Irans nuclear program has been a major focal point in the security environment of the Middle East since

the overthrow of Iraqs authoritarian regime in the course of the Second Gulf War in 2003. Although being accused with the development of nuclear weapons, the Iranian government continually asserts that the purpose of the program is a peaceful use of nuclear energy in accordance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Most of the countries with a current civil nuclear program buy the fuel for their reactors from the five nuclear powers acknowledged by the NPT (US, Russia, China, Britain, France) and return it to them for reprocessing (Makhijani 2004). However, Iran insists on its right to produce and recycle its own fuel by building uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing facilities. The problem is that these two technologies can be used for peaceful production of fuel but also for nuclear weapons (BBC News 2005). This potential double usage of fissile material is the main reason for the international communities worries about the Iranian nuclear program. This essay addresses the rationale behind Teherans nuclear ambitions. It is argued that Iran seeks nuclear weapons for security reasons and for increased regional as well as international leverage and prestige. Therefore, the first part examines shortly the arguments for and against nuclear weapons and then introduces the organizational approach of Jospeh Cirincione (2007) to explain why states acquire nuclear weapons. The second part focuses on the power and prestige dimensions of the model and applies them to Iran. In conclusion, the essay discusses and evaluates the arguments for a nuclear Iran, the pessimists arguments against proliferation and the role of the Cirincione model in the formulation of non-proliferation policies.

Drivers of nuclear proliferation Ever since the assembly of the first nuclear weapons in the 1940s there has been a lively debate about the arguments for and against nuclear weapons. On the one hand, the optimists, such as Kenneth Waltz, claim that nuclear weapons fulfill an important deterrence function; they help to prevent war between states and thereby increase the overall stability of the international system. Waltz argues that the proliferation of nuclear weapons is positive, because it increases deterrent capabilities and the cost of wars, thus making wars more unlikely. On the other hand, Scott Sagan and other nuclear pessimists argue that proliferation is negative and must be avoided because it increases the likelihood of preventive wars, nuclear terrorism, technical failure or accidental deployment of nuclear weapons. According to the pessimists, the spread of nuclear weapons destabilizes the international system (Sagan and Waltz 1995). The almost universal acceptance of the NPT1 (Federation of American Scientists 2011) indicates the prevailing trend against nuclear proliferation. Nevertheless, Iran (being a signatory to the NPT) and North Korea are currently suspected of pursuing a nuclear weapons capability. The American scholar and policy advisor Joseph Cirincione (2007) developed a theory which tries to explain why states do or do not acquire nuclear weapons. According to his model, a countrys decision for or against nuclear weapons is driven by five factors: power, prestige, politics, technology and economics. Each factor can either be a driver or barrier for nuclear proliferation. For instance, Britain and France acquired nuclear weapons to gain international prestige and live up to their self-perception as great powers. In contrast, countries can also gain international prestige by giving up their nuclear ambitions, such as Sweden in the 1970s. Cirincione claims that the majority of nuclear weapons programs can be described in terms of and as a combination of the first three factors. Therefore, the following part examines the power and
1

only India, Israel and Pakistan did not sign the treaty; North Korea withdrew in 2003

prestige factors more closely and applies them to Iran. The domestic politics factor is left aside due to the limited scope of this essay. The power and prestige models are based on the realist theory with the international system as its level of analysis, a theory of balance and power and states as unitary actors. On the contrary, the domestic politics model considers internal factions and bureaucratic politics on a state level.

The Iranian case Realist theory assumes that the international system is anarchic and every state is on its own in the struggle for power and survival. From this perspective, the deterrence function of nuclear weapons may be the ultimate tool to guarantee territorial integrity and sovereignty of a state. Bahgat (2006) argues that governments are most likely to acquire nuclear weapons capabilities when they perceive a serious threat to national security by rivaling or hostile neighboring states. In this context, nuclear weapons can either serve as a deterrent against conventional attacks (e.g. Israel) or as an equalizer against another nuclear state (e.g. US/Soviet Union; India/Pakistan). Iran has legitimate reasons to feel strategically insecure in the Middle East region. First, several states in its neighborhood have nuclear weapons capabilities (Russia, Pakistan, India, Israel). Especially the hostile relationship with Israel and incidents of anti-Shiite violence in Pakistan could compel Iran to develop nuclear weapons as an equalizer. Second, Iran is literally surrounded by American troops and allies. US Forces are currently stationed in Afghanistan and Iraq, Pakistan has become a strategic ally for the US war on terrorism, northern neighbor Turkey is member of NATO and Israel, although not a direct neighbor, is a close ally to the US. The Iranian regime feels threatened by this strong US presence in the region, since former US President Bush declared Iran a rogue state and part of the axis of evil in his State of the Union 3

Address in 2002. Iran fears that it could be the next target for US-driven regime change like in Afghanistan and Iraq (Perthes 2010). In this context, nuclear weapons could be a viable deterrent against US invasion. Finally, Iran has no allies in the region except for Syria, which currently undergoes a series of anti-government uprisings (Shuster 2011). Given those geo-strategic circumstances and under consideration of Barry Posens (1984) propositions for military doctrine2, it could be expected that Iran pursues an offensive military doctrine. However, Iran seems to lack the military and economic resources to pursue an offensive strategy, so that one of Posens other proposition could fit: Small states may choose a deterrent doctrine because their capabilities are insufficient to support either an offensive or defensive doctrine (Mayer 2004). According to the neorealist theory of Waltz, this would support Irans nuclear ambitions. The prestige model argues that nuclear weapons can fulfill symbolic functions and reflect national identity. They possession of nuclear weapons can make states feel more powerful and relevant in the international system. Brzezinski et al. (2004) claim that the prestige factor also plays an important role in the Iranian nuclear program. They observe a feeling of national pride and cultural superiority among the Iranian population, which makes it unbearable that the inferior neighbor Pakistan possesses nuclear weapons and Iran does not. Furthermore, the Iranian leadership beliefs that nuclear weapons would improve their international leverage and that a nuclear program is the most valuable bargaining chip in negotiations with the United States. The US invasion of non-nuclear Iraq in 2003 and the cautious US policy towards nuclear North Korea may foster this perception among Iranian elites.

States surrounded by bordering threats especially prefer offensive doctrines to prevent multi-front wars and to defeat multi-state threats sequentially; States without allies will prefer offensive doctrine.

Conclusion The aim of this essay was to highlight the security rationale behind Irans nuclear ambitions. After a short classification of the proliferation issue in the prevailing academic discourse, Irans nuclear program was discussed with respect to the security and prestige drivers of Cirinciones model of why states acquire nuclear weapons. It has been argued that it is a viable solution for Iran to develop a nuclear weapons capability according to realist international relations theory. However, the analysis was limited to a security perspective due to the limited scope of the essay. In order to assess the Iranian motivation more closely it would be necessary to include all five drivers of the chosen model and to change the unit of analysis to the state and individual level. The fact that nuclear deterrence mechanisms have successfully prevented war between the nuclear powers is a strong argument in favor of neorealist theory. In this spirit, the Iranian nuclear program would be justified because it contributes to regional security. However, the pessimists argue that events such as the Cuban Missile crisis or Able Archer brought the world to the brink of disaster and it was mere luck that war did not break out. Moreover, it may not be feasible to treat state as rational unitary actors. This may especially be true in countries like Iran and Pakistan, where state and religion are closely interwoven and several substate actors compete for political influence. The interesting point about the Cirincione model is that each driver also constitutes a barrier to proliferation. If the international community succeeds to acknowledge a countrys drivers for proliferation it can be possible to transform the drivers into barriers. For example, Irans national security card could be taken away by giving credible security assurances and the integration of Iran into a regional system of collective security or the creation of closer ties with an existing nuclear power which promises to protect Iran. 5

References Bahgat, Gawdat. 2006. "Nuclear Proliferation: The Islamic Republic of Iran." International Studies Perspectives 7:124-36. BBC News. 2011. The Nuclear Fuel Cycle 2005 [cited November 20 2011]. Available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/sci_nat/05/nuclear_fuel/html/mining.stm. Brzezinski, Zbigniew & Gates. 2004. "Iran: Time for a new approach." New York: Council on Foreign Relations. Cirincione, Joseph. 2007. Bomb scare : the history and future of nuclear weapons. New York: Columbia University Press. Federation of American Scientists. 2011. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 2011 [cited November 20 2011]. Available from http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/npt/. Makhijani, A., Chalmers, L., & Smith, B. 2011. Uranium Enrichment. Institute for Energy and Environmental Research 2004 [cited November 20 2011]. Available from

http://www.ieer.org/reports/uranium/enrichment.pdf. Mayer, Charles. 2004. NATIONAL SECURITY TO NATIONALIST MYTH: WHY IRAN WANTS NUCLEAR WEAPONS, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. Perthes, Volker. 2010. "Ambition and Fear: Irans Foreign Policy and Nuclear Programme." Survival 52 (3):95-114. Posen, Barry R. 1984. The sources of military doctrine : France, Britain, and Germany between the world wars. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Sagan, Scott Douglas, and Kenneth Neal Waltz. 1995. The spread of nuclear weapons : a debate. 1st ed. New York: W. W. Norton. Shuster, M. 2011. Iran Suddenly Turns Silent As Protests Spread In Syria. National Public Radio 2011 [cited November 20 2011]. Available from

http://www.npr.org/2011/04/29/135804964/iran-suddenly-turns-silent-as-protests-spreadin-syria.