis competing suppliers. Typically, they were the contact points the people at the buying company interacted with on a regular basis. Fre-
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quently, we were introduced to additional informants, such as chief engineer or sales staff for interviews. In order to ensure internal consistency of the data, plant tours were conducted in all plants visited. Plant tours provided the contextual information and indepth understanding of the products, and these observations made during the plant tour were used to triangulate the interview data. Documents from the buying companies were also collected and analyzed. These documents included performance report, annual report, major strategic meeting memos and news releases related to the focal product of this study. Therefore, the data triangulation was accomplished through having multiple respondents from different companies and through different sources of data (interviews, observation and documentation). 2.3. Data analysis Data were collected, coded and analyzed. The researchers coded the transcripts and compared the coding. Data collection stopped when additional data would not provide new information to our understanding of the research question, this marked the theoretical saturation point (Eisenhardt, 1989; Glaser and Strauss, 1967). Following the procedure by Miles and Huberman (1994), we rst conducted within-case analysis, where the case studies were built based on data and key constructs were derived. Basically, we identied the buyer and suppliers supply strategy and the relationship dynamics between suppliers in a supply arrangement. Then, the cross-case analysis was conducted. We show the results of within-case and cross-case analyses in the next two sections. When culling the archetypes from the data (Doty and Glick, 1994), each researcher independently grouped the cases into different types. Then, any discrepancies were overcome through long discussions. The inter-rater agreement is computed by taking the ratio of number of agreements and total number of items (Miles and Huberman, 1994).
cases used in this study. Each case is written based on the key data nuggets we obtained through data triangulations, it describes the case in a way that is as internally consistent and is compiled as objectively as possible with minimal subjective interpretations. Each case opens with some background information, then it proceeds to discuss product characteristics, buyers strategic objectives, buyersupplier relationships, information on each supplier considered and, most importantly, the relationships that existed between the suppliers. Suppliers are referred to as S1, S2 and so on in the cases. Each case is accompanied by a pictorial rendition of the particular relationship network. Arrows indicate the direction of the materials ow, and the dotted line indicates the existence of communications. A solid vertical line represents a wall, meaning there is no communication between the two companies between which it appears. 3.1. Coach: peripheral electronic components The two suppliers that have been working with Coach are contract manufacturers. Plants of both suppliers are presently located in Malaysia. Between the two, Coach has had a much longer and closer relationship with S1. Coach works with S2 in addition to S1 because of its dual sourcing policy, which is contained in what they call the 30% rule. This policy dictates Coach to take up no more than 30% of one suppliers production capacity. The obvious objective behind the 30% rule is to hedge against the supply risk in both boom and bust economic cycles. If a supplier has a high reliance on Coach for its business, a drop in Coachs market demand can easily starve the supplier and Coach can risk losing the supplier permanently. At the same time, in a robust market, where capacity becomes a key driver for success, the 30% capacity utilization rate still gives Coach room to expand production with each supplier. In former practice, when the design of a new generation of peripheral electronic component was completed, Coach would build a small quantity of prototypes so as to check product manufacturability and to make design adjustments. As the product life cycle got progressively shorter, Coach began to forgo this prototyping step and began handing over the design to the suppliers for immediate volume production. Consequently, it was not uncommon for
3. Within-case descriptions The within-case descriptions are the result of within-case analysis. They offer the details of the eight
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Coachs design engineer to make design changes on the spot when the suppliers production engineer reported production difculties. In the last few years, during the design phase, a higher level of integration had been required between the peripheral components and the microprocessors. Consequently, the role of peripheral components became more important to the overall design of microprocessors. Because the life cycle of a microprocessor was only about 9 months, any supply disruption or quality problem associated with the peripheral items would cost Coach dearly. S1 is the smaller company of the two. It is a local company indigenous to Malaysia. Seven years ago, Coach single-handedly began developing S1 as the supplier. For that reason, there seemed to be mutual respect and communications between Coach and S1, more so than between Coach and S2. S2 is one of the largest contract manufacturers in the world. It is a multinational corporation and has many facilities located in countries where Coach also operates. Indeed, Coach has been steadily moving toward broadening the scope of the work S2 does by expanding the product categories. Despite its familiarity with S1, Coach worked closely with both S1 and S2 and provided them with both design prints and technical support. As expected, having two suppliers for the peripheral component worked well for Coach. Coach gained exibility in production capacity as discussed above. Also, it gained price competition between these two contract manufacturers. This did not mean, however, Coach discouraged S1 and S2 from working together. In fact, Coach pressured S1 and S2 to work together on production and quality issues to tap into the aggregated engineering capability between them. Doing so would warrant suppliers bonus points during their evaluations. Consequently, the engineers of the two contract manufacturers were used to calling each other and working across company boundaries. The overall relational pattern is shown in Fig. 2. In this case, the supplier collusion might be a point of concern under the current context of dual sourcing. However, as far as Coach was concerned, this was not a signicant issue because it owned the intellectual property of product design and understood each suppliers production processes. Consequently, Coach
Fig. 2. Case of Coach.
believed that it had successfully created an environment where the suppliers could freely engage in information sharing. S1 and S2, two competing suppliers that would normally not engage in communications and engineering exchanges were working together on projects specic to Coach. 3.2. Flip-Flop: specialized molding parts For Flip-Flop, S1 was the existing supplier, while S2 was new. S1 manufactured specialized plastic injection molding parts and had been supplying to Flip-Flop as a single source supplier for over 10 years. During that time, the relationship, at least on the surface, was maintained based on mutual understanding. Flip-Flop would buy the plastic parts from S1 and then assemble them in-house. However, lurking under the surface was Flip-Flops concern for being overly reliant on S1 as a single source. At the same time, unbeknownst to Flip-Flop, S1 always coveted the assembly job that Flip-Flop was doing inhouse. Flip-Flop nally made a move and brought in another supplier (S2) to the existing relationship arrangement. S2 appealed to Flip-Flop because its size was bigger, and it garnered more stable nancial and technological capabilities. Also, the management team at S2 was enthusiastic about doing business with FlipFlop. Needless to say, this move upset and threatened the smaller and less resource rich S1. And S1 did not hide its displeasure. Since S1 owned the intellectual property of the tooling prints, it refused to share them with S2. Only after Flip-Flop agreed to compensate S1 for the prints, did S1 grudgingly release them to S2. However, S1 was still unwilling to hold direct talks with S2, let alone share any production knowledge.
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Then, to add insult to injury, Flip-Flop declared that it would outsource the assembly work to S2, the job S1 always wanted, and asked S1 to deliver parts to S2. This decision triggered a series of events. First, with no more assembly work, Flip-Flop closed its internal assembly plant. When this happened, a number of Flip-Flops engineers who used to work in the assembly plant went to work for S1 that was located in the same city. Further, in order to ramp up S2 for production, Flip-Flop had to appeal to S1 for technical support for S2. To make matters even worse for Flip-Flop, S2 became entangled in quality problems in the assembly job. At this time Flip-Flop sensed that its honeymoon with S2 was over: S2 was not all the roses we thought it was, an interviewee at Flip-Flop recalled. Since Flip-Flops business only accounted for a small portion of its total revenue, S2 was unwilling to invest in any technical resources to make the necessary improvements and requested that Flip-Flop retrieve the assembly job. As Flip-Flop considered the possibility of bringing the assembly work back in-house, it realized that this was not a feasible option because the cost of setting up the facility again would be prohibitively high. Its last option was to move the assembly work from S2 to S1. After a series of negotiations, S1 reluctantly agreed to take on the job it always wanted. S2 seemed content to supply S1 with the parts. In the end, after about 4 years had elapsed, since the rst move by Flip-Flop to introduce S2 into the relationship, S1 and S2 ended up swapping roles, and Flip-Flop ended up bearing all the cost for the mistakes incurred along the way. The relationship pattern that eventually emerged is shown in Fig. 3. Flip-Flop went back and forth on their strategic intent for the suppliers several times. It took 4 years for
the three rms to reshufe and settle on this eventual supply structure, one that all parties could live with. In the end, Flip-Flop became even more reliant on S1, something Flip-Flop tried to avoid in the rst place. In the meantime, Flip-Flop admitted that S1 was gradually learning a more standard business process from S2 as its business size grew. S1 was becoming the type of supplier that Flip-Flop anticipated S2 would be. 3.3. Hands-off: machined components Hands-off spends millions of dollars annually to purchase high-precision machined components. Hands-off typically designs the components and bids out the production to potential suppliers. The suppliers are expected to conduct the production engineering analysis of the parts and offer quotes on those parts. Over the past 8 years, Hands-off had focused on drastically reducing the number of suppliers. Facing erce cost pressures from its customers (e.g. airline operators), Hands-off was actively searching for low cost suppliers overseas. At the same time, it put pressure on its domestic suppliers to cut prices. The pressure from airline operators then became even more intense, owing to the recent downturn in the airline industries. Relentless cost pressures strained Hands-offs relationship with its suppliers. To a large extent, Hands-off had been successful in instituting supply consolidation initiatives in its supply base. Nonetheless, this change also led to other changes in the suppliersupplier relationship patterns that Hands-off had not anticipated. This new pattern represented a coalition of 14 suppliers and is shown in Fig. 4. As it happened, all suppliers were located near a large metropolitan city and their proximity facilitated their close collaboration. All the suppliers in the case had survived the downsizing effort by Hands-off, but the specter of cost cutting still loomed large over these suppliers. Purely as a defense mechanism, these suppliers organized themselves into the suppliersupplier relational arrangement, which they referred to as (State name) Manufacturing Network. S1 emerged as the leader of the group and organized the other 13 suppliers into a supply network. S1 in essence acted as a project manager of the contracts it received from Hands-off. In the context of this study, S1 led the group in quoting for a large
Fig. 3. Case of Flip-Flop.
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Fig. 4. Case of Hands-off.
machined parts contract and, when the contract was awarded, it took the lead in distributing jobs to the other 13 suppliers. When the jobs are completed, S1 would pull them all together and make the delivery to Hands-off. In this regard, the other 13 suppliers operated as the second-tier suppliers to Hands-off. Under the new arrangement, suppliers activities now complemented each other. S1 also organized monthly meetings among the network members, sharing industry information and discussing innovative methods to further reduce manufacturing costs. S1 also worked with the local Chamber of Commerce and city government trade groups, lobbying for policy changes to promote fair competition and increase state investment in vocational education, where the network draws its labor pools. There was another less obvious advantage to this network arrangement. From the collective perspective of the 14 suppliers, it reduced the total overhead cost in responding to the request for quotation and the actual execution of the contract. According to the operations director at S1, instead of having 14 suppliers quote all 600 part numbers, each may be quoting 20 or so part numbers, so they get less time involved. Therefore, it reduced the total quotation time and the burden of pricing effort expended by the suppliers. This approach also improved product quality and reduced production cost over time. There were other benets. The network model also reduced costs by creating exible production capacity.
Traditionally, when a supplier receives a large contract from the buyer, it has to resort to its internal production capacity and hire more engineers and machinists, incurring investment costs. Because of the huge demand uctuation in the aerospace industry, a supplier is often left with a surplus capacity when the demand drops. Now, the suppliers in the network can absorb an increase in demand without making new capital investment. In other words, they can grow business without growing in size. Such close collaboration did not exclude competition among the network members. After all, they all used to be rivals and just because they were collaborating now did not necessarily take away the sense of rivalry. For one, price competition determined who got the orders. So, when the jobs were being divvied up, price was the primary determinant. Also, not everybody shared the same vision about the network. Therefore, as an informant from S1 remarked, despite its efforts, it was difcult to coordinate the supply operations with some members of the network because they would mistreat S1, since S1 was not the ultimate buying company. The network arrangement indeed represented more complex relationships among the members in the network. Reactions from the management at the buying rm toward the network were mixed. On the positive side, some managers acknowledged the networks value as a viable way for the domestic suppliers to compete with overseas suppliers. They also appreciated the fact that S1 actually reduced the burden of managing its suppliers. On the negative side, some managers considered the network as an impediment to moving production overseas because the network had been lobbying against this move. Also, these managers did not appreciate the fact that the network garnered as a collective group more bargaining power when it came to price negotiations. 3.4. Mediator: logistics service providers Mediator is engaged in building telecommunications infrastructure to house Internet router or telephone switchboard, and its customers include telecommunication companies and Internet service providers. Building telecommunication infrastructure involves installing the telecommunication equipment at its customers construction sites across the United
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State. One basic type of construction materials used in such work includes lamps, ladders, ber cable ducts, etc. The materials themselves may appear to be lowtech, but the logistics service of furnishing such materials is a sophisticated undertaking that requires highly coordinated operations from suppliers in the supply chain. In the past, Mediator usually purchased large quantities of the required building materials and stored them in its internal warehouses across the United States. Then, these materials were shipped to the construction site all at once before the start of a project. However, they came to realize the cost associated with carrying and managing such high inventory. So, toward the end of the 1990s, Mediator started to streamline its supply chain operations. It rst consolidated all the materials procurement to the two largest distributors and asked them to purchase the inventory, store them in warehouses, engage in picking and packing for different locations, and route them at appropriate times when needed. These two distributors were now doing much more than distributing building materials; they were providing the complete logistics services to Mediator as S1 and S2. From the beginning, Mediator knew it would be difcult for two competing companies to begin collaborating to the point of synchronizing their service activities for a common customer. So, Mediator was careful to maintain the equity between the two suppliers and keep them from a head-on competition. Mediator allocated the size of the business volume evenly between the two suppliers and tried to have them work on different projects. However, Mediator continued to urge them to communicate with each other and warned them about the importance of working together closely fullling this task. Both S1 and S2 understood clearly, at least in their head, that they were expected to work very closely together to perform the complex and sophisticated logistics services to the locations across the country for Mediator. And, as it came to pass, the rst thing they had to work together on was to map out the detailed logistics service procedures as required by Mediator. However, like a couple wed through an arranged marriage, both S1 and S2 found it difcult to accept each other and work things out. Despite Mediators
enthusiasm, hot and cold responses from suppliers never led to the type of close and cooperative supplier supplier relationship that Mediator had envisioned for them. To Mediators dismay, S1 in particular was very reserved and tentative when it came to sharing any information. To make matters worse, the decisionmaking at S1 was centralized and it always took a very long time to respond to Mediators initiatives and inquiries. On the contrary, S2 embraced Mediators alliance idea right away. S2 was willing to share information on how it ran its internal operations. It was quick to respond to Mediators requests. S2 aimed to become a solution provider for Mediator. At a time when Mediator was downsizing, S2 helped Mediator by taking over a lot of its sourcing activities left by laid-off buyers. At some point, it became clear to Mediator that S1 and S2 were competitors rst, regardless of their attitude toward potential collaboration between them. We were told about the time when both S1 and S2 independently approached Mediator lobbying to become the sole supplier one day if Mediator wanted to single-source all the materials. In other words, the competitive tension between S1 and S2 never abated. Consequently, Mediator had to invest a lot of efforts to coordinate communication and supply activities of these two suppliers to make the intended supplier supplier relationship work. For instance, Mediator was heavily involved in making the key decisions on the service procedures the two suppliers were working on. Fig. 5 illustrates the present arrangement, where S1 and S2 supply the buyer directly. We add a vertical solid line to indicate that the interaction between S1 and S2 is tenuous and communication between them is guarded.
Fig. 5. Case of Mediator.
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3.5. Organizer: testing equipment Organizer is an industry leader in designing and manufacturing various micro-controllers and memory products. The testing equipment refers to capital equipment used to test microprocessors quality and speed. Every 5 years, Organizer needs a new generation of testing equipment to meet its new product testing needs. Since Organizer lacked expertise in testing equipment technology, it usually purchased testing equipment from suppliers. There were nine potential testing equipment suppliers in the world. When time came again to develop a new generation of testing equipment, Organizer engaged in selecting which suppliers to work with. As part of the selection process, it gave all potential suppliers problems to solve. Organizer rst engaged the suppliers in intense collaboration and brainstorming. It invited all nine suppliers engineers to a forum where the design requirements of the new tester were shared and discussed. Organizer expected to hear back from them with creative solutions. In a sense, it exploited heavily the knowledge base of potential suppliers and the ideas that emerged from these suppliers for the new equipment design and engineering. In the ensuing months of the proposal formulation, the engineers from nine suppliers discussed freely their available technologies and the new testing equipment technology requirements. All the engineers from the suppliers felt participating in such an open forum were essential to better understand the customers requirements. The potential suppliers even collaborated on writing up the technical specications and product evaluation criteria for Organizer. Once all the groundwork was completed, Organizer then began a formal bidding process for all suppliers to participate. Each supplier independently proposed its testing hardware and software prices and specications. They even built software prototypes and conducted demonstrations. In the end, one winner (S1) was chosen by Organizer. However, the job was not awarded to S1 forthrightly to have it build the testing equipment that it had designed. Instead, Organizer moved in to set up a joint venture with S1 to manufacture the testing equipment as proposed by S1. The intent here was to make the new testing equipment not just for Organizers internal use but also to make it available in the open market. In
Fig. 6. Case of Organizer. (*) Joint venture between Organizer and S1.
the end, the joint venture turned out to be a commercial success for both S1 and Organizer as many other companies started to purchase the new testing equipment from this joint venture. Fig. 6 illustrates the supply network structure that emerged in the end. Even after the nal selection of S1 as the joint venture partner, we still saw traces of open communications among the competing suppliers that existed prior to the bidding stage. In fact, such informal communications never ceased. The nine suppliers frequently trade information and new ideas in different business settings such as an industry trade association that they all afliate with. 3.6. Plotter: vehicle tooling systems This case involves Plotters procurement of a tooling system for its door production. This tooling system, made up of a set of capital equipment, would take the inner and outer door panels and bring them together into an assembly to produce the doorin-white that actually hangs on the vehicle. This assembly operation is typically split into 10 closely coupled workstations. Over the past 6 years or so, Plotter used S1 as its preferred full-service supplier to supply the complete tooling system. However, Plotter recently decided to inject some competition into the current relationship, which it described as lagging. To do so, it called for open bidding for a new tooling system. Six suppliers responded to the call. Each supplier was asked to rst quote all 10 workstations separately and
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then organize them into one complete bidding package. Among the packages submitted by the suppliers, the proposal for the hemmer workstation submitted by supplier S2 stood out; the hemmer workstation is one of the 10 workstations that hems the doors together. The traditional hemmer presses are huge and cumbersome to use, but the hemmer station S2 proposed was light and easy to use. S2 proposed the tabletop hemmer and it appeared to be a refreshing new technology, which suited well the exible manufacturing environment that Plotter was operating under. In the end, Plotter picked S2 as the supplier of the hemmer workstation. Then, what about the other nine stations? As it turned out, S1 received the contract for the other nine stations. First, S1s overall proposal package was technically superior to the other proposals. Also, this bidding out by Plotter jolted S1 in the sense that S1 realized that their sole sourcing status had to be earned and could not be taken for granted. After the bidding, S1s prices turned out to be better than the other suppliers. Therefore, while S2 got the hemmer station contract, S1 got the rest. What is interesting here is that, instead of buying the hemmer station directly from S2, Plotter requested that S1 buy the hemmer station from S2 and integrate it with the other nine workstations in a direct sourcing arrangement. In this way, Plotter still only dealt with one supplier (S1) for the complete tooling system. This arrangement is shown in Fig. 7. S1 and S2 have a buyersupplier relationship with Plotter mediating this relationship. Plotter selected S2, but the two suppliers negotiated contractual terms directly between themselves without Plotters involvement. The motive behind Plotters arrangement of a vertical buy-and-sell relationship between these two
suppliers was primarily driven by the fact that S1 was familiar with interacting with Plotter while S2 was not. Therefore, Plotter intended to rely on S1 to teach how to conduct business with it (e.g. problem reporting, procedure for design change, etc.). As S1 integrated the hemmer station of S2 into the complete system, it was basically leading the new supplier through the whole business process of how to work with the buyer. As the operations director at S1 insightfully pointed out, we are teaching a competitor who someday can take over our business. S1s dilemma went deeper. While the top management of S1 even instructed its design engineers to be on guard when it came to sharing technical information with S2, the engineers in the front line often had no choice but to share with them to get things done. This dilemma was captured well in a remark by the purchasing manager at Plotter, who said to get things done, sometimes the engineers have to share information that the top management would not condone. 3.7. Puppeteer: package delivery services Puppeteer uses two major package delivery suppliers (S1 and S2) for small package shipping. The shipment includes hazardous/classied materials such as samples of plasma, urine and chemicals. S1 and S2 are among the largest express delivery service providers in the world, and each has a sophisticated logistics and distribution infrastructure. The intent behind Puppeteers strategy for managing its suppliersupplier relationship was to keep them away from each other. On the surface, Puppeteer claimed that it did not think there was any need for the two suppliers to work together, each is competent to get its job done. But, under the surface, the real intent was to keep both S1 and S2 guessing and to instigate competitive pressure all the time. Puppeteer purposely co-located the sales ofces of S1 and S2 right next to each other at its corporate headquarters; the sales managers of the two suppliers saw each other every day. Although Puppeteer did not put the two suppliers in the same room for contract negotiation, the proximity between them made it difcult for the suppliers not to have some interaction; in practice, just enough interaction to know the other is also around. S1 and S2 were cognizant of what business the other side got. The supply structure is
Fig. 7. Case of Plotter joint venture between Organizer and S1.
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Fig. 8. Case of Puppeteer.
plain and simple. As shown in Fig. 8, S1 and S2 supply independently to Puppeteer, and there is virtually no direct communication between them. Puppeteer did not stop here; it pitted one supplier against the other when it came to contract negotiations. Puppeteer even admitted that sometimes it resorted to blufng tactics to get the price or technology it wanted from an unwilling supplier. Puppeteer held monthly meeting with S1 and S2 individually to discuss business performance, service offerings, needs, etc. Puppeteer was quick to change business volume awarded to a supplier if it was not satised with its performance or when the other supplier offered a creative solution. Another way of maintaining the pressure on suppliers was to avoid getting into a long-term contractual relationship. It certainly did not intend to establish long-term agreement with either S1 or S2. The short-term contracts created a situation where both S1 and S2 always tried to anticipate Puppeteers needs. Puppeteer surmised that a supplier would be less responsive to its requests had it a long-term contract. For instance, one supplier recently offered a new package tracking IT application, and this compelled the other supplier to match that offer. 3.8. Risk-minimizer: substrates Substrates refer to the platform on which a microprocessor and controller are built. There are 10 suppliers of substrates that Risk-minimizer works with. In our case, Risk-minimizer purchased substrates from two suppliers (S1 and S2), which were selected after a series of competitive biddings. These suppliers produce substrates basically as build-to-print products, where the substrate design prints are owned by Risk-minimizer. For this reason, S1 and S2 also had
a required level of manufacturing engineering capability so they are able to work off of the blueprint from Risk-minimizer. Even though there is a sizable pool of available suppliers, risk is a signicant managerial issue for Risk-minimizer. For substrates, the product life cycle is short, while production engineering takes time. Because of this, once a supplier is selected, it becomes almost impossible to switch to another one during the life cycle of the product, which is usually about 9 months. Simply, the time required to fully switch a supplier may in fact take longer than the life of a product. Therefore, to offset such supply risks, Riskminimizer uses dual sources to build redundancy in its supply channel, which was why it chose to work with both S1 and S2. Cost competitiveness is also important to Riskminimizer. So, to maintain a tight rein on suppliers and their competitive pressures at all times, Risk-minimizer intentionally conceals the name of one supplier from another to avoid direct communication between them. The suppliers are kept away from each other not just during the bidding period but also during the mass-manufacturing phase. For instance, S1 knew there was S2 and vice versa, but they did not exactly know who the other supplier was. Consequently, when jobs go to the low bidders, the other bidders do not know who got the contract. As purchasing director at Risk-minimizer observed, it is uncommon to see its suppliers drop in and out of the list. Essentially, S1 and S2 engage in free-market style competition. The supply structure is illustrated in Fig. 9. The solid vertical line between suppliers signies a wall separating any direct communication between them.
Fig. 9. Case of Risk-minimizer.
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Table 2 Cross-case comparisions Buying company Buyers strategic intent for suppliers and their relationships To reduce supply risk by using two suppliers To improve suppliers operations performance by having S1 and S2 work together To reduce reliance on S1 by bringing in a new supplier To reduce supply management task by having S1 manage S2 To reduce cost by increasing the level of outsourcing Buyersupplier relationship characteristics Long-term alliance relationship with S1 Cordial, working relationship with S2 Suppliersupplier relationship characteristics Collaborative relationship Explicit information sharing Some tacit information sharing Cordial relationship Minimal explicit information sharing Tacit information sharing Alliance and strategic partnership Lower purchasing costs Implications for performance gain/loss to the buyer Shorter supply lead time Lower product prices Higher product quality Reduced some reliance on S1 Implications for performance gain/loss to the suppliers S1: technical learning from larger S2; loss of contracts S2: getting tacit knowledge about the buyer through S1 S2: getting tacit knowledge about the buyer through S1 S1: matured business processes learned from S2 S2: minimal to no gain
Coach
Flip-Flop
Collaborative relationship with S1 Transactional working relationship with S2 Transactional and somewhat adversarial working relationship
Hands-off
To reduce cost by consolidating supply base
Explicit and tacit information sharing
Better quality More exible supply capacity
S1: ability to outsource jobs to other suppliers; more leverage against the buyer S1S14: shared resources and learning
Mediator
To receive seamless logistics services from two suppliers by having them coordinate activities closely together
Collaborative relationship Meaningful information exchange
Transactional working relationship Some explicit information sharing Minimal tacit information sharing Collaborative relationship during design phase Competitive relationship when bidding Transactional working relationship Guarded information sharing Minimal explicit information sharing
Minimal reduction in supply management cost Failure to receive a complete turn
S1: loss of buyers good will S2: attainment of buyers favor
Organizer
To create a new product and its design by tapping into suppliers synergy
Collaborative relationship with S1 Professional working relationship with S2S9
Successful new product development New revenue source
S1: becoming the leading producer of testing equipment S2S9: information acquisition regarding customer and market needs S1: gradual loss of core competency to S2 S2: learning buyers business processes through S1
Plotter
To set up alternate suppliers as potential substitute to S1 To reduce supply management task by having S1 manage S2
Collaborative relationship with S1 Working relationship with S2
Less reliance on S1 Lower purchasing price
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4. Cross-case comparisons
S1 and S2: diminishing prot margin S1 and S2: diminishing prot margin
Reduced supply management costs
Lower purchasing price
Lower supply risk
Lower purchasing price
Each case described above has gone through its unique process of evolution into the network arrangements shown in each of the gures. This evolutionary process and the characteristics of the relationships shown in the network arrangements are captured in Table 2. The table lists and compares across all eight cases the buyers strategic intent, buyersupplier relationships, suppliersupplier relationship and implications for performance for both buyers and suppliers. We discuss now how each of these areas of comparisons is played out in our cases. 4.1. Buyers strategic intent for suppliers and their relationships A buyers strategic intent is its strategic objectives in creating the supply structure that involves two or more competing suppliers. The buyer selects the suppliers and arranges them in certain relational structures. Frequently, the structure that emerged did not necessarily correspond completely with what the buyer intended, as demonstrated in the case of Organizer. Nonetheless, in all eight cases it was the buyers strategic intent that incited reactions from suppliers and subsequent events that unfolded. From Table 2, we see that there were a few strategic intents that were common to all buyers. First, all buyers wanted to ensure that they reduced supply risk. If they had only one source, then they wanted to add another source as a potential substitute (e.g. Coach, Flip-Flop, Plotter, etc.). Also, they wanted to make sure that the suppliers were under constant pressure of competition from other supplier(s). For instance, Riskminimizer put every new job to be bid competitively by the suppliers. Just because the job was awarded did not translate into the end of competitive pressure. The two suppliers chosen were made aware that one of them could always be replaced by the other. Of course, this sort of relentless competitive pressure did not mean that the buyer was shy about taking advantage of the suppliers resources. In almost all cases, the buyer exploited the suppliers engineering capabilities. Sometimes they were brought together under the buyers direction (e.g. Organizer, Mediator, Plotter), and sometimes suppliers themselves worked together
Minimal interactions Some knowledge of the identity of the other supplier
Tacit information sharing
Arms-length relationship
Arms-length relationship Risk-Minimizer
Puppeteer
To reduce supply risk by using two parallel suppliers To exert competitive pressure on the suppliers through competitive bidding
To keep suppliers on their toes to get better pricing
Meaningful information exchange
No knowledge of the identify of the other supplier
No interaction
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as a reaction to the buyers strategic initiatives (e.g. Hands-off). 4.2. Buyersupplier relationship characteristics We use such descriptors as collaborative, professional, alliance, transactional, arms-length, adversarial and working relationship to capture the characteristics of buyersupplier relationships, as shown in the third column of Table 2. Clearly, alliance and collaborative relationship both imply a closer relationship between a buyer and a supplier. In the Coach case, for example, the buyer and both suppliers share the same vision and collaborate to achieve the same business objectives. In the Organizer case, the buyer and S1 established a joint venture to accomplish their business objectives. The arms-length and adversarial buyersupplier relationship is just the opposite. In cases such as Puppeteer, Risk-minimizer and Hands-off, the buyers major concern was price reduction and, as such, this means that they would walk away from the relationship if not securing the deal they were looking for. A transactional or professional working relationship appears to be in the middle of collaboration adversarial relationship continuum. The buyers, such as Organizers relationship with S2S9 and FlipFlops relationship with S2, focused on the business issues on-hand and provided the suppliers necessary assistance. In the meantime, they were ready to replace these suppliers if they did not meet the buyers performance expectations. We also note that, in four of the eight cases, a buyers relationship with one supplier was particularly closer than its relationship with the other supplier. The buyer had favorites. In the Coach, Plotter and FlipFlop cases, the buyers had favorite suppliers that had been working with the buyer for years. The buyers entrusted them with more responsibility and business. This being said, the buyers still needed to bring in competitors to reduce supply risks and stir up competitive pressure on the favorite suppliers. 4.3. Suppliersupplier relationship characteristics As suppliersupplier relationship occurs between two competing companies, the descriptors in Table 2 paint a complex and dynamic relationship. In fact, this
relationship is more complex and dynamic than the buyersupplier relationship, and this difference comes primarily for two reasons. First, the suppliersupplier relationship is characterized by simultaneous competition and cooperation. Competition and cooperation interact in novel ways to accomplish the goals of each supplier company. Second, the complexity of the relationship is reected critically in their information sharing practices. As shown in Table 2, types of information and the attitude with which the information sharing occurs vary from case to case. In the Coach and Organizer cases, the suppliers collaborated to fulll the supply tasks, even though they knew the other company could take the job away. They understood that cooperation was a prerequisite to competition; the willing cooperation was a rational decision because they knew they had to demonstrate that before the buyer would consider them for further business. The buyers kept their policies toward suppliers clear and consistent, and the suppliers were willing parties to the process the buyers were instigating. In the end, both suppliers accepted the outcome and considered it fair. In the Flip-Flop and Plotter cases, however, the dynamics were different. The level of cooperation was more tenuous and less intense. The suppliers did only what they had to do just to fulll their contractual obligations. Here, one supplier perceived that it had more to lose by working with the other supplier. It became clear to us that, to have a cooperative suppliersupplier relationship, both suppliers had to be willing to see equity in the relationship. The Hands-off case brings us a situation where, after being pushed to the corner by the buyers relentless cost cutting initiatives, the suppliers organized themselves into a network to gain more leverage. In this process, the suppliers came together and cooperated with one another because they were all ghting for a common cause. They created a strategic partnership that went beyond just getting the job done; they engaged in learning for self-betterment. What made this case different from other cases was that, even though such a strategic initiative could also benet the buyer, the alliance was created by the suppliers and for the suppliers. It was a survival mechanism created in response to the threat from Hands-off. Mediator tried hard to create a cooperative relationship between the suppliers, but in the end it
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ended up with one willing supplier and one very unwilling supplier. The latter (S1) simply had a more bureaucratic culture and simply was more suspicious of Mediators intent. Having one willing supplier (S2) was not enough to create a cooperative supplier supplier relationship. We were reminded of the phrase, it takes two to tango. Finally, there was no collaboration, whatsoever in the cases of Puppeteer and Risk-minimizer. Here, free-market style competition dominated the suppliersupplier relationship. The suppliers largely competed on their product prices. Turning our attention to the aspect of information sharing between suppliers, we nd some patterns in suppliers practices. First, when suppliers interact with each other in technical tasks, explicit information is exchanged. Even though they did not have a cooperative relationship, the two suppliers in the Mediator case exchanged such explicit information as materials shortages or shipping delays. In this case, the operations of two suppliers never linked up to the extent that Mediator had hoped. However, in other cases where the operations between suppliers became closely coupled, we saw the exchange of not just explicit information but tacit information as well. The suppliers of Hands-off were pooling their resources together, making different parts within the same contract, and sharing technical and explicit information as well as tacit information such as how to agree on what to do next, which supplier might have extra manpower, who is good with numbers, how to secure bank loans, etc. What was counter-intuitive to us in all this information sharing was the observation that tacit information can be shared without a lot of explicit information sharing. We had thought that perhaps explicit information sharing was a prerequisite for tacit information sharing, but not so in our cases. Take the cases of Flip-Flop and Plotter, in these two cases, the suppliers were forced into a vertical arrangement where the buyer arranged one supplier to supply parts or assemblies to the other. The suppliers had little say in setting up the arrangements. Consequently, the suppliers did not like to work with one another and were not willing to share explicit information such as engineering specications, blue prints, etc. In some cases, they were forced to share information but only reluctantly. In any case, because they had to work together and their processes had to be linked up
together, they were learning about the other companys business processes and practices. Also, they often had to visit each other and talk to the engineers and, in doing so, they were picking up ample tacit information about the other company. 4.4. Implications for performance gains and losses for the buyer To act on their strategic intent, the buyers created certain supply structures and tried to manage the relationship they had with the suppliers and the relationship between suppliers. It appears that in most cases, the buyers were successful, but in several they were not. Coach was able to reduce the supply lead-time while improving product quality and reducing price. Similarly, Plotter reduced its reliance on the key supplier and was able to bring in a supplier (S2) without directly managing it. Most other buying companies were also successful. However, Flip-Flop was unsuccessful in reducing its reliance on S1 because after a series of managerial blunders, the jobs that had been channeled to S2 came right back to S1. Similarly, Mediator was unable to accomplish the complete turnkey operation that it had desired from the suppliers. Some buying companies to their surprise experienced some performance gains. Flip-Flop did not expect for S1 to be able to come up to speed and learn the mature business processes so quickly when, in the end, most jobs were given back to it. Similarly, Organizer did not plan on establishing a joint venture with any particular supplier or making the testing equipment a company cash cow when the suppliers were initially invited to the forum. As it turned out, the testing equipment was a big commercial success when the joint venture between Organizer and S1 started to sell them in the market. 4.5. Implications for performance gains and losses for the suppliers The most prominent type of gains that occurred through a suppliersupplier relationship was the attainment of tacit knowledge about the buyer through the other supplier. One supplier can also gain tacit knowledge about the other supplier in the process of
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working together. Through S1 in the Plotter case, S2 was able to learn about the business procedures and practices of Plotter from S1 that had been working with Plotter much longer. In the Flip-Flop case, as the small S1 grew into a bigger supplier, it learned from the bigger supplier (S2) the tacit knowledge of conducting business in a more professional manner. For instance, as a small player, S1 used to take the news from Flip-Flop personally, whether good or bad, and sometimes its representatives showed emotional outbursts. However, after working with S2 for a few years, S1 learned to overcome these traits and began to act much more professionally. A manager at Flip-Flop attributed this change to the relationship between S1 and S2. Another gain pertains to the attainment of technical knowledge through the other supplier. Often, the type of knowledge that would have been hidden from one supplier became known because the two suppliers, whether they liked it or not, knew that they had to work with each other. For instance, in the Coach case, normally it would not have been possible for smaller S1 to obtain technical knowledge of larger S2. But since they were brought together as part of Coachs dual sourcing strategy, they began working together and the technical knowledge began to ow from S2 to S1. Of course, what S2 got in return was knowledge about the customer because S1 had been working with Coach much longer. The suppliers were also able to achieve exibility in managing their capacity and capability by pooling resources. A good example comes from the case of Hands-off. The suppliers of Hands-off were able to work together, each taking a portion of the buyers contract, sharing best practices and idle capacity. By doing so, they were able to reduce costs and production lead-time and improve product quality. Finally, their relationship with other suppliers also had implications for how much business one supplier might get from the buyer. For instance, all the other suppliers besides S1 (S2, S3, etc.) received additional work from Hands-off through their relationship with S1. S1 took the lead in managing and coordinating the other competing suppliers. Also, in the case of Mediator, one supplier (S2) began getting more attention from Mediator because, while S2 was willing, S1 had been refusing to forge a close relationship with S2. In this case, lack of close
suppliersupplier relationship led S2 to potentially gain more business. Of course, there are negative implications of the relational arrangements discussed thus far. For one, one supplier could potentially lose the job to the other supplier. In both the Flip-Flop and Plotter cases, one supplier was losing its core competency, as it was coopted to share technical knowledge with the competing supplier. Further, a supplier stands to lose the goodwill of the buyer if it does not cooperate with the buyers initiatives. As discussed above, S1 in the Mediator case was losing favor from Mediator, and potentially losing future business to S2. For this reason, suppliers typically cooperated with the buyer in all the other cases. Cooperating with the buyers initiatives, of course, turned out to be a double-edged sword. In many instances, the buyer was interested in bringing in competition among suppliers that would lead to reduce price. The most salient and straightforward example of this comes from the cases of Puppeteer and Risk-minimzer. Here, suppliers complied with buyer initiatives and were forced to reduce price to meet buyer cost targets. They received the contracts, but their prot margins were eroding.
5. Results 5.1. Suppliersupplier relationship archetypes Five different archetypes have been identied, and these are listed in Table 3. In generating archetypes, the inter-rater agreement was 80%, both researchers came up with the same four groupings, except one. This one case was subsequently discussed and the researchers arrived at mutual agreement. The applicable cases listed in the second column categorize the suppliers into the appropriate archetype based on our analysis. Then, the denitions are offered, and the descriptions from cases are listed for illustrative purposes. Our empirical archetypes are intended as a classication scheme that simplies the complex dynamics embedded in the phenomena of supplier supplier relationship in our case analyses. The conicting archetype describes a supplier supplier relationship where one supplier was willing to work with the other supplier, while the other supplier
Z. Wu, T.Y. Choi / Journal of Operations Management 24 (2005) 2752 Table 3 Summary of suppliersupplier relation archetypes Archetypes Conicting Applicable cases Mediator Suppliersupplier relationship denitions Suppliers exhibiting entirely different attitudes about working together when they are expected to collaborate to meet buyer requirements Descriptions from case(s) One supplier was very reserved and tentative when it came to sharing any information, while the other was willing to share information on how it ran its internal operations and was quick to respond to Mediators requests The two suppliers found it difcult to accept each other and work things out The supplier that was told to supply parts to the other supplier felt threatened to do so because it would also have to give away the tooling prints it owned The supplier that was being directed to receive the parts from another supplier was aware that it was in essence training another supplier to take away its future business Competing suppliers for the same buyer with little or no direct interaction and with or without knowing the identify of the other supplier(s) The suppliers have some interaction, but just enough to know the other is also around The buyer pits one supplier against the other when it came to contract negotiations The suppliers are kept away from each other not just during the bidding period but also during the mass manufacturing phase Multiple suppliers collaborating to attain leverage, resource pooling, and information sharing under the direction of one leading supplier The leading supplier led the group in quoting for a large contract, and, when the contract was awarded, it took the lead in distributing the jobs to other suppliers When jobs were being distributed, price was the primary determinant which also promoted the sense of equity The network as a collective body can absorb an increase in demand without making new capital investment The suppliers held monthly meetings, sharing industry information and discussing innovative methods The engineers from both suppliers were used to calling each other because doing so would give them bonus points from the buyer
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Contracting
Flip-Flop
Vertical contractor-subcontractor arrangement driven by the buyer where one or more of the suppliers feel threatened to give away business and core competency
Plotter
Dog-ghting
Puppeteer
Risk-minimizer
Networking
Hands-off
Transacting
Coach
Peer suppliers rationally working together to meet the requirements of the buyer, and understanding the equal level of give-and-take between them
Organizer
Suppliers would engage in intense collaboration and brainstorming, knowing well that they would gain market knowledge and learn more about customer needs Suppliers would submit independent bidding to the buyer for the same contract
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was not. The contracting archetype characterized a suppliersupplier relationship where two suppliers for the same buyer were arranged in a relationship where one supplier was supplying to the other. As the name implicates, under the dog-ghting archetype, suppliers engage in a free-market style, zero-sum game competition where minimal direct interaction takes place between them. The essence of networking is characterized by the suppliers collaborating willingly to meet the buyers requirements. Under the transacting suppliersupplier relationship, two suppliers maintain a cool head and carry out a professional working relationship to optimize the gains for each. 5.2. Working propositions For every suppliersupplier relationship, there is a buyersupplier relationship. No suppliersupplier relationship exists in isolation. The former relationship is interdependent with the buyersupplier relationships. Hands-offs policy toward its suppliers pushed the suppliers to organize and create the networking archetype and, toward the end of the case, it adjusted its policies toward these suppliers. Also, Mediator began to adjust its approach toward these suppliers, seeing how one supplier was more willing to work with the other supplier (e.g. conicting archetype). Therefore, when we develop propositions we move beyond the archetypes of suppliersupplier relationships to the intricate dynamics that unfold between the buyer and the suppliers as well as between suppliers. Many of our propositions cut across several archetypes. We rst offer propositions pertaining to the buyer dynamics in the context of suppliers and their relationships and then move on to the propositions that address the dynamics among suppliers and their relationships. First, the cooperative buyersupplier relationship has been discussed in the existing literature as the mantra of desirable state of buyersupplier existence. The buyer and supplier should build a trusting relationship, and the critical element of trusting relationship is long-term commitment. However, according to our cases, what the buyers really care about is competition between suppliers and minimizing their risk against uncertain future. They try to
accomplish these things even at the cost of jeopardizing their long-term relationships with existing suppliers. For instance, Plotter had been building a long-term relationship with S1, and then it brought in S2 to mitigate its risk against having one supplier. S1 was a systems supplier and had been working with Plotter for 6 years. When learning that Plotter was considering other suppliers, the general sentiment that permeated through S1 was frustration and helplessness and even betrayal because S1 had developed the whole business process with Plotter under the auspices of a long-term relationship. The same thing happened in the Coach case. Coach had developed S1 and S1 trusted that the relationship with Coach would last a long time. Managers at Coach told us that they had always made it clear that Coach is not a touchyfeely company. As far as they were concerned, they would not hesitate to drop a supplier if it failed to meet their performance criteria. We propose the following proposition. Proposition 1. The long-term buyersupplier relationship does not prevent the buyer from nding alternate suppliers to create competition among suppliers. One key motivation for the buyer to set up alternate suppliers was to minimize its risks. For example, both Coach and Risk-minimizer carried two suppliers to guard against becoming overly dependent on one supplier. However, how they managed the supplier supplier relationship could not be more different. Coach promoted collaboration between the two suppliers, while Risk-minimizer instigated competition between the suppliers. As evidence, Coachs suppliers knew each other and worked with each other, whereas Risk-minimizers suppliers did not even know who the other supplier was. Proposition 2. Risk mitigation is the most salient driving force for the buyer in forging a particular type of suppliersupplier relationship. It was imperative for the incumbent supplier to understand rationally and accept the fact that the buyer was justied in acting to protect its own business interest. Otherwise, the supplier would be suspicious and no longer trust the buyer. Of course, not trusting
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the buyer was a suppliers prerogative but this sort of sentiment would typically translate into negative responses and bad attitude from the buyers perspective. It would eventually have a negative consequence on the suppliers business prospects. For instance, although its rst reaction was frustration and disappointment, S1 in the Plotter case eventually understood and bought into what Plotter was trying to do. That is in large part why S1 ended up keeping most of the jobs except one. Had S1 not understood the intent of the buyer and begun exhibiting negative attitude, it could have lost most of the jobs that were being bid out. The same thing happened with S1 in the Coach case. Although it was developed by Coach and felt it had a special relationship with Coach, S1 acknowledged Coachs 30% policy and accepted S2 as potential competitor and collaborator. Thus, a working triad of buyersuppliersupplier was established and, at the time of the conclusion of this study, S1 was very successful in working with Coach and also with S2. On the contrary, S1 in the Mediator case maintained its suspicion and mistrust of Mediators intent and persisted in its negative behavior toward S2. It even showed slowness in responding to Mediators inquiries about the work and its relationship with S2. Therefore, toward the end of the case, we saw how Mediator was considering distancing itself from S1 and was beginning to channel more jobs to S2. Based on recent, informal communication from Mediator, we learned that S1 has been phased out all together. Also, in the Hands-off case, we saw how S1 behaved naively and did not understand the buyers intent for bringing in S2. To its credit, S1 eventually came to understand and accept the fact that the buyer had to mitigate its risk by bringing in S2 and was ultimately awarded the jobs that it had always wanted. Proposition 3. When the supplier does not take the buyers intent personally and is able to rationalize it, this supplier ends up performing well in terms of competing against other suppliers and gaining future business from the buyer. A suppliers ability to understand and rationalize buyers intent is important in maintaining a good buyersupplier relationship and also good supplier supplier relationship. The complexity of such relationships places a higher cognitive load on the suppliers
management. The cognitive complexity comes from the fact that the supplier must simultaneously cooperate with and compete against other suppliers. Also, it must be willing to maintain a long-term relationship and yet tolerate buyers behavior that hedges against the risk of relationship failures. In the Plotter case and other cases, the suppliers that competed against each other during the bidding phase were expected to collaborate during the manufacturing phase. Needless to say, suppliers needed to be able to adjust their perspectives and behaviors as the relational context changed. As discussed previously, the failure to create a collaborative suppliersupplier relationship (e.g. cases of Mediator and Flip-Flop) could be attributed to the fact that the supplier management simply did not understand the buyer intent and the complexity of the relationships. The perspectives of these suppliers were short term as they looked for immediate gains. Proposition 4. A supplier that is able to rationalize the contracting relationship from multiple, competing perspectives is more likely to collaborate than a supplier that interprets the relationship from only its own perspective. As we observed competing suppliers collaborate with each other, we could not help asking, how would the suppliers rationalize their seemingly paradoxical action of collaborating with competitors? Undoubtedly, buyers purchase leverage and technology ownership play a role in forcing the suppliers to collaborate, as indicated in the Plotter, Flip-Flop and Coach cases. Some suppliers actually looked beyond immediate competition. They considered the tradeoffs of working with a competitor over time. In the Hands-off case, the suppliers realized that they needed to share resources to reduce costs and focus on providing exible production capacity and one-stop shopping for the buyer. Consequently, collaboration became a necessity for survival. In the Coach, Organizer and Mediator cases, the suppliers indicated their concerns with helping a competitor. However, they also realized that if they could not make the buyer successful, there would not be any business for them. Some interviewees at Coach, Organizer, Mediator and Plotter pointed out that giving assistance to a direct competitor should really not affect their competitive-
48
ness in any signicant way. Although they felt frustrated by the buyers arrangement, they had to make sure the buyers current requirements were met rst. They understood that the buyers supplier selection decision in the future was based on the best performer in the market. Hence, the current suppliers not only competed with the immediate competitors but also against other potential suppliers in the market. As a result, it is more important to focus on internal excellence and self-betterment than trying to put managerial effort in guarding against the other supplier. Proposition 5. Suppliers that focus on competition for excellence and continuous improvement are more likely to collaborate with competing suppliers than suppliers that only focus on immediate contractual gains. Managing its relationship well with other suppliers leads to many benets for the supplier. It almost seemed that there was such a thing as relationship capability and suppliers varied in this capability. Even if a supplier was competent to fulll the contract, not every supplier was capable of taking the responsibility of providing the buyer full service and managing the relationship it had with other suppliers. Individual case analysis reveals that the suppliers supply management skills differed. For example, the lead supplier (S1) in the Plotter cases was more procient in supply coordination tasks compared to S2. In the Mediator case, one supplier (S2) was more proactive and open to information sharing. Similarly, the lead supplier (S1) in the Handsoff case was akin to a systems integrator in the automotive industry. It essentially took over the supply management responsibility from Hands-off. On many occasions during the interviews, such lead suppliers with relationship capability identied themselves as a solution provider for the buyer. In the end, their supply chain coordination skills became a unique and inimitable resource. Proposition 6. A supplier that manages its relationships with other suppliers well is more likely to become a solution provider and consequently attains a larger share of supply responsibility from the buyer. We noticed in our cases that there were buyers intentionally awarding the suppliers similar but
complementary components instead of letting the suppliers supply identical products. For instance, in the cases of Coach and Hands-off, the suppliers were making parts with different part numbers. Although the suppliers were competing based on the same underlying product or service technology, they did not appear to be competing head-on. Such sourcing arrangement by the buyer reduced the tension between the suppliers, and consequently facilitated cooperative interactions between them. In the Mediator case, Mediator foresaw the potential problems of having two previous archrivals working together. To minimize potential confrontation between them, Mediator tried to give them different jobs. Mediator even remarked that they tried not to move the business back and forth between the two suppliers simply based on their short-term performance. Mediator expected to build a sense of equity between them, which would ultimately lead to suppliersupplier collaboration. Proposition 7. Suppliers supplying complementary or interdependent products or services are more conducive to a collaborative suppliersupplier relationship than competing suppliers supplying identical products or services. In the cases of Plotter and Flip-Flop, S1 and S2 worked in a project environment, where each supplier provided part of the total system. In both cases, S2 supplied S1 the components and S1 in turn assembled them to larger assemblies and supplied the total system to the buyers. Consequently, S1 and S2 in both cases needed to coordinate their work together closely, and to that end they ended up becoming familiar with each others production operations. A counter example comes from the Mediator case. Here, the suppliers would never invite the other to see its internal operations. One reason for this might be the fact that the operations of S1 and S2 were not closely coupled together, as occurred in the Plotter and FlipFlop cases. In the Mediator case, the buyer merely divided up the jobs into two separate piles without making them interdependent. Proposition 8. Suppliers whose operations have become tightly coupled, willingly or unwillingly, are more likely to gain tacit knowledge than those suppliers whose operations are de-coupled.
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6. Discussion Using eight cases, we identied ve archetypes of suppliersupplier relationships. These archetypes capture the intricacies of the cooperative and competitive relational dynamics between suppliers. We also offered eight propositions that examine the buyers sourcing strategy, supply structure that involves two suppliers, and the characteristics of the suppliers that are conducive to different types of suppliersupplier relationship. The study has both theoretical and practical implications. It contributes to theory development in supply chain relationship management in two ways. The rst contribution concerns suppliersupplier relationship archetypes. Specication of archetypes is an important theory development endeavor. The archetypes abstract a complex social phenomenon based on empirical evidence and our understanding of existing knowledge regarding the phenomenon under investigation (Meyer et al., 1993). Specically, the ve archetypes that emerged from the eight cases condense the intricacies of suppliersupplier relationship dynamics to types that are easy to relate and grasp. Each archetype encompasses certain assumptions, describes certain relational dynamics and forebodes certain performance outcomes for the buyer and suppliers. Second, the ve archetypes and the associated propositions attest to the notion of coopetition between suppliers as articulated by Choi et al. (2002). More importantly, the cases reveal how such co-opetitive suppliersupplier relational dynamics actually play out. The practical contributions are three-fold. First, the archetypes provide managers a classication scheme to capture the relational dynamics between their suppliers. The ability to categorize supplier supplier relationships will aid in communications among supply managers and establishing strategies toward suppliers. Second, these archetypes make implicit reference to performance issues (Doty and Glick, 1994). For instance, the conicting supplier supplier relationship prevents the buyer from obtaining the desired products or service from the suppliers, whereas the transacting relationship accomplishes such desired performances as shorter supply lead time and successful new product development (see Table 2). Third, the propositions
offer managers a tool to construct a supply structure that matches its purchasing objectives. In other words, when managers set up a strategy to manage their suppliersupplier relationships, they can use our propositions as guiding principles. For instance, the propositions call the buyers attention to the relationship capability of the suppliers when selecting or evaluating suppliers. The study has two primary limitations. First, the primary disadvantage of a case study is the lack of external validity and its idiosyncratic theories (Eisenhardt, 1989); it is difcult to draw deterministic inferences. We tried to alleviate this concern by using the widely adopted purchasing matrix to select polar cases in the sampling process. Second, we were unable to collect data from the supplier companies in two cases (see Table 1). We tried to overcome this shortcoming by triangulating the data in collecting data from additional buyer informants and through further observation and documentation. Clearly, the theories we discovered in this study will need to be further developed and tested in future studies. Building on Choi et al. (2002) study, we have taken another small step toward establishing suppliersupplier relationships as a research genre. There are yet large uncharted research topics. First, the future study needs to take on a more deductive mode and examine the theories presented here to gain external validity. The idiosyncratic nature of case research methods calls for further testing of the proposed theory. To empirically test the validity of the proposed ve archetypes of suppliersupplier relationship, future researchers should collect large samples of empirical data on suppliersupplier relationship and use cluster analysis or the numerical taxonomy method to identify types of supplier supplier relationship and compare them with the ones specied in this study. Second, lying behind suppliersupplier relationship is a more complex buyersuppliersupplier triad. Future research needs to consider triadic relational dynamics among these three entities. As we observed in this study, the buyers have different perceptions about each individual supplier in a buyersuppliersupplier triad. Hence, in order to fully understand the interplay and relational dynamics of buyersuppliersupplier relationships, we need to understand
50
simultaneously how one dyad in the triad affects the other two dyads. The balance theory from social psychology (Heider, 1958) and, more recently, strategy (Gimeno and Woo, 1999) may provide a theoretical framework from which we can build a triadic theory on buyersuppliersupplier relationships. Finally, one reason why we study supplier supplier relationships is that it affects a buyers purchasing performance. Future research should also examine the theoretical linkage between the product characteristics of buyers procurement, associated sourcing strategy of the buyer and the suppliersupplier relationship. Such research will enable us to identify the ideal types of supplier supplier relationship in the context of the particular product characteristics and buyers procurement strategy.
Acknowledgements This study was partially funded by the W.P. Carey School of Business Deans Award for Excellence Summer Research Grant Program at Arizona State University. We thank the rms and numerous managers who generously devoted their time to participate in this study. We also acknowledge and thank our colleagues, particularly Phillip Carter, Lisa Ellram and Arnold Maltz for their insights and help in introducing us to the rms used in this study.
Appendix A. Interview instrument Overview: Review the project. Dene the suppliersupplier relationship. Show a triadic buyersuppliersupplier picture. Ask the rm to identify a product procurement scenario and suppliers that meet the two criteria (i.e. competitors in the same market niche, major suppliers to the buying company in terms of dollar spent). The following questions are asked to both buyer and suppliers. Overarching questions: 1. If you are a buyer, describe a scenario where you purchase a product from more than one supplier. (If you are a supplier, describe the scenario where you
and the other supplier(s) supply a similar product to hthe buyeri.) 2. Describe how the suppliers interact with each other. 3. As the buying rm, describe how you manage the relationships between these suppliers. (If you are a supplier, describe how you manage the relationships with the other supplier and the buyer.) General information: 1. Company backgroundhistory, # of employees, annual sales, % purchased, products, # of total customers. 2. Relationship history between the buyer and each supplier, between the suppliers. 3. What percentage of the suppliers business is accounted for to this buyer? 4. How similar/different are the suppliers capabilities? Question on the product supplied: 1. How do you describe the product in terms of technology, supply market characteristics, importance and risks of the supply to the buyer? Technology ownership. Questions on supply structure: 1. For the two suppliers, how does the buyer split the business between the suppliers? 2. Or, if suppliers supply different components that share the same production and product technology, how is the business awarded, and what are the supplier selection criteria? 3. What (& how many) product lines and contracts does each supplier have with the focal buyer? 4. Are there contractual relationships between the two suppliers regarding this product and other product(s)? 5. 5Who are the other buyers that each supplier supplies? What kind of contractual relationships exist between the two suppliers for the other buyer? 6. How does the business relationship of each supplier to the other buyer(s) affect the focal supplier supplier and buyersupplier relationships? Questions on communication and interaction: 1. Describe how the buyer and suppliers interact with each other. 2. Describe how the two suppliers communicate with each other. And what is the role of the buyer in the suppliersupplier communication?
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3. Describe the interaction between the suppliers and between the buyer and the suppliers? Questions on buyersupplier and suppliersupplier relationships: 1. How do you describe the relationships between the two suppliers? 2. How do you describe the relationships between the buyer and each of the suppliers? Questions on supply performance: 1. How would you describe the performance of each of the suppliers? What are the implications of the buyersupplier and suppliersupplier relationship on buyer and each suppliers performance?
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Journal of Operations Management 24 (2005) 2752 www.elsevier.

Z. Wu, T.Y. Choi / Journal of Operations Management 24 (2005) 2752

Z. Wu, T.Y. Choi / Journal of Operations Management 24 (2005) 2752

Z. Wu, T.Y. Choi / Journal of Operations Management 24 (2005) 2752

Products or services purchased Peripheral electronic components Specialized molding parts

Number of suppliers considered 2 2

Number of interviews with buyer 6 4

Number of interviews with suppliers 0a 0a

Organizer Plotter Puppeteer

Testing equipment Vehicle tooling systems Package delivery services Substrates

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Fig. 1. Product sampling based on purchasing matrix.

Z. Wu, T.Y. Choi / Journal of Operations Management 24 (2005) 2752

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Fig. 2. Case of Coach.

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Fig. 3. Case of Flip-Flop.

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Fig. 4. Case of Hands-off.

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Fig. 5. Case of Mediator.

Z. Wu, T.Y. Choi / Journal of Operations Management 24 (2005) 2752

Z. Wu, T.Y. Choi / Journal of Operations Management 24 (2005) 2752

Fig. 7. Case of Plotter joint venture between Organizer and S1.

Z. Wu, T.Y. Choi / Journal of Operations Management 24 (2005) 2752

Fig. 8. Case of Puppeteer.

Fig. 9. Case of Risk-minimizer.

Z. Wu, T.Y. Choi / Journal of Operations Management 24 (2005) 2752

To reduce cost by consolidating supply base

Explicit and tacit information sharing

Better quality More exible supply capacity

Collaborative relationship Meaningful information exchange

Minimal reduction in supply management cost Failure to receive a complete turn

S1: loss of buyers good will S2: attainment of buyers favor

Collaborative relationship with S1 Professional working relationship with S2S9

Successful new product development New revenue source

Collaborative relationship with S1 Working relationship with S2

Less reliance on S1 Lower purchasing price

Z. Wu, T.Y. Choi / Journal of Operations Management 24 (2005) 2752

Reduced supply management costs

Lower purchasing price

Lower supply risk

Lower purchasing price

Minimal interactions Some knowledge of the identity of the other supplier

Tacit information sharing

Arms-length relationship Risk-Minimizer

To keep suppliers on their toes to get better pricing

Meaningful information exchange

No knowledge of the identify of the other supplier

Z. Wu, T.Y. Choi / Journal of Operations Management 24 (2005) 2752

Z. Wu, T.Y. Choi / Journal of Operations Management 24 (2005) 2752

Z. Wu, T.Y. Choi / Journal of Operations Management 24 (2005) 2752

Z. Wu, T.Y. Choi / Journal of Operations Management 24 (2005) 2752

Z. Wu, T.Y. Choi / Journal of Operations Management 24 (2005) 2752

Z. Wu, T.Y. Choi / Journal of Operations Management 24 (2005) 2752

Z. Wu, T.Y. Choi / Journal of Operations Management 24 (2005) 2752

Z. Wu, T.Y. Choi / Journal of Operations Management 24 (2005) 2752

Z. Wu, T.Y. Choi / Journal of Operations Management 24 (2005) 2752

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