RONALD ALLAN POE a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR., protestant, vs. GLORIA MACAPAGALARROYO, protestee. P.E.T. CASE No.

002. March 29, 2005 In the 2004 Presidential Elections, Protestant Fernando Poe Jr. (FPJ) ran against Protestee Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA). Congress proclaimed GMA as the winner, and FP obtained the second highest number of votes. FPJ filed an election protest before the Supreme Court, acting as the Presidential Electoral Tribunal. While the case was pending, FPJ died due to cardio-pulmonary arrest. FPJ's widow, as movant/intervenor, filed a motion to intervene as a substitute for her late husband. She claims that death of the protestant is not a ground for dismissal. GMA asserts that a widow is not a proper party to replace the protestant since public office is personal, it is not property that can be transferred from one person to another by succession. Besides under the rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, only those who obtained the 2nd and 3rd highest vote may file the protest. The intervenor claims that in as much as the office is personal, the action is imbued with public interest, like in quo warranto proceedings. Whether or not a widow may substitute/intervene for the deceased protestant. No. The court held that she cannot intervene for the protestant. Rule 14 of the PET Rules provides that: Rule 14. Election Protest.Only the registered candidate for President or for Vice-President of the Philippines who received the second or third highest number of votes may contest the election of the President or the VicePresident, as the case may be, by filing a verified petition with the Clerk of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty (30) days after the proclamation of the winner. This rule, in effect, determines who are the real parties in interest in an election protest. The rules of the PET are silent on substitution. Decisions of Electoral Tribunals, Supreme Court decisions and the Rules of Court can be applied suppletory to the PET rules. Rule 3, Section 16 of the Rules of Court provides for the substitution of a legal representative. However said rule is not applicable to election contests as the office is not a property and it cannot pass to the heirs. In Vda. De De Mesa v. Mencias, the Court held that substitution can be had but the widow is not a proper party as it she is not a real party in interest. Thus, we hold that the Court will allow substitution but only by a real-party-in-interest. This rule is founded on the dual aspect of an election contest. First, it is in pursuit of ones right to a public office, and second, it is imbued with public interest. Accordingly, we dismiss the present motion because the movant/intervenor is not a proper party to substitute for the deceased protestant.