Karpatschof Meaning of Activity

Part II: Theory of Knowledge Chapter 5: The Meaning of Activity. The Semiotics of Activity Theory Pp.
289-396 IN:
Karpatschof, (2000).Human activity. Contributionsto the B. AnthropologicalSciencesfro* a Perspective Activity Theory. of DanskPsykologisk Forlag.ISBN: 87 77063n 2. Copenhagen: (Front,cover+ xii + 513 pages). Re-published with acceptance from the authorand copyrightholder.
5. The Meaningof Activity

the Semioticsof Activitv Theorv
In this chapter, category meaningwill be examined. the previous the of ln two chapters, discussion the status meaningwas relatedto the prothe of of blems of anthropology and epistemology, whereasthe focus in the present chapteris limited to the Junctionanclproduc'tion signs.This conceptis of definedin the followins wav:
Signs arephenomena and ob.jectscurrving meaning.
Thus,the fleld of semicltics be examined. will coveringsuchissues srgns as that are the vehiclesof meanin-e, objec'ts the relbrredto, the ,subjects involved and,of course, very contentof themeaning. the The field of semiotics therefbre is engaged examining in issues that havebeendiscussed suchdisciplines in as philos ophy lan g u a g es e ma n ti c s i n g u i s ti c r agmati cs cogni ti ve of . l. p and psychology. To starttheinquiryinto these two elusive concepts, signsandmeuning, will I reveala somewhat embarrassing travel episode my youth. The purposeis of neither illuminate sometimes to the embarrassing troubles touristlife nor to of conf'ess awkwardbehaviour my youth now long past.The functionof the the of story is to illustratethe working of the entitiesthat are subjected the analysis to of the present chapter, that is, the vehic'les meanirzgs, signs.I will present of the primarilythe majortypesof signsthat will be examined the lastsections in of the chapter. Now to the story of my youthful travels.Some30 yearsago, I arrivedat the central stationof Warsawafter a rather exhausting journey by train from Copenhagen. Due to the somewhatmodestsanitarystandard the Polish of trainsof thattime,I felt an intense needto relievernyself. Luckily,I soonfound a localitythat was evidentlydedicated this not very pompous, essential to but purpose. fact, thereweretwo suchfacilities,in properaccordance In with the sexsegregation maintained intimate still for occasions these. like
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Ch.5: The Meaning of Activity
for entrances both localities,and on eachdoor. a word There were separate was painted. The two wordswere PANIE and PANOWIE. To my nrisfortulte , in to no otherpeoplehad indulgedin the temptation comfort themsel'u'es the I of sanitary services, as a furthercomplication matters. was not properlv and conAnyway.my visceral prepared to the linguistically decipher inscriptions. improvefor ditions were at the momentquite unfavourable any imrnediate knowledge the Polishlanguage. of superficial mentof my rather stucl y thi s passi onate of m I ns t ead dedic a ti n g y s e l fto a c o m p re h e n si ve of beingin a of a characteristic mammals I Slavictongue. hadto choose strategy i to u, si tuat ion her e he fb rc eo f mo ti v a ti o ni s p re d o mi nantn cotnpari son the t extentof their knowlcdgeof the field. In otherwords.I was forcedto rely on y' . I e xplor at or y t ion .S o m e w h a h e s i ta ti n g l y , c h o seal mosthaphazarcl lbut ac t p e r haps quit e.th e d o o r o rn a me n te w i th th e w ord P A N OW IE .(l n those d not of I days,long beforewomen'sliberation, shallnot deny the int-luence a males ic a chauv inis t ic lea b o u tth e d o m i n a ti n g e xh a v i ngal sothe most i mpressi ve d es ignat ion. ) , I transgressed A ny way ,in a m i x e ds ta te f y e a rn i n gh o p ea n d uneasi ness. o th th e door s t ep. t hre s h o l d a t v e ry w e l l . a t th e s a m eti me.coul d havebeena a for Indeed, worst fearswererealised. insidethe room of my limit of decency. lrs sanitation caughta glinipseof two women.who. however. a lucky reducI I Atter a hastt retreat. corwerebothquitedecently dressed. tion of my shame. that but also assured. rectedmy error by openingthe other door. resigned. theory, could be certainI wason the right trackthis I according intonnation to time.I consequently opened door markedwith the worclPANIE.However^ the no choicewasabsolutely improveto my astonishment horror,this second and panby jumping directlyinto from thefrying ment.Actually.I hadonly escaped sanitary locality, therewerenotjust two. but a hanclthefire. For in this second ful of femalepassengers busilyengaged the pursuitof beauty. thusheroin and Polandof nraterials ically compensating the shortcomings post-Stalinist for in necessary thisdemanding for activity With the icy looksfi'oma half dozen thisassembly, of consisting no doubt. of. withimpeccably women.I fled in my second desperate retreat devoutCatholic in lessthan a minute.On the vergeof a combinedurologicaland co-enitive I with my fastvanishing residuals will powerto thefirst of breakdown. returned room. the one thatborethe inscription PANOWIE.At leastI would preferthe limited majorityofjust two f-emales an outnumbering triple the amount. to by
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This time. however,I took the time to performa morethoroughexamination of the mysterious interiorof this room of sanitary service, and I now discovered that the women were not visitorsin the duty of eithernatureor beauty, they werecharwomen, fighting a losingbattleto keepa fair standard sanitation ol in the sanitaryservices. my greatrefief this time, I furtherdiscovered To that in the rearof the room therewere alsotwo Polishmen who were accommodating themselves the urinals,evidentlyquite unaffected the presence the at by of femalecleani personnel. ng What is the meaning tellingthis travelstory'? of Well. it is meantto demonstratesomebasicf'eatures the classof phenomena objectsthat is the subclf and ject of the present chapter. slgns.I havealreadyintroduced mediating the the relationin humanactivity that I calledre.ference; functionalvalueof this the ref-erence meaningandthe vehicleto which meaningis attached a sigrz. is is In the story.thereare two kinds of signs.The first signswere the painted inscriptions the doors, on this kind of signI call specificor dedicatedsigns,as they,in fact,aredefined throughtheir function reference. inscriptions of The in question, afier all. weremadewith the solepurpose referringto the exclusive of light of sanitary for one of the sexes. use The specificsignsof the storywere. h owev er not v ery u s e fu li n th e i rl u n c ti o no f re fe renceor a l i ngui sti cal l yl l . f i prepared foreigner. The signsactuallyshowingwhich room was for the laclies andwhich wastor the-eentlemen the verv users therespective were of rooms. Thus.the living persons werealsosigns. clfcourse specificsigns.as but not theywerecertainly prclduced nclt with the narrowpurpose showingloreignof ers in a state urgency propersexual of the assignment sanitary of rooms.Such un-dedicated signsI call unspecificor incidentalsigns. Theseun,spec'ifit' signscertainlydo not form a classof exquisitespecificity. Indeed. willdemonstrate a while thattheentireanthropological ect field I in obj coincides with theclass all signs, which thededicorarl of of signsamount just to a very small proportictn. the unspec'fic'signs and consequently amounttclthe a bs ol elygr eatep ro p o rto n . r ut i The story is further intendedto demclnstrate the ret-erence is the that that functionof signsis intimately relatecl the activityof which theiractualfuncto tion is a constituent. meaningof the dedicated The signsthat were paintedon the doorshad as their contextthe activityof travelling, which the operation in of usinga sexually appropriate playsa modest, urgentpart.The bathroom but story alsopointstclthe fact that a necessary aspect any humanactivity is the of
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productionand use of signs.Meaning is the very quality of the intentional mediationthat is thespecffica dffirenria of humanactivity. This story is meantto serveas an aperitifbeforea quite heavymeal consisting of many courses, fact therewill be six of them.The first main section in presents discusses plethora various and the positions of theoretical concerning the ontologicalproblems semiotics. of Eight diff'erent schools thoughtwill of be presented, includingmy own position, culturalhistorical the school. The next main section analyses problemof semioticdivisibilit,v, is, the that the relationbetweenwhole and part. It is succeeded a discussion the by of dialectics between meaningand operationin semiotics. The followin.emain sectionon corLcepls as its startingpoint the famous mediaevaldiatribe has aboutindividuals and universals. Then a personal contribution the problem to aboutlogical cLasses follows.The concluding main section treatsthe relation between emiotic's dialec:t s ond ic's. First,thedefinitions theories semiotics and of mustbeexamined. Therearethreerelatants the concept signthat will be discussed this of of in chapter:
I. 2. 3.
(vehicles meaning) the signsasentities of (userof the signs) the subject (objectof sign) the ref-erent
The specificdisciplines dedicated theseaspects to are:
l. 2. 3.
the studyof signs: semiotics the studyof subjects: psychology the studyof objects: ontology
Of thesedisciplines, havealreadyintroduced lasttwo and we shall we the therefore focuson the first in the present chapter. we proceed the relations If to between threeaspects, alsohavethreebinary relations: the we
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a. b.
subject-sign:the conceptual relation' sign-object: the semantic relation subject-object: the operational relation'
the third one has alreadybeen treatedin the previous Of theserelations, chapter epistemology we will accordingly on and concentrate the two flrst on "a" the conceptual relations. will call relation We relationand relation"b" the is semantic relation. mustbe remembered the relationof real relevance It that related meanins: thefull triadicrelation. thatis. the relation to
The Triangle of Meaning
M*
. . -l t r i u "n o a d i
o f
i n
o b
i S e h T
I'
i t
or Subject "0"*fll,Xl.i:Pect Object

fig.5.1
( This famoustriangle meaning of wasOgdenandRichard's 1936) attempt to (Colapietro Olshewsky1996)in a more conveyPeirce's obscure semiotics & lucid form. The presented triangle,however,is a versionthat is entirely my own, as the perspective intendedis not just semiotic,but the total scopeof humanactivity.
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Ch.5: The Nleaning of Activity
The trianglewas presented first in the chapter anthropology. the diaon In gramabove, is supplemented an explanation therelations it with of between the threerelatants meaning. havedefinedthe incomplete of I relations on the as. onehand,conceptual. on the otherhand,semantic. and The conceptual relationis the relationbetween subject the andthe sign.as it is distin-quishecl its object.I usethe logicalterntinten,sion indicate from Io this re lat ion, bec aus en te n s i o n e a n s e s y s te m f qual i ti es i rn th o consti tuti ng cona cept.Thus,intension be understood what the subject in mind. when can as has he or sheis usinga specific sign. A c c or ding o on ed e fi n i ti o n f s e m a n ti c s "n o ther sci pl i ne l i ngui sti cs. t o a di of (heregeneralised one examines relationbetween word or the sentence the the to the sign) andthe objector stateof aft'airs ret'erred to. The directaspect the relationbetween of subject andobjectis calledoperational. In l'act,it is a pure abstraction that sucha direct relationcan exist irr humanactivity.Moreover. this abstraction contradicts definitionof human the just as it is an abstraction activitythat waspresented chapter However. in 3. to talk abouttherelation between subject signin theabsence theobject. is and of it alsoan imaginative to conceive relationbetween act the subjectand objectin the absence the sign.Both of these of abstractions nevertheless. are. useful,as theytbcuson thetwin aspects humanactivity. of The grandarrow of the diagramref-ers the definition of meaning.accordto ing to Activity Theory, the significatir.'e as mediation humanactivity. of This diagram will be usedasa guideto the discussion meaning the preof in sent chapter. is my intention demonstrate mostof thepositions It to that ref'erring to a theoryof tneaning be identifiecl the ernphasis can by placed someof the on categories relations thetriangle meaning and in of ancl neglect othercatethe of goriesand relations. Typically, specific a theoryof meaning will hypostasise a certainsubset categories relaticlns. the price of ignoringothercateclf and at gories andrelations. exaggerating fbrmerandminirnising latter. thus the the The initialpresentation thetriangle meaning of of pointsto theconception of meaning based Activity Theorythat was introduced the preceding on in chapters.It should emphasised. be however, thisearlypointthatthereareambiguat itiesandshortconrings thismodel.astherearein all rnodels. particular. in In the relatant sub,ject under-deflned relationto the problern individuality is in of and collectivity(discussed theprevious in chapter epistemology). explainthe on To full meanin-u thegrandarrowof significative of mediation alternatively, or, the
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of aspect activity, subjectandobiectasthe operational relationbetween bclttom within a societal as the we haveto understand individualsubject contextualised setting. not collective, to saya societal s c T he t ot al f ield o f d i s c o u rs e o n c e rn i n g i g n sa nd thei r use i s cal l edsemi it because has,at the discipline. and otics.It is a rathercomplicated ill-defined and foundationof the sciences of sametime, the characteristics a philosophical a more precisely subfieldof anthropology. empiricalscience, an autonomous semiotics anthroand the Justas in the caseof epistemology. relationbetween of the We pologyis thusheterarc'hal. haveto presume existence signsandtheir and discourse. at the same an qualityof meaning entertain anthropological to and objectsmust be definedas a part of anthrotime the semioticphenomena was treatedin the pology.This somewhat disturbingconditionof semiotics preceding chapters rellexivilv,and it will be treatedat the end of the present as chapter. status the of the we Now, however, shallbeginby investigating ontological by phenomenon are dealingwith, meuning.as it is conceived the various we I schoolsof semantic-s.intendto treatthesepositionsin a way that is, at the thatwhatof having theidei J'i.re dialectics sametime, criticalandconstructive, even bizarrenature,eachof the schoclls and sometimes ever their erroneous and to contains kernelof truth contributing an adequate completetheoryof a m eanins .
5.1
The OntologicalStatusof Meaning
status of the s I n t his s ec t ic ln , e ma i n c o n c e p ti o nc o n c e rni ng ontol ogi cal th to of We the meaning will be discussed. shallrelate differentschools semantics I of For the categories relaticlns meaning. eachmajorposition, will present and to the a graphicaldiagramthat represents triangleof meaningaccording the conventions: position question. will usethe followinggraphical in I by will be circumscribed a square. l. The fundamental entityor entities will be circumscribed a circleor by 2. The derivative entityor entities ellips is . thatareignoredsirnplywill be left withoutany 3. The entityor entities circumscription
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We shallstartwith the positionthat hypostaces3 intension, very category the of meaning.
5.1.1 Absolute Idealismothe Hypostacy of Meaning in itself

Plato'stheoryof ideasis not only oneof the first consistent theories rreanof ing, but alsoone of the most influential.Platosuggests the meaningof the that fundamental concepts that he calls ideasare transcendental, prior and more essential than the phenomena ordinarylif-e.In this objectiveor absolute of idealism,the threetangiblerelatants meaningthat were introduced fig.5.1 of in dwindleto mereepi-phenomena. objects just shadowy The are ref-lections the of eternalforms (eide)'.Moreover.the consciousness uneducated of humanindividualsis nothingbut a simple-minded beliefin the realityof theseshadows. Thenbefbre began seeandhearanduseour othersenses, we to surely we musthave acquired knowledge whatequality if we werethengoing of is. to compare with it the equalobjects that we perceive. think thatall and these kindsof things doingtheirbestto be thesame it, but inferior.' are as Now if we hadit ftheknowledge thefbrmof equality] of before birthand werebornwith it. havewe bothbefore birthandas soonaswe wereborn knownnot only equality and greater and smaller everything that but of kind'l For our present argument not simplyaboutequality, about is but justice, goodness, beauty, holiness asI sayer,'erything and, to whichin asking questions givinganswers discussion givethetitle "whatit and in we itselfis". Therefbre musthavehadknowledee all these we of thinss befbre we wereborn." P lat o' st eac hi n g f th e fo rms w i l l b e d i s c u s sed the secti on concepts o in on (5.4.1.4\. Also, Hegelis a firm believer theobjectivity ideas: in of The ideais the true in and for itself Ian und ftir sichl, the absolute unity o1Concept andObjecti vity.? ln Hegel'sphilosophy, find anotherversionof absolute we idealism.The main differencebetween fbrmer and the latter is that the Platonicideasare the stat icand t he Heg e l i a n y n a mi c . c tu a l l y , i s d i sti ncti ons a l ogi calconsed A th i quenceof the disparitybetweenPlato's"reactionary"conceptionof evolution andHegel's"progressive" conception. The dynamicHegelian conception ideas expressed thefbllowing: of is in
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The idea is essentially process,as its identity is only the absoluteand free contentof the concepts, the condition that it is absolutenegativityand on thus is dialectical.*
Platohada conception a cosmicandhistorical of evolutionin which the original ideasof divineorigin weredepreciated their incarnation our sordid by in existence. Thus.the historical eventsof his own time were understood the as degradation the original aristocracy the contemporary of to regimeof a corrupt democracy. Platoconsequently believedthat the role of the philosopher to is correctthis decaying world by returningto the true and eternalideas(Popper 194- 5) . On the otherhand,Hegel'sphilosophy evolutionwas "progressive". of He wasa flrrn believer thebenevolence "cunningof history". in and This Istateof affairsl that the subjectivepurpose,as the power of those processes, which objectivitt' tearingitselfto pieces in is and elevating itself,is keepingitselfoutside processes, these beingthe conserved these, of this is the of cu nning r et s on ." The relation betweenthe true ideas and their historicalrealisationwas indeeda relationof imperf'ection, evenaccording Hegel,but his conception to of evolutictn the inverse Plato's. was of Evolution, especially it wasreflected as in humanhistory, was movinguphill.That is, it was movingfrom an undifferentiated, unretlexiveand non-freestateto a stateof ref-lexivity and freedom. The true ideaswere not the originatorof an almostforgottengloriouspast.but the splendid, luckily fastapproaching pointof history. and end Whateverthe considerable disagreements betweenPlato and Hegel,they thusshare appreciation meaning-in-itself the essence being.They the of as of primarily on whetherthe natureof this conceptual diff-er essence tclbe underis st oodas et er nal mo b i l i tyo r a s a tra n s c e n d e n tal nci pl eof dynami chi sim pri toricity.
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The Triangle of Meaning according to Absolute Idealism
r
tu t e i
o n
c
e
@"0"'"'lTll,lspector
frg.5.2
object
When we move from the wonderland absolute of idealismto the next position of semiotics. mechanical the rnaterialism extensionalism. of relations are totallyreversed.
5.1.2 Extensionalism,the Hypostacy of the Object

In philosophy language semantics, antithesis absolute of and the of idealism is the radical realism found in extensionalism. Whereasabsoluteidealism emphasises the intension as the true nature of meaning,extensionalism renounces elusiveconcept intension behalfof its coLtnterpart the of on e.rlension. The classical conceptof extension stands the extentof a certainword for or expression. extension theword "horse"is thustheclass all animals The of of belonging thiselegant to species. In the mediaeval (to diatribe the problems universals be treated secon of in tion 5.-1). antagonists the were(conceptual) realists claimingthe realityof conceptsand nominalists repucliating claim on behalfof the sceptical this position of reducing concepts just names (nomina). the to principle Occam's"'famous of
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a of expression extensionalism, warning is, parsimony in fact,a paradigmatic meaning. termswithouta clearandtangible introducing against
The Triangle of Meaning according to Extensionalism
fi g .5 .3
tendencyin Western The heritageof Occam has beenan anti-metaphysical cenin exponent the twentieth whosemostprominent and philosophy, science or tury waslogicalempiricism positivism." There is. however,a logical contradictionin this tradition - a tension The betweenrealismanclphenomenalism. startingpoint for extensionalistic the exampleof the meaningof "horse"mentioned as realismis in the objects, in which of of above.Thereare traces this positionin the semantics Montague, givesa solid,but rather realism Pureextensionalistic shortly. will be introduc-ed narrowsemantics. rejectsthe conflnement phenomenalism On the otherhand,extensionalistic as kin of its extensionalistic by definingthe extension a classof phenomena, datain logicalpositivism. oftencalledsense givenexperiences. thatis, sensory
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This is in a way an understandable position,but the resultis an abandonmenl of epistemic possibly and evenontological realism, seen the case Mach as in of ( 1900). Thus phenomenalistic extensionalism, paradoxically enough. approach est he pos it ion f p s y c h o l o g i c a lu b j e c ti v i s m, hi ch w i l l be di scussed a o s w in subsequent section. I shalltherefbre stickto realistic extensionalism, which I will brieflv menof tion two representatives, Montague andDavidson. 5.1.2.1 Montague's Referential Extensionalism Montague''hasconstructed semantic a theoryin which the buildingblocks are the individuul objects and, symbolsreferring to theseob.jects. then deHe f inesthe meaning anypredicate of termasthe class individuals which it is of of true to assertthe predication concerned. Thus. the extensionof rarl is the assembly all individualobjects of thatarered.A predicate alsobe a natural can kind. of which we havealready heavilyusedtheequestrian standarcl example. He then proceeds define a relution as the constellation individual to of objectsfor which the specificrelationhappens be true.Thus, the relation to l ov eshasas it s ex te n s i o n l l o rd e re d a i rso f h u m anbei ngs a p (possi bl y suppl emented highervertebrates) whom it is truethateachstands relationto by fbr in lovingtheother. T his as c r ipt io n f me a n i n g a re l a ti o n l f c o urse o to c can be extended any to degree complexity. of The relation between for instance 3-place of is a relation. wherethe first term ref-ers an individualobjectoccupying spatial to a position with the ref-erent the secclnd of term on the one sideand the rel'erent the thircl of term on the otherside.("The subtropics between temperate are the zoneandthe tro pic s . " ) I havestressed herethe somewhat square extensionalism Montague. of but this is not the whole story.His theory is a good deal more sophisticated than that.He is alsoan adherent the modal logic of Kripke (l9tt0), defining the of modalities necessity possibility the apparatus of and by calledpossible worlds. He is thus in a way more of a formalistthana genuinerealist.I will therefbre returnto Montague the subsequent in analysis. 5.1.2.2 Davidson'sVerificationistic Extensionalism Davidson a proponent the verificationistic is of theoryof sentence meaning, developed logicalpositivism, Tarsky's by and theoryof sentence truth.Logical
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positivismis similarto Frege'stheoryby definingthe meaningoJa prutpositictn as asserted a That is, in orderfor a sentence if asthe truth valueit possess, any.rr it it proposition possess meaning. mustbe eithertrueor false,otherwise to any at If it hasno meaning, is plainlymeaningles.l. it hasmeaning all, this meaning will be eithertrue or false.The criterionof meaningis now whetherthe asserter of can specifythe procedure verifying his/herassertion. and,in its conlogician,gavea more precise Tarsky, beinga mathematical '' Accordingto Tarsky,when meaning. theoryof sentence tent,more substantial is this in a sentence uttered someone a certainlanguage, sentence true in is by to the the language used.if andonly if we cantranslate sentence a formally conmust be of the sametype as the one usedin structed language. This language to which we can ref-er a certainstateof affairsthat Principia Mathematic'tt,in is: happens be thecase. to The celebrated example
'Snowis white' rstrue in Enplishif andonly if snowis white.
from the restriction a tormalised of Davidson's semantic theory''dispenses utteredas its conditionsof object language defining the truth of a sentence by verification. The sentence
'The
earth moves.
(andlaterafterbeingdenounced, possibly was assefted a famousoccasion at to still whispered Galilee),its meaningis according Davidsonthe way oi' by was exactly checkingwhetherit is true or not. I presume that sucha procedure what poor Galileesuggested The Holy See. to theoryof Davidsonis evidentlyquite closeto advocating operationalistic an procedure decidingthe truth of an assertion not just a is meaning,wherethe of rathersensible way of solvinga disagreement, in fact,the very "content"of but, meanins.
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5.1.2.3 The Problems of Extensionalism
We have alreadyseenthat phenomenalist extensionalism tendsto give up realism,consequently approaching ontological agnosticism evenidealism. or Actually,the strong-headed positionof objective extensionalism the same has kind of troublesin maintainingits relationto reality.Montagueneedsa fbrmal language thus,aswe shallseein a moment. and endsup in a kind of formalism. Davidson, his fellow operationalist, hardlyescape cognitive as can a relativisnr. because very criterionof verificationmakesthe objectiveextension capthe a tive of thecognitivehorizonpeculiarto the communityclfthe language users. Now let us takea closerlook at Montague's definitionof a relation. relathe tion of beingmarried.for instance. Accordingto Montagueand his formalistic fbllowers.the relationof marriage completelyspecif'ic' a specificlanguage. is to according a databasegiving the identification-numbers all individuals to of registered married. us imaginethat.in spiteof all the el'forts the Cetias I-et in (Communication project'o with Extra-Terrestrian Intelligences), shouldbe we overtaken sucha Ceti-civilisation by engaged a similarproject(e.g.. in CECIL - Communicatiort with Extra-Centaurian Intelligent Lif'e-fbrms). exo-bioOur logical/sociological colleagues from Alpha Centauri. lr,'ho assume of a we are herrnaphroditic fonn, would most likely havea hard time understanding life our matingbehavior-rr general in and the institutionof marria-ue particular. in W hat c an t he c o n fu s e d e n ta u ri a n o l l e a g ues C c fronr thi s possi bl e orl d w expectfrom thefitllowersof Montague semantics'l Well.their way of explanation would be t o g e t a p ri n to u to f a l l th e p a i rso f i denti fi cati on-numbers that ref-er all marriedcouples. to This thoughtexperiment hzrppened be my first reaction the forrrialistic to to settheclry, when I as a student mathematics 1960rvaspresented of in with this reductionistic extensionalism. However.I was neverconvinced the univcrof saltruthandonly partlyof the usefulness thisextensionalism settheory. of of In fact, I am still unconvinced today morethanthirty yearslater. A Davidsonian semanticist would be somewhat morecourteous our Cento taurianguests thanthe settheoretical extensionalist would be.Instead buryof ing the poor hermaphrodites a giant list frorn a database. Davidsonian in the guidewould instead handthe Centaurian scientists technical a procedure. This procedure would prescribe how to testwhethera specificpair of humanbeings constituted marriedcoupleor not. Sucha procedure a might consistclf the fbllowing steps:
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I .checkwhetherthey both areadults(abovethe legalagelimit of minors) 2. checkwhetherthey areof oppositesexes remaining a certain of ritualbeingper3. checkwhether thereis evidence fbrmedin the past.A ritual madeby an authorised ecclesiastical or person whether to municipal askingthetwo persons theyconsent being definedasbeingnrurried,tclwhich they both answered the affirmain t iv e. 4. possiblythe procedure shouldbe appended with evenmore steps to guarantee suchas:bigamy:effective, not legal against anomalies, but ( div or c e lor i n s ta n c ie c o u n tri e w i th re l i g i ous n s restri cti ons to divorce): andpro formamarriages. which case, (in all likein our lihood)unbearably embarrassed exo-biologist exo-sociologist or wor-rlcl forcedto clandestine be investigations the sexualbehaviour of of the alleged married couple.
I find this example somerelevance, the problems our severely of as of tried would in fact approach problemswith methods fieldCECIL researchers the of work found in culturalanthropological fieldwork. We havenow reached crucialpoint. Suppose a minutethat our Centaua for rian visitorsby somechance shouldbe ableto assimilate m.ores a specific the of country in the sameway as a Terrestrian anthropologist would, but without havingthe general humanorigin and the nativeculturalexperiences sucha of non-alien field worker. Let us now imaginethat after returninghome, this imaginaryCentaurian individual (for whom we are blockedby logic in using the personal gender rnarked pronouns or sheandby politeness applyingthe alternativer he gender in pronounir) published learned unmarked a treatise with a title in the Centaurian tonguecorresponding "About the institutionof man iageamongthe sexually to propagated form of Homo Sapiens Terra". lit"e on
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However, this successful exo-sociological fieldworkwould not accordwith the principlesof the verificationprocedure the truth conditionsof the relafor tion of beingmarried,neitherat its starting point nor in its results. Rather, the fieldwork would presuppose most intormal intimatenaturalisation the a into way of lif-eof this Terrestrian people.That includesparticipation the very in activityof the peoplestudied. the way, I suppose By that we shouldbe a little sceptical aboutthe extentof the Centaurian's participation the daily life of in humanbeings, of thealienresearcher's and understanding the specific of actiritiesor actionsoutsidethe areaof directparticipation. In particular, couldhavestrongdoubtabouttheCentaurian's we capacity tirr understanding sexual the feelings and conjugal emotions humanbein-ss a of in ca s e t he onejus t d i s c u s s e d . i s , h o w e v e r, o t the possi bl e as It n methodol oci cal problemsof comparative interplanetary sociologythat arethe main conce of rn our story.''The moralis, simply,thatno explicitly, and in thecasetreated operationalistically, definedprocedureof verificationcould ever do the .job of' expressing meaning termssuchas"beingmaruied". the of just introduced.absoluteitleuli.srn The two tendencies semantics in and extentionaLism, antagonistic are with respect theirontology. to The intensionalism of absolute idealism tends havea denying sceptical to or attitude to'uvarcl rhe independent existence an external of objectworld.Further, alsotends clcnv it to th e em pir ic alpos s i b i l i ty f th e tru e a c q u i s i ti o n f know l edge o o aboutsucha materialreality'*by means empiricalinvestigation. the otherhancl. of On this schoolc ons ider sn te n s i o nme a n i n g -i n -i ts e lto possess i , f, suchan autonorni c e xis t enc e. he po s i ti o no f e x te n s i o n a l i s m a to tal reversal thi s posi ti on. T is of Here. the primary existence an externalmaterialworld is the ontolclgical of basis, andmeaning considered kind of derivation this material is a of bedrock. T heir ont olog i c a a n ta g o n i s m s i d e ,i n te n s i o nal i sm extensi cl nal i sm, l a and however,do agreeon one importantpoint:
That meaning is grounded in something out.sidethe humun user,t.
Thus,they both arerealists somesort.the intensionalist of beinga ('on('eptLta/ realist, andtheextensionalist beinea"moterictl" realist.
30s
In contrast, next two main positionsin semantics negativeor sceptithe are cal towardsany kind of realism.Bclthdeny the trustful absoluteontology and epistemology the realisticpositionsandboth takea relativisticstance. of I suggest that these relativistic positions canbe classifled formalismand as subjectivism.
5.1.3 Formalism, the Hypostacy of the Sign

The positions be presented this sectionarejust as curiousas they are to in inf-luential: formalisttheories semiotics. these the of positions, is the si,qn [n it thatis placed an epistemological semiotic on pedestal. nakedvehicles and The of meaningare hypostasised the distinguished to statusof consistency and truth. I shall present two diffbrentpositionswithin this major type of semiotics. The flrst positionis logical.fbrmalism, schoolof semantics a relying on the rigorousformal systems that are constructed with the intentionof avoidingthe ambiguities our "natural"languages. of The second position lingui,stit'.fitrmali,srz, regards ,structure semialso the of , otic systems prior to the meaning as produced these by systems. in contrast but to logicalfbrmalism(its linguistic relative), relieson thefbrmal structures it of "natural"languages the discarded the formalists. by 5.1.3.f Logical Formalism Accordingto logicalformalism,we rely exclusively our own artificially on created ntathematical symbols. Empiricalphenomena only be trusted can when theyareultimately broughtinto congruence with the logic of thefbrmalsigns. Formalism wasoriginallya positionin the theoryof mathematics. a remAs edy to savemathematics from a deepcrisisat its fbundation, around turn of the the lastcenturyl'). Hilbert(l9l1) suggested mathematics that shouldfree itself of all ref'erence the materialworld of things and the ordinary activity o1to h um an beings .T h e fo rma l i s ti cc o n c e p ti o n f rnathemati cs as to set thi s o w obscure science, status which will be discussed the next chapter. a the of in in protectedreservation outsideall problenrs ontology and semantics. of The mathematical activitywasthento be understood clnlya game.Thus,anypart as of mathematics definedby someinitial symbols is and somerulesfor manipulatinethese svmbclls.
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Paradoxically enclugh, this programof formalismhad the impressive, but self--destructive triumphof producingthe final formal proof of its own inaccessibility.Godel'", sometwentyyears afierHilbert'slaunching formalism, of successfullyprovedthat any mathematical syntaxsufficientlyelaborate cover to the wholenumbers would fail in the garne formalismby eitherbeingincomof pleteor inconsistent. However,throughthe immenseinf-luence anotherseminalwork of frlrof malism, the Principia Mathematic:a Russelland Whitehead,tormalistic of logic and methodology continuedits march of victory for severaldecades, seeminglyunaffected the Mane Tekelthat was written by Gddel a f-ewyears by afier the publicationof Principia.The formalistictendencies logicalposiof tivism that arequite strongin the young Wittgenstein in mostworks of Carand nap receiveda hard blow in philosophyand the anthropological disciplines (suchas semiotics) ( when Wittgenstein 1974)started impressive an selt-criticism that was widely spread the Anglo-Saxonworld from the late fifties. in Throughthe technological boostof formalismin the wakeof the computerrevolution,however, therehasbeena renaissance duringthe 80sof tormalismin suc hnew s c ient i fi c v e m e n ts s Arti fi c i a l In te l l i gence C osni ti vesci mo a and e nc e. t ' T he s em iot icw a y to d e s c ri b e rma l i s mi s the fol l ow i ng: thi s posi ti on fo reduces semiotics a discipline to solelyconstituted syntax. by that is. the rules fbr producing signs."By hypostacing tbrmal signsandforgettin-e the the about (i.e.,the functionol the the subject, objec-t the mediationof rneanin-e the and signs),semiotics thus simplifiedto pure syntax, fields of semantics is the ancl pragmatics seemto be very redundant. The attraction this positionis of coursethat the slipperyand drearyprobof lemsof the repressed aspects meaning of seemto be tcltally eliminated the fitr logical ambitious, ontological ratherabsent-minded ly but ly formali st.
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The Triangle of Meaning according to Logical Formalism
n
l
Subject
operational aspect of Activity
fi g .5 .4 ratherakin to of and We seein this diagrama selection categories relations a T t he f or m er c as eo f e x te n ti o n a l i s m.h e rei s . h ow ever. cruci aldi sti ncti on. placesthe object as its fundamental categoryand the Where extentionalism logical formalisnr of sign as the derivationproducedby the relaticln reference, reverses this relationby having the sign as its primary and the object as its secondary relatant. The pure expression logical formalismis found in the of modeltheory formallogic." of After this lengthyhistoricalintroduction, will now presentsomeexamples I of formalistic semiotics.
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5.1.3.1.1 The Model Theory of Formal Logic The modeltheoryof formal logic incorporates following tripartiteappathe ratus:
L A formal languagedefinedby a certainformal syntaxthat provides rulesof composition the constituents theformallanguage, for guarof anteeing by followingthese that rulesonly well-formed sentences are produced. 2. Lnextralinguistic domain of reality, basicallyconsisting of a) object,s. which set-theoretic for abstrttt'tion,s be detined(these can abstractions setsof objectssharinga certainuttribute.suchasthe are qualityof beingred),andb) reLations, which areordered pairsor (suchas.therelation ordered sets a higherdimension of between 3 entities which theformeris an offspring for ot'thelattertwo). 3. A semanticfunction depicting linguistic the of entities theobject domain.
5.1.3.1.2 The InverseSemantics Montague of I havealready characterised Montague an extentionalist as siniilarto Davidson.However. is soinclinedto the modeltheoryof fornrallo_sic evenhis he that theorytendsin thedirection a formalismof the logicalt1'pe. of The modeltheoretical apparatus Montague basicallra predicate of is logic with a corresponding semantic tunction:
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1. The languageof predicatelogic consists individual of terms(names), predicates covering individual an term or an orderedsetof individualtermsand propositions, which are syntactically well-fbrmed compositions theconstituents of 2. The object domain consists a setof individualobiects of 3. A semanticfunction from | . to2. with thefollowingrulesof correspondence: a. eachindividualterm ref-ers a certainindividualobject to b. eachpredicate refers a setof individuals (one-place to predicates), suchas"red" ref'erring the setof objectsbeingred.or a certainset to of ordered listsof ir individuals (n-placed predicates). suchasNN beingthe oflipring of XX and YY presented Offspring(NN, XX, by YY)". c. truth-theoretical ascription defines truthvalueof every that the proposition accordance in with theextentionality principle defined in theprevious section. "Elizabethwasthe offspringof Henry VIII and Thus,the sentence Anne Boleyn"is trueif andonly if theentities referred by the to respective entitieswere in the historicalcasein sucha relationthat 3 the second entity andthe third entity had matedto producethe first entity.
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pure is of One characteristic this approach that the ultimaterelationbetween to which they refer is turnedupsidedown. Even if the forsignsand the objects is. malistis a realistin his/herontology,asMontague'* he or shetendsto put the carriagebeforethe horse,or rathertendsto put the formal systemof signs betorethe entitiesof the real world. not to occur'lIt is, in fact,quiteevident people trained Why doesthisreversal to think in the calculusof formal logic thatthe formal rulesgoverningthe artiflan exampleof the way we try to make cial signsarejust representing extreme of orderin our non-formalexperiences the real world andof real objects. ttt I considerformalismto be an attemptof the formally trainedscientist I of and the escape uncertainties ambiguities daily life anddaily language. also This canbe seenin the prodisease. regardformalisrnasa kind of occupational from reality and trainedin abstracting of fessional narrow-mindedness persons and living most of the time in the shadowyworld of formal structures calculati ons . in of This reinterpretation formalismwill be considered the sectionon the in 6. formal sciences chapter 5.1.3.1.3 The Searchfor Reality in Situation Semantics to originatingin formal model approach semantics Another very successful predicate logic is Here,the scope Montague's of theoryis situtttionsemantics.tt in any caseof meaningto a situation, a way somewhat enlarged ascribing by lessdualisticand upsidedown than seenin the logicalmodeltheorv.A situution is a section(in time and space)of reality,and in this sectiona stoteo.l' cffairs and the utteranceof a sentencereferring to this state of affairs are parallelism. situationsemanWith this object-utterance collinearconstituents. propositional attitude,that is, even the so-called tics is trying to incorporate to knowing,believingor doubtingsomething like seeing. mentalphenomena be the case. of integrates missingrelatant the subthe semantics It seems if situation as ject, and that it at the sametime rectifiesthe hypostacy pure signsin the forof hardlythe case. The category the subject of mal modeltheory.This is, however, resetnis still a merepuppetof formal logic, havingonly the mostrudimentary blanceto real humanbeings.Even the very conceptof a situationis a rather of of of conception a state affairs, meagre construction. consists a physicalist It as of conception propositions inspiredby the earlypositivism,and a Fregean
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the resultof semantic composition. Here,the reference the constituents of is embedded sentences in conveyinga reference the situation. to In effect,situationsemantics still confinedto the wonderland formal is of signs andf or m a ll o g i c . We can conclude that the positionof logicalformalismis characterised by two mainpoints:
L It reduces subject a mereappendixof the formal signs the to and 2. It conc:eives the objectasa pictureof the fbrmal signs of
5.1.3.2 Linguistic Formalism The tendency hypostacise to signsis most widespread logically trained in disciplines originatingin mathematical logic and having offshootsin philosophical semantics, computational linguistics and otherbranches cognitive of science. There is, however,anothervariantof formalism, in which the sign is stili the fundamental category, but where the secondary relatantis not the object,but the subiect. Hclwever, subject, this case,is to be understood the in not in the individualsense, as a collectiveentity being thelinguisticbearer but of signs. Actually, this collectivesubjectis more or less identifiedwith language itself. Language not conceived as a medium usedby humanbeingsfor is of communication, ratherthe other way round, as a subjectusingthe human but beingasa means expression. of
3t2
The Triangle of Meaning according to Linguistic Formalism
rllectiv qbje4
fi g .5 .5 The most famousexpression this linguistictormalismis the celebrated of Whorf-Sapir'o thesisof cognition.This is a theoryof linguisticrelativitythat postulates absolute the determination world perception the basiccateof by goriesand structures the language of system. Accordingthis thesis, suchdecisivecategories ob.ject. as time,ploc'e, causality,intentionality, and individualit,- all determined the basicgrammatical are by forms of the specificlanguage usedin a givenculture.For instance. makesan it importantdifference whetherwe havea distinctionbetweensyntactical entities corresponding subjec:t, to verb andobject.whetherwe havea tempussystemof past,presentand.future, whetherwe havea pronounof .firstpersonsinguand Lctr. 's Whorf theoryof linguistic determination profoundly was based his field on studies the Pueblosin Arizona. He found linguisticf'eatures the Pueblos' of of language that seemed strikingly diff-erent from the languages our own Indoof European family.Thus.the Pueblos not havea tense do system past,present of and future.Instead, they havean aspect system, and a distinction between an objectiveor factualrealmand a subjective realm of existence. Talkingabout
3r3
future eventsis therefore characterised placingtheseeventsin the realm of by what Whorf calledsubjectivity hope. or whorf pointedly expresses theoryof cognition thefbllowingway: his in Everylanguage contains terms have that come attain to cosmic scope reof ference. crystallize themselves basic that in the postulate an unformulaof tedphilosophy. whichis couched thought a people, culture, ciin the of a a vilization, evenof an area. Suchareour words'reality, [...] 'space. ancl time,past, present. future'.,' In addition, the same in collection papers, aphoristically of he writes: Language represents mass thus the mind;it is afl'ected inventions by and innovations. afl'ected andslowly. but little whereas inventors innoto and vators legislates thedecree it with imntediate.r' PerhapsI should stressthat it is not rny intentionhere to purge myself througha polemicattackon Whorf and Sapir.Not only werethey both excellent contributors the sciences anthropology linguistics, alsotheir to of and but hypothesis the relationbetweenlanguage of and our conception the world is of certainlyof relevance and value.The idea of this presentation actuallyis to placethis relativistic language theoryin a positionthatexpresses necessary. a but insufficient subset thecategories relations meaning. of ancl of Levy-Strauss' structuralistic theories anthropology in havea positionsimilar to theclassic Whorf'-Sapir thesis. Linguistictormalismis a closeneighbour the sociological to subjectivism that is introduced below.The similaritylies in the selection the signandthe of collectivesubjectas their main categories. The diff-erence betweenthe two positions, however,is basedon their disagreement concerning which of the selected categories shouldbe conceived the primary and which is the derivaas tiv eone.
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5.1.4 Subjectivism,the Hypostacy of the Subject

The sign is category. the In subjectivism, subjectis takenasthe fundamental and the objectis often ignoredor of a considered mereextension the subject, status. tcl reduced a purely subjective is Reference not has therefore any relevance. only intension Of the relations, phenomenon, and as on the agenda, the object is a rathershadowysub.iective positions. activity is certainlynot the concernof the subjective object-oriented two on In the previoussection formalism,I presented very differentforms of on on unitedin their emphasis the sign,but in disagreement the elaboration with the is Logical formalism,one of the versions, preoccupied this category. with the relationbetweensign and object.The logical problemsassociated of other version,linguisticformalism,is focusedon the interconnectedness and culture. language that of In a similar way,therearetwo quite differentversions subjectivism of hypostasis the subject.This the are definedby their positionsregardin-e of in of duality is a consequence a def'ect the very structure the meaningtrianof in gle.'o The categoryof the subjectis, in fact, ambiguous its representation the humanindividualandthe humancollectiveat the sametime. therearetwo with this duplicity of the categoryof the subject, In accordance as the The flrst stresses individual ,subjec't differentpositionsof subjectivism. societyor culture,thecollec' the of the main source meaning, otheremphasises of as tiye sub.iecl, the bearer any meaning. Subjectivism,the Hypostacy of Consciousness 5.1.4.1 Psychological is Sub.jectivisnr in the individual person The startingpoint for Psv-chological of in usingsignsand especially the consciousness this individual.In this way. Thereis, however. idealism. absolute resembles Psychological Subjectivism phenomean importantdistinction:for the latter,meaningis a supra-individual for non, whereas the former it hasa strictly individualstatus.
315
The Triangle of Meaning according to PsychologicalSubjectivism
fig.5.6 Cognitive or semantic theoriesthat stress psychological the predispositions of processes a prerequisite meaning includedin the positionof Psyas for are chological Sub.jectivism. eloquent An representative thispositionis the psyof cho-linguistFodor,who as a follower of Chomskyro returnedto the rationhas alismof Descartes. Fodorthuspostulates so-called a language thoughtasthe of pre-linguistic foundationof any language, and innateideasof, for instance, basicsemantic categories the startingpoint for acquiringconcepts. as Fodor describes acquisition concepts thefollowingway: this of in Nor need Rationalist a denythatthecharacter theconcepts entertain of we depends uponthecharacter theworld we live in. No simpie of concept is available unless is triggered, whilethefunction it and fromtriggers ontothe concepts release innately they is specified, is thewaytheworldis thatdeit termines whichtriggers in factencounter. innate we Our endowment determines whichworldwe can,in principle, understand; only theinteracbut tion of thatendowment thestimr-rlations receive with we determines which
sciencewe actually develop.t'
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As expressed the latterpart of the quotation, in this nativistictheoryhasepistemologicalconsequences, which Fodor himself, somewhatprovocatively. characterises "methodological as solipsi sm". Fodor'snativism. course, not the only conceivable of is positionwithin Psychological Subjectivism. quitedifferent A version thesubjectivism thepsyis of chodynamic schools, according whom the perception the externalworld is to of largelydetermined theworking of our unconsciousness.t' by Despite this important disagreement regarding rationalityand irrationality.the Cartesian and the Freudian conceptions bothpsychologistic are versions subjectivism. of The antipode the psychologistic to versions subjectivism ,soc'iologit:al of is subjectit,ism. according which the isolated, to cognitive pre-wired individualis replaced with a sociological entityasthebasiccategory thetheoryof meaning. in 5.1.4.2 SociologicalSubjectivism,the Hypostacy of the Meaning System The dramaticconsequences concentrating an isolatedsubjectare seen of on i n F odor ' sdes c r ip ti o n f h i s s o l i p s i s ti c n d n a ti v i sti cndi vi dual A s w e shal l o a i . now see,the sociological versionof psychologistic subjectivism dif-ferent, is but eventhis antipodal versionof subjectivism ratherunpleasant has features. just as with linguistic In the diagrambelow,thereis againa collective subject, formalism. Now thiscategory however. defininglocusof meaning. is, the
The Triangle of Meaning according to SociologicalSubjectivism
n c
operational aspect of
'
actinity
ObjeCt
fi g .5 .7
317
Sociological subjectivism beena dominanttendency the socialscihas in encesduring the major part of the twentiethcentury.Thus, it is represented in the field of sociologythroughthe socialconstructivism Bergerand Luckof man" and the ethno-methodology Garfinkel". In socialpsychology, of Harr6r. is an exponent.Moreover,in philosophy, the transcendental pragmatics of Habermas'n in fact,likewisea version thispositicln. is. of The emphasis society theproducing on as agent meaning, course. not of of is just an absurdity. the first chapterof this book, I introduced conception In the of the meaning system a societal as product. The weakness this position, of however,in a way resembles emphasis the related the in linguistic formalism the on basicstructures language the mouldof our conception the world.Thus, of as of all mattersof meaningare understood sociologicat by subjectivism be conto fined to the self-contained domainof society. Therefore, evensociological subjectivismis a kind of epistemological just relativism, aslinguistic formalismis. Close kin to sociologicalsubjectivismare the pragmaticapproaches to meaning and language. originator this semantic The of positionis C. S. Peirce, the founderof pragmatism and semiotics. willingly admit my greatdebt to I this highly originalphilosopher, who developed, amongorherthings,the concept of sign and the idea of the triangleof meaning.I also acknowledge the importantinspiration got from Peirce's I pragmatic theoryof truth,especially in ref'erence therealitycriterion to established theepistemological in this as key treatise. However.Peircealsocreated pragmatic a tendency the theoryof knowin ledgeand language the sense in that it not only stresses importance practhe of tical life in the development humanknowledge, of but also actuallyreduces questions truthand meaning questions practical of to of adequacy. This is akin to the pragmatism W. James, of and to normaluseof language, in Wittgenas stein's analysis language. of Peircesometimes took the stepfrom considering practice a basiccriterion as of truth and meaning practice co-extensive to as with truth and meaning. This can be seenin the following passage from one his most influentialpapers. "How to makeour ideas clear": Consider whatefl'ect, mightconceivably that havepractical bearings, we conceive objectof our conception have.Then,our conception the to of these ef-fects thewholeof our conception theobject.,' is of
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In the next quotation,however,we find a more careful, dialectical(rather thanrelativistic)theoryof knowledge:

...a conception, that is, the rational purport of a word or other expression, bearingupon the conductof life." lies exclusivelyin its conceivable
The integration the pragmaticrelation,the practicaluseof signs,into a of analysisof meanof realisticcontextis one of the main objectives the present with thisobjective. are to ing.The two concluding sections devoted positions
5.1.5 Putnam's Realism as an Integrated Theory of Meaning

that sections, tried to demonstrate all of thesepositionsin I In the preceding howeverinconrplete and unbalanced. semantics philosophy language, and of a of containa rationalkernel.They all tend to emphasise subset the necessary are categories relationsof meaning.Their drawbacks linked partly to their and promotionof the subset they select,and partly to their neglectof exaggerated th er em aining ons ti tu e n ts . c philosophy, Anglo-Saxon, analytical thereis However, within the dominant for a stubborn exponent a positiondevianttrom the rest.Hillary Putuamhas for coveringepistebeenthe somewhat isolatedadvocate a realistphilosophy, of theoryof mind, and what is of centralimpormology,philosophy science, tancehere,the theoryof meaning. Putnam'scareerhasbeena prolongedvendetta againstthe idealisticand/or theoriesof meaning.He aptly individualistictendencies the mainstream of gives a rdsum6of his criticism in a paperwith the classical title "The meaning ' m eaning" ' : of
Traditionalsemantictheory leavesout only two contributions the deterto mination of extension the contributionof societyand the contributionof the real world!'"
Here,Putnamcould appear be a hard-headed to extentionalist, he continbut nor with uesby sayingthat meaningcan neitherbe identifiedwith extension intension, understood the conceptof an individual speaker. as In a seriesof Gedankenexperimente a (to my personal wrth tastedelightful) flavour of science fiction, Putnamdemonstrates interplayof physicalrealithe
319
ty and sociologicalknowledge production in the fabric of meaning.For instance. discusses caseof a Twin Earth,an imaginaryplanetthat is suphe a posedto be identical our own. exceptin one singlerespect. this dobbelto On gcingerplanet,the liquid on which lif'e is conditionalis not water,not the fluid material whichour life processes on depend. Instead, is another it liquid having the samephenomenal attributes, leastfbr our extra-terrestrial at fellows. but a dift'erent chemical composition. his discussion the extension In on and intension of the two liquids,Putnamintroduces concept "the linguisticdivihis of sion of labor". According to what he calls a "socio-linguistic hypothesis", meaning not something is attached a psychological as disposition the human to individual.In contrast. is constituted the cooperative it by effortsof different people with diff-erent kindsof knowledge andskills. Putnam talksaboutthis linguistic cornrnunity a collective as body.andtherefore possiblycould be suspected beinga collective as subjectivist. evades, He however. subjectivism his determined by insistence a realistepistemology on and what he callsthe indexicality the useof words,that is, the necessity of of being able to point to the objectsand phenon'lena we are communicating that about. Putnamcombines these two tendencies. realismand collectivitv. the folin lowing passage: grotesquely ...the mistaken viewsof language whichareandalways have been current, reflect specific verycentral two and philosophical tendencies: thetendency treat to cognition a purely as individual matter thetendenand cy to ignoretheworld,insof'ar it consists morethanthe individual's as of 'observations'. Ignoring division linguistic the of laboris ignoring sothe cial dimension cognition; of ignoring whatwe havecalledtheindexic:alin, of mostwordsis ignoring contribution theenvironment. the of Traditional philosophy language, muchtraditional of like philosophy, leaves other our people theworld,a better and philosophy a better and science language of must encompass both.'" Putnam's specific theoryof meaning somewhat is eclectic, well asslightly as looselyconstructed. defines He meaning a vectorconsistin-e four parts: as of
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Ch. 5: The Meaning of Activity
l. 2. 3.
(thegrammatical syntactic markers class) semantic markers(thenaturalkind) (very much resembling conceptof prototypein stereotype the cognitive psychology'' )
4.
(thescientifically extension established denotation a termor of expression).
The purpose this section of hasnot beento advocate Putnam'sspecific tor contribution semantics, ratherto promotethe basicphilosophyof lanto but guageof which Putnamis a representative. This realisticand to someextent evencollectivist positionin several waysresembles conception the culthe of turalhistorical school, which is the subiect thenextsection. of
5.1.6 The Theory of Meaning in the Cultural Historical Schoola2

In chapter I sketched own conception meaning a primarymediii3, my of as tor of humanactivity.The basicinspiration this anthropological for approach ro the category meaning of was the work of L. S. Vygotsky. his posthumously In "Mind in society", actuallyusesthe term "mediated published book he activity" and then suggests that thereare two typesof mediators, tool and the the si gn: ...thebasic analogy between andtoolrests themediating sign on function thatcharacterizes of them. each Theymay.therefbre, fbrmthepsychologicalperspective, subsumed be under useof signs o1'tools the and using the
schema [below], which shows each concept subsumedunder the more general concept of indirect (mediated) activity.
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Mediated activity
t'*;ll L "
E
(Vygotsky 1978.54).
Vygotsky actually understood this duplicity of culture as based on signs as well as tools to be a consequence of a general anthropological dialectics of externalisation and internalisation.The sign is attachedto the external side of activity, what I call its operational level. Nevertheless, an external operation can be internally reconstructedby means of signs; it can be freed of the external, operationalrestraints,and thus it can begin to occur internally. In this dialectics,Vygotsky evidently saw a key to the ambiguity of meaning as a category that belongs to both the psychological and the sociological sphere.The duplicity of signs is also found in the double function of language: t h a t i s , l a n g u a g e( a n d a n y c u l t u r a l l y p r o d u c e d s i g n s y s t e m i n g e n e r a l ) h a s a n intruper.sonal as well as an interpersonal use. Vygotsky gave a kind of manifesto of what was to become the social or cultural historical school in the following passage:
The internalization culturalforms of behaviorinvolvesthe reconstrucof tion of psychological activityon the basisof signoperations. Psychological processes they appear animalsactuallycease exist;they are incoras in to poratedinto their systemof behaviorand are cLrlturally reinstituted and developed fbrm a new psychological to entity.The use of externalsignsis also radicallyreconstructed. developmental The changes sign operations in are akin to thosethat occur in language. Aspects external communiof or cative speechas well as egocentricspeechturn "inward" t<t becomethe basisof innerspeech. The internalization socially recordedand historicallydevelopedactiof vities is the distinguishingf'eature human psychology,the basis of the of qualitativeleap fi;rm animal to human psychology.'r
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to to As the primary successor Vygotsky,Leontievhascontributed an activiof understanding meaningby makingthe term meaningoneof his ty theoretical mainconcepts. distinctionbetweenthere.fFrege's famoussemantic In a way thatresembles an erence (Bedeutung)and sense (Sinn)", Leontiev suggests opptlsition (Sinn).Leontiev (Bedeutung) subjective sense and meaning objective between reflecwithin the frameworkof his epistemological theseconcepts introduces tion theoryin thefollowingway: that or in is enclosed anobiect a phenomenon is ...the meaning objectively It is and and in a system givenrelations interconnections. reflected fixed of up ln and in language in thisway getsits permanence. thisway,it makes
conAs of consciousness. the content the societal the content the societal of real is the sciousness, meaning at the sametime turnedinto the individual's sense what is of for which makesit possible the subjective consciousness, reflectedto be at the sametime somethingob.iective. is by The conscious ref'lection thus characterised a specificinner relation ernd objectivemeaning." the betweenthe subjectivesense
And Leontievcontinues: of The meaningis a generalisation reality that is crystallisedand fixed in lt its vehicle,the word or the word combination. is the ideal, spiritualform the societalpraxis of humanity is kept. in which the societalexperience, of The imagination.the scienceand the language a given societyexist as The meaningis thus a part of the objective systemsof certain meanings. historicalphenomena. This is the startingpoint. The meaningexistshowevereven as a tact of individualconsciousness. being, which is The world is perceivedby humansas a societal-historical furnishedwith the concepts and the knowledgeof their societal6poquethat and this knowledge.and whose wealth of is also limited by theseconcepts expein to of consciousness no way is restricted the treasure their personal riences.Peopledo not acknowledgethe world as a Robinsonmaking his indisland.In the courseof a person's own discoveries an uninhabited on of the ividual lif'e.he or she will appropriate experiences the earlier geneThe meaning rationsto the extentthat he or she learnsto mastermeanings. the is thus the fbrm in which the individual humanbeing appropriates generalisedand reflectedhuman experience.'n
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This is a sketchy, and until now, quite unelaborated, inspiring theory of but the relationbetweenthe collectiveand the personalstatusof meaning,that is, positions. the duplicity that resulted the splittingof the subjective in Leontiev,in f'act, Vygotsky'svision of the dialectics develops betweensemiotic externalisation internalisation his concept meaning. proposes and in of He
meaning as externalised sense and senseas internalised meaning
As to the questionof the reference and useof meaning,Leontievstresses its triple status:
l. 2. 3.
(andreflection) humanactivity As a necessary precondition of As an objectiveexpression the externalobjects of As an integral partof thecultureasa socialhistorical product.
I shallreturn thecrucialpointof therelation to between meaning andactivity in a following section(5.3), where the contributions some of Leontiev's of pupilswill be described. Beforegoing on to the more specifictopicsof semiotics,I will takethe liberty of presenting own definitionof meaning, my and thus,according Leontiev,it mustbe characterised the personal to as sense the of 'meanins'. meaning of
324
5.1.6.1 My own Definition of Meaning
(chapter I introduced definitionsof the ln the chapter anthropology on 3), my concepts signand meaning. of However, these definitions will be stated more preciselyhere.
I propose that a sign is: anyobjector phenomenon confined thefield of humanactivity to (naturally present or produced humans) andonly if it is referto by if ring to someobjector phenomenon anywhere theentirecosmos. in
In my definitionof reference, do not usethe extentionalistic just I position criticised.Instead, suggest I that referenceref'ers the psychological to processesof something beingperceived imagined a person be directing or or by to his her thinkingtowardsomeotherobjector phenomenon leastanother (at aspect of the originalsign),and therebybeinga mediator the mediated or activityof h um ans .
I propose thatmeaning is: the functional valueof a signthatmakes specific a ref-erence pos s ible.
J us tas t ools ha v eth e fu n c ti o n a lv a l u eo f m a k i ngcertai nobj ect-ori ented operations possible, signshavethe corresponding functionalvalueof niaking certainmediations feasible. eitherintrapersonal mediation individualthinkin ing or interpersonal mediationin interpersonal communication. However.I will not elaborate these on definitions signandmeaning of here,but will return to my own contribution thetheoryof meaning the subsequent to in sections on themorespecific topicsin semiotics. The s ur v eyof p o s i ti o n s n th e d i s c u s s i o n f meani ngust presentecl i j o has emphasised ontolclgical matters.Connected the disagreements to abclut the existence predominance thecate-eories relations meaning or of and of thereare.
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problems. will present five of semantic I however,in additionsomeclassical thesedebates. The first is the debate semioticatomismversusholism.In otherwords. on into or canmeaning decomposed constituents not. be The seconddebateconcernsthe relationbetweenthe operationalaspectof purified from any ideas,and the ideational humanactivity that is seemingly dimensicln human Activity, which ofien is understoodas immaculate. of labour. unblemished mundane by operational aboutthe status uniof The third debate continues celebrated the controversy versals. otherwords,do concepts In that do not havea tangiblereferentstill refer to something, at leasthave somekind of meaning.Or are they.in f-act, or meaningless chimeras the mind. of relatedto The fourth debate dedicated the logical problemsin semiotics is to ref'erence reflexivity. The question non-referentiality in and of discussed conI n ec t ion h t he u n i v e rs ails mo reg e n e ra l l y n a l ysed, speci fi cal l y w i l l wit a and focuson the logicalproblemof self-ret-erence. The fifih and final sectionbroadens theselogical problemsof ref-erence and reflexivity into a discussion the relationbetween of semiotics and dialectics: i.e.. the interactionbetweenthe meaningand the object of meaningis discussed. Likewise,the logicalandthe causal, historical nature reflexivityare of with a particular Thus,the covered, emphasis the case scientiflc on of theories. paves way for the subsequent final partof this chapter the chapter aboutthe theory of science.
5.2
Whole and Part in Semiotics - the Hermeneutical Circle
ln the presentation logicalformalism, stressed hypostasis the sign. clf I the of This positionraisesthesemere symbolsof the meaningsystems the very to substance meaning. of Emptiedof any intensional content, solelyrelated and to objectivereality througha depiction,the signsare conceived a logical or as mathematical functionimplemented a purelyformal device.This preoccuas pationwith the syntactical rulesof sign,devoidol any immanent has meaning, beenheavilypropagated suchareas mathematics, in as logic, linguisticsand lately ognitivecience. c s
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There are,of course,reasons this successful, paradoxical fbr but attemptto solvethe rneaning problemby the lobotomy-likeoperation that removesall meaning. Onemotiveis to avoidthe subjectivity scientifically and unbecoming lack of precision attached intension. stickingto the incorruptible to By rigour of unequivocal rules,the applicationof which seems be elevated to abovediscussionand beyondthe doubt of interpretation, approach well suitedfor this is (e.g., it is donein AI). implementation computers in as Another reason removingany meaningis that the syntactical for strategy of fornralismis a componential approach. atomistic an The problems Semiotics. of subjectivityand interpretative ambiguity are very much relatedto the integral formations meaningfound in a specrfic of text, or evenembedded the in contextual setting a text.Ultimately, of meaning determined the totalityof is by theculturein which thetext is produced communicated.will arguein this and I section that the f'eatures semantic of componentiality and cc>ntextuality funare damental aspects meaning. of
5.2.1 The Componential Semanticsof Frege

The godfather logicalformalismis Frege,a figure who, perhaps the surof to priseof my readers, not beenpresented the systematic has in presentation of this position.In his analysis the logic of mathematics, of Fregefoundeda general approach semantics was basedon a vision of rigorousreconstruction to that of the workingsof propositions. Thereareactuallythreeresionsof the Fresean universe:
l.
thepuresymbols, void of meaning, just objects somefbrmal and to rulesof composition transformation and
2. 3.
the physicalobjectsof reality thedornain publicknowledge belief. of and
327
of of The ontologicalstatus regionsI and 2 andthe conception their relation a in model theory have alreadybeendiscussed, conceptionthat is to my judgvalueof a sign that is to be understood The denotational ment fatally reversed. a is as the physicalobjectfor which it stands what FregecallsBedeutung, term Fregeprovidesthe following example:the generallytranslated reference. as body that term "The eveningstar"wasusedin Antiquity to denotethe heavenly is todayknownastheplanetVenus." besides conceptof ref'erence, his alreadythat Frege, I havebriefly mentioned examplealscl in introduces conceptof se.nse, GermanSinn.The celebrated the givenby Fregeis thattheuseof theterm: "The EveningStar"
fiom the useof the term canbe distinguished
"The Mornins Star"
entities. two diffbrentcelestial originally denoted Thesetwo expressions maintainingthat no matterwhat our predecesFregetook a realisticstance, the of sorsbelieved, reference both termswas one and the same,namelyour However,therewas planeton the hottersideof the Solarsystem. neighbouring The two termsdid not havethe samemeaningfor sense. a differenceregarding the peopleof the past. in and sense the Fregestates relationsbetweenname,object,reference the followingquotation: The notion of The reference a propernameis the very objectthat it denotes. not is in we have aboutit is quite subjective: between placedthe sense, as subjective asthe notion,but neitheridenticalwith the objectitself.** includesthree schemeindicatesthat a sentence Frege'scomponentiality kindsof constituents:
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Ch.5: The Meaning of Activitl'
l. 2.
Individual terms, eachhavingits own reference, suchasSocrute.\ Predicates, is, a universal that characterisation somethins. of such asbeinga man
3.
Logical operators suchasnegation. conjunction, disjunction thequantors and
The predicate relutio,?was a great logical invention of Frege. -uiring hirn the assertionsthat are the atomic kernels of any sentence.The sentencc is tLlnte(l i n t o a p r o p o s i t i o n . t h a t i s , a p o s t u l a t ea b o u t r e a l i t y . a n d a p r o p o s i t i o r r .i n ; r t cordancewith the Aristotelian rule of contradicticln. must be cither truc or t'ul.,c. This is a logical, but not very satisfying aspectof Frege's theory. In his botrorr.ru p - a p p r o a c h , e w a n t e d t o g i v e t h e w h o l e ( t h a t i s t h e s e n t e n c e ) i lr c t c r c n e c i r r h t h e s a m e w a y a s t h e i s o l a t e d t e r m t h a t w a s i t s c o r n p o n e n t .F r e g c d e t i n e \ r h c referenceof a sentenceas its truth value. Thus the two propositions:
P I : Caesar conquered Gallia and
P2:3>2
have the sameref-erence, namelytruth. Thus the two sentences sonrcare. what contra-intuitively, definedasbeingco-ref'erential. Further,according Frege,this is eventhe casefor the alternative to pnrpositions:
329
Germania conquered A1: Caesar

and
A2:3>4
namelyfalsity. which both havethe samereference, Frege,however,was well awareof the, for most people,ratherunsatisfactoFurther, in ref'erence. this ry, laconicitycharacterising definitionof sentence even introduced he distinction. therefore with his ref'erence-sense accordance of is The of Ihesense the sentence. sense a whole sentence conceived as the of to attached the singleterms; of composition the senses resultof the syntactical of in the sense the objectasmentioned the quotationabove,andthe sense the of of the between extention a concept predicate, whereFregemakes distinction a wasneverworked of itself.t'The exacttotalcomposition sense andtheconcept out by Frege. ref'erence and between the for reason maintaining distinction One important expressing foundin sentences levelis the logicalproblem sense thesentence on attitudes. whataretodaycalledpropositional it reference, is possiunequivocal with matters sheer of Whenwe aredealing For instance, sentence lhe synonymous terms. ble to substitute
"Venusis the second planetof the solarsystem"
and
"The evening planet the solarsystem" staris the second of
and for that matter even
330
"The morningstaris the second planetof the solarsystem"
areall co-referential propositions. That is, however,a distinctionwithout much content,as thesethreesentences are,at the sametime, equivalent with "3>2" and the fact that "Caesur conquered Gallia." The main point. from a logicalperspective, that we can is freely make substitutions co-referential of terms,without compromising the truth valueof the sentence. Let us now. however,turn to more subjectivematters,to the problemsof sense.lffor instance takethe well-knownfamily sagaof Oedipus, folwe the lowing propositional sentence be stated: can
l. Oedipusknew that the womanhe marriedwas queenlocaste.
We canlikewisestate:
2. Iocaste wasthe motherof Oedipus.
Let us now.however. thetrick of substitution try that was so successful the in caseof our solar conversation. us try then to substitute term queen Let the Iocaste with its co-ref-erential. motherof Oedipus: the
3. Oedipusknew thatthe womanhe marriedwasthe motherof Oedipus.
A sentence that accordingto transformational grammarcan be a little more elegantlyexpressed as,
331
3a. Oedipus knew that the woman he married was his mother.
sucha is This sentence evidentlyfalse.Not evenFreudwould haveaccepted hit verdicton the alreadyseverely king of Thebes. havebeenmet by of like the non-substitivity belief-propositions Problems suchas the to attempts solve the problemsin logical semantics, impressive and the modal logic basedon the appasituationgrammaralreadymentioned, Only a modestamountof progress, possible universes. ratusof the so-called however.hasbeenachieved. relatedto the substitivityquestionaredealtwith in computational Problems Theseare pronounsin a anaphors. with the so-called linguisticsin connection itself,but referringto entitiesnot explicitly definedin the sentence sentence which the senpart or deflnedeitherin a preceding subsequent of the text of tenceis a part,or possiblyquite implicitly understood. at of colleagues mine studyinglinguistics the Universityof CopenSeveral in hagen'" examinedthe following examples an attemptto implementanaphoin ric analyses a computer:
he because wanted sentthe pupil to the headmaster, l. The teacher peace the classroom. in
he because wantedto sentthe pupil to the headmaster, 2. The teacher in drink lemonade the classroom.
he because was to give sentthepupil to the headmaster, 3. The teacher him a curtain-lecture.
332
In these sentences, semantic the problems in a way thereverse theones are of concerning non-substitivity. Withoutthe slightest hesitation effort,we can and heresubstitute relevant the ref-erences theanaphors. existing for No computers, however,are ableto do so. Further, am a firm believerin the somewhat I illargued position thatnonewill everbe constructed will havesuchan ability. that Let usbriefly look at these sentences. thefirst one,the"he" of thesubordiIn nateclauseis evidentlyco-ref-erential the subject the main clause with (i.e.. of the teacher). Justasevident the reference the "he" in the second is of example. wherethe anaphor now pointingout the pupil. Finally,in the third example. is we have in ef-fect one, but two anaphors, first anaphoris a he denotin-u not the theheadmaster, the second ahim ref-erring thepupil. and rs to All this seems ratherunproblematic, the references quiteevident. as are But n''lr,r'is so evident us?I suppose evidence mostlyrestricted people it to the is to with school experiences an educational6poque now probably of that belongs to the past.For people with a difl'erent educational experience, is quitepossible it that the ref'erences the anaphors of would not be evidentat all, or they would possibly evident, havecompletely be but diff-erent references. I canimagine two typesof settings. first is a highlyauthoritarian The system. a Koran schocll a Muslim countryperhaps. this case, sentences of In the might be beyondunderstanding the following reason. act of suchimpudence for An as the one performed the pupil of the sentence by would not be totally out ef' question. however, sucha rude behaviour wereto occur.the teacher f, would not needto bringthe headmaster therescue, to because teacher the would without hesitation takehis long stickandslaptheoffbnder orderto teach latter in the a lesson aboutproperMuslim behaviour. I canalsoimagine modernschools, whereat least second the example woulcl be unintelligible, because mostkids would be drinkingsoftdrinksall the time. without anybodytakingthe slightest off-ence. I havepresented these examples only because not theydemonstrate probthe lemsconnected with thepractical implementation theFregean of thesis comof p onent ialit ybut a l s ob e c a u s e e y a re w e l l s u i tedto show i ngthe contextual , th character all informationconveyingmeaning.All informationconveying of meaningis contextual, which means that the componential bottom-up-proor cedure logicalfbrmalismis, at the very best,an incomplete of way of conveying meaning andsometimes evena blind alleyproducing totalannihilation a of m eanins .
333
whenit is notcomformalismis incomplete manner, in Statecl a moreprecise thatformalismhas presenting context the devices plemented hermeneutical by just removed.Thus, tormalism can only function as a specific method of wi d ec ont ex t ualis ati o nth i n a c o n te x to f, a t l e a s t,i mpl i ci t contextual i sati on. however,it is a quite logical stateof paradoxical, This may seemsomewhat affairs. meaningas an aspectof human activity and the meaning I have stressed Thus,the contextof any pieceof as structure part of the cultureof a society. informationcarryingmeaningis ultimatelyhumun actiui!'for which it is a mediatoror thecultural q'stemof which it is a part.
5.2.2 The Holistic Hermeneuticsof Gadamer

has of The analysis the divisibility problemin semantics beensubjectto a in but diff-erent, to a largeextentparalleltreatment the disciplineof somewhat is of One leadinganalyser the art of interpretation Gadamer, hermeneutics. works of art part andwhole in, for instance, the who clescribes relationbetween circle. asa hermeneutic this of lnspiredby the Germanromanticphilosophy art, he introduces conceptin t he f ollowi n g : in is seen, understanding alwaysa movement a circle. Fundamentally returnf'romthe wholeto the part and backagainis wherethe repeated of growing theconcept as this Fr-rrther, circleis always something essential. greater setinto one thewholeis a relative andthe integration constantly of for tingsall thetimehasimplications theunderstandingthepart.'' of Gadameralso has, however.anothercharacteristic meaning for the "the hermeneutic of the circle". Supplementing dialectics part and expression This and of whole is the relateddialectics pre-understanding understanding. philosophy. in is dialectic oneof thecornerstones Heidegger's thus,hastwo characteristics, in functions humanactivity. The way meaning of strategy logical formalcomponential eachof them btockingthe way for the ism:
334
l.
the textualityof semiotics
2 . the contextuality semiotics of
Semiotic textuality refers to the top-down-determination which the by meaningof the total text (thatis the integralentity of the meaningconveying sign)is influencing interpretation the textualcomponents, as much the just of as we havethe reverse influenceon the totalityby the parts. Semiotic contextuality refersto the even more far-reaching featureof our understanding beinginfluenced from what is not at all present the text, not in evenasan irnplicittotalityof meaning. Sometime around mid-1980s, the therewasan anti-Fregean swingin cognitive science, which had beenuntil then very closelyfollowing the strategy of semantic atomismthatwas the lock, stockand barrelof the originalArtificial Intelligence endeavour.'2 instance, For several theorists articulated polemic a againstsemantic and cognitiveatomism,the Fregean faith of early A[ (e.g., Dreyfus& Dreyfus.1986;Winograd& Flores,1986).Instead. holisticand a intuitionisticphilosophyof a decidedlyHeideggerian vintagewas proclaimed. As opposed rules,intuitive gut f'eelings recommended, belief in to are the effectivealgorithmsis replacedby an orderly heuristics, orderly semantic the memoryis denounced favourof episodic in recollections so on. and In a way, this tendencyis a sclmewhat exaggerated reaction.It is Frege turned, to speak, so downside-up. The enigmaof humanmeaning andknowledge not solvedby a semi-mysis tical holismandentuitionism. would like to be the victim of prejudiced I entuitionistsno more than to be the objectof mad scientists raving computers. or That this is not a far-fetched eventualitycan be seenin the following passage from DreyfusandDreyfus( 1986): Pat Bennerquotesan expertpsychiatricnurseclinician,highly regarded for herjudgnent: "when I sayto a doctor,'thepatient psychotic', ilon't always is I know how to legitimizethe statement. I am neverwrong. Because know But I psychosis from insideout. And I feel that,and I know it, and I trust it". (ibid. 34) Someyearsago.I was involved in a political debateaboutthe legalposition of peoplehospitalised mentalinstitutions. in Sincethen,I cannothelp feelinga
33s
certainchill down my spineat the thoughtof leavingthe questionof who is of intuition of this incarnation to considered be psychoticto the self-confident "big nurse"in the movie Oneflew over the cuckoonest. the
5.2.3 My own Reflectionson Part and Whole in Semantics

can be explainedusingthe following Finally,textualityand contextuality to model(by decontextualising cornplexityaccording the customof formalthe ism)."Context. Whole andPart":
Context, Whole and Part
Context
fi g .5 .8
hierarchythat The three levels,c'onte.rt, whole andpart, form the standard how our reality is organised. This is true for ontology.wherethe characterises contextis the physicalor ecologicalfield of any entity,andthe part is a compoactivity nent or attributeof the entity.It is even a relevantway of describing itself, with the contextnow being the total activity,the whole a certainaction, and the part an operation. addition,as alreadyseen, hierarchyis even In the highly relevantfor the meaningstructures. When studyingsomething, it a real entity,a caseof activity or meaning. be we havethefollowins dialectics dealwith thethreelevels: to
336
Ch.5: The Meaning of Activitl
A Model of Dialecticsbetween Abstraction (Serialising)and Concretisation(Deserialising)

Perspective Concrete Level of Context Abstract
Level of Whole
Generalisation
Level of Part General Dialectics of Contualisa Decontextualisation

Qualitative Procedure
De-Serialisation
fig.5.9
In this model, the three analytical levels are placed as the horizontal tlrrlrcrrsion. In contrast,the complementary set of seeing something is arrangctl u.' rhc vertical dimension, consisting clf a concreteand an abstractperspee c.. tir Starting from the top, we have two ways of dealing with the problenr of rhe context surrounding an object. If we take the concrete set, the obiects lvill be
337
entithatis, placedamongtheir neighbouring seenin their properenvironment, set, If to ties and with relations these. we, on the otherhand,choosean abstract we are abstracting from this context,from the surounding of the object.Both complimentary. quite legitimate, and,in f-act, are, setsof conceptions of course, on The relevantchoice depends the specifictask in which we are engaged thereis a dialecticof the two sets,and consetowardthe object.Consequently, going back and forth between two sets. the processes quentlytwo alternating Thesetwo processes in chargeof contexualisingand de-contexualising. are On the next level, we are analysingthe way of seeingthe object as an of autonomous entity.Regardless the kind of objectwe aredealingwith, we can cope with the object in two different ways. On the one hand,we can treat the individuality. Usingthe objectas a specificentity,havingits own ontological identity. the On it a terminology JensMammen( 1983), possessesnumerical of member its own of the otherhand,we canconsider objectasjust an anonymous ratherthanan individualobiect.We of category, kind. It is a specimen a general an thus havetwo setsconcerning object,the specificity and the generality set. processes specificaof Corresponding thesesets,we havethe transitional to tion and generalisation. Bckrw the levelof the whole,we havefinally the levelof the part.Here we If of aretalking aboutthe components which the objectconsists. we exarnine we the objectas a composition madeup by thesecomponents, are taking the perspective. we, however, positionof totality, which is a concrete If takethe opposite position, the abstractperspective,we have chosen atomicity. Betweenthesedual sets,thereare the transitoryprocesses totalisation and of atomisation. Thesethreedualitiescan be understood perspectives a comprehensive as of which I havebaptised qualitative or concreteand quantitative or the dr"rality, of is abstract pointsof view.The qualitative perspective thusthe combination ic'ity whereas quantitative point of view is the contextucrlity, spec:if and totalit v-, generalitl' and atomicit\,.Just as with the characterised decontertualit\,, by levels, havethe dual transitions we the threedifl'erent between comprehensive of or when turningfrom the sets, that is. the process serialisation abstraction, qualitativeto the quantitative set,and the process de-serialisation conor of cretisation when going in the opposite direction. This model of a generaldialecticsof cognitionhas,however,a specialrelevancefor the problemof contextin semantics logic, wherethe tendency and of
338
Ch. 5: The Meaning of'Actir itr
our contemporary culturehasbeenpredominantly favour the quantitl.rtrr to e procedure. With this diagram,I havetried to demonstrate duplicit.v- the :rrc.nsrh the of andthe limitationin the atomistic procedure logicalfbrmalisnr. of Wrth rhr-' cnl of the industrial society, therehasbeenan increasingly widespread atfinitr tirr' what I call serialisation.Serialisation is the tendencyto deal with the ob.lects and problemsof the world as decontextualised standardised systenis. totallr determined their cornposition a certainsetof components paranretrie by of or attributes. That is, therehasbeena biastowards seriality. towards decomposition the of contextual, specific totalities into decontextualised generalities atomiccomof ponents. The immense success formalised of science, scientifically-based of technology and of technologically-based industry, sincethe greatrationalistic movement of the | 7th century, hascreated fbllowing belief.Truth is tound in the the deconstruction the immediately of experienced realityinto a serialised representation that canbe the objectof rigorous,fbrmalisedlogic. This tendency towardserialisation was,however. certainly limitedto the not technical world of risingCapitalism. Eventhe administrative, politicalsystem was moving in the samedirection.Thus.in the samemanner, peoplewere seen and treated serialised as entities, just inanimate as objects. This fact is documentedby the birth of a brandnew scientific discipline. namely statistics. the etymologicalhistoryof which showsthat it was originallyconceived as a of tool for the rulersof states. In thevery same epoch. whererationalistic philosophy, natural science the in modernsense, mechanistic and technology blossomed, statistical the institutes of governments well asof insurance as companies weretounded. The biastowarda serialistic conception humanbeingsis far morethan an of importedattitudefrom naturalscienceinto the anthropological field. It is. rather,a logicalconsequence an ontologicalchangein the whole tabric of of society. This attitudeof serialisation. understandable it is from the background as of scientific,industrialand administrative success. however,alsoan expresis, sion of a one-sided worshipof formality.The very process decontextualisaof tion, of serialisation, totally unthinkable is without the complimentary process of contextualisation, de-serialisation. very mathematical of The turn of physics
339
sinceGalileepresupposes implicit, unformalised the knowledge the physiof cal wclrldthat is nowadays p/e_r'sics." accurately callednai've Actually,the common sense physicsthat has beenthe object of semantic researchin information technologyis highly sophisticated. a way, the In naivetd should refer to the physicalists, who believe that reality is totally reducible physical to equations. Thereis certainlynothingwrong with the attemptto formalisereality.Sometintes,partsof reality are shownto be nicely analysed a formal model.and by we canhardlyknow in advance whether formalisation be successful not. will or However,thereare two objections much of the formal thinking that has to beencharacteristic thelastfbur centuries. of
l.
theontological reversal objectandmodel(therepression of of reality)
2. theserialistic bias(therepression totality) of
The first tendency doubts anddenies objectivity theunformalised the of reality. andhypostacises fbrmalmodelto the standing a pseudo-reality. the of This turning the world upsidedown is demonstrated the logical model theory, in whererealityis the modelof the formalism. The second tendency to doubtthe objectivity unformalised is of totality. and hypostasise decomposition thetruereality. the as As mentioned the criticismof the intuitionistic in turn of the mid-eighties in cognitivescience. do not seethe semi-mystical I worshipping un-analysable of totalityasa remedy. Rather, will suggest the formal(serial) I that andthe intor(concrete) mal attitudes realityaredialectical to twins:thattruthis theresultof the interplaybetween these opposites, opposed the unbalanced blind as to and submittal only oneof them. to Especially theanalysis a formalmodelor procedure. is always in of it recomrnendcdthat one look for the feedbackchannelfiorn the model to the original ob.iect. This process cclncretisation often irnplicit, and sometimes of is even totally invisible,as our ability to understand world in a concrete the way is a strongly built-intendency.
340
that streamof a deserialisation lf we, however,try to ignorethe subterranean and intelligibletotality,it will just resultin a helpsto keepour world a coherent of wrong understanding the formal or serialattitude.It could eventuallythreatnot en to dissolve entirefabric of our culture.This would be a dissolution the of only on the level of the formaliseddescription the model,but evenof our extenta humanproduct. very actuality, which is to an ever-increasing will be disWe shall now leavethe problemof whole and part. Serialisation from a philosophyof science. cussed againin chapter whereit is analysed 6,
5.3
Meaning and Operation - The Relation betweenCommunicative and Operational Activity
and In the introduction the concept activity,the duplicityof af'ference to of the effbrence emphasised. was That is, the dialectics between pursuitof underwas introduced. This duplicity is often ref-erred as to standingand performance the relationbetween communication activity.I preferconsidering and activrty to be a super-concept, instead and splittingit into two sub-concepts calledcommunicativeactivity andoperational activity.
5.3.1 The Communication Analysis of Pragmatics

In the preceding we with signsand meansections. havebeenpreoccupied ingsasmoreor lessautonomic entities phenomena be studied thediscior to by pline of semantics, muchin the sameway that a f-lower the objectof botanical is investigation. positionsthat havebeenpresented Most of the semantic havebeenprimarily dedicated thoseimmanentattributes to and rulesof signsthat ref-er their forto (extensional) conceptual (intensional) qualimal (syntactical). referential and ties.In a way,thesepointsof view are an expression the fact that signsare of productsof humanactivity. objective points A perspective meaningdifferentfrom thesesyntactical semantic of or of view is the pragmaticangle,which is the studyof the functionof signsas instruments humancommunication. pragmatics, focusis shiftedfrom of In the theimmanent signsto theuseof the signs.
t I'
341
As we have seen,there has been a definite tendencytoward a linkage and linguisticapproaches based syntactical semantic on between classical the andan atomisticconception. the otherhand,therehasbeena corresOn studies pondingtendency a linkagebetween pragmatic approach a moreholisand to a tic attitude. approach with a strongatomistictenThis shift from a formal, syntactical view with a holisticflavour is thus dencyto an informal,pragmatic-oriented who started an ardentfollower of as tound rn the philosophy Wittgenstein. of laterworks, the useof language was conFrege.However.in Wittgenstein's sidered key to any understanding language.'* the of
A Model for Pragmatics
Signl
Sign2
subjlt I )objeck
Operation I Operation 2
2 Subject
Cooperation
fi g .5 .l 0
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scope pragof semiotic the I In thisdiagram, havetriedto illustrate extended by matics,as the singularsubjectof the meaningtriangleis replaced several subjects. mutuallycommunicating Theory of Sperber and Wilson 5.3.1.2 The Relevance compromisebetweensemantic An interestingexampleof a reasonable and Wilson theoryof Sperber holism is the relevance atomismand pragmatic principles Grice ( 1986). of by Sperber Wilsonwereinspired the pragmatic and pragmatic (1951& 1975), ethics the who alsohasgreatlyinfluenced universal of Habermas. in behaviour thefollowins wav: communicative Gricedefines
' I t h e s p e a k eS ] m e a n ts o m e t h i n g y x ' i s ( r o u g h l y q u i v a l e n t ) ' o ISl ine b r by of tendedthe utterance x to producesome ef{ect in an audience means of of the recognition this intention'."
Gricehasunveiled mutualityandreflexivityof his definition, By theelegant and WilSperber of someof the basiccharacteristics humancommunication. point.Additionally.they includesome son usethis definitionas their starting suchastherequireexpedition. maximsasluggage theirpragmatic on Gricean plain, unamrelevant, concise, truthful,reliable, mentsof being informative, biguous,brief and orderly.Finally. they usethe seminalGriceanconceptof that implicature, which refersto the logicalpresuppositions arebuilt into a sentence. of is The purpose this shortpresentation not to offbr an examination the of theory,which is a curiousand somewhat more technical detailsof relevance and the atomistic of eclectichybridisation the holistic ideasof pragmatism principles cognitivescience. Instead" is merelyto present it one of the ingeof from Sperberand Wilson's book. illustrating niously constructed examples which is at the is context. how a normalconversation deflnedwithin a comrnon between The following sliceof dialogue sametime cognitiveand intentional. is example: trendsetters a characteristic two professional
Peter: I'm tired. is I'll of Mary: The desert ready. makethespecialty theCapn restaurant.s6
!q!_l! leory of Knowledge
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From an immediatesemantic point of view, thereseems be no connection to between first and the second the sentence. Peteris informingMary abouthis fatigue,and Mary, apparently somewhatabsentmindedly, talks abouther dinner plans.The authors'analysisof this little scenefiom modernurban life reveals. however. that:
l. The actualintbrmationthat Peteris communicating Mary is notjust to that he is tired aftera no doubtindustrious effort in an importantmetropolitanoffice. The crucialpoint is thatthis laborious effort hasmade him too tired ro fulfil his duty of makingrhedinneron rheday of the conversation, day that Peteris scheduled performthe matrimonial a to cooking. 2. The replygivenby Mary (Peter's wif'e)is, ar first glance. quiteoblique in relation Peter's to statement fatigue. of Actually,it is, however, a most af-tbctionate reply,the contentbeingthat: a. sheunderstands acknowledges fatigue her hard-working and the of husband b. shehasconsequently decided relieve to him of thenot insignificant burdenof preparing meal,appropriate peoplewith demands a for for h i g hq u a l i t y i v i n g l c. she,in concord with the convention her culture. of conceives sucha dinnerasconsisting a maincourse of anda dessert d. happilyenough, hassomething thefridgethatcanserve a she in as dessert e. for the main course(a somewhat morecomplicated matterthanthe dessert, theformernormallyhasto be served a hot condition), as in shehasdecided cook an Italian specialty(thebook is insistingon to ossobuco) f. this specialty well known to bothof them,astheyhavesottenit is previously a restaurant in calledCapri.
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of The authors'positionis polemicalto one of the distinctivefeatures the and theorythat is basedon the work of Shannon formalisticcommunication of that who suggested a codeis usedasa transmitter signaland inforWeavert', propose that the prothey coding and decoding, of mation.Instead mechanical skilfully show these inferenc'e.They cessingof signsis basedon cclgnitive consisting The to inf-erences be highly contextual. contextis partlyet'ologicul, The that are the settingof conversation. of the actualcommonsurroundings by pool that is shared the communicaalso thecognitiue contextis, however, tors andof which they havea mutualand reflexivemeta-knowledge. that is so retreshthe Having demonstrated realismandholism of pragmatics I and idealisticswamps, ing afterour long marchthroughformalisticdeserts to stillhavethefinaljob of dialectics perform. suggest followingprocedure: the To performdialectics,I
The Stepsof Dialectical Sublation
l.
to show that both types of tw'o opposite apltroac'hes have a rutiotrul kentel
f I
2.
ancl incornplete are to show thatboth of'theop1tosites consequently denvtheirown kernelof truthandthereby in-valid,by hyperstacing kernelof truth of their opponent ing the complementary
i | I I I
3.
of for to struggle a sublation the partlyvalid,partlyin-validdual ' J antasonists.
5.3.2 The Contradiction betweenInteractionism and Instrumentalism in Activity Theory

in Traditionally, therehas beena long discussion SovietActivity Theory and communication activity. between abouttherelation the We canheredistinguish tollowing positions.
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5.3.2.I The Meaning (Communication/cognition)Eliminating Operationalism This positionemphasises operational object-oriented the and aspect activof ity and reduces communication theseaspects. all to This tendency was especially strongduring the periodwhen Pavlovwas raisedto primary authority. andthe Vygotskyan traditionwas accused idealistic (the of heresy5' concept of signespecially foundthebe suspicious). was 5.3.2.2 Leontievs' concept of communication as an Integrated Category within Activity In the theoryof A. N. Leontiev, communication not a separate is category, but a basic precondition the evolutionof human activity as a necessary fbr means the divisionof labour.This tendency beenelaborated in the for has on writings of his sonA. A. Leontiev'"', wherethe concept a specral.fonn actiof of vity is proposed. 5.3.2.3 Elkonin's Theory of the Duality of Interpersonal and Object-orientedActivity In the developmental theoryof Elkonin"", communication understood all is asbeingan inherent osped ratherthanspecial.fctrm activity. of 5.3.2.4 Lomow's Interactionistic Version of Activity Theory Lomow"'hascriticised Activity Theoryfor neglecting role of communithe cationin humanactivity. Lomow'sposition however, the vergeofjoining is, on ti the i nt er ac t ion ti ca n do b j e c-n e g l e cn g w e s te rn is t pragmati cs.
5.3.3 A Proposalfor Integrating Communication and Semioticsinto the Theory of Activity

I shallnow present own suggestion an activitytheoretical my for account of communication semiotics. and Using the four sub-paradigms above, will try I to conrbitre thinking of the second(classical) the and the third (dual aspect) positions. dualityof object-orientation meaning-orientation The and appears to be somewhat mixed up, both in the western positions well as in the position as within the socialculturalschool.
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Ch.5: The Meaning of ActivitY
into two and operation I will dissolvethe duality betweencommunication g n re diff-erent lations,both concernin meani g :
The two relations constituting the duality of communication and operation in activity
1.
the hierarcltic'alrelation between operutittnctl antl memting-based ( significat w e) I eveLof' uctiv itt'
2.
the co-loteralrelation between the interpersonul and the in.strumental lsi p ec t,soJ'ac t i vi tt:
5.3.3.f The Hierarchical Relation betweenOperational and Meaning-based(significative)Level of Activity of theoryof the structure activitywith hierarchical Leontiev's If we analyse we Io attached meaning, havethe followto respect the functionof mediation ing picture:
Table for Operational or Meaning-basedFunction according to Level of ActivitY Mode of Function Level
Activity Action Operation Operational No Yes Yes Meaning-based Yes Yes No
Table 5.1
over an often spread endeavour, Activity, beingthe apexo1a complicated people involl'ingmanydifferent and area space time andpossibly of incoherent (andcommunicate). in lact by definitionan almost is that have to cooperate is As st'.steriz. alreadypointedout by Vygotsky,rnediittion .stark nteuning-based
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a decisivecharacteristic human activity.In fact, the integrityof a certain of activity is determined the motive throughwhich the activity is present by for the peopleengaged it, and the motive in question exactlya phenomenon in is belonging thecategory to calledmeaning. At the nextlevelof the activitysystem, find actions.Actions,in opposiwe tion to thetotal system activity.areconfinedto a limited andcoherent of areaof space andtime, and normallycarriedout by an individualactoror at most a few cooperating Actionsareat the sametime meaning-orientedandoperaactors. tional units.As directedby a proximate,but not yet realised goal, and as a unit of the total activity servingthe motive of this system, rs meaning-related. rt As a limited accomplishment is immediatelypresent that anddirectly perceivable. and as a subsystem implemented a series automatic semi-automatised in of or operations suitable the specificconditionsof realisingthe goal, it is however to alsooperational. At the baseof the activity hierarchy,we have operations, the more or less piecesof behaviourby which an action,and ultimatelythe total mechanical activity,is implemented. operations, meaning In the orientation will normally be absentor at leastonly implicit. In somecasesthere has neverbeen any meaningattached an operation. it canbe of an innateor at leastpre-verbal to as o r igin. In othercases, operation an may havestarted a meaning-related as action, but afterhavingbeensubjectto the automatisation or ratherthe operationalisation of routinelearning, however,it haslost its meaningquality,and thereby its potentialto ref'eraway from itself. This is, for instance, casewith such the automatised operations dialling an often-used as telephone numberor pressing the keysof a codelock. It is a commonexperience when suchan operation. that consisting several of sub-operations, one day blockedfrom the operational is memory,there may be no way back to the semantic registerthat originally deflnedthe valuesof the sub-operations. Finally,an operation may still have somepotentialmeaningattached it, to but when on duty,an operation will not make useof this meaning. but rather havea status similarto what Freuddescribes pre-conscious. as Only whenelevatedto the level of an action.a promotionthat can be given to an operation meetingLrnexpected complications, will the slumbering meaningrelations be awakened.
t ;
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What I havedescribed here,asthe operational, or sub-significative unstatus of operation, typical of what is calledtacit knowledge cognitivescience.n' is in To summarise, seethe interplayof the operational I and the significative (meaning-oriented) level of human activity as one featureof the dialectical relationbetween pragmatics semantics meaningtheory. and in 5.3.3.2 The Collateral Relation tletweenthe Interpersonal and the Instrumental Aspectsof Activity In the preceding section, meaningwas considered groundof operation. the Many of the problemsin the differentschoolsof meaningtheoryare precisely related a lackof understanding thisoperational to of groundon whichthesignificativelevelof activityis based. Granted thathumanactivityis mediated, significative, is still activity.andtherefore it oriented towardsinvolvement the in ntosttangible matters aftairs. of The referential functionof meaning thr-rs is not just directedtowardobjectsin the understanding externalistic of realisnt. but ultimatelygoverningthe non-referential units of human action.that is. the operations. The word may proceed deedaswe aretold in Genesis, nteaning the but without operation no activity. is andultimately scarcely meaningful all. Therecan at be no significality withoutoperationality.n' Otherrelations built into humanactivity,however. often mixed up with are the hierarchyof meaningand operation. which is the co-lateral complementarity of the interpersonal the instrumental and aspects activity. of The instrumental aspect activity consists its object-orientation, is, of of that the connection eitherthe entities to that are a part of the very objective the of activity.or to the meansnecessary carry out the operations to that ultimately implementthe hierarchyof activity.In both respects, instrumentality the of activity is anchored externalthings.no matterwhetherthesethingsarenatuin ral entities artefacts or produced humans. by The interpersonal or transactional aspect activity,on the otherhand, of consists its orientation of towardotherpersons, our f'ellows to with whom we arecooperating the activity.or with whom we arepartners the transactions in in through which different productsof our activity are interchanged. Transactionsthusweavepartialactivitiesinto a greater activity. Justas it was the casewith the complementarity operationality and sigof nificality, thereis a relationof mutualnecessity between instrumentality and
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transactionality. Human activity, as stressed chapter3, is mediatedby in signs,by toolsandby cooperation. The reasonthat thesetwo set of relationsare often confusedis that in both caseswe have something extra-linguistic. The operationas well as the tool or objectof activity are opposed something to linguistic,or at least,semiotic,the meaning thefirst case. thecommunication thetransaction the second. in and of in The confusionof the two relationswill thus result in the enfoldingof the two-dimensional structureof activity into an ambiguousone-dimensional quasi-relation:
The Two Dimensionsof Semiotics

Hierarchic Levelsof Activity
Significality Operationality
Collateral Aspects of Activity

Transactionalitv Area of Communication Area of Cooperation Instrumentalitv Area of Cognition Area of Individual Operation
Table 5.2 The next diagramshowswhat happens we enfold the two dimensionof if semiotics, thusconfounding four distinctcategories just two identifithe into ableconceptual complexes :
The Enfolding of Dualistic Semiotics

Hierarchic Levelsof Activity
Signifi cality conceived as Transactionalitv Operationality conceived as Instrumentalitv Confused Area Table 5.3
Collateral Aspectsof Activity

Transactionality conceived as Significantly ConfusedArea of Meaning Confused Area of the Instrumentality conceived as Operationality
#.ffi
3s0
relatedto meaningoriginatein this incomplete A greatmanyof the problems analysisof the semiotic dimensionsof activity. Confoundingthe relation and between significolinn operationolitywrththerelationbetweentransactionresultsin a dualismbetweena ghostlikeworld of ality and instrumentulity void of world of "objects-an-sich" objectless meaningand an unobtainable point,any strategy will leadoneastray. starting meaning. Fromthisdualistic of within Activity Theory aboutthe status communication The discussion analysisof the semiotic expresses, a certainextent.even an incclmplete to with is of aspects human activity.The model here suggested in accordance as of Vygotsky's originalconception the doublefunctionof language a means with the even more important of cognitionand a meansof communication. of point that both cognitionandcommunication mediatrlrs humanactivity. are
5.4
Individuals and Universals - The Meaning of Concepts
The birth of the modern theory of meaningcan be tracedto the fanrous of Startingwith the Boetiustreatise the medievaldiatribeaboutthe universal.oo a Aristotelian teaching concepts, greatportionof thetopicsof philosophical of and debate duringthe high andlateMiddle Ageswasthe semantic ontological concept shouldbe The status the universals. outsetwas whethera universal of understoo in nomine(asjust a name)or in re (asreferringto a real entity).The d the werecallednominalists theydenied exisand adherents thefirst position of posiThe supporters the second of except individualentities. tenceof anything of and they arguedfor the existence something tion were calledthe realists. besides individualmembers a kind. the of
The DichotomousContradiction of Concepts
Conceptual Nominalism fi g .5 .1 l
Conceptual Realism
351
The nominalists had an individualAt the start.therewere thustwo schools. antian istic, anti-universalistic ontology,and consequently individualistic, universali theoryof ref'erence. stic produced extreme well as discussion In duetime.however, long standing the of as moderateversionsof the original schoolsas elaborations the simple in The resulted rangeof positions illustrated the diagrambelow. is dichotomy. Here we have a continuumwith four positionsmarked.Radicalnominalism positionsof nominalismand and realismare the extremepoints,and moderate realism situated between. in are
The Full Continuum of Positionstowards Concepts
Radical Nominalism
Moderate Nominalism
Moderate Realism fi g .5 .1 2
Radical Realism
5.4.1 The Classical Disputeabout Universals

5.4.1.1 RadicalNominalism with a uniRadicalnominalism totally denounced meaningassociated any versal. Accordingto this position, thatis, thereweremerelyindividualhorses. (u w the only ex is t inge n ti ti e s s i n gAri s to te l i a n r mi nol ogy) erethosecal l ed te secondary substances. Theseindividualthings,of course, could be namedby their propernarnes, havinga meaningexactlybecause the existence an of of unequivocal ref-erence. conceptcorresponding the word The and concrete to " hor s e" .howeve r, c c o rd i n g ra d i c a ln o m i n al i smw as voi d of any sense a to whatsoever. What Aristotlecalledprimarysubstance, species the horse, the of had no existence all. The word "horse" was consequently at nothing but a rneaningless sound,flatus voc'is,in the contemptuous characterisation of Roscelin."' The advocates radicalnorninalism of werethe true anti-authoritarian forerunnersof rationalistic individualismin transitionfrom the feudaldpoqueto modernindividualistic A capitalism. prorninent examplewas the Franciscan
1{?
nomiOccam,who wasnot only a philosophical radicaladvocating relentless a nalism and empiricism,but who was at the sametime a radicalcritic of the papacy, advocating independence the state, the of being in this respect direct a precursor Wycliff and Huss.oo of ThroughOccam'stheories, mainstream Western the has of science mainly beennominalistic, with a tendency towardthe radicalversionof this school. Actually,the empiricismof Hume and the criticismof Kant can be seenas an r a ddit ional adic al i s e d o mi n a l i s m. h e re e v e n th e exi stence i ndi vi dual n w of objectsis problematised. After the dismissal equineor canineuniversality, of th e ex puls ion t h e i n d i v i d u a la n i m a l s s e n ti ti es hoseexi stence of w coul dbe a established occured. The dissolution thc kind rntothe members of ot'thekintl was succeeded the dismembering the memberstntosense by of impressiorts. In this grandmovement Western of thinkingis a dialectics that is simultaneouslyfollowingan inexorable logic anda paradoxical The self--refutation. antiauthoritarian scepticism that startedin the refusalof abstract, oftenjust postulated.entities, and the absolute adherence the tangiblethingsof mundane to existence, endedup in a reinforced scepticism that rejected eventhoseindividualentities favourof only the sense in impressit'rns whichtheyappeared. by However,as foreseen Kant and demonstrated cognitivepsychology by in psychologynr, eventhe sense sinceGestalt not impressions havean immediate andbasicstatus whichto foundanepistemology. on Gibson's ecological theory of perception"na promising is psychology attempt restore realistic to a afterthe destruction the phenomenalism empiricism. addition, recent of of In the developmentin the studyof concepts cognitive in psychology. which will be treated shortly,can be seenas a further restoration that even seemsto exorcisethe scepticistic denialof natural kinds. This swingbackto conceptual realism thuscanbe seen a slow reaction as to the self-defeating resultof a scepticism hasso effectively that eliminated reality of firstly theconcepts. secondly objects the andfinally eventhephenomena. 5.4.1.2 ModerateNominalism Moderatenominalismwas stronglyforwardedby a braveand unfbrtunate scholar, Abelard,who personallymagnifiedthe beginningfermentation the in philosophical fight overthe status universals. of Abelardmodifiedthe position of extremenominalisminto the moderated position.as he, while denyingthe existence a primarysubstance such,did not deprivethe universal of as concept
3s3
horse of all meaning. While not existingin re,the word, however, should not be noise. reduced to a senseless There was a meaning, although somewhat vague, attached to the word. The concept had an existence in intelleclu. However, that was the case because there were indeed certain generalities in reality. This is expressed in the following quotation, in which he actually rejectsradical nominalism: ...there not a singlething that "man" or any other universal is term seems to signify. sincethere is not a single thing whose sensethe term seemsto express.Neither does it seem there could be any senseif no subject is thoughtof. Universalthen appears be totally devoid of meaning.And yet to this is not the case.For universaldoes signify distinctindividualsto the extent of giving namesto them. but this significative function does not requirethat one graspsa sense which arisesout of them and which belongs to eachof them."Man", for example, doesnot nameindividualthings,but for the common reasonthey are all men. That is why it is called a universal. Also there is a certain sensecommon, not proper- that is applicable to thoseindividuals which one conceives be alike."' to
Abelard's position gives to concepts what a modern cognitive scientist would call a cognitive existence, an existence as a representation. Intellectual statusis a consequence the fact that it is useful to operatewith speciesterms of such as "horse" or "dog", a fact that again follows from the presenceof certain similarities between theserightfully popular domestic animals. This brings us to the next position that is characterisedby a due quantity of moderation and, literally, common sense(not to talk about universal sense).
5.4.1.3 ModerateRealism Moderate realism was already represented by Aristotle'", who not only recognisedthe universal as useful, but also even argued that the use, and in fact the necessity,of a universal was a consequenceof a certain ontological reality of something referred to by the corresponding concept. This something was not just what modern nominalists would expressas the extension of the concepts, that is, the sheer class of individual members. The ontological ref-erent the universal was the presence of the common qualities of of the individual members constituting the concept. The individual members a l l h a d s o m e p r i m a r y s u b s t a n c ei n c o m m o n . I n t h i s c a s e , a l l t h e i n d i v i d u a l horses were characterised by some equine attributes.
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Thus, the species horse(that was the naturalexampleof the Macedonian of philosopher) was an empiricalfact. [t was an empiricalfact asa separate entity, but as an empiricalverifiablenaturalkind; establishing taxonomicstatus the in relationto otherspecies wasone of the mostdistincttasksof science. In the scholastic terminology, positionis calledin rebns, this signifyingthat the conceptexistsimmanentlywith the objectsthat are members the class of b eingit sex t ens io n . 5.4.1.4 Radical Realism Aristotle'steacher, Plato.was a more daringand passionate thinker.Plato was not satisfied with the limited ontological commitment the existence to o1' u n iv er s al unif or r n i ty mo n gi n d i v i d u a le n ti ti e sF or P l ato,the real exi stence a . was attached the universals. to the individualexemplars. argued tcl not He that we only know the individualentitiesthroughour fallible senses, that the and single exemplarsare merely more or less pitiful approximations their of species. fact, the relationbetweenindividualinstance In and universalis for Platothereverse theway it is conceived in nominalism. of of lt is not the universal is a blurredcopyof theparticular that object. Instead, it is the particularobjectthatis a poor copy of fbrm. from which it originates. The followingquotation an argument fbrwardby an Eleaticparticipant the put is in dialogue Sophist: That is why theiropponents opponents the materialist] great of take [the careto wardoff theirattack from higher andinvisible ground, vehemently contending certain that formsthataregrasped themindandareimmaby terialarervhat reallyexist;but asfor theothers' rnaterial bodies their and so-called reality. break they themin pieces theirargurnent, attribute in and to themnotbeing a kindo1'flux but o1'comins be.' to We cannotflnd any perfecthorse.as all of theseanimalsrvill be. in solne respects, detective their attempts represent in to horsedom. is therefore It ttnlv throughthinking that we can arrive at the perfectionof the ideas.Thus. the forms that we can reconstruct our thinkingrepresent in transcendental entities that are the pure forms existingin a divine realmof supernatural essentialitl'. elevated over the dire imperfection which the appearances mundane to of lif-e aredoomed.This positionwasdenoted the scholastics in re, meaning by as that
J55
in entity,transcendental relationto the munthe conceptexistedas a separate danespecimens its class. of There is, in f'act,a tendency radicalrealismto behavelike the positionof of Where the latterdeniesthe universalclf exisradicalnominalismin reverse. entities. Platoactually the existence theindividual of tence, denounced genuine the disputeaboutthe status the uniof Now havingbriefly sketched classical Here. I will startwith the versal.t will proceed a more contemporary to scene. traditionof Activity mainstream science thenmoveto the moreesoteric of and tradition. Theory,that is, the dialectical
5.4.2 The Statusof Conceptsin Contemporary Science

The medievaldiscussion aboutuniversals demonstrated thereare at has that leastthreeaspects concepts be takeninto consideration: of to
3 Aspectsof Concepts
l. The ontological aspect 2. The semantic aspect 3. The cognitive aspect
Thereis of course alsothe epistemological in status thatis analysed philosophy and methodology. However,having usedso much spacealreadyon the philosophy language, will concentrate the threementioned of I on aspects, as theyhavebeentreated empirically theirspecific in sciences. The ontologicalaspect concepts the assembly things,phenomena of is of and essentialities which a given concept to can be supposed ref-er. to Here the focusis on the problenr the status naturalkinds as they are fbund in the of of cosmological biological and field. 'fhe .gemun aspect the meaningof a conceptasa specificpart of the culric' is turalmeanin-s system. cclgnitive the culture. The cogniliue aspect a conceptis its psychological of standing, that is, the meaningandthe sense the concept a partof the consciousness a specific of as of person.
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5.4.2.1 The Ontological Statusof Concepts In the moderate realism thatgoverned scientific the methodof Aristotle. the (e.g.,the tour elements existence naturalkindswas presupposed s of o1'phvsie andthespecies living beings). of Granted. eventhoughthe specifictaxonomyof the fbundingfatherof nrost contemporary sciences certainlyhad its f-laws, Aristotlehasbeenprovencorrectin his beliefin theexistence natural of kindsin the cosmolosical well as as in thebiological field. We haveevenfoundthe essential qualities definingthese kinds.In the case (primarilythe number protons). of theelements, is the atomicstructure it of and (primarilytheir in thecase thespecies, is the structure the chromosomes of it of numberandthesites theirgenes). of Thereare,however, otherkeysto taxonomy. havefurtherdeveloped We theories of the genealogy the naturalkinds.Thus, thereare cosmological of theories that explain the formationprocess the elementary of particlesand their composition into atoms. Thereis alsothe theoryof thephylogenic evolutionin relation theexistingspecies. wassketched chapter to as in 2. The status natural of kindsof the anthropological field will be left for the last chapter theanthropological on sciences. mainquestion The regarding ontothe logicalstatus the so-called of naturalkinds thus is not whetherthereerre such kinds in existence, w'hen certainuniversal in fact ref-erring a natural but a is to kind, andwhen itis rutt.We havealready discussed problemof hyper-cllsthe sesin biology,thatis,genera. families, orders andsoon. T he biologic a s u b -d i s c i p l i no f c l a d i s ti c s " s concerned i th these l e i prohw lems.Thereis, however, another type of kinds,natural not. that is the rel'eror enceof universal. Thesearethe classes entities phenornenu in practiof or met cal lif e. W it h t he p o s s i b l e x c e p ti o n f e l e me n ts bi ol ogi cal e o and speci es. ntost universals attached areasof lit-ethat are just as confusingas the\ arc are to real.t' If we proceed from the orderlyspecies biological of taxonomy thc natural to kindsof pet anim a l s w e g e t i n to tro u b l ew i th c o ncepts . referri n-c crei l tl l rc\ to suchasthe harmless rabbit.'* Even leavingsystematic zoolo-ey its considc-rto . a blepr oblem san d i n s te a do o k i n ga t th e i n c re asi ngl popul arsector al i l y of mentation called"vegetables". get to a field that is, so to speak. we el'enlnol'c muddy.Theseproblems practical will be discussed moredetailin the of life in nextsections.
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5.4.2.2 The SemanticStatusof Concepts candidrevelationof the total breakdownof Schiffer" providesan admirable program,a programthat hasbeena dreamof his for the grandsemantic science a major part of his career. the onsetof his work, he had hopedto developa At from the ontologicalstateto which a proposition refers,to the chainof sciences semantic structure the sentence of expressing proposition. the cognitive a to state theperson formulated the sentence. in of havingthe propositionalattitude He convincinglyargues, however.that this plan is blockedin all partsof its course andthatit eventually that endsup in a position semantic of agnosticism I personallyfind under the circumstances very understandable, althoughnclt quiteacceptable. Schiff-er's scheme the semantic of by chain,erected and then devastated his bitterself-criticism, the followingpursuit(whichis simplifiedhereanddehas technified. the formulasof analyticalsemantics ratherinaccessible as are for lay people with only a general interest thequestion meaning). in of I will present elaborate an reconstruction a minor caseof an ordinaryuse of just asin the fbrmer example.ref'ers pet animals: of cclncepts that, to
"Tanya believesGustav to be a dog."'o
Schitferanalyses proposition thefollowingway: this in
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I . Thereis a naturalkind of dogs,the specie Canis.familiaris s (ontological usingmy terminology) fact 2. Thereis a naturalentity,an animalthe dog Gustav (ontological usingmy terminology) fact 3. Thereis a general kind-membership relation. expressed the by predicate <<individualokind>,kind-membership relation> (semantic usingmy ternrinology) fact Thus,our case zoological of classification be fbrmalised: can <<Gustav,Canisfamiliaris>,kind-membership relation> (abbreviated ) thathastu'o 4. Thereis a cognitive relation belie.f B relatants a. the certainperson pro b. a eer t ain p o s i ti o n Thustheform of beliefis: B(individual,proposition)
The final reconstruction then: is B (Tanya,<<Gustav,Canis familiaris>,kind-membership-relation>). Schiff'er's modernsemanticism very closeto Frege's is originalcomponential procedure. However,afier a painstaking analysis,Schiftbr is t'orcedto judgethatthisprocedure blocked. is Everyvariant endsup in logicalcontradicticlns. The Schiffbrean procedure in fact.a series representations. first, is, of At it is a propositional logicalrepresentation the realstate affairsby a certain of of proposition. Then it becomes componential a senrantic representation this of proposition a ratherorthodoxFregean in way. Finally,it is a translation from the public and manif'est langua-ee the internalworking of co-enitive to processes,that is. the representation calledLanguugeof'Thoughlor in the ar-9ot of semantics ntalese." . me
3s9
havetheir rootspartiallyin the specialTheoryof Mind, Thesecontradictions which Schiffer'sreflections the Languageof Thoughris basedon. Namely. on hypothesis that every stateof mind is ultimately this rs the psycho-physical neurological state.Other sources expressed a certainphysicaldeterminable as with the ideaof semantic atomismbuilt into the of difficultiesare associated Fregean tradition. which at first sight seemsto be Nevertheless, problem of universals, the is schoolof logicalformalism, stuckin the rigid ideallysuited this semantic to memberof the logic of classes that was originallyfoundedby the impressive Aristotle. class moderate of realists, of is The classical definitionof universals thatwe do havean assembly indibased certain on attrividualswhosebelonging a certain to classis determined that includes members the classis the the of butes. Thus.the setof individuals and sufficientfor ertensionof the class.whereasthe attributesnecessarv are of obtainingmembership the intension the class. is with the logic of serialisaA tripartiteserialstructure in closeaccordance sucha serialstruction described above.For manycases everyday concepts, of of ture,however, not to be found.Whole areas modernlogic and cognitive is havebeendeveloped alternatives this traditionalclassof theoretias to science cal understanding the universal. of fuzzyl'settheoryof logic and the protoSuchtheories includefor instance type theoryof concepts cognitivepsychology. in I shall now try to cross the border betweensemantics and psychology. willingly admittingthat this boundaryis quite fuzzy and that the areasof semantics psychology certainlybettersuitedto the prototypictheoryof and are sense. concepts thanto a settheoretical definitionin theclassical 5.4.2.3 The Cognitive Statusof Concepts Therearetwo f'eatures actualconcepts the psychological in of sense, that is, phenomena ascognitive attached theconsciousness an individualperson: to of l. The Anomaly of Extension The boundaries between concepts not necessarily are absolute., are most but ofien sradual.
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2. The Anomaly of Intension
The intension a conceptis uniform,that is to say,consisting a list of of of qualities possessed all members. by However, is heterogeneous sucha way it in that there are certain membersthat are more representative typical of the or concept, otherinstances and that.eventhoughtheyshouldstill be included. are ratherunrepresentative untypical. or The tlrst fact is somewhat fbrmalisedin the so-called fuzzy logic". wherethe kind-membership relationis relativised be described an analogue to by rather than a digital function.That impliesthat thereshouldbe a membership-parameterrangingfrom zero to one,replacingthe classical dichotomous logic of either-or.Thus, we can operate with an intermediate case.partly belongingto neighbouring sets. The second fact hasbeenempiricallyanalysed Rosch*", by who found that the ordinaryuseof ordinaryconcepts exposes ratherheterogeneous a internal structure, with someinstances the conceptbeing more centraland others of moreperipheral. The mostcentralinstance, oneexists,is calledthe prototype if of theconcept. Putnam's concept thestereotype a component themeaning of as of vector. as notedabove(p.26),is a view rathercloseto Rosch'sconception prototvpe. of Lakoff andJohnson*' havealsopropagated metaphorical a understandine of concepts is similarto RoschandPutnam. that I will now address problemof concepts the from another perspective. froni thetradition another of dialectical philosophy. Shortlythereafter. will return we tclthe problemof the non-classical structure the ordinaryconcepts. of
5.4.3 The Statusof Conceptsin Dialectical Phitosophy

The somewhat retarded evolutionin the mainstream analyticalscience of fiom the classical, Aristotelian logic of classes. the confused to st:ite tuz,zy of prototypicity tbr betteror worse- was anticipated much earlierin the tradition created Hegel.The understanding concept this tradition.which I by of in will herecall thedialectical, now brieflv be examined. will 5.4.3.1 Hegel'sconceptof concepts A decisivetrait in the philosophyof Hegel is his rejectionof the orclinary dualistic epistemology, which we haveto maintaina rigid divisionbetween in
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in itself.*'This dualismis reproduced the objectof knowledge and knowledge in the modernanalyticalsemantics the form of a distinctionbetweenthe referIt of enceof a conceptandthe internalrepresentation a concept. is alsofound in referringto the the Tarsky'ssemantics a distinctionbetween objectlanguage as refering to linguistic expressions. matters f actandthe meta-language of of or characteristic Accordingto one'spreferences, attractive repulsive the His Hegelean this distinction. dialectical thinkingis that Hegeldid not accept idealistic. Eventhe materialto semantics was,of course. alternative a dualistic however,as a basicpresumpistic correctioninstigated Marx was retained, by and subjective is something an objective of tion that a concept simultaneously that is external Mind, and something to character, the sametime something at part of Mind (Mind representing here- in the specificmannerof the English language something eitherindividualor supra-individual). in The so-called logic of Hegelwas anti-dualistic, the sense that the evolution of history(natural well ascultural)is notjustan object/o conceptualisaas theoryof tion,but in a crucialway realised b.1'conceptualisation. Cartesian The mind is largelya conception an outsider, spectator of a describing external an re,r in world that is foreignto the self.The rescogitans cananalyse extensa such in a way that we obtain a theoretical correspondence, which the theoretical is reality. description a mirrorof external According to Hegel'sphilosophy, have a monistic world where conwe qualityof being;this is a qualityrealised the grand sciousness a potential is in process TheSpirit o.fthe Wrtrldcomingto Self-con,cciousness. of pure understandis cognitive, Self-consciousnessherenot only something ing.but alsosomething moralrelevance. prerequisite freedom. for of a Hegel' ss c hem e a s a s u c c e s s i o o f s u b l a ti o nseadi ngto thi s sel f-conw n l sc ious nes s :
being, essence, concepts, ideas, spirit
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Again, the ideaevolvesthroughthe stages of
(psychological) the subjective spirit (sociological) theobjective spirit the absolute spirit
The AbsoluteSpirit is herethe identityof beingandthinkingthat Hegelin his somewhat self-conscious conceived be produced his own philosophy. way to in The monisticconception the identityof ontologyand logic led to the idioof syncratic Hegelian useof logic as a disciplinenot only expressing formal the schemes argumentation, eventhe actualforms and processes reality. of but of Logic is, in fact, morethan an expression reality,it is identicalwith reality of itself. The cautiousreactionto logical fbrmality that startedin moderndisciplines as non-classical logic, semantics and theclries cognition,was inaugurated of with a much morewholehearted radicalityin the absolute idealismof Hegel. The famousdialectics Hegelis alsoan aspect this monisticconception of of of sign and re.f'erent, meaningund objecr.as being identical.According to and suchan understanding, logicalcontradiction not just a matterof form, but is necessarily alsoof content, andascontent, matterof being.Thus,Hegeltransa ferredthe contradiction pure logic to be a stateof notjust our description of of the world. but of the real world itself.*' 5.4.3.2 Marx's ldeas of the Relation betweenHistorical and ConceptualEvolution Marx's thinkingwas so deeplyinf-luenced the Hegelian by dialectics thathe maintainedmany of the characteristics the monism described of above.He struggled transfer to this monismfrom the absolute idealismof Hegel.where the identity of being and thoughtis ultimatelystatedunderthe premises of beingratherthanthopugt.to a reversed monism,wherethe identity is an identity of materiality*'. The mostexplicitkey to Marx's ideaof the identityof the actualityand the concepts ref-erring this actualityis found in the introductionto his "sketch of to thecriticismof thepoliticaleconomics".*5
363
the abstraction, coining of theoretheoretical Here,Marx not only promotes he the socialsciences, alsopointsout the as tical concepts a primary methodof and the concepts the between subjectmatterof scientificconcepts connections the between evolutionof the the He themselves. evenemphasises parallelism (i.e.,thetheoretical field). matter(i.e.,theobjectfield) andits concepts subject field that betweenthe objectandthe theoretical It is preciselythis concordance criterionfor the scientificvalidity of a specifictheory. is his methodological from the field of theory to the object attributes Marx is thus free to transf'er but field. Thus.he usesnot only termshke contradiction, alsoa term suchas of characterisation the obiectfield in question. as abstractio,n, an ontological For of system society. example, of evolution the economic thatis, thehistorical of money is an abstraction the economicquality of valuealreadyfound before of The transactions. invention means economic of of the invention generalisecl in in money is an ontologicalabstraction that it is expressed the every day of in meaningof "money", which is furtherexpressed Marx's determination concept. moneyasa scientific Further,Marx saw the relationsbetweenthe objectivefield. practiceand wheretheoryis alsoa theory.not asa one-wayreflection.but as an interaction, is of Marx's analysis economics notjust a mirrtlrway of practicalintervention. but history, it is his own intervenandan economic ing of an econorticsystem of is andthereby clne thewaysthesysand thissystem thishistory, tion towards themselves.*" tem andhistoryweretransforming not tradition, foundin thedialectical short-circuit of This method conceptual effbct. alsoin Marx, hashad a strongintoxicating only in Hegel,but certainly and a warning should be issued.One of because which a recommendation quasi-theory. resulthasbeennot only a wave of dogmaticand phraseological * in a somewhat of with the teaching the concordance' diabolicalagreement but of and reality - even in the dogmaticmismanagement the between concepts of Marx'stheoryinto the actuality socialist greatexperiments implementing of societies. of that I on In the nextchapter thetheoryof science. emphasise this teaching is andconcept only correctin the field of anthropology. the identityof referent and the field of the between fields of naturalscience The semioticdifference of will alsobe a major point in the lastmain section the present anthropology (on of chapter the logicalclasses signs).
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C h .5 : The
$3{ng
gf A_ctivity
However,I will not thoroughlyexaminethe status concepts the clialectiof in cal traditionfollowing Marx, but will concentrate the Activitv Theorvthatis on thefocusof thistreatise. 5.4.3.3 Dawydow's Theory of Concepts Dawydow,probablyLeontiev'smost gifted pupil, developed dialectical a theoryof thedevelopmental psychology concept of fbrmation. Dawydow" compares classical the Aristotelianlogic of concepts with the dialecticaltradition,and argues that both of thesetheorieshavevalid interpretationsin the domainof actualconcepts. That is, he suggests therearetwo that typesof concepts. The first type,which can be fairly described usingclassical logic, ref'ers the empiricul(quasi-)r'oncepts. to The seconcl type consists the of theo ret i cct c' nc' pt s. I o e In fact,Dawydowproposes threecognitive stages:
l. The stage perception of 2. The stage empiricalabstraction of 3. The stage theoretical of conceptualisation
In the transitionfrom stageI to stage2,theprocess empiricalgeneralisuof tion occurs, wherethe generalattributes the individual sensory of experiences are subjectto an abstraction is bounded the planeof the phenomena, that to and thus leadsto empiricalconception only.The empiricalconception not yet a is true,full-fledged concept, it canonly isolate as singleattributes the common as denominators the individual of phenomena. The real development a conceptoccursin the transitionfrom stage2 to of stage wherethegeneralisation notjust an abstraction singlephenomenal 3, is of attributes happen be commonto all or mostof the indiviclual that to instances. but an appropriutionrf'the essentialities the complexphenomena of conceived by theconcept. ln the determination the specificcharacter the theoretical of of concept. Davydow,however,tendsto be more lyrical thanprecise. Grantedthat thereis. in all likelihood, important an lesson be learnecl to fiom Davyclow's distinction between empirical an conception a theoretical and concept, havedoubts I about
365
is The question now distinction. of of the status this conception a conceptual to whetherDavydow's conceptitself is developed the theoreticalstage.or in it whether is, asyet,moreernpirical nature. 5.4.3.4 ConceptsAccording to my own Theory of Meaning a ln my own definitionof meaning. distinctionwas madebetweenthecu:tual of nseof a sign andthe general.fttnctirtn a sign.
I . The actual use of sign is a spec'ifir:ref'erenceto a specific entity or phenclmenon.
2. The generalfunction of a sign is. however, the meaning attached to it, and me aning is the potentiul o.fa sign to .\erve in the process re of' u spe c'i.fic re.fe nc e.
it and of to If we now proceed thedispute individuals theuniversal, becomes quite clearthat in the caseof a speciticuseof a sign in referringto somespeciindividuals. as with semiotic well aswith ontological fic entity,we aredealing Gustavto be a dog, we havesucha that Tanyabelieves In the proposition The to caseof a specificreference a specificphenomenon. contextcouldbe that tells her that Gustavhasrun away,and newly arrivedneighbour, Peter, Tanya's that Tanyathinks that the individual referredto by Peteris his dog. In this example,it is not crucialwhetherthe Gustavthat hasgoneon the trampis actuson disturbed (eventhoughI will admitthatit is most behaviourally ally Peter's having a certainpower utterance crucial to Peter).The sign is the ready-rnade that The examplealsodemonstrates this rein of reference the actualsituation. or by communicated the sign,may not be complete not evencorrect. f-erence, is The reterence thusthe practicaluseof a conceptsuchasthe conceptof "dog" but to The conceptis not usedto ref-er a universal, to a in the exampleabove. specific individual. presupposes, however.that the sign hasthe of The very process ref'erence qualityof meaning, that is to sayu generulpotentiolof referring.In addition, of instances individualphenometo potential referring diverse of this general by only canbe possessed signscarryinga generulmeaning. na,of course.
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Thus. we seea dialectics betweenthe individual reference, instance a for to specificdog or a specificson,and the universal meaningof the concepts "dog" or "son". This semiotic dialectics between instantiation a concept thegenerthe of and alisaticln its individualinstances then an expression two fundamental of is of s em iot ic elat ion s : r
L the relationbetween naturalkind and its members the obiect the in field 2. therelation between individualising generalising the practice and in fleld.
The disputeaboutthe status the universals, of whetherthey are to be understood(not to sayconceived) something as ontological, something pragmatic or somethingsemantic, thus answered is within the paradigmof Activity Theory by a triple afTirmative. They areall these thingsat the same time. In the mediated activity specificto humanbeings(characterised theobjec.t activity,aswell by of asthepractical implementation it, and themediation meaning).the fielcls of b,3 of objec'ts. practic'eandconceptrare integrated and mutually interclependent. at leastin thecaseof the anthropological field, which is our majorconcern). The programof elaborating logic separate a from reality,aswasthetendency from Aristotleto the greatrationalists the 17th centuryto contemporary of logical formalism,is thusa necessary most usefulabstraction what is a conand of stant,implicit aspect humanactivity.The problemof formalism,however, of ariseswhen this aspect semioticabstraction hypostacised be the whole of is to story. Nonetheless, is not the entiretale,asit is vigorouslyarguedin thedialecthis tical tradition.This dialectical traditionis, however,not the whole story either. The tradltion of dialecticsoften reducesitself to a complementary type of hypostasic reductionism turning its back on the necessity formal abstracin of tion. On severaloccasions. havetouchedon the problemof the logical typesof I reference. Thus, in the previouschapteron epistemology. reflexivity was
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the I and briefly discussed, in this chapter, introduced problemof a symmetric the relationbetween signand its referent. or an asymmetric logicalcomthese will examine of main section thischapter The concluding plexitiesof semioticref'erence.
5.5
The SemioticUniverse- Logical Classes of Signs
about the statusof signsand meaning.a central In the many discussions is questionhasbeenwhetherthe reference externalor internal.Actually.there On are problemswith both of thesefclrmsof reference. the one hand,external of question a realitysuband epistemological the raises ontological reference differentfrom the sign itself.On the otherhand.internalref-erence, stantially the referringof a sign to itself or to anothersign,impliesthe logical nightmare circularity. semiotic of an endless of in A relatedproblemintroducecl the previoussectionwas the controversy semioticdualism gr monism. In other words. are there watertightshutters and by as betweensignsand their referents proposed extensionalism logical not only one-way is formalism?Or alternatively, therean intimaterelation, to from the reterents the signs,but evena tratfic of depictionot'representation in as two-wayexchange described thedialecticaltradition. mattersin a way resemblingthe I shall attemptto clarity thesecomplicated That is chapter. questionin the preceding the to approach answering epistemic whereneitherof the antagonisto say,I intendto performa dialecticalanalysis, singly,but ratherboth of them.Both positionsaretrue tic positionsis accepted Both positionshave limited validity in the sense and falseto the samedegree. that insidea speciticarea,the positiclnin questionis correct,while its antagonist is false.ancloutsidethis domainof validity,thereis accordinglya complementary area where the former position is false and the latter has a limited validity. motivesfor troublingthe readerwith theseenigmasof I havethns several Therearein particularfour problemsto be treated: semiotics.
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Issuestreated in this Section:
l . We shallattacksomeof the problems logic and semantics clf
appearing the setparadoxes, elimination which was in the of theaim of Russell's typetheory.
2 . We shallatternpt localisation the externalref-erents a of with

which natural science ofienoperates a quitecareless in way.
-). We shall,on theotherhand,discuss category fictionor the of

a
irnagination, whereby definitionthereis no realref-erence of sucha fictitiousweb of imaeination. 4 . We shallalsopointto the area actual of dialectics wheremeaning andobjectarein mutualrelation interaction. to
All theseissues will be stepping stones the next chapter. to which presents the theoryof science ratherthe theoryof the sciences. or I will startwith a mapto helpthereader keeporientated the following semiin otic circumnavigation. is, in fact,a map of the world or rathera map of cosIt mos, not diff'eringat all from the mapspresented chapter2. Thus,co,srnrl5 in is divided into the.fleld of natural scienceand the.fieLd of'anthropctlogt,.l shall remindyou thatalthough these fieldsarealsothe fieldsof thesesciences. thev are not to be understood consisting the artefacts as of produced the clisciby plinesinvolved.They areinstead ontological tieldsthatconsistof the phenomena,objects essentialities whichthese and to sciences dedicatecl studying. are to The decisive point in therepetition thisontologicaldichotomy howevof is. er, thatit coincides with the divisionbetween non-sign the areaandthe areaot signs.The anthropologic:al and field is the field of huntanat:tit:it.v-, human activity is mediated activity,that is activitymediated .signs. br, However,this doesnot imply that the humanworld, the world influencedby humans,is ozzl-v, com pos ed s ign si n a d u a l i s ti co r i d e a l i s ti c e nse.nstead, of s l nothi ngi n the a nt hr opologic ale l d c a ne x i s tth a t i s n o t a l s oa s i gn.a si gnbei ngsomethi ng fi with thepotentiality ref'erring something of to else.
369
A SemioticMap of the World
N World of atural Scienc
A- (a)
Anthropological ield
Specific Signs
.''..,
t fts o(c)Ssgu(d) Metat'"' Si g n f i ns of

Natural World Human A cti vi t Signs
fig.5.13
5.5.1 A Nature Void of Meaning - The Asemiotic World of the Natural Sciences
The objectfield of the naturalsciences cannotinclude signs.Any object, phenomenon essential or characteristic the cosmologicaland biologtcal of fields by definitiondoesnot havethe potentialof reference. This is only a brief statement aboutnon-existing semiotics the partof cosin mos that is outsidethe rangeof humans.However,it might be necessary to defendthis postulate.
370
This alienationof humansfrom the cosmosis ratherold-fashioned these days,particularly sincea new and sympathetic movement towardthe re-unific at ion of hum an sa n d n a tu rei s g a i n i n gi n c re asi ng momentum. w i l l al so I acknowledgethat many previously evident borders between nature and humans havebeenbrutallytransgressed the ruthlessness humanactivity by of sinc et he beginn i n g f th e p re s e nitn d u s tri ae ra ,w hi ch now seems be apo l to proaching end. its My reason ostracising fbr nature, moreprecisely, placingthe fleldsof or fbr naturalscience outside humanityand thusoutside dornainof signs.is that the our astronomic and physicalknowledgeirnplies. a way, the reassuring in fact that almostthe totalityof cosmos not only outside scope hunran is the of inf-luence, thatit will alwaysremains but so. Special relativity. which happens be one of a handfulof theories to that has beenmttstconvincingly validated throughthe majorpartof'thetwentieth century, implies that the velocity of light setsan effbctiveupper lirnit for the regionsclf space-time that can be reached any process. by and thus by any humanaction.We can therefore draw an areaof potential humanintluence orr the part of the universesurrounding our presentlocation.Further,the area aroundus wherewe can haveany impactwhatsoever. course.is dwarf'ed of by thedimension therernaining of cosmos. of part This doesnot meanin any way that the uninfluenced part of the cosntos is inaccessible hurnan to perception. to sayunderstanding. inaccessibility not The hasto do with action, with observiition. not Nevertheless. arein theposition we o f t he unhappy v e r s i tti n gb e l o w th e w i n d o w o f the bel oved. e can onl y lo W watch,nevertouch. The objectfield of naturalscience to be understood a narrowly cleflnecl is in way.In fact,this field is setby its definitionin sucha closedmanner thatI will not be offended you call it a circulardistinction. if An object, phenomenon an essential a or attribute belongs this fleld,asfar to asit is unobtainable humanactivity. just because for Thus, something studied is or analysed the naturalsciences by doesnot necessarily place it outsidethe rangeof humans. The ntaterial objects with which we manipulate the pheand nomenacreated humansare not a part of Op, the clbject by field of naturalscience.Instead, they areincluded the field of humanActivity by the very actiin vity tor which they areob.jects.
l
I I
),
37r
The importantdividing line, however,is not the distinctionbetweenthe atomsthatareoutside andinsidetherangeof humanintervention. decisive The borderbetween uaturalandthe humanworld, Op andOr1,is what is outside the and what rs within the range of human activity. Thus, the structures and processes discovered atomicandparticle by physicists belongto Op, the natural world.Conversely, specific the (e.g.,anuclear artefact powerplant)is a part of C)4,the world of humanActivity, which is alsocalledthe Anthropological field,andthatcouldjust aswell be calledthe fleld of humanActivity. Afier this excursion into generalontology,let us, however,proceed the to question serniotics. of The objectsand processes cosmologyareof course of includedin o51, naturalworld, and thusthey can neverbe signs.They are the without the potentialof ref-erring will neverappear signsto us. and as The galaxies quasars outer space, at this momentthey still are irr or of if existence all, are constitllents Op, the naturalworld. Further.events at of attached these to cosmicobjectsare likewisepartsof this intangible realmof cosmos. Nonetheless, shouldthe astronomical how signalbe categorised it (be light or radiowavesthroughwhich we get our infbrmation aboutthese distant objects) and whereshouldwe placeits essential characteristics, discovery the of whicl'r afterall, the objective scientists is, of working in the thertreticul field of natural science, Ty. in Thesesignals. the very fact of therrdetection, includedin 04, the by are world of humanActivity. Nevertheless, they not governed the laws of are by o51,the naturalworld'l Certainlythey are.That is preciselywhy they are of interest the cosmologists. to Thesesignals, observed directlyor, more likely, studiedthroughmediatingtools of observation, actuallysigns.They are are phenomena 04, the world of humanActivity. ref-erring the distantfield of in to Op, the naturalworld, fiom wherethey haveactuallyoriginated. short,they In are signswith a categorical difl'erence betweenthe fleld to which theybelonp andthe l'ieldto which theyre.fer. We havenow,however. alreadylefi the semiotically barrenobjectfield of naturalscience and,a little,prematurely movedinto the anthropological field. This bringsus to therealf ield of semiotic objects andphenomena, areathat the happens coincide to with thefield of all humanactivity, which is againidentical with the anthropological objectfield,Oa.
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5.5.2 The Significational Anthropological Field the Identity of Signsand the Area of Human Activity
Leavingthe strange processes elementary particles of andquasars billions of light yearsaway,andprobablyalreadyfbr a long time out of existence, enter we the areathat is, hasbeenor will be a part of humanactivity.Justas my definition of the fleld of cosmological objects, Op, w&S admittedlyso narrowthat the proposition thesematters of beingnon-semiotic might be judgedcircular,the corresponding definitionof the anthropological objectfield impliesthat the totalityof thisfield is semiotic. This proposition likewisecircularin relation is to thedefinition, which.however, doesnot reduce to an emptylogicaltautolit ogy,but specifies asa theoretical it statement a definiteontological of content. What doesit meanthatall object,phenomena evenessentialities 04, and of the anthropological objectfield. belongto the categoryof signs?It certainly doesnot imply thattheyareat any momentin theposition ref-erring someof to thing fbr somebody. Neitherdoesit meanthat they eventually going to do are so. Instead,the meaning(that is by the way the intendedreference) the of propositionis that all that belongs the field of humanaffairshasthepotential to oJ referringto humanbeings.That something a sign meansthat it can be is realised suchin the process actualref'erring. as of Thus.when an Americanfundamentalist suggests AIDS is the scourge that b egetby G od f or s i n fu l ,th a t i s to s a y s o d o mi ti call.i vi ng. w e may di sagree aboutthe specificreferent, not aboutthe very process ref-erence. but of I disagree with the bigotedhomophobes the Bible Belt. because do not believe of I thattheepidemic a signof God'swrath.More likely,it is a sign,for instance, is of liberalised sexualmores.The parasitic quasi-lif'e form of HIV apparently succeeded tindingits eco-niche thesomewhat in in careless sexual lifestyle that expanded considerably duringtheeconomical boomof thesixties.*' However.this problemof interpretation be addressed a latersection will in (5.-5.3.2.1). Instead an indiscriminate of discussion regarding signs, which by definition canoccuranywhere within the field of humanaffairsthatnowadays coincides more or lesswith a major part of the solarsystem, us proceed the major let to divisionwithin thisconfusing multitudeof signs.I am ref'erring thedivision to between non-specific specific and signs. This distinction wasintroduced the in travelstoryat thebegtnning thischapter. of
Part II:
Th"o.y of Knowledge
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5.5.3 Specificand Non-specificSigns: the Professionals and the Amateurs of Semiotics

Until now, when talking aboutsignsand meaning, havebeenprimarily we ttccupied with matters language corresponding of or humansigns, thatis, with theconstituents the meaning of just introduced, system. The deflnitionof signs however.is vastly more comprehensive than that. AIDS, althoughhardly of divine origin. is neithera humanproduct,nor a part of what I havecallecl the meanings y s t em T h e l i b e ra li n c l u s i o no f th e to tal i tyof the fi el d of human . aftairsinto semiotics therefbre necessitatessubsequent a divisionof this unorganised plethora whatareonly signs, thevague of in sense theycaneventuthat ally be the startingpoint of the process referringfbr somehumanindividual. of The anthropological field, 04. as the grandfield of semiotics therefore is dichotomised into two subfields. The first subfieldis a small,rathercompact field of genuinesigns:it includes signsin the narrowsense all phenomena of and objectsthat humanbeingsare producingwith the specificintentionof ref-erring. othersubfieldincludessignsin the broad.non-specific The sense; these objects are andphenomena eventually that havethe unintended effbctof ref'erring something someperson. tcl fbr The first, narrowfleld ref-ers specificsigns,to be symbolised the letter to by (standing for sign,but for specific). S not The second, broadfield includes the unspecific signs. andis denoted the letterU.', by 5.5.3.1 The UnspecificSigns- Unintended Reference The second sublieldof signsthusincludes semiotic the amateurs, unspethe cific objects andphenomena eitherarenot produced humans if manthat by or. made,are at leastnot intendedto be usedfor ref-erence. unintended This referencemay be quite accidental, a sheersideeffbct of an artefactor spontaas neoushumanactionthat,at a certainoccasion, comesto functionas a signfor so nr et hing. Thus.thosesignals fiom the galaxies that were discussed aboveare unspecific signs.and so is the phenomenon AIDS. [n fact,all naturalphenomena of functioning signs, definition, as by mustbe unspecific. The dividing line between unspecific the and the specificsigns. however. is not determined the attributeof having a naturalor a humanorigin. Even by humanartefacts and processes be unspecific. can Thus, the lights seenby a pilot whenapproaching city areunspecific a signsof this city. Additionally, an
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or action.an emotionalexposure, any otherkind of humanactivity,behavtour unspecificsign. and can or evenmetabolism, be an unintended, therefbre (in but be informative, not communicative signcan This kind of unspecific and Wilson""). Sincethe Anby the sense the definitionsuggested Sperber of doctorshaveusedthe word srmptomtct tiquities,in the traditionof medicine, as or ofappearance functionthat can be conceived signs referto thosechanges he When Freudfoundedclinical psychology. transl'erred of a certaindisease. to the term, symptomof a disease, be usedwhen referringto psychopathology of as is, the word symptom,formerlyunderstood the presence a as well. That was by biologicalphenomenon, referringto another biologicalphenomenon meaning, thatof a psychologigeneralisation acquiring second a metaphorical as this wasto be comprehended a partof or characteristic cal symptom.Further, althoughgenerallynot known or at leastnot that was manifest, of behaviour properlyunderstood the personbeinganalysed. by Unspecificsigns.however,neednot be hidden like that. The activity or without as of behaviour a personcan be unintended an act of communication of as being unintended an act in itself. A greatdealof our repertoire nonverbal signs. is of behaviour thusa treasury unspecific Actually,thesesignsare the primary onesin the phylogenicas well as the We ontogenicsense. sharethis nonverbalregisterwith our pre-linguisticrelawe tives in our evolutionarypedigree. have this registerat our disposition of Withoutthe precursor nonsystem culture. of the beforeacquiring meaning of we verbalcommunication, wouldnot havethemeans theculturalacquisition to connected the successor. semioticstructure. has non-verbal communication a complicated So-called between case l. and case2. In the list wherewe actuallyhaveto distinguish below:
signs l . thepre-verbal unspecific l s 2. th ev e rb a s p e c i fi c i g n s specificsigns 3 . thepost-verbal
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Both categoriesI and 3 are non-verbal. the former refersto the unsutlbut lated old, and the latterrefersto the sublated old''. which is a transformation of non-verbal communication broughtaboutby the creationof language. However.I will not continue discussing psychologically the interesting, unspecific signs, will proceed theareaof specific but to signs. The specificsignsconsist all that is or hasbeendoneby humans of with the (i.e.,all thingsand actswith the intended intention creating of meaning potential of referring).As hasbeennoted,the domainof the specificsignscoincides with the meaning system culture. of We have now partitioned the totality of the universe into three major dom ains :
1. the objectfield of naturalscience, O* 2. thedomainof unspecific signs, U 3. thedomainof specific signs, S
This last domain.althoughrnorehomogeneous than the disorderlycollection of all signsin general, still a composite, I shalltherefore is and create new a trichotomous divisionof thisdomain.This subdivision will be madeaccording to the natureof the referent that a given sign is designating. The referent can belong to any of the threedomainslistedabove.Consequently, specific the (i.e.,whateveris purposefully si-ens produced humansto ref-er) be dividby can ed afterits termination. This terminationhasto be O*, U or S. We cantherefore subdiv ide int o : S
I . SN,the specificsignsof naturalscience 2. Su,thespecific signsof practice 3 . Ss ,th em e ta -s i g n s
The (specific)signsof naturalscience called Sy, because are their ref'erents arerestricted the part of cosmos to that is by definitionoutsidehumanrange.In
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produced natural by system this way,they actuallycoincidewith the meaning science describe explainits objectfield. to and they refer to the r-rnspeThe specificsignsof practicearecalledSg, because hr of cific signs,that is. to all thoseaspects humanlife that are not defrned an in inherent intension be engaged semiotics. to they are specificsignsrct'cr'Finally,the meta-signs calledSq,because are produced our' br system ri n g t o ot hers pec i fi cs i g n s .Sq i s th u s th e me a n i n g and semiotic activity. humanactivitythathasthe production useof thc'spcthe ci f ic s igns it soh j e c ti v e . as Eachof these subfields thespecific of signswill now be introduced. 5.5.3.2 The Signsof Natural Science the Categorical Difference betweenSign and Referent in this Domain signsis characterised thedualistic This sub-domain specific of by opposition found.on theonehand,in thecategory the signitself.andon the otherhand. of the category its ref-erent. otherwords,the sign itself,being speciflc.is a of In mostdistinguished constituent theanthropological of objectfield,but thereterentof the signis something outside this field,andtherefore something that is a partof the objectfield of naturalscience. A historical(and partially rational)reasonfor the dualistictendencyso (suchaslogic,semantics, strongly represented the semiotic in disciplines theory of language) no doubtthe predominance the naturarl is in of sciences the history of modernscience. I will consequently fbllow this dualismas f-ar it is related the semiotic as to problemsof this specificdomainof the meaningsystemproduced natural by The dualism. science. however, shouldbe restricted this sub-domain to alone. In thedisciplines anthropology, is catastrophically it of wrong."' Evenwithin the disciplines naturalscience of certainrestrictions necesare sary,because the emergence technologyas a specifictype of humanactiof of vity,intimately connected natural to science, categorically but drfferent from it. This complicated problemwill be discussed the nextchapter. in Let us now. however,focuson the semioticdistincticln the categoryof the of sign and its referent the domainof naturalscience. in Actually,we haveto be evenmore rigorousin our sign-natttral objec't-dLtulism what is common than within the dualistic positions the philosophy naturalscience. of of The categorical heterogeneity impliesthat all the signsof naturalscience what I call are
Part !: Tleorylf Knowledge
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hetero-semiotic"r,contrast the nexttwo classes signs, in to of which arehomos em iot ic . Therehasbeena widespread, mostregrettable, but tendency identifythe to theorvfield of natural science, includingits signs, with the ob.ject field of natural science. we haveseen, As however, thereis a clearcategorical diff-erence betweenthe former and the latter.The fbrmer is, in f'act. part of the anthropoa logicalfield,whereas latterconstitutes the whatis clefinitely outside thisfield. This impliesthat the very momentnaturalscientists turn from their ref-erent in nature towards theirown activity,for instance towards problems their the of meaningsystem. they havechanged their objectfrom one that is a part of the natural field to onetharbelongs theanthropologicar to tield. The knowledgeof naturalscienceconcernswhat is outsidethe fielcl of human affairs.However.the very clornain knowleclge of constituted this by endeavour itselfa component, of the natural is not fleld,but of theanthropological field,thefleld of humanaflairs. After havingtakena guidedtour throughthe stronglyhetero-semiotic field of naturalscience, will now go on to the remaining we semiotic areas. That is, we will examine two domains specificsignshavingref-erents do not the of that belong to the sign-external naturalfield. but are parts of the sign-internal anthropological field: the majordomainof the ut'tiy,it"v-.ligns the morespeand cific minordomainof themeto-sipns. 5.5.3.3 The Activity Signs S,, arethe specificsignsthatref'er commonphenomena objectswithin to and the rangeof humanactivity.Thus,the vastproportionof the meaningsystem belongs thisdomain. to As noted above,medical and psychological symptomsare examplesof u ns pec if ic igns .T h e v e ry te rm s " me d i c a l s y m ptom"and ,,psychol ogi cal s symptom"are.however, constituents the activitysigns. of Actually.any specificsignret-erring something to within the field of human affairsis an activitysign,aslong asit is not specifically pointingto another specific sign.Thus,the partof the meaning system consisting signsaddressing of any object,phenomenon essentiality is not a partof the meaning or that sysrem belongs the activitysigns. to Wheneverwe haveto talk aboutsomething that is going on or that is producedwithin the field of humanaffairs.si-ens activity must be used.The of
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a but activity signsarenotjust referringto humanpractice, they arethemselves primary They are,in fact, the necessary integralpart of humanpractice. and of mediator thisactivity. semiotic of This is their function.and this is their limitation.Exactly because their generallyare not to intimaterelationship the contextof humanactivity,they of from this context.They are semioticcaptives a suitedto being abstracted for specifichumanactivity.andthey aregenerallynot suitable the freedomof a The implicationof this is that many of the probreference. decontextualised turn of but lems,not only of semiotics. of all areas anthropology, up when we of ref'erence activity terms,and the validity of suchreferthe discuss precise This is thefocusof thefbllowine sub-section. ences. 5.5.3.3.1 The Problem of Fictitious and Misleading Sigrls- the Power of Human Imagination and the Abyssof Mistaken Reference by are Two of the mostdifficult problemsin semantics caused the phenomena of fictitious and misleadingsigns.The first problemis relatedto termsthat termsthat problemconcerns The second without a reference. are apparently that to are of althoughin the possession a referent. not ref'erring the denotation to seeminglyis built into the meaningof the term, but instead a referentthat is diffbrentfrom the former. To clarify,I will usethe term "unicorn" as an exampleof the first category. category. andthe term "witch" asan exampleof the second i i t A v er y pr om in e n t n h a b i ta no f th e d o m a i no f semi oti css the si gn " uni however, be completelydevoid of any actualre[o corn", a term that seems, animal,waiting patientlynot only for a true r,'irgin. ferent.Further, this fabulous is referent, not the onlv impatience a decent lor but probablywith evengreater ol' The sameis true for inhabrtants semioticstatus. exampleof sucha f-lawed mythologyand literature. voyage with a definitionof activisemiotic the Nonetheless, I started present part of humanactivity as their ret'erents. ty termsas havingthe non-specific of of Thus,the existence a subsection fictitioussignswithout any referentis What then are we to do with this problern certainlyan importantcontradiction. expression the dreadof thesesemioticmonsters. of that is, in fact,just another of The whole apparatus possibleworlds has beenerectedto domesticate I a theseogresof semiotics, panacea flnd to be evenworsethan the problemin the first case.
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What thencan I otfer? Well, the very categoryof fiction is far from being just a peculiarityof part. It is exactlythe ability to humanactivity,but is a centraland essential imagine whatis not thecase mediated humanactivity. whichis elethatenables vatedabovethe activity of otheranimals. In fiction, the general creativityof humanactivity is isolatedin a subfieldof themeaning system. is thispotential isolating meaning It of the system from its referents, separating level of meaningfrom the level of operation. of the which distinguishes humanactivity. In the normal mediationof signs,the meaningrelatantis only stretched somewhat from the otherrelatant. operationand the objectof activity.The the anomalyof flctitious signs,however,is that in this case,the stretching hasled to a breakthat is seemingly beyondrepair. I think that theseproblemsof non-referential reference are,however,a consequence a problematic of analysisof theseterms.Let us therefore startafresh with our unsettled unicorn. What we have,then,is a certain signbelonging a to nteaning system thatobviously old mythsasits reference. has This is, however, a fossiliseddegeneration the unicorn as a meta-sign. of Originally,people believedthat unicornsroamedaround.but not in the theoretical field of semiotics or in the fossilised field of mythology.They were to be found in the dark and dangerous torests,hauntingthe small medievalvillagessurrounded by thesetorests, andonly to be pacifiedby the costlyresource a true virgin. of Let us examineanotherpieceof flction, a character Shakespeare. of suchas Hamlet.Whatever historicroots,this creation evidentlya productof the its is author.How can we then address problemclf ref-erence the broughtabout -great by the f'ertile imagination this poet?Literatureis a specifickind of human of activity, an activity having the form of plav."' Thus, literaturehas no external objective and no externalob.ject.lt ref-lexive the sense beingits own puris in of pose. Therefore, signsfound in literaturedo not have any externalreferents. the It would bejust asfutile to look for the referentof Hamletasto search a matefor rial objectthat could be the outcomeof a footballmatch(if not a cup match). The play may havetools.but not an externalgoal to which the play is referring. How can we derivea solutionof the missingreferentfrom this understanding of the activity of fiction as a specificself-motivated production meanof ing?First,it is necessary look at the seemingly to innocent term,"referent". In
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fact. in this chapter, deflnedthe relatedterm "reference" the potentialor I as actualsemioticprocess a phenomenon an objectpointingtowardsomeof or thing else.This something elseis then what the term "reterent"is referringtcl. Something elsets thusthe ref-erent "ref-erent". of Many semiotic problems originate from a mistaken simplification this reof f-erent. Thereareat leasttwo complications that we shouldconsider:
l.
the ref-erent need not be a distinct object, but can also be an intangible phenomenon or essentialityof an object
2.
the referent related to the generol meaning of sign is not necessarily identical with the refbrent of'the instuntiated sign
We havetclexamine particular second in the complication. already As stated in the sectionon universals, general the ref'erent "dog" attached the universal to is an uninstantiated of the highly loved species dog canis.fttmiliaris. The ref'erent a specific of caseof applyingthe sign"dog". however. typicatlywill be an instantiated member thiskind, suchasGustavin theexample of used. Thus, thereis a necessary ambiguitybuilt into the scopeof reference for mostsigns.If this was not the case, they could not functionin all the changing situations wherethey are actuallyused.This implies.however, remarkable a versatility most"natural"meaning "natural"is of systems. wherethe adjective to havethe ratherunequivocal meaningthat is antonvmous "fbrmal". The to precisionof the use of a "natural" meiiningsystern doesnot come from the unequivocality its singular of signs. from the sophistication composine but of u textthatis adequate thepractical in context which it is a tool. of This m ult it udin o ue q u i v o c a ti oa n da m b i g u i ty f si gns s exactl y s n o i oneof the decisive functions invented of meanings (verbalor oral) fbund in the literature of fiction.Imaginea parallel universe, whereHamletwasa realprincewith the tragic fate of a murderedfather,a faithlessmotherand a treacherous uncle. where Shakespeare a spy servingthe kingdom of Englandanclthe text was "Hamlet- princeof Denmark"was a pieceof infbrmation aboutthe entangled relations theDanishcourt.In this universe. well-defined unambiguous of a and
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referent thesign"Hamlet"would exist,andthetextof whichthistermwould of be a constituent would alsohave a specificpracticalfunctionin the specific typeof activityknown in politicsas"information". However.this is not the casefor the text of the tragedyHamlet and its specific termof the same name. "Hamlet" would havebeena ln the fictive example the paralleluniverse, of sign of the classSu, a specificsign havingas its ref-erent personwho would a himself be an unspecificsign. The term would have beena normal activity term; a term havinga mediating tunctionin humanactivity.It is precisely the mildly heterosemiotic structure theactivitysignsthatallowsus to escape of the abyssof equivocation. Thereis, in f-act. certaindistinction a between sign the andits ref'erent thissemiotic in class. This distinctionis. however,not presentin the caseof fiction, where the signsin m any w a y s a re mo re s i mi l a rto th e re f l exi vesi gnsthat w i l l be di scussed shortly. Now thatthe prclblem fiction heis of beenaddressed, will now turn to the we problemof misleading signs. The problemassociated the term "witch", in with a way.is thereverse theproblemwith "unicorn".ln thecase "unicorn",we of of werevainly lookingfor a ref-erent. the case "witch", we actually havea In of do ref-erent. we f-eel but that we shouldnot. The embarrassment regarding term "unicorn" or the fictitious leading the character Shakespeare's clf tragedyis that we areunsuccessfully lookingfbr a tangible ref-erent. the caseof the term "witch". it is. however. otherway In the round.W e k now th a tth e b e l i e fi n w i tc h c ra tii s an abomi nabl e expressi on of (andevena type of superstition is very repressive woman). superstition that to How canwe. asenlightened unprejudiced and persons. cometo termswith the fact that many tensof thousands humanbeings(the rnajorityactuallywere of f'emale) werepersecuted executed and duringthe l6th and l Tth centuries'/ We are evidentlycaughtin a logicaldilemma,having(so to speak) fblthe lowine two horns:
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I . eitherwe denythe existence witchesandthenhavea (dareI say of for devilishly) hardtime accounting the victimsof eitherthe ruthless zealof inquisition Catholicism the misogynous of or Protestantism or 2. we admitthe existence the victimsof witch persecution then of and we havean evenhardertime gettingthis admittance agreewith to our denialof witchcraft
Could therepossiblybe a third way that allowsus to escape both hornsof the dilemma.I will try an analysis sornewhat line with the preceding in examination of fictive referents. Evenin the case "normal"activity-signs, which is thecategory of Sg, where "witch" shouldbe placed, therecan be, and thereoften will be confusion and disagreement aboutreference. ofien pointedout. the activity signshaveultiAs matelyour activity astheir fleld of ref-erence. With an activity term,we arethus mediatingour activityby relatingonepartof the activity to another part,which, for instance, placed is somewhere in time or space. else In the caseof the conceptwitch,therewere,at the time whenthe concept had its practicaluse,several activity contextsthat were interacting. Firstly,thereis someevidencefor a heathen religiouspracticeof a f'ertilitycult. Secondly. therewas, no doubt,a generalpracticeof "wise ladies" servingas lay doctors, midwifes,who possibly alsohelped limit the numberof child birthsby birth to control and inducedabortion.Thirdly, there was the dreadof black magic amongthe superstitious population, instance for exerted the "evil eye" by a as womanwith a strongphysiognomic appearance. Finally,the church(Catholic and Pr<ltestant unholy agreement), in because the inheritedMosaic prclhibiof tion of witchcraft,produced powerfulmyth of the diabolicand perverted the alliance between Satan and lusttulandevil womanwho wereto be persecuted aswitches.'5 Thus, in the caseof the term "witch", the problemis not that a ref'erent is lacking.In fact, we havea quite normalcongruence between objectof ref-eran
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enceon the meaninglevel of activity and the object of a most tangibleand dreadfulactionon the operational level. It is. after all, mainly because these of operational consequences the poor women that we cannotdeny that the for term hasa ref'erent. Therecertainlywas a ref.erent; term had a quite tangibledenotation. the The problem originates.however,in the generalunequivocalityof reference. Besidesreferringto the specificpersonplacedon the top of a fire, the term "witch" can ret'erto phenomena attached sucha woman or at leastbelieved to to be so. ln fact, besides simpledenottttion a term, thereis often a much more the of l-luidsurrounding semioticareacalled connotationthat is also a part of the meaningof the term.That was.in a way,what Fregewasattempting describe to (Bedeutung) sense (Sinn). in his distinction ref-erent of and In my opinion, therearetwo waysof dealing problems with thesemiotic that originate the clashbetween in diff'erent meaningsystems. The first strategy is relativism andthe second realism. is The strategy relativism of denies possibility makinga decisive the of choice betweeninterpretations a disagreement. in That is, fbr instance, consethe quence the relativistic of positions linguisticformalismand of sociological of relativisrn.Ofien theserelativisticprotagonists talking about different are just worldsor universes, like the modal logicianwho, however, will generally stick cautiously the difl-erent to worlds asa technical tool. The strategy realism.on the other hand,takeson the responsibiiity of of attemptingto provide a verdict aboutwhethera certainref-erence corrector is not. Because, course, reference of a neednot be correct.eitherits denotation or its connotation be misleading misled. natural can and In science, suchdisagreententis part of the game,and in the next chapter, examinehow attempts we are madeto solvedisagreements this fleld.The question, in however, evenlnore is complicated whenwe aredealing with theactivitysigns. They areconfined a to certain context activityandto makea comparison contradicting of of meanings implies.theref ore.a comparison contradictory of contexts activity. of In the case about the witches, we have preciselysuch a contradiction between. the one hand.the activity systemthat existedin the late Middle on Agesandin theso-called of rationalism era and,on the otherhand,our contemporarysystemfrom which we aretalking now.
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Anotherexample from theologythat we canexamineis the term "The holy spirit". Within the Christianmeaningsystem,this is supposed ref-er a to to divineentity,which is. as decreed the dogmaof trinity,at the sametime an by partof the one andonly God. From my atheisindividualagentandan integral pointof view,thereis no room in my ontologyfor a spetic, activitytheoretical cific areaof divinity. Therefore, term "The holy spirit" is to be understood the asan activityterm,a termusedin the specific activityof religious lif-e."" In this analysis, term doesnot ref'er what is believed the Christian the to by prayingto sucha supernatural congregation entity (or possiblysemi-entity or evena third-of--an-entity). correctreferentis the religiousphenomena The that areactuallypresent duringprayerand worship. The verdict that the right interpretation the term "witch" rs the one made of by us andnot theoneof the "Hammerof witches", because arethejudgesin we a position enlightenment, beencorrectly of has criticised ethnocentrism. The as question an adherent a criticalrealismthenremainswhetherthereareany fbr of non-circular, ethnocentric criteriato iudeewhether ref-erencemisledor not. a is 5.5.3.4 The Signsof Reflexivity - Meta-signs ln t his las ts ubse c ti o n ,w i l l d i s c u s s ta -s i g ns,category si gnsthati s I me a of just as troublesome the signswithcluta specificref-erent with an ambiguas or just ousor a misleading ref'erent. This category includes signsthatarespecific. as werethe signsin the domainof the signsof naturalscience and the activity signs.However, this category consists the signsthat not only in themselves of arespecific, whoseref'erent alsoa specific but is sign. In a previous section, introduced distinction I a heterosemiotic between and homosemiotic signs. wascharacterised strongly Sn as heterosemiotic, because the referents thesesignsaretotally outsidethe areafrom which they origiof nate.Sg is only mildly heterosemiotic, because ref-erents its belongindeedto anotherfield than the signsthemselves. However,the field of the ref'erents. b eing uns pec if icsi g n s ,i s n o t th a t m u c h d rffe r entfrom the nei ghbouri ng d om ainof t he s pe c i fi c i g n s .In b o th c a s e sw e c an di sti ngui sh s , si betw een -tn andref-erent from their categorical status alone. However. meta-signS, arehomo-semiotic. Sq, The meta-signs not necessarily are autological, the sense Grelling.but in of all autological signsarehomo-semiotic, homosemioticism a qualitythat and is is complicated enough.
38s
The meta-signs appear instance constituents what Tarsky" called for as of meta-languages. They alsoappear, however, unlormalised in languages. Here they can causeso much confusionthat logicianslike Russell.Grelling and Tarskyhaveinstigated procedures draconian againstany attemptof self--reference,by confiningthemin a state captivity. of eitheras members meta-lanof guages ascompulsory or residents a restricted of logicaltype. What then is the scandalous behaviourof the meta-signs? The disorderly aspectof their semiotic function is relatedto the cumbersome paradoxes attached their potentialof self--reference. otherclasses signs,being to The of mildly or stronglyheterosemiotic, not have this potentialof pointing to do (at themselves leastnot in a logicalflagrantdirectmanner). This, however. is precisely only the possible, sometimes not but eventhe actualbehaviour the of m et a- s igns . Let us look at oneof the mostcommonmembers thisclass, seemingly of the innocentword "word". In fact,the introductorysentence beforethe present one revealsthe scandalous affinity fbr self-ref-erence this particularsign.In this of sentence, word "word" is usedasan attribute itself.This fact of the predithe of catelogic of this term showsthat it hasa very peculiarref'erence. areferIthas encethatis not only hclmosemiotic. in f-act, but autological. I will defineautoktpyin accordance with Grelline" to mean:
Thata signis a member its own extension. of
If we examineour little sign "word", it is in fact ref-erring words.The term to is a concept, universal a whosefunctional valueis that it canref-er any word. to Thus,it can evenref-er itself.And. this scandalous to violationof decent semiotic conduct madein thefollowrngproposition: is
The word "word" is itselfaw,ord.
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A readernot broughtup with the tabooof self-ref'erence was issuedby that Russell may indeed why it is sucha terriblesin to makeuseof a self-relerask ring sentence. Well, the whole orderlydualisticworld of formal logic is indeed severely threatened any caseof self-reference. by Self-ref-erence really boilis ing over with perpetual regress self-contradiction. and The typical caseis the paradoxof the Liar. Here.the antiqueCretanEpimenides makesthe following disastrous propositionfbr all loeicians consider: to
(1.theCretan Epimenides assert that:)All Cretans liars"" are
The tantalising attribute this assertion not that we can bejustifiablyin of is doubt aboutits truth or talsity.The crucialquestionis not whetherEpimenides or all the inhabitants the delightfulislandof Creteshouldbe characterised of as eithermendacious truthful.The eventual or mendacity one,several all the of or Cretans actually thetopicat all. is not The semiotic scandal a consequence the humanmeaning is of system itself. And, that is revealed the fact that this enigmatic by Epimenides afterall. a is, flctivecharacter, cannot subject anypoliceinterrogation, detector who be to lie testor mentalexamanyway. The dilemmain which we arecaughtis demonstrated first supposing by the proposition be true,andsecond to examining underthepresumption its falit of sity.In eithercase. turnsinto a hopeless -contradiction. it self Supposing sentence be true,it mustrefer,based its autolo-eical the to on construction, its originator. to Epimenides, he happens be a Cretanhimself. as to Thus,the verdictof the sentence thathe.the asserting is person, a liar.Howis r0" ever.bv the very supposition its truth.the sentence of impliesits or,vn t-alsity. We arenot muchbetter starting off with thealternate supposition thef alsiof ty of the proposition. thatcase. In someCretans boundto be truthfurl. are SLrpposethatEpimenides happens be oneof these. to Further, theautology the by of sentence, tellsus that he is himselfa liar.Again,we arecaughtin a vicious he andperpetual self-ref-erence. eitherhe is truthtulin the assertion. truthFor but ful in admittinghis own mendacity. thereby and denouncing truth anyway, the
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or he is lying andthereby declaring himselfto be tellingthe truth,which however impliesthat he is at the sametime lying and not lying at all. I shall stop herebeforeunnecessarily magnifying the headache my poor of reader(not to mentionmy own), passing to the relevance this irritating cln of paradox. The importance partly in logic and semiotics is itself,whereit hasbeena not yet detonated theoretical bomb,sincethe realisation the logicalimplication of The attempts disby Russell aroundthe beginning the twentieth of century. to arm the bomb havebeenmostlyto issuedraconian laws of semioticapartheid like Russell'stheory of types'"'or Tarsky'sdistinctionbetweenobiect and meta-language. "" I believe thisstrategy, howeverunderstandable,an expression thedualis of ism of logicalformality.It consists on the one hand,an astonishingly of, successful ability to find andcreate order.and,on the otherhand,a Jungian shadow, a frugal, ritualisticrepression ambiguity.This irrationaltendencyto of replacefertile lif-ewith barrenordercan be interpreted a compulsoryneuroas sis of a ratiortalism that is terrifiedby the logical chaosof humanexistence. Further, this chaos, ironicallyenough, cannot confinedto the slovenlyconbe ditionsof ordinarylife. as eventhe disciplines mathematics logic seern of and to havebeeninf'ested. can neitherbe sureof avoidingcontradictions We inside the informalmeaning system daily lif-e, evenwithin the seemingly of nor saf-e borders formal system. of "'r
5.6
Semiotics and Dialectics
We arenow aboutto complete this tortuous circumnavigation the semiotic of domains. very importanttopic. however. A hasbeenmentioned only in passing; the relationbetweenthe interactivity and reflexivity associated with the semiotic aspects humanactivity. of
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Semioticinteractivity is a reversal the "normal" behaviour signs. of of This refersto their status beingmerelya reflectionof their referents of and therefore ontologically causally and secondary them.This reversal to consistsof a feedback trorn the activity relatedto the sign,a f'eedback changing the stateof the objectthat is the referent the sign. of
Semiotic reflexivity is an even more radicalbreakfrom classical semiotics,namelythe autology a sign;it is the phenomenon a sign ref'erclf of ring to itself.
Both phenomena. we haveseen, abhonedby dualisticlogic. Neveras are theless, shalltry to demonstrate both are of centralimportance the traI that to ditionof dialectics. thusto thetheorvof activitv. and
5.6.1 InteractivityandDialectics
We will startwith the a-semiotic objectfield of naturalscience, On. one of theontcllogical domains listedin the previous main section. this objectfield. In thereare no signs,and therefore interactivity the kind defined.Conseno of quently, thereis no traceof dialectics the sense in usedin thistreatise. posThe tulateof the interconnection betweeninteractivity and dialectics thus supis portedby the lack of the presence eitherin the naturalworld. of Proceeding the field of human affairs,we first enterthe domain of the tcl unspecific signs. Here,theremay be interactivity the sense U. in thatan unspecific sign is notjust a passive ref-lection its ref-erent: former can influence of the th e lat t er . his is t h e c a s ew i th p s y c h o l o g i c as ymptoms, hi ch w ere menT l w tionedas an example unspecific of signs. Accordingto Freud. originator the of psychoanalysis"'',symptomis a manifest a psychological phenomenon ref'erring to another phenomenon, hiddento the subject because repression. of Further,fbr the bearer. is a latent it phenomenon. to be moreprecise, repressed or a p er s onalit y onf li c t.O b v i o u s l y th e s y mp to mi s a si gn of the type P ei rce' " ' c , calledan index;the signis acausaleffectof the repressed personality contlict.
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This primary relationis explained Freudthroughhis conceptof thepritnun' by gain of'cts\,mptom', functionsas a way of relieving its bearerof someof the it burdens theconflict. of Freud.however, proposed that therewas a secondary relationbetween the basicconflict and the symptomthat it produces, phenomenon calledthe a he goin o.f'a,s1,mptom. is a t-eedback secondart' This causality,implying that the very existence the symptomhasan eff-ect the surroundings the person of on of in question, especially because the reactions the peoplewith whom he or of of sheis in contact. Thus.a sign,evenan unspecific sign that is unintended and eithertotallyor partlyunconscious, be muchmorethana mirror of reality; can it can be an active.interactive partof reality. The secondary gain of the symptom, iilthoughnot directlyinfluencing source. its may havea causalinfluence anywayon thecontextin which it exists. The specificsigns,referringto the next areato be discussed, however are rnuchmoreinteresting respect interactivity. in to SNJ a special is herewe havea basicheterosemioticity, case, which is a defining characteristic, blockinginteractivityand thus makingthe term dialectics meaningless this field. Again,we seethe simultaneous of interactivity in lack andof dialectics. qualityof the natural This decisive will sciences be examined thoroughly the nextchapter. in provides with the mostvigorous Su. on thecontrary, us examples interacof tivity. Namely,thereis two-way traffic betweenthe meaningsystemand its operational counterpart. as in the case U itself.signsarenotjust passive Just of ref-lections reality.Instead. of they aredecisive constituents besides that being intluencedby their ref-erents themselves are ofien capableof influencingtheir ref'erents return.To be more precise.the assertion both directionsof in of causality somewhat is hypostasic. whatwe seeis, in fact,the dynermic for evolution of activity,an evolution that is at the sametime attached its significato tive andoperational aspects constituents. and ln the previouschapter, criticisedthe theory of ref-lection its partial I for returnto serniotic dualisrn; deprives it ideas materiality definingthemas of by merereflections materiality. of Thereis an importantexpression the interacof tivity of theactivitysignsthatcanbe seen whenwe studythe influence ideas of in history. This will be a majorthemein the final chapter sociology on andpsychology.However,here I will restrictmyself to asserting that the dialecticsof
390
our concepts shouldnot be limited to the historyof ideas. but mustbe broadenedto the whole process history.be it "material"or "social". of A very interesting part of Sg concerns sciences anthrclpology. the of Here. the phenomenon interactivityshouldbe understood a feedback of as relation:a theoryaboutan anthropological objectflres backon this object,therebyreversing the original relationof causeand effect.For example.the theoryof market economics formulated Smith"'o by evidentlyhasbeenone of the main factors influencingmoderneconomiclife. Likewise,the theoryof Marx hasundeniably influencedthe course our historyfor morethana century'. of In markedcontrast the naturalsciences, anthropological to the sciences do not just reflect,but alsooften interactwith their objectfield. This tact will be discussed thenextchapter. in
5.6.2 Reflexivity and Dialectics

Strictly speaking. haveonly reflexivity in the semioticdornainSg,the we ref-lexive signsor the meta-signs. However, this quality (which was examined in a previous sub-section semiotic on categories) existsin the meta-theory also of anthropology. This is not a contradiction, because meta-theory this belongs, in fact.to the category 55 whenits ref-erent anthropology, of is which is mainly a part of Sg. The meta-theory anthropology, of therefore,hasthe potentialof reflexivity.and indeed,we often find that logical and semioticproblemsare characteristic thisrelation. of Being a part of anthropology, and in this respect even a part of the object field of anthropology, anthropological an meta-theory can be self-ref-erring. andthuscapable producing tiresome of the problems andparadoxes discussed above. Of specificimportance that sucha reflexivemeta-theory end in either is can c ircularity or self--refutation. If we takethe Whorfianepistemology an example, can be described as it as an inconsistent theory,because reflexivequality makesit selt'-refuting. its If any thesisaboutrealityis alreadydetermined the structure language, by of even theWhorfianmeta-theory subject thiscondition. is to However. thatcase is in it only expressing specific a aspect its own language, not sayinganything of and abouttheobjectmatterto which it is seemingly, albeitvainly,referring.
391
The sameproblemis associated with the theories sociological of relativism, andapparently, evenwith thetheories psychologicalrelativism. of 'Ihe meta-theory Marxism hasofien beencriticisedfor beingplaguedwith of the sanre problemof reflexivity.""This Marxian meta-theory, which I largely to adhere. suggests matters theoryarean expression matters the practhat of of of tical life. If, however. this meta-theory be reduced the status beinga can to of mere reflectionof the struggles the mundane of world of practice,it has no independent truth value. This criticism,however,is relevantonly in regards a vulgar misunderto standing Marxistmeta-theory. meta-theory I defendis the dialectics of The that clf history,wherewe not only find a reflexive,but even an interactive relation. Thus, the evolutiottoJ',socielr the evolutionoJ'thetheoriesrl'societie.s and are related a way morecornplicated expressed vulgarMarxism. in than in Not only is the theoryinfluenced the societyin which it is formed.but by alsosocietyis itselfsusceptible the influence the theorydescribing as to of it. we just sawin thepreceding sub-section. In fact.the Marxianmeta-theory based theprincipleof thedialectics is on of theoryandpractice. According thistenet, to sociological theoryis, in f'act, partl y a r ef lec t ion th e s o c i e ty n w h i c h i t i s d e v e loped, i t i s al soone of the of i but mediators which society changed. by is Thus.the oblectlevelof societal processes. theoretical the levelof developing and understanding processes, the meta-theoretical these and levelol'elucidatingthe rvay sociological meta-theory developed all interacting. is are We changeclursocietypartly throughsociological theory.and we get an understanding our own theorythroughour experiences how the theoryfield of of interacts with its objectfield. The way to understand dialectics the anthropological the of sciences, however,will be postponed thenextchapter. to
392
Notes
I Pragmatics alsoan ambiguous is term.It is, on the one hand,the nameof a phrlosophicalschoolthat asserts that the matterof truth is derivableto matterot'plactice,andon theotherhand.it is a subfield linguistics of thatstudies useo1'lanthe guagewithin a socialcontext. is in this lattersense It thatI suggest thererntis that ref-erring the relationbetweenthe subjectand the sign.tctstress intportancc to the of signsassocialmediators. 2 In f'act, thushavetwo kinds of object-directed r.r,e relations: a. sub.iect-s i gn-object the si gni ficative (mediated ob.l : ect-rel ation ) and (immediate) b. subject-object: operational the object-relation. 3 4 -5 6 7 tt 9 l0 II l2 l3 l4 l-5 l6 17 Hypostacing the conceptual of ascribing status objecthood a pheis act the of to n o m e n o l t . e e2 . 2 . 3 . 2 ) ls (Matthewsl9l2). Platois discriminating between errle=forms t,itleui=ideas. and Fron IPhaedo (Mathews1972, 7-5b] 66). From [Phaedo 75dl (ibid..p. 69). (Hege1969, 82). l 1 ( H e g e l1 9 6 9 , 8 4 ) . 1 ( H e g e l1 9 6 9 , t t O ) . l See(Leff 1970). Positivisnr briefly describedin the subsection History ot' Meta-screnccis the ( 6 . 6 . l )i n t h en e x tc h a p t e r . ( D o w t y ,D . R . ,W a l l ,R . E .& P e t e r s , . 1 9 8 1 ) . S The semiotics Freseis discussed section of in -5.2. (Tarsky95l ). l (Davidson1984), (Schiff'er 1987b). The Ceti-project described (Sagan1973). is in As with the scepticism regardinginter-planetary empathy.there is also u idespread doubtin culturalanthropology aboutthe existence inter-r'ultuntl of understanding. l8 19 T h e s c e p t i c i s m .o w e v e ri.s n o t a b s o l u t eb u t m e r e l yd i r e c t e d g a i n se r r i p i r i c a l h , a t knowledge. opposed purelycognitive as to knowledge. The crisisemerged with the paradoxes set theory and the relatedproblerr ot' of continuity, andalsoas a resultof the abandonment ol'anyontological pretensi()ns fbr Euclideangeometryafter the discoveryof non-Euclidean geometries: see ( D a v i s H e r s h1 9 8 6 ) . &
20 2l
(Rogers1971 196-210). , I havecliscussed these disciplines (Karpatsch 1992.9j). in of
393
22
In any formalism,thereis a tacit assumption somebody of making at leastthe formal caseof the sign,the meaning-less symbolsof the play.Nevertheless, these sign-producers users. and ofcourse. cannotbe understood fiom the standpoint of formalism.Formalismis based an incomplete on metaphor, metaphor the the of piecesandthe rulesof a transcendent gamethat playsby itself,without players, clr with players thataremarionettes controlled thetranscendent by game.
23 24 25 26
S e ef b r i n s t a n c ( R o g e r s9 l 1 . 5 7 ) . e l This is true in the caseof Montague. However.therearealsoagnosticor even idealistversiclns logicalfbrmalism. of (Barwise Perry.l9ll3). & I havefbcr-rsed Whorf because main share the thesis his merit.Sapir's on the of is strongassociation with the thesisis due to the ratherirrelevant fact that Whorf's education was as a chemicalengineer andhis prof'ession as an officer of a fire was
2l 29 30 3I 32 33
insurance firm. (see SchultzI 990). ( W h o r f1 9 5 6 . 6 1 ) . The conception the semiotic of triangleis thusbased the epistemic on inclividualism thatwascriticised theprevioLrs in chapter. (Chomsky1966,1972). (Fodor 98. 3 l4). 1 l
2t3 (Whorf1956. 56). 1
Someof thesemiotic implications psychoanalysis treated 5.6.1. of are in (Berger Luckman1967 & ). 3.,1 (Garfinkel1987).. 3 - s ( H a r r 61 9 9 3 . ) s - 1 6 ( H a b e r r n a1 9 8 4 - 8 9 ) . 3l 38 (Peirce. Collected works V:,102), herequored fiom (Ayer r968.49). (Peirce. collectedworks v:zll2), herequoted fiom (Ayer r968,62). ( P u r n a m9 l t 0 .2 4 _ 5 ) . l
39 -10 (PutnamI 9tt0.271). :l I I am herethinkingof Rosch'sprototypetheoryof concepts (Rosch 1913). 12 43 44 45 46 4l 4fi 19 A ctlmmon. but flawed English name fbr this school is the Socio-Historical School. (ibid.. .-57) p (Frege 962. 966). 1 1 (Leontiev1973:180, author's translation from theGerman edition). (ibid p I 8 l . author's translation fiom theGerman edition). (Frege1975.27). (ibid.p.4,1. author's translation fiom theGerman edition). (Frege 1916,96).
-50 (Prebensen 1987).
394
5l 52 ( G a d a m e1 9 6 5 ,1 7 8 ) . r
Characteristically, of the first triumphsof AI was the accomplishment tr.vo one of of its foundingfathers, Simon& Newell.They designed general problemsolver. a a specificimplementation which started make proofs of the sentences of to of PrincipictMathematicc, that is. of the seminalwork in logicalfbrmalism that u,as the directott.spring Frege'swork (Newell & Simon 1912). of
-53 An example theproject Nar've of of Physics Cognitive in Science Have ( 198-5 is s r. His projectpointsout that a lot of physicalknowledge,in everydaylif'eas u ell as in science, an implicit logicalpresupposition a sophisticated. unfirrnruhas of but latednaturalscience, rathercomplicated a body of partly tacit knowledge. 54 56 51 58 59 60 6l 62 63 (Wittgenstein 196l, 1974). ( S p e r b e r & i l s o n1 9 8 6 , 3 5 ) . W 1 (Shannon Weaver1964). & See(Petrovsky 1990:366ff). (Leontiev, Leontiev Judin 1984). & Elkonin(1971). L o m o w ( 1 9 7 8 , 9 8 01 9 8 2 , 9 t l 4 ) . 1 . l ( P o l a n y i 9 5 8) . | On the other hand,thereis operationality without significality,because human as beings.we still havethe pre-mediated activityof our phylogenic pastas a behavioural resource and possibilitya retreat.This is thus an importantargument against significationistic the idealismof for instance symbolicinteractionism or pragmatics Habennas. theuniversal of 64 6s 66 6l 68 69 70 7| 12 13 See(Leff l9l0). (Ibid., . 106). p ( l b i d . ,p . 2 5 6 ) . (Koflka. 1950). (Gibson1956,I 966, 1979). From the treatise"On Universal".here quotedfrom (Wippel & Wolter 1969, t92f). (Aristotle1968). (Matthews1912). From (.Sr;pft 256a),here quotedfiom (MatthewsI 972.234). i.sr: For cladistics (Ridley l9tl6). see JensMammen( 1983) defined has two category systems calledsensory categories and categories choice.The lattertype coversthe classiflcation humanpracof clf tice. 74 ( Schifl-er1987a, writesthatthis class petsbelongs several 67) of to species within the family Leporidae,the unifying quality being sirnply that they have been domesticated pets. as 75 (Schifl'er l9ll7a). -5-5 (Grice 1957. 386).
39s
, l6 ( l b i d . p . 6 5 ) . 77 Schifferis heremainly ref-erring Fodor,mentioned p.21. to on (Cupta,Siridis& Gaines1977). 7 8 (ZarJdy,l96-5). 79 ( r b i d . ) . 80 ( R o s c h1 9 7 8 ) . 8 l (Lakoff& Johnson 1980). 82 This fact is demonstrated fiom a modernpoint of view by the unorthodoxcontent of thetwo Hegelian treatises logic (Hegel1911& 1969b). on
8 3 In Popper's furiousattackon Hegel,this point is regrettably overlooked. There

are.in fact,many reasonable targets criticismin the philosophy Hegel,but of of Popperis trivialising own attackby ignoringthe philosophical of Hegel, his aim nanrelv overcome dualisnr western to the of rationalism. Granted, this aim is not within reachof the absolute idealism Hegel,and eventhis very objective of ntay be mistaken. However, is still a mostrelevant it alternative the barren to alleysof lbrmalistic rationalism. 114 The reversal expressed Marx as"turning Hegelupsidedown". is by ( M a r x1 8 5 7 ) . U5 86 A monograph treatingMarx's conception the relationbetween categories of the of "concrete" and"abstract" fbundin (ll.lenkov is 1982). modernphilosopher A who has given an originalcontribution this understanding abstraction conto of and cretisation ontologicalprocesses as is Sive (1916).
n7 u8
( D a w y d o wl 9 t i g ) . The reader. however, may wonderhow a naturalentity,seemingly belongingto the aserniotic natural world,canbe a sign.Here,the strictdefinititin a dividingline of must be kept in mind. The very'moment that AIDS comesinto contactwith a human.it loses manyof its characteristics an entityof thenatural as world.All the attributes AIDS that are influencedby the humanworld belongto this, but not of the qualities AIDS. They will be a part of the humanworld. For instance. of the geneticcodeis pre- and a-anthropological. sameargument The could be carried throughfor the nuclear plant.wherelikewisetherewill remainqualities fixed as belonging thenatural to world.
89
Both of theselettersare,of crourse. constituents the region ref-erred by S. It of to shall eventuallybe shown that they belong to that sub-region S that is the of domainof the nreta-signs, specific the signsthathaveotherspecificsignsastheir ref-erent.
90 9l
(Sperber Wilson 19ti6.60f). & By the conceptthe sublated old, I mean the modificationof an old category brought about by a categol'ythat has emergedfiom the ori-sinalcategory,the unsublated old. Thus,the first bifurcationof the (unsublated) and the (enrerold gent)new is lbllowedby a new branchof the elevated thatis, in a wav,a secold ondarvelevation.
396
92

An implicationis that the fbrmalisticapproaches anthropology to mustevenbe catastrophically misguided. proposition A thatwill be def'ended a laterscctiep in oncognitivc cience. s The termsheterological autological and wereintroducecl the logicianGrellinc by in ctlnnectictn with the problems self'-ref-erence. paradox Grellins'shcof The of terology concept discussed (Valpolal9-53). is in (Huizinga 970). 1
93
94
9-5 ( Henningsen973). I 96 An attemptto discuss religionfrom a culturalhistoricalpoint of view u,aspubjournalof psychology Schultz l 990). lishedin a Danish ( by 97 (Tarskyl9-5 ). I 9ti 99 (Valpolal9-53). (Hofstridterl9U0) is, in a way. a monograph this paradox. on | 00 There are someartificialitiesto be addedin order lor the paradoxto work. Th Lrs. the meaning liar cannot ref'erring a person of be to whoselackof trustworthincss is based our insecurity a specific on in instance aboutwhether asserted the senrelrcc is falseor true.Instead. meaning the shouldbe thatwe areconfionted with a co1sistent who would neverdreamof spoilinghis reputation f irnt mendacitr liar of br l0l evertellinga truth. ( R u s s e l1 9 1 7 ) . l
102 (Tarsky9-5l). l 103 The irnpossibility securing rich, fbrmal systemfrorn self-conrraclictiep of yirs a discovered Gcidel, (Rogerslgj l). by see 104 (Freud 1976). 105 (Peirce1992). 106 (Smith 1976\. 107 (Popper1957).

Karpatschof Meaning of Activity

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Karpatschof Meaning of Activity

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Part II: Theory of Knowledge Chapter 5: The Meaning of Activity. The Semiotics of Activity Theory Pp.

5. The Meaningof Activity

Signs arephenomena and ob.jectscurrving meaning.

Ch.5: The Meaning of Activity

Part II: Theory of Knowledge

Ch.5: The Meaning of Activity

The specificdisciplines dedicated theseaspects to are:

Part II: Theory of Knowledge

The Triangle of Meaning

or Subject "0"*fll,Xl.i:Pect Object

Ch.5: The Nleaning of Activity

Part II: Theory of Knowledge

The OntologicalStatusof Meaning

Ch.5: The Meaning of Activity

We shallstartwith the positionthat hypostaces3 intension, very category the of meaning.

5.1.1 Absolute Idealismothe Hypostacy of Meaning in itself

Part II: Theory of Knowledge

Ch.5: The Meaning of Activity

The Triangle of Meaning according to Absolute Idealism

5.1.2 Extensionalism,the Hypostacy of the Object

Part II: Theory of Knowledge

The Triangle of Meaning according to Extensionalism

Ch.5: The Meaning of Activity

Part II: Theory of Knowledge

'Snowis white' rstrue in Enplishif andonly if snowis white.

Ch.5: The Meaning of Activity

Part II: Theory of Knowledge

Ch.5: The Meaning of Activity

That meaning is grounded in something out.sidethe humun user,t.

Part II: Theory of Knowledge

5.1.3 Formalism, the Hypostacy of the Sign

Ch.5: The Meaning of Activity

Part II: Theory of Knowledge

The Triangle of Meaning according to Logical Formalism

operational aspect of Activity

Ch.5: The Meaning of Activity

Part II: Theory of Knowledge

Ch.5: The Meaning of Activity

Part II: Theory of Knowledge

Ch.5: The Meaning of Activity

The Triangle of Meaning according to Linguistic Formalism

Part II: Theory of Knowledge

Ch.5: The Meaning of Activity

5.1.4 Subjectivism,the Hypostacy of the Subject

Part II: Theory of Knowledge

The Triangle of Meaning according to PsychologicalSubjectivism

Ch.5: The Meaning of Activity

The Triangle of Meaning according to SociologicalSubjectivism

Part II: Theory of Knowledge

Ch.5: The Meaning of Activity

In the next quotation,however,we find a more careful, dialectical(rather thanrelativistic)theoryof knowledge:

5.1.5 Putnam's Realism as an Integrated Theory of Meaning

Part II: Theory of Knowledge

Ch. 5: The Meaning of Activity

(thescientifically extension established denotation a termor of expression).

5.1.6 The Theory of Meaning in the Cultural Historical Schoola2

Part II: Theory of Knowledge

Ch.5: The Meaning of Activity

Part II: Theory of Knowledge

meaning as externalised sense and senseas internalised meaning

Ch.5: The Meaning of Activity

Part II: Theory of Knowledge

Whole and Part in Semiotics - the Hermeneutical Circle