AGUSTIN VS. EDU.

(from Champ) President Marcos issued LOI # 229 providing for EWD for all motor vehicles. It provides that all motor vehicles shall have at least 1 PAIR of EWD consisting of triangular and reflectorized in yellow and red, to be used when the vehicle is stalled for more than 30 minutes. The LOI further provided that the LAND TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION shall promulgate rules and regulations as are appropriate to effectively implement the LOI. Agustin was the owner of a VW Beetle equipped with BLINKING LIGHTS. He argues that these lights could very well served as the EWD. Agustin further argues that the LOI is invalid because it clearly violates the delegation of police powers and that it infringes on the non-delegation of legislative powers. It claims that the LOI 229 has no standard.

In the REFLECTOR LAW, the legislative objective is PUBLIC SAFETY and SAFE TRANSIT UPON ROADS.

Also, the Philippines has ratified the Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals, which recommends enactment of legislation for the installation of road safety signs and devices. Since the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law, the country cannot repudiate its commitment based on the doctrine of pacta sunt servanda. CHIONGBIAN VS. ORBOS (from Champ) Congress passed the ORGANIC ACT FOR ARMM, calling for a plebiscite in Mindanao. Only 4 provinces voted for the creation of ARMM (LanaoSur, Maguindanao, Sulu, Tawi2) The other provinces who did not vote for ARMM shall remain in the existing administrative regions, provided that the PRESIDENT may by ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINATION, MERGE THE EXISTING REGIONS. So, President Cory issued EO 429 which reorganized those regions who did not vote for ARMM. Petitioners are Congressmen who opposed the issuance of EO 429. They claim that President Cory had no authority to restructure new administrative regions. They insist that the provinces should remain as they are.

ISSUE: Whether the LOI provided a standard in the LTCs implementation. SC: LAW VALID. According to the case of EDU vs. ERICTA, to avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard set by the legislature itself which determines matters of principle and lays down fundamental policy. A STANDARD: a) defines legislative policy, b) marks its limits and maps out its boundaries, and c) specifies the public agency to apply it. d) indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command it to be effected e) is the criterion by which legislative purpose may be carried out. The standard may be EXPRESS or IMPLIED. The standard does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied form the policy and purpose of the ACT CONSIDERED AS A WHOLE. Here, LOI 229 itself provided the standard.

ISSUE: Whether the Organic Act for ARMM unduly delegates legislative power to the President by allowing Cory to merge the existing regions by mere ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINATION. Whether the Organic Act provided a standard to guide President Corys discretion. DEFENSE: The SOLGEN argues that the Act is valid and there is no undue delegation but only a POWER TO FILL UP THE DETAILS OF LEGISLATION which was given to Cory. SC: LAW VALID. NO UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS TO THE PRESIDENT.

While the power to merge regions is not expressly provided for in the Constitution, it is a power traditionally lodged with the President, in view of the POWER OF GENERAL SUPERVISION OVER LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. Thus there is no abdication by Congress of its legislative powers in conferring on the President the POWER TO MERGE ADMINISTRATIVE REGIONS. As to the question of STANDARD, a legislative standard NEED NOT BE EXPRESSED. IT MAY SIMPLY BE GATHERED OR IMPLIED. Nor need it be found in the law challenged because it may be EMBODIED IN OTHER STATUTES ON THE SAME SUBJECT as that of the challenged legislation. With respect to the power to merge existing administrative regions, the STANDARD IS TO BE FOUND IN THE SAME POLICY underlying the grant o the PRESIDENT in RA5434, THE POWER TO REORGANIZE THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT. Under said law, the standard is to promote simplicity, economy and efficiency in the government, to enable it to pursue programs consistent with national goals for acceleration socio-economic development and to improve the service in the transaction of public business. Since the original 11 administrative regions were established with this same law/ policy, it is but logical to suppose that in authorizing the President to merge by administrative determination, the existing regions (following the rejection of the ARMM by some regions), the purpose of Congress in enacting the Organic Act of ARMM was to reconstitute the original basis for the organization of administrative regions. GARCIA vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (237 SCRA 279) FACTS: In Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataanagreed to the inclusion of the municipality of Morong as part of the Subic Special Economic Zone(SSEZ) in accord with RA no. 7227, otherwise known as the Bases Conversion Development Actof 1992. May 24, 1993: Petitioners filed a petition to annul the Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10,

Serye1993. In the said petition, they set some conditions which they want to be complied with beforethey include their municipality with SSEZ. Municipality of Morong did not take any action on the petition within 30 days after its submission,which prompted the petitioners resorted to their power of initiative under the Local GovernmentCode of 1991 whereby they started to solicit the required number of signatures to cause therepeal of said resolution. Hon. Edilberto M. de Leon, Vice- Mayor and Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang BayanMorong, wrote a letter to the Executive Director of COMELEC requesting the denial of the petitionfor a local initiative as it will just promote divisiveness, counter productive and futility. July 6, 1993: COMELEC en banc resolved to deny the petition for local initiative on the groundthat its subject is merely a resolution and not an ordinance July 13, 1993: COMELEC further resolved to direct Provincial Election Supervisor, Atty.Benjaminn Casiano, to hold on the authentication of signatures being gathered by the petitioners ISSUE: Is Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong Bataan the proper subject of an initiative? (i.e. Whether or not the power of initiative can be exercised even what isquestioned is only a resolution and not an ordinance?) HELD:Petition is GRANTED and COMELEC Resolution 93-1623 are ANNULED and SET ASIDE. RATIO: In a Republican system, there are 2 kinds of legislative power: 1.ORIGINAL - possessed by the sovereign people 2.DERIVATIVE

- delegated by the sovereign people to legislative bodies and is subordinateto the original power of the people. One of the lessons the people learned is the folly of completely surrendering the power tomake laws to the legislature. Thus, in the new Constitution, a system of peoples initiative wasthus installed which endows the people with the power to enact or reject any act or law bycongress or local legislative body. COMELEC was also empowered to enforce and administer all laws and regulationsrelative to the conduct of an initiative and referendum. Thus, on Aug 4, 1989, it approved RA no.6735 entitled An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating ALSE 2013:ALDANA, BARRIENTOS, BELLOSILLO, BRIONES, CASTANEDA, DELOS SANTOS, DE JESUS, GODUCO, IBARRA,LAGROSAS, MANGAHAS, PENA 1CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTSARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT Funds Therefor. Which spelled out the requirements for the exercise of the power of initiativeand referendum; procedure of the local initiative and referendum; and their limitations. It was alsointended for the acts to be included as appropriate subjects of local initiatives. LOCAL INITIATIVES-legal process whereby the registered voters of a local governmentunit may directly propose, enact, or amend any ordinance. It does not, however, deal withthe subjects or matters that can be taken up in a local initiative. The Constitution clearly includes not only ordinance but resolutions as appropriatesubjects of a local initiative. An act includes a resolution. Black defines an act as "an expressionof will or purpose...it may denote something done...as a legislature, including not merely physicalacts, but also decrees, edicts, laws, judgments, resolves, awards and determinations." The lawshould be construed in harmony with and not in violation of the Constitution. Jan 16, 1991: COMELEC also promulgated RA 2300 where it was stated in Sec 5, Art 1that the power of initiative may be exercised to

amend the Constitution, or to enact a nationallegislation, a regional, provincial, city, municipal or barangay law, resolution or ordinance. Sec 124 of the Local Government Code of 1991 does not limit the application of localinitiatives to ordinances, but to all subjects or matters which are within the legal powers of theSanggunians to enact. Resolution vs. Ordinance RESOLUTION-used whenever the legislature wishes to express an opinion which tohave only a temporary effect ORDINANCE-intended primarily to permanently direct and control matters applying topersons or things in general. Considering the lasting changes that will be wrought in the social, political, and economicexistence of the people of Morong by the inclusion of their municipality in the SSEZ, it is logical tohear their voice on the matter via an initiative. TABLARIN VS. GUTIERREZ [152 SCRA 730; G.R. No. 78164; 31 July 1987] Friday, January 30, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law Facts: The petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, the Board of Medical Education and the Center for Educational Measurement from enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, series of 1985, dated 23 August 1985 and from requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as a condition for securing certificates of eligibility for admission, from proceeding with accepting applications for taking the NMAT and from administering the NMAT as scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future. The trial court denied said petition on 20 April 1987. The NMAT was conducted and administered as previously scheduled. Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 4224 and 5946, known as the "Medical Act of 1959" defines its basic objectives in the following manner: "SECTION 1. Objectives. This Act provides for and shall govern (a) the standardization

and regulation of medical education; (b) the examination for registration of physicians; and (c) the supervision, control and regulation of the practice of medicine in the Philippines." The statute, among other things, created a Board of Medical Education. Its functions as specified in Section 5 of the statute include the following: "(a) To determine and prescribe requirements for admission into a recognized college of medicine; x x x

for admission into the medical schools and its calculated to improve the quality of medical education in the country. The cutoff score for the successful applicants, based on the scores on the NMAT, shall be determined every year by the Board of Medical Education after consultation with the Association of Philippine Medical Colleges. The NMAT rating of each applicant, together with the other admission requirements as presently called for under existing rules, shall serve as a basis for the issuance of the prescribed certificate of eligibility for admission into the medical colleges.

(f) To accept applications for certification for admission to a medical school and keep a register of those issued said certificate; and to collect from said applicants the amount of twenty-five pesos each which shall accrue to the operating fund of the Board of Medical Education; Section 7 prescribes certain minimum requirements for applicants to medical schools: "Admission requirements. The medical college may admit any student who has not been convicted by any court of competent jurisdiction of any offense involving moral turpitude and who presents (a) a record of completion of a bachelor's degree in science or arts; (b) a certificate of eligibility for entrance to a medical school from the Board of Medical Education; (c) a certificate of good moral character issued by two former professors in the college of liberal arts; and (d) birth certificate. Nothing in this act shall be construed to inhibit any college of medicine from establishing, in addition to the preceding, other entrance requirements that may be deemed admissible. MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, issued by the then Minister of Education, Culture and Sports and dated 23 August 1985, established a uniform admission test called the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) as an additional requirement for issuance of a certificate of eligibility for admission into medical schools of the Philippines, beginning with the school year 1986-1987. This Order goes on to state that: "2. The NMAT, an aptitude test, is considered as an instrument toward upgrading the selection of applicants

Issue: Whether or not Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985 are constitutional.

Held: Yes. We conclude that prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain minimum scores therein as a condition for admission to medical schools in the Philippines, do not constitute an unconstitutional imposition. The police power, it is commonplace learning, is the pervasive and non-waivable power and authority of the sovereign to secure and promote all the important interests and needs in a word, the public order of the general community. An important component of that public order is the health and physical safety and well being of the population, the securing of which no one can deny is a legitimate objective of governmental effort and regulation. Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is whether there is some reasonable relation between the prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for admission to medical school on the one hand, and the securing of the health and safety of the general community, on the other hand. This question is perhaps most usefully approached by recalling that the regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the public. MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985 articulates the rationale of regulation of this type: the improvement of the professional and technical quality of the graduates of medical schools, by upgrading the quality of those admitted to the student body of the medical

schools. That upgrading is sought by selectivity in the process of admission, selectivity consisting, among other things, of limiting admission to those who exhibit in the required degree the aptitude for medical studies and eventually for medical practice. The need to maintain, and the difficulties of maintaining, high standards in our professional schools in general, and medical schools in particular, in the current stage of our social and economic development, are widely known. We believe that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the NMAT as a means for achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants into [our] medical schools" and of "improv[ing] the quality of medical education in the country. We are entitled to hold that the NMAT is reasonably related to the securing of the ultimate end of legislation and regulation in this area. That end, it is useful to recall, is the protection of the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance in those who would undertake to treat our bodies and minds for disease or trauma. WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED and the Order of the respondent trial court denying the petition for a writ of preliminary injunction is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners. PELAEZ VS. AUDITOR GENERAL TABLARIN VS. GUTIERREZ [152 SCRA 730; G.R. No. 78164; 31 July 1987] Friday, January 30, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law Facts: The petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, the Board of Medical Education and the Center for Educational Measurement from enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, series of 1985, dated 23 August 1985 and from requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as a condition for securing certificates of eligibility for admission, from proceeding with accepting applications for taking the NMAT and from administering the NMAT as scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future. The trial court denied said petition on 20 April 1987. The NMAT was conducted and administered as previously scheduled.

Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 4224 and 5946, known as the "Medical Act of 1959" defines its basic objectives in the following manner: "SECTION 1. Objectives. This Act provides for and shall govern (a) the standardization and regulation of medical education; (b) the examination for registration of physicians; and (c) the supervision, control and regulation of the practice of medicine in the Philippines." The statute, among other things, created a Board of Medical Education. Its functions as specified in Section 5 of the statute include the following: "(a) To determine and prescribe requirements for admission into a recognized college of medicine; x x x

(f) To accept applications for certification for admission to a medical school and keep a register of those issued said certificate; and to collect from said applicants the amount of twenty-five pesos each which shall accrue to the operating fund of the Board of Medical Education; Section 7 prescribes certain minimum requirements for applicants to medical schools: "Admission requirements. The medical college may admit any student who has not been convicted by any court of competent jurisdiction of any offense involving moral turpitude and who presents (a) a record of completion of a bachelor's degree in science or arts; (b) a certificate of eligibility for entrance to a medical school from the Board of Medical Education; (c) a certificate of good moral character issued by two former professors in the college of liberal arts; and (d) birth certificate. Nothing in this act shall be construed to inhibit any college of medicine from establishing, in addition to the preceding, other entrance requirements that may be deemed admissible. MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, issued by the then Minister of Education, Culture and Sports and dated 23 August 1985, established a uniform admission test called the National

Medical Admission Test (NMAT) as an additional requirement for issuance of a certificate of eligibility for admission into medical schools of the Philippines, beginning with the school year 1986-1987. This Order goes on to state that: "2. The NMAT, an aptitude test, is considered as an instrument toward upgrading the selection of applicants for admission into the medical schools and its calculated to improve the quality of medical education in the country. The cutoff score for the successful applicants, based on the scores on the NMAT, shall be determined every year by the Board of Medical Education after consultation with the Association of Philippine Medical Colleges. The NMAT rating of each applicant, together with the other admission requirements as presently called for under existing rules, shall serve as a basis for the issuance of the prescribed certificate of eligibility for admission into the medical colleges.

public. MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985 articulates the rationale of regulation of this type: the improvement of the professional and technical quality of the graduates of medical schools, by upgrading the quality of those admitted to the student body of the medical schools. That upgrading is sought by selectivity in the process of admission, selectivity consisting, among other things, of limiting admission to those who exhibit in the required degree the aptitude for medical studies and eventually for medical practice. The need to maintain, and the difficulties of maintaining, high standards in our professional schools in general, and medical schools in particular, in the current stage of our social and economic development, are widely known. We believe that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the NMAT as a means for achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants into [our] medical schools" and of "improv[ing] the quality of medical education in the country. We are entitled to hold that the NMAT is reasonably related to the securing of the ultimate end of legislation and regulation in this area. That end, it is useful to recall, is the protection of the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance in those who would undertake to treat our bodies and minds for disease or trauma. WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED and the Order of the respondent trial court denying the petition for a writ of preliminary injunction is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners. Francisco Tatad et al vs Secretary of Energy 15 11 2010 Equal Protection Oil Deregulation Law Considering that oil is not endemic to this country, history shows that the government has always been finding ways to alleviate the oil industry. The government created laws accommodate these innovations in the oil industry. One such law is the Downstream Oil Deregulation Act of 1996 or RA 8180. This law allows that any person or entity may import or purchase any quantity of crude oil and petroleum products from a foreign or domestic source, lease or own and operate refineries and other downstream oil facilities

Issue: Whether or not Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985 are constitutional.

Held: Yes. We conclude that prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain minimum scores therein as a condition for admission to medical schools in the Philippines, do not constitute an unconstitutional imposition. The police power, it is commonplace learning, is the pervasive and non-waivable power and authority of the sovereign to secure and promote all the important interests and needs in a word, the public order of the general community. An important component of that public order is the health and physical safety and well being of the population, the securing of which no one can deny is a legitimate objective of governmental effort and regulation. Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is whether there is some reasonable relation between the prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for admission to medical school on the one hand, and the securing of the health and safety of the general community, on the other hand. This question is perhaps most usefully approached by recalling that the regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the

and market such crude oil or use the same for his own requirement, subject only to monitoring by the Department of Energy. Tatad assails the constitutionality of the law. He claims, among others, that the imposition of different tariff rates on imported crude oil and imported refined petroleum products violates the equal protection clause. Tatad contends that the 3%-7% tariff differential unduly favors the three existing oil refineries and discriminates against prospective investors in the downstream oil industry who do not have their own refineries and will have to source refined petroleum products from abroad.3% is to be taxed on unrefined crude products and 7% on refined crude products. ISSUE: Whether or not RA 8180 is constitutional. HELD: The SC declared the unconstitutionality of RA 8180 because it violated Sec 19 of Art 12 of the Constitution. It violated that provision because it only strengthens oligopoly which is contrary to free competition. It cannot be denied that our downstream oil industry is operated and controlled by an oligopoly, a foreign oligopoly at that. Petron, Shell and Caltex stand as the only major league players in the oil market. All other players belong to the lilliputian league. As the dominant players, Petron, Shell and Caltex boast of existing refineries of various capacities. The tariff differential of 4% therefore works to their immense benefit. Yet, this is only one edge of the tariff differential. The other edge cuts and cuts deep in the heart of their competitors. It erects a high barrier to the entry of new players. New players that intend to equalize the market power of Petron, Shell and Caltex by building refineries of their own will have to spend billions of pesos. Those who will not build refineries but compete with them will suffer the huge disadvantage of increasing their product cost by 4%. They will be competing on an uneven field. The argument that the 4% tariff differential is desirable because it will induce prospective players to invest in refineries puts the cart before the horse. The first need is to attract new players and they cannot be attracted by burdening them with heavy disincentives. Without new players belonging to the league of Petron, Shell and Caltex, competition in our downstream oil industry is an idle dream. RA 8180 is unconstitutional on the ground inter alia that it discriminated against the new players insofar as it placed them at a competitive disadvantage vis--vis the

established oil companies by requiring them to meet certain conditions already being observed by the latter. Eastern Shipping Lines v. POEA 166 SCRA 533 (1988) FACTS: Vitaliano Saco, the Chief Officer of a ship, was killed in an accident in Tokyo, Japan. The widow filed a complaint for damages against the Eastern Shipping Lines with the POEA, based on Memorandum Circular No. 2 issued by the latter which stipulated death benefits and burial expenses for the family of an overseas worker. Eastern Shipping Lines questioned the validity of the memorandum circular. Nevertheless, the POEA assumed jurisdiction and decided the case. ISSUE: W/N the issuance of Memorandum Circular No. 2 is a violation of nondelegation of powers

GENERAL RULE: Non-delegation of Legislative Power EXCEPTION: Subordinate Legislation Tests for Valid Delegation of Legislative Power

HELD: SC held that there was valid delegation of powers. In questioning the validity of the memorandum circular, Eastern Shipping Lines contended that POEA was given no authority to promulgate the regulation, and even with such authorization, the regulation represents an exercise of legislative discretion which, under the principle, is not subject to delegation. GENERAL RULE: Non-delegation of powers; exception It is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be delegated. What can be delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be

enforced, not what the law shall be. The ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to the delegate. Two Tests of Valid Delegation of Legislative Power There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power, viz, the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or stations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegates authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative. Xxx The delegation of legislative power has become the rule and its non-delegation the exception. Rationale for Delegation of Legislative Power The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of government and the growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the myriad problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be expected to reasonably comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. Too many of the problems attendant upon present-day undertakings, the legislature may not have the competence to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say, specific solutions. These solutions may, however, be expected from its delegates, who are supposed to be experts in the particular fields. Power of Subordinate Legislation The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are particularly

applicable to administrative bodies. With the proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant peculiar problems, the national legislature has found it more and more necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the authority to issue rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute. This is called the power of subordinate legislation. With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in statute by filling in the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to provide. Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one such administrative regulation. Tobias v. Abalos Posted: August 4, 2010 in Case Digests Tags: case, constitution, digest, law 0 G.R.No. L-114785 08 December 1994 PONENTE: BIDIN, J. FACTS: Prior to Republic Act No., 7675 also known as An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong, Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one legislative district. A plebiscite was held for the people of Mandaluyong whether or not they approved of the said conversion. The plebiscite was only 14.41% of the said conversion. Nevertheless, 18,621 voted yes whereas 7, 911 voted no. ISSUE: Whether or not the ratification of RA7675 was unconstitutional citing Article VI, Sections 5(1), 4 and 26(1) HELD/RULING: For the purposes of discussion, lets breakdown all of the claimed violations to the 1987 Constitution. Section 26(1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof. The creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion. Moreover, a liberal construction of the one-title-one-subject rule has been liberally adopted by the court as to not impede legislation (Lidasan v. Comelec). Sec. 5(1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred

and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations. The Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250 members, unless otherwise provided by law. The emphasis on the latter clause indicates that the number of the House of Representatives may be increased, if mandated via a legislative enactment. Therefore, the increase in congressional representation is not unconstitutional. Sec. 5(4). Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standard provided in this section. The argument on the violation of the above provision is absurd since it was the Congress itself which drafted, deliberated upon and enacted the assailed law. The petition is thereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED. Mariano v. Commission on Elections Posted: August 16, 2010 in Case Digests Tags: case, comelec, congress, constitution, digest, law, legislative, Philippines, political 0 G.R. No. 118627 07 March 1995 Ponente: Puno, J. FACTS: Juanito Mariano, a resident of Makati, along with residents of Taguig suing as taxpayers, assail Sections 2, 51 and 52 of R.A. No. 7854 (An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati). Another petition which contends the unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7854 was also filed by John H. Osmena as a senator, taxpayer and concerned citizen. ISSUES: 1. Whether Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 delineated the land areas of the proposed city of Makati violating sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code on specifying

metes and bounds with technical descriptions 2. Whether Section 51, Article X of R.A. No. 7854 collides with Section 8, Article X and Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution stressing that they new citys acquisition of a new corporate existence will allow the incumbent mayor to extend his term to more than two executive terms as allowed by the Constitution 3. Whether the addition of another legislative district in Makati is unconstitutional as the reapportionment cannot be made by a special law HELD/RULING: 1. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 states that: Sec. 2. The City of Makati. The Municipality of Makati shall be converted into a highly urbanized city to be known as the City of Makati, hereinafter referred to as the City, which shall comprise the present territory of the Municipality of Makati in Metropolitan Manila Area over which it has jurisdiction bounded on the northeast by Pasig River and beyond by the City of Mandaluyong and the Municipality of Pasig; on the southeast by the municipalities of Pateros and Taguig; on the southwest by the City of Pasay and the Municipality of Taguig; and, on the northwest, by the City of Manila. Emphasis has been provided in the provision under dispute. Said delineation did not change even by an inch the land area previously covered by Makati as a municipality. It must be noted that the requirement of metes and bounds was meant merely as a tool in the establishment of LGUs. It is not an end in itself. Furthermore, at the time of consideration or R.A. No. 7854, the territorial dispute between the municipalities of Makati and Taguig over Fort Bonifacio was under court litigation. Out of becoming a sense of respect to co-equal department of government, legislators felt that the dispute should be left to the courts to decide. 1. Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 provides that: Sec. 51. Officials of the City of Makati. The represent elective officials of the Municipality of Makati shall continue as the officials of the City of Makati and shall exercise their powers and functions until such time that a new election is held and the duly elected officials shall have already qualified and assume their

offices: Provided, The new city will acquire a new corporate existence. The appointive officials and employees of the City shall likewise continues exercising their functions and duties and they shall be automatically absorbed by the city government of the City of Makati. Section 8, Article X and section 7, Article VI of the Constitution provide the following: Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. xxx xxx xxx Sec. 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election. No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. This challenge on the controversy cannot be entertained as the premise on the issue is on the occurrence of many contingent events. Considering that these events may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy. Moreover, only Mariano among the petitioners is a resident of Taguig and are not the proper parties to raise this abstract issue. 1. Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution clearly provides that the Congress may be comprised of not more than two hundred fifty members, unless otherwise provided by law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a general reapportionment of the law. Montejo v. Commission on Elections Posted: August 17, 2010 in Case Digests Tags: case, comelec, constitution, digest, law, legislative, Philippines, political 0

G.R. No. 118702 16 March 1995 Ponente: Puno, J. FACTS: Petitioner Cirilo Montejo, representing the First District of Leyte, pleads the annulment of Section 1 of Resolution No. 2736 of the COMELEC, redistricting certain municipalities in Leyte as it is said to violate the principle of equity of representation. Petitioner now seeks to transfer the municipality of Tolosa from the First District to the Second District of the province. For an overview of the distribution in the province, see the below table for the population distribution, census 1990 and 1994: Census 1990 Census 1994 First District 303, 349 178, 688 156, 462 125, 763 155, 995 181, 242

Second District 272, 167 Third District 214, 499

Fourth District 269, 347 Fifth District 309, 148

ISSUES: Whether COMELEC has the jurisdiction to promulgate Resolution No. 2736 HELD/RULING: The basic powers of COMELEC are spelled out in Section 2(c), Article IX of the Constitution, which states: Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections is hereby empowered to make minor adjustments of the reapportionment herein made. The meaning of minor adjustments is found in the debates of the Commission wherein it was stated that the transfer of one municipality in a district to another district is not a minor adjustment; rather it is a substantive one. Minor adjustments does not allow the change in allocations per district. It is then held that COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it promulgated Section 1 of its Resolution No. 2736. Section 1 is then annulled and set aside. The petition praying for the transfer of the municipality of Tolosa from the First District to the Second District of the province of Leyte is denied. PELAEZ VS. THE AUDITOR GENERAL (15 SCRA 569)FACTS:

 September 4 to October 29, 1964: President of the Philippines issued EO Nos. 93- 121, 124 and126- 129 which created 33 municipalities. November 10, 1964: Emmanuel Pelaez, Vice President of the Philippines, instituted a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction, against Auditor General, to restrain him from passing inaudit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said executive orders and/or anydisbursement by said municipalities ISSUE: EO Nos. 93- 121, 124 and 126- 129 are null and void upon the ground that said Section 68 of the RevisedAdministrative Code has been impliedly repealed by Republic Act No. 2370 and constitutes an unduedelegation of legislative power. HELD: WHEREFORE, the Executive Orders in question are hereby declared null and void ab initio and therespondent permanently restrained from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds inimplementation of said Executive Orders or any disbursement by the municipalities above referred to. It isso ordered. RATIO: ALSE 2013:ALDANA, BARRIENTOS, BELLOSILLO, BRIONES, CASTANEDA, DELOS SANTOS, DE JESUS, GODUCO, IBARRA,LAGROSAS, MANGAHAS, PENA CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1: CASE DIGESTSARTICLE 6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT January 1, 1960: RA No. 2370 was enacted. This act states that barrios may not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed except by an Act of Congress or of thecorresponding provincial board upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected andthe recommendation of the council of the municipality or

municipalities in which the proposedbarrio is situated Moreover, section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, upon which the disputed executiveorders are based, provides:The (Governor-General) President of the Philippines may by executive order define the boundary,or boundaries, separate or merge any province, name any new subdivision created and changethe seat of government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare mayrequire: Provided, That the authorization of the (Philippine Legislature) Congress of thePhilippines shall first be obtained whenever the boundary of any province or subprovince is to bedefined or any province is to be divided into one or more subprovinces. When action by the(GovernorGeneral) President of the Philippines in accordance herewith makes necessary achange of the territory under the jurisdiction of any administrative officer or any judicial officer, the(Governor-General) President of the Philippines, with the recommendation and advice of thehead of the Department having executive control of such officer, shall redistrict the territory of theseveral officers affected and assign such officers to the new districts so formed.Upon the changing of the limits of political divisions in pursuance of the foregoing authority, anequitable distribution of the funds and obligations of the divisions thereby affected shall be madein such manner as may be recommended by the (Insular Auditor) Auditor General and approvedby the (Governor-General) President of the Philippines. The power to fix common boundaries may partake of an administrative nature since itinvolves the adoption of means and ways to carry into effect the law creating said municipalities. But the authority to create municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature. Although the Congress may delegate to another branch of the government the power tofill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of the law, it is essential that saidlaw should be:1 . C o m p l e t e i n i t s e l f omust set forth the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by thedelegate2 . F i x a s t a n d a r d

oThe limits of which are sufficiently determinate must conform in the performanceof his functions. Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well settledrequirements for a valid delegation of the power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. Itdoes not enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented by the President. Neither does itgive a standard sufficiently precise to avoid the evil effects above referred to. if the validity of the delegation of powers made in Section 68 were upheld, there would nolonger be any legal impediment to a statutory grant of authority to the President to do anythingwhich, in his opinion, may be required by public welfare or public interest. Such grant of authoritywould be a virtual abdication of the powers of Congress in favor of the Executive, and would bringabout a total collapse of the democratic system established by our Constitution, which it is thespecial duty and privilege of this Court to uphold. The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to interfere inthe exercise of such discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the executivedepartments, bureaus, or offices of the national government, as well as to act in lieu of suchofficers. This power is denied by the Constitution to the Executive, insofar as local governments are concerned. Thus, the President cannot interfere with local governments, so long as the same or itsofficers act within the scope of their authority. Also, the power of control of the President over executive departments, bureaus or offices impliesno morethan the authority to assume directly the functions thereof or to interfere inthe exercise of discretion by its officials. Instead of giving the President less power over local governments than that vested in himover the executive departments, bureaus or offices, Section 68 of the Revised AdministrativeCode reverses the process and does the exact opposite , by conferring upon him more power over municipal corporations than that which he has over said executive departments, bureaus or offices

ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS VS. COMELEC [G.R. 119976/ SEPTEMBER 18, 1995/ JUSTICE KAPUNAN] FACTS: Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her certificate of candidacy for representative of the 1stdistrict of Leyte. Private respondent, Cirilo Roy Montejo, incumbent Representative of the 1stdistrict of Leyte, fileda petition for Petitioners disqualification, alleging that she did not meet the Constitutionalrequirement for residency. Petitioner the 1yr residency required as her Certificate of Candidacy showed ____ years andseven months. Petitioner then filed with the Provincial Election Supervisor of Leyte an Amended/CorrectedCertificate of Candidacy, changing the entry seven months to since childhood. This was notaccepted for it was filed out of time. It was then filed to COMELEC, where the 2 Division, by a vote of 2:1, came up with theresolution:1.Finding the private respondents Petition for Disqualification meritorious2.striking off petitioners Corrected/Amended Cert. of Candidacy of March 31, 19953 . C a n c e l i n g h e r o r i g i n a l C e r t . of Candidacy Even the MR to COMELEC was denied. Petitioners reasons for the change: oIt should be noted that she was born and raised in Leyte. oShe moved to Manila to pursue her studies as well as work. She met Ferdinand Marcoswho was then the representative of Batac, Ilocos Norte. When they got married, shefollowed her husband throughout his political career. Her husband fixed their residence in Batac but during his presidency, they lived inMalacanang Palace. After the death of her husband and her exile, she was not allowed to return to her ancestral home as it was sequestered by the PCGG,
nd

forcing her to live in differentresidences. Eventually she returned to Leyte and settled there. ISSUES: Whether or not petitioner met the 1yr residency qualification for election purposes. Whether or not COMELEC properly exercised its jurisdiction before and after the elections. HELD:1 . Q u a l i f i c a t i o n o n 1 y r residency No. Depending on the justice, there are multiple reasons or opinions. First, the SC said that for the purposes of election law, residence is synonymous to domicile. In the caseOng vs. Republic , the Courts concept of domicile is to mean an individualspermanent home. She has never lost her domicile, which she had since birth even when she got married. When she got married, the husband has set their domicile and she lost her domicile of Leyte byoperation of law but regained such domicile when her husband died. It was further decided thatwhen her husband died, the return to her original domicile was as if there was no interruption.Furthermore, on basis of another opinion, upon the death of her husband, she had the freedom tochoose her domicile. An individual does not lose his domicile even if he has lived and maintained residences indifferent places. Residence, it bears repeating, implies a factual relationship to a given place for various purposes. To effect a change in domicile, one must demonstrate:1.an actual removal or an actual change of domicile2.bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a newone; and3 . A c t s w h i c h c o r r e s p o n d with the purpose The absence of any, residence of origin is deemed to continue. 2.Qualification on 1 yr residency The contention of the petitioner is that it is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal andnot the COMELEC has jurisdiction

over the election of members of the House Representatives inaccordance with Art. VI Sec. 17 of the Constitution Doctrine: a statute requiring rendition of judgment within a specified time is generally construed tobe merely directory, so that non-compliance with them does not invalidate the judgment on thetheory that if the statute had intended such result, it would have clearly indicated it. Mandatory vs. Directory provision oDifference lies on grounds of expediency; less injury results to the general public bydisregarding than enforcing the letter of the law oStatute is construed to be merely directory when the statutory provisions which may bethus departed from with impunity, without affecting the validity of statutory proceedings,are usually those which relate to the mode or time of doing that which is essential toeffect the aim and purpose of the Legislature or some incident of the essential act. Free Telephone Workers Union vs Ople On November 4, 2011 00 Political Law Control Power over the Ministries [Cabinet] Alter Ego Forms of Government On September 14, 1981, there was a notice of strike with the Ministry of Labor (Ople) for unfair labor practices and arbitrary implementation of a Code of Conduct. Several conciliation meetings called by the Ministry followed, with petitioner manifesting its willingness to have a revised Code of Conduct that would be fair to all concerned but with a plea that in the meanwhile the Code of Conduct being imposed be suspended a position that failed to meet the approval of private respondent. Subsequently, respondent, on September 25, 1981, certified the labor dispute to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration and enjoined any strike at the private respondents establishment. Private respondent, following the lead of petitioner labor union, explained its side on the controversy regarding the Code of Conduct, the provisions of which as alleged in the petition were quite harsh, resulting in what it deemed indefinite preventive suspension

apparently the principal cause of the labor dispute. Ople issued the certification for compulsory arbitration pursuant to the provisions on strikes of the Labor Code this is to avoid adverse effects to the national interest. ISSUE: Whether or not such provision is an undue delegation of power. HELD: FTWU failed to make out a case of undue delegation. The President shall have control of the ministries. It may happen, therefore, that a single person may occupy a dual position of Minister and Assemblyman. To the extent, however, that what is involved is the execution or enforcement of legislation, the Minister is an official of the executive branch of the government. The adoption of certain aspects of a parliamentary system in the amended Constitution does not alter its essentially presidential character. Article VII on the presidency starts with this provision: The President shall be the head of state and chief executive of the Republic of the Philippines. Its last section is an even more emphatic affirmation that it is a presidential system that obtains in our government. Thus: All powers vested in the President of the Philippines under the 1935 Constitution and the laws of the land which are not herein provided for or conferred upon any official shall be deemed and are hereby vested in the President unless the Batasang Pambansa provides otherwise. However, it must be stressed that the exercise of such competence cannot ignore the basic fundamental principle and state policy that the state should afford protection to labor. Whenever, therefore, it is resorted to in labor disputes causing or likely to cause strikes or lockouts affecting national interest, the State still is required to assure the rights of workers to self-organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of work. At this stage of the litigation, however, in the absence of factual determination by the Ministry of Labor and the National Labor Relations Commission, this Court is not in a position to rule on whether or not there is an unconstitutional application.