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Philippine Press Institute v.

COMELEC FACTS: The Philippine Press Institute (PPI), a non-stock, non-profit organization of newspaper and magazine publishers filed a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer of issuance of Temporary Restraining Order, assailing the constitutional validity of Resolution No. 2772 issued by Comelec directing newspapers to provide a free Comelec space of not less than one-half page for the common use of political parties and candidates. The Comelec space shall be allocated by the commission, free of charge, among all candidates to enable them to make known their qualifications, their stand on public issue and their platforms of government. The Comelec space shall also be used by the commission for dissemination of vital election information. However, PPI claimed that Comelec violates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the government against the taking of private property for public use without just compensation. The Solicitor General in behalf of the Comelec, claimed that the resolution is a permissible exercise of the power of supervision and regulation of the Comelec over the communication and information operations of print media enterprise during the election period to safeguard and ensure a fair, impartial and credible election. Also, Comelec Chairman, Hon. Bernanrdo Pardo claimed that the resolution was not intended to compel those members to supply Comelec with free space, it was merely designed to solicit from the publishers the same fee print space which many publishers had voluntarily given to Comelec during the previous election. ISSUE: Whether or not Resolution No. 2772 is unconstitutional. HELD: Resolution No. 2772 is unconstitutional. The Supreme Court held that to compel print media companies to donate Comelec space of the dimension specified in Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 amounts to taking of private property for public use or purpose. It does not constitute a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain. There is nothing at all to prevent newspaper and magazine publishers from voluntarily giving free print space to Comelec for the purposes contemplated in the Resolution No. 2772. Section2 does not, however, provide a constitutional basis for compelling publishers, against their will; in the kind of factual context here present, to provide free print space for Comelec purposes. Section 2 does not constitute a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY


G.R. No. L-18841 January 27, 1969

FACTS: Sometime in 1933, respondent PLDT contracted an agreement with the American company, RCA Communications Inc., connecting calls coming and going from RCA to the Philippines and vice versa. Later, this agreement extended to radio and telephone messages to and from European and Asiatic countries. In 1956, PLDT, complying with their 24-month notice agreement, made known its termination of the agreement, which came to pass in 1958. Created in 1947, the Bureau of Telecommunications set up a Government telephone System by renting trunk lines from PLDT. In doing so, the Bureau has agreed to abide by the rules and regulations of PLDT, which includes the prohibition for public, use that which was furnished for private use. In1948, the Bureau extended service to the general public. In 1958, the Bureau entered into an agreement with RCA for a joint overseas telephone service. PLDT then complained that the Bureau was violating their agreement as the latter was using PLDTs trunk lines for public use and not just private. PLDT then gave notice that if these activities continued, they would disconnect service. When no reply was received, PLDT pulled the plug on the Bureau, causing an isolation of the RP from the rest of the world, except the US. The Bureau proposed an interconnecting agreement, but as negotiations wore on, neither party could come to a compromise. Petitioner Bureau of Telecommunications is prayed for a judgment commanding PLDT to execute an agreement, allowing the Bureau to use PLDTs facilities, as well as a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain respondent from severing existing connections as well as restoring those already severed. While the lower court directed respondent to reconnect the severed lines and refrain from disconnecting more, as well as to accept incoming international calls, PLDT filed its answer denying any obligation it has to the Bureau, as well as assailing the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance. PLDT also claimed that the Bureau was engaging in commercial telephone operations, which was in excess of its authority. The court then said that it could not compel the parties to enter into agreement that under EO 94, establishing the Bureau, said Bureau is not limited to government services, nor was it guilty of fraud, abuse, or misuse of PLDTs poles, as well as declared the injunction permanent. The complaint and counterclaims, however, were dismissed. Hence this appeal. ISSUES: Whether or not the Republic may require PLDT to permit interconnection between it and the government.

HELD: The Republic may require, in the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain, require the telephone company to permit interconnection of the government telephone system and that of the PLDT, as the needs of the government service may require, subject to the payment of just compensation to be determined by the court. Nominally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of title to, and possession of, the expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why the said power may not be availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of condemned property, without loss of title and possession. It is unquestionable that real property may, through expropriation, be subjected to an easement of right of way. The use of the PLDT's lines and services to allow inter-service connection between both telephone systems is not much different. In either case private property is subjected to a burden for public use and benefit. If, under section 6, Article XIII, of the Constitution, the State may, in the interest of national welfare, transfer utilities to public ownership upon payment of just compensation, there is no reason why the State may not require a public utility to render services in the general interest, provided just compensation is paid therefor. Ultimately, the beneficiary of the interconnecting service would be the users of both telephone systems, so that the condemnation would be for public use.

Republic v. Salem Investment Corporation FACTS: Batas Pambansa Blg. 340 was passed authorizing the expropriation of parcels of lands in the names of defendants in this case, including a portion of the land, consisting of 1,380 sq. meters, belonging to the spouses De la Rama covered by TCT No. 16213. However, five years thereafter the spouses De la Rama entered into a contract with intervenor Alfredo Guerrero whereby the De la Rama agreed to sell to Guerrero the entire property, consisting of 4,075 sq. meters for the amount of P11,800,000.00. The De la Rama received the sum of P2,200,000.00 as partial payment of the purchase price, the balance thereof to be paid upon release of the title by the Philippine Veterans Bank. Guerrero filed in the RTC Pasay a complaint for specific performance to compel the De la Ramas to proceed with the sale but while this case was pending, the Republic of the Philippines filed the case for the expropriation pursuant to B.P. Blg. 340 among the defendants named in the complaint were the De la Ramas as registered owners of Lot 834, a portion of which (Lot 834-A) was part of the expropriated property. Upon the deposit of P12,970,350.00 representing 10 percent of the approximate market value of the subject lands, a writ of possession was issued in favor of the government. Consequently, Guerrero filed a motion for intervention alleging that the De la Ramas had agreed to sell to him, the entire Lot 834 and that a case for specific performance had been filed by him against the De la Ramas. The De la Ramas claim that they should receive the just compensation because when they agreed to sell Lot 834 in 1988 to Guerrero, it did not include the portion expropriated by the Republic since, at that time, such portion had been expropriated by the government by virtue of B.P. Blg. 340. On the other hand, Guerrero argues that the title to the expropriated portion did not immediately pass to the government upon the enactment of B.P. Blg. 340 in 1983. as payment of just compensation was yet to be made before ownership of the land was transferred to the government. As a result, De la Ramas still owned the entire Lot 834 at the time they agreed to sell it to Guerrero. Therefore, since Guerrero obtained ownership of the said lot, including the lot expropriated by the government, he has the right to receive the just compensation over the said property. Meanwhile the trial court rendered a decision for the specific performance, upholding the validity of the contract to sell and ordering the De la Ramas at the rate of p23,976.00 per sq. meter for the taking of 920 sq. meters out of the 1, 380 sq. meters to be expropriated under B.P. Blg. 340. The De la Ramas appealed to the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court, and both courts denied their petition. Meanwhile, Guerrero filed an Omnibus Motion praying that the just compensation for the land deposited in court and filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for mandamus, certiorari and injuction with temporary restraining order to enjoin the Republic from releasing or paying to the De la Ramas any amount corresponding to the payment of the expropriated property ad to compel the trial court to resolve his two motions. The trial court and the Court of Appeals declared Alfredo Guerrero the rightful recipient of the amount for the expropriation of lands under B.P Blg. 340. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not Guerrero was the rightful owner entitled to receive the just compensation from the Republic. HELD: Guerrero was the rightful owner entitled to receive the just compensation from the Republic because evidently Lot 834 was conveyed in 1994 to Guerrero by virtue of the Deed of Absolute Sale. This contract was registered in the Register of Deeds and, accordingly, a new transfer of certificate of title was issued to Guerrero. The power of eminent domain is an inherent power of the state. No Constitutional conferment is necessary to vest it in the state. The Constitutional provision on eminent domain, Art III, section 9, provides a limitation rather than a basis for the exercise of such power by the government. Thus, it states that Private Property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. Expropriation may be initiated by court action or by legislation and it consists of two stages. In the case at hand, the first stage of expropriation was completed when B.P. Blg. 340 was enacted providing for the expropriation of 1,380 sq. meters of the land in question. In 1900, the government commenced the second stage of expropriation through the filing of a petition for the determination of just compensation. This stage was not completed, however, because of the intervention of Guerrero which gave rise to the question of ownership if the subject land. Therefore, the title to the expropriated property of the De la Ramas remained with them and did not at that point pass to the government. And since they sold the said property to Guerrero, Guerrero became the owner of the subject land and the rightful owner entitled to receive the just compensation for the expropriation of lands under B.P. Blg. 340. Thus, the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

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