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Elliptic
Curve
A1ed
Logarithms
Menezes &
to Logarithms
Scott Vanstone University N2L 3G1.
in a Finite
Field
Dept.
of Combinatorics Waterloo,
of Waterloo
Abstract
Previously, known that paper curve in the lar tic tic key ran for no the in better general-purpose elliptic than problem e field. the time time, curve exponential the reduction group algorithm logarithm time. was problem In this problem of the
In [8] and the group field tems. upon The this tacks nite the the matic arithms field The
[12], Koblitz
described
how
on an elliptic of these
curve
over a finite is based of group. solving root atto that dralogcurve is choprime time. reduces E is the by probThis between n dea finite
can be used to construct the presumed best (for group order intractability in the that see [13])
key cryptosys-
of the problem
of the elliptic
computing problem,
are
are the
For the class of supersingureduction thus algorithm probabilisthe former providing a probabilisto public
to any fidividing
proportional argues
the square
Miller
problem.
implications
of our results
are discussed.
in the
group
1
The group and
Introduction
discrete G can that the logarithm be stated such problem as follows: z such exists. for that The a general a 6 G @ = a=, integer
if the attacks
sen so that
is divisible take
Given
~ c G, find
an integer an integer
elliptic
in a curve
discrete curve
over a finite achieved the subgroup the Weil Since ing that
Fq to the discrete
paper,
we shall
in a suitable subgroup
by establishing of nth roots of P. pairing. the index-calculus in a finite of computing k is small. classes
of 2? generated isomorphism
by P, and is given
in Fqk, where
for running
logarithms
fee atl or part of this material are not made or distributed copyright
the ACM
is indeed
and its date appear, and notice is given that copying for Computing requires a fee and/or percussion,
of elliptic
curves,
including
01991
ACM
089791-397-3/91/0004/0080
$1.50
80
ation
in
[12], the
aS to
# O.
O, if There
the
has
jad-
we prove
invariant
is a natural
reduction.
is given involves
11
If
J?3(Fq) is a supersingular
of the elliptic to the discrete curve logtime logarithm
tangent
a few arithmetic dition, of rank the more or not Lemma curve (i) (ii) the points
an abelian
is a probabilistic
polynomial
1 or 2. By is (nl,
group
determines
n in a supersingular R = 1P be a point q is a pnme subexponential The lows. remainder In Section curves the some some power time. the new algomthm
of a certain There
If q is a prime, p is small,
ezists Fq if holds:
can determine
1 in probabilistic
one of the following paper we will and for Finally, curves is organized of the In in use. as fol3, t $0 m is odd and (1) t =
of the that
some
holds:
o.
Section
special
which of our
is especially
in Section
holds:
of the implications
results
crypt ography.
Background Curves
on
Elliptic
= q + 1 t denote is said the is preceding supersingular following of the group Let result,
order we can
of a deif gives
if p dionly curves.
In
this
Section, curves
some fields
of the
theory
of use.
duce the
which
we will
t2 = O, q, 2q, 3q, or 4q. The group structure the cyclic 4.8) either
@ ~fi+l,
For further
information,
we refer
the reader
to the
by Silverman E(Fg)
Zn denotes curve over Fq, the finite where than p is the 3, then Lemma (i) (ii)
2 ([18],
q = pm,
characteristic
If p is greater solutions
E(Fq)
~ Z~_l
in Fq x Fq to an
respectively. 3 (mod 4), q s 3 (mod % Zfq+l]/2 be viewed field The #E(Fqk q + 1 K Weil #E(Fq). then either
If t =
@ Zz.
additive
a subgroup
) from
as #
O, if the
curve
has j-
t =
invariant
where
a, @ are com-
the factorization
y2 + ~y
PT).
81
F is a point the
nP
a brief Appendix.
algorithm, of the
see algo-
denote
of n-torsion
E[~l
CIOthen ~ {O}
if ~ is
l?(~)[n], ~ zn@z~.
Fq denotes = P, then
algebraic
of < P>,
subgroup
if E is supersingular, non-supersingular. The ficient terms Lemma E[n] (i) n following conditions points in condition 3 ([18], result for in (iii), 3.7) and
or else ~b]
and
suf-
be an and Then
with E
of the of the
n-t orsion
E(~).
of
maximum
Pz are in
gcd(n, if
E(FQ) hold:
if
the following
is similar 4. For
and
as Lemma
completeness,
I #E(Fq)
~ ~ Z or 8 (~) integer
s
to q.
E(Fg) and
be an where
elliptic
curve
such inte-
en(P, Proof.
For
a definition We list
pairing, properties
some usefid
of the Weil
clearly P)k
en(P, en(P,
Pz)en(P, Pz).
ldentit~
For
e~(P, PI,
P)
F2
= 1.
E E[n],
all
Conversely,
l3 c and E[n], e~(R, ett(~l l2 + +
suppose + aQ,
that
l?zlineatit~
I3) = = en(Pl, e~(pl,
~3),
where and
(P, Q) is a generating
P2)en(Pl,
(iv) en(P1,
If
PI
< then
E[n],
and
if
in E[n],
all 1% E -E[n],
l1 = O.
en(a2Q, hp
e~(a2Q, p)ble~(Q,
en(P, by that azQ)-bl. the
Q)a2b2
(v) E E[nl
all Pl,l Miller pairing rithm, expected mial in
Q E(Fqk),
< E[n].
then
%(pl,
l%)
C lqk, for
=
If e~(P, aQ ) of = 1 then we have en(P, en(P, en(P,
has [11].
developed algorithm By
an
efficient
non-degeneracy = O, a con-
en, Thus
a2Q
a2Q ) # 1. Finally, P2)en(P, P). that curve This P)l en(P, a2Q)
is bounded
PI)
= #
s
follow, it is essential and
expected
O < a <1
to pick
points can
P uniformly be
E (F.q ) in probabilisaccomplished
82
randomly
choose that
that
R = 1P,
of some
we can find
from
Lemma =0
4 and in
by solving
are various time; yl)
a root
techniques over
problem
Fq in
probabilistic assume
we will
or a prime
has equation
and
describe
parlogcase
(1) (respectively,
~ = (ZI, YI) or
P = (izl,
(CI, V1 + z1)
or (21, Y1 +~3),
information problem
about in the
1 by solving
(3)). From
al is the 1/2 described least
Hasses
if the curve has equatheorem, the probaof some point Note that with of picking of picking three in the a
z-coordinate 11~.
at
Algorithm Input: nl, and Output: divisor (i) Pick (ii) (iii)
P c E(Fq) 1 s 1 (mod
order n! is a
2 is twice however 2.
are at most
Finally, ing results. Lemma ~$_l ha; (i) (ii) pifli order &Pi
for future
reference,
we state
the follow-
Compute Compute
base a in Fq. 6 Let G be a group be the prime n if and # 1 for 7 Let If only if and a 6 G. of n. Let n = Then a Theorem (mod n), 8 Algorithm where Let 1 correctly divisor computes of n2. n2 of 1 s 1 factomzation
n is some
s
of type {ccq) of the
of the element
G E E(Fq)
elements distributed
selected
uniformly
and
let 2 = CIP +
randomly
then about
the elements
enl (P, T)a enl (P, P)cln2 en, (P, O) 1. enl (P, c2n2G)
3
Let field n2 Inl. can ing mine teger ther that Let divides is the
The
E(F~) Fq, Given
Reduction
be with an group the #E(F~) algorithm due elliptic defining curve Znl equation [17]. to Miller Also, [11], q) = over for the finite where we ustime the inwe can then logarithm Since of order We R, logarithm n, where assume that the problem n We furfollows b= by Now, since
= =
structure
E (Fq),
in polynomial
en,
(R, 2)
= =
en, al
(Zpj~)
deter-
=
=
polynomial q 1).
determine of ~ to the
the discrete
s
within however, any 13(F), that then signifiof this
there from
4 that provide
R c J?2(Fg).
If n2 is small
n is known.
following:
determine
1. In the remainder
83
we describe n. k be the
a technique
for
computing
Remarks The reduction time not large for described in general. provided the finding in this Algorithm methods point section Q. section takes exponential tially (in in q) in general, as k is exponen2 is incomplete for We determining shall accomsupersingular
smallest
positive that
integer such
such
that k
); it is clear
an integer
such
that
in the next
for the
curves.
Then, that
by the bilinearity
of
pairing, en(P,
we have Q) = = =
4
nQ) O)
Supersingular
this Section, 3 takes we prove probabilistic curves, time logarithms
Curves
that the in for reduction time of for el-
e.(P, en(P, 1. p.
In
Section denotes in Fqk. within E[n], em(P, Q) The result and by the varies now among the sub-
polynomial
a probabilistic computing
n cosets atives
of <P>
By Lemmas classes
of these elements
2, E falls
s
Q c E[n] of unity. 10 H can now curve problem 2 An An element integer the ~ E[n] P E E(Fq) that of order R = 1P. k such = em(P, Q) that n, and describe logarithm the method field. for reducing such The Let f Q). that next en(P, result * Q ) is a primitive is easy to prove. P. be defined isomor-
t = O and O ~d 4)).
E(F,) E(F,)
~ Z,. ~ Z(,+i)/Z @
~2 (ad q =
by f : R w phism. We
en(R,
is a group
the elliptic logarithm Algorithm Input: R G<P>. Output: (i) E[n] (ii) order (iii) (iv) base Note since
problem
to the discrete
in a finite
applying teger
determine
E[n] C ~(Fqk ). For convenience, the relevant information in Table for now each class form of curves, Ztil to give @ Zax, the for is of the
integer that a
structure appropriate
has
proceed
a detailed
description
reduction. @ = e~(li, 1, the Q). logarithm of @ to the Algorithm Input: curve output of Algorithm 2 is correct Output: (i) (ii) P = = e~(Jp, en(.p, Q) Pick E(Fq), An 3 An element and integer k and P of order R ~<P>. 1 such c from point that R = iP. 1. and set Q = Q). Table n in a supersingular
discrete
Determine
a random
Q c E(Fqk) Q) and
(cnl/n)Q. (iii) (iv) Compute Compute a = e.(~, the discrete ~ = e.(l?, logarithm 1 of @ to the
Q)J
a.
84
of
Group structure
nl
Type E(F~k)
of
o o
*& I *./2a .1 .
cyclic
cyclic I 1 q+ la 1
-.!*
Q+l
2 2
1 2
l+@
IV
Cvclic
.
+ 1 T d2a
/3
I
14 6 1
Iv
I
izs&
Table 1: Some information VP = R. If this the is so, then order of a Otherwise,
k
about supersingular curves Note that nential point in discrete we obtain Proof ing the be solved n, where that the discrete in (iv) logarithm The problem in Fqk subexpothat the we solve has a base element probabilistic field require 12. of findF~k can time time as usof [3], [4] and in a finite Using a of order n < qk 1. algorithms logarithms the proof of Corollary logarithm We first in probabilistic obtain
n, so go to (ii). 7, Q is a random that This there n is #(n)/n. the facts that there
the probability
base element
be primitive.
a has of order
of Corollary 12.
n in Fqk, and
are n cosets
of J3 to the the
subexponential subexponential
We now proceed Section. Proof given. Fq. time, method have This To
to prove
the main
result
of this
follows. ing
of Theorem
do arithmetic polynomial can be done
11. in
We assume field Fk, we need of degree given power). denotes the isomorphic and k ~
that to find
is explicitly k over
a heuristic Observe
running
polynomial in [15] (the fields, the but is We then ideal polyto Fq. poly6, and time. in probalgorithm.
for example
(11) q -1 q-l
also applicable
F. =
(m)q3-l
(q+l)(q+l-~)(q+
by
~(z).
constant
a subfield E E(Fk) in by
elements expected
7 in Fk, number
until
7 is
qk 1; the
of trials
elements
a and
~ can be computed
(qk l)/#(qk 1) which is O(ln in q) since The order of 7 can be checked in polynomial using t,o<s, Since ~ (mod v=(q~
(s/w) -l(~/w)
polynomial
Lemma t<qk =
6. By solving
two discrete
logarithm
integers
aZ, 1)/w
the
expected that
ben is
qk 1).
a Q such Finally,
Then
observe time,
2P = R can be s
(mod
in polynomial
The logarithms
in prob-
85
subexponential also subexponential the algorithm and of a small solving the one fmd 13[n] Q, until
time
in /n qk (and in in q) using,
consefor ex-
curve
cryptosystems efficiently security. studying such field, The that an elliptic the must the as RSA block 1,000 some curve for
and k = 1,
[5] if q is prime
s
curve first logarithm n. the n. problem Using order This fact this of a. avoids
in a finite security.
sizes in excess of are necessary be exerfield. where It of the preceding over a finite with RSA
preferably
in practice, factorization, Thus points the 1. logarithm Note different rithm bilistic logarithm The puting running small We the more these (A) (B) prime, (mod (C) to in
factor check
for adequate
results
we can easily
care must
repeatedly
choose several
random
a has order
to this solve modified before
situation curve
discrete
equal in to is
be judiciously
chosen.
problems
1 is in
reduction time
y+y=z
particular in a finite
polynomial problem dominant discrete time prime. conclude tractable special that than elliptic
reduction field.
F2rn is no more of non-zero that the than existing the 4. curve y+ cost the
secure
than
using
the Since
in F2Z~.
on the in
step of the algorithm paragraph logarithms of the and algorithm is the final in Fq&.
in the previous
such a curve
is inferior classes
purposes and
statements (C)
is thus
L[l/2, power
q is a prime,
L[l/3,
qk] if q is the
F2*
considcrypsug-
for
the
elliptic
curve
discrete curves
by Koblitz discrete
Fz2.4 are
previously
m = 61 and
y+ y
g = z = z
+ b over over
F2_, F,,
az I).
methods,
m = 191 and m = 251 were suggested curves made (B) Finally, also be avoided paragraph. suggested (D) the of elliptic [6] for number over z+ Fz~ z (C) were by the The by curve in the previous
yz = z II). y
of curves
is a prime,
3) (class these
curves
in the next
The
Cyclic curves
:y+y=
5
In
Cryptographic
order to implement protocols is relatively for which the easy discrete the to
Implications
and Diffie-Helhnan like a cyclic in, problem exponentiate logarithm and El are much plementable that
grOUP
E2 more
23+2 they
group and is
since and
(see
give
a security
is apparently
Of F24?n
equivalent
to the
intractable.
(k = 4).
86
It
should to
be
the the
tools,
PhD
thesis,
M.
L T.,
January
curves
have
date,
that
is unattractive. curves
Koblitz,
Elliptic
curve
Mathematics
of Computation,
supersingular
Menezes of in
and
The crypt
imple-
elliptic
Acknowledgements
wish to thank Neal Koblitz Victor for conjecturing k value. for send[11].
Cryptology
curves
We would
10. A.
Menezes
curve in
of his unpublished
crypt
implementation,
preparation. 11. V. Miller, Short unpublished Uses Advances 218 (1986), programs for functions 1986. in cryptog- Proceedings Sci417-426. and Advances of Eurocrypt Science, their in 84, 209 on
References
1. L. Adleman, taking the 20th tions 2. A. roots K. Manders in tit and G. Miller, Proceedings on the Founda(1979), 175-178. On the On of
manuscript, curves
e fields, Science G.
of elliptic Notes
Annual
Symposium
85, Lecture
in Computer
elliptic
cryptosysSci-
Discrete Proceedings in
crypt
89, Lecture
rithms (1984),
of characteristic
C. and
Pomerance, discrete
Transactions
on Information
Algorithms A. Odlyzko logarithms 1-15. subexponential-time discrete logarithms algoover in and R. SchroepAlgo15. M. nite Rabin, fields,
Complexity
GF(p),
Computing,
(1980),
273-280. and for Illinois 64-94. Elliptic curves over finite fields p, 483L. some Schoentleld, functions of Approximate of prime Mathematics, num6
EIGamal, for
Transactions 473-481.
on Information
Journal
Kaliski, on Notes
bit
Schoof, the
based ture
Advances 293
computation
of square
roots
mod
Cryptology
of Crypto
Mathematics
of Computation,
44 (1985),
Springer-Verlag,
Schoof, finite A
plane of 183-211.
cubic
curves
7. B.
phy:
Kaliski, A
~~Ewptic pseudorandom
curves bit
and
cryptograand
Combinatom.al
generator
Theory,
87
19.
J.
Silverman,
The
of
let e
be
an
coprime ~ Do
to such and
Curves, 20. R.
E[m].
and.B~(Q)-(0), disjoint supports. and Q ) is fA(B) . fB(A) fA, f~ = rnB. (~A ) = mA em(~,
polynomial Computa-
G F(E) Then
quadratic
tiO?t,
Mathematics
pairing
em(P,
Q)
Appendix
We give a brief visors, algorithm more to [19] and Let sure. the K Let define for thorough [11].
(Weil
Pairing)
to the theory and outline Weil pairing. subject, of diMillers For we refer a D2 Let = DI, (Pz) D2 c Do (0) with + (fZ), Then DI
D1 = (Pi) where + Dz
(0)
+ (fI), and
P1, Pz = (P,)
G E -
~1, fz
c F(E).
(0)+
treatment
of this
line
= .Fq and
let
cloK. If D = ~ nP(P) can edly in l?, that D, tations method may itself find D using if then P f = the c ~(1.3) ~ np((P) method term for and in K. each 6 E(K) ~ c E(.E), take place the D. is that input the ~ by program that writing is a principal such that (0)), D divisor, = (f) then and previous summation. P in the intermediate problem rational size, instead relative
denotes
coordinates
repeatNotice
to compute divisor zP@ all but is a formal where many The denoted # O}. by the equation jield ~(z, K(E) lCIZ, y) = O, ~ c of E over y] /If. of T[a, Y]/It. i.e. ~ E K Simrip(p), ~ np. group, I np C Z, and The The of degree support
np
= O
compu-
P c E. divisors Do.
degree of D O form of D
The
size of the explicitly, efficients straight-line and time of the line at most occurring To pick (P find random + T) j
is the field
of fractions
we represent
be of polynomial is defined).
respectively. /,
the divisor
program
be undefined
of the intermediate fB = to T, U
~ Do. also
steps. compute e E(K). (U). for Finally, fA e~(p, Let We and Q), A fB we = by then
and points B
can
~nP=Oand~nPP=O. Let Then D that If such Dz denote Dz forms D1 there w the D2 exists (0). is a divisor (~) have disjoint f(P)nP. and f E ~(11) then if set of all D1 D2 a unique principal E D1. point P divisors. For each
(Q + U) programs above.
straight-line described
a subgroup
of Do.
we compute
we write G Do
em(P,
Q)
tA(Q
fl?(p
+ u)f~(~)
+ ~) fA(u) addition em (P, Q ) that P + T
D w (P) D =
1 =
= m be a fixed
The value provided
that
supports,
t s log2 m. successfully
we define
= ~pc~
88
and also
from U are
ai U and distinct
and and of
ai(p
pairs ditions Hence pair
+ T),
each
satisfy
= #l?(K).
probability Thus if m Q)
If the
computation
of random
89