Q & A in TRANSPORTATION LAWS

1. Q: Ernesto, a junk dealer, is engaged in the business of buying used bottles and scrap metals in Olongapo City. Upon gathering sufficient quantities of such scrap material, he brings such materials to Manila for resale. He utilizes two (2) six wheeler trucks which he owned for hauling such materials to Manila. On the return trip to Olongapo City, respondent usually loads his vehicles with cargo which various merchants wanted delivered in different establishments in Olongapo City. Ernesto charges freight rates for that service. Pedro, a merchant and authorized dealer of Mangboro Cigarette Company, Inc. contracted with Ernesto for hauling 200 cartons of Mangboro cigarettes from a warehouse of Mangboro Cigarette Company in Caloocan City to Pedros establishment in Olongapo City. In compliance with their agreement, Ernesto loaded in Caloocan City said merchandise on to his trucks. Only 100 boxes of Mangboro cigarettes were delivered to Pedro since the other boxes were hijacked somewhere along Olongapo-Gapan Road in San Fernando, Pampanga by armed men. May Pedro hold Ernesto liable as a common carrier? Explain. A: Yes. Pedro may hold Ernesto liable as common carrier. Article 1732 of the Civil Code makes no distinction between one whose principal business activity is the carrying of persons or goods or both, and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity. The said provision also carefully avoids making any distinction between a person or enterprise offering transportation service on a regular or scheduled basis and on offering such service on occasional, episodic, or unscheduled basis. Neither does said article distinguishes between a carrier offering its services to the general public and one who offers services or solicits business only from a narrow segment of the general population. Article 1732 deliberately refrained from making any distinction (Pedro De Guzman vs. Court of Appeals, 168 SCRA 612). 2. Q: May a common carrier be exempt from liability upon proof of exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees? A: No. A common carrier must exercise extraordinary diligence for the safe transportation of their passengers to their destination. This duty of care is not excused by proof that they exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees.( Engracio Fabre Jr v Court of Appeals 259 SCRA 426) 3. Q: H and W were spouses who owned a minibus used principally in connection with a bus service for children. The couple had a driver, D, whom they hired after trying him out for two weeks. F, a Christian Fellowship Association, arranged with the couple for the transportation of 33 of its members from Manila to La Union and back. A consideration was paid for the same. D did not take the usual route to La Union because a bridge was under repair in Pangasinan. He was thus forced to take a detour. D was unfamiliar with the area. At 11:30 p.m., D came upon a sharp

curve on the highway. The road was slippery because of the rain. The bus, running at the speed of 50 kph, skidded to the left road shoulder and rammed a fence, and then turned over, it came to a full stop only after a series of impacts. Several passengers were injured. An action for damages was filed against the couple. Were H and W liable for a breach of contract of carriage considering that they were not engaged in the business of public transportation? A: Yes. As common carriers, H and W were bound to exercise extraordinary diligence for the safe transportation of the passengers to their destination. This duty of care is not excused by proof that they exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employees. The case involves a contract of carriage. H and W did not have to be engaged in the business of public transportation for the provisions of the Civil Code to apply to them.(Fabre v CA) 4. Q: A was sailing southbound leaving the port of Manila for Cebu when it collided with B, which was then approaching the port of Manila coming from Japan. The collision inflicted a gaping hole on the left side of B, through which seawater rushed in and flooded the hatch damaging all the cargo stowed. Ten minutes prior the collision and at the distance of eight miles, each vessel made a visual sighting of each other. Four minutes after B gave one blast whistle to inform A that it was turning starboard (right), there was no blast or proper response from A. At the time of the collision, A failed to follow Rule 18 (a) of the International Rules of the Road which requires 2 vessels meeting head on to change their course by each vessel steering starboard (right) so that each would pass by the port side (left) of the other. Also, at that time, A had no proper lookout. Who would you hold liable for the collision? A: A was negligent for two reasons: (1) It failed to follow Rule 18 (a) of the International Rules of the Road by not altering her course to the starboard; and (2) it did not have a lookout properly trained and who is given no other duty save to act as a lookout and who is stationed where he can see and hear best and maintain good communication with the officer in charge of the vessel, and who of course must be vigilant. (Smith Bell vs. CA, 197 SCRA 201) 5.Q: Are the common carrier and arrastre operator always solidarily liable for damages to the goods shipped? A: No. The Supreme Court held that since it is the duty of the arrastre to take good care of the goods that are in its custody and to deliver them in good condition to the consignee, such responsibility also devolves upon the carrier. Both the arrastre and the carrier are therefore charged with the obligation to deliver the goods in good condition to the consignee. The Court, do not, of course, imply by the above pronouncement that the arrastre operator and the customs broker are themselves always and necessarily liable with the carrier, or vice versa, nor the attendant facts in a given case may not vary the rule. (Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. CA, 234 SCRA 78)

6. Q: When the interisland vessel M/V Pioneer bound for Cebu left the port of Manila, its officers were already aware of the typhoon Klaring building up somewhere in Mindanao. Near Romblon, the vessel encountered heavy rains. Fearing that due to zero visibility the vessel might hit an island, the captain ordered a reversal of the course so that the vessel could weather out the typhoon by facing the winds and the waves in the open. Unfortunately, the vessel struck a reef, sustained a leak and eventually sank. A suit for damages was filed against the carrier. a. Will the defense of fortuitous event prosper? Why? b. Can there be recovery despite total loss of the vessel? A: (a.) No, because the carrier was at fault. In Vasquez vs. CA (L-42926, September 13, 1985), it was said that to constitute caso fortuito that would exempt a person from liability, it is necessary that: (1) the event must be independent of the human will; (2) the occurrence must render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill the obligation in a normal manner; and that (3) the obligor must be free of participation in, or aggravation of the injury to the creditor. The event must have been impossible to foresee, or if could be foreseen, must be impossible to avoid. There must be entire exclusion of human agency from the cause of the injury or loss. In the instant case, the typhoon was inevitable occurrence, yet, having been kept posted with the same, the captain and the members of the crew took a calculated risk in proceeding with the voyage. In so doing, they failed to observe the extraordinary diligence required of them by law for the safety of the passengers transported by them with due regard for all circumstances and unnecessarily exposed the vessel and the passengers to the tragic mishap. They failed to overcome the presumption of negligence under the provisions of Article 1756 of the Civil Code. (b) Yes. The liability of the shipowner is limited to the value of the vessel or its insurance. Despite the total loss of the vessel, its insurance answers for the damages that a shipowner or agent may be held liable for any reason of the death of its passengers. (Vasquez v CA L- 42926 September 13, 1985) 7. Q: Z Transportation Co., unregistered owner of an ill-fated vehicle which claimed the lives of some people, and ZZ Transportation Co. , the registered owner of the same vehicle, were sued for breach of contract of carriage . Both Z and ZZ admitted that the driver of the said vehicle were in their employ. Can Z, ZZ and the driver be jointly and severally liable ? A: Previous decisions of the Supreme Court is to the effect that transfer of a certificate of public convenience to operate a transportation service is not effective and binding insofar as the responsibility of the grantee under the franchise in its relation to the public is concerned. Without the approval of the transfer by the Public Service Commission required by the Public Service Act, the transferor of such certificate continues to be the operator of the service and as such operator, he is the one responsible jointly and severally with his driver for damages incurred by passengers or third persons in consequence of injuries or deaths resulting from the operation of such service. We do not find any need for applying these rulings to the present petitioners for the simple reason that in their respective third-party complaints, as noted by the Court of Appeals, they both admitted separately that they are the owners of the bus involved in the incident in question and that Valeriano Marcos, the driver of said bus at the time of

said incident, was in their employ. (Zamboanga Transportation Company v CA G.R. No. L-25292) 8. Q: Will the extraordinary responsibility of a common carrier commence from the issuance of a bill of lading without the actual receipt of the shipment covered by the same? A: No. The Supreme Court held that explicit is the rule under Article 1736 of the Civil Code that the extraordinary responsibility of the common carrier begins from the time the goods are delivered to the carrier. This responsibility remains in full force and effect even when they are temporarily unloaded or stored in transit, unless the shipper or owner exercises the right of stoppage in transit, and terminates only after the lapse of reasonable time for the acceptance of the goods by the consignee or such other person entitled to receive them. And, there is delivery to the carrier when the goods are ready for and have been placed in the exclusive possession, custody and control of the carrier for the purpose of their immediate transportation and the carrier has accepted them. Where such delivery has thus been accepted by the carrier, the liability of the common carrier commences co instanti. Hence, while we agree with petitioners that the extraordinary diligence statutorily required to be observed by the carrier instantaneously commences upon delivery of the goods hereto, for such duty to commence, there must in fact, have been delivery of the cargo subject of the contract of carriage. (Saludo v CA 207 SCRA 498) 9. Q: A bus of X Bus Co. figured in an accident with a jeepney, resulting in the death of several passengers including two Maranaos. Information was received that certain Maranaos were panning to avenge their death by burning some of the buses of X Bus Co. Days after the accident, three armed Maranaos, who pretended to be passengers, seized a bus of X Bus Co., poured gasoline on it and ordered the passengers to get off the bus. However, "A", one of the passengers, returned to the bus to retrieve something. At that point, one of the armed men was pouring gasoline over the driver. "A" pleaded to spare the driver's life. The driver took that opportunity to jump off the window of the bus. The armed men shot "A" and set the bus on fire. An action for breach of contract of carriage was filed against X Bus Co. but the latter raised the defense of caso fortuito. Is the bus company liable? A: YES. In the case of Fortune Express, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 305 SCRA 14, the Supreme Court ruled that a fortuitous event is an occurrence which could not be foreseen or which though foreseen, is inevitable. If the bus company and its employees had been vigilant, they wou1d not have failed to see that the malefactors had a large quantity of gasoline with them. Simple precautionary measures to protect the safety of passengers could have been employed, such as frisking passengers and inspecting their baggages, preferably with the non-intrusive gadgets such as metal detectors, before allowing them on board, without violating the passenger's constitutional rights. To be considered force majure, it is necessary that (1) the cause of the breach of the obligation must be independent of human will; (2) the event must be either unforeseeable or unavoidable; (3) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill the obligation in a normal manner; and (4) the obligor must be free from participation in, or aggravation of, the injury to the creditor. The

absence of any of the foregoing requisites would prevent the obligor from raising the defense of force majure. (Fortune Express v CA 305 SCRA 14) 10. Q: A shipment insured under ABC Insurance arrived at the port of Manila. The shipment was discharged from the vessel to the custody of XYZ Services, an Arrastre Operator. A "good order" cargo receipt was then issued by the latter to the carrier. Upon arrival at the port of destination, some of the goods were found to have been lost. After the insurer indemnified the consignee for the loss, it sued the arrastre operator for reimbursement. Is the arrastre operator legally liable for the loss of a shipment in its custody? A: Yes. The Supreme Court held that the relationship between the consignee and the arrastre operator is akin to that existing between the consignee and the common carrier, or that between a depositor and a warehouseman. In the performance of its obligations, an arrastre operator should observe the same degree of diligence as that required of a common carrier and a warehouseman as enunciated under Article 1733 of the New Civil Code and Section 3(b) of the Warehouse Receipts Law, respectively. Being the custodian of the goods discharged from a vessel, an arrastre operator's duty is to take good care of the goods and to turn them to the party entitled to their possession. (Summa Insurance Corp. vs. C.A., 253 SCRA 175) 11. Q: Mr. A contracted the services of X to haul 305 tons of scrap iron from Mariveles, Bataan on board the latter's lighter. Pursuant to their agreement, Mr. A delivered the scrap iron to the captain of the lighter for loading. When about half of the scrap iron was already loaded, Mayor Y of Mariveles, Bataan demanded P5,000 from Mr. A. When Mr. A refused to give the said amount, Mayor Y ordered his men to dump the scrap iron at a certain compound. A receipt was thereafter issued stating that the Municipality of Mariveles had taken custody of the scrap iron. Is the common carrier liable to the owner of the scrap iron? A: Yes. By the act of delivery made by Mr. A, the scraps were unconditionally placed in the possession and control of the common carrier, and upon their receipt by the carrier for transportation, the contract of carriage was deemed perfected. Consequently, the carrier's extraordinary responsibility for the loss, destruction or deterioration of the goods commenced. Pursuant to Article 1738 of the Civil Code, such extraordinary responsibility would cease only upon the delivery, actual or constructive, by the carrier to the consignee, or to the person who has the right to receive them. The fact that part of the shipment had not been loaded on board the lighter did not impair the said contract of transportation as the goods remained in the custody and control of the carrier, albeit still unloaded. (Ganzon vs. Court of Appeals, 161 SCRA 646) 12. Q: A, a fare-paying passenger boarded FLY Airlines and checked in three pieces of baggage. One of the baggages did not arrive with the flight because it was missent. When the baggage finally arrived, it was discovered that some of its contents was missing. Upon complaint for damages, the carrier claimed that its liability is limited to the stipulation printed at the back of the airline ticket. A, the passenger averred that he was not able to read such stipulations as they were

printed so small and that they were hard to read. As such it does not bind him. Decide. A: The pecuniary of the common carrier may by contract limited to a fixed amount provided that the contract is reasonable and just under the circumstances and has been freely and fairly agreed upon. Where however, the conditions limiting the carrier's liability printed at the back of the ticket are in letters so small that they are hard to read, this would not warrant the presumption that the passenger was aware of these conditions such that he had "fairly and freely agreed" to them. A, therefore is not and cannot be bound by the conditions found at the back of the ticket stub. (Shewaram vs. Philippine Airlines, Inc., 17 SCRA 606) 13. Q: A passenger jeepney owned by spouses Isidro Mangune and Guillerma Carreon and driven by Tranquilino Manalo was on its way to Pangasinan when the jeepney's right rear wheel was detached forcing it to invade the other lane. After it encroached into the other lane, a bus bumped it from behind killing 3 passengers and injuring others. A complaint for recovery of damages was filed. Who should be held liable for the death and physical injuries suffered by the passengers of the jeepney? A: The owners and the driver are liable. In culpa contractual, the moment a passenger dies or is injured, the carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, and this disputable presumption may only be overcome by evidence that he had observed extra-ordinary diligence or that the death or injury of passenger was due to a fortuitous event. In an action for damages against the carrier for his failure to safely carry his passengers to their destination, an accident caused either by the defects in the automobile or through the negligence of the driver, is not a caso fortuito which would avoid the carrier's liability for damages. (Necessito v Paras 104 Phil 75) 14. Q: Corporation A sought recovery from carrier B the alleged value of the merchandise it shipped which was not delivered to the consignee or returned to it. The carrier contended, however, that assuming it is liable, it could not be held liable in excess of P300.00 for each package unless the value and the contents thereof are declared in the bill of lading at the time of shipment pursuant to a provision in the bill of lading executed between the parties. Is the stipulation limiting the liability of the carrier for the loss of the cargo valid and binding upon shipper? A: NO. A common carrier cannot lawfully stipulate for exemption from liability unless such exemption is just and reasonable, and the contract is freely and fairly made. The carrier cannot limit its liability for injury to or loss of goods shipped where such injury or loss was caused by its own negligence. The rule rests on considerations of public policy. The undertaking is to carry the goods, and to relieve shipper from all liability for loss or damage arising from negligence in performing its contract is to ignore the contract itself. The natural effect of a limitation of liability against negligence is to induce want of care on the part of the carrier in the performance of its duty (Juan Ysmael and Co., Inc. vs. Gabino Barreto and Co., Ltd, 51 PHIL 90). 15. Q: X a duly licensed copra dealer, loaded sacks of copra on board the vessel "M/V Luzviminda" for shipment from Mindoro to Manila. Said cargo however, did

not reach Manila because along the way, the vessel capsized and sank with all its cargo. Petitioner filed an action to recover the value of his cargo. In its defense, the shipowner claimed that his liability is extinguished by the total loss of the vessel. Is the defense of shipowner tenable? A: Yes, the direct liability of the shipowner is moderated and limited by the shipagent's or shipowner's right of abandonment of the vessel and earned freight. This expresses the universal principle of limited liability under maritime law. The most fundamental effect of abandonment is the cessation of the responsibility of the shipagent/owner. It has been held that by implication, the shipagent's or shipowner's liability is confined to that which he is entitled as of right to abandon -"the vessel with all her equipment and the freight it may have earned during the voyage,"/and "to the insurance thereof, if any." In other words, the shipowner's or agent's liability is merely co-extensive with his interest in the vessel such that a total loss thereof results in its extinction. "No vessel, no liability" expresses in a nutshell the limited liability rule. The total destruction of the vessel extinguishes maritime lien as there is no longer any res to which it can attach.(Chua Yek Hong V IAC 166 SCRA 183) 16. Q: ABC Corp. imported from the U.S. several machineries and equipment which were loaded on board the S/S Albert Maersk. The shipment arrived at the Port of Manila and was turned over complete and in good order condition to the arrastre operator XYZ Service, Inc. An employee of XYZ Service, Inc. was ordered to transfer the shipment and while the employee was manoeuvring the tractor, the cargo fell from the chassis and the machineries were broken, dented, cracked and no longer useful for their purposes. It was discovered that there were no twist lock at the rear end of the chassis where the cargo was loaded. DEF Insurance Co. paid the value of the damage to the consignee and as a subrogee, filed and action for damages against the arrastre operator, XYZ Service, Inc. Is the arrastre operator solidarily liable with the carrier for damages to the goods while in its custody? A: YES. The legal relationship consignee and the arrastre operator is akin to that of a depositor and warehouseman. The relationship between the consignee and the carrier is similar to that of the consignee and the arrastre operator. Since it is the duty of the arrastre to take good care of the goods that are in its custody and to deliver them in good condition to the consignee, such responsibility also devolves upon the carrier. Both the arrastre and the carrier are therefore charged with and obligated to deliver the goods in good condition to the consignee. (Firemans Fund Insurance Co. vs. CA) 17. Q: Jose is the holder of a certificate of public convenience for the operation of a jeepney line. One of his jeepneys hit Mario and his wife, Maria, causing Mario's death. The latter's heirs filed an action for damages against Jose, Juan (the driver) and Pedro (the actual owner of the jeepney). Pedro denied ownership of the jeepney, while Jose claimed that he was only the franchise owner and that he had nothing to do with the actual operation and supervision of the jeepney which is under the control, operation and supervision of Pedro who operates the same under the "kabit system". In the case at bar, who should be held liable for the death of Mario? A: Jose should be held liable. In the case of Vargas vs. Langkay, the court held that it is the registered owner of passenger's vehicle who is jointly and severally liable with the

driver for damages incurred by passengers or third persons as a consequence of injuries or death sustained in the operation of said vehicle. This is, however, without prejudice to the right of the registered owner/operator to be indemnified by the real or actual owner of the amount that he may be required to pay. (Jereos vs. Court of Appeals, 117 SCRA 395) 18. Q: Mylene Saba boarded Northwest Airlines flight bound for South Korea to attend a four- day convention. She checked-in one piece of luggage and after boarding, however, they were asked to disembark and transfer to Korean Airlines plane due to the Northwest Airlines plane's engine trouble. Mylene was assured that his baggage would be with him in the same flight. When she arrived at South Korea, she discovered that her luggage was nowhere to be found, instead, it was flown to Seattle, USA. It was not until four days later, after repeated representations, she was able to retrieve her luggage. Consequently, almost a month after, she filed an action for damages against Northwest Airlines which raise the defense of prescription since the claim was filed beyond the 21- day reglementary period under the Warsaw Convention. Does the Warsaw Convention renders inoperative the pertinent provisions of the Civil code on Common Carriers? A: NO. The Supreme Court held that the Warsaw Convention was a treaty commitment voluntarily assumed by the Philippine Government, consequently, it has the force and effect of law in this country. However, the Warsaw Convention does not operate as an exclusive enumeration of the instances for declaring an airline liable for breach of contract of carriage or as an absolute limit of the extent of liability. The Convention merely declares the carrier liable for damages in the enumerated cases, if the conditions therein specified are present. For sure, it does not regulate the liability, much less exempt, the carrier for violating the rights of others, which must simply be respected in accordance with their contracts of carriage. The application of the Convention must not therefore be construed to preclude the operation of the Civil Code and other pertinent laws. (Rufino Luna vs. CA, 216 SCRA 107) 19. Q: A ship was chartered, bareboat or demise. While in port, the vessel's master contracted the services of a third engineer for twelve months. The engineer boarded the vessel but was required to disembark before the expiration of his contract. The cause of the discharge was described in his Seaman's Book as "by owner's discharge." Is the shipowner liable for the wage of the said third engineer? A: A shipowner is not liable in a bareboat or demise charter. A bareboat charter is likened to a lease of an unfurnished house. The shipowner turns over his possession of the ship to the charterer, who then undertakes to provide a crew and supplies during the charter. It is well-settled that in a demise or bareboat charter, the charterer is treated as owner pro hac vice of the vessel, the charterer assuming in a large measure the customary rights and liabilities of the shipowner in relation to third persons who dealt with him or with the vessel. The master of the vessel is deemed the agent of the charterer. The charterer, not the owner of the vessel, is the one liable for the expenses of the voyage including the wages of the seamen.(Litonjua Shipping Company Inc v National Seamen Board 176 SCRA 189)

20. Q: What law shall govern the liabilities of a common carrier in the event of loss, destruction or deterioration of goods? A: As enunciated in the case of National Development Corp. vs. Court of appeals, the law of the country to which the goods are to be transported governs the liability of common carriers in case of loss, destruction or deterioration of goods. In the case aforementioned the law of the Philippines shall govern, being the country of destination of the said goods. The liability of the carriers is governed primarily by the Civil Code and in all matters not regulated by the said Code, the rights and obligations of common carriers should be governed by the Code of Commerce and Special Laws. (National Development Corp v CA) 21.Q: May a passenger be bound by the provisions of a plane ticket, i.e., the carriers' limited carriage liability, notwithstanding that he had not signed the same? A: YES. As was held in the case of ONG YIU vs. CA, the provisions of the plane ticket bind the passenger. It is what is known as the contract of adhesion where one party imposes a ready-made form of contract on the other, as the plane ticket. Thus, the carrier's liability for loss or delay of its passenger's baggage is valid and binding in the absence higher value declared for luggage and actual value of goods lost.( Ong Yui v CA) 22. Q: Due to the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo, which caused heavy ashfall, the NAIA was temporarily closed. During the period that the airport was non-functional, international airlines bound for Manila were forced to unload their passengers in foreign countries. For a few days, the airline companies shouldered the expenses for the hotel accommodations of their passengers. However, the companies later informed the passengers that they were no longer willing to defray the cost of hotel accommodations of their passengers, forcing the latter to bear the same. When the passengers were eventually transported to Manila, they sued the airline companies for damages. Are the airline companies liable? A: NO. Common carriers are not absolutely responsible for all injuries or damages even if the same were caused by a fortuitous event. To rule otherwise would render the defense of "force majeure" as an exception from liability illusory and ineffective. Accordingly, there is no question that when a party is prevented or unable to fulfill his obligation because of "force majeure", the general rule is that he cannot be held liable for damages for non-performance. Airline passengers must take such risks incident to the mode of travel. In this regard, adverse weather conditions or extreme climactic changes are some of the perils involved in air travel, the consequences of which the passenger must assume or expect. After all, common carriers are not insurers of all risks. (Japan Airlines vs. Court of Appeals, 294 SCRA 19) 23. Q: A common carrier named SS Titanic sank on a voyage from Hong Kong to the Philippines. The investigation found that such sinking was due to force majeure and that subject vessel, at the time of the sinking was seaworthy. Is the doctrine of limited liability applicable in this case? A: The only time the Limited Liability Rule does not apply is when there is an actual finding of negligence on the part of the vessel owner or agent. The pivotal question,

thus, is whether there is a finding of such negligence on the part of the owner in the instant case. In the case at bar, the answer is in the negative.( Aboitiz Shipping Corporation v General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corporation, Ltd) 24.Q: M/T "Tacloban City," a barge-type oil tanker of Philippine registry and M/V "Don Juan", an inter island vessel also of Philippine registry collided at the Talbas Strait near Maestra de Ocampo island in the vicinity of Mindoro. When the collision occurred, the sea was calm, the weather fair and visibility good. As a result of this collision, the M/V "Don Juan" sank and hundreds of its passengers perished. The Captain of the "Don Juan" in this instance was playing mahjong before and up to the time of the collision. Petitioners filed a complaint against the Captain. The Captain asserted in his defense that he was on "off duty". Discuss the merit of the Captain's defense. A: The behavior of the captain of "Don Juan" playing mahjong "before and up to the time of collision" constitutes behavior that is simply unacceptable on the part of the vessel to whose hands the lives and welfare of the passengers had been entrusted. Whether or nor the Captain was "off-duty" or "on duty" at or around the time of actual collision is quite immaterial; there is both realistically speaking and in contemplation of law, no such thing as "off-duty" hours for the master of the vessel at sea that is a common carrier upon whom the law imposes the duty of extraordinary diligence. (Mecenas v CA 180 SCRA 83) 25. Q: Rogelio Carochea, while being a passenger of a taxicab owned and operated by Pascual Perez, was stabbed and killed by the driver. The said driver was found guilty of homicide. While the criminal case was on appeal, Antonla Maranan, Rogello's mother filed an action to recover damages for the death of her son. The trial court awarded damages against Perez but dismissed the claim against the driver. A: Article 1759 of the Civil Code provides that "common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the negligence or willful acts of the former's employees, although such employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of the common carrier." It is the carrier's strict obligation to select Its drivers and similar employees with due regard not only to technical competence but also to their total personality, their behavior, and their moral fiber. The dismissal of the claim against the driver is correct. The action by the plaintiff was predicated on breach of contract of carriage and the driver was not a party thereto. His civil liability is covered in the criminal case. (Maranan v Perez 20 SCRA 412) 26. Q: The petitioners Norberto Quisumbing, Sr. and Gunther Loeftler were among the passengers of PALs plane in its flight which left Mactan City with Manila for its destination. After the plane had taken off, Florencio 0. Villarin, a Senior NBI Agent who was also a passenger of the said plane, noticed a certain 'Zaldy, a suspect in the killing of Judge Valdez, seated at the front seat near the door leading to the cockpit of the plane. 'Zaldy had three companions on board the plane. Villarin then scribbled a note addressed to the pilot of the plane requesting the latter to contact NBI duty agents in Manila for the said agents to ask the Director of the NBI to send about six NBI agents to meet the plane

because the suspect in the killing of Judge Valdez was on board. Capt. Luis Bonnevie, Jr., explained that he could not send the message because it would be heard by all ground aircraft stations. Villarin, however, told the pilot of the danger of commission of violent acts on board the plane by the notorious 'Zaldy and his three companions. "Soon thereafter an exchange of gunshots ensued between Villarin and 'Zaldy' and the latter's companions. 'Zaldy' announced to the passengers and the pilots in the cockpit that it was hold-up and ordered the pilot not to send any SOS. The hold-uppers divested the passengers of their belongings. Upon landing at the Manila International Airport, Zaldy and his three companions succeeded in escaping. Quisumbing and Loeffier brought suit against PAL to recover the value of the property lost by them to the robbers as well as moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. Whether or not robbery constitute force majeure and exonerates a common carrier who took necessary steps to prevent the same. A: Yes. A careful analysis of the record in relation to the memoranda and other pleadings of the parties, convinced the Supreme Court of the correctness of the essential conclusion of both the trial and appellate courts that the evidence does indeed fail to prove any want of diligence on the part of PAL, or that, more specifically, it had failed to comply with applicable regulations or universally accepted and observed procedures to preclude hijacking; and that the particular acts singled out by the petitioners as supposedly demonstrative of negligence were, in the light of the circumstances of the case, not in truth negligent acts "sufficient to overcome the force majeure nature of the armed robbery. The Court quite agrees too, with the appellate tribunal's wry observation that PAL's "failure to take certain steps that a passenger in hindsight believes should have been taken is not the negligence or misconduct which mingles with force majeure as an active and cooperative cause. (Norberto Quisumbing Sr v CA G.R. No 50076 September 14, 1990) 27. Q: A Co., a common carrier, shipped from England to Manila 180 cartons of "Dunhill" cigarettes consigned to B Co. When the shipment arrived at the port of manila, the container van carrying the goods was received by the arrastre operator. However, due to lack of space, the containers were not turned over to the responsibility of the arrastre. Subsequently, the goods were placed in two containers, both duly padlocked and sealed by the representative of the carrier. The following day, it was found out that 90 cases of the goods were missing. The consignee then filed a claim against the carrier but the latter denied liability contending that the loss occurred at the area under the absolute control of the arrastre. The carrier then filed a claim against the arrastre. Will the action prosper? A: NO. The shipment was lost while it was still in the custody of the common carrier and it failed to prove that the loss was occasioned by an excepted cause. Hence, the inescapable conclusion is that the carrier was negligent and should be held liable therefore. The common carrier is bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods. If the goods are lost, destroyed or deteriorated, the presumption of fault or negligence falls upon the common carrier unless extraordinary diligence is shown to have been exercised. The extraordinary diligence lasts from the time the goods are unconditionally placed in the possession of, and received by the carrier for transportation until the same are delivered, actually or constructively, by the

carrier to the consignee or to the person who has the right to receive them. (Citadel Lines, Inc. vs. CA, 184 SCRA 544) 28. Q: A passenger of petitioner Bachelor Express, Inc. suddenly stabbed a PC soldier which caused a commotion and panic among passengers. When the bus stopped, passengers were lying on the road, one died as a result of head injuries while others were severely injured. During the trial in the action for damages against petitioner, it was established that shortly after the commotion, the bus conductor opened the front door while the bus was still running, from which some of the passengers, including the deceased alighted. Would a caso fortuito absolutely exonerate the carrier from liability for damages when there was a finding of negligence on its part to prevent injuries to passengers? A: NO. The Supreme Court held that the sudden attack/act of the passenger who stabbed another passenger in the bus is within the context of force majeure. However, in order that a common carrier may be absolved from liability in case of force majeure, it is not enough that the accident was caused by force majeure. The common carrier must still prove that it was not negligent in causing the injuries resulting from such accident. Considering the factual findings of the Court of Appeals- the bus did not immediately stop at the height of the commotion; and the victims fell from the bus door when it was opened or gave way while the bus was still running; the conductor panicked and blew his whistle after people had already fallen off the bus; and the bus was not properly equipped with doors in accordance with law- it is clear that petitioner was at fault and negligent under the law governing common carriers. (Bachelor Express, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 188 SCRA 216) 29. Q: Spouses Paeng and Arlene together with their minor children boarded a bus. The front tire of the bus exploded. The driver lost control causing the bus to fall into a ravine. Paeng died. May the common carrier exculpate himself from liability solely on the ground that the tire that blew was new and thus, constitutes fortuitous event? A: No. The explosion of the new tire may not be considered a fortuitous event. There are human factors involved in the situation. The fact that the tire was new did not imply that was entirely free from manufacturing defects or that it was properly mounted on the vehicle. Neither may the fact that the tire bought and used in the vehicle is of a brand name noted for quality, resulting in the conclusion that it could not explode within day's use. Be that as it may, it is settled hat an accident caused either by defects in the automobile or through the negligence of its driver is not caso fortuito that would exempt the carrier from liability for damages. (Yobido v CA 281 SCRA 1) 30. Q: A is the registered owner of a freight truck. B hired the truck to haul fertilizer. Under the lease contract, B shall be liable for all losses and damages attending the carriage of the goods hauled by him. Thereafter, B entered into an agreement with C for the use of the freight truck in question for the hauling of certain merchandise. The merchandise was delivered to B but was not delivered to the consignee. Is the registered owner liable for the loss of the goods?

A: Yes. The Supreme Court has invariably held in several decisions that the registered owner of a public service vehicle is responsible for damages that may arise from consequences incident to its operation or that may be caused to any passengers therein. It is settled in our jurisprudence that if the property covered by a franchise is transferred or leased without obtaining the requisite approval from the Public Service Commission, the transfer is not binding upon the public and third persons. (Gelisan v Alday 154 SCRA 388) 31. Q: Gillaco was a passenger of appellant Manila Railroad Co. He was shot by Deresa, a train guard of appellant Manila Railroad Co., who has a long-standing grudge against him. An action for damages was filed against the appellant company. Whether or not a carrier is liable for all injuries sustained by passengers due to the willful act of its employees. A: No. The responsibility of the carrier extends only to those acts that the carrier could foresee or avoid through the exercise of the degree of care and diligence required of it. The shooting was therefore caso fortuito, being unforeseeable and inevitable and pursuant to established doctrine, the resulting breach of the company's contract of safe carriage was excused thereby. The crime stands on the same footing as if committed by a stranger or co-passenger, since the killing was not done in line of duty.( Gillaco v Manila Railroad Company) 32. Q: What relationship exists between the jeep owner and the driver under the boundary system arrangement? A: An employer-employee relationship exists between a jeep owner and a driver under a boundary system. The features which characterize the boundary system -namely the fact that the driver does not receive a fixed wage but gets only the excess of the amount of the fares collected by him over the amount he pays to the jeep owner I and that the gasoline consumed by the jeep is for the account of the driver - are not sufficient to withdraw the relationship between them from that of employer-employee. (Magboo v Bernardo 7 SCRA 952) 33. Q: May the owner of a passenger jeep operated under the boundary system arrangement be held liable for the indemnity due to the victim of the accident caused by the driver in case of the latter's insolvency? A: YES. Since an employer-employee relationship exists between the jeep owner and the driver, the former is subsidiarily liable as employer in accordance with Art. 103, RPC. To exempt him from liability on the ground that he is a mere lessor would not only abet flagrant violations of the Public Service Law but also place the riding public at the mercy of reckless and irresponsible drivers. 34. Q: A was killed in a motor vehicle accident. The jeep he was riding was owned by B and driven by C under the boundary system arrangement. C was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence but was not able to pay the indemnity due to insolvency. The heirs of A filed an action against B for the enforcement of his subsidiary liability as employer in accordance with Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code. Will the action prosper?

A: YES. B the owner of the jeep is considered as an employer of C. Thus, being so, he is liable subsidiarily for damages caused by the latter in case of insolvency in accordance with Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code. 35. Q: Arelene took a Japan Airlines (JAL) flight from the United States to Manila. The plane had an intermediate stop at Osaka, Japan. Upon reaching Manila, Arlene discovered that her luggage was erroneously loaded on a different flight. She demanded from JAL employees to return the luggage. The employees found the luggage but lost it again due to carelessness. Arelene filed a suit for damages. The JAL management admitted to the negligence of its employees but refused to pay the total damages being prosecuted. It claimed that it is liable only for $20 per kilo of luggage according to the Warsaw Convention. A: The management is wrong; The Warsaw Convention denies the carrier to avail of its provisions if the damage was caused by its willful misconduct or by such default on his part as, in accordance with the law of the court seizing the case, is considered to be equivalent to willful misconduct, or if damage is caused by any agent of the carrier acting within the scope of his employment. 36. Q: Transcontinental Fertilizer Co. enters into a voyage charter with Hong Kong Island Shipping Co. over the latter's vessel, "M/V H. K., for the transport of urea from USSR to the Philippines. One of the stipulations in the Charter agreement provides that the vessel owner shall not: be liable for loss or damage to the goods transported unless the same be due to the negligence of the owner or want of diligence to make the vessel seaworthy. The vessel arrived in Manila but the goods were shortlanded. The consignee filed claim with the insurer which in turn, as subrogee, filed action for reimbursement against the ship owner and the agent or the charterer. May the ship owner and charterer under the said contract stipulate that the owner be exempt from liability for damages to the goods unless the same be due to his negligence? A: Yes. A voyage charter being a private carriage, the parties may freely contract respecting the liability for damages to the goods and other matters. The basic rule is that the responsibility for cargo loss rests on the one who agreed to perform the duty involved "in accordance with the terms of most voyage charters. The charterer was responsible for the loading, stowage and discharging of the cargo at the ports visited, while the owner was responsible for the care of the cargo during the voyage. If the goods were shortlanded, this means that the loss took place on board the vessel before unloading of the shipment, for which the owner will be answerable. However, goods damaged or lost during the unloading is the liability of the charterer. (Maritime Agencies v. CA, 187 SCRA 346) 37. Q: A driver of a passenger bus ran over a pedestrian who died instantly. The insurance company indemnified the heir in the amount of P5,000 under a vehicular insurance policy obtained by the bus owner. The surviving heir of the deceased sought to recover damages, among others, for loss of pension in the sum of P10,000 which the deceased failed to receive against the driver. (a) Is the errant driver liable? (b) What is the nature and extent of the liability of the bus owner in case the driver fails to pay?

A: (a) Yes. Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides that "the amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at least P3,000 (now P50,000), even though there may have been mitigating circumstances. In addition: (1I) the defendant shall be liable for the loss of earning capacity of the deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; xxx". The pension of the decedent being a sure income that was cut short by her death for which the driver was responsible, the surviving heir is entitled to the award of P10,000 which is just equivalent to the pension the decedent would have received for one year if she did not dic.(De Caliston vs. CA, 122 SCRA 958) (b) The liability of the bus owner is subsidiary m nature. The P5,000 paid to the surviving heir by the insurer of the bus may be deemed to have come from the bus owner who procured the insurance. Since the civil liability (ex delicto) of the bus owner for the death caused by his driver is subsidiary and, at bottom, arises from the same culpa, the insurance proceeds should be credited in favor of the errant driver. (supra) 38. Q: L, an inspector of the Bureau of Forestry, contracted malaria fever while classifying the logs of V.L. asked V if he could take him in his pick-up truck as there was no other means of transportation back to the city. V agreed and invited L to sit with him on the front seat, but L declined. L accidentally fell-off the truck and suffered serious injuries which caused his death. Whether or not V should be made liable for the death of L. A: V should not be made liable. The deceased, as well as his companions who rode in the pick-up of defendant, were merely accommodation passengers who paid nothing for the service and so they can be considered as invited guests within the meaning of the law. As accommodation passengers or invited guests, defendant as owner and driver of the pick-up owes to them merely the duty to exercise reasonable cm-e so that they may be transported safely to their destination. Thus, the rule is established by the weight of authority that the OW11er or operator of an automobile owes the duty to an invited guest to exercise reasonable care in its operation, and not unreasonably to expose him to danger and injury by increasing the hazard of travel. The rule is that an owner of an automobile owes a guest the duty to exercise ordinary or reasonable care to avoid injuring him. Since one riding in an automobile is no less a guest because he asked for the privilege of doing so, the same obligation of care is imposed upon the driver as in the case of one expressly invited to ride. Defendant, therefore, is only required to observe ordinary care, and is not in duty bound to exercise extraordinary diligence 80'3 required of a common carrier by our law (Articles 1755 and 1756 of the New Civil Code). (LARA vs. VALENCIA, 104 PHIL. 65) 39. Q: Mr. X shipped thirteen pieces of luggage through Lufthansa German Airlines. Mr X did not declare an inventory of the contents or the value of the luggage. When the luggage reached the place of destination, only twelve out of the thirteen pieces of luggage were claimed by the consignee. A complaint for recovery of damages was filed against Lufthansa, which the latter claimed that its liability is only limited to $20 per kilo under the Warsaw Convention. A: The Convention does not operate as an exclusive enumeration of the instances of an airline's liability, or as an absolute limit of the extent of that liability .It should be deemed a limit of liability only in those cases where the cause of the death or injury to person, or destruction, loss or damage to property, or delay in its transport is not attributable to or

attended by any willful misconduct, bad faith, recklessness, or otherwise improper conduct on the part of any official or employee for which the carrier is responsible, and there is otherwise no special or extraordinary form of resulting injury. ( Lufthansa V IAC) 40. Q: Maria and her 5 year old son boarded a bus. The bus was running at an inordinately fast speed despite the passenger's warnings. As such was the case, the bus driver failed to notice a stalled truck and kerosene lamp the road, causing it to collide with said truck. Is the common carrier liable? A: Yes. In a contract of carriage, it is presume that the common carrier was at faun or negligent when a passenger dies or is injured. Unless the presumption is rebutted, the court need not even make an express finding of faun or negligence on the part of the common carrier. (Baliwag Transit v CA 256 SCRA 746 41. Q: X boarded a bus and seated himself at the left side of the vehicle. In the course of the trip, he rested his left arm on the window. This was his position when the bus he was riding collided with another vehicle. X's left arm was completely severed as a result of the accident. May X file a suit against the common carrier for breach of contract of carriage. A: It is negligence per se for a passenger to voluntarily/inadvertently protrude his arm I hand I elbow, or any part of his body through the window of a moving vehicle beyond the outer edge of its window. Thus, no recovery can be had for an injury which but for such negligence would not have been sustained.(Isaac v A.L. Ammen Transportation August 23, 1957) 42. Q: Mejia shipped thru PAL a microwave oven from San Francisco, USA, under PAL airway bill 001, to Manila, Philippines. PAL's office at San Francisco inspected it and found it in a good condition with its front glass intact. Mejia did not declare its value upon advice of PAL's personnel there. Upon arrival, however, in Manila, Mejia discovered that its front glass door was broken and the damage rendered it unserviceable. Discuss the statutory liability of PAL under the said airway bill. A: There is no absolute obligation on the part of the carrier to accept a cargo. Hence, where a common carrier accepts a cargo for shipment for valuable consideration, it takes the risk of delivering it in good condition as when it was loaded. By Virtue of Article 1735 of the Civil Code, PAL has to overcome the statutory presumption of negligence it was a laboring under in case of loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods, through proper showing of the exercise of extraordinary diligence. It may also prove that the damage to the microwave was because of any of the causes excepted under Article 1734 of the same code. Inasmuch as the subject item was received in apparent good condition, no contrary notation or exception having been made on the airway bill upon its acceptance for shipment, the fact that its glass was broken upon delivery raises the presumption that PAL's personnel were negligent in the carriage and handling of the cargo. (Philippine Airlines, Inc v CA 255 SCRA 48)

43.Q Passenger X boarded ABC Airlines at the airport of Laoag City for Manila. The plane which would then take an hour from Laoag City to Manila did not reach its destination. It was ascertained that the plane crashed at Benguet. All the passengers, including X must have been lulled instantly. In an action to recover damages, ABC Airlines disclaimed liability on the ground that there was no express finding of its fault or negligence to hold it responsible. During the trial, it was established that the pilot of said plane did not follow the designated route. Decide. A. Negligence of the common carrier need not be adequately or clearly proved to entitle them to recover damages. In the absence on any satisfactory explanation, the presumption is, the common carrier is at fault. In an action based on a contract of carriage, the court need not make an express finding of fault or negligence in order to hold it responsible to pay damages. The common carrier assumes the express obligation to transport the passengers to their destination safely and to observe extraordinary diligence with due regard for all the circumstances; and any injury that may be suffered by the passenger is right away attributable to the fault or negligence of the common carrier. This is an exception to the general rule that negligence must be proved. (Conrado Vda. De Abeto vs PAL 115 SCRA 489 July 30, 1982) 44.Q Vessel XXX received on its board goods for shipment which were insured with Star Insurance against various risk. Vessel XXX in turn was insured by Diamond Insurance. On its voyage, the vessel along with its cargo sank. Star Insurance paid the insured in full settlement of the claim and the latter executed a subrogation receipt. Star Insurance filed a complaint against Vessel XXX and Diamond Insurance alleging that the sinking of the vessel was due to the fault and negligence of vessel XXX which disclaimed liability on the ground that it was a private carrier because it was not issued a certificate of public convenience. Decide. A. Vessel XXX is a common carrier. It is not necessary that the carrier be issued a certificate of public convenience and this public character is not altered by the fact that the carriege of the goods in question was periodic, occasional, episodic or unscheduled. A Certificate of Public Convenience is not a requisite for incurring liability under the New Civil Code provisions governing common carriers. That liability arises from the moment a person or firm acts as a common carrier, without regard to whether or not such carrier has also complied with the requirements of the applicable regulatory statutes and implementing regulations. To exempt Vessel XXX from liabilities of a common carrier because he has not secured the necessary certificate of public convenience would be against sound public policy. (Loadstar Shipping Co., Inc.vs Court of Appeals GR No. 13162 September 28, 1999) 45. Q Mr.Z boarded Train ABC as a paying passenger from Manila. Mr. Z opted to sit on the platform instead of the designated seats for passengers. Upon passing a bridge which was under repair, Mr. Z fell off from the platform causing his death. Despite the alarm raised by other passengers due to the accident, Train ABC did not stop. Heirs of Mr. Z filed a case for breach of contract of carriage and seek for damages. Decide whether train ABC could be held liable under the circumstances.

A: Train ABC is guilty of being negligent when it did not even slow down while approaching the bridge which was under repair. Neither did it stop despite the alarm raised by the other passengers that a person had fallen off the train. Train ABC is rendered liable but mitigated by the presence of contributing negligence on the part of the victim since he opted to sit on the platform. He should have exercised due diligence to avoid injury unto himself. (Philippine National Railways vs. Court of Appeals 139 SCRA 87 October 4, 1985) 46. Q A cargo was consigned to Company A and insured with Diamond Insurance Company were shipped on board Vessel XXX. Upon arrival, Company A was advised of its arrival but did not immediately commence the unloading operations. Upon examination of the cargo after unloading, it was determined that the cargo deteriorated. Company A rejected entire cargo and demanded payment for damages from Vessel XXX. The demands were unheeded and Diamond Insurance Company was per forced obliged to pay. As subrogee, Diamond Insurance Company filed an action against Vessel XXX which disclaimed liability on the ground that the contract entered was a charter party agreement and as such, only ordinary diligence in the care of the cargo was required. Decide. A. A charter party is defined as a contract by which an entire ship, or some principal part thereof, is let by the owner to another person for a specified time or use; a contract of affreightment by which the owner of a ship or other vessel lets the whole or part of her to a merchant or other person for the conveyance of goods, on a particular voyage, in consideration of the payment of freight. Contract of affreightment may either be time charter, wherein ship is leased to the charterer for a fixed period of time, or a voyage charter, wherein ship is leased for a single voyage. In both cases, the charter-party provides for the hire of the vessel only, the shipowner to supply the ships store, pay for the wages, and defray expenses for the maintenance of the ship. The charter party agreement between Vessel XXX and Company A did not in any way convert the common carrier into a private carrier. (TABACALERA Insurance Co. vs. North Front Shipping 272 SCRA 52 May 16, 1997) 47. Q Mr. A bought from Mr. B a jeepney of which a down payment with a promise that the balance would be paid within one year. In default thereof, Mr. B filed an action for damages. A chattel mortgage was constituted as a security for the payment of the balance. Trial Court records show that the jeepney sold to Mr. A was first mortgaged to ABC Marketing by Ms. X though the two are one and the same to make it appear that way only as Mr. A had no franchise of his own. The agreement was from Mr. B to undertake the yearly registration of the jeepney which he failed due to failure to comply with some requirements by Mr. A. As a result, Mr. A suffered damages when he failed to claim any insurance indemnity when the jeepney figured in an accident. ABD Marketing and/or Ms. X filed an action for sum of money with damages. Trial Court rendered a judgment in favor of ABC Marketing. Was the Trial Court correct with its judgment? A: Party having entered into an illegal contract, neither of the parties can seek relief from the courts and each must bear the consequences of his acts. The Kabit System had been identified as one of the root causes of graft and corruption, and although not outrightly penalized as criminal offense is contrary to public policy is void and inexistent

under Article 1409 of the New Civil Code. It is a fundamental principle that the court will not aid either party to enforce an illegal contract but will leave both where it finds them. The court has erred in applying the doctrine of pan delicto.(Teja Marketing vs. Intermediate Appellate Court 148 SCRA 347 March 9, 1987) 48. Q Mr. X purchased from ABC Airlines a roundtrip ticket in San Diego, USA for his flight from San Diego, USA to Manila via Hong Kong. Despite a previous confirmation for his scheduled flight, he was later informed that he had no reservation for his flight from Hong Kong to Manila and was to be waitlisted. Mr. X sued said airlines for damages in the RTC of Manila. ABC moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction citing Article 28 (1) of the Warsaw Convention which provides that action be instituted only in the territory of one of the contracting parties. Before: 1) the court of the domicile of the carrier; 2) principal place of business; 3) where it has a place of business through which the contract had been made, and 4) the court of the place of destination. Decide. A. The Warsaw Convention provision on the matter of where the action for damage should be filed is one of jurisdiction which is not subject to waiver by the parties. A number of reasons tend to support the characterization of Article 28 (1) as a jurisdiction and not a venue provision. First, the wording of Article 32 which indicates the place where the action for damages must be brought, underscores the mandatory nature of Article 28 (1). Second, its characterization is consistent with one of the objectives of the convention. Third, convention does not contain any provision prescribing rules of jurisdiction other than Article 28 (1). In fact, the last sentence of Article 32 specifically deals with the exclusive enumeration in Article 28 (1) as jurisdiction, which cannot be left to the will of the parties regardless of time when the damage occurred. (Augusto Benedicto Santos III vs Northwest Orient Airlines 210 SCRA 256 June 23, 1992 49. Q Diamond Bus Lines collided with a delivery truck of ABC Marketing resulting in the death and serious physical injuries of the passengers of the bus. An action for damages was filed and trial court awarded, among others, P3,000.00 to the heirs of the deceased. A motion for reconsideration was filed on the decision seeking an award of legal interest on the amount adjudged but the same was not acted by the court a quo. No appeal was made by the heirs of the deceased but Diamond Bus Lines filed an appeal for the granting of legal interest and for the increase of the P3,000.00 award for the death of the passenger to P12,000.00. Can the court award damages not specifically prayed for when the claimant did not appeal the questioned decision? Decide. A: YES. As long as the damages which can be awarded is deemed by the court as just and equitable. Civil indemnity for the death of a passenger was properly awarded by vitue of Article 1764 in relation to Article 2206 of the New Civil Code which allows a minimal indemnity of P3,000.00 for the death of a passenger caused by the breach of contract of carriage by the common carrier. In accordance with prevailing jurisprudence, the indemnity of P3,000.00 should be increased to P50,000.00 and not P12,000.00 as prayed for in the case. (Eladia de Lima vs Laguna Tayabas Co. 160 SCRA 70 April 15, 1988)