A Weary Titan: Russian Foreign Policy Thinking since 1992 Jittipat Poonkham

A Weary Titan Russian Foreign Policy Thinking since 1992 Jittipat Poonkham 1

Abstract At the end of the Cold War, Russia lost its status of superpower and became merely a weary titan, which inevitably affected foreign policy making. The paper argues that Russian foreign policy since 1992 originated from the ideational debate, which was part and parcel of a longer debate whether Russia would integrate into the West (Westernization) or would follow its own developmental path (Russianization). It begins with a contested identity problem about Russias position and role in the post-Cold War world, which constituted the background for major changes and continuity in foreign policy thinking. Then the paper divides ideational patterns of Russian foreign policy thinking into four distinct phases: (I) liberal idealism (1992-1993); (II) geopolitical realism (19932000); (III) geopolitical-geoeconomic realism I (2000-2004); and (IV) geopoliticalgeoeconomic realism II (2004-present), respectively. During the early periods of both Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin administrations (Phases I and III), Russian foreign policy was prone to cooperative with the West while during their later periods (Phases II and IV), it fundamentally shifted to more assertive relationship. Keywords: Russian foreign policy thinking, identity, ideas, change, continuity

At the end of the Cold War, International Relations (IR) scholars particularly the realists emphatically failed to predict the scenario of the breakdown of the Soviet Union. The world was astoundingly stunned by the end of the bipolar international system, the democratization of the former Soviet states or the so-called near abroad2, the reunification of Germany, and, significantly, the loss of one of dual superpowers. At time, Russia became a weary titan without a strategic balance, without an economic security, and without a political or energy leverage vis--vis the near abroad. Unquestionably, Russian foreign policy underwent significant changes. Then, what has Russian foreign policy after the Cold War been like? To what extent has Russian foreign policy transformed during Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin administrations?

Department of International Relations, Faculty of Political Science, Thammasat University The near abroad includes the South Caucasus (Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan), Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan), and the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania).
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Realists may argue that constrained due to its declined relative power position, Russia rationally needed to bandwagon with the West but Russias improving relative power, coupled with the increased oil prices (for Putin), provided changes in Russian policy towards balancing against the West (See MacFarlane 1999; Lynch 2001; Donaldson and Nogee 1998). However, it is insufficient to explain why under both Yeltsin and Putin eras they decided not only to bandwagon but also to balance the West and the US. In fact, during the early periods of both Yeltsin and Putin administrations, Russian foreign policy was prone to cooperative with the West in general and the United States in particular while during their later periods, it fundamentally shifted to more assertive and confrontational ones. Given the same international and domestic structures, why have foreign policy makers envisioned the international system differently and differed in applying foreign policy tools? Social Constructivists, on the other hand, propose that the incoherence of early Post-Soviet Russian policy resulted from the lack of grand strategic visions and collective ideas and the failure to construct coherent national identity in the international system. Russian elites were deeply divided by the questions of foreign policy ideas and identity (See Legvold 2007; Tsygankov 2006). Other scholars suggest domestic politics (i.e. the president-parliament relationship) and economic transformations as sources of a shift in foreign policy toward a more assertiveness (See McFaul 1997/8; Malcolm and Pravda 1996b). Yes, structure matters. Yes, ideas matter. Yes, domestic factors matter. Rather than (over)emphasizing one variable over the others, the international-domestic nexus provides a broader, well-rounded and critical understanding of the post-Soviet Russian foreign policy. Despite its incoherence at the early stage, there are some significant patterns of relationship. The paper argues that the twist and turn of ideas in foreign policy emerged within the longer debate whether Russia would integrate into the West or would follow its own developmental path or both (the middle ground). That is to say, it is a Russian great debate between Westernization, Russianization, and Eurasianization at a particular time. Thus patterns of changes and continuity in Russian foreign policy since 1992 can be understood through the lens of foreign policy thinking that is caused by the intertwined interrelationship between international and domestic sources. The main objective of the paper is thus to provide a broad perspective covering the development of Russian foreign policy since 1992. It begins with Russias identity crisis, which constituted the background for major changes and continuity in foreign policy thinking, particularly Russias position and role in the post-Cold War world. Then it provides ideational patterns of post-Soviet Russian foreign policy thinking, which are divided into four distinct phases: (I) liberal idealism (1992-1993); (II) geopolitical realism (1993-2000); (III) geopoliticalJournal of Social Science, Vol. 42: No. 1 (January-June 2012).

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geoeconomic realism I (2000-4); and (IV) geopolitical-geoeconomic realism II (2004-present), respectively. Russia: Who are we? By the time of the Soviet collapse, Russia has become a state in search of itself. Although Russia had inherited the international role of the Soviet Union, Russias economy was close to collapse and politics was highly unstable. Russia remains a great power but was not a superpower in the Cold War sense of the term. Although Russian elites said all about the cooperation with the West, they almost always felt nostalgic for the good old days. They immediately faced with a contested identity problem about Russias position and role in the post-Cold War world under the emerging US hegemony. Yeltsin attempted to retain the notion of great power-ness based on the assumption that Russia had been, was, and would always be a great power since a tsarist time (Legvold 2007, 77-144). There was also a dilemma about its geopolitical identity affecting the coherence of Russian foreign policy: Was Russia a part of or apart from Europe? Is Russia a Eurasian power? Russia, as Yeltsin himself asserted, had yet to assume a worthy place in the world community (Lo 2002, 13). Russias fundamental identity, including its degree of belonging to the Western community, remains ill-defined and incoherent. The challenge for Russias post-Soviet elites has thus been to reconcile traditional national interests with the newly emerging social and political entity (Mankoff 2009, 21). This reflected in the competing foreign policy thinking debate. Despite their disagreements, Soviet elites and officials have not directly questioned Russias fundamental identity arrangement as an autonomous great power in the international system. With its identity uncertainty, post-Soviet Russian foreign policy outcomes were the result of changes in the Russian leaderships foreign policy thinking or discourse from 1992 until now and the perception of the international system in particular the US hegemony. In the following section, the paper divides Russian foreign policy thinking into four different phases. (I) liberal idealism (1992-1993) The early period of the post-Soviet Russian foreign policy was incoherent and dissensus, largely because of the loss of its identity and the confusion in foreign policy structures and processes in particular the conflict between the government and the parliament. It was a power relationship within Moscow that complicated the concept formation and decision making of foreign policy. There is a foreign policy debate between what Margot Light (1996) terms Liberal Westernists, Pragmatic Nationalists, and Fundamentalist Nationalists over the

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extent to which Russia should become Westernized or follow its own path. 3 In fact, this is the continuation of the nineteenth-century Westernizer-Slavophile debate (Neuman 1996). Between 1992 and 1993 Russian foreign policy thinking was largely informed by liberal idealism (or Liberal Westernists). According to Realist scholars, Russian foreign policy thinking was significantly constrained by external factors (i.e. its weak position in the international system), thereby pursuing cooperation, or bandwagoning, with the West in general and the US in particular (MacFarlane 1999). During these early years, Moscow conceived of the international system as benign that Russia and the West would share not only interests but also values and it was likely to be a positive-sum cooperation (Thorun 2009). That is, the Westernization of Russia. Given that Russia was economically weak with low oil prices, it was necessary for the Yeltsin administration to seek help from the international community. Yeltsin and liberal reformers such as Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar, a privatization czar Anatoly Chubais, and Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, sought integration with the West and its institution by assuming that the West would help Russia in its transition to democratization and a market economy via liberalization and privatization (or neoliberalization of Russia). During the early 1990s, Russia wanted to join North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the long term, did not object to NATO membership of Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs), and cooperated closely with the West to find a solution to the conflict in Bosnia. Above all, Russian foreign policy aim was, as Kozyrev asserted, a constructive partnership between Russia and the US to influence positively the course of world affairs (Quoted in Lo 2002, 20). While Russia had focused on the far abroad, its foreign relations with the near abroad was largely unilateralist. 4 Preoccupied with modernization and integration with the West, Russia decided to go it alone in the region. The formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), officially included the twelve newly states (without the Baltic States), fundamentally aimed at completing the republics separation from Russia, rather than for promoting or preserving their integration (Tsygankov 2006, 60). Russia had reduced to a minimum responsibility for maintaining order in the CIS. However, when the new security threats emerged in the form of military conflict in Moldova during
Liberal Westernists supported a market economy, a democratization of society, and a proWestern and Atlanticist foreign policy while Pragmatic Nationalists favored a democratic political system and a more balanced and independent foreign policy vis--vis the West, thereby diversifying the relations toward the East. Fundamentalist Nationalists were extreme nationalists with anti-Western foreign policy and Russian uniqueness. 4 Some uses the term isolationism to explain the early Russian-CIS relations. (Tsygankov 2006, 7785)
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Spring 1992 (which later spilled over to Central Asia states of Tajikistan, Georgia and Chechnya), Russia organized the peacekeeping forces5, culminated in the Tashkent treaty signing in 1992. However, with its weakness and limited resources, Russias multilateral CIS was blocked by the diverging interests of its members, thereby favoring bilateral ties with key pro-Russian states like Belarus, Armenia and Kazakhstan (Jackson 2003; Allison 2001). (II) geopolitical realism (1993-2000) However, the failure of neoliberal economic reforms, coupled with an uncertainty and reluctance of the Western integration, frustrated the Yeltsin administration. The intense confrontation and showdown between the president and the parliament in 1993 marked the watershed in post-Soviet Russian relations of power, thereby the 1993 constitution redistributing foreign policy power in favor of the president. 6 By then, a new foreign policy thinking consensus was in the making, influenced by geopolitical realists, rather than liberal idealists. Light (2004, 44-45) claims that a consensus among the elite emerged in 1993, embodied by a middle ground pragmatic nationalism, in which a reassertion of Russians sense of great power-ness was combined with a pragmatic attitude towards cooperation with the West. In fact, the period was characterized by an aggressively great power rhetoric but with limited actions (Jackson 2003, 15). Yeltsin appointed the former Gazprom director Viktor Chernomyrdin, as a new Prime Minister in December 1992. Chernomyrdin began to gradually modify its foreign policy. (Malcolm and Pravda 1996a, 22) With regard to the nature of international system, it was more competitive environment that states strive for spheres of influence and Russia aimed to establish herself as an equal partner vis-vis the West and as a Eurasian great power. Russias foreign policy towards the West and towards the CIS became increasingly assertive and ambiguous. Doctrinally, geopolitical realist thinking succeeded in the 1993 Foreign Policy Concept reflected the significant shift towards greater readiness to justify the use of force in the former Soviet sphere, and towards claiming its own Monroe Doctrine, thereby assuming special rights as guarantor of stability and the right to defend Russians living in the near abroad. Russia attempted to prevent other great powers from filling a power vacuum in the region. The Concept also identified the economic threats challenging Russia: Opening
Dov Lynch (1999, 4) calls Russias peacekeeping operation a strategy of armed suasion, using coercive intervention, clear hierarchical power relations in the CIS region by means short of war. 6 The constitution made the president responsible for determining the basic guidelines of policy, representing Russia abroad, appointing diplomats and Security Council members, and conducting international negotiations. International treaties had to be ratified by the parliament.
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Russias economy into the world economy might undermine her economic selfsufficiency and its technological and industrial capacity (Light 2004, 46). The replacement of the first Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev with Yevgenii Primakov in January 1996 represented a critical transition. As Mankoff (2009, 5) put it nicely, it was the shift to a new approach emphasizing Russias role as a sovereign Great Power in an anarchic, self-help international system where power, rather than international norms or institutions, remained the ultama ratio in international relations. Unlike Light, many Russian scholars argue that the consensus only emerged since Primakov took over Kozyrev as Foreign Minister that Russian foreign policy began, for the most part, to rise above conflicts between the executive and legislative branches (Lo 2002, 4). Primakov had set Russian foreign policy on the course of seeking independent great power status. On the one hand, while pursuing a multivector diplomacy toward non-European states (China and India in particular), Moscow continued to cooperate with the West, by agreeing to join NATOs partnership for Peace program, signing the NATO-Russia Founding Act, and supporting the final conflict resolutions during the conflicts in both Bosnia and Kosovo. On the other hand, Moscow at times carefully balanced against the West. By the mid 1990s Russia increasingly perceived NATO enlargement as a zero-sum game directed against Russia and its emerging external threat. 7 The expansion of NATO, rather than the ethnic conflict in the Balkans, proved to be unacceptable for Russia. Importantly, Primakov believed that Russia should aspire to create a multipolar order, thereby balancing against unipolarity in the international system and promoting the primacy of the UN, particularly the UNSC, as the central arbitrator in international conflicts (Legvold 2009, 30). However, Russias notion of multilateralism was highly selective. It did not allow interfering with the principle of state sovereignty and rejected humanitarian intervention (e.g. during the Kosovo crisis). Russia firmly resisted attempts to internationalize the settlement of disputes in the former Soviet Union while reserving the rights to intervene militarily in the near abroad on behalf of Russian-speaking ethnic minorities ironically justifying by the discourse of humanitarian intervention (Lo 2002, 88, 91). In addition, Primakov had begun to make Russias capability to manipulate energy resources in the former Soviet Union so as to ensure their loyalty to Moscow (Mankoff 2009, 48). In Central Asia, for example, Russia used its monopolistic power of energy pipelines in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Thus to reestablish Russias status as a great power in a multipolar international
For example, during the Balkan conflicts, Russia asserted its veto power in the UNSC, lent diplomatic support to forces that the West depicted as responsible for the escalation of the crises, and sometimes used aggressive rhetoric, most notably the near-firefight between Russian and NATO troops over control of the airport in Pristina in 1999. (See Thorun 2009, Chapter 5).
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system, Primakov aimed at balancing the US as well as exerting Russian informal influence over the CIS. According to the West, this cautious mixture of bandwagoning and balancing created the impression of an incoherent and irrational Russian foreign policy. Nevertheless, during this period the elite consensual acceptance of Realpolitik was reached, which would be the basis of the contemporary Russian foreign policy thinking. In other words, Russias foreign policy thinking was more consensual domestically and more confrontational internationally (Mankoff 2009, 30). The second period can be called geopolitical realism or Primakovism. (III) geopolitical-geoeconomic realism I (2000-2004) Third, between 2000 and 2004 Russian foreign policy thinking was influenced by Putins pragmatic geopolitical-geoeconomic realism. Putin had derived the Primakovian legacy that characterized the international system as competitive. The 2000 Foreign Policy Concept identified a unipolar world structure dominated by the United States as one of the major threats to Russian interests. However, Putin saw the international relations not only in geopolitical but also in geoeconomic lenses. Putins discourse of a normal great power (See Tsygankov 2005) emerged from an understanding that it is only on the basis of a strong economy that Russia can hope to regain its position as a global power. He asserted that There can be no superpower where weakness and poverty reign (Lo 2003, 65). As a result, economic threats gained greater prominence in the Russian foreign policy thinking about national interest, and economic development was inevitable for Russia to preserve its great power status. Unlike Primakov, Putins grand strategy was pragmatic cooperation with the US, rather than balancing against it. With the rise of terrorism in the Northern Caucasus in particular Chechnya, non-state terrorism emerged as an emerging security threat toward Russia. Furthermore, Putins initial deference to Western cooperation resulted from a recognition of Russias weakness position in the world and of the need for domestic consolidation. Russian foreign policy under the early years of Putin administration thus displayed a higher level of cooperation with the West, an increased degree of coherence, and a substantial effort to present Russia as a reliable partner on the international stage. The 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks against the US represented the hallmark of the pragmatic geoeconomic realist Russian foreign policy, rather than a complete departure from previous approaches (See Pravda 2003). The dangers of Islamic terrorism were compatible with Russian interests and security in Chechnya and Central Asia. Moscow substantively became a strategic partnership

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with the US in the war in Afghanistan, and benevolently acquiesced to a temporary deployment of American forces to Central Asia. However, after Americas thrust into Iraq in 2003, Russian foreign policy elites began to be skeptical of American motivations, and together with other great powers condemned US unilateralism. Importantly, American military presence, coupled with its democracy promotion as well as the NATO enlargement, in the former Soviet region rendered Russian skepticism possible. The Russian-US relations were turning from a short-term alliance towards a historic rivalry. In its relations with the near abroad, Putin favored bilateral relations, rather than Primakovite multilateral regionalism, and aimed at strengthening Russias economic presence in the region. He asserted control over their strategic property and transportation in particular ports, electricity, and energy pipelines facilities (Tsygankov 2006, 150). Even though Putin did not prioritize the CIS, he used them to achieve his ultimate goals, in particular the counter-terrorism scheme. In Central Asia, Putin initiated the formation of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) to fight war on terror. Moscow also reestablished new military bases in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. At the end of the first-term Putin administration, Russian foreign policy thinking was overwhelmingly shaped by the linkage between geopolitics and geoeconomics, which Bobo Lo (2003, 67) terms the geopoliticization of foreign economic policy. (IV) geopolitical-geoeconomic realism II (2004-present) Last but not least, geopolitical-geoeconomic realism is prevailed and remains during the second-term Putin and Medvedev administrations. Russian elites, however, have perceived the international system as more intensely competitive. American expansionism and its regime change strategy into the region made Russian foreign policy more assertive. It is realism with more assertiveness, which I terms geopolitical-economic realism II. Russias position in the international system was relatively strong vis--vis during the end of the Cold War. High commodity prices particularly energy prices increased Moscows independent foreign policy and economic leverage over the West. They have freed Russia from economic dependence on the IMF while turning the Wests dependence on Russian oil and gas. Putin had reestablished the states role in the economy, thereby retaining control over its strategic resources, namely its oil, gas and pipelines, from foreign companies and

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local challengers like Yukos and exerting influence in the near abroad.8 Consequently, Russia has emerged as what Putin terms an energy superpower (Goldman 2008). During this period, Russian foreign policy thinking was encompassed not only by geopolitics and geoeconomics but also by its own value systems. The Putin administration launched the concept of sovereign democracy, which maintained Russian unique identity and calculated its national interest above all other matters. Like China, Russia has favorably accepted the realist perception of international system in which great powers are the primary stabilizers of global order while their relations dictated by calculations of national interest, but never normatively Westernized or internationally institutionalized. As Mankoff (2009, 40) suggests, it was a change in tactics rather than strategy. That is, its initial deference with the West resulted from its recognition of Russian weakened position, instead of any convergence between Russian and Western policy goals. In other words, Russia has pursued foreign policy with its own characteristic. The Putin-Medvedev duopolistic regime was characterized by a growing number of disagreements between Russia and the West, a more assertive Russian foreign policy in its sphere of influence, and diverging views on matters of European and international security. Putin took a harder stance on a further enlargement of NATO, especially including Ukraine and Georgia, and its criticism about the planned deployment of a missile defense system in Europe precisely because of a stronger position of Russia relative to the West (Mankoff 2007, 127). Moreover, a permanent presence of American military bases in Central Asia, coupled with the colored revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan since 2004, had largely frustrated Russia. By 2006, Putin decided to shut off gas supplies to Ukraine by claiming to force the government to pay market price for deliveries of Russian energy. In August 2008 Russia invaded Georgia, and announced its recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia under the pressures of the West. Geostrategically, it appeared Russia was using energy resource as a political weapon to pressure a pro-Western Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko and Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili, who proclaimed reducing the countrys dependence on Russia and seeking membership in Western institutions, particularly NATO (Mankoff 2009, 24). Shortly after Russia recognized the independence of two enclaves of Georgia, Medvedev declared that like other great powers in the world, Russia would regard the area around its border as a region where it has privileged

Moscow had nationalized massive extraction operations on Sakhalin Island and in the Far North (Shtokman) that had been ceded to Western firms like Royal Dutch Shell and British Petroleum in the 1990s (Lo 2003, 61).
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interests. The so-called Medvedev Doctrine (or the so-called Russias Monroe Doctrine) was a continuation of post-Soviet Russian foreign policy thinking. At least, rhetorically Medvedevs foreign policy goals, promulgated in May 2008, were to create favorable external conditions for the modernization of Russia, transform its economy through innovation, enhance living standards, consolidate society, strengthen the foundations of the constitutional system, rule of law and democratic institutions, realize human rights and freedom, and ensure national competitiveness in a globalizing world (Mankoff 2009, 31, 13). Very importantly, the new foreign policy concept identified the institutional arrangement that the cabinet, which is headed by the prime minister, carries responsibility for implementing Russias foreign policy. This allows a president-cum-premier Putin to maintain a free hand in foreign affairs. And in 2012 Putin would return as president while Medvedev back to the prime minister. 9 The post-Soviet Russian foreign policy is overwhelmingly personalized, rather than institutionalized. Conclusion After 1992 Russian foreign policy thinking is not completely a parvenu. Rather, it is an ideational continuation of a longer Westernizer-Slavophile debate whether Russia would adopt the Western civilization or pursue its own characteristics. Particularly, the post-Cold War Russia is largely driven by a transposition between liberal-Atlanticist Westernization, Eurasianization, and Russianization, which depended upon the changing international and domestic contexts of foreign policy making. Up until now, this great debate remains and will be vivacious. Despite an ongoing debate, some general trends underlying the shifting nature of Russian foreign policy thinking can be preliminarily presented. First, despite its sectionalization of foreign policy making (Lo 2002, 5), elements of autonomous great power thinking (geopolitical mindset) has predominantly shaped and constituted elite foreign policy preferences. The Russian consensus emphasizes the existence of a multipolar world order in which Russia is one of the principal poles. Second, the sovereignty thinking, which focuses on the calculation of national interests, has prevailed over multilateralism and international norms. It is the existence of an anarchical society in which power and interests matter more than norms and institutions. Third, the geoeconomic thinking in the foreign economic policy making has increasingly emerged under late Primakovism and under Putinism-Mevedevism due to the corresponding primacy of energy sector and states growing role in the economy, or the rise of corporatism. In sum, as Celeste Wallander (2004, 63) puts it nicely, Russian foreign policy in the early twenty-first century is one of a Great Power aspirant,
In 2008, Russian parliament adopted a constitution amendment that extended its presidential term to six years.
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with strong geopolitical influences shaping a core pragmatic strategic goal of economic development, prosperity, and international integration. Like the US, Russian foreign policy can be characterized as multilateralism when we can, unilateralism when we must.

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