History and Theory, Bezalel // Issue Ao.

14 - Cermania
Panofsky's Idea and Auerbach's Figura, 1wo Philological Iconodulist
Experiments
Adi Efal
Abstract: In this article I propose a comparative examination of two essays:
Erwin Panofsky's Idea (1924) and Erich Auerbachs' Figura (1938). Basing my
reading on our own present-day embarrassment regarding the status of images,
I propose to view both Idea and Figura as responsible for shaping the terms, as
well as the possible resolutions, for our present-day iconoclast episode. In as
much as Panofsky demonstrated how the history of the European theory of art
stemmed out of the ancient platonic condemnation of produced mimesis, while
developing the concept of the (artistic) "Idea", Auerbach envisaged an
alternative for the definition and mechanics of images, which is not eidetic but
figurative. I conclude my essay by proposing the method I refer to as
"Figurative Philology" as a synthesis of Idea and Figura. 1]



Iconoclasm and the Science of Art
The Iollowing article suggests a comparative reading oI two essays, written by two
German-Jewish Scholars: Erwin PanoIsky`s Idea,|2| published in 1924, and Erich
Auerbarch`s Figura,|3| published in 1938. I understand these two essays as
experiments in constructing a philological apology oI the pictorial, and thereby, it is
possible to regard the two essays as posing an Iconodulist agenda to the Humanities.
In addition to being two supreme maniIestations oI an assimilated German Jewry,
Idea and Figura also Iurnished the terms Ior a continuous iconoclast crisis, one
which I believe was prominent during the 20
th
century, but still Iorms a relevant
subject oI debate nowadays: It is the latent crisis revolving around the issue oI the
fudgmental capacitv of the pictorial, which was actually initiated during the 18
th
century, yet which is still apparent in art-historical scholarship, as well as in other
cultural Iields, as those revolving around the criticism and presentation oI
contemporary art, or in media and visual studies.|4| It seems that the relationship
between the judgmental and the pictorial was initiated when the Imaginary was
Iorwarded as an accepted and central Iaculty oI thought.|5| The judgmental capacity,
so I contend, presently dominates our current western visual culture. With and under
this capacity, images are responsible Ior Iorming valuating representations of the
world. I suggest that the contemporary paradigmatic tendency oI visual culture is to
make images behave as juridical agents, presenting a cohesive-state-oI-aIIairs
between a particular and an encompassing totality (Or a universal). This is a
situation concordant with the Kantian deIinition oI the activity oI the Iaculty oI
judgment (Urteilskraft), which is the human capacity to draw a relation between a
particular and a universal.|6| The capacity oI the image to Iorm a cohesive totality,
and the modern demand that it will exercise this capacity,|7| is one oI the central
causes oI the iconoclast episode we are witnessing. Many 20
th
century philosophers,
Irom Bergson and Wittgenstein to Heidegger, Deleuze and Lacan, were occupied
with the power as well as the dangers to be Iound in images as Iorming this
cohesiveness. Many 20
th
century thinkers were skeptical regarding the capacity oI
the image to serve as a carrier oI thought and truth. The dominancy oI Iconocalstic
arguments in 20
th
century aesthetic discourse was pointed out by Michael Kelly.|8|
Kelly understood that the source oI 20
th
century aesthetic Iconoclasm is rooted in the
latter's uneasy relationship with Truth, and he argued that "(.) it thus seems that we
must consider the option oI dispensing with the notion oI truth when we think
philosophically about art."|9| I suggest that it is the one and the same problem oI the
relationship between Truth and the artistic image that served as the starting-point Ior
PanoIsky's Idea, and which, so I suggest, embodies also the underlying challenge oI
Auerbach's Figura.
II Kelly emphasized the iconoclastic tendency in 20
th
century aesthetics, then
Martin Jay has argued that 20
th
century French thought had lead a process oI
"denigration oI vision" altogether. I believe that we can Iurther argue, Iollowing
Jacques Ranciere,|10| that it is the "Aesthetics regime" itselI, initiated by 18
th
century German thought, which lead to the iconoclast episode oI the 20th century:
While the artwork was identiIied more and more with the (essentially "subjective,"
sensual, passive and synthetic, i.e. phenomenolocial) experience oI viewing, it was
more and more impossible to account Ior the place "truth" should occupy in this
Iormulation. This problem lead, so goes my suggestion, to many oI the inner-
conIlicts, so much a characteristic oI 20
th
century aesthetics, which lead to explicit
iconoclastic gestures. Against the synthetic cohesiveness oI the art-work,
iconoclastic strategies oI analysis, deIormation and deconstruction were employed in
order to hail the meaning oI truth as "diIIerence." Regarding this narrative that I
pose, the Importance oI Idea and Figura lies in the Iact that both essays examined
the relationship oI Picture and Truth, and while Idea reconstructed the history oI this
problem, Figura suggested its possible resolution. II in PanoIsky's Idea truth is
presented as the carrier oI the value oI the image, then in Auerbach's Figura reality,
or rather historical reality, Iunctions as the validating Iactor (and not as the valuating
Iactor) oI the domain oI the plastic (which replaces the domain oI images).|11|
Thus, the two essays should be considered as two subsequent moves oI the same
process, in which the modus oI plastic or rather Iigural rationality was explored. In
this doing, as I will elaborate at the end oI this essay, they both can serve as a basis
and a pedestal Ior a more general project oI a renewal oI the philological method.
Figural Philology, I suggest, should be considered as an iconodulist method Ior the
humanities, producing the past-reality oI historical truth, by the help oI the agency
oI Iigures.

As I've explained elsewhere,|12| my supposition is that Iconoclasm is a living
and relevant issue at our present turn-oI-the-century era.|13| It is worth mentioning
that the original iconoclastic episode took place in the 8
th
century A.D, in the
Byzantine Christian Empire,|14| where a wide-ranging debate was launched
regarding the status and the legitimacy oI the use oI imagery in religious practice.
The exceptionally abundant use oI religious icons had lead to its oIIicial prohibition.
AIter several ages oI blunt Iconoclaism, the second council oI Nichea (787 A.D)
declared a renewed oIIicial conIidence in religious icons, though iconoclast
controversies continued to appear in Byzantium up until the 10
th
century.|15| OI
course, throughout the history oI European culture, we can Iind many other
iconoclasts episodes.|16| Returning to Byzantium, In as much as the "Iconoclasts"
condemned the production, as well as the usage oI imagery in religious theurgy, the
"Iconodulists" (sometimes called the "Iconophiles"), among them John oI
Damascus|17| and Theodor oI Studion,|18| produced written deIenses oI religious
icons and images in general. Byzantine Iconoclasm, oI course, was an elaboration oI
the Jewish prohibition oI the production oI images in the Ten Commandments. It is
well worth emphasizing that the Iconodulists insisted on the Christian pious
character oI their arguments, and even declared Iconocalsm itselI as heretic.|19| The
Iconodulist authors were cautious not to Iall into Irames oI argumentation
determined as heretic, and thereIore they never argued Ior the picture`s selI-validity;
instead, they examined and shaped the mechanics oI icons usage, enabling the icon
to serve as a theurgical instrument, embodying a distance between man and the
divine.|20| It is, then, through the argument oI hierarchical distance that the icon
was re-evaluated and legitimized.
Though Byzantine Iconoclasm is the historical accepted prototype Ior any
iconoclast phenomenon, it was not the Iirst occasion oI an Iconocalstic attitude to be
revealed in the history oI western thought. Another case oI ancient approach to art,
exhibiting iconoclastic tendency, oI course, could be Iound in Plato`s dialogues. And
it is that same well-known platonic disqualiIication oI produced mimesis which
makes the starting point Ior PanoIsky`s philological narrative in Idea. PanoIsky
posed Plato's rejection oI produced mimesis at the opening pages oI Idea,|21| and
then continued to examine the manner in which this archaic platonic rejection
actually established the history oI western theory oI art and was conserved by it. The
tradition oI the European theory oI art thus can be regarded as Iconophilic in nature,
and PanoIsky`s Idea thus articulated the problem oI the European pictorial tradition
in iconoclastic terms.
The speciIic iconoclast episode to which PanoIsky's Idea belongs has a
distinctive trait as Iar as the arrangement oI the iconoclast structure is concerned: II
Byzantine Iconoclasms' underlying question was- What gives a picture (Icon) a
theological value?, then 20
th
century Iconoclasms' underlying issue is what are the
categories that establish pictorial value? The "Pictorial turn" (To use the expression
oI W. J. T Mithchell),|22| to which I am reIerring here, is marked by the strong
affinitv between the definition of the image and the definition of Jalue. The image
(i.e. the picture) fudges, the image itself acts as a valuating instrument. Its
judgmental activity consists on drawing the above mentioned relation between a
particular and a universal.|23| Thus, images behave exactly according to the
structure oI the Kantian power oI judgment. As a matter oI Iact, the concept oI Value
(Wert) itselI, was construed, during the 19
th
and 20
th
centuries as holding a pictorial
character: In the writings oI RudolI Hermann Lotze, Wilhelm Dilthey, Heinrich
Rickert and others,|24| Value (Wert) was presented as an organic discernable unit,
whose exclusive operation is to produce judgment-sentences, that draw the relations
between organic worlds made oI particular organs, and the ideas (or Iorms, or rather
"values") that regulate them.|25| As I've suggested above, I believe that it is this
judgmental, valuating capacity oI the image that brought about many oI the
iconoclast aggressions oI the 20
th
century. II we are to take upon ourselves an
Iconodulist creed relevant to the present iconoclast episode, then it is necessary that
we devise the means Ior a separation between Pictures and Values. But in order to
do just that, a re-deIinition oI the 'pictorial is needed. First, it is my suggestion to
align the pictorial with the domain oI the plastic, and not with the domain oI
imagination. The picture as a plastic plastic reality (i.e., as a Iigure) will not consist
oI Iorming cohesive unities, but oI sustaining and limiting extended reality itselI(As
I will explain bellow).
Furthermore, the domain oI the plastic-pictorial then should Iunction on a
territory other than that oI Aesthetics. The aesthetic "regime" (To use again the terms
oI Jacques Ranciere) oI the 18
th
and 19
th
century has been the chieI enhancer oI the
development oI the notion oI "aesthetic value."|26| And iI we want the Iigure to be
spared oI the valuating burden, then we should separate conceptually between
domain oI "the pictorial" and the domain oI "the aesthetic." The notion oI the
"Figure" can be used to achieve such a separation. By separating the plastic Irom the
aesthetic, Auerbach's "Figura" opens the door Ior establishing a diIIerent relation
between Pictures and Truth, a relation which does not lean on a representational
mimesis, nor on "autonomous" aesthetic values, but rather on the mechanics oI
rehearsal and restoration, to be Iound in the philological-Iigural construction oI
history. Thirdly, this same project requires a supplementary distinction between the
domain oI the pictorial and the domain oI culture as such, leading to a distinction
between (Auerbachian) Philology and the Iield oI research known as "Cultural
studies." As I will explain at the end oI this essay, Iigural- philology's general
subject is not the cultural organism, but the reality oI the past itselI. ThereIore, the
notion oI the Iigure, as it was presented by Auerbach, perIorms Ior us a necessary
series oI distinctions: Firstly, the understanding that the Iield oI the 'pictorial has
an imaginary and a plastic aspects, distinguished Irom each other; The imaginary
produces images, the plastic- Iigures. Secondly, a separation between the plastic-
domain and the aesthetic-domain; and thirdly, a distinction between the plastic-
domain and the cultural-domain. The science which explores the above
distinguished plastic-domain, so I suggest, is Philology. And the restoration oI the
philological method is motivated by the current on-going iconoclastic episode.
PanoIsky was one oI the Iew to state clearly the iconoclast Ioundation oI
the western theory oI the pictorial. Using Neo-kantian terminology, he identiIied
implicitly between artistic and judgmental activity. II PanoIsky presented the
iconoclast roots oI the European theory oI art, Auerbach's Figura pointed toward the
way out oI the iconoclast impasse. It is through the agency oI the 'Figure that it is
possible to turn Irom the problematics oI the Eidetic value oI pictures to the
perIormative plastical mechanics oI the historical reality.|27| The Iigure, as
Auerbach describes its logics and historical transmutations, has its reality neither in
the cioo nor in a schematic-unity oI possible experience and the transcendental
ideas that regulate it, but in the extension oI the past itselI, construed out oI
rehearsal, restoration, narration and realization (ErIllung).|28| For example, the
biblical Iigure oI Joshua, is a (pre-) Iiguration oI Christ; but symmetrically Christ
could be a Iigural couple oI Adam only iI Joshua was, and even iI he was merely a
Iragment oI history; thereIore, even iI there might be doubt regarding the reality oI
the person oI Joshua, there is no doubt as to the past realitv of the figure of Joshua.
Thus, the issue standing at the ground oI Auerbach`s Figura is not that oI valuation
oI the picture but that oI its validating capacitv; the validation oI the reality oI the
past through the Realprophetie|29| oI Iigures. Figural Philology thus could be
considered as an iconodulist proposition to the current "Bilderstreit." But Iirst we
must take a look at PanoIsky's deployment oI the iconoclastic crisis oI the 20
th
century.


Panofsky's Idea and the disclosure of the Iconoclastic structure
As I mentioned above, PanoIsky deployed Idea around the platonic iconoclast
rejection oI the produced picture, grounded in the transcendent status oI the cioo.
According to PanoIsky, platonic Truth is indeed Ioreign to art (KunstIremede);|30|
but this Ioreignness, according to his story, actually served as the subject-matter Ior
the entire history oI the theory oI art, Irom the Roman period to the Baroque and the
19
th
century. PanoIsky demonstrated that all along the history oI the western theory
oI art, Irom Plotinus to Bellori, the artwork was being valued as a mimesis oI Truth
by the (artistic) Idea. The question regarding the location oI this truth; whether in the
spirit oI the artist, in "objective" reality, or in the art oI the past, was secondary to
the central consistent underlying argument to be Iound all along the development oI
the European theory oI art: What gives the work oI art its value is the Iormers'
capacity to imitate truth, via the Ideas. It is with the unending task oI re-conciliating
art with truth that the whole essay is concerned, and it is the assumption oI platonic
separation that is also the kernel Ior the PanoIskyan iconodulist argument. PanoIsky
traces the historical transmutations oI the relation between the plastic picture
(Plastische Bild) and Truth, incorporated in the Idea. European theory oI art used the
concept oI Idea as the bearer oI the original platonic cohesiveness-oI-strangers
between art and truth:|31| It has been a continuous essay to deIine the pictorial core
oI the 'Idea. Until the18
th
century, in which was established what Ranciere
identiIied as the aesthetic regime,|32| in which the "Idea" was re-located as
immanent to the territory oI artistic production. Thus, in his earlier writings,
PanoIsky demonstrated the construction oI the plastic domain, in which plastic
values constitute the Iundamental concepts (GrundbegriIIe) oI the science oI art.|33|
The Idea, bearing the mark oI truth, is portrayed as a valuating agent, Iirst oI the
'exterior world represented in the picture, then oI the world oI artistic production
itselI. ThereIore, the riIt between Truth and Art serves as the Ioundation oI the
history oI the theory oI artistic production. But this riIt is only the introduction to the
real crisis which is hidden in PanoIsky's text, and it is the riIt between Truth and
Reality.

Value, Truth and Reality in Panofsky's Idea
Both "value" and "reality" appear many times along the lines oI Idea. The notion oI
value appears mainly in the role oI the value oI the work oI art,|34| and in most
cases, it is contrasted with "Iact" or with "reality." An evident general character oI
Idea, and with PanoIsky`s approach in general, is its disavowal oI the Iactor oI
realitv in the process oI the deciphering oI the work oI art. Even when discussing the
more 'realist tendencies oI Renaissance theory oI art, PanoIsky is interested more
in the way the schematization oI reality Iinds its seat in the inner-ideas oI the artist,
and with the 'Subject-Object copula which is achieved through it,|35| than in the
notion oI reality itselI and it`s relation to the creative action.
Thus, Idea demonstrates how the 'Idea had gradually become a valuating
instrument Ior the image: When artworks imitate an Idea, their relation to Truth is
guarantied. Gradually, during the 16
th
century, it had become clear that the agent
responsible Ior the imitation oI the "Idea" is the creative artist himselI, and that the
Idea is immanent to the mind oI the subject.|36| The "Idea," then, in PanoIsky's
story, never-ever belongs to "reality," only to the creative agent, would it be the
divine creator or the human artist, who maintains the capacity to produce images
operating as agents oI valuation.
It is well known that PanoIsky's art-history is strongly inIluenced by the Neo-
kantian school. One oI the most typical traits oI the Neo-kantian school oI the
second halI oI the nineteenth-century, was the conceptual schism between Value and
Reality, which haunted also PanoIsky's Idea. This dramatic schism is present in the
work oI two Neo-kantian thinkers; Heinrich Rickert, who was PanoIsky`s teacher in
Freiburg,|37| and Bruno Bauch,|38| who was Rickert's student in Freiburg, a decade
beIore PanoIsky.|39| For Rickert, values are conceived as the subject-matter
philosophy,|40| as well as oI the cultural sciences (KulturwissenschaIten) at large.
|41| Bruno Bauch published in 1926, shortly aIter PanoIsky's Idea, a Neo-kantian
presentation oI the notion oI the Idea. In his view and similarly to PanoIsky, Value
and Idea are actually synonymous. The Idea, according to Bauch, is the never-
ending responsibility ("unendlicher AuIgabe) oI reaching absolute value, the Truth-
value.|42| Generally, we can Iind in PanoIsky, Bauch and Rickert's writings what
could be termed a platonic Neo-kantianism.|43| In the work oI both three scholars
we can detect an aspiration to highlight the continuity between Plato and Kant, and
to examine the possibility Ior a modern, transcendental, understanding oI Ideas.
From within the Iramework oI Platonic Neo-kantianism Bauch, Rickert, and the
early PanoIsky drew a riIt between Truth and Reality and, moreover, between Value
and Reality; and the Idea is located, on this Neo-kantian account, on the side oI
Value (And Truth), not on the side oI reality.|44|
This Neo-kantian dichotomy|45| entrusted the humanities with the task oI
'valuating cultural organic wholes by describing their answerability to underlying
substantial schemes oI Truth. In several essays belonging to his neo-Kantian period,
PanoIsky laid bare his claim Ior the establishment oI a Kantian system oI judgment
Ior the plastic arts according to an autonomous (i.e. plastic) system oI values.|46|
Art, as well as the science oI art, in his view, has, and rightly so, given-up the claim
Ior any reality outside itselI, either oI things or oI the ideas (coq). The task, as the
early PanoIsky sees it, is, thereIore, to work-through the epiphany oI the
transcendental schematism oI artistic production itselI. For PanoIsky (At that time a
proIessed neo-Kantian), the history oI artistic production is a documented epiphany
oI the establishment oI the subjective, even iI universal, plastic schemes and system
oI values.
PanoIky's Idea concerns implicitly also the issue oI modern art and the
modern science oI art: PanIsky's story is oriented towards an elucidation oI the
extent to which modern art and the modern science oI art, maniIest a transcendental
solution to the iconoclastic problems oI the past: In modern (i.e. 20
th
century) times,
so argues PanoIsky, artistic production itselI becomes a transcendental reIlexive
autonomous valuating subject, who acts as the ground oI Ideas (i.e. artistic values).
|47| PanoIskys' project remains torn by the antinomy between, on the other hand,
the need to conserve the generic problem oI the relation between artistic production
and Truth, and, on the other hand, the demand to understand and evaluate artistic
production out oI its own conditions oI possibility, where also artistic Ideas are to be
re-located.
Idea should be considered as an Iconodulist essay in two senses: First, it
achieved a restoration oI the history oI the theory oI art issuing Irom the Platonic
prohibition (and thus actually served as an Iconodulist answer to Platonic
iconoclasm), and secondly, it was responsible Ior a primary condensation oI an
iconic approach to the humanities, in the sense that it started to draw the story oI the
relationship between images, history and truth. Indeed, PanoIsky's overall project
should be viewed as an Iconodulist one, leading to the Iormation oI PanoIsky's later
"Iconological method," which, as I showed elsewhere,|48| makes his Iully-
developed Iconodulist method Ior the humanities.
Apart Irom being an iconodulist essay, Idea is also a philological experiment
in the narration oI the movement back and Iorth out oI the basic prohibition,
perIormed by the historical plasticity oI the concept oI the Idea, presented actually
as a figure in Auerbach's sense oI the term, as I will explain bellow. It is with the
assumption oI a non-historicist neo-Kantian 'redemption, i.e. redemption through
the transcendental scheme oI values, that the PanoIskyan philological process is
activated, and the Iconodulist gesture is achieved.

Auerbach's Figura: Plasticity and History
The essay Figura, written by Auerbach during his exile to Istanbul, is similar
in style and scope to PanoIsky's Idea. Indeed, Auerbach reIers to PanoIsky's "Idea"
in a Iootnote towards the second part oI his essay.|49| "Figura" can be considered as
an implicitly critical response to "Idea." "Figura" deploys a genealogical and an
etymological survey oI the "unit" oI the Iigure: similarly to PanoIsky, the central
texts to be discussed belong to the Latin tradition. The chronological borders oI
Figura, though, are narrower than those oI Idea: they extend only Irom the Iirst
century B.C. to the late middle ages known also as the "proto Renaissance," taking
part in 14
th
century Italy (In as much as the narrative oI Idea reaches the 16
th
and 17
th
centuries). Indeed, iI Idea preserves a problem originating in the Greek scriptures,
then Auerbach's Figura explores a conceptual scheme issuing Irom Roman
civilization. But elsewhere in Auerbach's writings, especially in Mimesis,|50| it
becomes apparent that the realist impulse residing in the Iigure exits already in the
Old Testament, and continues aIter the 14
th
century to play a central role in western
art, especially in the 19
th
century.|51| Thus, the Iigural dynamics are inherent to the
Judeo-Christian cultural narrative.
II in PanoIsky`s Idea the problem-structure conserves the "eidetic" status oI
beauty, then in Auerbach`s Figura the Idea oI beauty is laid aside and the cioo is
replaced by another term: The Latin Figura.|52| Figura is the etymological source
Ior the word Fictor, engendering also the terms factum, pictorial, factorv and
fiction.|53|
Auerbach poses in advance the constant heretic element to be Iound in the
notion oI the Iigure: historical corporeal reality, being the validating Iactor oI the
Iigure. But, as Auerbach's inIluential ancestor, Giambatista Vico,|54| had argued, in
the Latin language, the words truth (Verum) and Iact (Factum) are actually
synonymous.|55| The word "Factum," I remind the reader, comes Irom the same
etymological source as the work Iigure. Human truth, in Vico as well as in
Auerbach, reIers to what man has done; and the Iigure is the vessel by which the
fact has become. Otherwise put, the Iigure is the produced past, presented as
historical reality. Thus, the Latin term "Figura" itselI holds the restoration oI the
alliance between the domain oI the plastic and truth, the same alliance whose crisis
PanoIsky explored in Idea.
Auerbach argues that the essence oI the shiIt between the Greek and the Roman
paradigms consists in the Iact that the Latin word "Figura" was actually used as a
translation Ior the numerous terms used Ior describing "Iorm" in the Greek
language. The term "Figura" was used as synonym to Schema, Plasis, Morphe,
Eydolon, Eidos etc.|56| The word "Figura" itselI, in its early maniIestations, entailed
the Iollowing meanings and connotations: Sensuality, Carnality, Variation oI Form,
Ornament, Manner, Corporality and transmutability.
The Iabrication oI the word "Figura" is dated to the same historical moment as
the appearance oI philology, at the period oI the Hellenization oI the Roman empire.
Auerbach begins by exploring the manner in which the term "Figura" appeared in
the writings oI Varro, Lucretius and Cicero, around the Iirst century B.C., serving in
the Latin language primarily as the physical concrete aspect oI things.|57| In Cicero,
we Iind the use oI the term "Figura" also in the vocabulary oI oratory and rhetorics.
|58| In Quintilians' writings, a substantial theory oI the rhetorical Iigure was
developed.|59| But it was only in the writings oI the Church Fathers, according to
Auerbach, that the Iull Iigural structure came into being. In the writings oI Saint
Augustine, Ior example, we see the Iigural structure as reIerring exclusively to the
aIIinity between the New and the Old Testaments.|60| It is between the two
Testaments that the Christian Iigural dynamics operate. Not only that the New
Testament rehearses the old One, but the old one is, and was already a "real
prophecy" oI the later one.

Thus, in the Iull-blown version oI the Iigural structure, historical reality is
understood as carrying a latent Iigurality which can be recognized as such only a-
posteriori, and as taking part in a series. As such, history is conceived as the eternal
perIormance (ErIllung) oI history itselI|61| (or rather, as we shall see, oI the end oI
time). In as much as Ior PanoIsky the past exists mainly as the :oao oI the eruption
oI a generic question, Ior Auerbach the past exists as a pre-established certitude,
supporting the dynamics oI history. When pictured as a net oI series oI Iigural
realizations, historical reality is portrayed as an extended reality, not primarily as a
temporal one. Drawing the connecting lines between the Iigural elements becomes
similar to the work oI the synthetic method in geometry. Indeed, Vico reIerred to the
geometrical method in the science oI history thus:|62|
"(.) physical things will be true only Ior whoever has made them, just as
geometrical things are true Ior men because they make them." And thereIore: " This
Science |i.e. Vicos' New Science, AE| proceeds exactly like geometry, which, as it
contemplates the world oI dimensions or constructs it Irom its elements, makes that
world Ior itselI, but the reality oI our Science is as much greater |than that oI
geometry| as is that oI the orders which pertain to the aIIairs oI men than that oI
points, lines, planes and shapes."|63| In that sense, Philology, using the Iigural
"mechanics," portravs the past as a res extensa (In the Cartesian sense oI the term),
i.e. as an abstraction oI physical extension itselI. But in as much as the science oI
geometry Iirst and Ioremost analvses Iorms, Vico's New Science svnthesi:es them.
|64| The new science oI Vico, as well as Auerbach's philology, thus, reIer to the
extended reality oI the past (i.e., to history) by the aid oI synthetic operations.|65|


"Real and Historical": The Figural Mechanics of Validation
According to Auerbach, it is in the writing oI the Church-Fathers that we encounter
Ior the Iirst time the Iull Iigural structure. It is here that the "Figure" gets its explicit
historical sense: "Figura is something real and historical which announces
something else that is also real and historical."|66| The Iigure is a kind oI a plastic
sign which remains entirely real, speciIic and concrete. Its two elements (the pre-
Iigure and the "late-"Iigure) always retain their speciIic "real" character.
Furthermore, Iigures never consist oI a unique element- the Iigure necessarily
participates in a Iigurative series, embracing at least two historical realities. As I
mentioned above, the "Idea" itselI, in PanoIsky`s essay, behaves as an Auerbachian
Iigure: it is a plastic Iorm, existing in a dynamic oI variation, anticipation and
retroaction through the ages. Nevertheless, as I will explain bellow, PanoIsky's
philological method is not entirely Iigural; The conceptual narrative oI "Idea" entails
a regression towards, and a restoration oI a generic problem to be Iound in the past
oI the genealogical story; in as much as the Iigural narrative reIers to the certainty oI
the reality oI the past itselI.
As I argued above, PanoIsky's Idea holds a problematic attitude towards the
notion oI reality, the same notion which makes the chieI concern oI Auerbach's
Figura. Indeed, in PanoIsky`s articulations, plastic production does not regard
reality as such.|67| It is no wonder, then, that historical reality, along with its
economical and social aspects, is almost absent Irom all oI PanoIsky`s works. But
Ior Auerbach, "real" means Iirst and Ioremost "historical." And now we will turn to
the question oI the realist impulse residing in both essays, serving as their
iconodulist kernel.


Reality, Value and Truth: Two versions of Realism
Both Idea and Figura use realist argumentations in their restorative narration oI
the legitimacy oI the pictorial. For PanoIsky, Platonic realism paves the way Ior a
neo-Kantian re-construction oI the transcendental subject oI artistic experience.
Auerbachs' realism,|68| on the other hand, is more oI an Aristotelian-Bergsonian
nature, in which historical reality holds a pre-established validity. Explaining in
depth the Aristotelian nature oI this historical reality is beyond the scope oI the
present essay. Nevertheless I would remark that the dynamics oI historical reality in
Auerbach are similar to the Aristotelian conception oI realization (1vcpciu), which
is prior to Iorce (or "capacity," or "power," Auvui), and can be in-born or acquired.
|69| The Bergsonian nature oI this historical reality resides, in turn, in the duration
oI occurrence and recalling.|70| Indeed, diIIering with Michael Hollquists' view,|71|
I contend that Auerbach's realism isn't a representative realism, but a presentative
realism, i.e. a perfomative and a methodic one;|72| it is a realism whose reIerence is
the reality oI the past, narrated and presented as historical truth. It may be Iurther
speciIied as a methodic realism, to use the neo-Scholastic term oI Etienne Gilson,
|73| in the sense that the reality oI the past in the necessary postulate oI an always
certain and speciIic philological inquiry. And it is this same postulated reality oI the
past which is being conIirmed and validated through historical reality (which, by the
Iorce oI this validating capacity, comes to be a historical truth). As in Descartes'
method, the methodic bias also points to the Iact that the realist aspect regards
always a specific problem oI reasoning, encountered by the researcher, which
demands a certain amount oI regulation in order to proceed in the inquiry.|74|
Within the conIines oI the examination oI a speciIic problem, the reality oI past
transmutations oI this speciIic problem holds a certain validity. Philological
methodical realism asserts a certainty (Certum) regarding the past which is not an
outcome oI the latters' representation, but oI the Iact oI its having-been-made
(Facto). And as I mentioned above, This certainty, according to Vico, supports the
application oI the geometrical method, i.e. oI conceiving oI the past as a res extensa.
|75| Thus Iar thereIore, we've pointed to the Aristotelian, Cartesian and Bergsonian
aspects oI the Auerbachian deIinition oI the realism oI the Iigural dynamics.

Yet again, PanoIsky and Auerbach diIIer to a great extent regarding the notion
oI Realism. The diIIerence between the two regarding what is considered as real
concerns also the question oI Value. In PanoIsky's Idea, along the lines oI both neo-
Kantianism and Hegelian Geistesgeschichte, the picture, then the artist, and Iinally
the activity oI artistic production bestow values upon the world oI phenomena, by
the Iorce oI the Idea, being the medium oI Truth. Thus, PanoIsky`s project searches
to determine the platIorm Ior a subjective reIlexive judgments that will serve as a
transcendental basis Ior the production oI "plastic|76| values." II PanoIsky poses
Truth as the valuating agent oI the picture, then Auerbach is interested less in Truth
than in Jalidv or Certaintv;|77| and his occupation with this validity is again similar
to Descartes' presentation oI the establishment oI certainty in the extended "res,"|78|
in the sense that this distinguished reality is approachable only through the already
existent schemes oI thought, deployed as an aIIirmed net oI topological coordinates,
which undergoes re-examination and re-habilitation through the methodic process.
In Auerbach, then, the 'subject which is being explored is the reality oI the past,
validated by the Iigurative engine, perIorming the deployment oI historical
truth. The Iigure re-aIIirms the reality oI the past and validates the
components oI historical reality, by isolating, repeating and distinguishing them,
instead oI being occupied with endowing the world oI phenomena with values.

The diIIerence between PanoIsky and Auerbach regarding the character oI
their realist arguments is maniIested also in their relation to the age oI the
Renaissance. Both scholars viewed Italian Humanism as establishing the liaison
between picture and reality. PanoIsky emphasized the importance oI the period oI
15
th
century early Renaissance culture, in which authors as Alberti and Ficino
theorized the procedures oI the depiction oI reality.|79| For Auerbach, it is during
the 14
th
century proto-renaissance, that Iigurative realism achieved its apogee, most
notably in Dante's Divine Comedv.|80| But both Auerbach and PanoIsky shared the
general interest in the Renaissance period and its contribution to shaping the terms
Ior the relationship between art and reality. PanoIsky meticulously analyses the
manners in which the Renaissance authors understood the picture as an imitation oI
reality (Nachahmung der Wirklichkeit).|81| He also states, somewhat
anachronistically, that it was in the Renaissance that the Subject-Object structure and
the "Idea" serving as its copula had been established. But in as much as PanoIsky
demonstrates how the Renaissance planted the seeds oI a Kantian transcendental
dyad oI subject and object, Ior Auerbach it is in the age oI the proto-renaissance that
we Iind the seeds oI modern realism, which consists oI a whole other kind oI a
copula- the copula opened between two historical reality. It is in Dante`s Divine
Comedv that Auerbach Iinds the paradigmatic apogee oI the Iigural dynamics. In the
Divine Comedv the antique Iigure oI Virgil (Frist century B.C.) appears in 14
th
century Florence, the residence place oI Dante, and leads the latter into the depth oI
the moral-theological cosmos, populated with speciIic historical and mythic Iigures.
Auerbach observed that the "realist" traits oI Renaissance art weren`t exclusively
based on the depiction oI the 'reality oI the exterior world, as PanoIsky observed,
but instead they were based on a certitude in the reality oI the past, a certitude which
served also as the support Ior any poietics. It is thus not only the reality oI worldly
appearances nor the truthIulness oI Ideas, as PanoIsky Iound, but also the reality oI
the past itselI which was underlined by the Renaissance authors; The Iigural
dynamics do not lead the artist to the world through the picture; Instead, it leads him
to the past through the Iigural series. II PanoIsky placed the "Idea" as a copula
between a "subject" and an "object," then Auerbach`s "Iigure" consists oI a copula
between two separate historical realities, being both "subjects" and "objects," a-
posteriori to be read as chained in a series. The question oI reality, in Auerbach, is
Iirst and Ioremost oI a historiographical nature. Finally, PanoIsky's and Auerbach's
interest in the Renaissance stem also Irom the philological tendency they share:
Both were deeply intrigued by the Renaissance rehearsal and restoration oI
antiquity. The Renaissance itselI, then, is actually examined as a figural
phenomenon, establishing a Iigural series between itselI, Roman antiquity, Classical
antiquity and Iinally, Ior Auerbach, also the Old Testament, and 19
th
century
literature.

Panofky's Idea, Auerbach's Figura and Figural Philology as an
Iconodulist method
My contention is that PanoIsky's Idea and Auerbach's Figura were taking part in a
joint latent iconoclastic debate. Both expressed a deep concern regarding the
pictorial, and both took upon themselves the task oI a justiIication oI the use oI
pictures as cognitive agents. In neither case the picture stands as a sovereign entity:
In PanoIsky, the iconoclast riIt between image and truth lies at the ground oI the
western theory oI art, and in Auerbach's iconodulist alternative the Iigure guarantees
the validity oI the past. In the PanoIskyan version, we encounter an approach to the
plastic domain which is inherently epistemological: The work oI art is considered as
an agent oI knowledge regarding the exterior world; In Auerbach, the structure oI
remembrance and restoration precedes any knowledge. A synthesis oI the methods
oI PanoIsky and Auerbach, and especially oI their approaches to the domain oI the
"plastic," can pave the way to the possibility oI Iorming an iconodulist method
which promotes the possibility oI the plastic domain to serve as a vessel Ior thought.
The early PanoIsky, somewhat apologetically, deploys the iconodulist eIIorts
oI the history oI the theory oI art, leading to a transcendental schematization oI art
production itselI; Auerbach, in his turn, suggests that we'll exchange value with
validity, truth with certainty and beauty with character. Instead oI opposing Truth to
Reality (as PanoIsky did), here Reality is Truth, but only on the condition that we
consider reality as that-which-has-been-made. Instead oI letting images carry the
judgmental and valuating capacity, Auerbach's Iigural dynamics suggest to perIorm
a validation oI the researcher's own extended-reality by the deployment oI the
history oI that reality.
The concept oI the Auerbachian Iigure can be regarded as a response to the
iconocalst problem which is presented in PanoIsky's philological re-construction oI
the concept oI the "Idea." This iconoclast tendency, which originated in the Platonic-
Neo-Kantian Ioundations oI PanoIsky's thought,|82| continued to be present also in
his later "Iconological" writings. PanoIsky was occupied with the status oI the
eidetic in thought and in Art; Auerbach, on his part, was occupied with that which is
figural, i.e. that which is plastic, historical, concrete and real.
As I mentioned in the beginning oI this essay, the Iigural dynamics draw on a
separation between the plastic realm and the aesthetic realm. The Iigure is not the
object oI a judgment oI taste (in the Kantian sense), but a subfect|83| oI a certain
articulation whose reIerence is the reality oI the past itselI. Again as I've argued at
the opening oI this essay, another element oI the same iconodulist habilitation oI the
humanities is to be Iound in the distinction between the Iigural realm and the
cultural realm. Under this distinction, though construed out oI cultural and linguistic
contexts, the Iigure is not conceived primarily as taking part in a local cultural
whole, nor as a maniIestation oI a Weltanschauung; instead, the Iigure is a
combination oI two partial realities, speciIic events oI characters, coming Irom two
distinguished world-views or cultures. The "raison d'tre" oI the Iigural dynamics
consists oI the gesture oI distinguishing a quality (a tendency, or a habitude)
traversing the relativity oI culture organisms. The Iigural structure is not essentially
a culturally-based one; its reIerence lies instead in a trans-cultural, trans-temporal
truth. Thus, the judgmental structure I've mentioned at the opening oI this essay,
which activates the relation between the particular and the whole to which it
adheres, is not the constituting structure oI the Iigural dynamics (Though it is not
absent Irom it either). Indeed, it is the reality oI the plastic domain which overcomes
the inherent problems oI the aesthetic regime. ThereIore, the Iield oI Iigural
philology is distinguished Irom the Iields oI cultural studies and aesthetics.
Figural Philology's truth lies with the non-temporal reality oI the past. The
Iigural reading is established by the positive certainty in the permanent reali:ation
oI the past via history.

Idea and Figura: Towards a Figural Philology
The suggested aIIinity between PaInosky and Auerbach is supported also by
the biographical data. PanoIsky and Auerbach exchanged letters at least Irom the
middle Iorties, when Auerbach was still residing in Istanbul, until at least the middle
IiIties. Both PanoIsky and Auerbach were German-Jewish scholars at exile in the
USA (PanoIsky emigrated to America in 1933, and Auerbach in 1947). Auerbach
resided at the Princeton Advanced Studies center in 1949-1950, with the help and
support oI PanoIsky (beIore moving to Yale as proIessor oI Romance philology, at
1950). Numerous letters exchanged between them are available in print,|84|
testiIying to the amicable connection between the two scholars, sharing the
uncertainties oI Jewish intellectual immigrants in the American academy.|85|
Indeed, PanoIsky and Auerbach could be aIIiliated with a non-oIIicial group oI
scholars who were occupied, along the 20
th
century, with the renewal oI "roman
philology," in Germany as well as in the U.S.A, between them Karl Vossler, Leo
Spitzer and Victor Klemperer.|86|

II I choose to underline the Iact that both Idea and Figura should be
considered as pertaining to a philological rationality, it is because I believe that their
work reinIorce the statement that philology is not to be regarded any longer in the
accepted, derogative sense, as the "discipline" interested solely with the historical
variations oI linguistic expressions. Rather, it should be treated as a legitimate
method A Iorm oI argumentation and a modus oI thought whose target is to intuit
the past, out oI a certainty in its non-timely nature, and to re-validate its extended
reality.
From that perspective, Philology could be regarded as a historicist method.|87|
It is historicist in the sense that the validity oI its statements stems primarily Irom
historical reality. Auerbach discusses in several places the threat oI historical
relativism to be Iound in the historicist|88| attitude. With reIerence to this threat, he
describes his position as "radical relativism.|89|" As Leopold Waizbort has argued,
Auerbach's radical relativism endeavors to overcome historicism Irom within the
conIines oI historicism itselI.|90| It is the outcome oI the philological depiction oI
the change oI subject simultaneous to a change oI object. And Iigural philology,
resulting Iorm the synthesis oI Auerbach's conception oI his method with his
description oI the Iigural dynamics, will be even more remote Irom the threat oI
relativism. Auerbach writes: "Figurative interpretation, in spite oI its stress on
historical completeness, derives its inspiration Irom the eternal wisdom oI God, in
whose mind there does not exist a diIIerence oI time. In his sight, what happens here
and now, has happened Irom the very beginning and may recur at any moment in the
Ilow oI time."|91| The Iigural dynamics are motivated by a conviction in some
dogma, and in that sense they are essentially non-relativist. It is impossible to
produce a Iigural narrative without the help oI a pre-given knowledge oI the
narrative's eternal reality, i.e. oI the narrative's end.
In this manner, Iigural philology should hold to a more philosophical
standpoint than a "gross" historicist method. Figural Philology is again even remoter
Irom historicism, as what it regards as "truth" is the outcome oI the reality oI the
past (which is validated by history). And this philological past is modeled as a
Cartesian res-extensa, and not as a Iree temporal Ilux.
Based on the models oI Idea and Figura we can, thereIore, suggest two basic
types oI Intuition, both active in Iigural philology. I propose understanding the
philological truth as built upon the synthesis oI the two Iorms oI Intuition, to which I
reIer as Archeological Intuition and Historical intuition.
The Archeological Intuition, which I Iind in PanoIsky`s Idea, conserves a
generative problem: It aspires to contract a certain chain oI events and situations into
a sole Iigure (Such as the "Idea" in PanoIsky's essay), which it believes (or rather
determines) to be Iound at the "Ground," "Origin" or better still the "Cause," oI the
plural material.|92| We can call PanoIsky's intuition archeological, in as much as it
is interested in a conservation oI an upq, which in the case oI PanoIsky (But not
necessarily in any philological construction) oI PanoIsky, oI a generative antinomy
(i.e. in the case oI Idea, the antinomy oI Mimesis and Truth); In this manner, the
artwork, Ior PanoIsky (In Idea, but also in his later writings), holds a character oI a
"Vera Icona," embodying and thus preserving the basic adhesion between Idea and
Truth. ThereIore the past, in PanoIsky's Idea holds the status oI a transcendentental
origin. In that sense, archeological intuition is Iirst and Ioremost regressive.
Auerbach`s intuitional gesture, on the other hand, is genuinely historical as
there is no other upq oI the Iigural dynamics except Ior the reality oI the past itselI.
Thus, the artwork, Ior Auerbach, is not so much an icon but a relic, which makes a
piece oI a narrative series oI realization. In as much as PanoIsky is occupied with the
conservation oI an idea, Auerbach is interested in the restoration oI the trail oI
change.
Archeologcial Intuition produces a repression oI memory, in the sense that it
contracts and consumes an entire historical narrative into a sole generative Iorm;
Historical Intuition, on the other hand, restores a series oI characters, and activates a
deployment|93| oI memory, while it is interested in making evident variations,
nuances and distinctions residing in the philological series.
The synthesis oI the two kinds oI intuition creates the full philological
intuition. This Iull philological gesture simultaneously compresses archeologically
and deploys historically the past. Philology regresses backwards Irom a given,
encountered problem, in search Ior a reality, which is a tendancy|94| or a habitude,
and which carries a mark oI distinction. It is possible to distinguish this tendency
only retroactively, with the help oI the agency oI Iigures. I propose, then, Iigural
philology, cohering between archeological and historical intuitions, as an iconodulist
method Ior the humanities.
Auerbach is oIten considered and discussed as a philologist,|95| but
PanoIsky is regarded mainly as a prominent art historian. Not withstanding, amongst
the numerous possible approaches to PanoIsky`s corpus oI works, it is also possible
to view his method, and especially his later Iconological method, as essentially
philological, in essence, character and method. PanoIsky reIerred to himselI as a
'Frustrated philologist and was described as a 'philologist aIter the Iact.|96|
PanoIsky`s later "Iconological writings," though continuing to exhibit neo-Kantian
sensitivities, also endorsed the philological categories oI investigation: They are less
interested in the archeology oI the transmutations oI a basic scheme through the
ages, and more with the way a speciIic picture or another kind oI plastic document
contracts an entire Iigural narrative.|97|
Philology itselI does not exclude the examination oI plastic documents, just
the opposite: Philological method, as Auerbach phrased its core structure in Figura
as well as in his other writings, entails exactly the plasticitv of anv historical realitv.
This plasticity entails also the possibility Ior nuance and variation.
To conclude, philological rationality, elaborated by Auerbach (on the basis oI
the Iigural mechanics and Vico's deIinitions oI philology) and shared by the later
PanoIsky, is suited Ior the establishment oI the iconodulist project oI Ireeing the
domain oI the plastic Irom judgmental, valuating, cultural and Iinally aesthetic
responsibilities. Philology can be considered as the art (tcvq) oI history, and Iigural
philology can be considered as a productive (aoiqtikq) art, as it produces Iigures,
i.e. series oI historical realities. Figural philology would be a method directed to a
realization (1vcpciu) oI a Iorce (Auvui) to be Iound in a speciIic problem oI
reasoning tackled by the researcher. By restoring backwards a Iigural series, in a
constant retrograde movement, it should regress towards the upq- the reality oI the
past.


|1| This essay is dedicated to the memory oI ProI. Gustave Khnel who taught at
the Art History department at Tel-Aviv University, whose exquisite post-graduate
seminar was Ior me the Iirst occasion
to tackle with the issue oI Iconocalsm.

|2| Erwin PanoIsky, Idea- Ein Beitrag zur BegriIIsgeschichte der lteren
Kunsttheorie, Berlin: Verlag Bruno Hessling GMBH, 1975 (First published in
Studien der Bibliothek Warburg 5, 1924); Erwin PanoIsky Idea- A Concept in Art
Theory, New York and London: Icon Editions, 1968. When reIerring bellow to both
essays, I note the German pagination, Iollowed by the English one.

|3| Erich Auerbach, 'Figura, Archivum Romanicum 22 |1938|, 436-489; Erich
Auerbach, "Figura," in
Scenes from the Drama of European Literature- Six Essavs, Minneapolis: University
oI Minnesota
Press, 1984, 11-76.

|4| I reIer the reader to my article, which discusses in more depth the iconoclastic
aspects oI contemporary art and compares PanoIsky's Iconology with Jean-Luc
Marion's contemporary iconoclast philosophy: Adi EIal, "Iconology and Iconicity-
Towards an Iconic History oI Figures, Between Erwin PanoIsky and Jean-Luc
Marion," Naharaim- Zeitscrift fr deutsch-fdische Literature und Kulturgeschichte,
Ed. AshraI Noor, Berlin and New-York: De Gruyter, vol. 1, 81-105.

|5| Currently, two outstanding Hebrew scholars are preparing works to be
published on the subject oI the imagination and the imaginary: Menahem
Goldenberg, Who prepare a metaphysical critic oI the Iaculty oI imagination, and
Yotam Hotam who writes on imagination, political-theology and science-Iiction.

|6| Immanuel Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft |1790|, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag,
2003, 19 (B XXVI).

|7| On the deIinition oI the image see W. J. T. Mitchell, "What is an Image?" in
Iconologv- Image, Text, Ideologv, Chicago and London: The University oI Chicago
Press, 7-46.

|8| Michael Kelly, Iconoclasm in Aesthetics, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2003.

|9| Ibid., 96.

|10| See Jacques Ranciere, Le partage du sensible- esthetique et politique, Paris:
La Iabrique-editions, 2000; Jacques Ranciere, Le destin des images, Paris: La
Iabrique-editions, 2003; Jacques Ranciere, Malaise dans lesthetique, Paris: Galilee,
2004.

|11| This is to paraphrase James Elkins, The Domain of Images, Ithaca,
NY : Cornell University Press, 1999.

|12| EIal, Iconology and Iconicity.

|13| A notable example Ior the present turn-oI-the-century iconoclastic discourse
is the philosophical work oI Jean-Luc Marion. See Jean-Luc Marion, Lidole et la
distance- Cinq etudes, Paris : Editions Grasset et Fasquelle, 1977; Jean-Luc Marion,
La croisee du visible, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1991; Jean-Luc
Marion, De surcroit- Etudes sur les phenomenes satures, Paris: PUF, 2001, 65-98,
123-153.

|14| For a detailed study oI Byzantine Iconoclasm see Marie-Jose Mondzain,
Image, Icon Economv- The Bv:antine Origins of the Contemporarv Imaginarv,
trans. R. Franses, StanIord: StanIord University Press, 2005.

|15| Ibid., 5.

|16| See David Freedberg, "Idolatry and Iconocalsm," The Power of Images-
Studies in the Historv and Theorv of Response, Chicago: University oI Chicago
Press, 1989, 378-428.

|17| See Ior Example Moshe Barasch, Icon- Studies in the Historv of an Idea, New
York and London: New York University Press, 1992, 183-253.

|18| Barasch, Icon, 254-289.

|19| See Mondzain, Image, Icon Economv, 233-245.

|20| See Marion, L`idole et la distance.

|21| PanoIsky, Idea, 1-4.

|22| W. J. T. Mitchell, 'The Pictorial Turn, in his Picture Theorv, Chicago and
London: The University oI Chicago Press, 1994, 11-34 (First Published in ArtForum
30/7 (March 1992)).

|23| In Jean-Luc Marion`s thought, the Picture (Both 'Icon and 'Idol) is identiIied
not simply with value but moreover with surplus value, in the Iigure oI the Saturated
Phenomenon., see Marion, De surcrot, 131-136.

|24| See Fritz Bamberger, Untersuchungen zur Entstehung des Wertproblems in
der Philosophie des 19. Jahrhunderts, I- Lotze, Halle a.s.: M. Neimeyer, 1924, 55-
56.

|25| Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Jernunft (1781, 1787), Hamburg: Felix
Meiner Verlag, 2003, 420-441.

|26| On Aesthetic, Plastic or artistic value, see Paul Crowther, "The scope and
value oI the artistic image," DeIining Art, Creation the Canon: Artistic Value in an
Era oI Doubt, OxIord and New York, The Clarendon Press and the OxIord
University Press, 89-123; Hugo Anthony Meyhell, "On the Grounds oI Aesthetic
Value," The Nature oI Aesthetic Value, London, Macmilan, 1986, 3-24; Roman
Ingarden, Erlebnis, Kunstwek und Wert: Vortrage zur Aesthetik 1937-1967,
Tbingen, Max Neimeyer, 1969; Elisabeth Schellekens, "The Aesthetic Value oI
Ideas," Philosophy and Conceptual Art, Peter Goldie and Elisabeth Schellenkens
eds., OxIord and New York: The Clarendon Press and the OxIord University Press,
2007, 71-91. All writers discuss the relation between "aesthetic value" and the action
oI criticizing the work oI art.

|27| ,geschichtliche Wirklichkeit'- Auerbach, Figura, 451/29: ,(...)Iigura ist etwas
Wirkliches, Geschichtliches welches etwas anderes, ebenIalls Wirkliches und
Geschichtliches darstellt und ankndigt.'; "(.) Iigura is something real and
historical which anounces something else that is also real and historical."

|28| See Hayden White, "Auerbach Literary History- Figural Causation and
Modernism Historicism," Figural Realism- Studies in the Mimesis Effect, Baltimore
and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999, 88-94.

|29| Auerbach, Figura, 450/ 28- The English translation is "Phenomenal
prophecy."

|30| PanoIsky, Idea, 2/4 (The English translation converts "KunstIremde" to
"IndiIIerent to or unIamiliar with art.")

|31| Actually, the Greek language diIIerentiates between Eidos (cioo) and Idea
(iocu); this diIIerence holds the same Ioreignness PanoIsky is discussing: Eidos is
reIerring to the absolute and eternal Iorms, and Idea is reIerring to apparent
maniIestations oI them, Ior example in beautiIul harmonic relations. Next in this
etymological chain lies 'Eydolon (coeov) which is already the illusionist,
imaginary, deceiving, even heretic appearance. On this subject, see Ernst Cassirer,
'Eidos und Eidolon. Das Problem das Schnen und der Kunst in Platons Dialogen
|1924|,' in Ernst Cassirer, Gesammelte Werke Hamburger Ausgabe (Hrsg. Brigit
Recki), Band 16, Aufst:e und Kleine Schriften (1922-1926), Hamburg: Felix
Meiner Verlag, 2003 (First appeared in Jortrge der Bibliothek Warburg, 1924),
135-164.; and Ior a discussion oI the diIIerence between Eidos and Idea see Jean-
Luc Marion, Sur Lontologie grise de Descartes, Paris: Vrin, 1975, 116-131.

|32| Ranciere, Partage du sensible, 31.

|33| Erwin PanoIsky, "ber das Verhltnis der Kunstgeschichte zur Kunsttheorie
|1925|," Aufst:e :u Grundfragen der Kunstwissenschaft, Hrsg. HariolI Oberer und
Egon Verhezen, Berlin: B. Hessling, 1964, 51.

|34| For one example among many others, see PanoIsky, Idea, 3 (my emphasis)-
,So bestimmt sich also der Wert einer knstlerischen SchpIung, nicht anders als
der Wert einer wissenschaItlichen Untersuchung...'

|35| Posing reality as the result oI the encounter between the subject and the object
could be an articulation oI the Hegelian deIinition oI Reality in his Logik: G. W. F.
Hegel, Wissenschaft der Logik, Hrsg. Georg Lasson, Leipzig, Felix Meiner Verlag,
zweiter Teil, III, 156-7: "Die Wirklichkeit ist die Einheit des Wesens und der
Existenz (.) Diese Einheit des Inneren und uern ist die absolute Wirklichkeit."

|36| PanoIsky, Idea, 39-56.

|37| See Joan Hart, 'Erwin PanoIsky and Karl Manheim: A Dialogue on
Interpretation, Critical Inquirv 19 (Spring 1993), 538.

|38| Bruno Bauch, Wahrheit, Wert und Wirklichkeit, Leipzig: Felix Meiner Verlag,
1923.

|39| Bauch completed his Promotion under Rickerts' supervision in Freiburg at
1901. PanoIsky was studying in Freiburg, taking also courses with Rickert, between
the years 1912-1914: he received his Promotion there at 1914 under Wilhelm
Vge.

|40| Heinrich Rickert, "Die Philosophie als Wertlehre," Allgemeine Grundlegung
der Philosophie, Tbingen: Verlag von J. C. B Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1921, 142-
155.

|41| Heinrich Rickert, Kulturwissenschaft und Naturwissenschaft, Freiburg,
Leipzig und Tbingen : Verlag von J. C. B Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1899, 24 II. ;
Heinrich Rickert, Die Problem der Geischichtsphilosophie- Eine Einfhrung (1904),
Heidelberg: Carl Winters Universittsbuchhandlung, 1924), 54-67; Heinrich Rickert,
Allgemeine Grundlegung der Philosophie, Tbingen: Verlag von J. C. B. Mohr (Paul
Siebeck), 1921, 112-129, 142-166.

|42| Bruno Bauch, Die Idee, Leipzig: Verlag Emmanuel Reinicke, 1926, 152-
174.
|43| The best example Ior this Platonist Neo-kantianism is to be Iound in Bauch's
works. See Bauch, Die Idee.

|44| Though the present essay is not dealing with the political implications oI
PanoIsky`s and Auerbach`s texts, It must be noted that Bauch was a right-winged
nationalist and a supporter oI the National-Socialist regime. Bauch was Iorced to
quit his position as the editor oI the journal Kantstudien as a result oI his blunt Anti-
Semitic expressions. See Hans Sluga, Heideggers Crisis- Philosophv and Politics
in Na:i Germanv, Cambridge Mass. & London: Harvard University Press, 1993, 7,
15, 83, 93-94.

|45| This Neo-kantian dichotomy is not absent also Irom Cassirer`s philosophy oI
Svmbolical forms, See Ernst Cassirer, ,Der BegriII der symbolischen Form im
AuIbau der GeisteswissenschaIten (1923),' in Cassirer, Gesammelte Werke, 75-
104.

|46| PanoIsky, Idea, 71-72; See also Erwin PanoIsky, ,Der BegriII des
Kunstwollens (1920),' ,ber das Verhltnis der Kunstgeschichte zur Kunsttheorie
(1925)', in Erwin PanoIsky, Aufst:e :u Grundfragen der Kunstwissenschaft, Hrsg.
HariolI Oberer und Egon Vreheyen, Berlin: B. Hessling, 1964, 40-1, 51 II.

|47| PanoIsky, Idea, 72-73/125-126; Erwin PanoIsky, "ber das Verhltnis der
Kunstgeschichte zur Kunsttheorie- Ein Beitrag zu der Errterung ber die
Mglichkeit "KunstwissenschaItlicher GrundbegriIIe,"" AuIstze zu GrundIragen
der KunstwissenschaIt, 51.

|48| See my article (In Hebrew), Adi EIal, "Erwin PanoIsky's Iconological
Method: Synthesis, Value and Intuition," Tabur- Yearbook for European Historv,
Societv Culture and Thought, The Richard Koebner Minerva Center Ior German
History, The Hebrew University oI Jerusalem, Vol. 2 (2009), 177-208.

|49| Auerbach, Figura, 477/236, note 44. PanoIsky uses the notion oI 'Figura
towards the end oI Idea, when discussing Michelangelo and Drer (PanoIsky, Idea,
65, 70/117, 123), but without mentioning its conceptual etymology.

|50| Erich Auerbach, Mimesis, Dargestellte Wirklichkeit in der Abendlndischen
Literature (1946), zweite AuIlage, Bern: Francke Verlag, 1959, 11-27; Erich
Auerbach, Mimesis, The Representation of Realitv in Western Literature, trans. W.
R. Trask, Princeton and OxIord: Princeton University Press, 2003, 9-23.

|51| Auerbach, Mimesis, chapters 18 & 19, 422-487/ 454-523. See also Hayden
White, Auerbach's Literary History, 96-99.

|52| The Latin word Figura hasn`t got one deIinitive source in the Greek
Language. The Greek coo and opq were translated into the Latin 'Forma.
Other possible Greek partial equivalents are Schema (oqu), Tupos (tuao) and
Plasis (auoi). See Auerbach, Figura, 438-440/ 13-16.

|53| Auerbach, Figura, 437/ 12-13.

|54| Auerbach was responsible Ior the translation oI Vico's New Science into
German, and reIerred to Vico many times in his writings. See Giambattista Vico,
Die Neue Wissenschaft- ber die gemeinschaftliche Natur der Jlker, bersetzt und
eingeteiltet von Erich Auerbach, Mnchen: Allgemeine Verlagsanstallt, 1924; Erich
Auerbach, "Vico and Aesthetic Historism," Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism,
8/2 (December 1949), 110-118; Erich Auerbach, "Introduction: Purpose and
Method," Literarv Language and its Public in Late Latin Antiquitv and in the
Middle Ages, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965, 5-24. On Auerbach and
Vico see Claus Uhlig, "Auerbach's "Hidden" (?) Theory oI History," Literarv
Historv and the Challenge of Philologv- The Legacv of Erich Auerbach, StanIord:
StanIord University Press, 1996, 36-39; Diane Meur, "Auerbach and Vico: Die
unausgesprochene Auseinandersetzung," Karlheinz Barck & Martin Treml (Hrgs.),
Erich Auerbach- Geschitchte und Aktualitt eines europischen Philologen, Berlin:
Kulturverlag Kadmos, 2007, 57-70.

|55| Giambatistta Vico, "On Jerum and Factum," Selected Writings, Edited and
translated by Leon Pompa, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 50-56. See
also Karl Lwith, Jicos Grundsat:. verum et factum convertuntur Seine
theologische Prmisse und deren skulare Konsequen:en, Heidelberg: Carl Winter
Universittsverlag, 1968.

|56| Auerbach, Figura, 438-439/14-16.

|57| Ibid., 437-444/11-21.

|58| Ibid., 442-444/ 18-21.

|59| Ibid., 447-450/ 25-28.

|60| Ibid., 450-464/ 28-49.

|61| White, Erich Auerbach's Literary History, 88-9.

|62| Vico, Selected Writingns, 75-76; For another notable realist conception oI the
past, leaning on a geometrical grid, reminding oI Descartes' res extensa see Michael
Dummet, Truth and the Past, New York: Columbia University Press, 2004, 46-52.

|63| Vico, Selected Writings, 206/ Vico, Die Neue WissenschaIt, 139.

|64| Ibid., 61, 75- "(.) We might demonstrate by synthesis, i.e. we should make
truths rather than discover them." I discuss the importance oI Synthesis in the Neo-
kantian deIinitions oI the historical and cultural sciences in my article, EIal,
PanoIsky's Iconological method.

|65| Auerbach himselI notes the important part syntehsis takes in his philological
method, see Erich Auerbach, "Introduction: Purpose and Method," Literarv
Language and its Public in Late Latin Antiquitv and in the Middle Ages, London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965, 17-18. See also Leopold Waizbort, "Erich
Auerbach im Kontext der Historismusdebatte," Erich Auerbach- Geschichte und
Aktualitt, 17-18.

|66| Auerbach, Figura, 29 (English)/ 451- "Iigura ist etwas Wirkliches,
Geschichtliches, welches etwas anderes, ebenIalls Wirkliches und Geschichtliches
darstellt und ankndigt."

|67| A good introduction to PanoIsky's Iconological method oI interpretation,
leaving no place Ior reality as such, could be Iound in Erwin PanoIsky,
'Iconography and Iconology: An Introduction to the Study oI Renaissance Art,
(1939), Meaning in the Jisual Arts, New York: Garden City, Doubleday Anchor
Books, 1955, 26-54.

|68| On Auerbach's Realism see Ernst Mller, "Auerbach's Realismus," Erich
Auerbach: Geschichte und Aktualitt, 268-261; Luiz Costa Lima, "Zwischen
Realismus und Figuration: Auerbachs dezentrierter Realismus," Erich Auerbach:
Geschichte und Aktualitt, 255-267.

|69| Aristotles, The Metaphvsics, Trans. Hugh Lawson-Tancred, London: Penguin
Books, 1998, Book Theta, chapters 5 & 8, (1047b-1048a; 1049b-1051a), 263-265,
272-277.

|70| See Henri Bergson, La pensee et le mouvant (1938), Paris: Presses
Universitaires de France, 2003.

|71| Michal Holquist, "The Last European: Erich Auerbach as Precursor in the
History oI Cultural Criticism," Modern Language Quarterlv, 54/3 (September
1993), 374-379. Barry Maine had suggested a more plausible interpretation oI
Auerbach's realism, which relates Auerbach's concept oI historical reality to Nelson
Goodman's nominalist constructionism. See Barry Maine, "Erich Auerbach's
Mimesis and Nelson Goodman's Ways oI Worldmaking: A Nominal(ist) Revision,"
Poetics Todav, 20:1 (Spring 1999), 41-52. Hayden White's presentation oI Auerbach
(See White, Auerbach's Literary History) is closest to the one I propose here, but as
much as he emphasizes the aesthetic parameters oI Auerbach's realism, I emphasize
the very reality oI history and the certainty oI the past.

|72| The philosopher Michael Dummett contended that radical realism is
necessarilv a non-representative realism, in the sense that radical realism should
reIer to the reality oI the thing in issue as independent Irom any apparatus oI its
representation. See Michael Dummett, "Realism, (1963)" Truth and other Enigmas,
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard university Press, 1978, 358-74. See also, Michael
Dummett, "The Reality oI the Past," in Ibid., 358-374.

|73| Etienne Gilson, Le realisme methodique (1935), Paris: Pierre Tequi editeur,
2007.

|74| Rene Descartes, "Rules Ior the Direction oI the Mind," Descartes
Philosophical Writings, trans. Elizabeth Anscombe and Peter Thomas Geach,
London: Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd., 1954, 153-180.

|75| Vico, Selected Writings, 61- " Geometry, which is taught by the synthetic
method, i.e. by Iorms, is completely certain both in result and in procedure. For by
proceeding Irom the smallest to the inIinite by means oI its own postulates, it shows
how to synthesize the elements Irom which the truths which it demonstrates are
Iormed."

|76| PanoIksy uses explicitly this notion oI 'Symbolical value in his Iamous
presentation oI Iconology. See Erwin PanoIsky, Iconography and Iconology, 40.

|77| The identiIication oI Truth, Factuality and Certainty is part oI the legacy oI
Giambattista Vico, which Auerbach endorses. See Auerbach, Vico and Aesthetic
Historism, The Journal and Aesthetics and Art, 110-118.; Erich Auerbach,
Intoduction: Purpose and Method, 16. See also Lwith, Jicos Grundsat:.

|78| On Descartes' res extensa, see The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Vol.
I, Trans. John Cottingham, Robert StoothoII and Dugald Murdoch, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1985, Vol. I: 51-65, 223-247, Vol. II: 44-62. See also
Marleen Rozemond, Descartess Dualism, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1998.

|79| PanoIsky, Idea, 23-33/47-59.

|80| Auerbach, Figura, 477-489/62-76. See also Carlo Ginzburg, "Auerbach und
Dante: Eine VerlauIbahn," Erich Auerbach- Geschichte und Aktualitt, 33-45.

|81| PanoIsky, Idea, 23/ 47.

|82| EIal, Erwin PanoIsky's Iconological Method.

|83| I.e. an active carrier.

|84| On the relationship between Auerbach and PanoIsky almost no scholarly
material exists. Some letters exchanged between the two could be Iound in the
second and third volumes oI Erwin PanoIsky, Krresponden:- Eine kommentierte
Auswahl in Fnf Bnde, Hrsg. Dieter Wuttke, Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2003-
2005.

|85| See Anthony Heilbut, Exiled in Paradise. German Refugee Artists and
Intellectuals in America, from the 1930s to the Present, Berkeley, CaliI. : University
oI CaliIornia Press, 1997. See also Erwin PanoIsky, "Three decades oI Art History in
the United States: Impressions oI a Transplanted European," Meaning in the Visual
Arts, 321-346.

|86| Auerbach himselI noted the aIIinity between his work and Spitzer's:
Auerbach, Introduction, Purpose and Method, 19; On Spitzer's and Auerbach's
renovation oI philology, see GeoIIrey Green, Literarv Criticism and the Structure of
Historv- Erich Auerbach and Leo Spit:er, Lincoln and London: University oI
Nebraska Press, 1982. Auerbach himselI reIers to Spitzer's work in one oI the
methodological introduction to his philological method. See Erich Auerbach,
Introduction: Purpose and Method, 19. See also Thomas R. Hart, "Literature as
Language: Auerbach, Spitzer, Jakobson," Literary History and the Challenge oI
Philology, 227-239; Kader Konuk, "Deutsch-jdische Philologen im trkischen Exil:
Leo Spitzer und Erich Auerbach," Erich Auerbach- Geschichte und Aktualitt, 215-
229.

|87| On Auerbach and Historicism, see Waizbort, Erich Auerbach im Kontext der
Historismus debatt. Being a historicist, Auerbach's historiosophic position stands
apart Irom what David Myers has identiIied as an anti-historicist tendency oI many
German-Jewish thinkers, Iollowing the guidelines oI Cohen's Neo-kantianism . See
David N. Myers, Resisting Historv. Historicism and Its Discontents in German-
Jewish Thought, Princeton and OxIord: The Princeton University Press, 2003.
Viewed Irom that perspective, Auerbach's philology is historicist to a greater extent
than Ernst Cassirer's Neo-kantian philosophy oI symbolical Iorms.

|88| On the origins and principles oI Historicism, see Otto Gerhard Oexle Hrsg.,
Krise des Historismus- Krise der Wirklichkeit- Wissenschaft, Kunst und Literature
1880-1932, Gttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2007.
|89| See Auerbach, Introduction: Purpose and Method, 12; Waizbort, Erich
Auerbach im Kontext der Historismus debatt, 294-296.

|90| Waizbort, Erich Auerbach im Kontext der Historismus debatt, 291-
"Historismus durch Historismus zu berwinden."

|91| Erich Auerbach, "Typological Symbolism in Medieval Literature," Yale
French Studies 9 Svmbol and Svmbolism, New York: Kraus Reprint Corporation,
1965, 9.

|92| OI course, my understanding oI the archeological intuition paraphrases
Foucault's notion oI the archeology oI knowledge, though it does not coincide Iully
with it. A Iull comparison will merit a special essay. See Michel Foucault,
Larcheologie du savoir, Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1969.

|93| See Gilles Deleuze, Le Pli- Leibni: et le Baroque, Paris: Les Editions de
Minuit, 1988.

|94| Bergson, La pensee et le mouvant, 211- "Il y a une realite exterieure et
pourtant donnee immediatement a notre esprit (.) Cette realite est mobilite (.)
Toute realite est donc tendance."

|95| See Michael Holquist, "Erich Auerbach and the Fate oI Philology Today,"
Poetics Todav 21:1 (Spring 1999), 77-91; Karlheinz Back & Martin Treml, "Erich
Auerbachs Philologie als KulturwissenschaIt," Erich Auerbach- Geschichte und
Aktualitt eines europischen Philologen, 9-29.

|96| See Joan Hart, 'Erwin PanoIsky and Karl Manheim: A Dialogue on
Interpretation, Critical Inquirv 19 (Spring 1993), 553-554, notes 50 and 51. For a
notable example Ior an essay by PanoIsky which exhibits an evident philological
method, see "Et in Arcadia Edo: Poussin and the Elegiac Tradition," Meaning in the
Visual Arts, 295-320.

|97| EIal, Erwin PanoIsky's Iconological Method.

About the Author : Adi EIal submitted her doctorate thesis in 2005, dealing with the
paintings oI Edouard Vuillard and models oI cohesiveness in European intellectual
culture oI the 19th century. Since then she has been researching various themes, in
the center oI which the history oI French thought Irom Descartes to Bergson, and the
Historiography oI the History oI Art (Riegl and PanoIsky). She teaches at Bezalel, the
Beit-Berl College and the University oI Tel-Aviv.
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