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Prevention of Fire in Oil Industry

Structured Review Techniques for Hazard Management

A number of structured review techniques are used to check that fire control and recovery measures are adequate and appropriate. Many of these are first used in the design phase, but the integrity and performance of the measures finally adopted has to be maintained and confirmed in the operations phase The most common techniques are listed below: FIREPRAN (Fire Prevention and Protection Analysis) FEA (Fire and Explosion Analysis) EPR (Explosion Protection Review) PEMs (Physical Effects Models and Consequence Models) ESSA (Emergency Systems Survivability Analysis) SIA (Smoke Ingress Analysis) TR/EERA (Temporary Refuge/Escape Evacuation and Rescue Analysis) HAZID (Hazard Identification) HAZOP (Hazard and Operability Study) PLM (Platform Layout Methodology)

Fire and Explosion Strategy (FES)

2.1

Development of FES

A Fire and Explosion Strategy (FES) is defined in ISO/CD/13 702 'Control and Mitigation of Fire and Explosion in Offshore Installations' as the results of the process that uses information from the fire and explosion evaluation to determine the measures required to manage these hazardous events and the role of these measures. A FES will be different for each facility or installation although the framework and some components may be similar.

The starting point for the development of a FES is the HSE-MS that sets the policy and strategic objectives of the business. It will also cover organisation, responsibilities, resources, standards, documentation and the management of hazards. The management of hazards through the HEMP includes the basic steps of identifying and assessing hazards and effects. Controls for each threat that may cause the release of a hazard are selected as required together with recovery measures that reduce the consequences should the hazard be released. This information is included in the HSE Case and Hazards and Effects Register. The FES records the conclusion of the HEMP as it applies to fires and explosions and summarizes the key aspects of the following: a)
b)

The physical effects of representative fire and explosion hazardous events The risks associated with fires and explosions How the facility has been designed to minimise the consequences of fires and explosions The measures to prevent fires and explosions arising The assumptions used in risk assessments regarding the measures provided to control and to recover from fires and explosions The role of recovery measures and the essential systems and performance criteria of these measures (performance criteria for systems on a complex facility may be described elsewhere and referenced in the FES).

c) d) e)
f)

2.2

Level of detail in FES

The level of detail in the FES will vary depending on the scale of the installation and the stage in the installation life cycle when the hazard management and risk assessment process is undertaken, For example: Complex facilities For example, a large production platform incorporating complex facilities, drilling modules and large accommodation modules are likely to require detailed studies to address major hazards and fire and explosion hazardous events. For simpler facilities For example, for a wellhead platform or simple onshore plant with limited process facilities, it may be possible to rely on application of recognised codes and standards as a suitable base for hazard management that reflects industry experience for this type of facility. For facilities which are a repeat of earlier designs Evaluations undertaken for the original design may be deemed sufficient to determine the measures needed to manage hazards and fire and explosion hazardous events. For facilities in the early design phases Evaluations will necessarily be less detailed than those undertaken during later design phases. The FES will be progressively refined as a design for a new installation develops but the conclusions and information will always be recorded in the Hazards and Effects Register for the project. The FES should be updated whenever there is a significant change to the facility that may affect the management of the fire and explosion hazardous event.

2.3

Determination of risk

The risks may be determined in either a quantitative or qualitative manner. For a complex manned offshore structure the assessment of risk will usually be rigorous and quantitative. In other environments risk will be assessed in a more subjective manner. As with other risks, risk due to fire and explosion can be presented on a Risk Matrix by plotting the probability of events that could result in fire or explosion on one axis against the severity of the expected consequences in terms of people, assets, environment and reputation including cost on the other axis. The tolerability of risk can be displayed on the matrix and here factors such as the strategic criticality of uninterrupted operation of the facility can be reflected. More often it is impractical to determine the total risk by examining the risk presented by every conceivable scenario that might result in a fire or explosion. However in identifying most of the threats and scenarios it will become apparent where the main risk contributors are.

2.4

Objectives and system performance criteria

To reduce the risks to ALARP it must be established what, if any, measures are required to reduce the probability or consequences arising from a fire or explosion. The FES records how this is to be done and sets out the high level goals for control and recovery measures. Cascading from these are the goals and objectives for the various systems that will be required and the performance criteria for these systems and their sub-systems. These performance criteria include reliability and availability requirements. An example of how such a cascade is defined for one particular system can be found in the DEP on Fire Water Systems for use on offshore facilities. Many of the control measures used on a hydrocarbon plant, to reduce the probability of hazardous events involving fires and explosions are common with those used to prevent unplanned hydrocarbon releases. These include for example corrosion allowances / monitoring, limiting small bore connections, avoidance of screwed fittings, lifting procedures over live equipment and location of risers to avoid impact. In developing the FES there is a wide range of issues that should be considered to ensure that the measures selected are capable of performing their function when required to do so. These issues include: Nature of fires and explosions that may occur The environment
The nature of the fluids to be handled The anticipated ambient conditions The temperature and pressure of fluids handled The quantities of flammable materials to be processed and stored The amount, complexity and layout of equipment on the installation The location of the installation with respect to external assistance / support The production and manning philosophy`

Human factors.

2.5

Specification of systems and procedures

The FES should describe the essential systems that have been selected to meet the overall objectives and their role in the management of fires and explosions. These systems comprise both hardware and procedures. They include: Installation layout Emergency shut down systems Control of ignition Control of spills Emergency power systems Fire and gas detection Active fire protection Passive fire protection Explosion mitigation and protection systems Evacuation, escape and rescue Inspection testing and maintenance. In describing the functional requirements and performance criteria of these systems and their elements the following should be considered: The essential duties that the system is expected to perform and the parameters within which it must operate The integrity, reliability and availability of the system The survivability of the system under the emergency conditions which may be present when it is required to operate The dependency on other systems that may not be available in an emergency. Consideration of the above will form the basis of the specification of each of the systems and their elements. To maintain the integrity of the FES throughout the life of the installation, the means to verify the performance criteria of the systems and their elements must be defined. This is equally true of operating procedures and systems such as PTW systems, emergency procedures and Manual of Permitted Operations (MOPO) that must be fully defined such that their effectiveness can be periodically confirmed. In this document the focus is on the operations requirements of the FES.

Fire and Explosion Hazardous Events

3.1

General

During the design of a facility, fire and explosion control and recovery measures are considered and developed. This is done using fire and explosion scenario planning, physical effects and consequence modeling. The required response measures will be established on a performance basis and recorded in the FES for the facility. In the operations phase it is important that these control and recovery measures are understood and that the hardware and procedures are maintained and performance-tested. In the operations phase it is important that additional hazards and effects that may be present are identified and managed. 3.2

Fires
3.2.1 General

During production and maintenance there are many combinations of causes, which can result in a fire in EP plants. Liquid hydrocarbon fires can take many forms depending upon the pressure at the release and the volatility and flash point of the material. A jet fire usually requires a highly volatile or vaporised liquid flammable under pressure. Heavier hydrocarbons can produce running fires and ultimately pool fires where the burning material comes to rest. 3.2.2 Types of fires EP operations have the potential to generate all the following classes of fire. Class A Class B Ordinary combustible materials, e.g. rubbers, wood, paper, tapes, diskettes, etc. Flammable liquids such as hydrocarbons. These exhibit various fire characteristics according to their type and process conditions. Solvents, additives, glycols, alcohols, etc are also included. Electrical fires, e.g. overheating of cable insulation, fire in an energised electrical transformer or switchgear. Fires in combustible metals, e.g. magnesium, aluminum and titanium.

Class C Class D

Flammable hydrocarbon (gas, condensate and oil) fires are by far the most hazardous types that may occur in EP facilities and fall into the following general categories: Jet fires are turbulent diffusion flames resulting from the combustion of a fuel in a gaseous, vapour or spray form, continuously released under pressure with forward momentum. Pool fires are turbulent diffusion fires burning above an upward-facing horizontal pool of vaporising fuel under conditions where the fuel vapour or gas has zero or very low initial momentum. Running fires are fires caused by ignited fuel flowing under gravity to the lowest point in the area where a pool fire often forms. Cloud fires are transient fires resulting from the ignition of a cloud or vapour not subject to significant flame acceleration through the effects of confinement, turbulence or due to obstructions.

For hydrocarbon fire types an important consideration is the resulting heat flux levels. These can be calculated based on the following parameters: Fire characteristics, i.e. length, shape and orientation of the flame Flame surface emissive power, i.e. emitted radiation from the flame Geometry of flame and target, i.e. orientation of the flame surface relative to the target surface. Calculations are usually carried out using Physical Effects and Consequence Models although these are not usually suitable for running fires. 3.2.3 Thermal energy transfer Once a vapour-air mixture has ignited, part of the energy from the combustion process is evolved as heat that is distributed as conducted, convicted and radiated components. These components that can cause further failures and fire spread are described below. Conduction is the transfer of thermal energy along or through conductive materials, e.g. steels girders, decks plating and bulkheads. Convection is the transfer of thermal energy from one location to another by air movement due to density variations, wind or draught. Radiation is the transfer of thermal energy in the form of electromagnetic radiation. Its intensity is dependent upon the temperature of the sources emitting the radiation, e.g. flares. 3.2.4 Escalation Once a fire or explosion / fire sequence of hazardous events has started, escalation caused by one or more of the above mechanisms is almost inevitable, unless measures are taken to prevent it. The progressive transfer of thermal energy to adjacent plant and equipment will result in further failures and expansion of the area where combustion is taking place. Two examples are boil over and boiling liquid expanding vapour explosions (BLEVE). Boil over Is an escalation phenomenon where all, or part of the contents of a crude oil storage tank are forced upwards and out of the tank, due to superheated crude caused by oil burning on the surface, coming into contact with the water layer at the bottom of the tank and flashing it to steam. The result is massive escalation of the fire as a large part of the contents of the tank are ejected. (Boiling liquid expanded vapour explosions) Is an escalation phenomenon that involves vessels containing vaporising liquids. If such a vessel fractures, whilst exposed to a fire, the loss of containment leads to the immediate release of an enormous vapour cloud as the previously compressed liquid flashes to vapour. This may ignite giving a fireball and blast that can have catastrophic consequences.

BLEVE

Both of these can be a serious danger to firefighters as well as threatening recovery systems. Consequence assessment and physical effects modeling should be used to develop an understanding of the term 'safe distance' and ensure fire response measures employ procedures that contain this information. The primary role of mitigation and recovery fire protection systems is to prevent escalation moving to the next stage. This allows time for control measures such as blow down and ESD to have their full effect.

Failure to fully assess the escalation potential of a fire/explosion scenario may result in inappropriate fire protection measures and inadequate response resources. Without external intervention a fire in this situation will escalate until burn out is reached. Re-instatement times are likely to be long and expensive. It is therefore necessary to consider the various possible escalation scenarios and the adequacy of the control and recovery measures to meet the objectives set in the FES. 3.2.5 Combustion products Products of combustion can be divided into four categories; combustion gases, flames, heat and smoke. The effect of these products on human life and property should be carefully considered during the conceptual design. Combustion gases comprise carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide, sulphur dioxide, ammonia, hydrogen cyanide, nitrogen oxides, halogen acids, isocyanates, acrolein and volatile hydrocarbons in high concentrations. Control measures and consequences are as follows: Design specifications for flammable and combustible solids (e.g. cables, soft furnishings, wall panelling) should take the above effects into account and try to use fire retardant or inert materials Superheated, oxygen-deficient combustion gases may react violently if fresh air is suddenly introduced (e.g. when entering the fire area) Fatalities from inhalation of combustion gases and hot air are far more common than are fire deaths from all other causes combined. Flame luminosity varies with the efficiency with which the fuel is burning: Low molecular weight alcohols in the pure state (e.g. methanol, ethanol and propanol) burn efficiently in air and generate a hot almost invisible (non-luminous) flame Hydrocarbon fuels usually burn fairly inefficiently in air and generate highly visible, luminous flames and copious quantities of smoke (the one exception is a jet fire that entrains large quantities of air in the hydrocarbon vapour stream) Flame height for a liquid hydrocarbon is typically 1-2 times the diameter of the pool in still air conditions. Heat (thermal energy) is the combustion effect most responsible for the spread of a fire: For the purpose of fire prevention and protection, radiation, conduction and convection (direct transport of heat through the spread of fire gases) have to be considered Heat transfer in crude oil storage tanks can result in superheated oil reaching the water layer at the bottom of the tank. This causes it to flash to vapour and much of the tanks contents are ejected violently, greatly escalating the size of the fire. This has to be taken into account when implementing mitigation and recovery measures against this type of fire. Smoke is produced in considerable quantities by burning hydrocarbons and solids, (particularly under conditions of incomplete combustion). It is also produced in large quantities by burning electrical and electronic equipment: Smoke consists of finely divided particulate matter and suspended liquid droplets (aerosols)

Smoke can contain toxic by-products of combustion Smoke creates a serious hazard to personnel due to its physiological effects and reduction of visibility Smoke control should be considered during engineering design, especially with regard to material selection, enclosed spaces, escape routes, and ventilation.

3.3

Explosions
3.3.1 General

Although explosions are combustion events, their potential for escalation is not simply related to their thermal energy output but to physical effects associated with expanding burning gases, generated by the explosion event. Flame speed is also critical and this depends on the density of obstacles in the path of the flame front. When a flammable vapour or gas mixes with air and the concentration exceeds its lower flammable limit (LFL) and is less than its upper flammable limit (UFL), an ignition source will ignite the mixture. Ignition will take the form of a flame front traveling through the mixture causing rapid expansion of the burning gas mixture. The flame front is accelerated by the presence of obstructions that cause the process to become turbulent and burn more efficiently. If this event takes place in a confined space then the enclosure usually suffers a significant internal overpressure of short duration. Overpressures as low as 0.5 bars in an enclosure can cause moderate structural damage and more severe damage to unprotected equipment and systems. A further source of damage is the rapid turbulent flow of the burnt gas itself, which causes drag effects on equipment of significant surface area. 3.3.2 Types of explosions Deflagration is a type of confined explosion in which an exothermic reaction propagates from the burning gases to the un-reacted material by conduction, convection, and radiation. In this process the combustion zone progresses through the material at a rate that is less than the velocity of sound in the un-reacted materials. Maximum pressures of approximately eight times the initial pressure result from deflagration of stoichiometric gas-air mixtures in enclosures. Unconfined vapour clouds can also develop high overpressures. Detonation is a type of confined explosion involving an exothermic reaction characterized by the presence of a shock wave in the material, which establishes and maintains the reaction. A distinctive difference from a deflagration is that the reaction zone propagates at a rate greater than the velocity of sound in the unreacted material. The principal heating mechanism is one of shock compression. Detonations give rise to rise to very high overpressures but rarely occur in EP operations. ISO/CD/13 702 gives a useful description of fires and explosions in Annexes A1 and A2 which provide useful further reading on these subjects.

Control measures for fire and explosion related hazards

4.1

Control Measures for Hydrocarbon Operations 4.1.1 Hydrocarbons in EP operations

Hydrocarbons that are gases at normal ambient temperatures and atmospheric pressure are flammable and readily ignited in air. Those that are normally liquids will gradually vaporise when exposed to the atmosphere and under certain conditions the vapour air mixture over the liquid surface will become flammable. The tendency for a liquid to vaporise is known as its volatility. Volatility increases with temperature. The pressure exerted in a closed container by the vaporisation of a liquid is referred to as the vapour pressure. The flash point is the temperature to which the liquid must be heated to produce sufficient vapour to form a vapour-air mixture that can be ignited by an ignition source. The upper and lower flammability limits (UFL and LFL) correspond to the minimum and maximum proportions of vapour in air that will ignite. Products with a wide flammability range are potentially more vulnerable to ignition because the probability of ignition is higher. 4.1.2 Hydrocarbon ignition Ignition is caused by the supply of sufficient heat or energy to initiate combustion. For a given flammable substance there are two temperatures at which the threshold heat supply will be sufficient to cause combustion, i.e. two ignition temperatures. These two temperatures are termed the spontaneous or autoignition temperature (AIT) and the flash point ignition temperature. Materials such as lagging, rags, sawdust, etc when contaminated with oil may give rise to spontaneous ignition due to a self-heating reaction that accelerates due to heat being retained within the material. In EP facilities, the possibility of product becoming ignited will depend on the existence of an ignitable vapour-air mixture in the presence of an ignition source. Ignitable atmospheres can exist in the following places: In the vapour space of fixed roof tanks (especially during pumping down operations) At the vents of storage tanks during filling operation At the vents during filling of tank trucks, tank cars, drums or other containers At the surfaces of sumps and oil/water separators At poorly fitting seals of floating roof tanks. An abnormal situation, such as a leaking valve, fitting or pump, overfill of a storage tank, or any other unplanned release of liquid or gaseous hydrocarbons can also result in the formation of flammable vapourair mixtures. The likelihood of ignition (assuming an ignition source is present) varies directly as the volatility of the product.

4.1.3 Hydrocarbon combustion process The combustion of a flammable material (e.g. a hydrocarbon containing carbon and hydrogen) is a chemical oxidation reaction involving the formation of water, carbon dioxide, carbon monoxide (and other toxic gases) and generally resulting in the release of heat, smoke and flame. For combustion to occur, a threshold heat supply / ignition source, oxygen (or oxidant) and fuel must all be present in the correct proportions. The basis of fire control measures is to prevent a fuel release event. Recovery measures seek to remove one of the other components, or to inhibit the combustion chemical reaction chain. 4.1.4 Reducing the likelihood of fires and explosions Operations are responsible for safeguarding design technical integrity during the operations phase, over the life of the facility. Fire and explosion prevention measures start in design and share the same goals as those aimed at preventing plant releases. There are two main methods for reducing the likelihood of a release event of flammable materials during operations as follows: Maintaining the highest level of inherent safety with simplicity, fault tolerance and operator independence high on the list of design functional requirements Managing hazards effectively during production and maintenance activities. To achieve these objectives, which are usually set in the facility FES, operations control measures should have the following goals: Minimise the likelihood of hazard release events (inventory control) Minimise the risk of fires and explosions occurring (ignition source control). These objectives can be met using the following measures: Elimination or reduction of hazardous inventories Inherently safe designs (maintain their integrity) Substitution (use safer materials for construction and maintenance) Attenuation (operate at lower temperatures and pressures if practicable) Simplification (avoid complex operations and maintenance procedures) Intensification (group planned maintenance into shutdown periods). Separation (avoid compromising the layout philosophy) Segregation (avoid the inadvertent interconnection of utility systems, drains and ventilation) Area classification (avoid compromising hazardous areas) Orientation (site potential ignition sources upwind of hydrocarbon plant).

Location of hazardous inventories

Containment of hazardous materials

Reduce the number of potential leak sources (avoid introducing specification breaks) Maintain the design integrity (avoid uncontrolled modifications or repairs). Area classification (avoid the introduction of uncontrolled ignition sources) Ventilation (keep functional to ensure dilution of any hydrocarbon vapour) Selection of electrical equipment (ensure electrical equipment is appropriate for the area in which it is installed or used) Portable ignition sources (eg diesels and petrol engines) Fixed ignition sources (eg turbines, furnaces) Radio frequency ignition sources (eg high power radar transmissions).

Control of ignition sources (for minor and major releases)

4.1.5 Safe operating procedures A fire or explosion cannot be initiated without a release or availability of flammable material coupled with an ignition source. Fire and explosion prevention measures in operations are mostly aimed at reducing as far as practicable the likelihood that sufficient concentrations of flammable or combustible materials reach an available ignition source. This principle should be inherent in all procedures developed to cover during production operations, maintenance, repair and construction work. Plant operation procedures should also seek to maintain the integrity of those prevention measures incorporated in design. Procedural measures alone, which are subject to human factors uncertainties, should not be relied upon, in isolation, to effectively prevent hazardous events. Typical procedures are as follows: Permit to work Gas free certification Hazardous area requirements Confined space work Ignition source control (electrical equipment permitted on site and its location) Access control (both personnel and vehicles). This can sometimes be achieved to a point where recovery measures to reduce their consequences may no longer be justified. A final decision on this would be based on which risks are considered critical and the tolerability of potential consequences. Each case has to be considered on its merits and once personnel and environmental risks have been dealt with, the criticality of the asset and consequences of lost production may well demand further protection measures, to minimise consequences that are not tolerable. In summary the priorities are as follows: Remove operational hazards as far as practicable from where personnel need to work, thereby reducing exposure Reduce the likelihood/probability of ignited hazardous events occurring during operations and maintenance by efficient procedural controls of flammables and ignition sources.

4.1.6 Maintenance activities Maintenance activities have an important role to play as preventive measures in their own right (planned maintenance before failure) as well as ensuring other preventive measures remain fully functional during operations. Activities include:
Identification of plant and equipment where failures could have significant consequences in the form of fire and/or explosions and implementation of a planned maintenance strategy as a preventive measure Maintenance of plant equipment and instrumentation to a high standard so that incipient plant upsets are detected and the necessary automatic or manual shutdown measures implemented Maintenance and regular testing of ESD and EDP valves and systems, as they may be employed if a process upset looks like developing into an unplanned release Maintenance of electrical equipment, especially that designed for use in hazardous areas Maintenance requirements linked to consequence assessment studies and the findings of previous incidents.

Operational procedures should be directed at:


Reduction of hazards in production and maintenance tasks using safe operating procedures Introduction of generally safer working methods Strict understanding and use of permit to work (PTW) procedures and access control where appropriate.

As far as reasonably practicable, under specified operating conditions, there should be no un-addressed foreseeable risk of failure that could result in a loss of technical integrity, release of hydrocarbons and a potential fire and/or explosion. 4.1.7 Operations reference plan The maintenance requirements needed to combat fire and explosion control and recovery equipment failure form a module of an Operations Reference Plan. Within this plan is contained the activities matrix for maintaining fire control (e.g. inventory control and ignition sources) and recovery (e.g. detection, alarm, evacuation and protection systems) measures. 4.1.8 Reducing potential hydrocarbon leak sources Preventing loss of containment is a major factor in maintaining plant technical integrity. This is addressed in the Manual of Permitted Operations (MOPO). Some factors that may cause loss of containment are:
Exceeding the design envelope

Over pressure Corrosion/erosion Mechanical damage Incorrect operation Material failure Design error Construction defects.

Threats that can compromise plant integrity during the operating life of the facility are influenced by:
The number of specification breaks Process facility complexity The number of flanges and small bore connections, etc The number of local atmospheric vent points, etc Failure to consider dynamic, in addition to, steady state loads Failure to protect against dropped objects The need to consider maintenance and inspection requirements during the design phase The need to recognise the potential for human error if the design requires constant operator intervention The need to carry out adequate operator training.

Measures can be taken to minimise the size and duration of a release, in the event of a loss of containment. These measures should be addressed in fire and explosion prevention and protection reviews, HAZOPs and other structured review techniques. Further guidance on the control of hydrocarbon hazards is given in DEPs. 4.2

Control Measures for Other Flammable Materials


4.2.1 Combustible solids

Non-hydrocarbon combustible solid hazards are generally associated with cellulosic and polymeric materials used in the construction and operation of installations. These can often be present in facilities, especially living quarters, offices and stores. The following measures can reduce the likelihood of a significant fire: Removal Replacement with non-combustible materials Quantity reduction Sub-division Surface area reduction Redistribution and relocation.

The characteristics to be reviewed when assessing the fire performance of cellulosic or polymeric type materials include: Ease of ignition Rate of flame spread Heat of combustion Smoke and toxic gas production. DEPs and industry standards should be used to assist in reducing the use of flammable materials, particularly electrical cables. Electrical installations, living quarters, computer installations, etc can all have the likelihood of a significant fire and smoke generation reduced by careful choice of materials. Replacement equipment and components for maintenance and repair work are often delivered in cellulosic or plastic packing materials. These materials should be controlled and not allowed to accumulate in any location. 4.2.2 Combustible liquids These are present in facilities in a variety of forms. Primary sources are the hydrocarbons being processed but chemicals, lubricating oils, heating oils, diesel, gasoline, paint and other sources have to be considered. Where releases of flammable / combustible liquids could occur, adequate drainage arrangements should be in place. Storage and bunding of flammable hydrocarbon liquids should be done in accordance with DEP 34.11.00.11 (Ref.2) and DEP 34.18.51.10. (Ref. 3) to minimise the likelihood of escape and ignition. 4.2.3 Flammable gases These will be present in non-process applications such as fuel and cutting gas, e.g. acetylene supplies. They can be generated from pressurized flammable liquids, e.g. LPG cylinders. They need to be stored in wellventilated cages with controlled personnel access. 4.3

Ignition Source Control


4.3.1 Identification and assessment

Designing out ignition sources completely is not practicable, but many can be eliminated and often substituted with lower energy equipment that will do the same job. The use of certified equipment and electric heaters instead of fired heaters is one example. Typical sources of ignition include, but are not limited to: Open flames Non intrinsically safe lightning

Hot surfaces Radiant heat Smoking Cutting and welding (hot work) Spontaneous ignition Frictional heat or sparks Static electricity/lightning Electrical sparks/stray currents Internal combustion engines Furnaces and heating equipment Compressors or other equipment temporarily on site. Operations measure should ensure that equipment that has the potential to act, as an ignition source is not introduced into areas where hydrocarbon vapours could be present. Two different scenarios are likely to be encountered as follows: Major releases Minor releases. A case by case assessment should be made for facilities to identify which non essential energy sources exist and in the event of a gas release these should be de-energized by remote isolation, e.g. electrical tripping as part of a partial or total emergency shutdown. One example of this would be the utility power points for hand tools. Essential electrical systems required to operate in an emergency outside a temporary refuge or an emergency control point should be suitable for use in Zone 1 hazardous areas and have proven water resistance if exposed to water deluge systems. Pump driven foam systems, electrical actuators and emergency lighting should remain energised. Detailed information on design measures for the control of ignition sources and choice of electrical equipment is included in ISO CD 13 702 (Ref. 1). 4.3.2 Area classification and environmental control The aim of hazardous area classification is to avoid the ignition of those releases that inevitably occur from time to time in the operation of facilities handling flammable liquids and vapours. Classification of hazardous areas affects the type of electrical equipment permitted and hence can reduce sources of ignition. At the design stage, measures usually aim at achieving the least hazardous classification. Operations activities should ensure that introducing materials that could give off a flammable vapour does not compromise these measures. Consideration should also be given to hydrocarbon releases from non-routine operational activities and from major releases. The DEP on hazardous area classification is based on IP Code part 15, the Institute of Petroleum Area Classification Code for Petroleum Installations, Model Code of safe Practice Part 15 (Ref. 4).

Build up of flammable vapours beyond their lower flammability limit can be prevented by efficient ventilation of an enclosure. This progressively dilutes any leaks or fugitive vapours present rendering, the flammable gas/air mixture incapable of combustion. Similar measures can reduce the concentration of combustion products in a particular area. On offshore platforms open modules aid dispersion with natural ventilation wherever practicable. Areas that are normally manned (e.g. living quarters), are usually pressurised to exclude smoke, toxic fumes and flammable gas. The inlet ducting for the HVAC systems to these areas are usually fitted with gas detectors to automatically alarm, shutdown pressurisation fans and close inlet and outlet dampers. HVAC shutdown upon fire detection will result in the overpressure being lost. Maintenance and inspection schedules should ensure that detection and isolation measures are operating according to the required performance standard. Checks should include automatic or remotely operated vents in the roof of a building, automatically closing fire/smoke doors and air conditioning dampers within buildings and modules. 4.3.3 Segregation Segregation of ignition sources from flammables should be optimised during operations within the limits of the design. All options available to reduce the likelihood of ignition should be employed during operations and maintenance by the implementation of such means as permit to work systems and safe operating procedures. Each area of the plant should be designated with a clear management authority having jurisdiction over electrical and hot work activities. 4.3.4 Access control A central permit to work system should control access to any area of a facility where hydrocarbon vapours could be present. Where vehicles regularly traverse EP facilities their potential as ignition sources should be assessed. Petrol engines and catalytic converters provide sparks and hot surfaces with sufficient energy to ignite hydrocarbon vapours. Access control measures coupled with vehicle specification (e.g. diesel engines) reduce the likelihood of a vapour accumulation being ignited. Access control for personnel should ensure that items capable of igniting flammable vapours are not permitted in production areas of EP facilities. These items include matches, lighters, radios, cameras, etc.

Recovery from fires and explosions

5.1

General

There are a range of operational measures that prevent escalation and assist recovery from fires and explosions. Usually, early detection of an incident and an effective response depends on early fire or gas detection followed up by executive action. These may include the automatic or manual actuation of evacuation alarms, initiation of shut down procedures and selective power isolation, actuation of fixed fire

protection systems and mobilisation of emergency response pre-plans. The latter may involve in-house and/or other fire services. 5.2

Operations Recovery Measures


5.2.1 Fire and gas detection

Assuming an appropriate design philosophy has been developed, the reliability and availability of fire and gas detection systems (based on FES performance criteria which reflect their contribution to risk reduction) is largely dependent on servicing and maintenance. Control room (operations) emergency procedures should be integrated with site fire and explosion responses pre-plans, and have a clear response strategy when gas or fire is detected. These should include alarm and emergency shutdown protocols as well as ignition source isolation. Fire and gas systems are maintenance critical safety systems and require: Maintenance of gas detection systems to a high standard so they detect gas accumulations well before they reach a potentially hazardous level, and on detection initiate inventory isolation, blow down of residual pressures and isolate all non-essential ignition sources Maintenance of fire and smoke detection systems (especially high sensitivity smoke detection) to a high standard so they detect actual or incipient fires rapidly and initiate alarms, executive actions and automatic fixed systems.

5.2.2 Emergency shutdown/emergency depressurisation ESD/EDP Controlling the amount of inventory available for combustion can reduce the severity of consequences, in the case of an ignited release. This is achieved by and emergency depressurisation (EDP) of the plant involved in the fire as well as vessels or pipe work upon which flames or thermal energy may impinge. In most cases the vented gas is routed to a flare where it can burn in a controlled manner. Emergency shutdown systems (ESD) limit the hydrocarbon inventory available to a release event. They can be both manual (local control point in plant) and automatic (fire and gas detection system). Circumstances, in which a control room initiated emergency shutdown may be required, should be evaluated and training, based on preplanned responses, given. Shutdown and blow down are primary means of preventing a minor incident from resulting in a major loss, by shutting off the flow of fuel to a fire and removing flammable material from the equipment in the vicinity of the fire. EDP should generally be provided for pressurised gaseous inventories with the gas going to flare. Where ESD or EDP valves are located such that they may be involved in fire or explosion events, they should be suitably protected, regularly inspected, tested and maintained. Pressure vessels (and other pressurised equipment) are normally fitted with relief valves that open at a preset pressure to ensure that internal pressure does not exceed the maximum allowable working pressure. They may not prevent pressure vessel failure under fire conditions due to loss of vessel material strength with increasing temperature. The venting constraints of relief valve design should also be taken into account when assessing the level of protection given to pressure vessels exposed to potential fire scenarios. For gas filled vessels, relief valves to atmosphere have little value from the point of view of fire protection. Pressure relief devices should be

regularly maintained and tested at predetermined intervals (usually set by regulatory authority) to see they achieve their design parameters. Emergency shutdown valves and blow down valves, which normally fail shut and open respectively, need regular inspection and testing to ensure they function during an incident. Checks are needed to see that EDP valves failing open will not overload the flare system. Maintenance and testing of passively fire protected well, facility and pipeline shutdown valves Regular maintenance and testing of the isolation and shut-off for the fuel source. Flare headers and other essential emergency equipment should be protected if they are vulnerable to early failure in a fire or explosion situation. An ESSA study may be needed here. All operations activities are influenced by the designs they involve. Operations feedback to engineering should encourage designs that do not generate complicated or highly conditional operational and maintenance procedures. 5.2.3 Power supplies and isolation Power generation and distribution should be suitable for the loads expected during emergencies as well as for normal production. Power supplies essential for response to emergencies should be protected against fire and explosion events. These measures should include firewater supply, fire and gas detection and protection systems, instrumentation, alarms, controls, emergency lighting, ESD systems, essential HVAC and necessary communications, drilling emergency systems, an air compressor and diesel transfer pump where required. Non-essential power that may act as a source of ignition should be isolated on gas detection. It is important that during operations and maintenance activities portable or uncontrolled power sources are not introduced into areas where hydrocarbon vapours could be present. It is recognised that essential power sources still have the potential to be ignition sources. Electrical equipment utility points should not be energised in areas where firefighters are required to enter with water based extinguishing means and isolation is required before firefighting operations commence. 5.2.4 Pump-out of product Where hydrocarbon storage tanks are threatened by fire it may be prudent to pump the inventory to a safer location and reduce the fuel available to the fire. There are several points to be considered: Removal of liquid hydrocarbon (e.g. crude oil) from a storage tank reduces its ability to act as a heat sink for thermal energy If the fire has been burning for some time, pump-out may cause a vortex bringing superheated surface hydrocarbon from the fire zone into contact with the water layer in the bottom of the tank creating a boil over condition.

5.3

Explosion Mitigation

5.3.1 Layout A benefit of an effective layout philosophy is the protection of utilities such as fire pumps from hydrocarbon fires and reduction of potential explosion overpressures and damage scenarios. Effective layout philosophies can mitigate explosions by using the following measures: Reducing congestion Locating obstacles away from vents Orientation of obstacles to provide a low drag profile to the explosion venting flow. Venting can employ: Open module designs Grated floors Weakly attached weather cladding Explosion relief panels and hatches. The measures should not be compromised during operations, construction and maintenance activities. 5.3.2 Structural resistance to fire and/or explosion loads Fire/blast walls can provide protection from escalation by confining a fire or explosion to one particular area. Regular inspection of fire and explosion wall integrity is needed to ensure they function as designed when required. Where access through the barrier is required and unavoidable, the aperture should be filled with a door or hatch of at least the same performance as the rest of the barrier. These points of access should be self-closing to prevent escalation of fire or transmission of explosion overpressures to other parts of the plant. Cable and pipe apertures should be sealed to a similar standard. 5.4

Escape, Evacuation and Refuge


5.4.1 Alarm systems and communications

For protection of personnel it is essential that manual and automatic alarm systems are simple and easy to understand. They should be fully functional and well maintained. The cause and effects diagram for the facility should be up to date and show clearly which incidents are likely to trigger which alarms, along with permissible overrides. Where some form of executive action is needed, alarms should be easy to interpret and be acted upon. Effective communications are essential for safe operations and critical to control and recovery from a fire or explosion incident. Public address systems form an important part of the communications chain and should be regularly maintained and tested, as a key recovery measure. Where alarm and PA systems may be exposed to fire and/or explosion events they should be suitably protected and the protection measures regularly inspected and maintained along with the system itself.

5.4.2 Escape and evacuation As a general principle escape routes should be the same routes that personnel would use during normal access to an area. This approach helps to ensure that personnel are familiar with escape routes which should be identified with signs, marking, emergency escape lighting, and where necessary by way-finding lights if visibility could be a problem. Some escape routes may need heat shielding or protection from smoke to remain viable in certain emergencies. Escape routes should never be compromised. Maintenance activities often require replacement components to be brought on site ready for installation in the plant. Operations should ensure that packing and spare parts are not allowed to block escape and evacuation routes during this process. Where major work is anticipated and an escape route will be temporarily unavailable, alternative escape routes should be indicated and suitably marked. The objectives for escape and evacuation routes in onshore and offshore facilities should not be compromised by production operations as follows: To enable all personnel to leave an area where they are directly affected by an incident, such that risks to them are maintained, as low as reasonably practicable To enable all personnel to get from a part of the installation they are likely to occupy to a Temporary Refuge (TR) To enable all personnel to transfer from a TR to an embarkation area, in order successfully evacuate using the selected method, within the TR endurance time to

To ensure that all escape routes from areas likely to be occupied, including TR(s), are capable of handling the maximum flow of personnel required for subsequent successful evacuation To ensure that the escape routes available from all areas of the installation are readily identifiable by all personnel in any emergency. Regular escape and evacuation drills should be conducted to ensure that all personnel are familiar with the location of escape routes and safe refuges. Exercises should be independently observed and any congestion which delays escape noted and arrangements made to correct the situation. The average time needed to clear areas which contain hazards to personnel should be used to determine the period during which recovery measures need to keep escape and evacuation routes viable. Evacuation requirements will be different in onshore facilities from offshore installations. Onshore personnel may be able to walk clear of the facility using the escape routes. Offshore the primary means of evacuation will generally be the normal mode of transport to and from the installation. This is usually by helicopter but bridge links can sometimes be a primary route for evacuation. Similar to escape routes, evacuation routes may need to be protected from smoke, heat and structural damage. In certain cases a secondary means of evacuation may be needed and in offshore this is usually a form of Totally Enclosed Motor Propelled Survival Craft (TEMPSC). Maintenance of these craft should form part of the overall fire and explosion, recovery measures, maintenance programme. 5.4.3 Mustering Normal muster areas should be provided for all personnel at facilities or installations. Muster areas should be located to facilitate subsequent evacuation and the normally used areas should be close to a TR. In some onshore facilities the muster area may serve as a refuge if suitably located.

Mustering allows people manning a facility to be accounted for and better control of evacuation from the area of a potential incident. Muster areas must be adequate in size and facilities, to accommodate the numbers personnel who will need to use them. 5.4.4 Temporary refuges (TR) The concept of a TR is mainly relevant to offshore facilities but can be considered for onshore plant. It may not always be a sophisticated enclosure but could be an onsite muster area or a protected stairwell to which access is available for most potential fire and explosion scenarios. All facilities or installations should have one or more areas dedicated to this purpose. The sitting of these areas should be determined using the fire and explosion scenario, physical effects and consequences modeling data. A TR affords protection to personnel who need to seek shelter for a period derived from potential fire scenario studies. Personnel may need to stay there whilst they review the options for controlling an incident and organise an evacuation. To meet its design objectives its air supply, fire and gas detection, smoke dampers and communication systems need to be regularly tested and maintained. TRs are normally protected by location and use of passive fire protection cladding that should be maintained to a high standard. They may not necessarily be an enclosure as such and further information is given in ISO CD 13 702 (Ref. 1) section 14.3.3 and DEP 37.17.10.11-Gen (Ref. 5). 5.4.5 Crowd control Where an incident occurs in a facility close to a populated area, the danger of a crowd gathering, possibly where emergency services need access, needs to be addressed. Crowd control measures should aim to keep people at a safe distance from the incident and out of the path of essential services. 5.5

Active Fire Protection


5.5.1 General

Active fire protection is not always essential as part of the recovery measures from hydrocarbon and other fires. It should normally be considered when the risk reducing contributions of other threat control, escalation control and recovery measures have been fully explored. If these are considered inadequate in reducing risk to ALARP levels or potential consequences are still not considered tolerable then active fire protection may have an important role to play in achieving the objectives of the facility or installation FES. 5.5.2 Fire pumps and firewater Firewater availability is critical for effective escalation control and recovery measures following fires or explosions. Regular testing of fire pumps, fire main pressures/flows and deluge or other water or foam systems is essential if these systems are to be available when required. Maintenance schedules should aim at keeping the firewater availability at the level set by FES performance criteria. Actions required in case the firewater supply or fire pump availability is significantly impaired should be described in the Manual of Permitted Operations (MOPO) for the facility. This will detail any

resultant restriction on operations activities where this is appropriate and may cover other control and recovery systems. Fire pump availability may be covered by legislation. 5.5.3 Fire control and extinguishment (active fixed systems) Active fire protection systems may be actuated manually or automatically upon detection of a fire. Normally automatic operation is required to provide rapid response to a fire. Active fire protection systems are quiescent for most of their operational lives but are required to work first time when actuated. These systems need regular maintenance and testing to ensure their availability. Service and maintenance schedules or the permit-to-work system should ensure that systems cannot be left in a locked off state after work has been carried out on them. Active fire protection can be used to prevent escalation and assist recovery from fires. the mechanisms available are as follows: Cooling (deluge systems on jet fires are effective outside fire impact zone) Control of burning (deluge systems on hydrocarbon running or pool fires) Extinguishment (film forming foam on pool fires) Inerting (fixed roof tank vapour spaces) Total flooding (use of inert gases or halon alternatives in discrete enclosures) Local application (first shot foam systems on floating roof tanks). When a major protection system is taken out of service, for maintenance or remedial work, the impact on risks in the affected area should be assessed to see if adequate resources still exist to respond to a fire and/or explosion incident. The Manual of Permitted Operations should detail any resultant restriction on activities if required. General information on active fire protection systems is given in Appendix I. 5.5.4 Fire control and extinguishment (mobile systems and fire vehicles) Mobile fire protection equipment may be deployed to back up fixed systems or in some cases provide a primary response to fires. Mobile systems such as foam generators should be stationed, serviced and ready for use in areas of low risk. They should be easy to reach and put into service during an incident and should not have to cross high-risk plant areas. Operators should be trained in their deployment and use. 5.5.5 Combustion product control and containment Should a fire incident occur measures should be in place to prevent the control room, escape routes and any safe refuges from being engulfed in smoke and other combustion production. Consumable storage areas should have clearly marked escape and evacuation routes and ventilation measures to vent smoke combustion products. This permits the escape routes to be viable for as long as possible.

5.6

Passive Fire Protection


5.6.1 Coatings

Passive fire protection coatings, of one sort or another, that delay the transfer of thermal energy from a fire to other adjacent areas, have the advantage that they are always available. They do, however, need regular maintenance to check their integrity and adhesion to the plant or equipment they are protecting.

5.6.2 Barriers Passive fire protection system barriers have the advantage that they are always available. They may form part of a composite fire/blast wall barrier designed to resist certain explosion overpressures. In common with coatings they need regular inspection to check their integrity has not been compromised. Whenever apertures are made in fire or blast walls (e.g. cable or pipe penetrations or access doors) they should be maintained at equal or greater fire resistance than the wall itself. Passive fire protection systems are dealt with in more detail, with references, in Appendix I of this document. 5.7

Emergency Response
5.7.1 Plans and procedures

Emergency response plans and procedures are an important part of the recovery from fires and explosions. They incorporate the pre-planning necessary to efficiently employ recovery measures such as an in-house fire service. Pre-fire planning is dealt with in detail in Chapter 6 and Appendix III of this document. The guiding principles of effective emergency management as they apply to fires and explosions are to: Create an awareness of the emergency situations that come about as consequences of ignited releases, examine how they could arise from operations and how best to recover from them Develop an organisation, based on the internal line organisation, of teams and individuals with clearly defined responsibilities Provide the resources required to fulfil these responsibilities, especially for fire fighting, and support all other aspects of emergency response Develop and define procedures that will deliver an effective and appropriate level of response to fire and explosion events and other aspects of ignited releases Conduct training, practice and review activities. Control room executive actions, for example, should have a clear strategy behind them, so operators have a pre-planned shutdown procedure that minimises risks to personnel and prevents escalation of a fire to adjacent plant. These actions should be integrated with the response by an in-house or external fire service. They will need to be familiar with the following: ESD and EDP duration

Likely duration of a release Operational controls such as pump out of storage tanks during a fire The type of fire that may need to be tackled such as seal fire on a floating roof tank, vent fire on a fixed roof tank, full surface tank fire or major fires near storage vessels with the potential for BLEVE.

5.7.2 Training and drills Training and drills ensure that personnel understand their responsibilities in a fire situation. 5.7.3 Salvage Salvage is a specialised activity and should normally be planned with the assistance of companies specialising in this field.

Pre-fire planning

6.1

General

Pre-fire planning may be described as the advance preparation of documentation and practical rehearsals based on potential credible fire scenarios, which can assist fire department and line management personnel to respond to and control fire events within company facilities. Pre-fire planning sets plant control (e.g. pump out), safeguarding and firefighting, objectives and strategies, so that in the case of a potential incident critical time is saved, should hazardous events come about. It also identifies particular fire and explosion scenario resource requirements and hazards, which may be encountered during an incident. The appropriate actions to be employed when applying mitigation and recovery measures are then developed. The measures should meet the requirements of the operations section of the FES. Pre-fire planning is an essential function for all fire response groups if they are to be effective. Properly prepared and studied, they can greatly assist company personnel in controlling the incident and achieving fire damage mitigation objectives. 6.2

Planning Considerations

Pre-fire plans need to be scenario specific. They should not be overly detailed or inflexible since it is not possible to predict with accuracy the precise events or impact which may occur from any given scenario. The written scenario for a pre-fire plan should be credible and realistic, with emphasis on what fire response groups and operations personnel may encounter on arrival at the incident. This approach provides a clear picture for participants during exercises and drills and allows evaluation by observers to be more precise. It

also permits the plan to be included in the FES as part of the operational HSE Case for the facility or installation. When preparing pre-plans it should be remembered that the objective is not to produce individual documents of considerable detail and volume. For any pre-plan to work effectively it should: Be realistic and credible Be informative Provide guidance Be easy to read Be easy to understand Have a viable control and extinguishing plan. Be as brief as possible. In establishing pre-plans it is necessary to prepare a list of company facilities, then list the processes, plants, operation, structures, equipment and personnel within the facilities. From this list the numbers and types of potential (moderate, serious and major fire) incident scenarios should be further listed. It is anticipated that company personnel in the vicinity and therefore such incidents should not be used for pre-plans would deal with minor or incipient fires. The scenarios generated from a FIREPRAN study of a facility can form a starting point for pre-plan development. This plan should also address issues of escalation, operational actions and their third party impact. After confirming the credibility of the draft fire scenarios with line management supervisors actions to prepare for the event can be developed in the line with emphasis on impact upon operations, facility, plant and equipment, to ensure accuracy of planning. A final list of scenarios should then be converted into fully prepared pre-fire plans with further investigative work on impact on environment and the public. Establishing a pre-fire plan for every single potential fire incident in all company facilities serves little useful purpose since it would take many years to exercise the response to these incidents. Operators preplans should be prepared as well as those for firefighters and co-ordinated on a scenario basis. Details of the components needed to prepare a pre-fire plan are contained in Appendix III. 6.3

Rehearsals/Training

Once pre-fire plans have been prepared they should be exercised to ensure involved personnel are familiar with them, which they are applicable to the scenarios, that the strategies and tactics are correct and that their objectives can be realised in practice. For exercises or drills, a small team of observers should be used to evaluate the operation and highlight problem areas. Post exercise discussions should be held to identify and rectify errors, faults and misunderstandings, which may have occurred during the exercise. This should ensure continuous improvement and effective fire and explosion response group performance. Aspects of the exercise that should be observed in detail include the following: Speed of response (equipment and manpower)

Site evacuation and mustering Communications (radio/telephone/personnel - clarity and frequency) Access to incident and vehicle/equipment positioning Initial and subsequent actions of fire response group leader Equipment availability and operability Fixed systems condition and operability Fire response personnel overall ability (knowledge/actions/tasks and communications) Physical fitness of fire response personnel. During exercises or drills, fixed systems, water supplies, fire vehicles and equipment should actually be used to ensure operability. However, it is advisable to ensure that process operations are not unduly affected by the use of fixed systems and to prevent clean up problems, water instead of foam may be used through fixed systems. Since fire simulation is always difficult during exercises, the affected or involved area should be clearly identified to prevent misunderstandings and provide observers with proper evaluation. In an actual incident, for example, radiant heat levels may reduce access to the incident area. The frequency of exercises depends on the facility and manning but they should normally be conducted so that shift personnel on site participate in sufficient exercises to develop and maintain their competency in all major scenarios. Typically this should be once during a tour of duty. Consideration should be given to infrequent unrehearsed exercises some of which can be held during shift changeovers, late evening and night shift to ensure alertness and readiness. Full training records should be maintained for each pre-fire plan exercise with comments on performance and improvement recommendations. 6.4

Updating

Once all pre-fire plans are prepared, the list and contents should be reviewed and updated in line with operational changes such as expansion, revamping and upgrading projects. The responsibility for updating plans should be clearly defined within fire response groups. Out-of-date plans should be destroyed to prevent confusion and operational errors. Revised or additional pre-fire plans should be further exercised to ensure they work in practice.

APPENDIX I - EXTINGUISHING AGENTS, ACTIVE AND PASSIVE FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS


I.1 Fire Extinguishing Agents

I.1.1 General
The selection of a particular firefighting agent is dependent on the fire scenario and required extinguishment mechanism. The applicability of fire extinguishing agents is detailed in DEP 80.47.10.10 (Ref. 9) and discussed below.

I.1.2 Water
Water has 5 primary uses in firefighting and extinguishment as follows: Fire extinguishing agent Carrier for enhanced fire extinguishing agents (e.g. foam) Cooling medium to prevent fire spread to adjacent equipment and/or re-ignition of an extinguished fire Cooling protection for fire-fighters and other personnel who may be near the incident Use in the form of a mist as an alternative to gaseous extinguishing agents and halons (e.g. turbine enclosure protection, transformer protection, etc). Water extinguishes fire by a combination of cooling and eliminating fuel/air contact. It is highly effective in extinguishing fires of solid materials such as wood, paper, natural rubber, etc. Water is also used to control burning and hence rate of heat and smoke production without necessarily extinguishing a hydrocarbon pool fires. Water will be effective in cooling equipment not engulfed in the high momentum region of a jet fire. It has limited effectiveness against gas fires and should only be applied to liquid fires if the following conditions are met: Combustible product, cooled down by the ambient water, has a high flash point
Temperature of the bulk liquid is below 100oC thus avoiding explosive steam generation

Where it cannot spread a hydrocarbon liquid fire Use of water for fires on live electrical equipment should in general be avoided (water mist extinguishing tests are showing this method of application may be the one exception) Displacement of liquid fuel in lines that are feeding or could feed a fire and for flushing spilt liquid hydrocarbon, which has not ignited away from the fire area. Water mist behaves differently to bulk water applied from deluge, sprinkler or monitor systems. When particle sizes are between 150 and 400 microns water mist can be a very effective extinguishing agent for many combustibles, including some hydrocarbons. See I.2 for further information.

I.1.3

Fire fighting foams

Foam concentrate is a mixture of surface-active agents and other stabilisers, which is added to water to make a stable foam solution. This is subsequently mixed with air to generate expanded firefighting foam. Some foam can be used un-aspirated, for example in deluge systems, which are normally designed to use only water. Foams are normally classified into low, medium and high expansion types. Details of foam types and design guidelines for foam systems are given in DEP 80.47.10.10-Gen. (Ref. 9). Fluoroprotein foam (FP) is suitable for most onshore uses in fighting hydrocarbon fires. Alcohol resistant fluoroprotein foams are now available for water-soluble (polar) solvent hazards such as methanol. Normally the quantities of this type of hazard found on site do not justify the extra cost of this type of foam. Aqueous film forming foams (AFFF) or film forming fluoroprotein foams (FFFP) is particularly suitable for offshore facilities and aircraft fires. They are available in alcohol resistant grades for use with polar solvents but not normally justified in EP facilities. Advice on the selection of an appropriate foam type for fires found in EP facilities is given in DEP 80.47.10.10-Gen (Ref. 9). The use of one type of concentrate is usually possible for most facilities. Similarly, foam concentrates should be used at only one proportioning rate throughout the company and especially in any one location to avoid incorrect application strengths. Alcohol Resistant Concentrates are multi-purpose concentrates designed for use on hydrocarbons and water-soluble liquids. They are not normally required for company sites. Where small quantities of alcohol or other water-soluble flammable liquids are used, wheeled extinguishers or trolley type foam stations with the special concentrate can cover these. Tight quality control over the storage and refilling of concentrates should always be exercised particularly where different foam concentrates are used. When considering foam as an extinguishing agent the following points should be considered: Fires involving liquid jets, or falling liquid fires are difficult to control with film forming foams but when it is applied to the running fuel it can control the subsequent pool fire that develops where the burning liquid comes to rest Foams for use on polar solvents, such as glycols and methanol are specifically formulated for that purpose Foam concentrate selection should wherever possible be biodegradable and non-toxic so that there is minimal environmental impact during use Foam streams have electrical conductive properties, so should not be used on live electrical equipment Atomised foam extinguishers are available with certifications for use when power supplies are connected and are suitable for domestic or office risks but should not be used in sub stations or electrical installations. Foam is applied in a number of ways with different results as follows: Behaviour is different on non-ignited and ignited fuels depending on the nature of the fuel, see DEP 80.47.10.10-Gen (Ref. 9) Applied on a relatively flat surface to suppress and extinguish pool fires

Applied to three dimensional equipment fires in which case the film forming foams (AFFF and FFFP) are more effective than protein based foams although extinguishment is not certain Applied on non-ignited liquids e.g., spills, to suppress vapour emission. Foam quantities and application rates are selected considering fuel, foam type and method of application. Below a design minimum application rate it will not be effective. The distance that foam will flow over a liquid by gravity from the application point is called its 'travel distance'. Spacing and locations of fixed foam application points are selected in accordance with the distance the foam must travel. Storage of foam concentrates should note the following guidance: Storage should be located outside the impact zone of the events against which it is expected to be used Storage designs should provide means to minimise the contact with air of the foam solution surface and so prevent degradation by oxidation Supply of foam to a fire site may be by fixed piping from a storage tank or by mobile equipment depending on case by case assessment Availability of stocks of foam should be sufficient to recharge fixed systems within 24 hours of their being discharged although this may not be achievable offshore Foam storage levels should be sufficient to fight the single largest credible fire scenario on an installation Foam concentrate purchase should be to a specification that reflects the performance requirement of its use (e.g. foam intended for aircraft crash fires should not be used for hydrocarbon storage tank fires).

I.1.4 Dry chemical powders


Dry chemical powders extinguish fires by a mainly chemical mechanism. They give very rapid fire control and are particularly useful against running flammable liquid fires. They do not give satisfactory protection for deep-seated fires in ordinary combustibles where the powder cannot fully access the combustion process. They also have poor burn back resistance on liquid hydrocarbon fires. When using dry chemical extinguishing agents the following guidance should be noted: Special powders are used for combustible metals They should not be used for the protection of instrumentation and electrical equipment as corrosion is possible if moisture is present and powder clean up is difficult They have virtually no cooling effect on fires so re-ignition is always a possibility after extinguishment if temperatures remain high and oxygen is present They are normally used from portable extinguishers or mobile equipment They should only be used where water is not available and rapid detection can be assured The largest potential fire scenario should determine the amount of dry chemical powder to be available for immediate use with 100 per cent spare capacity being maintained in stock. Dry chemical powders should be selected depending on the fire classification and details of powder types are given in DEP 80.47.10.10-Gen (Ref. 9).

I.1.5

Halons

Halon phase out strategies including replacements and alternatives is covered in detail in the booklet HSE Committee booklet Recommendations for Alternatives to Firefighting Halons 1994 (Ref. 10).

I.1.6 Carbon dioxide and inert gases


Carbon dioxide acts as a fire suppressant by reducing oxygen levels in the protected enclosure below the concentration necessary to support combustion. In enclosures it will penetrate and spread to all parts of the hazard (e.g. gas turbine enclosures). In open areas it has to be directed at the fire by a local application system or portable equipment. The following guidance should be used: Carbon dioxide can be initiated manually or automatically from fixed or portable systems In enclosed areas large discharges of carbon dioxide are hazardous to personnel with the risk of asphyxiation and reduced visibility during and after the discharge period Other potential effects are cold burn on skin contact and noise Precautions should always be taken to protect personnel from inadvertent exposure to extinguishing concentrations of carbon dioxide which can be lethal: normally discharge is prevented (auto and/or manual) into a normally or temporarily manned area prior to evacuation (see NFPA 12 (Ref. 11) and BS 5306 part 4 (Ref. 12)) Concentrations required for extinguishment (more than 30 percent) are greater than that for suffocation so care should be taken to adequately vent enclosed spaces before re-entry Carbon dioxide is heavier than air and can drift from the point of usage to low points such as pits and trenches creating an asphyxiating atmosphere Carbon dioxide is used as an extinguishing agent for specific hazards and in enclosures where an inert electrically non-conductive medium is essential and where clean up of other agents could present a problem Carbon dioxide discharge can sometimes produce static electrical charges which may have the potential to create sparks Carbon dioxide may damage sensitive equipment through cold shock or direct impact on discharge In most cases water mist or inert gases should be used in preference to carbon dioxide. Inert gases currently in use as follows: Argon, nitrogen and carbon dioxide mixtures known as 'Inergen' Argon and nitrogen mixtures known as 'Argonite' Argon gas. Inert gases and their mixtures function in much the same way as carbon dioxide in extinguishing a fire. They can be tolerated for short periods by personnel who may be exposed despite the reduced availability of oxygen for respiration.

Their main disadvantage is that, being ideal gases, they can only be stored in the compressed gaseous phase requiring high-pressure hardware for storage and delivery. Application criteria for inert gases and mixtures are given in the HSE Committee booklet Recommendations for Alternatives to Firefighting Halons 1994 (Ref. 10).

I.1.7 Steam
Steam is generally used for firefighting purposes in areas where it is readily available in large quantities, such as boilers. Steam extinguishes fire by exclusion of air or reduction of the oxygen content of the atmosphere in a similar manner to carbon dioxide or inert gases. It is not an agent that is very suitable for application by methods other than fixed systems because of its high temperature. Its main application is in the marine field, for fires in holds, where personnel are not normally present.

I.1.8 Sand
Sand can be applied on small surface fires. It can also be used for fire prevention, absorption, covering and directing of spills.

I.2

Active Fire Protection Systems

I.2.1 General
Active fire protection systems play an important role in reducing the consequences of fire and explosion hazardous events and aiding recovery. Active fire protection systems are normally employed when a fire and explosion analysis indicates the need for a fixed system to assist recovery from hazardous events of this type. Extinguishment can be achieved by application of various extinguishing agents via fixed, semi-fixed, mobile and/or portable systems, and in many cases a combination of mechanisms is used. They have to be available when required, for a weakness of active fire systems is their standby nature. They require effective inspection, maintenance and testing to ensure their readiness and because of their intermittent use latent or unrevealed faults may occur. The various active methods available for mitigating fires and explosions are as follows: Contain local fires to prevent them involving additional inventories in the same or adjacent areas Provide cooling of items not immediately engulfed in a large fire Provide a method for extinguishing fires using foam, dry powder or inerting gas when appropriate Assist escape and evacuation by protecting these routes Meet current legislative requirements. Active systems require initiation and the availability of extinguishing agents to function. They are, therefore, less reliable than passive systems which are generally independent of any external systems.

Extinguishment can be achieved by the application of various extinguishing agents via fixed, semi-fixed, mobile and/or portable systems, and in many cases a combination of mechanisms is used. Agent selection and methods of application should be aimed at optimising the likelihood of extinguishment or at least fire control. The fire scenario under consideration and the likelihood of escalation dictates this. On normally manned installations, fixed firefighting systems should be designed to be activated manually or automatically, if a fire is detected. On all facilities or installations the provision of a fixed firefighting system should be based on an assessment of the risk reduction it offers. Fixed fire protection systems mean an increased maintenance burden and hazards to personnel from work related exposure including travel to the location. When evaluating fire scenarios and considering what hazardous event response measures may be needed it may be useful to refer to Chapter 5 on recovery from fires and explosions.

I.2.2 Fixed systems


I.2.2.1 General

A fixed system usually employs a distribution pipe network for the application of a specific fire extinguishing or controlling medium. General guidance on the application of fixed systems is as follows: They should be used where either a large quantity of agent needs to be available over a large area of the fire zone to be protected, or when a small quantity of agent is required at a specific location They should, where a large quantity of agent is to be applied, include storage or be connected to an adequate source of supply They should be used for remote and/or automatic application of the agent, thereby minimising the exposure of operators/fire-fighters to the event They can provide the shortest response time and should be used where delays cannot be tolerated, e.g. sprinkler systems in living quarters They have the lowest manning requirement to operate They may need a significant maintenance requirement They need to be accessible for servicing, agent replenishment and maintenance They need routine testing to ensure that the fire extinguishing agent is supplied at the required rate, duration and to the required target If system testing and maintenance is ensured and the design objectives of the system remain constant, fixed systems should be selected in preference to semi-fixed or mobile systems It is important to ensure that materials of construction are compatible with, or galvanically isolated from each other and other plant materials, to avoid corrosion Non-metallic (e.g. GRP) distribution systems are suitable for some situations and avoid the problems of corrosion.

I.2.2.2 Deluge systems

The objectives of firewater deluge systems are as follows: Containing the effects of small fires and thus reducing the likelihood of escalation Providing cooling of equipment and structures not engulfed in large fires to minimise their effects Providing a means to apply film forming foam to extinguish hydrocarbon pool fires Providing water screens/curtains/barriers where these are required to protect evacuation and escape routes Meeting legislative requirements. Deluge systems should be provided at normally manned facilities offshore where oil, gas processing or drilling facilities are present on a manned installation. Deluge systems function in the following way by providing: Area protection with a general array of overhead and low level open spray heads to provide uniform application of water to equipment and pipe work within a given area and protect screened areas, e.g. undersides of vessels Equipment protection (water spray systems) using dedicated nozzles directing water onto specific critical items such as un-insulated vessels, storage tanks, wellheads, BOPs, pumps, etc Structural protection (water spray systems) using dedicated nozzles directing water onto selected structural members. Water deluge may be used in process areas, flammable liquid pumping and storage areas, as well as on offshore platforms to control burning and/or provide exposure protection. Where multiple layers of equipment exist it may be more appropriate to use general area deluge rather than equipment specific deluge, although this will require additional protection for shadow or screened areas. Deluge is not effective against jet fires or major pool fires and hence passive fire protection should be used for critical non-redundant steelwork and possibly for critical equipment. Offshore locations should use passive protection for structures, which either support the TR or members, which, if they collapsed, could impair the TR. This protection should also be used for equipment and structures where failure could have unacceptable consequences for a facility or installation. The design of deluge systems should be based on the rate of heat transfer into the object by the fire. Thermal energy emissions from a fire are a complex subject and there are still uncertainties in knowledge of fire behaviour, particularly where hydrocarbon fires occur in compartments. The quantity of water theoretically required to remove the heat from an object is also a function of the temperature of the surface when the water is applied. Details of deluge design requirements, including water application rates, for onshore plants are provided in DEP 80.47.10.30-Gen (Ref. 13) and DEP 80.47.10.31-Gen (Ref. 14). Deluge system design and water application rates specified in the NFPA 15 standard are applicable for offshore facilities (Ref. 15). Further reference information is found in ISO CD 13702 Annex H (Ref. 1). Deluge and water spray system pipe work and components need to be protected from the effects of fire and explosion along the following lines: Deluge valves stations should be located such that they are protected from an incident in the areas which they protect

Their operation may be local or remote, manual or automatic depending on the case by case assessment Water cooling of onshore fixed roof tanks should utilise two feeders to the roof ring headers Water system feeders should be located on opposite sides of the tank, be fitted with manual operation valves and check valves Deluge (water spray) isolation valves should be in an accessible location under fire conditions
Mini deluge systems may be used to protect specific items of equipment within utility areas

and to provide protection within the fire pump enclosures, boiler rooms, boiler fronts, etc Water can have adverse effects on electrical important to avoid spreading the fire supplies and control of drainage water is

Testing of deluge systems requires the classification of exposed electrical equipment in the protected area Electrical equipment required to operate when deluge is in operation should be tested under representative conditions.

I.2.2.3 Sprinkler systems

Sprinkler systems are wet-pipe fixed water spray systems actuated by a temperature sensitive frangible bulb. They are mainly used in accommodation areas, offices, buildings, workshops and laboratories. Water is normally supplied to each system from a fire main through a sprinkler installation control valve. Usually, arrays of sprinkler heads are spaced at intervals in the distribution pipe work. Sprinkler systems should be used where personnel are normally present and vulnerable to the effects of fire. A relatively fast response is required to contain a fire within the enclosure in which it starts, e.g. living quarters compartments. 'Pre-action' sprinkler systems may be used in areas where sensitive equipment is to be protected against accidental releases yet fire containment is required to prevent escalation to adjacent areas. Sprinkler systems should be designed in accordance with the requirements of NFPA 13 (Ref. 16).

I.2.2.4 Water mist systems

Recent developments in fire protection engineering have highlighted the potential benefits in using water mist systems with water droplets less than 400 microns diameter. These systems discharge water, either under pressure or gas/air assisted, through small orifice nozzles. This produces a high proportion of small droplets (typically 150-400 microns), which can extinguish fires very rapidly using only small quantities of water and therefore minimising water damage. They seem suitable for several applications on class A and hydrocarbon fires, particularly in enclosed spaces. Current testing of various manufacturers version of water mist systems is still under way and only certain systems have comprehensive test data. Systems may be used subject to validation of their extinguishing capability based on comprehensive fire scenario type testing. Some systems use much larger quantities of water than others to achieve extinguishment. To date the following acceptances have been obtained:

Approvals have been granted by certifying authorities for several marine applications in living quarters and machinery spaces Some turbine and machinery vendors have granted approvals for use Systems for flare snuffing have been installed Insurance bodies are testing systems. NFPA 2001 standard (Ref. 17) is being extended to cover water mist systems and NFPA 750 (Ref. 17) which is specific to water mist system design is in draft.

I.2.2.5 Gaseous systems

Gaseous systems can, in many cases, be used to replace halon systems where the need for a fixed fire protection system has been demonstrated. Carbon dioxide systems should be avoided if the problems of protecting personnel from discharges cannot be satisfactorily overcome. They can be used as follows: Fixed carbon dioxide systems have application in protecting high capital intensive equipment or those with high consequential losses and which are located in enclosures, e.g. gas turbines Carbon dioxide systems comprise a dedicated gas and fire detection and protection systems. Details of design and operations requirements are provided in DEP 80.47.10.31-Gen (Ref. 14) NFPA 12 (Ref. 11) and BS-5306: Part 4 (Ref. 12) Carbon dioxide systems, where employed, should in all cases have an adequate lock off and system discharged indication to prevent personnel entering or working in the protected space when the system has discharged.

I.2.2.6 Inert gas mixtures

Inert gas mixtures have been developed to replace halons in total flooding applications. Development work and exposure tests have indicated that lock off isolation for some of these systems may not be necessary. Selection of inert gas extinguishing agents such as IG 541 ('Inergen') can be made for fire protection in specified enclosures, subject to verification of its ability to extinguish potential fires. In the case of turbine or similar small enclosures where people do not have ready access them Inergen systems may be installed without the lock off protection required for carbon dioxide where fire development is likely to be rapid. Designs should conform to local legislation for the protection of personnel. NFPA 2001 (Ref. 17) gives advice on design considerations for these systems. Several major chemical companies have developed halon-like replacements. Some of these replacements are now commercially available. Unfortunately very little fire system hydraulic design data is available at present. There is no prospect, at present, of a replacement chemical that will mimic halons 1301 and 1211 exactly. Determining the potential human toxicity has delayed or limited commercialisation of some these new molecules. Halon replacements usually involve some performance trade-offs. It is likely that either toxicity

(of the agent or of the combustion by-products), fire extinguishing effectiveness, and/or storage stability would be areas of compromise compared to halons 1301 and 1211. No replacement exists that satisfactorily meets all four criteria listed below: Acceptable environmental impact including zero ozone depletion potential and low global warming potential Low toxicity Cleanliness, i.e. no residue Fire extinguishing effectiveness. Most replacement agents require a higher extinguishing concentration than Halon 1301 or 1211. As a general rule, the more agent that needs to be applied to extinguish a fire, and the longer the time required for extinguishment, the more toxic the agent and fire combustion by-products. Lower fire extinguishing effectiveness often means a greater weight of agent is required for the installed system. Whilst fire-extinguishing concentrations are usually good indicators of extinguishing efficiency in a total flood application, they may not fully reflect agent performance for streaming (e.g. hand-held extinguishers) or for explosion suppression and inerting applications. In summary, choosing a halon replacement agent for fire extinguishing, explosion suppression or inerting applications requires analysis of all the relevant performance parameters. Guidance on when to use these gaseous agents as alternatives to halons 1301 and 1211 can be found in HSE Committee booklet Recommendations for Alternatives to Firefighting Halons 1994.
I.2.2.7 Dry chemical systems

Where dry chemical systems are installed their design goal is rapid knockdown of three dimensional hydrocarbon fires, eliminating escalation due to thermal radiation effects. Dry chemical systems provide little security against re-ignition and the potential exists for an explosion due to the subsequent build up of a flammable atmosphere following the extinguishing of a jet fire or one involving volatile liquids. Agent application frequently needs to be backed up with foam application, e.g. pool fires which can be sealed to eliminate the possibility of burn back and re-ignition of the original hydrocarbon release. Dry chemical for fixed system application should be a last choice for protection in installations and facilities. Service requirements and the need to keep the chemical extinguishing agent dry and suitably fluidised during application, mean that this type of system does not have the inherent reliability normally expected from fire protection systems. Application can be from hand hose line or fixed nozzle systems. To cover several areas with a single supply of agent, rigid piping to a single dry chemical supply connects remote hand hose lines with remote actuators. A major disadvantage of using a single large supply unit for protection is the loss of firefighting capability if the unit malfunctions (e.g. due to compaction of the powder or nozzle blockage) or is damaged. This disadvantage may be overcome by using several smaller units. The discharge of dry chemical and expellant gas is a two-phase flow, and the flow characteristics depend upon the particular dry chemical, expellant gas and equipment being used. Therefore, it is important to use the manufacturers' data that has been established by investigation and tests when designing the piping. The most effective dry chemical agent in current use is 'Monnex'.

When dry chemical and foam extinguishing agents are used at the same location, compatibility should be confirmed. Combined agent self-contained systems are available for simultaneous or sequential use. These apply dry chemical and then film forming foam. Such systems offer the advantages of a rapid knockdown by dry chemical and the securing ability of foam as previously mentioned. DEP 80.47.10.30-Gen (Ref. 13) and DEP.80.47.10.31-Gen (Ref. 14) give detailed design information for dry chemical systems.

I.2.3

Semi-fixed systems

Semi-fixed systems use a combination of fixed and mobile components, e.g. trailer mounted foam systems to connect to piping at tank pumps. General guidance on the application of semi-fixed systems is as follows: They should be provided where the attachment of the mobile component enhances the effectiveness of the agent of the fixed system, where the use of mobile components results in a lower cost than extending the fixed system and where there is a low probability of usage of the system Typically this involves low pressure firewater being taken from the fixed main and pumped via a mobile system to improve its throw, or a mobile foam supply/inductor system being provided for application using firewater from the fixed system adjacent to the fire area The size of mobile equipment and access requirements usually means that semi-fixed systems are used only on large onshore sites They may be used to deliver fire-extinguishing agent to potential fire areas that are a significant distance apart, without the requirement for a fixed distribution system. In the case of foam, a fixed distribution system of foam solution over a large spread-out site would be expensive and require large inventories of foam concentrate They provide a slower response time than fixed systems and usually require fire scenario evaluation by trained personnel which should form part of detailed pre-fire planning of scenarios The design should ensure that sufficient points for mobile hook-up are strategically located on the fixed system to ensure access to hook-up points from more than one direction so that wind blown smoke, etc does not block access Fixed system design should allow for rapid connection of mobile equipment, e.g. by use of large bore water connections instead of many small ones. For details of onshore mobile equipment design refer to DEP 80.47.10.32-Gen (Ref. 8) and also DEP 80.47.10.33-Gen (Ref. 7).

I.2.4 Fixed and semi-fixed fire fighting foam systems


The requirement for a fixed foam system is normally determined by a case-by-case assessment. Foam systems should be provided for all normally manned platforms, unless they are producing gas with only a small inventory of hydrocarbon liquids. The following general guidance applies as follows: Central foam systems should be manually activated and make use of the deluge system(s) by proportioning aqueous film forming foam (AFFF) concentrate into the fire main to provide full fire extinguishing capability

Delay in foam solution reaching the fire area from the proportioning point is not considered to be critical, except in the case of the helideck where a local dedicated system should be provided Facilities for bringing the central foam system into operation should be provided at the main fire and gas panel Where appropriate alcohol resistant foams may be deployed locally Foam fire fighting systems should be used in onshore facilities where required by a case by case assessment, design information these systems is provided in DEP 80.47.10.31-Gen (Ref. 14) Foam systems for onshore facilities can either be fully fixed or semi-fixed using mobile equipment For protection of critical storage tanks secondary (back up) systems should be provided which utilise mobile equipment and primary fixed systems The required period of operation for various types of foam system design is specified in the following standards: NFPA 11: Foam monitors and hand lines fixed and semi-fixed systems for exterior storage tanks (Ref. 19) DEP 80.47.10.30-Gen (Ref. 13) for fire protection of onshore facilities specifies sufficient foam concentrate for one hour's uninterrupted fire fighting plus 100 per cent reserve as minimum storage, actual level being reviewed against design fire scenarios Further considerations are as follows: Fires on fixed roof tank with some flammable liquids, particularly crude oils can result in boilover due to transfer of thermal energy to the water layer below the crude oil Some hydrocarbon storage tanks (depending upon their size, usually around 18m diameter) may require subsurface or semi-subsurface extinguishing systems and these should be provided, based on a combination of fixed or semi-fixed fire fighting equipment, as dictated by risk assessment, which should consider the likelihood and consequences of a fire Floating roof tank fires do not boil-over if the fire is limited to the annular seal but they behave in a similar manner to fixed roof tanks if a full surface fire develops on crude oil Firewater systems at existing onshore sites are usually sized for the largest fixed roof tank fire and are generally incapable of extinguishing the larger full surface floating roof tank fire so extinguishment of the floating roof seal area is essential Floating roof tanks in hydrocarbon service should be supplied with fire detection and alarm system, foam dams and top pourer aspirated foam systems These systems may be supplied from fixed foam skids or semi fixed systems depending on the level of risk and response services Fixed foam skids should be installed if the mobile fire service response time exceeds 15 minutes Fixed foam systems should have connections for mobile foam supply vehicles to permit extended supply Fire retardant rim seal materials should be used on floating roof tanks to prevent fire development First shot AFFF pressure systems may be used as an initial automatic fire attack on tanks in critical service but are not replacements for fire retardant rim seals or top pourer foam systems

Fluoroprotein based foams should be used for onshore tank fire protection systems. Foam system designs (including foam pourer design) should be in accordance with the requirements of NFPA 16 (Ref. 20). I.2.5 Hydrants and monitors

The goal of hydrants and monitors, so far as is reasonably practicable, is to provide a reliable means for personnel to supplement deluge and sprinkler systems, if required, by directing water at specific areas or items of equipment. Hydrants should use the following design criteria: Be distributed around a facility or installation so that water can be brought to bear on any location by application as water jets supplied from two separate hydrants, via two separate hoses both kept as short as practicable Have valved outlets complete with suitable couplings with hoses, couplings and branch pipes stored in cabinets, mounted adjacent to the hydrants, and standardised for the site Where hydrants have been positioned to provide supplementary protection of a major hazard location is important as should ignition occur, high levels of radiant heat may be emitted and they should be located outside the predicted 5kW per square metre radiation boundary Measures should be taken to protect personnel using hydrant coupled equipment from injury, as a result of pressure surges when the main fire pump starts up, following the loss of maintained pressure in the firewater main. Hydrant design information is available from DEP 80.47.10.31 - Gen. (Ref. 14) and DEP 80.47.10.30 Gen. (Ref. 13). Monitors may be required at strategic locations in a facility or installation and utilised for the application of water or foam. They can be manually controlled, self oscillate or remote controlled. Normally operating only with water, monitors can be equipped with a foam feed where extinguishment is required as in the case of helidecks. They should be sited as follows: Taking into account the effects of radiant heat envelopes from potential fire scenarios in order that operators are not at risk when tackling a fire Once the optimum application area has been established monitors should have the capability to be locked in that position They should be capable of discharging in both jet and spray modes and self oscillating or remote control types should be provided with local manual override controls When set up to operate in the automatic mode they should not impede escape routes or be a hazard to personnel in the vicinity. Design information for monitors is available from DEP 80.47.10.31 - Gen. (Ref. 14). I.2.6 Helideck fire protection systems

The overall goal of helideck fire protection system design, so far as is reasonably practicable, is to prevent and/or extinguish helicopter and aviation fuel fires, that may occur on a helideck, by applying a reliable, secure and effective distribution of foam solution.

A typical helideck fire protection system consists of three self-oscillating monitors with a local dedicated foam system. This is normally backed up by portable carbon dioxide extinguishers, dry powder extinguishers and fire hydrants and associated equipment as required by local legislative requirements. I.2.7 Firewater supply I.2.7.1 Firewater pump systems Guidance on firewater pumps is given below with details on meeting firewater demand given in I.2.7.3. Sufficient pump(s) should be provided to reliably supply 100 per cent of the firewater demand at the required quantity and pressure, (a back up facility is required to ensure supply under abnormal conditions, e.g. power failure) Details of special requirements for firewater pumps are given in NFPA 20 - Centrifugal Fire Pumps (Ref. 21) Firewater pumps and their drivers should be separately located in a non-hazardous area such that a single fire, explosion or other incident cannot simultaneously put these out of action The pumps should be independently powered and sized such that 100 per cent of the water required for the largest single fire risk is always available if one pump or the source of power supply is out of service The number and specification of firewater pumps for onshore facilities should be in accordance with the requirements of DEP 80.47.10.31-Gen. (Ref. 14) Where extended pump maintenance occurs, temporary or permanent back up of an extra pump and/or a reduction in fire demand such as stopping certain operations, should be implemented Pumps used in parallel should each be of the same curves capacity and have matching pump

Various combinations of diesel driven, diesel/hydraulic driven and electrically driven pumps are acceptable The use of high integrity service water pumps specially designed and manifolded to automatically switch to firewater service can be considered, provided that the fire emergency operational requirements are met and the reliability of the system can be shown to be adequate Offshore, all pumps should take a separate suction from clean sea water with no possibility of contamination from hydrocarbons Fire pumps should be in immediate stand-by condition, the pumps starting up automatically upon loss of fire main pressure, or a signal from the fire and gas panel or by local start, shutdown should be manual only at the fire pump unit Pump controllers should be in accordance with NFPA 20 (Ref. 21) Where firewater pumps are electrically driven, the electric power should be from the essential supply system and generally in accordance with NFPA 20 Firewater pump installations should as a minimum be fitted with a test line and flow meter so that actual performance of each pump can be checked individually over the full range of the fire pump curve (individual pump test features may be provided).

I.2.7.2 Firewater mains

The principal requirements of firewater distribution are as follows: Firewater should be made available to all strategic points in areas where the potential for fire exists by means of ring mains, which may be either dedicated or dual purpose utility/firewater, provided that the dual purpose system meets firewater requirements as a minimum Firewater should be available to protected areas via ring mains of required capacity Large areas should be sub-divided into smaller (ring main) sections each equipped with adequate hydrants and block valves and spur line supplies avoided Firewater mains are normally above ground in onshore EP facilities and are protected from incidents and accidental impact damage (installation below ground is sometimes used to protect fire mains from low ambient temperatures) Ring main systems should incorporate block valves so that sections can be isolated for maintenance so that in the event of a single failure the required quantity of water can still be supplied to hazards served by the isolated area from hydrants and fixed system offtakes in other sections Firewater ring mains systems, materials and equipment details are provided in DEP 80.47.10.31-Gen (Ref. 14) Pipeline material for installation underground can be glass-fibre reinforced epoxy (GRE) with rubber seal locks joints or flanged connections in accordance with DEP 31.38.70.37-Gen (Ref. 22) and DEP 31.38.01.12-Gen (Ref. 23) Above ground fire mains made of GRE should be type tested against possible fire scenarios and constructed from ultraviolet resistant materials Capacity of the drainage system should be matched to firewater delivery Flow metering is not essential because the flow rates can be deduced by measurement of pressure at key points in the system, assuming a full hydraulic analysis is available and comprehensive fire pump tests undertaken. Pressure in firewater systems should be managed as follows: Provision should be made for reducing the effect of firewater surge upon fire pump start by inclusion of an overboard dump line, which should automatically close upon receipt of a 'Fire Pump Started' signal Manual isolation of the dump line should also be provided and fire pump test facilities should be suitable to demonstrate the correct operation of the surge control system Pressure relief facilities should be provided at each pump set as appropriate to avoid exceeding the design pressure of the piping system Flowing pressure available for deluge systems, monitors and hand held hoses local to the incident should be a minimum of 7 bar (g) For offshore installations, the flowing pressure at the helideck should be a minimum of 4 bar (g) Under non-fire conditions the ring mains should be kept full of water at a suitable pressure (normally 4-5 bar (g)) by means of jockey pump(s), or by static head from a water storage tank. Location of firewater mains should be in protected routes chosen taking the following needs into account: Minimising the possibility of damage from fire, explosion or other occurrences Accessing the sectioning valves

Preventing the contents from freezing Not passing through nor immediately above electrical switchgear rooms Onshore ring mains may be laid above or below ground, but below ground is preferred for overall protection of the main Ring mains should not be run below buildings, process equipment or storage tanks Offshore ring mains should be routed so that they are protected from blast or mechanical damage by structural members Requirements for actuated sectioning valves that can be operated from the control point should be determined based on the routing selected and the potential fire scenarios on offshore facilities. Hydrants should be suitably located and in sufficient number around a ring main to avoid long hose strings. Typical onshore spacing is provided in DEP 80.47.10.31-Gen. (Ref. 14) On offshore platforms, hydrant spacing should generally be such that each area, which has the potential for fire, can be reached from two separate hydrants each with a single length of hose.

I.2.7.3 Meeting firewater demand

Where firewater is required for EP operations, the quantities should be based on one major fire occurring at a time. This largest single fire risk to be protected by a water system may involve gases, liquids or solids. Determination of firewater storage and supply rates should be based on a scenario type approach to fires and their potential escalation. This assessment should consider escalation outside of the original fire zone and to mitigate this, determine effective water flows in firewater pump curves when run beyond their duty point. The results of a fire and explosion assessment can be used to assess the design firewater demand. This is the largest firewater demand for a single fire event and should take into account: The demand of all firewater systems which are likely to be initiated by the initial fire incident Requirements for manual fire fighting by personnel (e.g. boundary cooling) Any requirements for personnel protection during escape and evacuation Any firewater requirements for essential users (e.g. drilling make-safe and generator cooling). The maximum foreseeable firewater demand should also take into account: Possible escalation to other fire areas (e.g. due to external flaming or due to failure of a fire barrier following an explosion) Release of protection systems covering other areas (e.g. due to explosion or external flaming being detected by flame detectors in the area) Possible manual initiation of additional water based protection systems by personnel in order to protect nearby equipment and facilities. Other aspects of firewater demand are as follows:

For large gas fires the firewater system should be designed for cooling until the supply of flammable gas can be isolated enabling extinguishment of any jet fire For large liquid fires the firewater system should be designed for foam application to the liquid surface as well as to cool exposed metal parts and neighbouring equipment Large cellulosic type fires may occur in buildings (offices, living quarters, warehouses, etc) proper sub-division by fire barriers permits the largest single fire risk to be taken as one compartment The details of required water rates should be generally in accordance with DEP 80.47.10.30Gen (Ref. 13) but NFPA 15 (Ref. 15) gives details of specific water rate requirements for offshore installations For naturally ventilated offshore platforms, sizing of demand should include the single largest deluge area plus supporting monitors/hand hose lines and helideck supply along with standby firewater pumps, as a contingency measure for firewater provision to adjacent areas For offshore installations with enclosed hazardous areas, the minimum demand should be the single largest deluge area alone, plus the monitors and helideck Firewater delivery systems should be capable, under design conditions of meeting the design firewater demand, although the maximum foreseeable firewater demand may be met by allowing the firewater pumps to run out beyond their duty point and taking credit for all sources of firewater likely to be available in an emergency The major factor in sizing systems to deal with large liquid fires is the largest surface area to be protected In terminals the largest surface area is usually the largest fixed-roof tank which requires extinguishment of both tank and spill fires, plus cooling of the tank and adjacent tanks if radiation levels on them could lead to escalation For floating roof tanks the annular seal is the area the system is designed to protect and full surface bund fires are not taken into account If supply of firewater from open water, well water or third party firewater mains cannot be guaranteed at all times, at the required rate and for the required duration, a dedicated firewater storage facility should be provided DEP 80.47.10.30 (Ref. 13) stipulates that (for new refineries), chemical plants, LNG/NGL plants, storage areas and jetties) a minimum of 6 hours uninterrupted fire fighting should be possible The required minimum time for EP facilities may be more, or in some cases less than 6 hours, dependent upon the nature of the facility, the potential fire scenarios envisaged and the design intent Water supply should be ensured for the design duration by sizing the storage volume to meet the above criteria or by the provision of top-up facilities Firewater storage should contain sufficient water for uninterrupted supply of the maximum water demand of the firewater pump(s) and for the period determined in the case by case fire scenario assessment The use of stored firewater for non-fire purposes should be avoided and should be controlled to ensure adequate reserves are always in place to deal with the largest potential single incident at all times Where water is stored for dual usage purposes (combination utility water and firewater storage), design should be such that the minimum required firewater quantity is always available for fire fighting purposes Firewater storage facilities should be designed and located in accordance with the requirements of DEP 80.47.10.31-Gen (Ref. 14).

I.2.8

Mobile fire equipment

A mobile system has no fixed component and is usually transported to the fire by truck (fire tender) or towed trailer system. In offshore locations firefighting vessels are an effective way of providing back up water in large quantities for cooling of the load-bearing structure. Key considerations are as follows: The deployment and hook-up of mobile systems to fixed systems should only be used if there is manpower trained in the equipment use Mobile equipment needs to be maintained to a high degree of integrity, this requires a programme of maintenance and routine testing The mobile equipment may have a dual function, being the mobile part of a semi-fixed system and also a fully self contained unit Equipment design should account for all equipment functions, its hook-up interfaces with the fixed system, the personnel who will use it and the facilities to service it Mobile systems may be considered where events are expected to be minor enough or remote enough to preclude the installation of a fixed system Mobile systems may be provided as back up to fixed systems, to cater for variations in fire scenarios and for spill fire attack around fixed equipment scenarios Deployment time of mobile systems should be as short as reasonably practicable, to the scene of major risks, (short enough that the mobile resources may still reasonably be able to control events and prevent them from escalating beyond the maximum tolerable loss for the facility) Short response times of typically less than 5 minutes are only considered practicable when mobile facilities are available on site Longer response times than the above mean fixed systems should be considered to control the fire scenario and prevent escalation at least until mobile resources arrive Mobile systems should be suitably equipped and carry fire fighting agents in sufficient quantity for a range of potential fire scenarios Generally areas to be protected from fire events will require access from more than one direction so that wind blown smoke, spills, etc do not block access to the incident Mobile systems should be designed to be compatible with the personnel who will use it and the facilities available to service it, including ergonomic functions of man/machine interfaces The time for an offshore mobile system (vessel) to deploy to an event will be dependent on the location of the event and the availability of personnel to operate the system Offshore deployment is dependent on the geographical distribution of platforms involved and possible sea states and control over vessel locations. Details of mobile equipment design refer to DEP 80.47.10.32-Gen, (Ref. 8) and DEP 80.47.10.33-Gen (Ref. 7). I.2.9 Portable fire equipment

Portable units include hand held and wheeled extinguishers which enable immediate response to small fires by personnel in the vicinity of the incident, and equipment which is an integral part of a fixed fire protection system, e.g. fire hoses and interconnecting components. When installing portable equipment the guidance given below should be followed:

Portable equipment provision at facilities is normally mandatory, and provides the simplest method of preventing minor fires from escalating and backing other extinguishing systems Portable extinguishers should be prominently located along escape routes and at escape exits, at fire points in and around processing areas, either separately or in combination with hose boxes, and be carried on mobile units Attachments to the fixed system should be stored in boxes located throughout the process and storage areas and on jetties Portable extinguishers should be suitable for the expected fire type (fuel type and size) Response times using portable equipment are largely dependent on human observation, the availability and functioning of extinguishers Attachments to fixed fire systems should be accessible from outside the immediate fire zone but be capable of directing extinguishing agent onto the fire Portable extinguishers should be located within easy reach of personnel (i.e. not stored behind objects) or obstructing escape routes Portable units need people to utilise them and for effective response all personnel should be trained in the use of equipment available in their area of work Hand held extinguishers must be reliable to ensure that people will use them to tackle small fires promptly The status of portable units needs to be closely controlled with complete and accurate records for their use, inspection, maintenance and testing Portable attachments to fixed systems should have matching fittings to those provided on the fixed system Fittings should, where possible, be standardised throughout the facility to enable attachments to be utilised in areas other than where they are housed Fittings should also be consistent with those used by outside agencies who may be called upon for support. Details of portable equipment design refer to DEP 80.47.10.32-Gen. (Ref. 8). I.2.10 Selection of Fire Extinguishers When selecting fire extinguishers, due account should be taken of the following: The nature and quantity of the fuel present, and therefore the character of the potential fire (halontype extinguishers should not be used for environmental reasons) The construction, dimension and occupancy of the protected sites Any hazards additional to the primary fuel The safety of personnel, both of the operator of the extinguisher and others (e.g. dry powder gives a large cloud which obscures vision) The existing or proposed fixed fire fighting systems The potential secondary damage caused by the extinguishing medium The climatic conditions

The persons likely to use the equipment; the maximum weight and the ease of operation of the equipment The resources available at the location for routine maintenance and prompt servicing of the equipment Any regulatory requirements specified by the regional or local fire or other authorities.

I.2.11 Types of Fire Extinguishers There are four main categories of extinguishers. A summary of each is given below with details provided in Table I.2.10.1. Water filled Water extinguishes fires by cooling. Water-filled extinguishers are suitable for risks involving wood, paper and fabrics (i.e. Class A fibres). Manufacturers offer a wide range; for example water may be expelled under pressure either by air (700 kPa) or carbon dioxide (1100-1200 kPa). The discharge can be controlled and interrupted as required. A typical 9 litres water capacity extinguisher has an effective jet length of 9 metres. Typical continuous discharge durations are 40 to 75 seconds. Air has the advantage that, on refilling, the extinguisher can be pressurised with a simple handpump. Various additives can be incorporated to enable low temperature operation down to 30C (although this reduces extinguishing capability) or to improve spread and penetration (wetting agents). For locations with restricted access to piped water supply water units of up to 150 litres capacity are available. Foam Foam extinguishes fires by smothering and cooling. Foam systems are mainly used as fixed fire fighting systems. They are also available as portable systems. The major advantage of foam extinguishers over water extinguishers is that they can be used to seal burning flammable liquids. Otherwise the use of foam extinguishers is subject to the same advantages and limitations as water extinguishers (e.g. foam extinguishers must not be used directly on electrical fires, nor for burning metals). Foam is also unsuitable for gases or very volatile liquids. Foam extinguishers are based on fluoroprotein or AFFF foam compound up to 100 litres capacity and, as for water extinguishers, are pressurised by air or carbon dioxide. The foam solution is discharged through an aspirating nozzle or branch pipe. Typical effective jet lengths and discharge durations are as for water extinguishers. For premix extinguishers, which are freezing protected with mono-ethylene glycol, the quantity of foam concentrate used is generally increased by 50%. (For example, in a 100-litre extinguisher using 3% AFFF the three litres of foam concentrate that would usually be used should be increased to 4 litres). Carbon dioxide Carbon dioxide work by smothering and cooling. Liquid carbon dioxide filled extinguishers are suitable for liquid gas and electrical fires. They are less suitable for Class A fires (e.g. smouldering solids). There is a possibility that thermal shock from carbon dioxide could damage sensitive electronic equipment. The carbon dioxide is discharged as liquid 'snow' (or gas) under a container pressure of 5500-6000 kPa (dependent on ambient temperature). The capacity varies from about 1 to 45 kg. Carbon dioxide extinguishers have a relatively short range, which is affected by drafts or wind. Care should be taken not to touch the discharge horn during operation (to avoid 'cold burns'). They should not be used to render flammable gas inert, since there is a danger of a static charge being generated.

All pressurised extinguishers should be protected from extended exposure to high ambient temperatures. This is particularly true for carbon dioxide extinguishers. For tropical areas manufacturers usually recommend a smaller charge in each cylinder. Dry chemical Dry chemical extinguishes fires by smothering. Dry chemical extinguishers are suitable for liquid, gas and electrical fires. Some powders are less effective on smouldering solids than water or foam, but better than carbon dioxide. The size, rating and method of operations of different types of dry chemical extinguisher currently available are described in NFPA 10. The chemical powder is contained in a steel or high-density polythene container and pressurised with nitrogen, dry air or carbon dioxide. The pressurising gas is stored in the container itself or released from an internal or external cartridge when the lever is depressed. The cartridge is preferred. A typical portable extinguisher has a powder capacity of 9 kg (charged weight 15 kg), an effective jet length of 6 m and discharge duration of 16 seconds. A large wheeled unit contains about 70 kg of dry chemical (charge weight 155 kg) with discharge duration of up to 60 seconds. Dry chemicals are not affected by wide variations in ambient temperature, but they should be protected from the effects of damp to avoid clogged nozzles. They have the disadvantage of contaminating delicate or sensitive equipment, e.g. electrical circuits, instruments, etc which may be difficult or impossible to clean. Dry powder units can become inoperable due to powder compaction, particularly if the extinguisher is subjected to prolonged vibration. Maintenance intervals must take this into account. Maintenance of this type of extinguisher should only be carried out by professional organisations, since: The mixing of different types and/or makes of dry chemical can lead to hazardous reactions. Consequently, extinguishers have to be thoroughly cleaned before using a different dry chemical

A fatal accident occurred due to corrosion of the threads, which led to ejection of the cartridge assembly.

Halon extinguishers

Halon extinguishers are used as fixed systems or portable extinguishers to smoulder fires where people are present. These are being phased out for environmental reasons (see Ref. 53).

Table I..2.10.1Fire Extinguisher Selection Chart


FIRE CLASS BS 4547 and EUROPEAN STANDARD EN2 EXTINGUISHING PRINCIPLES

CLASS
3

A.B.C. ALL PURPOSE POWDER YES Excellent

MONNEX & B.C. DRY POWDER NO

METAL POWDER NO

CARBON DIOXIDE FOAM NO YES

WATER YES Excellent

B.C.F. YES

A
Fires involving solid materials Water cooling usually of organic or combustion nature in which inhibition combustion normally take place with the formation of glowing embers. Wood, paper, textiles etc. CLASS Rapid flame knockdown and excellent protection against reignition Will control small surface fires only Will control small surface fires only Has smothering, cooling and sealing action Good penetration Rapid flame and rapid cooling knockdown of combustion below fire point prevents re-ignition

YES Excellent

YES Excellent

NO

YES

YES Excellent

NO

YES

Fires involving liquids or liquefiable solids. Burning liquids, oil, fat, paint etc. CLASS

Flame inhibiting or surface blanketing & cooling Flame inhibiting

Rapid flame knockdown

Rapid flame knockdown

Leaves no residue. Foam blanket gives protection Water will spread Does not against re-ignition & cools the the fire contaminate food liquid fuel NO YES (1) NO NO

Rapid flame knockdown

YES (1)

YES (1)

YES (1)

C
Fires involving gases CLASS

NO

NO

D
Fires involving metals Magnesium, Sodium, Titanium, Zirconium Fires involving electrical hazards Exclusion of oxygen & cooling Flame inhibiting Use of wrong medium could cause explosion YES Use of wrong medium could cause explosion YES

YES Excellent

NO

NO

NO

NO

Forms a crust over burning metal and excludes oxygen NO

Use of wrong medium could cause explosion YES Excellent Non-conductor. Leaves no residue CO2 stored By arrangement with supplier BLACK

Use of wrong medium could cause explosion

Use of wrong medium could cause explosion NO Water is a conductor CO2 cartridge and stored pressure On site RED

Use of wrong medium could cause explosion YES Excellent Non-conductor. Leaves no residue Nitrogen stored

NO Foam is a conductor CO2 cartridge and stored pressure On site CREAM

Non-conductor Non-conductor PRESSURE SOURCE RECHARGING BODY COLOUR CO2 cartridge and stored pressure On site BLUE CO2 cartridge and stored pressure On site BLUE CO2 cartridge On site BLUE

Replacement cylinder on site GREEN

(1) Gas supply should be isolated before extinguishing gas fires

Table I.2.10.2 Examples of Hand-Held Fire Extinguishers Type/BSI colour code Protected area Capacities/total charged weights 7-9 kg Comments

Dry chemical powder Accommodation (Multi-purpose Houseboats A, B, C type) Workshops Storage areas Helipad/parking area Fuel storage area (outside) Chainsaw crew Recording crew Fly camps (outside fuels store)

Aggregate powder on helipad not less than 45 kg 9 litres Portable equipment 6.5 l/m2/min for 10 mins

Foam-AFFF Where fixed water system is available Water hoses/hose reels (where fixed water systems are available) Fire blanket

Fuel storage barge Helipad/deck Fuel storage Helipad/deck Accommodation

Galley/kitchens Workshops Accommodation Helipad/helideck

I.2.12 Special application systems Galley hood fire extinguishing systems using aqueous potassium carbonate/acetate should be provided in living quarters offshore. Gas turbines provide sources of fuel and ignition in close proximity. They require large quantities of air both for combustion and for cooling and are generally installed within acoustic hoods. The protection system for a gas turbine should cater for the possible occurrence of the following hazardous or emergency situations: Fire under the acoustic hood Fire in the area of the turbine but outside the hood. Protection systems for turbines should be self contained. Full annunciation, including single fire detector operation should be provided at the installations main fire and gas panel located in the control center. Confirmed fire detection should shutdown the gas turbine and isolates the fuel supply, damper the venting and initiate extinguishing discharge.

The high noise levels associated with gas turbines means that if a fire develop, detailed attention should be given to alerting personnel audibly and visually, especially if they are working under the turbine hood or in the immediate vicinity of the incident. Fire protection under the turbine hood should be by means of a water mist or inert gas system. Water mist systems are suitable for turbine hood fire extinguishing in manned locations. The system should be certified as suitable by the turbine vendor. Placement of nozzles to extinguish concealed and small fires and extinguishment of lagging fires should be included in functional requirements of the design. Repeat discharge shots can be provided to cater for reignition during turbine cool down period. Discharge of a gaseous extinguishing should be delayed until dampers, where fitted, have closed and ventilation has been shut down. Where dampers are not fitted or cannot be closed due to temperature constraints, an extended discharge may be necessary. A second shot system can be made available for manual release if re-ignition is assessed as likely. The gaseous extinguishing cylinders should be installed outside the hood and be suitable protected from a potential incident and the environment. The detailed requirements for fire detection in gas turbines are being moved to DEP 32.30.20.11. (Ref.24).

1.3

Protection of Active Fire System Equipment and Agents

To function in emergency active fire protection systems, equipment and agents need to be generally protected from an incident and the local environment. Equipment and extinguishing agents for active fire systems should be located remote from the areas where they provide protection, or if inside that area, protected from local incidents as follows: Fire pumps should be located in areas away from hydrocarbon processing areas and outside the zone affected by the largest credible fire scenario Individual fire pumps should be protected from potential incidents at other fire pumps by location or passive fire protection barriers Foam storage should be located in areas where there is no hydrocarbon processing and be protected from an incident at the fire pumps Deluge system supply valves should be located outside the area they protect Carbon dioxide and gaseous extinguishing storage cylinders should be located outside the enclosures they protect according to requirements of NFPA 12 (Ref. 11) Safe access should be provided to equipment that may be required during a fire incident Fire fighting equipment should be located so it is accessible should a fire incident occur.

I.4
I.4.1

Passive Fire Protection Systems


General

Passive fire protection systems are frequently preferred over active systems since they are, if one assumes regular maintenance, more reliable and more available. Regular inspections of fire protection coatings and cladding are required to ensure their integrity.

A weakness of active fire systems is their standby nature. They often require extensive maintenance and testing to ensure their readiness and because of their intermittent use latent or unrevealed faults may occur. Passive fire protective (PFP) coatings and systems are commonly applied to steelwork, equipment and plant to give protection of critical structural members that could be weakened by exposure to fire. Evaluation of the need for PFP should be based upon fire scenarios and consequence analysis.

I.4.2 Passive fire protection applications


The functional requirements of a PFP system are as follows: To prevent or delay the transfer of thermal energy from a fire to adjacent areas, modules, escape and evacuation routes, structural members and critical equipment To maintain the load bearing capacity (structural capability) of a structural member or a fire barrier To maintain the integrity of a fire barrier by preventing the transmission of flame, smoke, hot and toxic gases To keep the unexposed side of a barrier at a defined temperature when the other surface is exposed to a fire To remain effective even if deformed due to exposure to explosion events.

Passive fire protection is utilized where it is essential that equipment or system integrity be maintained during a major fire incident. Hazards should be assessed and possible consequences evaluated with regard to predicted fire scenarios and the potential for escalation. Based on this study, areas requiring PFP can be identified taking into account the AFP systems available. Selection of PFP systems should take into account the duration for which protection is required, the type of fire that may be experienced and the limiting temperature for the structure or equipment to be protected. Typical applications of passive fire protection systems are as follows: To prevent escalation of the fire due to progressive releases of inventory, by separating the different fire risk areas and if necessary by protection of critical components such as separators, risers and topside ESDVs Minimise damage to the installation by protecting the critical structural members, essential to the support of the temporary refuge TR, the evacuation routes to and from the TR(s) and other critical equipment Protect personnel in the TR, until safe evacuation can take place to protect any section of the escape routes to the TR(s) for a predetermined time to cater for safe escape from the area and allow for emergency response activities Protect any sections of the evacuation routes from the TR(s) to the locations used for installation evacuation Protect safety critical equipment. The selection of different materials should consider the type and size of fire, the duration of protection, the environment, application and maintenance and smoke generation in fire situations. Running assessments of the worst-case fire scenario may be sufficient to determine the PFP requirements without more detailed calculations of possible fire scenarios within a given area.

If analysis shows that certain fire scenarios are identified to exceed the survival capability of critical safety systems, it may be necessary to undertake risk assessment to evaluate whether it is reasonably practicable to provide additional PFP for these cases. The alternative is to use some other approach to prevent, control or mitigate the identified fire hazardous events. PFP materials should be verified as fit for purpose. Where general approvals from recognized third party or governmental body are not available, performance under fire conditions should be documented by test reports from a recognized fire test laboratory. Design information on PFP systems can be found in DEP 34.19.20.11- Gen. (Ref. 25) DEP 37.19.10.30 Gen. (Ref. 26).

APPENDIX II - PERFORMANCE STANDARDS AND MONITORING

II.1

System Performance Standards

II.1.1 General
Recovery systems are normally designed in response to assessed hazardous event scenarios. A set of standards should be prepared which specify what is expected from a particular system in terms of performance. This forms part of the Fire and Explosion Strategy (FES). Performance standards for fire and explosion recovery systems provide the basis for the development of maintenance programmes to ensure reliability, availability, survivability and appropriate interfaces and interdependencies with other systems.

II.1.2 Fire and explosion related systems


II.1.2.1 Systems for recovery from loss of containment

Flammable gas detection Manual alarm call-point (MAC) Oil mist detection Riser ESDV system Topsides ESDV system Reservoir isolation SSIV system Depressurisation (blow down) Hazardous area ventilation Non-hazardous area ventilation

II.1.2.2

Systems for recovery from explosions

Explosion protection II.1.2.3 Systems for recovery from fires

Fire detection Deluge systems Fixed fire fighting equipment Foam systems

Fire pump Fire main Gaseous systems Passive fire protection Relief system Open hazardous drains Open non-hazardous drains Sprinklers UPS systems

II.1.3 Escape evacuation and rescue systems II.1.3.1 Escape and refuge systems

Access/evacuation routes Temporary refuge (TR) Emergency/escape lights Mandatory communications Operational communications Personal safety equipment

II.1.3.2

Means of evacuation and escape to the sea

Helicopter TEMPSCs Tertiary means of escape

II.1.3.3

Means of rescue

Standby vessel/FRC II.1.3.4 Other systems

Navigation aids

II.1.4 System performance standard template


Typical system performance standards should be developed for the above systems. They can be developed in a similar manner for other control and recovery systems and used for monitoring performance. An example relating to a deluge system is on the following pages. Table II.1 Performance Standard Template Deluge System Installation/Location Goal: Assist in the recovery from a fire by applying a reliable, secure and effective distribution of firewater to limit escalation, provide cooling to equipment and structures, protect personnel and, by the introduction of foam concentrate, to extinguish pool fires. 1. FUNCTIONALITY Function Provide water through network of pipes to control rate of burning and/or provide exposure protection to plant/ equipment Criteria/Guidance Minimum discharge density of - 10.2 l/min/m2 for general area protection. Nozzles not more than 3.5m spacing, and one per 10m2 for general areas. Obstructions over 1m wide protected underneath. - Pumps and compressors 20.4 l/min/m2 - Vessels, tanks, pipelines etc 10.2 l / min / m2 - Personnel exposure 45-130 l/min - Structural protection 10.2 l/min/m2 For wellheads and BOP supply, 400 l/min/head via at least two High Velocity sprayers. Nozzles selected to achieve density without dry spots Minimum pressures open sprinklers Normal area - 1 bar (g) Nat. ventilated Open area - 1.4 bar (g) medium velocity Open sprayer - 1.4 bar (g) high velocity sprayer windage area - 3.5 bar (g) Enclosed area - 2.8 bar (g) Analysis/Verification Hydraulic analysis and function test. Water demand per area confirmed by hydraulic analysis after layout established.

Visual inspection under test. Recorded on table of fire zones/type/performance Hydraulic analysis and/or function test

Maintain pressure at nozzles

Respond rapidly to fire

Within 20 seconds of input from F and G, water to reach remotest nozzle

Function test with pressure and flow meters

Table II.1 Performance Standard Template (continued) Materials selected to minimise velocity, corrosion/ erosion effects New installations Selected according to relevant standards Existing installations - no action unless system performance unacceptable to System Custodian Existing installations judgement by System Custodian based on system performance. Function test Inspection or confirmation by System Custodian of historical performance. Function test and recording in table indicating module/type/test.

Enunciate confirmation of deluge operation.

Indication given at F & G panel

Winterisation

External pipe work and valve trims exposed to low temperatures that become charged when deluge operated, should be self-draining, a procedure available or trace heated - Automatic by frangible bulb - Automatic by fire detectors - Manual electric/pneumatic locally - Manual by key switch at F AND G panel - Manual by release of deluge system - Manual by operation of secondary by-pass valve

Means of initiation

Table II.1 Performance Standard Template (continued) 2. RELIABILITY / AVAILABILITY Element/Component Entire system Criteria/Guidance If required by QRA, system availability to be determined by analysis Maintenance System routine(s) - specify No more than 2 adjacent nozzles blocked and still achieve average application rate Documented in Integrity Envelope Analysis/Verification By calculation, confirmed by monitoring Outstanding items accepted by System Custodian Recorded in Maintenance System Routine Work History

System maintenance System testing

Integrity envelope Interdependencies: Fire and Gas panel logic

Y/N - see Integrity Envelope methodology

Fire and Gas panel output for executive action Pneumatic control lines (including solenoid valves) Variable pressure/flow deluge valve Operation annunciation Nozzles

Table II.1 Performance Standard Template (continued) 3. SURVIVABILITY Event Explosion Component All components Criteria Valve sets to remain operable under foreseeable explosion Need to remain operable under foreseeable conditions: Verification Analysis of overpressure from FEA. Experienced judgement, test evidence or similar to support design or protection provided. Analysis of fire loading from FEA. Experienced judgement, test evidence or similar to support design.

Pool fire Jet fire

All components

Assumptions in QRA:

4. DEPENDENCY / INTERACTIONS System Fire pump and fire main Air supply to deluge valve and pneumatic detection circuit F & G System Critical Yes - to provide sufficient water on demand Yes - Need to maintain supply for a minimum of two hours to prevent unnecessary valve opening at wrong locations around platform Yes - to initiate executive actions: Applicable PS

APPENDIX III - PRE-FIRE PLANNING DETAILS

III.1 Structure of a Pre-fire Plan


Typical components of pre-fire plans are as follows: Affected equipment Definition of affected equipment forms the basis of the initial fire scenario this should take into account layout, inventory and potential for fuel leaks and potential for leaked fuel to migrate from another area Impinged equipment Fuel inventory and pressure and layout (proximity and orientation) should be reviewed to establish equipment that could be impinged upon by the initial fire, which may be that leading to escalation thus needing to have protection provided Resources needed The initial fire scenario can determine the fire fighting resources needed, requirements for fire fighting agents, their method of delivery, their location relative to the fire scene and the number of fire-fighters should all be established and incorporated into the plan: (where the resources available at an existing site or proposed for a new facility, do not meet those required, the fire department should request that the facility, or the design be suitably upgraded) Command structure The command structure in the response to the fire emergency should be incorporated into the fire plan and should clearly define the relationships between the various parties Role of plant operators Definition of this role should include procedures expected from the control room or key control points on the plant including ESD/EDP philosophies, electrical operations, communications and such items a battery limits and compressed air supplies for valve closure etc Response time impact Generally the more rapid the fire fighting response, the greater the impact of that response, (in certain situations though, where personnel are in danger, e.g. helicopter or aircraft crash, immediate response is essential and for these fire scenarios equipment and fire-fighters should be available and ready) Control method The fire plan should define the method for control of a fire to prevent spread and/or escalation whilst the extinguishment method is being implemented Extinguishing plan Each fire scenario requires that extinguishing be specifically planned for that event Impact of actions Fire fighting plans should incorporate postulations of the impact of actions taken to fight of fire and include a review of items such as: Impact of spilt fuel and used fire fighting agents on the environment Impact of fire fighting agents on equipment and buildings adjacent to but not impacted by the fire, e.g. firewater damage to other floors of a multi-storey building

Exposure of personnel deployed for fire fighting to fire hazards, e.g. smoke, in the event of change of wind direction

Escalation response Fire fighting plans should review the response required to combat any escalation and consider: Additional life safety protection measures required, e.g. evacuation of neighbouring facilities Evacuation alert/implementation of fire-fighters and/or of offsite areas, Additional fire fighting equipment required Additional fire fighting agents required Additional fire fighting manpower required (onsite, mutual aid and/or local municipal) Shutdown of local adjacent facilities both onsite and offsite and/or feeder/produce lines from upstream/downstream facilities

Variations The value of any plan is reduced when the unexpected occurs so fire plans should be formulated and practised to include some anticipation of the unexpected by considering concealed responses such as: Personnel may panic and not follow designated evacuation/escape routes and this could lead to mustering and communication problems, which in the worst case, require fire fighting attention to be diverted to search/rescue activities Communication systems breakdown Mutual aid and/or local municipal fire brigades not available due to fighting another unrelated event

Concealed risks Anticipation of the unexpected should be extended to: Fire spread via cable trenches or site drains Gas cylinders (e.g. chlorine for water dosing) being stored in the fire area although these may not contribute to the fire they could create other serious hazards

Backup services Mutual aid and local municipal fire brigades are an obvious source of additional/backup equipment, agents and manpower and each fire plan should determine the level of response required from such back up services Other external services Communications, weather forecasting, local availability of earth moving equipment and/or craneage, local medical and ambulance services and local police services need to be evaluated and incorporated into fire fighting plans Well fires Well fire scenarios require specialist fire-fighters and their equipment to be brought in and a fire plan should include for this provision by ensuring that points of contact are defined, and that the site design has suitable access and equipment is available etc Extended response In the event of a prolonged or major incident, e.g. storage tank fire that failed to be extinguished, it may be necessary to cool adjacent tanks/facilities for a period greater than that used for firewater storage design and the fire plan should consider the following: Opportunities for provision of additional water or other fire fighting agent and manpower

A list of contacts should be maintained to identify where to obtain additional resources Temporary (mobile) communications unit and feeding, sleeping and ablution facilities for fire-fighters

Pre-plans should reflect the anticipated actions of operations personnel together with guidance on actions to take prior to arrival of the fire department or external fire response groups. A copy of pre-plans should be located at the facilities themselves as well as the fire department and personnel made familiar with them.

III.2 Typical Pre-fire Plan Content


A typical pre-fire plan should normally include the following information: Location and function of facility, equipment and plant involved Exposure of personnel affected by incident Scenario written description with possible cause and effect Process or operational status if applicable Potential consequences of scenario for life safety, environment, production, plant, equipment not forgetting public concern Fire control strategy (overall fire control plan) Fire fighting tactics to achieve the objectives of the plan in order of priority (rescue, protection, control or extinguishment) Resources required such as fixed/semi-fixed systems, fire vehicles, manpower, fire equipment, extinguishing agent, water demand and water supply quantities Requirements for medical support and casualty handling Procedures for company assistance call out and external assistance call out and control of personnel in event of incident escalation Role and expected actions of the local authority fire brigade Overall incident chain of command Additional comments should include direct or indirect potential hazards resulting from the incident or fire fighting actions and their impact on company personnel, environment, facilities or production and the general public A diagram of the location showing equipment positions and sizing, major dimensions and fire fighting resources and locations. For major fire scenarios where prolonged fire control measures are identified the pre-fire plans should also describe the emergency personnel management procedures for crew rotation (rest and recuperation) as well as catering and transport arrangements. Major scenarios should also be critically assessed for abnormal water, fire equipment and extinguishing agent quantities which may have to be arranged for the incident from external sources at short notice. Where required, such sources should be identified with listed contact numbers to save time.

III.3 The Role of Pre-fire Planning in Emergency Response

The effectiveness of the fire department in responding to an emergency event is directly related to how well prepared they are for that type of event. Detailed plans should include the following: Scenario specific Written Approved Exercised. Pre-plans may be an important component of the overall fire and explosion strategy for a facility.

IV. HAZARDS AND EFFECTS HIERARCHY


The hazard categories related to fires and explosions in the hazards and effects hierarchy are as follows: H-01 H-02 H-03 H-04 H-05 H-06/09 H-10 H-11 H-14 H-15 H-16 H-27 Hydrocarbons (flammable hazard) Refined hydrocarbons (flammable hazard) Other flammable materials (combustion potential) Explosives (potential explosion) Pressure hazards (initiation of hazardous events or escalation) Potential initiating events Hot surfaces (ignition source) Hot fluids (possible ignition source) Open flame (ignition source) Electricity (ignition source from sparks) Electromagnetic radiation (possibility of induced electrical energy) Potential initiating events

Occasionally other categories may be applicable, eg where a physical pressure explosion could damage hydrocarbon plant. Examples of typical ignition sources are as follows: Thermal, e.g. hot exhausts Mechanical, e.g. friction sparks Electrical, e.g. electrical sparks or arcs Chemical, e.g. oxidising agent Arson/sabotage, e.g. explosives Natural causes e.g. lightning. Ignition sources may be found in a number of locations as follows: On site, e.g. electrical switchgear, hot exhausts, hot work, etc. Off site, e.g. motor vehicles, hot exhausts, electrical equipment, etc. Non-certified electrical equipment used in hazardous areas Transient sources, e.g. hot work, construction work, vehicle access to the plant, etc. Table III.1 - The Hazards and Effects Hierarchy
Key: Safety Hazards F = Flammable MH = Major Hazard Se = Security Hazard WP = Work Practice Health Hazards B = Biological Agent C = Chemical Agent E = Ergonomic Agent P = Physical Agent LS = Life Style Agent Psy = Psychological Agent M = Medical Issue Environmental Hazards D= Discharge Hazards R = Use of Natural Resources P = Presence

Table III.1 Hazard Number H-01 H-01.01 H-01.02

The Hazards and Effects Hierarchy (continued) Hazard Description Hydrocarbons Crude oil under pressure Hydrocarbons in formation MH MH C D D Flow lines, pipelines, pressure vessels and piping Oil wells especially during well drilling and entry/work over operations Process fractionating equipment, storage tanks, transport trucks and rail cars Cryogenic plants, tankers Gas wells, gas pipelines, gas separation vessels Oil/gas separators, gas processing plants, compressors, gas pipelines Oil storage tanks Filter separators, well tubulars, pipelines Fuel source, mining activities Safety Health Environ Sources

H-01.03

LPGs (e.g. Propane)

MH

H-01.04 H-01.05 H-01.06

LNGs Condensate, NGL Hydrocarbon gas

MH MH MH

C C C

D D D

H-01.07 H-01.08 H-01.09 H-02 H-02.01 H-02.02 H-02.03 H-02.04 H-03 H-03.01 H-03.02

Crude oil at low pressures Wax Coal Refined Hydrocarbons Lube and seal oil Hydraulic oil Diesel fuel Petroleum spirit/gasoline Other flammable materials Cellulosic materials Pyrophoric materials

MH F F

C C P

D D R

C C C F C

D D D D

Engines and rotating equipment Hydraulic pistons, hydraulic reservoirs and pumps Vehicle fuelling stations, vehicle maintenance Vehicle fuelling stations, vehicle maintenance

F F C D

Packing materials, wood planks, paper rubbish Metal scale from vessels in sour service, scale on filters in sour service, iron sponge sweetening units

H-04 H-04.01 H-04.02 H-04.03

Explosives Detonators Conventional explosive material Perforating gun charges WP MH MH C C Pr Seismic Operations, pipeline construction Seismic Operations, pipeline construction Well completion activities associated with drilling rigs and work over operations

Table III.1 Hazard Number H-05 H-05.01

The Hazards and Effects Hierarchy (continued) Hazard Description Pressure Hazards Bottled gases under pressure WP Welding and metal cutting operations, laboratory gas sources Water disposal, water floods and injection operations, strength testing of pipe works, well fracturing and treatments Purging and leak testing of facilities Seismic air guns and related piping, Safety Health Environ Sources

H-05.02

Water under pressure in pipe works

WP

H-05.03 H-05.04 H-06 H-06.03

Non-hydrocarbon gas under pressure in pipe works Air under high pressure

MH WP

Hazards associated with differences in height Overhead equipment MH Objects falling while being lifted/handled or working at a height over people, equipment or process systems, elevated work platforms, slung loads Pipeline trenches, excavations, repairing buried facilities

H-06.05 H-08 H-08.01

Personnel below grade Dynamic situation hazards On land transport (driving)

WP

WP

Driving to and from locations and camps, transporting materials, supplies and products, seismic operations, moving drilling rigs and work over rigs Boat transport to and from locations and camps, transporting materials, supplies and products, marine seismic operations, barges moving drilling rigs and work over rigs Helicopter travel to and from locations and camps, transporting materials, supplies and products Shipping lane traffic, product transport vessels, supply and maintenance barges and boats, drifting boats Engines, motors, compressors, drill stems Workshop, construction sites, maintenance sites, rotating equipment

H-08.02

On water transport (boating)

WP

H-08.03

In air transport (flying)

MH

H-08.04

Boat collision hazard to offshore structures

MH

H-08.05 H-08.06

Equipment with moving or rotating parts Use of hazardous hand tools (grinding, sawing) Environmental Hazards Weather Tectonic

WP WP

H-09 H-09.01 H-09.03

WP MH

Winds, temperature extremes, rain, etc. Earthquakes or other earth movement activity

Table III.1 - The Hazards and Effects Hierarchy (continued) Hazard Number H-10 H-10.01 Hazard Description Hot surfaces Process piping and equipment WP between 60 and 150 deg C Process piping and equipment MH over 150 deg C Engine and turbine exhaust systems WP P Oil well piping, piping in fractionation systems, glycol regeneration Hot oil piping, piping associated with stills and re-boilers Power generation, gas compression, refrigeration compression, engine driven equipment such as forklifts Sulphur plants, power boilers, waste heat recovery systems, heat tracing and jackets Safety Health Environ Sources

H-10.02 H-10.03

P P

H-10.04

Steam piping

WP

H-11 H-11.01

Hot fluids Temperatures between 100 and 150 deg C WP P Glycol regeneration, low quality steam systems, cooling oils, galley Power boilers, steam generators, sulphur plants, waste heat recovery units, hot oil heating systems, regeneration gases used with catalysts and desiccants

H-11.02

Temperatures greater than 150 MH deg C

H-14 H-14.01

Open flame Heaters with fire tube F P D Glycol re-boilers, amine reboilers, salt bath heaters, water bath heaters (line heaters) Hot oil furnace, Claus plant reaction furnace, catalyst and desiccant regeneration gas heaters, incinerators, power boilers Pressure relief and blow down systems

H-14.02

Direct fired furnaces

H-14.03 H-15 H-15.01

Flares Electricity Voltage > 50 to 440 V in cables Voltage > 50 to 440 V in equipment MH

Power cables, temporary electrical lines on construction sites Electric motors, electric switchgear, power generation, welding machines, transformer secondary Overhead power lines, power generation, transformer primary, large electrical motors Major lightning-prone areas Non-metallic storage vessels and piping, product transfer hoses, wiping rags, unearthed equipment

H-15.02

WP

H-15.03

Voltage >440 V

MH

H-15.04 H-15.05

Lightning discharge Electrostatic energy

WP WP

Table III.1 - The Hazards and Effects Hierarchy (continued) Hazard Number H-16 H-16.01 H-16.02 H-16.03 H-16.04 H-16.05 H-21 H-21.15 H-21.16 H-21.17 Hazard Description Electromagnetic radiation Ultraviolet radiation Infra-red radiation Microwaves Lasers E/M radiation: high voltage ac cables Toxic liquid Alcohol-containing beverages WP Recreational drugs Used engine oils (polycyclicaromatic hydrocarbons) Carbon tetrachloride Toxic solid Oil based sludges Corrosive substances Hydrofluoric acid Hydrochloric acid Sulphuric acid Caustic soda (sodium hydroxide) Ergonomic hazards Lighting P Pr Worker areas requiring intense light, glare, lack of contrast, insufficient light Offshore locations utilising long shift cycles, overtime, night shifts, rollover shifts WP WP WP C C C C D D D D Well stimulation Well stimulation Wet batteries, regenerant for reverse osmosis water makers Drilling fluid additive C D Oil storage tank cleaning WP LS LS C D Used engine oils P P P P P Arc welding, sunshine Flares Galley Instrumentation, surveying Transformers, power cables Safety Health Environ Sources

H-21.18 H-22 H-22.14 H-23 H-23.01 H-23.02 H-23.03 H-23.04 H-25 H-25.09

Plant laboratory

H-25.14

Long and irregular working hours/shifts Security related Hazards Piracy Assault Sabotage Crisis (military action, civil disturbances, terrorism) Se Se Se Se

H-27 H-27.01 H-27.02 H-27.03 H-27.04

Abbreviations
The following abbreviations are used in this document: A&M BA BS CAA CAP CO2 DEP EP FAA FES FIFI HLO HSE ICAO NFPA HEMP OIM OPTIB OSC PA SCBA UK UL VCR Texas College of Agriculture and Mining Breathing Apparatus British Standards Civil Aviation Authority Civil Aviation Procedure Carbon Dioxide Design and Engineering Practice Manual Exploration and Production Division of SIPM Federal Aviation Authority Fire and Explosion Strategy Lloyds Classification for Firefighting Boats Helicopter Landing Officer Health Safety and Environment International Civil Aviation Organisation National Fire Protection Association (of America) Hazards and Effects Management Process Offshore Installation Manager Offshore Petroleum Industry Training Board (UK) On Scene Commander Public Address System Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus United Kingdom Underwriters Laboratories Video Cassette Recorder

References
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 ISO CD 13702 Requirements and Guidelines for the Prevention, Control and Mitigation of Fires and Explosions on Offshore Oil and Gas Installations, ISO. DEP 34.11.00.11-Gen, Site preparation and earthworks, MFEC/2, 1983. DEP 34.18.51.10-Gen, Minimum requirements for the construction and maintenance of tank foundations etc, MFEC/4, 1985. Area classification code for petroleum installations (Model Code of Practice Part 15), Institute of Petroleum, March 1990. DEP 37.17.10.11-Gen, Design of offshore temporary refuges. UK Fire Service Manual of Firemanship, UK Fire Service. DEP 80.47.10.33-Gen, Fire fighting Vehicles and Fire Stations, MFEO/1,1993. DEP 80.47.10.32-Gen, Portable and Mobile Equipment for Fire fighting, MFEO/1, 1984. DEP 80.47.10.10-Gen, Fire fighting Agents, MFEO/1, 1991. Recommendations for Alternatives to Fire Fighting Halons, SHSEC, 1994. NFPA 12, Standard on carbon dioxide extinguishing systems, NFPA, 1993. BS 5306: Part 4, Specification for carbon dioxide systems, BSI, 1986.

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DEP 80.47.10.30-Gen, Requirements for Fire Protection in Onshore Oil and Gas Processing and Petrochemical Installations, MFEO/1, 1985. DEP 80.47.10.31-Gen, Active Fire Protection Systems and Equipment for Onshore Facilities, MFEO/1, 1992. NFPA 15, Standard for water spray fixed systems for fire protection, NFPA, 1990. NFPA 13, Standard for the installation of sprinkler systems, NFPA, 1993. NFPA 2001, Standard on clean agent fire extinguishing systems, NFPA, 1994. NFPA 750, Standard for water mist fire suppression systems, NFPA, 1994 (draft). NFPA 11, Standard for low expansion foam, NFPA, 1994. NFPA 16, Standard for the installation of deluge foam-water sprinkler and foam-water spray systems, NFPA, 1995. NFPA 20, Standard for the installation of centrifugal fire pumps, NFPA, 1993. DEP 31.38.70.37-Gen, Requirements for glass-fibre reinforced epoxy and polyester pipes and fittings, MFEM/51, 1988. DEP 31.38.01.12-Gen, MF Piping classes, MFEO/5, 1994. DEP 32.30.20.11-Gen, the instrumentation of fire and gas detection systems, MFTX/51, 1987. DEP 34.19.20.11-Gen, Fire hazards and fireproofing/cold splash protection of steel structures, MFEC/1, 1991. DEP 37.19.10.30-Gen, Weldable structural steels for fixed offshore structures (Amendments/Supplements to BS 7191), EPD/52, 1993. Lloyds Register of Shipping, Rules and Regulations for the Classification of Ships, Latest Revision. CAP 437 Offshore Helicopter Landing Areas - Guidance on Standards, Civil Aviation Authority. 9137-AN/898, Airport Services Manual, ICAO. CAP 168, Licensing of aerodromes, Civil Aviation Authority. BS 7170, Specification for respiratory protective devices: self-contained closed-circuit compressed oxygen breathing apparatus, BSI, 1990. BS EN 137, Specification for respiratory protective devices: self-contained open-circuit compressed air breathing apparatus, BSI, 1993. BS5430:Part 1, Specification for seamless steel containers of water capacity 0.5 litres and above, BSI, 1990.

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