Jurisdiction Intro Class1 The subject of jurisdiction is vast and in the next several classes we will attempt to give

e an overall explanation of what jurisdiction is and a break-down, how its obtained, when you are subject to it, how to challenge it, and several other issues concerning it. Because of the vast material and special areas, you will be taught by several teachers that have much experience in this particular subject. This is the root essential to any challenge or problem that exists between you, the dejure government or the defacto government. In law, jurisdiction (from the Latin ius, iuris meaning "law" and dicere (to say) and meaning "to speak") is the practical authority granted to a formally constituted legal body or to a political leader to deal with and make pronouncements on legal matters and, by implication, to administer justice within a defined area of responsibility. Or in common English: Jurisdiction is the authority given to a legal body, or to a political leader (Prime Minister, President, etc.) to deal with legal matters, and to pronounce or enforce legal matters. One of the most fundamental questions of law is whether a given court has jurisdiction to preside over a given case. A jurisdictional question may be broken down into three components: 1. whether there is jurisdiction over the person (in personam), 2. whether there is jurisdiction over the subject matter, or res (in rem), and 3. whether there is jurisdiction to render the particular judgment sought. The term jurisdiction is really synonymous with the word "power". Any court possesses jurisdiction over matters only to the extent granted to it by the Constitution, or legislation of the sovereignty on behalf of which it functions. The question of whether a given court has the power to determine a jurisdictional question is itself a jurisdictional question. Such a legal question is referred to as "jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction." Subject matter jurisdiction is the court's authority to decide the issue in controversy such as a contracts issue, or a civil rights issue. State courts have general jurisdiction, meaning that they can hear any controversy except those prohibited by state law (some states, for example, deny subject matter jurisdiction for a case that does not involve state citizens and did not take place in the state) and those allocated to federal courts of exclusive jurisdiction such as bankruptcy issues (see 28 U.S.C. 1334). Federal courts have limited jurisdiction in that they can only hear cases that fall both within the scope defined by the Constitution in Article III Section 2 and Congressional statutes (See 28 U.S.C. 1251, 1253, 1331, 1332).

Subject matter jurisdiction must contain these elements: 1) Two parties in appearance. One injured party. 2) A law, statute or precedent on the controversy. 3) Two witnesses and testimony. Attorneys cannot testify. 4) Sufficient pleadings. Territorial jurisdiction is the court's power to bind the parties to the action. This law determines the scope of federal and state court power. The Due Process Clause of the Constitutions Fourteenth Amendment determines state court territorial jurisdiction and the Due Process Clause of the Constitutions Fifth Amendment determines the federal court territorial jurisdiction. JURISDICTION 1. Jurisdiction is "The right to adjudicate concerning the subject-matter in the given case. To constitute this there are three essentials: First, the court must have cognizance of the class of cases to which the one to be adjudicated belongs; second, the proper parties must be present; and third, the point decided upon must be in substance and effect within the issue." Reynolds v. Stockton, 140 U.S. 254, 268. 2. As to persons on whom process is actually and personally served within the territorial limits of jurisdiction, or who appear and by their pleadings admit jurisdiction. McMullen v. Guest, 6 Tex 275; Barnes v. Harris, 4 N.Y. 375; Adams v. Lamar, 8 Ga. 83; Wells v. Patton, 50 Kan 732. 3. Jurisdiction over the person is acquired by actual service of process or personal appearance of the defendant, which is a simple question of fact. (See conflict of law in the law dictionaries) 4. Once jurisdiction is challenged, it must be proven. Hagens v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 533, note 3; 5 USC 559(2) & 556(d) 5. Mere good faith assertions of power and authority (jurisdiction) have been abolished. Owens v. The City of Independence, 445 US 622. 6. Where jurisdiction is not squarely challenged, that subject matter is presumed to exist. Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471. 7. No sanction can be imposed absent proof of jurisdiction. Standard v. Olsen, 74 S Ct. 768. 8. It is settled that a distinction obtains, and equitable jurisdiction exists to restrain criminal prosecutions under constitutional enactments, when the prevention of such prosecutions is essential to the safeguarding of rights of

property. Traux v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 37-38; Packard v. Banton, 264 U.S. 140, 143. 9. The general rule undoubtedly is that a court of equity is without jurisdiction to restrain criminal proceedings unless they are instituted by a party to a suit already pending before it to try the same right that is in issue there. re Sayer, 124 U. S. 200, 209-211; Davis & Farnum Manf Co. v. Los Angeles, 189 U. S. 207, 217; Packard v. Banton, 264 U. S. 140, 143. 10. The judgment of conviction pronounced by court without jurisdiction is void, and one imprisoned there under may obtain release by habeas corpus. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468. 11. At the common law a plea to the jurisdiction is in the form of a plea of abatement. Roberts v. Lewis, 144 U.S. 653 12. Where the subject-matter is not within the jurisdiction, the court may dismiss the proceedings of its own motion. Gormly v. McIntosh, 22 Barb. (N.Y.) 271; Robertson v. State, 10 NE 582, 643. And a remedy may be had by a writ of prohibition; 3 Bla. Com. 12. 13. Jurisdiction must be raised before making any plea to the merits, if at all, when it arises from formal defects in the process, or when the want of jurisdiction over the person. Smith v. Curtis, 7 Cal 584; Bohn v. Devlin, 28 Mo. 319; Brown v. Weber, 6 Cush. (Mass) 560; Whyte v. Gibbes, 20 How 541. 14. Illegality in the service of process by which jurisdiction is to be obtained is not waived by the special appearance of the defendant to move that the service be set aside; nor after such motion is denied, by his answering to the merits; such illegality is waived only when, without having insisted upon it, he pleads in the first instance to the merits. Harkness v. Hyde, 98 U.S. 476. 15. A court of general jurisdiction is presumed to be acting within its jurisdiction till the contrary is shown. Brown, Jur Section 202; Wright v. Douglas, 10 Barb.. (N.Y.) 97; Town of Hunnington v. Town of Charlotte, 15 Vt. 46. 16. The burden is on the defendant to show the nonexistence of jurisdictional facts. Russell v. Butler (Tex Civ app) 47 S.W. 406; Gilchrist v. Oil Land Co., 21 W. Va. 115. 17. 100-106 17. "The judicial power of the United States extends to all the cases enumerated in the third article of the constitution, but to none other;....it is not cognizable by the courts of the United States, unless it represents a case arising under the constitution, laws, or treaties of the union, or is a subject of equity, admiralty, or maritime jurisdiction." Bains, supra., p. 546

18. "I, therefore, hold that we are under a peculiar obligation to restrain the admiralty jurisdiction within its proper limits." Ramsey v. Allegrie, supra, p. 418. 19. "And if the admiralty jurisdiction, in matters of contract and tort which the courts of the United States may lawfully exercise on the high seas, can be extended to the lakes under the power to regulate commerce, it can with the same propriety and upon the same construction, be extended to contracts and torts on land when the commerce is between different states. And it may embrace also the vehicles and persons engaged in carrying it on. (Roads) The Genesee Chief et al. v. Fitzhugh, 12 How 443, p. . 20. "But if the power of regulating commerce can be the foundation of jurisdiction in its courts, and a new and extended admiralty jurisdiction beyond its heretofore known and admitted limits, may be created on water under that authority, the same reason would justify the same exercise of power on land." (Roads) The Genesee Chief et al. v. Fitzhugh, 12 How 443, p. . 21. "It is evident that a definition that would at this day limit public rivers in this country to tide-water rivers is utterly inadmissible. We have thousands of miles of public navigable water, including lakes and rivers in which there is no tide. And certainly there can be no reason for admiralty power over a public tide-water, which does not apply with equal force to any other public water used for commercial purposes and foreign trade. The lakes and the waters connecting them are undoubtedly public waters; and we think are within the grant of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction in the Constitution of the United States. The Genesee Chief et al. v. Fitzhugh, 12 How 443, p. 22. "The phrase 'common law,' found in this clause, is used in contradistinction to equity, and admiralty, and maritime jurisprudence." Parsons v. Bedford, et al, 3 Pet 433, 478-9. 23. "If the common law can try the cause, and give full redress, that alone takes away the admiralty jurisdiction." Ramsey v. Allegrie, supra, p. 411. 24. The admiralty from the highest antiquity has exercised a very extensive criminal jurisdiction. United States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137, 139. (1933) 25. Admiralty courts have a jurisdiction over contracts and torts and other special cases. (Commerce) Waring v. Clark, 5 How. 441, 454-464; Genesse Chief v. Fitzhugh, 12 How. 443, 454. United States v. Flores, 289 U. S. 137, 142. (1933) 26. The criminal jurisdiction of the United States is wholly statutory, see United States v. Hudson, 7 Cranch 32,...United States v. Flores, 289 U. S. 137, 154. (1933)

27. "It is true that the criminal jurisdiction of the United States is in general based on the territorial principle, (commerce) and criminal statutes of the United States are not by implication given an extra-territorial effect. United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98; compare Black v. States, 284 U.S. 421." United States v. Flores, 289 U. S. 137, 155 (1933) 28. It is natural to consider the vessels of a nation as parts of its territory, though at sea, as the State retains its jurisdiction over them. This is the doctrine of the law of nations. (Admiralty) United States v. Flores, 289 U. S. 137, 156 n. 9 (1933) 29. Separate courts exercising the jurisdiction of the Court of Exchequer were never established in the American Colonies. Instead, that jurisdiction was absorbed by the common law courts which entertained suits for the forfeiture of property under English or local statutes authorizing its condemnation. By 1700, the jurisdiction of the common law courts to condemn ships and cargos for violation of the Navigation Acts had been firmly established. In general the suits were brought against the vessel or article to be condemned, were tried by jury, closely followed the procedure in Exchequer, and if successful resulted in judgments of forfeiture of condemnation with a provision for sale. (Commerce, Admiralty) C. J. Hendry Co. et al. v. Moore et al., 318 U.S. 133, 139-40 (1942) FOURTH AMENDMENT/SEIZURE 1. It is our opinion, therefore, that a compulsory production of a man's private papers to establish a criminal charge against him, or to forfeit his property, is within the scope of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, in all cases in which a search and seizure would be; because it is a material ingredient, and effects the sole object and purpose of search and seizure. 2. The seizure of stolen goods is authorized by the common law. (Get a source for this statement) 3. Now it is elementary knowledge, that one cardinal rule of the court of chancery is never to decree a discovery which might tend to convict the party of a crime, or to forfeit his property. And any compulsory discovery by extorting the party's oath, or compelling the production of his private books and papers, to convict him of crime, or to forfeit his property, is contrary to the principles of a free government. It is abhorrent to the instincts of an Englishman; it is abhorrent to the instincts of an American. It may suit the purposes of despotic power; but it cannot abide the pure atmosphere of political liberty and personal freedom. (Body vs United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). 4. If the government prosecutor elects to waive an indictment, and to file a civil information against the claimants -- that is, civil in form -- can he by this device

take from the proceeding its criminal aspect and deprive the claimants of their immunities as citizens, and extort from them a production of their private papers, or, as an alternative, a confession of guilt? This cannot be. The information, though technically a civil proceeding, is in substance and effect a criminal one. (See Fourth) 5. It is the duty of courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon. (Body vs United States, 116 U.S 616 (1886). 6. "The 4th Amendment is a limitation upon police conduct even if the police officers stop short of something called a 'Technical Arrest' or a 'Full Blown Search.'" (892 20th L. ED.) (seizure) 7. "Even though the rule excluding evidence seized in violation of the 4th Amendment should not be applied rigidly and unthinkingly in futile protest against police investigatory practices which it can never be used effectively to control, courts still retain their traditional responsibility to guard against police conduct which the Federal Constitution requires; where such conduct is identified, it must be condemned by the judiciary and its fruits must be excluded from evidence in criminal trials." (Terry vs Ohio, 1967 392 U.S. 891.) 8. When officers detained appellant for the purpose of requiring him to identify himself, they performed a seizure of his person subject to the requirements of the Fourth Amendment....The Fourth Amendment, of course, applies to all seizures of the person, including seizures that involve only a brief detention short of traditional arrest...Whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has 'seized' that person, and the Fourth Amendment requires that the seizure be 'reasonable'. "But even assuming that purpose (prevention of crime) is served to some degree by stopping and demanding identification from an individual without any specific basis for believing he is involved in criminal activity, the guarantees of the Fourth Amendment do not allow it." "To this end, the Fourth Amendment requires that a seizure must be based on specific objective facts indicating that society's legitimate interests require the seizure of the particular individual, or that the seizure must be carried out pursuant to a plan embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the conduct of individual officers. "The application of...(a code)...to detain appellant and require him to identify himself violated the Fourth Amendment because the officers lacked any reasonable suspicion to believe appellant was engaged, or had engaged, in criminal conduct. Accordingly, appellant may not be punished for refusing to identify himself, and the conviction is reversed." (probable cause) Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, (1979)

9. Accordingly, we hold that except in those situations in which there is at least articulable and reasonable suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed, or that an automobile is not registered, or that either the vehicle or an occupant is otherwise subject to seizure for violation of law, stopping an automobile and detaining the driver in order to check his driver's license and the registration of the automobile are unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. This holding does not preclude the State of Delaware or other states from developing methods for spot checks that involve less intrusion, or that do not involve the unconstrained exercise of discretion. Questioning of all oncoming traffic at roadblock type stops is one possible alternative. We hold only that persons in automobiles on public roadways may not, for that reason alone, have their travel and privacy interfered with at the unbridled discretion of police officers. (Search, Probable cause) (Delaware vs Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979)). 10. Only the rare taxpayer would be likely to know that he could refuse to produce his records to Internal Revenue Service agents. (Fourth) United States vs Dickerson, 413 f 2D 1111. 11. A person cannot be forced to submit records for inspection. (Fourth, Tax) United States of America, and Fred J. Rosauer, special agent IRS v. Johanna Van Poperin, U.S. District Court, District of Minn, 4th Division, 4-71 Civil 635. 12. The Supreme Court argued that the IRS could not use material gained by IRS agents under a routine questioning for what purported to be a routine audit." The difference between a routine and a criminal investigation was 'too minor to justify departure from the Miranda Doctrine." Justice White drew a mandatory conclusion. "Indeed," he added, "the Black opinion suggested that the Miranda warnings are required through the immensely broad area of investigations which frequently lead to criminal inquiries." (Fourth, Tax) The Mathis decision, (No. 726, May 6, 1968, 3 910 S.)(Winterhaven, Florida). 13. "The right to be free from unreasonable search". (Fourth) Sherar vs Cullen, USCA 9th, 71-1558, July 3, 1973. 14. It is clear, of course, that no act of Congress can authorize a violation of the Constitution. But under familiar principles of constitutional adjudication, our duty is to construe the statute, if possible, in a manner consistent with the Fourth Amendment. Almeida--Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973). 15. These (Fourth Amendment rights), I protest, are not mere second-class rights, but belong in the catalog of indispensable freedoms. Among deprivations of rights, none is so effective in cowing a population, crushing the spirit of the individual, and putting terror in every heart. Uncontrolled search and seizure is one of the first and most effective weapons in the arsenal of every arbitrary government. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180; also see Almeida-Sanchez v. US, 413 U.S. 266 (1973).

16. The exclusionary rule was fashioned as a sanction to redress and deter overreaching government conduct prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. To make an exception for illegally seized evidence which is trustworthy would fatally undermine these purposes. Thus in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961), we held that "All evidence obtained by searches in violation of the constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a state court. Fingerprint evidence is no exception to this comprehensive rule. Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 724. 17. At the outset, we find no merit in the suggestion in the Mississippi Supreme Court's opinion that fingerprint evidence, because of its trustworthiness, is not subject to the proscriptions of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721. 18. Person cannot be forced to submit records for inspection. United States of America, and Fred J. Rosauer, special agent I.R.S. v. Johanna Van Poperin, U.S. District Court, District of Minn., 4th Division, 4-71 Civil 635. (Tax, Fourth) 19. The 4th Amendment is a limitation upon police conduct even if the police officers stop short of something called a "Technical Arrest" or a "Full Blown Search." 892 20th L. Ed. 20. "Even though the rule excluding evidence seized in violation of the 4th Amendment should not be applied rigidly and unthinkingly in futile protest against police investigatory practices which it can never be used effectively to control. Courts still retain their traditional responsibility to guard against police conduct which the Federal Constitution requires; where such conduct is identified, it must be condemned by the judiciary and its fruits must be excluded from evidence in criminal trials." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 891 (1967) 21. Court order for books, records, pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists, memoranda, pictures, recording, and other written instruments, court said such words could not be used in a search warrant. (Fourth) Standford v. Texas, 85 S. CT 506. 22. Any time IRS attempts to secure your personal records of any type, you may refuse to produce such records. Body v. United States, 116 U.S. 616; Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591; Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43; Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361; Baltimore Etc R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 221 U.S. 612; United States v. Sischo, 262 U.S. 165; United States v. Lombardo, 228 Fed. 980; United States v. Dalton, 268 Fed 756; United States v. Mulligan, 26 FED 893; United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 225 U.S. 81; United States v. Sherry, 294 FED 684. (Fourth) 23. The above inclusion (Par. 75) is fortified in the recent decision in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, overruling Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, which had held

"that in a prosecution in a state court for a state crime, the Fourteenth Amendment does not forbid the admission of evidence obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure. 38 U.S. 33, Mapp held that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination implemented the Fourth Amendment in such cases, and that the two guarantees of personal security conjoined in the Fourteenth Amendment to make the exclusionary rule obligatory upon the state. We relied upon the great case of Body v. the United States, 116 U.S. 616, decided in 1886, which considering the Fourth and Fifth Amendments running "almost into each other." Id. M. 630, held that "breaking into a house and opening boxes and drawers are circumstances of aggravation; but any forcible and compulsory extortion of a man's own testimony or his private papers to be used as evidence to convict him of crime or to forfeit his goods, is within the condemnation of (those amendments).... 24. Respondent is in fear of federal prosecution for violation of federal tax laws; and there is no federal statute which would grant immunity to respondent for the specific offenses set forth in 26 U.S.C., Sections 7201 through 7210. In the absence of a federal statute granting immunity for the specific offense to which the question relates, states cannot compel disclosure. (Fourth) Mulloney v. United States, 79 F 2d 566, and United States v. Johnson, et al, 76 F. Supp., 538. 25. The government's anxiety to obtain information known to a private individual does not without more (????) render that information public; if it did, no room would remain for the application of the constitutional privilege. Nor does it stamp information with a public character that the government has formalized its demands in the attire of a statute. If this alone were sufficient, the constitutional privilege could be entirely abrogated by any act of Congress. (Fourth) Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 57. 26. The effect of the Fourth Amendment is to put courts of the United States and federal officials, in the exercise of their power and authority, under the limitations and restraint as to the exercise of such power and authority, and to forever secure the people, their persons, houses, papers, and effects against all unreasonable searches and seizures under the guise of law. This protection reaches all alike, whether accused of a crime or not, and the duty of giving it force and effect is obligatory upon all entrusted under our federal system with the enforcement of laws. The tendency of those who execute the criminal laws of the country to obtain by means of unlawful seizure and enforced confessions, the latter often obtained after subjecting accused persons to unwarranted practices destructive of rights secured by the federal constitution, should find no sanction in the judgments of the courts, which are charted at all times with the support of constitution. Weeks v. U.S., 232 U.S. 383. 27. Regarding the statute (26 USC Sec. 7210) which prescribes criminal punishment for anyone refusing to obey an internal revenue summons for

production of records, the Supreme Court, in Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, said "None compliance is not subject to prosecution there under when the summons is attacked in good faith." And, by the same token, it seems that one who makes a "good faith" challenge to specific questions on a 1040 tax return is not subject to a successful prosecution. (Fourth) 28. Belief, however well funded, that an article sought is concealed in a dwelling house, furnishes no justification for a search of that place without a warrant. And such searches are held unlawful, notwithstanding facts unquestionably showing probable cause. When properly invoked, the Fifth Amendment protects every person from incrimination by use of evidence obtained through search or seizure made in violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment. Angello v. U.S., 269 U.S. 33. 29. But we cannot agree that the seizure of the contraband property was made in conformity with requirements of the Fourth Amendment, it is a cardinal rule that, in seizing goods and articles, law enforcement agents must secure and use search warrants whenever reasonably practicable....to provide the necessary security against unreasonable intrusions upon the private lives of individuals, the framers of the Fourth Amendment required adherence to judicial processes wherever possible. And subsequent history has confirmed the wisdom of that requirement. Trupiano v. U.S., 334 U.S. 705. a "good faith" challenge to specific questions on a 1040 tax return is not subject to a successful prosecution. (Fourth) 30. Belief, however well funded, that an article sought is concealed in a dwelling house, furnishes no justification for a search of that place without a warrant. And such searches are held unlawful, notwithstanding facts unquestionably showing probable cause. When properly invoked, the Fifth Amendment protects every person from incrimination by use of evidence obtained through search or seizure made in violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment. Angello v. U.S., 269 U.S. 33. 31. But we cannot agree that the seizure of the contraband property was made in conformity with requirements of the Fourth Amendment, it is a cardinal rule that, in seizing goods and articles, law enforcement agents must secure and use search warrants whenever reasonably practicable....to provide the necessary security against unreasonable intrusions upon the private lives of individuals, the framers of the Fourth Amendment required adherence to judicial processes wherever possible. And subsequent history has confirmed the wisdom of that requirement. Trupiano v. U.S., 334 U.S. 705. 32. There have been powerful hydraulic pressures throughout our history that bear heavily on the court to water down constitutional guarantees and give the police the upper hand. That hydraulic pressure has probably never been greater than it is today. Yet if the individual is no longer to be sovereign, if the police can pick him up whenever they do not like the cut of his jib, if they can "seize" and

"search" him in their discretion, we enter a new regime. The decision to enter it should be made only after a full debate by the people of this country. (Fourth) Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 39 (1967). 33. When the right of privacy must be reasonably yielded to the right of a search, is as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or government enforcement agent. (Fourth) Johnson v. U.S., 333 U.S. 10, 14. 34. Of course, in applying any reasonableness standard, including one of constitutional dimension, an argument that the public interest demands a particular rule must receive careful consideration. But we think this argument misses the mark. The question is not, at this stage at least, whether these inspections may be made, but whether they may be made without a warrant. (Fourth) Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 533. 35. Of course, in applying any reasonableness standard, including one of constitutional dimension, an argument that the public interest demands a particular rule must receive careful consideration. But we think this argument misses the mark. The question is not, at this stage at least, whether these inspections may be made, but whether they may be made without a warrant. (Fourth) Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 533. 36. Failure to secure a valid court order must be punishable for those conducting a search or seizure without it, if the rights of the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution are to be maintained. If no penalty will be ever attached to a failure to seek a warrant, as distinguished from the officers making their own, correct, determination of probable cause, warrants will never be sought. Quotation of Niro v. U.S., 338 F. 2d 535, 539 (1st Cir. Ct.) cited in U.S. v. Mason, 290 F. Supp. 843 (1968). 37. We accept as a general and prudent rule of contemporary constitutional law, that the "crucial question is whether the Respondent is in fear of federal prosecution for violation of federal tax laws; and there is no federal statute which would grant immunity to respondent for the specific offenses set forth in 26 U.S.C., Sections 7201 through 7210. In the absence of a federal statute granting immunity for the specific offense to which the question relates, states cannot compel disclosure. (Fourth) Mulloney v. United States, 79 F 2d 566, and United States v. Johnson, et al, 76 F. Supp., 538. 38. "The 4th Amendment is a limitation upon police conduct even if the police officers stop short of something called a "Technical arrest" or a "Full Blown Search." (892 20th L. Ed.) 39. The effect of the Fourth Amendment is to put courts of the United States and federal officials, in the exercise of their power and authority, under the

limitations and restraint as to the California, 89 S. Ct. 2034, with a comprehensive analysis of the development of the law with respect to searches and seizures. 40. Moreover, even where probable cause exists, a warrantless search is forbidden unless made incident to a lawful arrest. (Fourth) Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20. (1925) 41. The following decisions all bear against illegal search and seizure. United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51; McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456; Vale v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 34; James v. Louisiana, 382 U.S. 37. (Fourth) 42. Internal Revenue Service could not seize private records even with a seizure warrant. (Tax, Fourth) Vincent R. Hill v. Jay G. Philpott, District Director of IRS, et al, No. 18487, January Session, 1971: The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals PROBABLE CAUSE 1. When officers detained appellant for the purpose of requiring him to identify himself, they performed a seizure of his person subject to the requirements of the Fourth Amendment....The Fourth Amendment, of course, applies to all seizures of the person, including seizures that involve only a brief detention short of traditional arrest...Whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has 'seized' that person, and the Fourth Amendment requires that the seizure be 'reasonable'. "But even assuming that purpose (prevention of crime) is served to some degree by stopping and demanding identification from an individual without any specific basis for believing he is involved in criminal activity, the guarantees of the Fourth Amendment do not allow it." "To this end, the Fourth Amendment requires that a seizure must be based on specific objective facts indicating that society's legitimate interests require the seizure of the particular individual, or that the seizure must be carried out pursuant to a plan embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the conduct of individual officers. "The application of...(a code)...to detain appellant and require him to identify himself violated the Fourth Amendment because the officers lacked any reasonable suspicion to believe appellant was engaged, or had engaged, in criminal conduct. Accordingly, appellant may not be punished for refusing to identify himself, and the conviction is reversed." (Probable cause) Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, (1979) 2. "..... this Court defined probable cause as follows: "If the facts and circumstances before the officer are such as to warrant a man of prudence and caution in believing that the offence has been committed, it is sufficient." (Carroll vs United States, 267 U.S. 132, (1925).

3. But as we have seen, good faith is not enough to constitute probable cause. That faith must be grounded on facts within knowledge of the Director General's agent, which in the judgment of the court would make his faith reasonable. (Director General vs Kastenbaum, 263 U.S. 25). Since an order of a Criminal Court Judge to return to a defendant all fingerprints, palm prints and photographs taken at the time of arrest (CPL 160.50) is not appeal able, an article 78 proceeding in the nature of a writ of prohibition is the only remedy available to the People to challenge the claimed abuse of authority by the Judge in issuing the non-appeal able order, it being well settled that prohibition may be used to restrain an inferior court from exceeding its authorized powers in a proceeding over which it has jurisdiction. Morgenthau v Becker (1979) 102 Misc 2d 507, 423 NYS2d 977. "Criminal action." A criminal action (a) commences with the filing of an accusatory instrument against a defendant in a criminal court, as specified in subdivision seventeen; (b) includes the filing of all further accusatory instruments directly derived from the initial one, and all proceedings, orders and motions conducted or made by a criminal court in the course of disposing of any such accusatory instrument, or which, regardless of the court in which they occurred or were made, could properly be considered as a part of the record of the case by an appellate court upon an appeal from a judgment of conviction; and (c) terminates with the imposition of sentence or some other final disposition in a criminal court of the last accusatory instrument filed in the case. "Appearance ticket" means a written notice issued by a public servant, more fully defined in section 150.10, requiring a person to appear before a local criminal court in connection with an accusatory instrument to be filed against him therein. 29. "Superior court warrant of arrest" means a process of a superior court directing a police officer to arrest a defendant and to bring him before such court for the purpose of arraignment upon an indictment filed therewith by which a criminal action against him has been commenced. 30. "Bench warrant" means a process of a criminal court in which a criminal action is pending, directing a police officer, or a uniformed court officer, pursuant to paragraph b of subdivision two of section 530.70 of this chapter, to take into custody a defendant in such action who has previously been arraigned upon the accusatory instrument by which the action was commenced, and to bring him before such court. The function of a bench warrant is to achieve the court appearance of a defendant in a pending criminal action for some purpose other than his initial arraignment in the action. Abuse or misuse of contempt power as ground for removal or discipline of judge. 76 ALR4th 982. Download the zip file for the classes