A Small World after All?

The Reach and Grasp of the Globalization Debate National Diversity and Global Capitalism by Suzanne Berger; Ronald Dore; The Myth of the Global Corporation by Paul N. Doremus; William W. Keller; Louis W. Pauly; Simon Reich; Internationalization and Domestic Politics by Robert O. Keohane; Helen V. Milner; Capital Ungoverned: Liberalizing Finance in Interventionist States by Michael Loriaux; Meredith Woo-Cummings; Kent Calder; Sylvia Maxfield; Sofia Perez; Global ... Review by: Bryan R. Daves Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 42, No. 2, Special Issue: The European Union and Latin America: Changing Relations (Summer, 2000), pp. 109-121 Published by: Center for Latin American Studies at the University of Miami Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/166284 . Accessed: 20/12/2011 19:43
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ReviewEssay A SmallWorldAfterAll? TheReachand Graspof the Globalization Debate

Bryan R. Daves

Berger, Suzanne, and Ronald Dore, eds. National Diversity and Global Capitalism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996. Tables, figures, notes, index, 387 pp.; paperback $18.95. Doremus, Paul N., WilliamW. Keller,LouisW. Pauly, and Simon Reich. The Myth of the Global Corporation. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998. Tables, figures, notes, bibliography, index, 193 pp.; hardcover $29.95, paperback $16.95. Keohane, Robert 0., and Helen V. Milner, eds. Internationalization and Domestic Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Tables, figures, notes, bibliography, index, 308 pp.; hardcover $59.95, paperback $19.95. Loriaux,Michael, MeredithWoo-Cummings, Kent Calder, Sylvia Maxfield, and Sofia Perez. Capital Ungoverned:Liberalizing Finance in Interventionist States. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997. Tables, notes, index, 234 pp.; paperback $16.95. Stallings, Barbara,ed. Global Change, Regional Response: The New International Context ofDevelopment. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1995. Tables, figures, notes, index, 410 pp.; hardcover $64.95, paperback $29.95. Alook at the world economy today seems to find it more integrated than ever before. Firms such as Daimler-Benz and Chrysler Corporation merge and keep their headquartersin both Germany and the United States. The United States wants the European Union to buy bananas grown in CentralAmerica by U.S. companies, while the Europeans continue to favor bananas grown in their former Caribbean colonies. Automobiles sold under U.S. company names are now engineered in the United States, but their parts are manufactured in East Asia and then assembled in Mexico. Meanwhile, Japanese cars sold in the United States are also increasingly

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built here. Finance has become so global that questionable lending practices in the private sector in parts of East Asia caused a crisis that reached as far as Brazil. The trend that has been popularly termed globalization embodies a number of issues that are addressed in these five books. Beyond the basic nature of globalization and its causes and effects, these books examine how this powerful dynamic has changed the relationship between economics and politics, or between economies or polities. They also question the relationship between international and national economies. Is there room for national diversity in a more integrated world market? Although these volumes provide insight into the phenomenon of globalization, they do not always fully define or operationalize the concept. What does appear are two related but distinct interpretations of how the international economy has changed. The first relates to increased international exchange of goods, services, and capital. Some observers refer to this type of change as internationalization.The second refers to a change in the division of labor that erases distinctions between national economies. Some commentators call this type of change globalization. Economic specialization is no longer based on the production of goods within a single territory and their exchange between sovereign states; instead, production is more diffuse. It has changed from a primarily national phenomenon to an international one. (This distinction is more fully elaborated by Hirst and Thompson 1996). These two different conceptualizations have profound implications. An international political economy that is internationalized still emphasizes trade between nation-states. National governments are the sources of economic policy, albeit possibly in response to international changes. National sovereignty still exists, and there still is room for policy innovation by individual states. In other words, domestic politics still matter. Robert Keohane and Helen Milnertake this view: "Internationalization ... refers to the processes generated by underlying shifts in transaction costs that produce observable flows of goods, services, and capital" (p. 4). In contrast, for those who see the international economy as globalized, national sovereignty and national politics have given way to the international market as the chief allocator of resources and costs (see, in addition to these books, Strange 1996; Ohmae 1990; Greider 1997). In addition to the conceptualizations they follow, the authors reviewed here disagree on the extent to which the international economy is globalized or internationalized and on the implications for national governments. What is particularlyuseful in the volume edited by Suzanne Berger and Ronald Dore, as well as the one by Keohane and Milner, is that they present healthy debates on these questions.

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Is How CHANGED IT?

Keohane and Milner observe the transformation in the international economy in the increased openness of national governments to the international flow of goods and capital. They argue that trade flows have increased relative both to previous levels and to domestic product. Import levels in the period 1880-1972 averaged 10.6 percent of real GNP annually for industrialcountries and jumped to 22 percent in the period 1973-1987. From the 1950s on, they add, 16 advanced industrialized countries, for which they present data, saw a sustained increase in the ratio of exports to GDP. For the newly industrialized countries (NICs) Mexico, Brazil, Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan, Keohane and Milner argue that even with an absence of trade rules thatwould give preference to these states by the more industrialized North, the NICs'share of world GDP and exports grew dramatically. In 1964-65 these countries represented 3.5 percent of world GDP and 1.9 percent of world manufactured exports, while in 1983 the figures rose to 6.2 percent of world GDP and 8.7 percent of manufactured exports (pp. 10-11). More dramatic were the increases in international capital flows. By the end of the 1980s, gross international flows grew to $600 billion annually. In the industrialized world, capital inflows were $99 billion annually in 1975-77 and grew fivefold by 1985-89 to $463 billion annually. This boom was also seen in the developing world, where inflows were $52 billion annually in 1975-77 and doubled to $110 billion in 1985-89. Keohane and Milner's statistics make a strong case for an international economy fundamentally changed. But RobertWade, in an excellent urges piece in the Berger-Dore volume titled "Globalizationand Its Limits," readers to "use two eyes ratherthan one" to evaluate the evidence (p. 66). First he points out that trade as a percentage of GDP is small for most countries. If the international economy is truly internationalized or if production has become globalized, then more of a country's domestic product should be involved with trade. Some of this change, Wade suggests, results from a structuralchange in the most advanced economies, a shift from manufactures to services. This shift also means an increase in the nontradables sector of the economy (pp. 66-67). Second, Wade points out that world trade is highly concentrated in the industrialized North, and this concentration is increasing. From 1970 to 1989, the North's share of trade rose from 81 percent to 84 percent. What's more, the relatively small share of trade for the South includes the NICs. While conceding that growth in trade for the South was substantial from the 1970s through the 1990s, Wade argues that this increase began

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from a very low level, so the percentage of growth is somewhat deceptive in terms of its significance for the actual change in world trade patterns (pp. 60-70). Wade is even more skeptical of the evidence for foreign direct investment (FDI). As with trade, FDI flows are highly concentrated among the industrialized powers, with the United States and the European Union representing two-thirds of the global inflows of FDI during the 1980s. The South's share of FDI flows actually decreased between the 1960s and the 1980s. Moreover, much of this drop occurred simultaneously with the loss of private bank lending in the wake of the debt crisis. When Wade disaggregates the South's share of FDI, it is concentrated in the four socalled tiger economies of East Asia and in Mexico and Brazil (pp. 70-72). "Thereis no doubt that the world market for standardized financial assets such as currencies, government bonds and commodity, currency and interest futures has become highly integrated over the 1980s," Wade concedes. "The governmental barriers to finance capital in the OECD world have been largely eliminated" (p. 73). Yet he maintains that differences in regulation remain between countries, along with a limit on the number of financial products that are sold across borders. Some states place restrictions on incoming capital, while others restrictits exit and still others restrictits use. Most companies have their stock traded in their home markets. If capital markets were truly globalized, differences in the cost of capital would not exist, but in reality they do. Internationalfinance is also highly concentrated in the more advanced North.What liberalization to the flow of capital has taken place is found mostly among OECD countries. This is not the typical picture of unrestrainedcapital moving rapidly across the globe without regard to national boundaries. Wade's article can be seen as a repudiation of the claim of a truly globalized economy. But this does not necessarily deny that the international economy is becoming integrated. Indeed, the data from the 1990s show a trend toward greater investment in the developing world. By 1997, the developing countries accounted for 40 percent of world FDI inflows, double the amount they received four years earlier and a tenfold increase from 1985 (U.N. 1998). Thus the debate over whether globalization has happened is far less interesting than the process itself and its impact on states and economic actors. This leads to questions such as the political and economic pressures on states to liberalize their economies, the bargaining process at the international and domestic levels, and the possibilities or limits for states following independent paths in their economic policies.

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SOURCES OF CHANGE Although most of the books under review are far more concerned with the effects of international economic change than with its causes, they offer three categories for the latter: technology, politics, and economics. The importance of technology in production, its increasingly rapid evolution in the twentieth century, and its impact on commerce and finance have been profound, affecting the comparative advantage of states. In Global Change, Regional Response, Gary Gereffi points to the changed nature of production. No longer fully produced in one country, manufactured goods now fall into either producer- or buyer-driven production chains. Controlover the production process has shifted largely to multinational corporations (MNCs) and to market forces (pp. 113-20). Michael Loriauxoffers a more political explanation in the context of the changing nature of international finance. He applies Robert Gilpin's argument of uneven growth within hegemonic stability. Uneven growth led the United States, the hegemonic power that guaranteed the postwar internationalmonetary system, to abandon its role as a stabilizing force for internationalcurrency exchange. Then, purely out of national self-interest, it adopted policies that brought about financial liberalization across the globe. The form and pace of liberalizationdiffered from country to country according to the extant domestic institutionsand a country's position in the international economy (Loriaux et al., 220-28). BarbaraStallings offers another political factor: the end of the Cold War, which had the effect of changing sources of capital for developing countries. The collapse of the Soviet Union meant the loss of foreign assistance from both superpowers. As the need for developing-country allies disappeared, developing countries had to turn to alternative sources of capital: private investment, both direct and portfolio (pp. 11-12, 144). With the shifts in capital sources came stipulations. International financial institutions attached explicit conditions, requiring states to embark on reform programs in return for badly needed loans. Private investors attached implicit conditions: if states were to attractinvestment, they had to restructuretheir economies to ensure investor confidence (pp. 11-12). In economic terms, the advent of international regimes governing international transactions profoundly influenced the flow of goods and capital. The creation of the World Trade Organization and regional trading organizations such as NAFTAand MERCOSUR significantly changed the rules of international commerce by reducing or altering the barriers to international exchange. All of these factors have, in the view of Jeffry Frieden and Ronald Rogowski, led to "an exogenous decrease in the costs, or an increase in the rewards, of internationaleconomic transactions"(Keohane and Milner,

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26). Not all of them, however, have equal weight. Moreover, these sources of change may have boosted the possibility of increased integration but by no means have ensured its inevitability. Wade's evidence suggests, and Keohane and Milnerconcur, that of all the sources of change, the growing mobility of capital is probably the most significant, and then largely for economies already integrated into international financial markets. Technological change, however, only makes it possible to move capital across the globe; marketimperfections in the internationaleconomy still exist. The degree to which liberalization has occurred is the result of a very political process of bargaining and competition among the more powerful states over how the institutions that govern the international economy are constructed. Disagreements over the contours of these rules-especially between Europe and the United States-are manifest in the limited effectiveness of the WTO and the failure to conclude and adopt the MultilateralAgreement on Investments. Technological and economic changes only raise the possibility of greater integration;power and politics determine how it proceeds. THE FATE OF NATIONAL DIFFERENCES The most hotly debated questions raised by these books concern what happens to national differences amid increasing economic integration. Has the reduction in barriers to international economic exchange caused economic logic to replace political logic in determining policy choice? Although other commentators have declared that the state is dead and the world's economy is now trulyglobalized (see Daedalus 1995), the authors here would not agree. They differ, however, as to whether there are strong international pressures to liberalize economies, making it difficult for national governments to pursue independent economic policies. The contributors to both the Loriauxand the Stallings volumes view policy change as a process of sovereign states reacting to changes in the international political economy. States respond to changes in the international distribution of wealth, the international division of labor, and political pressures. The possibilities and limitations are determined mostly by position in the international economy. States' choices are dictated by such factors as the potential benefits from liberalization and the health and competitiveness of the national economy. Neither of these volumes, however, provides much insight into the domestic politics of policy changes. This is missing, in part, because they do not address the distributional struggles that changes in the international economy foster. Neither volume, moreover, can identify the causes clearly enough to test its hypotheses. As a result, neither the reason for the patterns of convergence nor the existence of divergence is fully explained.

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JeffryFrieden and Ronald Rogowski make an important contribution to the debate in their essay, "TheImpact of the InternationalEconomy on National Policies," analyzing the origins of domestic actors' policy preferences. Their work and the other contributions to the Keohane and Milner volume are firmlyrooted in the "second-image reversed"approach, which focuses on how changes in the international economy affect such preferences. Frieden and Rogowski argue that easing restrictionson international exchange reduces the costs of that exchange, and therefore can be viewed as a change in relative prices. The effects of these price changes are reflected both in aggregate social welfare and in the preferences of domestic economic actors regarding countries' foreign economic policies. These price changes have, in other words, both an impact on the overall health of the economy and a distributional impact. Internationalization,say the authors, reduces the costs for consumers of imported goods and increases profits for producers of exported goods while it decreases prices for goods that must compete with imports. In a schema reminiscent of their earlier work, they present three different approaches to predicting which economic actors would be harmed by internationalization: a factor endowment approach, an asset specificity approach, and a third approach that stresses economies of scale (36-42; see also Frieden 1991; Rogowski 1989). While they assert that these three approaches are not mutually exclusive, they do not make a strong case for their complementarity, as the three perspectives do provide quite different empirical predictions. The factor model would predict labor-capital strife; the asset specificity model would predict sectoral rather than factoral conflict. The authors' contribution is important nevertheless because it does present a parsimonious argument. What remains to be done is continued empirical research to test which deductive theory provides the best predictive model. Frieden and Rogowski do not go so far as to suggest that changes in the international system will automatically lead to changes in a country's economic policies, as have those who represent the most economistic approach to the globalization debate. In that view, one international market has replaced national governments as the arbiter of economic policy. But although it might be true that changes in the international political economy put pressure on domestic political economies, not all states respond similarly. CHANGES NATIONAL RESPONSES TO INTERNATIONAL To varying degrees, all the books under review reject the most economistic arguments about greater international integration leading to economic convergence. Robert Boyer, in "The Globalization Hypothesis Revisited:

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Globalization, But Still the Century of Nations?"in the Berger-Dore book, outlines three conceptualizations of convergence: economic convergence, referringto prices and productivity;development, the adoption of markets and democracies; and regulation, the adoption of similar institutions to regulate economies (Berger and Dore, 30-33). Intuitively, the convergence argument is quite attractive. States face potentially strong economic pressures. If capital is more mobile than before and if the nature of production has changed, as Gereffi points out, then states' room to maneuver is quite limited. If states do not maintain policies to ensure macroeconomic stability, investors will move their capital to more receptive countries. If governments continue to protect local markets from foreign competition, domestic costs will rise and international competitiveness will decline. For advanced industrialized states, a liberalized international economy means that the price for Keynesianism has reached untenable levels; and for developing countries, it means that import substitution industrialization strategies must be abandoned. These pressures would seem too great to withstand. Boyer points out, however, that the empirical evidence does not support the claims of economic convergence, either in terms of economic performance or in productivity, especially when developing countries are included (pp. 3441). His most important contribution, however, is the third category of convergence, that of institutional forms. If economic pressure worked the way convergence advocates suggest, then states would adopt policies that would make them most competitive. But Boyer finds far more divergence in institutional forms than convergence (pp. 41-59). In a similar vein, Paul Doremus and his coauthors critique the globalization thesis through an examination of the structure and function of multinational corporations. If the convergence thesis is true, then it should be reflected in how the carriers of globalization function. While Doremus et al. agree that the international economy has become more integrated, they reject the argument that economic logic has produced a single form of corporate organization and policies. Indeed, they point out that MNCsstill reflect the national characterof their country of origin (pp. 4-10). This occurs because the home government plays a role in regulating investment, employment, research and development, and antitrust oversight. This portion of the globalization debate continues an earlier exchange between Charles Kindleberger and Robert Gilpin (Gilpin 1975; Kindleberger 1970). Although all the authors agree that national diversity exists, they disagree over what explains the different national reactions to liberalizing trends in the international economy. Some attribute such differences to geographic location and the impact of powerful actors on the international

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system; others emphasize structuralchanges in the international economy. Those scholars who focus on domestic politics emphasize the importance of institutions or coalitions. BarbaraStallings and her colleagues argue that despite the dramatic changes to the international economy, the economies in the developing world reacted in regional patterns, influenced partly by the style of capitalism dominant in a particularregion. These scholars divide capitalism into three blocs represented by U.S., European, and Japanese models (pp. 14-22, 354-64). But although they can identify, to a certain degree, what characterizes the U.S. and Japanese models, they are completely unable to describe clearly what the European model looks like. The strongest cases are built for the influence of the Japanese model on Asia and the U.S. model on LatinAmerica. But even in these cases, the causal mechanisms are unclear. Stallings et al. rely heavily on trade and investment flows to make their argument. It might be possible to identify spheres of influence, but it is much more difficult to explain how these flows influence the structure of economic institutions.There are distinct differences among states within regions, moreover, that can only be accounted for by examining how these pressures are affected by different domestic institutional configurations and incumbent political coalitions. Because Stallings et al. do not include the Middle Eastand South Asia in their analysis, and because the European model is poorly defined (which would be relevant to their discussion of Africa),they can substantiate their thesis only possibly for parts of Asia and LatinAmerica. The contribution of Stallings'svolume is to call attention to different models of capitalism and how majorcapitalistpowers might influence their smaller trading partners. More work needs to be done in this area, with particular attention to the microdynamics of how trade and investment flows from dominant powers affect policy choices of smaller countries. The volume is also important because it suggests that however attractive approaches like that of Frieden and Rogowski might be, we still need to understand how regional links to the international economy may alter individual states' responses to global change. In Capital Ungoverned, Michael Loriaux argues that shifts toward more liberal financial policies can be traced to the decline of the United States as a hegemon and the subsequent pressure this put on the international political economy. This pressure manifested itself in the U.S. refusal to devalue its currency in the late 1960s, the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, the rejection of international exchange controls, and U.S. efforts to attract capital to support the U.S. military buildup during the Reagan administration (pp. 219-22). These events made it potentially difficult for countries to maintain policies that supported a goal of full employment over reducing inflation. But as Loriaux'scoauthors point out,

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the reactions of individual states to those pressures were determined by "a) their own position in the world economy; that is, the degree to which they themselves benefited or suffered from uneven growth, and b) specific institutional features of their domestic political economies" (p. 222). In the case studies, the authors focus on these variations as the key to understanding different responses to the same systemic change. Although this solves the problem of explaining such divergence within an overall trend of liberalizing financial regimes, it does raise the question, is a focus on the international level justified?Instead of looking at an overall trend, the differences in the states' reactions of states apparently should be the subject of closer examination. That seems to indicate greater diversity than uniformity. Like Stallings's book, however, Capital Ungoverned contributes to the globalization debate by focusing on how a state's links to the international economy can affect its reaction to changes in that economy. The neoclassical view would predict that similar stimuli, in the form of changes in relative prices, should produce similar reactions. But as these two volumes demonstrate, links to the international economy can affect the amount of freedom states have to maneuver and the path they may take.

DOMESTIC POLmcs
As Frieden and Rogowski observe, changes in the international economy do not affect all domestic economic actors equally. A pluralist view of politics would examine how a change in relative prices affects the interests of powerful economic actors, and how they might change political coalitions. Two fundamental assumptions in pluralism are that all actors are of equal importance within a polity, and that coalitions can easily change. Institutions, both political and socioeconomic, can mediate the effects and potentially alter the preferences of economic actors and politicians. Peter Gourevitch points out, in the Berger-Dore volume and in his earlier work, that to understand changes in policy, we must link changes in preferences to political power (Gourevitch 1986). The way people are organized can influence their importance to policymakers, the types of demands they make, and their reactions to economic changes. Geoffrey Garrettand Peter Lange, in their article, "Internationalization, Institutions, and Political Change," in the Keohane-Milner volume, demonstrate that differences in types of labor union organization have consequences for labor's reaction to changes in the internationaleconomy. Building on Frieden and Rogowski's insight that changes in the international economy lead to an expansion of the tradables sector in a domestic economy, Garrettand Lange present three types of labor organization. In

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the first, unions are free to form, but they organize only a small portion of the workforce and bargain at the plant or firm level. In the second, unions are organized on the industry level and can organize a large portion of the workforce, but there is little intra-union coordination. Here, unions are fashion, strong. In the third form, unions are organized in a "corporatist" with one labor confederation or a wage-leader union. In this type of organization, a large portion of the workforce is unionized (pp. 56-60). Garrettand Lange find that for weak unions or strong confederations, the shift in policies is smoother than it is with strong unions organized along industrial lines. Where there are strong unions with little coordination among them, unions in the nontradable sectors have a strong ability to mobilize in opposition to changes in government policies. In centralized unions, the leadership has the dual goals of maintaining overall employment and protecting the welfare of workers in the nontradables sector. In this case, unions are likely to advocate policies that promote overall economic performance, by facilitatingadjustment,and protect workers, by compensating those in the nontradable sectors. Differences in political institutions can also influence how a country responds to changes in the international economy. At the broadest level, these would be differences in regime type. Garrettand Lange argue that democracies will come closest to the pluralist model, because if policies do not change in the face of changed societal preferences, the policymakers can be turned out of office. In a democracy, then, politicians respond to changes in societal preferences out of self-preservation. Nondemocratic forms of government, conversely, do not have set procedures for replacing leaders; and because acting in opposition to governments can be costly, change will be sporadic and possibly dramatic (pp. 61-63). Garrett and Lange also point out that institutions are not necessarily fixed, and can be a central part of the adjustment process. Another institutionalist school, historical insitutionalism, is represented in the work of Doremus et al. In addition to their analysis of corporate structures, these authors the importance of national trajectories in the development of economic institutions, both macro and micro. Building on the work of Peter Katzenstein through an emphasis on domestic structures, they add what they call "national ideologies" to the factors that guide corporations (p. 16; Katzenstein 1978). Doremus et al. do not deny that changes in the international system influence the behavior and structureof firms,but they hold that differences between firms can be traced to different national institutions and ideologies. They therefore adopt a path-dependent approach in their analysis: options taken at earlierpoints in history influence the firms'later behavior. The authors present strong evidence that the different national patterns of institutions and ideologies have persisted even in the face of strong centripetal forces stirred by international integration.

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These lasting legacies lead to furtherconflict between states, as Miles Kahler points out in his article, "Tradeand Domestic Differences," in the Berger-Dore book. Internationaltrade is regulated through institutions that are themselves the product of political negotiations among states. Increased trade levels have exposed differences in the domestic economic institutions of states. These differences underlie the conflicts in trade relations; and as trade increases, the conflicts over its regulation increase as well (pp. 327-32). This is similar again to the view Robert Gilpin expresses in his hegemonic stability theory (Gilpin 1987). For all these reasons, politics is central to understanding increasing international economic integration. At both the domestic and international levels, politics is crucial in explaining how states and economic actors react to economic change. States want to craft new institutions that give them distributional favor, while domestic economic actors and politicians want to ensure their continued survival. To understand the dynamics of change, we have to answer questions of power, influence, and information-the realm of politics. It is clear from these five books that despite the trend toward greater international exchange, much diversity remains in how economies organize themselves and function. Changes in relative prices do not simply translate into the adoption of more responsive institutionalforms; instead, those changes are mediated or refractedthrough different institutional and coalitional arrangements. The next step for scholars is to continue and deepen the investigation of links between the international economy and domestic politics. Although greater international integration may not mean the death of the nation-state, it may bring about the need to remove artificial barriers to analysis. As Keohane and Milnerpoint out, the globalization debate allows scholars (or requires them) to move beyond the restrictionsof comparative politics or international relations in political science. To understand the impact of changes in the international economy on states, we need to examine the interaction of domestic and international politics.
REFERENCES Daedalus. 1995. 124, 2 (Spring). Special issue. Frieden,Jeffry.1991. DebtDevelopmentand Democracy:Modem PoliticalEconomy and Latin America, 1965-85. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Gilpin, Robert. 1975. U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation. New York:

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1987. ThePoliticalEconomyoflnternationalRelations. Princeton:Princeton University Press. Gourevitch, Peter A. 1986. Politics in Hard Times.Ithaca:Cornell University Press. Greider, William. 1997. One World Ready or Not: The Manic Logic of Global Capitalism. New York: Simon and Schuster.

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Hirst, Paul, and Grahame Thompson. 1996. Globalization in Question: The International Economy and the Possibilities of Governance. Cambridge: Polity Press. Katzenstein, Peter, ed. 1978. Between Powerand Plenty:Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. Kindleberger, CharlesP., ed. 1970. TheInternational Corporation.Cambridge:MIT Press. Ohmae, Kenichi. 1990. TheBorderlessWorld:Powerand Strategyin the Interlinked Economy. New York: Harper Business. Rogowski, Ronald. 1989. Commerce and Coalitions: How TradeAffects Domestic Political Alignments. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Strange, Susan. 1996. TheRetreat of the State: TheDiffusion of Power in the World Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Tsebelis, George. 1995. Decision Making in Political Systems. British Journal of Political Science 25, 3 (July): 289-325. United Nations. 1998. WorldInvestment Report.New York: United Nations.