The aim of this essay is to explore Deleuze's conception of the idea, particularly in a social sense.

I would like to argue that work the work of Deleuze and Deleuze & Guattari potentially provides a new means of approaching social theory and in particular a new means of approaching some aspects of Marxism. What I propose may be gained from this exploration, is the possibility of viewing a potential path that Deleuze may have taken into Marxism or instead as Stolze states that Difference and Repetition can be considered a 'vital resource, not so much of a Marxist philosophy but instead of a philosophy for Marxism.' (Stolze p62) As it is acknowledged that Deleuze and Guattari both considered themselves Marxists, any exploration of their work from such an angle would perhaps take into account Deleuze's earlier comments on Marxism such as those in Difference and Repetition,as such I propose that the work of Deleuze and Deleuze & Guattari may provide a new means of exploring areas of Marxism that have previously been dealt with by a synthesis of Freud and Marx's ideas. What I would like to explore is the extent to which Deleuze's philosophy must turn towards Althusser and his structural/Spinozan approach to escape the dialectic of both Hegel and Marx's historical or humanist approach. This motivation for following Althusser and his conception of Marxism seems to be fundamentally rooted in Deleuze's attempt to escape the philosophical logic of Hegel; in particular it is seemingly Hegel's reliance upon negation and its role in the dialectic that Deleuze is attempting to move away from. It has been suggested that one of the central problems of the dialectic is that it considered as the product of a mystification or contradiction that has not yet been resolved. It has been argued that the reason the dialectic may remain so elusive is not due to any hidden meaning but rather that the 'representation of the dialectic appears in the form of a false problem which distorts the nature of movement itself in thought and in matter.' (Lambert p104) Deleuze locates this problem in the positing of the identity and its opposition, this simple move does not move beyond difference in the concept, rather than Deleuze's proposition of a conceptual difference. For Deleuze the significance of escaping the logic of the dialectic within Difference and Repetition, seems to be part of his larger project to begin to think difference outside of the concept by moving away from the positing of the identity and its negation. However, it is also noted that Deleuze, following Nietzsche objected to Hegel not simply on the grounds of the problematic nature of the dialectic but rather because Hegel's philosophy seems to offer a slave's view of the world, in which a 'model of thought is designated that legitimates the system of slavery by installing the master-slave dialectic at the centre of our argument, making it seem as though it is the only choice and effectively denying the option of the formation of ones own problematics. (Buchanan 2005) Deleuze states; Contradiction is not the weapon of the proletariat but, rather, the manner in which the bourgeoisie defends and preserves itself, the shadow behind which it maintains its claim to decide what the problems are (268). Deleuze argues that 'the negative is merely the turning shadow of the problematic upon the set of propositions that subsumes it as cases,' he finds that 'the problematic of production is already subsumed under the negative of the division of labour, the mode of production is already determined (negatively) by the concrete relations of production. A critique that begins with the present division of labour as the primary instance of the social dialectic fails to grasp the true nature of the problem' (Lambert p 109) Similarly Althusser suggests that an 'entire tradition of Marxian enquiry has been preoccupied by the false problem concerning the true image of the dialectic'. (Lambert p104) On the basis of this he conceived of a reading of Marx, in which he locates an epistemological break between the 'young Marx' whom Althusser views as being informed by a left-Hegelian humanist philosophy and the 'mature Marx which Althusser conceives of as Marx's turn to a scientific approach to society in Capital. With this break, Althusser focuses on reading Capital and the works of Marx's later work as a scientific theory of the mode of production within society, and in doing so also conceives an interpretation of Marx that denies what he views as a humanist-historical philosophy. Althusser's move away from the Hegelian dialectic also means a move away from the idea of a subject situated

historically within this process. (Holland) As such, he approaches history as a process without a subject, and attempts to demonstrate that Marxism is not a historicism nor a humanism but rather is given the status of scientific theory by Althusser. For Althusser, the idea of class agency in history is accounted for by structural determinations which he finds explained in the works of the 'later Marx' particularly in Capital and its conception of the mode of production; for Althusser it is the mode of production that plays the role of the determinant factor. One of the most important effects to consider within Althusser's attempt discredit Hegel's expressive causality was 'to render the problem of class agency in historiography as a moot point: Marxism was not a historicism.' (Holland) It is noted that while Deleuze seems to represent - along with Althusser an anti-Hegelian, Spinozian Marxism. For Deleuze then, his approach to Marxism will remain as anti-historicist as Althusser's, although his mode of anti-historicism is far more complex than Althusser's structuralist mode. (Holland 1998:149) Social Ideas in a Marxist sense In Difference & Repetition, Deleuze considers the genesis of ideas in doing so he points toward the conception of three types of idea for his third example he begins with the question; are there social Ideas, in a Marxist sense? He states In what Marx calls abstract labour, abstraction is made from the particular qualities of the products of labour and the qualities of the labourers but not from the conditions of productivity, the labour-power and the means of labour in a society. The social idea is the element of quantitability, qualitability and potentiality of societies. It expresses a system of multiple ideal connections or differential relations between differential elements: these include relations of production and property relations which are established not between concrete individuals but between atomic bearers of labour-power or representatives of property. (Deleuze D&R p234) Deleuze states that Ideas are by no means essences, (Deleuze D&R 236) and as such, he conceives of the idea in a similar way to Althusser's anti-humanist Marxism. Althusser's attempt to move away from the humanist approach to Marxism as a means to avoid an essentialist or historical account of the subject, instead the subject is the product of, or determined by the structures in place that serve the dominant mode of production. When conceiving of the social idea, Deleuze points toward Althusser's reading of Marx, in which 'Althusser demonstrates the presence of a structure to Capital which is not subject to historical interpretations of Marxism, a structure that acts by incarnating its varieties in diverse societies' (Deleuze D&R p234) Althusser claims that 'Ideas have disappeared (as they are endowed with an ideal or spiritual existence), to the precise extent that it has emerged that their existence is inscribed in the actions of practices governed by rituals defined in the last instance by ideological apparatus. Following this; he states: 'the subject acts insofar as he is acted by the following system (set out in the order of its real determination): ideology existing in a material ideological apparatus, describing material practices governed by a material ritual, which practices exist in the material actions of a subject acting in all consciousness according to his belief. (Althusser ISA's) Here he seems to draw upon Marx's work in his Contribution to a Critique of Political Economy, where Marx states that (t)he mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness. Marx further states that 'changes in the economic foundation of society will sooner or later lead to the transformation of the whole superstructure.'(Marx preface CCPE) The reliance upon a structural model that characterises the approach taken by Althusser towards Marxism, appears to take Deleuze away from his account of the development or genesis of ideas and closer to a static model that allows for very little contingency

in it's development. While Althusser is consistently attempting to overcome any element of historicism in Marx, it may be stated that he relies upon a conception of the subject that is granted a very small role within the process of the development of society and as a result is considerably close to a telelogical account of society. For Althusser, the structures in society have priority over the 'real objects and beings' that occupy them as well as the 'imaginary roles' that are played by those that take these places. Althusser finds that the 'true subjects within society are not those that occupy the places, but the places themselves, within a social spatium which defines the type of society.' This spatium can be considered as Marx's 'relations of production.' (Stolze P53) What seems to be immediately problematic within this reading of Marxism is the autonomy of the subject, whilst he attempts to avoid economic determinism he completely neglects any notion of social actors as contributing to systemic change, the subject seemingly becomes the completely determined product of differential forces, such as the mode of production or of an ISA, whilst Althusser is able to overcome some of the difficulties here by employing the psychoanalytic term 'overdetermination' to account for the problematic nature of determining given relations, this concept is key in his formulation of the break from economic determinism, and any logic that 'presumed, sought and found an essential cause of - a master narrative to account for- social conditions and changes. Such reasoning reduced what could be an infinity of causal influences to merely a few (Bertens & Natoli p8) The conception of a structure 'that allows each individual productive process or element to stand in relation to and play a part of a complexly structured whole, none of which is reducible to being the simple or essential cause of the others, is what Althusser terms as overdetermination, or the theory that every element in the total productive process constituting a historical moment is determined by all the others.'(Lewis 2009) However Laclau and Mouffe have objected to Althusser's conception of the economy as an object that is able to determine all subjects and ideas within a society 'in the last instance,' they find that this determination will always gravitate towards being simple, definite and one-way. (Lewis p7) Laclau and Mouffe find that Althussers subject and social must be precisely determined with the real object of the economy. For them the strength of Althusser's use of the concept of overdetermination which they view as being able to provide a critique of every type of fixity, through an affirmation of the incomplete, open and politically negotiable character of every identity - is rendered implausible by his own 'insistence that the social and every subject in the social, is decisively fixed by the economy.(Lewis p7) Within Althusser's attempts to escape the historicist, determinist and teleological claims of particular readings of Marxism he seems to have taken up a Spinozist approach, this has been considered as an alternative to many philosophers who have retained the Hegelian, dialectical approach of Marx. However the extent to which Marx actually declares the economy as the determinant factor within society is questionable, he states that 'his inquiry has led to the conclusion that neither legal relation nor political forms may be comprehended by themselves or on the basis of a so-called development of the human mind, on the contrary they originate in the material conditions of life.' (Marx preface CCPE) Marx invariably finds reciprocal relations amongst the structures and institutions of society, the mode of production and also the agents involved, the extent to which Althusser's theory can provide the subject with a role in this process is questionable. It is the precedence granted to the economy in particular readings of Marx, that seems to lead to what has been considered to be an economic determinist view of Marxism, this is normally attributed to the work of Marx and Engels, however it is seemingly more prevalent in particular interpretations of Marxism.

Engels states According to the materialist conception of history, the ultimately determining element in history is the production and reproduction of real life. Other than this neither Marx nor I have ever asserted. Hence if somebody twists this into saying that the economic element is the only determining one, he transforms that proposition into a meaningless, abstract, senseless phrase. (Engels p294)

Similarly Marx notes the importance of 'distinguishing between the material transformation of the economic conditions of production, which can be determined with the precision of science, and the ideological forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out.' (Marx preface CCPE) The appropriation of Althusser's concept of structural interplay by 'overdetermined' forces in many senses seems appropriate for Deleuze in his attempt to move away from the Hegelian dialectic and essentialism, 'within this conception there are patterns and orders to historical life along with historical change. However, there is no necessity to any of these transformations and history does not necessarily progress. Transformations do occur. However, they do so only when the contradictions and levels of development inherent in a mode of production allow for such change.' (Lewis 2009) As Althusser conceives of all aspects of any society as being overdetermined, it follows 'that each aspects exists in/as a complex relation of pushes and pulls emanating from all aspects.' Therefore everything exists as a 'complex set of infinitely diverse contradictions, a conceptualisation of contradiction more complex than the dualistic notions usually attributed to Hegel.' (Bertens & Natoli P9) For this move away from the dialectic in Hegel, Althusser seems to draw particularly from Spinoza, in that he follows the idea 'that there are an inexhaustible infinity of causal relations underlying historical process, that are distinguished from the clear and distinct ideas humans can produce regarding the laws and mechanisms of that process.' (Holland) In this sense the reciprocal determinations present within any given circumstance, seem to be comparable to Deleuze's 'systems of differential relations between reciprocally determined genetic elements.' (D&R173-4) While the move away from Hegel for Deleuze may be a move away from the limits imposed by representation in thought, the use of Spinoza to escape the dialectic and its problems is questionable. It has been suggested that within the 'Spinozan universe' is the idea that everything can be objectively knowable, that it has the feature of mathematical 'thought' as one of its innate properties. (Holland) If the Spinozan universe is a knowable one then it is questionable how far away he moves away from essentialism, or rather an image of thought in Deleuzian terms. Hegel states: Spinozism is a defective philosophy because in it reflection and its manifold determining is an external thinking. The substance of this system is one substance, one indivisible totality; there is no determinateness that is not contained and dissolved in this absolute; and it is sufficiently important that in this necessary notion, everything which to natural picture thinking or to the understanding with its fixed distinctions, appears and is vaguely present as something self-subsistent, is completely reduced to a mere positedness. Determinateness is negation-is the absolute principle of Spinoza's philosophy; this true and simple insight establishes the absolute unity of substance. (Hegel -1179) The elusive nature of the subject In its all-encompassing theory, Althusser's reading of Marx does not seem to account for thought beyond the scope of science or ideology. Althusser states that the 'individuals that live in ideology, i.e. in a determinate (religious, ethical, etc.) representation of the world,' are subject to an 'imaginary distortion depending on their imaginary relation to their conditions of existence,' in other words, in the last instance, to the relations of production and to class relations (ideology = an imaginary relation to real relations). I shall say that this imaginary relation is itself endowed with a material existence. (Althusser thesis 2 ISA) Althusser states that the subject 'behaves in such a way, adopts such and such a practical attitude, and participates in certain regular practices which are those of the ideological apparatus on which depend the ideas which he has in all consciousness freely chosen as a subject,' he states If he believes in Duty, he will have the corresponding attitudes, inscribed in ritual practices according to the correct principles. If he believes in Justice, he will submit unconditionally to the rules of the Law, and may even protest when they are violated... Throughout this schema we observe that the ideological representation of ideology is itself forced to recognize that every subject

endowed with a consciousness and believing in the ideas that his consciousness inspires in him and freely accepts, must act according to his ideas, must therefore inscribe his own ideas as a free subject in the actions of his material practice.... Indeed, if he does not do what he ought to do as a function of what he believes, it is because he does something else, which, still as a function of the same idealist scheme, implies that he has other ideas in his head as well as those he proclaims, and that he acts according to these other ideas, as a man who is either inconsistent (no one is willingly evil) or cynical, or perverse. (Althusser thesis 2 ISA) Althusser's subject seems to be entirely determined by the institutional structures that are present within society, it is in this sense that Althusser's account of the subject does not seem adequate to Deleuze's project and furthermore seems at odds with Deleuze's conception of the development of ideas. Deleuze states that 'determination must be a complete determination of the object, yet form only a part of it,' (Deleuze 1994 p160-161) this seems to become a rather simple account of determination in Althusser as he maintains that the 'complex unity of social practice is structured inherently through the practice of transforming raw material into useful products by the activity of living men through the determinate means of production within a given framework of determinate relations of production. (Althusser 1963 part VI) The all-encompassing theory of Althusser accounts for seemingly all social phenomena and subjectivity within this seems to be entirely determined by the institutional structures that are present within society, it is in this sense that Althusser's account of the subject does not seem adequate to Deleuze's project and furthermore seems extremely one-dimensional in contrast to Deleuze's conception of the development of ideas. Althusser holds that the 'complex unity of social practice is structured inherently through the practice of transforming raw material into useful products by the activity of living men through the determinate means of production within a given framework of determinate relations of production. (Althusser 1963 part VI) Althusser states: Ideas have disappeared as such (insofar as they are endowed with an ideal or spiritual existence), to the precise extent that it has emerged that their existence is inscribed in the actions of practices governed by rituals defined in the last instance by an ideological apparatus. It therefore appears that the subject acts insofar as he is acted by the following system (set out in the order of its real determination): ideology existing in a material ideological apparatus, describing material practices governed by a material ritual, which practices exist in the material actions of a subject acting in all consciousness according to his belief. (Althusser 1970) This approach according to some was a 'complete renunciation of the project of human emancipation from the alienated structures of capitalism, in which self-conscious activity of workers plays the pivotal role.' (Harman) On this note, the extent to which Althusser himself leaves the Hegelian dialectic is questionable, as firstly he retains the base-superstructure model in a similar relation and only in granting the superstructure 'relative autonomy' does he differentiate the same relation that is present in Marx. It could be stated that Althusser's method did not serve to make the dialectic any less mystifying, he did not solve the problem but deferred its solution by means of 'the last instance.' It may be alleged that Althusser reintroduces the Hegelian absolute moment or 'circle of circles' back into Marxist practice (Lambert p105) It is further noted that although Althusser was critical of the Stalinist interpretation of Marxism, he shares with it the 'rejection of the notion of workers overcoming their own alienation, a rejection of the objects of history becoming its subjects. (or, in Hegelian terms: negate the negation)'. (Harman) An important point in Althusser's reading of Marx is that he views Marxism, not as theory of the workers movement becoming conscious of its own exploitation, but as a 'science' evolving alongside the physical sciences. As such it then becomes 'the work of a specialist group of scientists guided by a concern for knowledge, the majority of people within society cannot then escape from ideology which is considered to be pre-scientific notions and beliefs the scientific elite can recognise and see through the ideologies that the 'masses' are

susceptible to. (Harman) Conceiving of Marxism as a science seems to be one of the more problematic aspects of Althusser's work, at this point I suggest that there is a disjuncture between Deleuze and Althusser, and that any consideration of social ideas in the Marxist sense must take this account. It may be stated that Althusser actually retains more of a Hegelian influence in some ways than Marx seems to, where Althusser views the subject as determined between the economic base and the ideological superstructure, Marx seems to leave room for contingency based upon 'human practical activity.' It is alleged by some commentators that the role of human activity within Marxism is the difference between his and the Hegelian dialectic, where 'Marx is able to move beyond the Hegelian approach,' putting it on its feet, Marx states: The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory but is a practical question. Man must prove the truth, ie, the reality and power, the this-sidedness of his thinking, in practice. The dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking which is isolated from practice is a purely scholastic question All mysteries which lead theory to mysticism find their rational solution in human practice and in the comprehension of this practice. (Marx cited by Harman) Harman notes that Althusser's disregard 'for practice as a test of theory, ends up with a scheme much like that put across by conservative interpretations of Hegel, in which truth is attained simply by the application of reason to concepts or theoretical practice as Althusser termed it. (Harman) It has been argued that Althusser's approach leaves little room for autonomy resulting from his account of the mode of production in both For Marx and Reading Capital, which has led to what has been termed a 'static philosophic approach of a static analysis of society, which provides little room for one mode of production to give way to another, as society is seemingly dominated by a single, unchanging, structure of structures, their transformation becomes theoretically unthinkable.' (Harman) When Althusser attempts to conceive of society in a scientific way, he seems to lead toward a functional explanation and in doing so begins to privilege a particular way of thinking, that seems to privilege the structures themselves rather than the reciprocal interplay between the structures, processes and agents involved. Compared to Deleuze's earlier comments in chapter 4 on the organism as biological idea, the social ideas are seemingly missing the element which genes play in the former; whereby they are able to express differential elements which also characterise an organism in a global manner, and play the role of distinctive points in a double process of reciprocal and complete determination. (p234) While autonomy may not be an adequate term to use to describe this account, it seems to rely more on some form of agency compared to the role of Althusser's social actors whose determination seems fully accounted for between the mode of production and Ideological State Apparatuses. For Althusser, 'relations of production are determined as differential relations, not amongst real mean or concrete individuals but between objects and agents'(Deleuze p178 - D I) Deleuze (on Althusser) states: Each mode of production is thus characterized by singularities corresponding to the values of the relations. And if it is obvious that concrete men come to occupy the places and carry forth the elements of the structure, this happens by fulfilling the role that the structural place assigns to them (for example the "capitalist"), and by serving as supports for the structural relations. This occurs to such an extent that "the true subjects are not these occupants and functionaries... but the definition and distribution of these places and these functions." The true subject is the structure itself: the differential and the singular, the differential relations and the singular points, the reciprocal determination and the complete determination. (Deleuze p178 - D I) In a Deleuzian ontology a thing is not defined by its essential traits but rather by the morphogenetic process that gave rise to it. Rather than representing timeless categories, species are historically constituted entities. (De Landa p9-10) As Deleuze moves away from a humanist ontology, the move

toward a conception of society as informed by Althusser's Marxism has the pre-conceived notion of subjectivity without a subject. (Badiou p58) What can be seen here is the potential to move away from an anthropocentric philosophy which Badiou views as providing the means to reject the humanist vision of the bond, or the being-together, which binds an abstract and ultimately enslaved vision of politics to the theological ethics of rights.(Badiou p66) Where an essentialist account may rely on factors that 'transcend the realm of matter and energy, a morphogenetic account disregards all transcendent factors using exclusively form-generating resources which are immanent to the material world.'(De Landa p10) It may be argued however, that in this move Althusser does not seem to entirely leave the domain of essentialism, while his approach to Marxism is considerably removed from the 'humanist' tradition, Althusser's recourse to ideology and the central place that it plays within his conception of Marxism leaves the question open as to whether he is not relying upon a disguised form of essentialism, with the role of subject taken by an empty form of subjectivity that is imposed upon social agents. It may be argued that by intentionally trying to avoid a historicist approach Althusser leaves little room for a 'genetic' account of the development of ideas or the social subject. In later work, Deleuze and Guattari seem to escape the problem of Althusser's structural approach by conceiving of the mode of production as a virtual structure that poses economic problems, the solution for this problem within the capitalist mode of production they find in axiomatisation, they propose that the solutions to the problems given in the virtual structure are around the axiom of debt which is said to draw more on Nietzsche than Marx's dialectical derivation of surplus value from production - their view gives finance capital priority over industrial capital, in which society is able to manage the problems of economics by organising a system of debt relations that drive production and exchange' (Holland 150) a patchwork of finite and temporary debts in the case of savagery; an innite debt owed to the despot, head priest or king in barbarism; an equally innite debt owed to capital in capitalism. These solutions may be false (illusory, ideological), but they are nonetheless effective in organising production and exchange relations. (Holland p150-151

Conclusion Althusser's conception of the social idea seems to lead to the conclusion that society may be understood scientifically and in effect is essentially knowable to some degree on an objective basis. Whilst acknowledging the similarities of both thinkers, Resch finds that the anti-Althusserian implications within Deleuze's work are very clear. While it is noted that both thinkers 'oppose domination in the form of capitalist property relations and recognize the importance of the constitution of subjectivity in maintaining these relations', (Resch 232) the means by which they both conceive of this seem to be radically different. 'Deleuze'; he states, 'seems to follow Nietzsche in viewing a chaotic will to power as the ahistorical ontological motor of history, this chaosmos is always historically structured, but the principle of that structuration lies outside of history as for both Deleuze and Nietzsche history is a structure of meaning imposed upon meaningless differences taking a historical form.' Deleuze's turn to Nietzsche rather than Marx, is what seems to differentiate him entirely from the 'repressive, narrow rationalism of Althusserian theory,' whilst also 'providing a framework in which the ideals of May 1968 could survive the pessimism of their defeat' (Resch 1992 232-3) In Deleuze's later work, particularly a lecture entitled Capitalism, flows, the decoding of flows, capitalism and schizophrenia, psychoanalysis, Spinoza., Deleuze seems to have far surpassed the Althusserian model of society and social ideas. In this lecture Deleuze retains the concept of the repressive state apparatus, but moves toward an account of the encoding and decoding of flows with this Deleuze is able to account for the role of information and ideas and their passage between people, through history and also their ideological role. He finds the deployment of axioms as the ability for capitalism to recuperate 'the things which pass beneath its codes.' (Deleuze Capitalism, Flows....) Such as the invention of the theory of social class in the 19th century; Deleuze notes, it was first in the 19th century to have thought in terms of classes, they are the ones who invent the

theoretical notion of classes and invent it precisely as an essential fragment of the capitalist code, namely: the legitimacy of capitalism comes from this: the victory of the bourgeoisie as a class opposed to the aristocracy. The system that appears in the works of Saint Simon, A. Thierry, E. Quinet is the radical seizure of consciousness by the bourgeoisie as a class and they interpret all of history as a class struggle. It is not Marx who invents the understanding of history as a class struggle, it is the bourgeois historical school of the 19th century..... the day when capitalism can no longer deny that the proletariat is a class, this coincides with the moment when, in its head, it found the moment to recode all this. That which we call the power [puissance] of recuperation of capitalism, what is it? For Deleuze, 'the idea of liberation as opposed to that generally seen in most Marxist theory- seems to consist of contesting the territorialisation of difference in theory, in the psyche and society. The social world is an assemblage for Deleuze, and it lacks central structure and overarching pattern, therefore contestation cannot be localised, it must be as nomadic as difference itself. (Resch 232) it is this strength of Deleuze's project which I view as able to challenge attempts at 'territorialisation' of thought. In a similar manner to the invention of social classes as an axiom of capitalism, in these terms it could be argued that Althusser's approach to a science of society is considered as the invention, application or 'encoding' of theory which corresponds to a self-justifying structure. As such, an exploration of the potential synthesis of Deleuze's and Marx's work does not seem to be substantially benefited by the contributions of Althusser's reading of Marx mentioned in Difference and Repetition, and seems to be of little importance to Deleuze & Guattari. However, this does not necessarily mean that Althusser's reading of Marx provides nothing for a reconsideration of both Marx and Deleuze, as one the most important contributions seems to be his attempt to think outside of the concept of subject and identity. While it may be alleged that he goes too far with this ambitious project, it may warrant further investigation into the shortcomings of anthropocentric tendencies within Marxism and the extent to which Deleuze and Deleuze & Guattari may aid a move away from this.

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