TOPIC: Burden of Proof Cangco v Manila Railroad Allegation and proof of negligent act or omission by plaintiff required when

action based on negligent act or omission, not when action based on breach of contractual undertaking. 1. The position of a natural or juridical person who has undertaken by contract to render service to another, is wholly different from that to which article 1903 relates. 2. When the source of the obligation upon which plaintiffs cause of action depends is a negligent act or omission, the burden of proof rests upon plaintiff to prove the negligence, if he does not his action fails. 3. But when the facts averred show a contractual undertaking by defendant for the benefit of plaintiff, and it is alleged that plaintiff has failed or refused to perform the contract, it is not necessary for plaintiff to specify in his pleadings whether the breach of the contract is due to wilful fault or to negligence on the part of the defendant, or of his servants or agents. 4. Proof of the contract and of its non-performance is sufficient prima facie to warrant a recovery. As a general rule, it is logical that in case of extracontractual culpa, a suing creditor should assume the burden of proof of its existence, as the only fact upon which his action is based; 5. while on the contrary, in a case of negligence which presupposes the existence of a contractual obligation, if the creditor shows that it exists and that it has been broken, it is not necessary for him to prove the negligence. FGU Insurance Corporat v G.P. Sarmiento Trucking Corporation | 2002 | Vitug, J. Facts: 1. G.P. Sarmiento Trucking Corporation (GPS) undertook to deliver 30 units of Condura refrigerators aboard one its truck driven by Lambert Eroles from the plant site of Cocepcion Industries: a. Along the route towards its destination, the truck collided with an unidentified truck causing it to fall into a deep canal, resulting in damage to the cargoes; 2. FGU insurance Corporation (FGU), an insurer of the shipment, undertook to pay Concepcion Industries; and in turn, FGU is subrogated to go after reimbursement from GPS: a. It filed a complaint for damages and breach of contract against GPS and its driver Lambert Eroles;

b. In respondents answer, it (GPS) was the exclusive hauler of Concepcion Industries and thus, is not a common carrier; also, the damages were purely accidental; 3. FGU then presented evidence to the extent of damage to the cargoes and in turn, GPS filed to dismiss by way of demurrer of evidence on the ground that FGU failed to prove GPS was a common carrier (because if it was, presumption of fault lies with them); 4. The RTC affirmed the defence of GPS that its not a common carrier so theres no presumption of fault; with regards to the driver, it cited Article 2185 in that a person driving a motor vehicle is presumed negligent if he was violating any traffic violation at the time of the mishap; 5. CA affirmed; saying that since GPS had Concepcion Industries as its exclusive contractor since 1970, its not a common carrier; Issues: 1. W/N GPS is a common carrier; NO, a private carrier. 2. W/N GPS may be presumed negligent; YES. And since it failed to prove otherwise, its liable. 3. W/N the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor is applicable in the instant case. NO. Held and Ratio: 1. GPS not a common carrier but a private one: a. Common carriers persons, corporation, firms or associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air, for hire or compensation, offering their service to the public, whether to the public in general or to a limited clientele in particular, but never on an exclusive basis; b. Test carriage of passengers or goods, providing space for those who opt to avail themselves of its transportation service for a fee; 2. In culpa contractual, the mere proof of the existence of the contract and the failure of its compliance justify, prima facie, a corresponding right of relief: a. A breach upon the contract confers upon the injured party a valid cause for recovering that which may have been lost or suffered; b. The remedy serves to preserve the interests of the promise which may include his expectation interest, reliance interest and restitution interest;

c. The effect of every infraction is to create a new duty, that is, to make recompense to the one who has been injured unless he can show extenuating circumstances, like proof of his exercise of due diligence or the attendance of fortuitous event; d. GPS admitted the loss and in such a situation, a default or noncompliance, the obligation gives rise to the presumption of lack of care and corresponding liability on the part of the contractual obligor; the burden being on him to establish otherwise; GPS failed to do so; As for the driver: a. Without proof of his negligence or fault, he may not be ordered to pay petitioner; b. He, not being a party to the contract, may not be held liable under the agreement; c. With the axiom res inter alisos acta aliis neques nocet prodest, such contract can neither favour nor prejudice a third person; d. FGUs civil action against the driver can only be based on culpa aquiliana which, unlike culpa contractual, would require the claimant for damages to prove negligence or fault on the part of the defendant; 3. Res ipsa loquitor not applicable here. a. The doctrine holds a defendant liabile where the thing which cause the injury complained of is shown to be under the latters management and the accident is such that, in the ordinary course of things, cannot be expected to happen if those who have its management or control use proper care; b. It is a rule of substantive law and, as such, it does not create an independent ground of liability; c. Instead, it is regarded as a mode of proof, or a mere procedural convenience since it furnishes a substitute for, and relieves the plaintiff of, the burden of producing specific proof of negligence; BURDEN OF PROOF is on defendant; d. Resort to it may be allowed only when: i. He event is of a kind which does not ordinarily occur in the absence of negligence; ii. Other responsible causes, including the conduct of the plaintiff and third persons, are sufficiently eliminated by the evidence; (should be understood as limited to cases of (noncontractual) tort since obviously the presumption of negligence is in culpa contractual; and iii. The indicated negligence is within the scope of the defendants duty to the plaintiff;

e. It only finds relevance whether or not a contractual relationship exists between the plaintiff and the defendant, for the inference of negligence arises from the circumstances and nature of the occurrence and not from the nature of the relation of the parties; f. At case, it is not shown that the damage was purely the drivers fault so the doctrine doesnt apply; JUDGMENT: GPS ordered to reimburse FGUs costs. RTC and CA affirmed with regards to the driver (so hes absolved) GPS wasnt allowed anymore to present evidence against its presumption of negligence since its demurrer to evidence was granted but on appeal the order of dismissal was reversed. It was deemed that it waived its right to present evidence. TOPIC: Applicability of doctrine of proximate cause. Calalas v CA | 2000 | Mendoza Facts: 1. At 10 a.m. of 23 August 1989, Eliza Jujeurche G. Sunga, then a college freshman majoring in Physical Education at the Siliman University, took a passenger jeepney owned and operated by Vicente Calalas: a. As the jeepney was filled to capacity of about 24 passengers, Sunga was given by the conductor an extension seat, a wooden stool at the back of the door at the rear end of the vehicle; b. On the way to Poblacion Sibulan, Negros Occidental, the jeepney stopped to let a passenger off. As she was seated at the rear of the vehicle, Sunga gave way to the outgoing passenger; Just as she was doing so, an Isuzu truck driven by Iglecerio Verena and owned by Francisco Salva bumped the left rear portion of the jeepney; c. As a result, Sunga was injured. She sustained a fracture of the distal third of the left tibia-fibula with severe necrosis of the underlying skin. ; d. Her confinement in the hospital lasted from August 23 to September 7, 1989. Her doctor, certified she would remain on a cast for a period of 3 months and would have to ambulate in crutches during said period. 2. On 9 October 1989, Sunga filed a complaint for damages against Calalas, alleging violation of the contract of carriage by the former in failing to exercise the diligence required of him as a common carrier: a. Calalas, on the other hand, filed a third-party complaint against Francisco Salva, the owner of the Isuzu truck; 3. RTC decided against Salva as third-party defendant and absolved Calalas of liability, a. It said that it was the driver of the Isuzu truck who was responsible for the accident;

b. It took cognizance of another case (Civil Case 3490), filed by Calalas against Salva and Verena, for quasi-delict, in which Branch 37 of the same court held Salva and his driver Verena jointly liable to Calalas for the damage to his jeepney; 4. CA, however, reversed the RTC: a. It said that Sungas cause of action was based on a contract of carriage, not quasi-delict, and that the common carrier failed to exercise the diligence required under the Civil Code; b. It also dismissed the third-party complaint against Salva and adjudged Calalas liable for damages to Sunga. The Court ordered Calalas tro pay Sunga (1) P50,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages; (2) P50,000.00 as moral damages; (3) P10,000.00 as attorneys fees; and (4) P1,000.00 as expenses of litigation; and (5) to pay the costs. 5. Calalas motion for reconsideration was denied; Hence, the petition for review on certiorari; 6. Calalas contends: a. that the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490 that the negligence of Verena was the proximate cause of the accident negates his liability and that to rule otherwise would be to make the common carrier an insurer of the safety of tis passengers; b. the bumping of his jeepney by the truck was caso fortuito; c. He also assails the moral damages. Issues: 1. W/N the doctrine of proximate cause is applicable in the instant case; NO 2. W/N Calalas was at fault; YES 3. W/N the bumping was caso fortuito; NO 4. W/N the moral damages is warranted. NO Held and Ratio: 1. Issues in Civil Case 3490 and the present case are different; the former is of quasi-delict while the latter is of breach of contract or culpa contractual: a. Sungas cause of action against Calalas is one of breach of contract of carriage; b. In case of death or injuries, Article 1756 of CC provides that common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently unless they observed extraordinary diligence as define in Articles 1733 and 1755; Burden of proof shifts to the common carrier; c. Thus, there is no basis that the ruling in Civil Case 3490 (that Salva and Verenais liable to damge of Calalas jeepney) should be binding on Sunga; it is immaterial that the proximate cause of the collision between the jeepney and the truck was the negligence of the truck driver; d. The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions for quasi-delict, not in action involving breach of contract; the doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a person where there is no relation between him and another party;

e. in such a case, the obligation is created by law itself; but if there is preexisting contractual relation between the parties, it is the parties themselves who create the obligation, and the law mere regulates such relation; 2. Yes, Calalas was at fault: first, his jeepney was not properly parked, its rear portion being exposed about two meters from the broad shoulders of the highway and facing the middle of the highway in a diagonal angle in violation Land Trasportation and Traffic code Section 54 (Obstruction of Traffic, and second, overloading; a. Calalas argues that Sungas taking an extension seat amounted to an implied assumption of risk; SC says this is akin to arguing that the injuries to the many victims of tragedies in our seas should not be compensated merely because those passengers assumed a greater risk of drowning by boarding an overloaded ferry; 3. Not caso fortuito; petitioner should have foreseen the danger of his wrong parking; 4. Moral damages not warranted; such damages are recoverable in cases which the mishap results in the death of a passenger and in cases where the carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith; a. Petitioner not shown to be in bad faith; Although it was the driver of the Isuzu truck who took the girl to the hospital, it was not an implied indifference on petitioners part; if at all, it was merely an implied recognition by Verena that he was at fault for the accident. JUDGMENT: Affirmed with modification moral damages deleted. TOPIC: Defense of Employer for Negligence of Employee Cangco v Manila Railroad Defendant cannot invoke negligence of servants as defence in breach of contract 1. As it is not necessary for the plaintiff in an action for the breach of a contract to show that the breach was due to the negligent conduct of defendant or of his servants, even though such be in fact the actual cause of the breach, it is obvious that proof on the part of defendant that the negligence or omission of his servants or agents caused the breach of the contract would not constitute a defence to the action. 2. If the negligence of servants or agents could be invoked as a means of discharging the liability arising from contract, the anomalous result would be that persons acting through the medium of agents or servants in the performance of their contracts, would be in a better position than those acting in person. 3. If such a theory could be accepted, juridical persons would enjoy practically complete immunity from damages arising from the breach of their contracts if caused by negligent acts of omission or commission on the part of

their servants, as such juridical persons can of necessity only act through agents or servants, and it would no doubt be true in most instances that reasonable care had been taken in the selection and direction of such servants