I.

THE PROPRIETY OF RAISING A FACTUAL ISSUE FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL Petitioner raises for the first time the argument that respondent Deinla executed at the time of his dimissal a quitclaim whereby he waived his rights to go after the petitioner for any money claims arising from his dismissal. It is submitted that this novel issue of fact should fail on the basis of well-settled procedural rules and jurisprudence. As a general rule, a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court covers questions of law only. Questions of fact are not reviewable and passed upon by this Court in its exercise of judicial review. The distinction between questions of law and questions of fact has been well defined. A question of law exists when the doubt or difference centers on what the law is on a certain state of facts. A question of fact, on the other hand, exists if the doubt centers on the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. It is conceded that this rule admits of exceptions, namely: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on misappreciation of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings, the same are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; and (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record. None of these exceptions, however is present in this case. In fact, the findings of fact of both the Court of Appeals and the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) are consistent with each other. The well-entrenched rule, especially in labor cases, is that findings of fact of quasi-judicial bodies, like the NLRC, are accorded with respect, even finality, if supported by substantial evidence. Particularly when passed upon and upheld by the Court of Appeals, they are binding and conclusive upon the Supreme Court and will not normally be disturbed. (G&M Phils. vs. Cruz, G.R. No. 140495, April 15, 2005) There is no reason in this case for the honorable Court to depart from such doctine. Whether or not there is evidence on record to support the findings of the NLRC and the Court of Appeals that respondent indeed executed the quitclaim calls calls for a re-examination of the evidence, which the Supreme Court cannot entertain. As stated earlier, factual findings of labor officials, who are deemed to have acquired expertise in matters within their respective jurisdiction, are generally accorded not only respect but even finality, and bind the Court when supported by substantial evidence. It is not the Courts function to assess and evaluate the evidence all over again, particularly where the findings of both the NLRC and the Court of Appeals concur. Moreover, it is a well-settled rule that points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower court need not be, and ordinarily will not be, considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the first time at such late stage. It would be unfair to the adverse party who would have no opportunity to present further evidence material to the new theory, which it could have done had it been aware of it at the time of the hearing before

the NLRC. Thus, to permit the petitioner in this case to change their theory on appeal would thus be unfair to the respondent and offend the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process. (Spouses Ernesto and Vicenta Topacio vs. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank, G.R. No. 157644, November 17, 2010). II. THE VALIDITY OF QUITCLAIMS OR WAIVERS EXECUTED BY EMPLOYEES PURPORTEDLY TO RELEASE EMPLOYERS FROM THEIR CLAIMS ARISING FROM ILLEGAL DISMISSAL OR UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES Nevertheless, even if the Court tackles the issue posed by petitioner, there is still no reason to grant the petition. Assuming arguendo that respondent Deinla indeed executed a quitclaim in favor of petitioner, it is submitted that the same would not automatically bar respondents claims against petitioner. In labor jurisprudence, it is well-established that quitclaims and/or complete releases executed by the employees do not estop them from pursuing their claims arising from the unfair labor practice of the employer or from illegal dismissal. The basic reason for this is that such quitclaims and/or complete releases are against public policy and, therefore, null and void. The acceptance of termination pay does not divest a laborer of the right to prosecute his employer for unfair labor practice acts. (Cario vs. ACCFA, L-19808, Sept. 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 183; Philippine Sugar Institute, vs. CIR, L-13475, Sept. 29, 1960, 109 Phil. 452; Mercury Drug Co. vs. CIR, L-23357, April 30, 1974, 56 SCRA 694, 704). In the Cario case, supra, the Court, speaking thru Justice Sanchez, said: Acceptance of those benefits would not amount to estoppel. The reason is plain. Employer and employee, obviously, do not stand on the same footing. The employer drove the employee to the wall. The latter must have to get hold of money. Because, out of job, he had to face the harsh necessities of life. He thus found himself in no position to resist money proffered. His, then, is a case of adherence, not of choice. One thing sure, however, is that petitioners did not relent their claim. They pressed it. They are deemed not to have waived any of their rights. Renuntiatio non praesumitur. Likewise, in Firestone Filipinas Employees Association vs. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. of the Philippines, L-37952, December 10, 1974, 61 SCRA 340, 345, where petitioners therein were given separation pay in consideration of which they executed releases and quitclaims releasing the respondent company, the Court, in the words of then Justice Enrique M. Fernando, held: ... What weakens the case for private respondent even more is that as a matter of law the acceptance of the terms of the alleged compromise including the benefits attributed to it did not automatically negate the assertion of whatever rights may be possessed by virtue of the Industrial Peace Act. Mention has just been made on the length of time that had elapsed since the strike began. The financial plight of the petitioner is thus obvious. They are the people who without work would find it difficult to know how their basic needs can be met. They are likely to be family men, appalled by the thought that they cannot even provide sufficiently for their young ones. It is precisely the reaction of their lot is far from enviable that led to this highly relevant excerpt from the opinion announced in Philippine Sugar Institute vs. Court of Industrial Relations (109 Phil. 452), "By accepting the benefits of their separation the petitioner argues that they are in

estoppel. The separation thrust upon them and the acceptance of benefits thereof cannot constitute estoppel." So was it made clear in the opinion of Justice Padilla, a jurist with the solid reputation for soundness and competence, who was ever careful never to go further than the law allows in the recognition of the claims of the workingman. The then Justice, now Chief Justice Makalintal had occasion to reiterate such doctrine in Urgelio vs. Osme;a (L-14908, February 28, 1964, 10 SCRA 253) in these words: "Contrary to respondents' theory, the fact that petitioners received their terminal pay cannot be considered as a waiver of the right to question the termination of their services." That was so under the 1935 Constitution. The present Constitution as already noted, is much more liberal in its recognition of labor's dependence on governmental efforts to assure that its welfare be truly promoted. It would be to blunt the force then of the decision referred to earlier, promulgated after the approval of the Charter now in force, if the defense of the petitioners having executed releases and quitclaims will be given the seal of approval. This Court is not disposed to take that step. These rulings were affirmed in JMM Promotions and Management, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, et al. (G.R. o. 139401, October 2, 2002), an illegal dismissal case, where the Court held: Nonetheless, we find it necessary to discuss the issue of validity of the quitclaims. In the instant case, private respondents claim that they were merely compelled to sign the releases in favor of their employer. Petitioner, on the other hand, asserts that private respondents entered into the compromise agreement freely and voluntarily and should not, at this late stage, be permitted to renounce their signed commitments. No reasonable argument, however, can possibly sustain petitioners position. Although quitclaims have long been accepted in this jurisdiction, when the voluntariness of the execution of the quitclaim or release is squarely at issue, then the employees claim may still be given due course. The law looks with disfavor on quitclaims and releases by employees who have been inveigled or pressured into signing them by unscrupulous employers seeking to evade their legal responsibilities. We are not ready to deviate from this rule for the reason that the courts a quo have sufficient factual basis in ruling that private respondents were merely pressured to sign the quitclaims/compromise agreements. The fact that private respondents signed the subject statements releasing petitioner and Sam Jin from any liability and assenting to a refund of the amount allegedly representing the expenses incurred by petitioner, without any objection, does not automatically mean the absence of duress, considering the pathetic circumstances private respondents were in. We find it incredible that, after all the expense and the trouble they went through in seeking greener pastures abroad, private respondents would suddenly and without reason decide to return home and face, as jobless people, a staggering debt of W140,000. The private respondents had no choice but to sign. They were stranded in a foreign land with no work and no income, and with their employer threatening not to give them their return tickets to Manila if they refused to sign.

Thus, we have time and again held that quitclaims, waivers and/or complete releases executed by the employees do not stop them from pursuing their claims arising from unfair labor practice - if there is a showing of undue pressure or duress. The basic reason for this is that such quitclaims, waivers and/or complete releases, being figuratively exacted through the barrel of a gun, are against public policy and therefore null and void ab initio. Accordingly, private respondents signatures in the subject waivers or quitclaims never foreclosed their right to pursue a case for illegal dismissal and money claim. Employer and employee were not on equal footing. As aptly observed by the Court of Appeals, private respondents backs were to the wall. Had they been in a position to object, private respondents would not have agreed to reimburse petitioner the amount of W140,000 as no person in his right mind, specially if he is in dire financial straights, would agree to such an undertaking. Private respondents went abroad precisely to escape poverty. Obviously it was out of desperation and helplessness that private respondents agreed to affix their signatures on the subject waivers. They are therefore deemed not to have waived any of their rights. Renuntiatio non praesumitur. In the case of Rondina vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 172212, July 9, 2009), the petitioners Rondina et al. filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against respondent Unicraft Industries International Corporation. Both the Voluntary Arbitrator (VA) and the Court of Appeals found that: the quitclaims executed by some of the employees carried with it the presumption of validity since these were verified by an officer of the Department of Labor and Employment. Such presumption is strengthened by the fact that the employees failed to disclaim their signatures therein or assert that they were forced to sign the same. Thus, the quitclaims effectively barred those who executed the same from making further claims from the corporation. On this issue, the Court said: On the validity of the quitclaims, we note that both VA Calipay and the Court of Appeals declared the same valid due to the failure of the employees to disclaim their signatures therein or assert that they were forced to sign the same. The only question before us is the extent to which the amount reflected therein is to be credited to petitioners monetary award as the only employee who appealed the appellate courts decision. However, we find that VA Calipay and the appellate court erred in concluding that petitioner voluntarily signed the quitclaim. Contrary to this assumption, the mere fact that petitioner was not physically coerced or intimidated does not necessarily imply that he freely or voluntarily consented to the terms thereof. Moreover, private respondents, not petitioner, have the burden of proving that the quitclaim was voluntarily entered into. As a rule, deeds of release or quitclaim cannot bar employees from demanding benefits to which they are legally entitled or from contesting the legality of their dismissal. The acceptance of those benefits would not amount to estoppel. Furthermore, there is a gross disparity between the amount actually received by petitioner as compared to the amount owing him as initially computed by VA Calipay. The amount of the settlement is indubitably unconscionable; hence, ineffective to bar petitioner from claiming the full measure of his legal rights. In any event, we deem it appropriate that the amount he received as consideration for signing the quitclaim be deducted from his monetary award.