Philosophical Review

The Logic of Religion by Joseph M. Bochenski Review by: William L. Rowe The Philosophical Review, Vol. 76, No. 4 (Oct., 1967), pp. 533-536 Published by: Duke University Press on behalf of Philosophical Review Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2183295 . Accessed: 28/06/2012 04:59
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BOOK REVIEWS

as merely verbal shadow battles, in which the parties are spokesmen only for unconscious psychic forces. No metaphysician is allowed by Lazerowitz to explain the persistence of a dispute by the blindness of his opponent to the truth of any propositions or the force of any arguments. We are sternly warned against "resorting to such transparent rationalizations as that philosophers fail to see their glaring mistakes because they are wanting in wit or that philosophers who are made to see their mistakes won't admit themselves to be in error because of stubborn pride, and the like." But in recognizing that this very theory of his own will be rejected by most philosophers, Lazerowitz attributes the rejection to "an emotional retreat from understanding" which leads otherwise able thinkers to misconceive and misjudge his arguments and so blinds them to the truth of his doctrine. He takes comfort in Freud's assurance that "the voice of truth is soft but persistent and eventually makes itself heard." Lazerowitz' voice is persistent but not soft. He has the "obsessive, and repetitive manner" that he finds in Bradley's Appearance Reality, where he takes it as a sign of a preoccupation with "the expression and gratification of needs buried deep in the mind." But this is as would be to Lazerowitz, unfair to Bradley as the tempting tu quoque whose conclusions on metaphilosophy and on the other important topics of this book-logical necessity, value, space-deserve the careful and reasoned treatment that he asks for his own opinions but seems inconsistently to deny to those of other philosophers past and present.
RENFORD BAMBROUGH

St John's College,Cambridge THE LOGIC OF RELIGION. By JOSEPH M. BOCHENSKI, O.P. New York, New York University Press, I965. Pp. x, I79. $5.00. This book is about religious discourse (RD), not religion. In the course of the book Professor Bochenski endeavors (i) to prove that general logic can be applied to RD (Chapter II, "Religion and Logic"); (2) to describe the formal structure of RD and the logical relations between RD and profane discourse (Chapter III, "The Structure of Religious Discourse"); and (3) to discuss certain fundamental problems concerning the meaning and justification of RD (Chapter IV, "Meaning of RD," and Chapter V, "Justification of RD"). 533

BOOK REVIEWS RD, apparently, is a certain class of sentences used by groups belonging to various religious traditions. The members of these groups use profane discourse (PD) as well. The most important part of RD is a certain subclass whose members constitute the creeds of various religions. In fact, apart from reference to the creeds, Bochenski gives us no criterion for determining whether a given sentence is a member of RD. By a logic of religious discourse Bochenski means two things: (i) the application to RD of the laws and rules of logic that apply to any discourse involving propositions, and (2) the development of special logical-formal, semiotic, and methodological-tools, which may be needed for the analysis of RD. Although he does little in this book to develop any special logical tools for RD, Bochenski does stress the importance of such an undertaking. Analogous to developments in deontic logic, with their special application in the field of morals, the author envisions, but does not here develop, special logical tools for the analysis of RD. The applicability of general logic to RD depends, Bochenski maintains, on whether in uttering at least some sentences in RD the believer is asserting propositions. if no sentences in RD express propositions, For then general logic cannot be applied to RD-although a special logic might still be developed. In discussing the question of whether RD contains sentences expressing propositions, Bochenski acknowledges that other theories about RD may be partially true. That is, he grants that parts of RD may simply be nonsense, other parts may express emotions, and still other parts may express rules of action. His claim is merely that there is in religion a discourse which is "partly, at least, propositional" (p. 43). Although this claim about RD is very likely correct, the argument given for it is, I am afraid, deficient. Bochenski seems to think it is sufficient to establish only that "some parts of the RD of every religion are intended their users to express and by assert propositions" (p. 41, italics mine). Again, he says, "we are trying to see whether believers do thinkthat they are dealing with and asserting propositions" (p. 41, italics mine). But it does not follow from the fact that someone thinks that in uttering a sentence he is asserting a proposition that he is asserting a proposition. Hence, from the fact that the users of RD thinkthey are asserting propositions it does not follow that the sentences in RD do, in fact, express propositions. Every propositional discourse, we are told, must have some structure. Indeed, certain features present in "modern axiomatic systems" are claimed to constitute part of the structure of every propositional discourse. Three such features are singled out: (i) the class of valid 534

BOOK REVIEWS sentences, called by Bochenski the "objective content"; (2) the class of rules determining which sentences belong to the objective content, called "heuristic rules"; and (3) the metalinguistic statement that every sentence designated by the heuristic rule is valid, called by the content author the "basic assumption." In terms of RD the objective (also called "objective faith") consists of a class of sentences made up of creeds, catechisms, and the like. The heuristic rule in RD, according to Bochenski, "is a meta-linguistic rule and corresponds to the rule by which the axioms are enumerated in logical systems" (p. 6o). Its function is to specify some characteristics of sentences in terms of which their membership in the objective content can be determined. In practically all religions, Bochenski notes, "there is a rule which says that whatever is contained in the Scriptures or in the Creed of that religion belongs to the objective faith" (p. 6o). Finally, it is claimed that there is a basic assumption (basic dogma), "a meta-logical rule, according to which every element of objective faith -that is, every sentence designated by the heuristic rule-has to be accepted as true" (p. 6I). It is not at all clear to me that religious discourse exhibits these three structural features. I should think that it is an empirical matter whether the discourse of a particular religion contains these structural features. But I suspect that Bochenski regards it as an a priori necessity. At any rate, it does seem to be a claim about RD that needs justification. None is given in the book. At one point Bochenski seems to imply that one way of determining the sort of discourse to which a sentence belongs is in terms of the kind of reason taken to support it. Thus in discussing whether there are any sentences which are both religious (p sentences) and profane (7rsentences) he says: The question arises,then, whether one and the same sentencemay be recognized, at the same time, by a subjectfor religiousand for profanereasons? If that be the case, the product of p and r would be non-empty[p. 71]. Bochenski's answer is that the product of p and X need not be empty. I suppose Bochenski's point here is something like the following. There are religious reasons-for example, it is taught in the Bible-for accepting "God is good." But there are also proofs in natural theology for the goodness of God. Presumably, the premises of these proofs would qualify as "profane reasons." If a person accepts "God is good" for both religious and profane reasons, then "God is good" is a member of his RD and PD. What Bochenski fails to note, however, is that 535

BOOK REVIEWS

on this test "God is good" might be a member only of A's PD, a member both of B's PD and B's RD, and a member only of C's RD. For C might not accept "God is good" for any profane reasons, and A might not accept "God is good" for any religious reasons. Thus the question of whether a given sentence in RD is also a sentence in PD seems relative to a given subject. Theorem 24.3 (p. 74) is mistakenly printed as "3! - r np"; it should read "3! - r n - p" (that is, the class of sentences which are neither elements of ir nor elements of p is not null). Also, derived theorem 25.I (P. 77) is mistakenly printed as "(P) - FL(P) D T(P)"; it should read "(P) - F('P) D T(.P)" (that is, if -P is a faith sentence then -P is true). In the chapter on meaning, Bochenski is primarily concerned to develop the alternative positions that may be taken, and only secondarily with the question of the correctness of any given position. Thus, having accepted the principle that a sentence has meaning if and only if there is a method of verifying it, Bochenski develops alternative interpretations of the principle and notes their implications for the meaningfulness of religious discourse. Justification of RD must be distinguished, Bochenski maintains, from justification within RD. The latter is not a problem for the logic of religion since it is in terms of the basic assumption of RD that a given sentence in RD is justified. Problems of a logical sort arise only when the question of the justification of the basic assumption or dogma of RD is raised. Bochenski is perhaps at his best in explaining what these problems are and in describing and examining various theories of justification. An appendix contains an interesting discussion of analogy and authority. WILLIAM L. ROWE PurdueUniversity

CONTRIBUTIONS TO LOGIC AND METHODOLOGY IN HONOR OFJ. M. BOCHENSKI. Edited by ANNA TERESA TYMIENIECKA in collaboration with CHARLES PARSONS. Amsterdam, NorthHolland Publishing Company, i965. PP. xviii, 326. As could be expected in a tribute to J. M. Bochenski, a large variety of topics are covered by these seventeen essays on the occasion of his sixtieth birthday. 536