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OIL DEPENDENCY AMP

Tommy, Fan, Megan Northwestern 08

Index 1
Index............................................................................................................................................................................................................1
Inherency: Dependency Rising / Production Low [1/2]..............................................................................................................................3
Inherency: Dependency Rising / Production Low [2/2]..............................................................................................................................4
Alternative Energy Increases Energy Security............................................................................................................................................5
Ethanol solves Dependency.........................................................................................................................................................................6
National Security/Heg 1AC [1/5]................................................................................................................................................................7
National Security/Heg 1AC [2/5]................................................................................................................................................................8
National Security/Heg 1AC [3/5]................................................................................................................................................................9
National Security/Heg 1AC [4/5]..............................................................................................................................................................10
National Security/Heg 1AC [5/5]..............................................................................................................................................................11
Foreign Policy Extensions [1/5].................................................................................................................................................................12
Foreign Policy Extensions [2/5].................................................................................................................................................................13
Foreign Policy Extensions [3/5].................................................................................................................................................................14
Foreign Policy Extensions [4/5].................................................................................................................................................................15
Foreign Policy Extensions [5/5].................................................................................................................................................................16
Heg Extension............................................................................................................................................................................................17
National Security Extensions.....................................................................................................................................................................18
Foreign Policy- Vacillations.......................................................................................................................................................................19
Foreign Policy- Passivity...........................................................................................................................................................................20
Foreign Policy- Military Intervention........................................................................................................................................................21
Foreign Policy- Military Intervention........................................................................................................................................................22
Foreign Policy- Military Intervention- Iraq proves [1/3]...........................................................................................................................23
Foreign Policy- Military Intervention- Iraq proves [2/3]...........................................................................................................................24
Foreign Policy- Military Intervention- Iraq proves [3/3]...........................................................................................................................25
Foreign Policy- Middle East......................................................................................................................................................................26
Terrorism 1AC [1/5]..................................................................................................................................................................................27
Terrorism 1AC [2/5]..................................................................................................................................................................................28
Terrorism 1AC [3/5]..................................................................................................................................................................................29
Terrorism 1AC [4/5]..................................................................................................................................................................................30
Terrorism 1AC [5/5]..................................................................................................................................................................................31
Terrorism Extensions- Resentment............................................................................................................................................................32
Terrorism Extensions- Funding [1/2].........................................................................................................................................................33
Terrorism Extensions- Funding [2/2].........................................................................................................................................................34
Terrorism Extensions- Disruptions............................................................................................................................................................35
Terrorist Attack Kills the Economy...........................................................................................................................................................36
Oil = Vulnerable to attack [1/3].................................................................................................................................................................37
Oil = Vulnerable to attack [2/3].................................................................................................................................................................38
Oil = Vulnerable to attack [3/3].................................................................................................................................................................39
Terrorists want to attack Oil.......................................................................................................................................................................40
AT: Attack would fail.................................................................................................................................................................................41
AT: Small funding......................................................................................................................................................................................42
Terrorism Impact- War on Terror...............................................................................................................................................................43
Democracy Impact- Shell..........................................................................................................................................................................44
Democracy Impact- Extensions [1/2]........................................................................................................................................................45
Democracy Impact- Extensions [2/2]........................................................................................................................................................46
Democracy Impact- Middle East...............................................................................................................................................................47
Soft Power Impact- Shell [1/2]..................................................................................................................................................................48
Soft Power Impact- Shell [2/2]..................................................................................................................................................................49
Soft Power Impact- Extension...................................................................................................................................................................50
Middle East Impact- Instability.................................................................................................................................................................51
Middle East Impact- Extensions................................................................................................................................................................52
Iran Impact- Nuclear Iran ..........................................................................................................................................................................53
Iran Impact- Heg and Terror......................................................................................................................................................................55
Iran Impact- Iraq war.................................................................................................................................................................................56
Iran Impact - Heg.......................................................................................................................................................................................57
Iran Impact- Shields/ Leverage..................................................................................................................................................................58

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AT: Iran Sanctions...........................................................................................................................................................................59
2
AT: US would win against Iran.......................................................................................................................................................60
Saudi Arabia Impact- Terror Shell [1/2]....................................................................................................................................................61
Saudi Arabia Impact- Terror Shell [2/2]....................................................................................................................................................62
Saudi Arabia Impact- Terror Extensions....................................................................................................................................................63
Saudi Arabia Impact- Heg..........................................................................................................................................................................65
Saudi Arabia Impact- Heg Extensions [1/2]..............................................................................................................................................66
Saudi Arabia Impact- Heg Extensions [2/2]..............................................................................................................................................67
Environment Impact- Shell .......................................................................................................................................................................68
Environment Impact- Extensions...............................................................................................................................................................69
Economy Impact- Shell .............................................................................................................................................................................70
Economy Impact- Extensions....................................................................................................................................................................71
Famine Impact- Shell.................................................................................................................................................................................72
Disruption Impact- cooperation.................................................................................................................................................................74
List of Possible Disruptions.......................................................................................................................................................................75
AT: Domestic Production CP [1/2]............................................................................................................................................................76
AT: Domestic Production CP [2/2]............................................................................................................................................................77
AT: Diversifying Oil Resources Solve Middle East [1/2]..........................................................................................................................78
AT: Diversifying Oil Resources Solve Middle East [2/2]..........................................................................................................................79
AT: SQ solves [1/2]....................................................................................................................................................................................80
AT: SQ solves [2/2]....................................................................................................................................................................................81
AT: Can’t be completely independent of oil..............................................................................................................................................82
No link to DAs...........................................................................................................................................................................................83
AT: Spending..............................................................................................................................................................................................84
Non-Unique- Dependency decreasing.......................................................................................................................................................85
AT: Dependence constrains Foreign Policy...............................................................................................................................................86
AT: Dependence collapses Econ................................................................................................................................................................87
AT: Dependence  Famine.......................................................................................................................................................................88
AT: Countries disrupt Oil ..........................................................................................................................................................................89
AT: Disruptions- Strategic Reserves Solve................................................................................................................................................90
AT: Specific Country is corrupt.................................................................................................................................................................91
AT: Iran would block Straits of Hormuz....................................................................................................................................................92
AT: Iran Disruption....................................................................................................................................................................................93
AT: Dependence  Terror.........................................................................................................................................................................94
AT: oil infrastructure vulnerable................................................................................................................................................................95
AT: Instability ...........................................................................................................................................................................................96
AT: Independence= Social Reform............................................................................................................................................................97
AT: Withdraw from Middle East if decrease oil dependence....................................................................................................................98
AT: US will Attack Iran Post-Energy Security..........................................................................................................................................99
Switch to Alt Energy fails........................................................................................................................................................................100
Switch  Oil Scarcity.............................................................................................................................................................................101
Reducing Dependency Fails- Middle East...............................................................................................................................................102
Reducing Dependence Turns Case- backstopping...................................................................................................................................103
Dependence Good- Heg ..........................................................................................................................................................................104
Dependence Good- Economy..................................................................................................................................................................105
Dependence Good- Stabilize Iraq............................................................................................................................................................106
Dependence Good- US control over Iran.................................................................................................................................................107
Dependence Good - Sanctions.................................................................................................................................................................108
Dependence Good for Iran.......................................................................................................................................................................109
Investment Key for Oil............................................................................................................................................................................110
OPEC Bad (Terror and Economy)...........................................................................................................................................................111

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Inherency: Dependency Rising / Production Low [1/2] 3

Saudi Arabia is unable to increase its production as demand for oil increases
Rutledge 06
(Ian, graduated in Economics and Social Science in the University of Cambridge in 1968. receiving his PhD in Economic History in 1973. He has taught both economics and
sociology in the Universities of London and Sheffield, as well as spending three years working for the British Coal Corporation, “Addicted to Oil: America’s Relentless Drive for
Energy Security”)

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Inherency: Dependency Rising / Production Low [2/2] 4

[Rutledge continues- no text deleted]

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Alternative Energy Increases Energy Security 5

A switch to alternative energy sources increases our energy security ensuring US survival
Committee on International Relations 02 House of Representatives Committee
[“OIL DIPLOMACY: FACTS AND MYTHS BEHIND FOREIGN OIL DEPENDENCY” HEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION 6/20/02 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS, Washington, DC.]
.
Today, the Committee holds a hearing on Oil Diplomacy: The Facts and Myths Behind Foreign Oil Dependency. The national
security of the United States depends on the reliable supply of energy to support our needs. Fluctuating oil prices and instability
in the Middle East once again are prompting calls for energy independence for the United States. The enticing prospect of
freedom from the whims of foreign rulers has been held by every President since 1973 and its infamous Arab oil boycott. Our
energy security is also directly linked with the voracity of OPEC’s demands. OPEC, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries, conspires to fix prices and restrict the supply of crude oil to the world market in order to maximize profits. We must
devise alternate sources of energy and supplies to confront this threat. Yet barring radical changes in our lifestyles, the economy
and technology, our domestic resources alone will continue to fall short of this goal. As Americans, we count on energy to
protect our security, to fuel our cars, to provide heat, air conditioning, and light for our homes, to manufacture goods, and to
transport supplies. In all of these needs, we, as consumers, pay the price for fluctuations in the global energy market. Gas prices
are largely determined by the price of crude oil, which has fluctuated greatly in recent months. Recently, prices at the pump were
as high as $1.73 per gallon for regular unleaded gasoline in Hawaii. Currently, in Chicago the same type of gas sells for on
average $1.58 per gallon. The U.S. Department of Energy reports that this summer’s gas prices are expected to reach the third
highest on record. The United States imports 52 percent of the oil it uses, and as an oil-importing nation, our energy security is
inextricably linked with the political and economic security of our suppliers. Currently, the riskiest factors include: Instability in
the Middle East and Venezuela; Iran’s recent call to all Arab and Muslim nations to use oil as a weapon against the United States;
and Iraq’s recent suspension of oil exports to the U.S., currently amounting to one million barrels of oil per day.
U.S. energy security is not only affected by our imports, but our domestic supplies are an important part of the equation as well.
We must examine why domestic production has been falling over the past 2 decades. Are regulations so overbearing that they
place the energy security of the United States in jeopardy? By increasing our domestic production of energy in both fuel types
and efficiency, we ensure our survival in the event of a catastrophic disruption of world oil supplies. I believe this may be
accomplished through new technology which is much more environmentally sound than in years past. I am pleased that the
President’s National Energy Plan calls for an increase in the Strategic Petroleum Reserve as a means to address an imminent
disruption in supplies and as a national defense reserve. Is energy independence possible or even advisable? Is diversification of
suppliers and types of fuel the answer to the U.S. national energy security? Even if energy independence is not feasible in the
short term, greater energy security certainly is. I believe that the means of achieving that lies close at hand in our own
hemisphere, and I would like to suggest, here and now, the creation of the North American Energy Alliance.

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Ethanol solves Dependency 6

Ethanol solves oil dependency


Timothy E. Wirth, C. Boyden Gray, and John D. Podesta 03 Wirth is President of the United Nations Foundation and a former
U.S. Senator from Colorado. Gray is a partner at Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering and served as Counsel to former President
George H.W. Bush. Podesta is a visiting professor of law @ Georgetown and served as chief of staff to president Bill Clinton
["The Future of Energy Policy" Foreign Affairs July-August 2003, Lexis]

The major breakthrough for the use of bioenergy will lie in the commercialization of chemical and biological conversion
techniques that can make cost-effective use of cellulosic plant material (e.g., corn stalks, wheat straw, rice hulls). Currently,
ethanol is produced from the starch in corn kernels, as opposed to the woody (cellulosic) material in the stalk and leaves.
Conversion of cellulose would enable the use of agricultural waste products, providing a double dividend for farmers (only 50
percent of harvested food and feed crops are used at present). Other materials (grasses, wood wastes, even municipal waste)
could also be utilized. In the long run, crops grown for energy markets -- using sustainable management and consistent with
biodiversity -- could greatly increase the supply of cellulose. The current ethanol industry, based on corn, produced 1.6 billion
gallons of ethanol in 2000, or slightly more than one percent of total gasoline consumption in the United States. Available waste
materials could increase ethanol production by a factor of ten, and low-cost crops grown as ethanol feedstocks could triple that
number yet again. One of the great advantages of ethanol is that it can constitute both a short- and a long-term answer to oil
dependence: long-term, because it will be an efficient and carbon-friendly liquid carrier of hydrogen for fuel cells, when they
become cost-effective; and short-term, because ethanol can be cleanly used as an alternative fuel with today's technology in
blends of up to 85 percent in flexible-fuel vehicles. Importantly, the production of these vehicles -- i.e., cars that can run equally
well on ethanol or gasoline -- is a simple and low-cost adjustment to conventional automotive manufacturing. About four million
such cars and minivans are already on the road.

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National Security/Heg 1AC [1/5] 7

The United States is dependent on oil now


Frost 07 served in Congress from 1979 to 2005,served two terms as chairman of the House Democratic Caucus, the third-ranking
leadership position for House Democrats, and two terms as chairman of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee, serves
as a regular contributor to FOX News Channel and is a partner at the law firm of Polsinelli, Shalton, Flanigan and Suelthaus,holds a
Bachelor of Journalism degree from University of Missouri and a law degree from the Georgetown Law Center.
[Martin, "U.S. Must Get Head out of Sand on Oil Dependency" http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,263284,00.html

Just a little more than a year ago, President Bush pledged to move our nation away from an oil-dependent economy. Like so many
other Bush pronouncements, it turned out to be a statement made for political expediency with no substance or commitment
behind it. Now the new Democratic Congress is appropriately raising the issue of energy dependence and the critical need to free
us from the financial and security risks of an oil-base economy. We will see over the coming months whether Democrats in
Congress are willing to call for the sacrifices and changes that industry and individual Americans must make to actually solve the
problem. The House Committee heard from two extraordinary witnesses – Daniel Yergin, author of the definitive history of the oil
industry, “The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money and Power,” and former CIA Director John Deutch, co-chair of a recent
Council on Foreign Relations task force report on “The National Security Consequences of U.S. Oil Dependence.” Foreign
Affairs Committee Chair U.S. Rep. Tom Lantos, D-Calif., set the tone in his opening remarks. He noted, “With 5 percent of the
world’s population, we are using fully one-quarter of the oil consumed on this planet. Worse yet, the bulk of the stuff is under the
soil of hostile or despotic states, and to get hold of it we are making compromises that undermine our foreign policy.” He added,
“more than 70 percent of the global oil reserves are controlled by countries with which the United States has tenuous and troubled
relations, such as Venezuela, Russia and Saudi Arabia. ... Our insatiable quest for more and more [oil] has got to come to an end.
It is a matter not only of financial stability and environmental imperative, but it also goes to the core of our national security
policy.” Yergin, chairman of Cambridge Energy Research Associates, pointed out that we import 60 percent of the oil we use and
that over the next 25 years world oil consumption could increase by 45 percent with over half of the future growth in world oil
demand taking place in Asia. He echoed Lantos’ concerns by noting that “a good part of the growth in world energy supply after
2010 will occur in countries going through transitions or subject to turbulence.”

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National Security/Heg 1AC [2/5] 8

Oil dependence is driving the US from its foreign policy priorities. Even if we can’t be completely energy independent,
reducing dependence is key to national security
Tom Lantos 7-Former Professor of Economics & Intl’ Affairs Analyst, Chair of House Committee on Foreign Affairs
[“HEARING OF THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE; SUBJECT: FOREIGN POLICY AND NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF OIL DEPENDENCE; ”,
March 22, Lexis]

(D-CA): The committee will come to order. The United States is gorging itself on oil from overseas, a diet that is both
unsustainable and unhealthy and it seriously weakens our nation. With five percent of the world's population we are using fully
one- quarter of the oil consumed on this planet. Worse yet, the bulk of the stuff is under the soil of hostile or despotic states and
to get hold of it we are making compromises that undermine our foreign policy. Any way you slice global oil production along
political lines, the picture is bleak. The non-profit, non partisan NGO Freedom house reports that over half of the world's oil-rich
countries are not democratic. Six of the top ten oil-exporting countries to the United States rank at the bottom third of the world's
list of most corrupt countries, according to Transparency International. And more than 70 percent of the global oil reserves are
controlled by countries with which the United States has tenuous and troubled relations, such as Venezuela, Russia, and Saudi
Arabia. These are the people we cut deals with to satisfy our thirst for oil. Our insatiable quest for more and more of it has got to
come to an end. It is a matter not only of financial stability and environmental imperative, but it also goes to the core of our
national security policy. Take, for instance, our ties with Saudi Arabia. If it were not for U.S. intervention in 1991, the House of
Saud would be nothing more than a villa on the Riviera by now. And because of its petroleum wealth, it continues to enjoy
unwarranted indulgence where U.S. interests are concerned. Blessed with the world's largest proven oil reserves, and riding on a
close relationship between Washington and Riyadh going back some 60 years, Saudi Arabia received a free pass when it was
identified as the home of 15 out of the 19 hijackers on 9/11. And it has bristled at subsequent suggestions by the United States
that it has taken inadequate action against the private financing of terrorist activity within its borders. But since a steady supply
of oil and a stable regime of whatever nature in Riyadh are key to our country's actions in the Middle East, our government does
next to nothing to pursue these matters. Consider, too the latitude we grant Russia, the second largest oil producer after Saudi
Arabia, with increasing amounts of that output coming to the United States. The Administration talks a great game about
spreading democracy and promoting human rights abroad yet refuses to pressure Moscow to reverse its brutal crackdown on
political dissent. Is it because we have a financial stake in the reliability of Russian oil supply, and its guarantee by the state? As
long as Russia uses its energy sector as a foreign policy instrument, it will continue to enjoy the upper hand. It is important to
note that even if the United States completely switched to some other energy source tomorrow and no longer imported a drop of
oil, we would remain vulnerable to oil-related disruptions in the rest of the world. This is because other countries, large and
small, are also hooked on petroleum. China is the second largest consumer of oil after the United States and its oil consumption
is expected to increase from eight percent of world demand today to thirteen percent by the year 2030. To feed its growing
energy needs, China scouts the globe for sources of oil and has come to rely increasingly on supplies from Africa including
Sudan. Is it any wonder that China has been a stubborn impediment to international efforts to pressure Khartoum into bringing its
genocide in Darfur to an end? Similarly as we seek to galvanize international public opinion and to mobilize diplomacy to put an
end to Iran's quest for nuclear arms, we are once again handicapped by the world's dependence on oil. Iran continues to cut
lucrative deals with other countries involving its energy sector which directly benefits Tehran's quest for nuclear weapons. It is
able to do so because the European Union and others are reluctant to compromise their steady oil supply in favor of international
nonproliferation goals. They are willing to flirt with the threat of nuclear disaster to keep the oil flowing. Creating viable and
renewable energy alternatives to oil is clearly a matter of not only U.S. foreign policy interest, but also a matter of global
security. Unfortunately, it took five years for the current administration suddenly to wake up to the fact that the United States is
addicted to oil, as President Bush announced last year. A new office to coordinate international energy priorities was only just
created. I am glad that the Administration finally has acknowledged our energy insecurity, but the rhetoric must be followed by
decisive action. We need to continue to press for higher CAFÉ standards, so that the vast majority of vehicles in the United
States will be more fuel efficient. We have to put real resources into research and development of alternative fuel sources, with
the aim to replace petroleum altogether. And we must immediately step up national efforts at energy conservation which is an
immediate and effective way to wean ourselves away from oil and gas. It is clear that the United States cannot be completely
energy independent. But the goal of reducing our energy dependence is within our reach and stabilizing the supply of energy is
and should remain a key component of United States national security. Our energy and foreign policies are inextricably bound.

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National Security/Heg 1AC [3/5] 9

Oil dependence kills heg- petropolitics and axis of oil


Leverett and Noel 06 Flynt Leverett is senior fellow at the Brookings Institution's Saban Center for Middle East Policy and has been
appointed visiting professor of political science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Pierre No'l is research fellow at the
French Institute of International Relations (IFRI) in Paris. He will join the Electricity Policy Research Group at Cambridge
University's Judge Business School in September.
[Flynt and Pierre, “The New Axis of Oil” The National Interest Lexis]

While Washington is preoccupied with curbing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, avoiding policy failure in Iraq
and cheering the "forward march of freedom", the political consequences of recent structural shifts in global energy markets are
posing the most profound challenge to American hegemony since the end of the Cold War. The increasing control that state-
owned companies exercise over the world's reserves of crude oil and natural gas is, under current market conditions, enabling
some energy exporters to act with escalating boldness against U.S. interests and policies. Perhaps the most immediate example is
Venezuela's efforts to undermine U.S. influence in Latin America. The most strategically significant manifestation, though, is
Russia's willingness to use its newfound external leverage to counteract what Moscow considers an unacceptable level of U.S.
infringement on its interests. At the same time, rising Asian states, especially China, are seeking to address their perceived energy
vulnerability through state-orchestrated strategies to "secure" access to hydrocarbon resources around the world. In the Chinese
case, a statist approach to managing external energy relationships is increasingly pitting China against the United States in a
competition for influence in the Middle East, Central Asia and oil-producing parts of Africa. We describe these political
consequences of recent structural shifts in global energy markets by the shorthand "petropolitics." While each of these
developments is challenging to U.S. interests, the various threads of petropolitics are now coming together in an emerging "axis
of oil" that is acting as a counterweight to American hegemony on a widening range of issues.2 At the center of this undeclared
but increasingly assertive axis is a growing geopolitical partnership between Russia (a major energy producer) and China (the
paradigmatic rising consumer) against what both perceive as excessive U.S. unilateralism. The impact of this axis on U.S.
interests has already been felt in the largely successful Sino-Russian effort to rollback U.S. influence in Central Asia. But the real
significance is being seen in the ongoing frustration of U.S. objectives on the Iranian nuclear issue. This will likely be a
milestone in redefining the post-Cold War international order--not merely because Iran is likely to end up with at least a nuclear-
weapons option, but because of what that will imply about the efficacy of America's global leadership.

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National Security/Heg 1AC [4/5] 10

Withdrawal of US leadership sparks global power wars, economic collapse and nuclear war
KHALILZAD (Rand Analyst, Envoy to Afghanistan) 1995
[Zalmay, “Losing the Moment”, Washington Quarterly, Spring, ln// wfi-tjc]

What might happen to the world if the United States turned inward? Without the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO), rather than cooperating with each other, the West European nations might compete with each other for
domination of East-Central Europe and the Middle East. In Western and Central Europe, Germany -- especially since unification --
would be the natural leading power. Either in cooperation or competition with Russia, Germany might seek influence over the
territories located between them. German efforts are likely to be aimed at filling the vacuum, stabilizing the region, and precluding its
domination by rival powers. Britain and France fear such a development. Given the strength of democracy in Germany and its
preoccupation with absorbing the former East Germany, European concerns about Germany appear exaggerated. But it would be a
mistake to assume that U.S. withdrawal could not, in the long run, result in the renationalization of Germany's security policy.
The same is also true of Japan. Given a U.S. withdrawal from the world, Japan would have to look after its own security and build up
its military capabilities. China, Korea, and the nations of Southeast Asia already fear Japanese hegemony. Without U.S. protection,
Japan is likely to increase its military capability dramatically -- to balance the growing Chinese forces and still-significant Russian
forces. This could result in arms races, including the possible acquisition by Japan of nuclear weapons. Given Japanese technological
prowess, to say nothing of the plutonium stockpile Japan has acquired in the development of its nuclear power industry, it could
obviously become a nuclear weapon state relatively quickly, if it should so decide. It could also build long-range missiles and carrier
task forces. With the shifting balance of power among Japan, China, Russia, and potential new regional powers such as India,
Indonesia, and a united Korea could come significant risks of preventive or proeruptive war. Similarly, European competition for
regional dominance could lead to major wars in Europe or East Asia. If the United States stayed out of such a war -- an unlikely
prospect -- Europe or East Asia could become dominated by a hostile power. Such a development would threaten U.S. interests. A
power that achieved such dominance would seek to exclude the United States from the area and threaten its interests-economic and
political -- in the region. Besides, with the domination of Europe or East Asia, such a power might seek global hegemony and the
United States would face another global Cold War and the risk of a world war even more catastrophic than the last. In the Persian
Gulf, U.S. withdrawal is likely to lead to an intensified struggle for regional domination. Iran and Iraq have, in the past, both sought
regional hegemony. Without U.S. protection, the weak oil-rich states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) would be unlikely to
retain their independence. To preclude this development, the Saudis might seek to acquire, perhaps by purchase, their own nuclear
weapons. If either Iraq or Iran controlled the region that dominates the world supply of oil, it could gain a significant capability to
damage the U.S. and world economies. Any country that gained hegemony would have vast economic resources at its disposal that
could be used to build military capability as well as gain leverage over the United States and other oilimporting nations. Hegemony
over the Persian Gulf by either Iran or Iraq would bring the rest of the Arab Middle East under its influence and domination because of
the shift in the balance of power. Israeli security problems would multiply and the peace process would be fundamentally undermined,
increasing the risk of war between the Arabs and the Israelis. The extension of instability, conflict, and hostile hegemony in East Asia,
Europe, and the Persian Gulf would harm the economy of the United States even in the unlikely event that it was able to avoid
involvement in major wars and conflicts. Higher oil prices would reduce the U.S. standard of living. Turmoil in Asia and Europe
would force major economic readjustment in the United States, perhaps reducing U.S. exports and imports and jeopardizing U.S.
investments in these regions. Given that total imports and exports are equal to a quarter of U.S. gross domestic product, the cost of
necessary adjustments might be high. The higher level of turmoil in the world would also increase the likelihood of the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and means for their delivery. Already several rogue states such as North Korea and Iran are
seeking nuclear weapons and long-range missiles. That danger would only increase if the United States withdrew from the world. The
result would be a much more dangerous world in which many states possessed WMD capabilities; the likelihood of their actual use
would increase accordingly. If this happened, the security of every nation in the world, including the United States, would be harmed.

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National Security/Heg 1AC [5/5] 11

The longer we wait, the greater the impacts


Deutch & Schlesinger October 2006
[John (Former Director of Central Intelligence and Undersecretary of Energy) & James R. (Former Defense and Energy Secretary), “national security consequences of u.s. oil
dependency”,Council on Foreign Relations Press, http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/EnergyTFR.pdf]

The lack of sustained attention to energy issues is undercutting U.S. foreign policy and U.S. national security. Major energy
suppliers— from Russia to Iran to Venezuela—have been increasingly able and willing to use their energy resources to pursue
their strategic and political objectives. Major energy consumers—notably the United States, but other countries as well—are
finding that their growing dependence on imported energy increases their strategic vulnerability and constrains their ability to
pursue a broad range of foreign policy and national security objectives. Dependence also puts the United States into increasing
competition with other importing countries, notably with today’s rapidly growing emerging economies of China and India. At
best, these trends will challenge U.S. foreign policy; at worst, they will seriously strain relations between the United States and
these countries. This report focuses on the foreign policy issues that arise from dependence on energy traded in world markets
and outlines a strategy for response. And because U.S. reliance on the global market for oil, much of which comes from
politically unstable parts of the world, is greater than for any other primary energy source, this report is mainly about oil. To a
lesser degree it also addresses natural gas. Put simply, the reliable and affordable supply of energy—‘‘energy security’’—is an
increasingly prominent feature of the international political landscape and bears on the effectiveness of U.S. foreign policy. At
the same time, however, the United States has largely continued to treat ‘‘energy policy’’ as something that is separate and
distinct— substantively and organizationally—from ‘‘foreign policy.’’ This must change. The United States needs not merely to
coordinate but to integrate energy issues with its foreign policy. The challenge over the next several decades is to manage the
consequences of unavoidable dependence on oil and gas that is traded in world markets and to begin the transition to an economy
that relies less on petroleum. The longer the delay, the greater will be the subsequent trauma. For the United States, with 4.6
percent of the world’s population using 25 percent of the world’s oil, the transition could be especially disruptive.

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Foreign Policy Extensions [1/5] 12

Oil dependency kills foreign policy


Council on Foreign Relations 06
[“National Security Consequences of U.S. Oil Dependency: Report of an Independent Task Force” http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/EnergyTFR.pdf]

Second, oil dependence causes political realignments that constrain the ability of the United States to form partnerships to
achieve common objectives. Perhaps the most pervasive effect arises as countries dependent on imports
subtly modify their policies to be more congenial to suppliers. For example, China is aligning its relationships
in the Middle East (e.g., Iran and Saudi Arabia) and Africa (e.g., Nigeria and Sudan) because of its desire to secure
oil supplies. France and Germany, and with them much of the European Union, are more reluctant to confront
difficult issues with Russia and Iran because of their dependence on imported oil and gas as well as the desire to pursue business
opportunities in those countries. These new realignments have further diminished U.S. leverage, particularly in the Middle East
and Central Asia. For example, Chinese interest in securing oil and gas supplies challenges U.S. influence in central Asia,
notably in Kazakhstan. And Russia’s influence is likely to grow as it exports oil and (within perhaps a decade) large
amounts of natural gas to Japan and China. All consuming countries, including the United States, are more constrained in dealing
with producing states when oil markets are tight. To cite one current example, concern about losing Iran’s 2.5
million barrels per day of world oil exports will cause importing states to be reluctant to take action
against Iran’s nuclear program.

Oil dependence constrains US foreign policy


Council on Foreign Relations 06
[“National Security Consequences of U.S. Oil Dependency: Report of an Independent Task Force” http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/EnergyTFR.pdf]

The lack of sustained attention to energy issues is undercutting U.S. foreign policy and U.S. national security. Major
energy suppliers— from Russia to Iran to Venezuela—have been increasingly able and willing to use their energy resources to
pursue their strategic and political objectives. Major energy consumers—notably the United States, but other countries as
well—are finding that their growing dependence on imported energy increases their strategic vulnerability and constrains their
ability to pursue a broad range of foreign policy and national security objectives. Dependence also puts the United
States into increasing competition with other importing countries, notably with today’s rapidly growing emerging economies of
China and India. At best, these trends will challenge U.S. foreign policy; at worst, they will seriously strain relations between the
United States and these countries.

Oil dependence constrains US foreign policy


News24.com 06 Southern Africa and Africa's premier online news resource, full member of the Online Publishers Association (OPA)
["Oil dependency 'weakening US'" 12/19/06 http://www.news24.com/News24/World/News/0,9294,2-10-1462_2046668,00.html

New York - US dependence on oil imports has weakened the nation's foreign policy influence, while the sway of crude producers
such as Iran, Russia and Venezuela has grown, a Council on Foreign Relations report said on Monday.
Former US secretary of defence James Schlesinger, the co-chairperson of the group writing the report, said the oil dependence of
China and India should be a concern, noting Beijing has already negotiated with rogue and "near-rogue" states like Iran and
Sudan to secure future oil resources. It also puts the United States in competition with China and India for oil imports, said the
report titled: National security consequences of US oil dependency. "At best these trends will challenge US foreign policy; at
worst, they will seriously strain relations between the United States and these countries," the 26-member group wrote in the
report. Schlesinger, who served as the first US secretary of energy in the 1970s, said a spike in the price of oil of more than 40%
during the past two years had also further undercut Washington's power. "What it has done is weaken our foreign policy
influence and that of course is a national security problem," Schlesinger told a meeting of the Council on Foreign Relations, an
influential New York-based foreign policy think tank. Political realignments "Importing countries have much less leverage." The
report said imported oil currently meets 60% of US demand, which - with 4.6% of the global population - accounts for 25% of
the world's oil consumption. "The central task for the next two decades must be to manage the consequences of dependence on
oil, not to pretend the United States can eliminate it," the report said, adding that energy issues must be integrated with - but not
be central to - US foreign policy. The report found the oil wealth of exporters such as Iran, Russia and Venezuela had allowed
these countries to pursue and adopt policies that oppose US interests and values and that oil dependence was also causing
political realignments that constrain the US ability to form partnerships. "For example, China is aligning its relationships in the
Middle East and Africa because of its desire to secure oil supplies," the report said.

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Oil dependency constrains our foreign polciy and we must act now
Sandalow and O'Hanlon 06 Senior Fellows of Foreign Policy at Brookings Institute
[David B. and Michael E., "Iran: Regaining Energy Leverage" http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2006/0131iran_ohanlon.aspx]

This is unacceptable. Three decades after the first oil shocks—and a quarter-century after the humiliating capture of U.S.
diplomats in Tehran—the world community remains hostage to its continuing dependence on Mideast oil. Tough-talking leaders
are unable to match words with action because the hard work of reducing our oil dependence remains undone. More than ever,
the world needs an energy cushion that will allow it to consider sanctions against a major oil-exporting country such as Iran that
so flagrantly defies the international community. Such a cushion is also needed to prevent political instability on the Arabian
Peninsula or terrorist attacks on major oil fields from leading quickly to full-scale global crisis. We are taking a foolish and
unnecessary risk by remaining so dependent on every drop of oil pumped that the global economy shudders and political leaders
tremble the moment any major source is threatened. This vulnerability is not new. But today our ability to overcome it is better
than at any time in decades, for three reasons. 1. We have a model of success: Brazil. While the United States dithered for much
of the last quarter-century, pursuing ineffective and inconsistent energy security policies, Brazil set out to reduce dependence on
foreign oil in part by harnessing its agricultural wealth. Starting in the 1970s, vast sugar plantations were devoted to producing
ethanol, a homegrown liquid fuel. The Brazil stuck with the program through several setbacks and today is essentially
independent of foreign oil. True, Brazil is blessed with a favorable climate for biofuels. But the real lesson is that determination
and resolve pay off. In the United States, wildly fluctuating budgets for energy research have choked progress on biofuels that
could increase rural incomes while enhancing national security. Building on the Brazilian experience, the U.S. government
should immediately launch a crash program to develop advanced or "cellulosic" ethanol made from switchgrass, poplar and other
nonfood crops. Technology breakthroughs in the last decade have made this even more practical than before. Cities should
launch community biodiesel programs, collecting waste oils to produce liquid fuel. Such steps could also help transform global
agriculture, reducing the need for the traditional farm subsidies in the West and providing developing countries' farmers more
market opportunities. 2. U.S. automakers are poised for historic transformation: The strategy of the past several decades—on
massive advertising to sell gas-guzzling cars—failed miserably. The terms of the Washington-Detroit dialogue should be
rewritten, with Washington recognizing health-care and pension costs put U.S. automakers at a competitive disadvantage, and
Detroit recognizing its products profoundly affect our national security. Starting in the next few model years, all cars sold in the
United States should be "flex-fuel," giving consumers the choice between gasoline or ethanol. GM and Ford already make such
cars in Brazil, where they're the hottest-sellers. Then, automakers should leap ahead to commercialize a new generation of
vehicles with oil-saving technologies such as plug-in hybrid engines and lightweight, super-strong carbon composite materials. A
grand bargain with Detroit agreeing to put many such vehicles on the road and Washington agreeing to help support health and
pension costs would strongly serve the national interest. By steadfastly pursuing opportunities in biofuels and automotive
technologies, the United States could in a generation cut in half its need for oil, reducing the importance of any one supplier.
Strategic implications would be profound—thening the U.S. and our allies in all manner of dealings in the Persian Gulf and
around the world. The challenge is fundamentally not one of technology, but political will. 3. Political prospects: This suggests a
third reason the opportunity for progress on oil dependence is greater today than at any time in memory. A far-reaching coalition
—including security hawks, farmers, manufacturers, labor unions and environmentalists—is ready to embrace vigorous policies
to break our oil addiction. It's hard to think of a more compelling confluence of events—September 11, 2001, Katrina, Russia's
democratic reversals, Iran's nuclear program—to shake us out of our complacency and past ways of doing things. Although it
may be too late to promptly resolve this particular crisis with Iran, we can be sure there will be others. This year is the time to
act.

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Oil dependence challenges US foreign policy—oil revenue gives oil nations flexibility
Deutch & Schlesinger October 2006
[John (Former Director of Central Intelligence and Undersecretary of Energy) & James R. (Former Defense and Energy Secretary), “national security consequences of u.s. oil
dependency”,Council on Foreign Relations Press, http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/EnergyTFR.pdf]

The Task Force has identified five major reasons why dependence on energy traded in world markets is a matter of concern for
U.S. foreign policy. We have also examined a sixth, the relationship of military force structure to oil dependence. First, the
control over enormous oil revenues gives exporting countries the flexibility to adopt policies that oppose U.S. interests and
values. Iran proceeds with a program that appears to be headed toward acquiring a nuclear weapons capability. Russia is able to
ignore Western attitudes as it has moved to authoritarian policies in part because huge revenues from oil and gas exports are
available to finance that style of government. Venezuela has the resources from its oil exports to invite realignment in Latin
American political relationships and to fund changes such as Argentina’s exit from its International Monetary Fund (IMF)
standby agreement and Bolivia’s recent decision to nationalize its oil and gas resources. Because of their oil wealth, these and
other producer countries are free to ignore U.S. policies and to pursue interests inimical to our national security.

Oil dependence kills foreign policy—we bend to the wills of other nations
Lugar 07-Former vice-chair Commission on Intergovernmental Relation, Foreign Relations Committee, former chair of the
Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry Committee
[Richard, “ENERGY SECURITY, ENERGY URGENCY: KEY ISSUES FACING THE NEXT PRESIDENT”, Dec. 18,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/events/2007/1218_lugar/20071218lugar.pdf]

Third, energy is the underlying condition that exacerbates almost every major foreign policy issue. We pressure Sudan to stop
genocide in Darfur, but we find the Sudanese Government is insulated by oil revenues and oil supply relationships. We pressure
Iran to stop its uranium enrichment activities, yet key nations are hesitant to endanger their access to Iran’s oil and natural gas.
We try to foster a global respect for civil society and human rights, yet oil revenues flowing to authoritarian governments are
often diverted to corrupt or to repressive purposes. We fight terrorism, yet some of the hundreds of billions of dollars we spend
on oil imports are diverted to terrorists. We give foreign assistance to lift people out of poverty, yet energy poor countries are
further impoverished by expensive energy import bills. We seek options that would allow for military disengagement in Iraq and
the wider Middle East, and yet our way of life depends on a steady stream of oil from that region.

Oil dependency enables producer countries to resist US pressure on key issues


Gal Luft 2005, Co-Director @ Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, Committee on Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South
Asian Affairs
[“THE U.S., THE MIDDLE EAST AND PETROLEUM”, CAPITOL HILL HEARING TESTIMONY, October 20, 2005, Lexis]

The growing economic power of OPEC producers enables them to resist U.S. pressure on a variety of issues from human rights
to nuclear proliferation. As the second largest oil producer and holder of 10 percent of the world's proven oil reserves Iran is fully
aware of the power of its oil. Its supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei warned in 2002: "If the west did not receive oil, their
factories would grind to a halt. This will shake the world!" The Iranians also know that oil is their insurance policy and that the
best way to forestall U.S. efforts in the UN is by bedding themselves with energy hungry powers such as Japan and the two
fastest growing energy consumers--China and India. After securing the support of a third of humanity the Iranians are unfazed by
the pressure coming from the U.S. and the EU. Last month Iran's President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad warned that Iran could wield
the oil weapon if Tehran's case was sent to the Security Council for possible sanctions.

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Oil dependence prevents US influence against Iran and Venezuela, allowing anti-american sentiments to continue
Sandalow 07 (David, Energy and Environment Scholar at The Brookings Institution, “Ending Oil Dependence”, January 22)
<http://www.brookings.edu/views/papers/fellows/sandalow20070122.pdf>

This points to a broader problem -- oil dependence reduces the leverage of the world community in responding to threats from
oil-exporting nations. Today, the most prominent threat comes from Iran, whose nuclear ambitions could further destabilize the
Persian Gulf and put terrifying new weapons into the hands of terrorists. Yet efforts to respond to this threat with multilateral
sanctions have foundered on fears that Iran would retaliate by withholding oil from world markets. Experts predict this would
drive prices above $100 per barrel – a risk many governments are unwilling to accept. In short, three decades after the first oil
shocks -- and a quarter-century after the humiliating capture of U.S. diplomats in Tehran – we remain hostage to our continuing
dependence on oil. Other oil-exporting nations pose problems as well. President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela – the world’s fifth
largest exporter -- fans anti-American sentiments throughout Latin America. Oil revenues not only help maintain his grip on
power, they allow him to finance policies that put U.S. assets at risk in countries such as Bolivia and Argentina.6 Russia recently
cutoff oil flows to five European nations in a dispute with Belarus over natural gas prices and transit fees.

Oil dependence subjects us to the wills of other countries


John Deutch 7-Prof @ MIT, former director of the CIA, DOE & DOD staff
[“HEARING OF THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE; SUBJECT: FOREIGN POLICY AND NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF OIL DEPENDENCE; ”,
March 22, Lexis]

Russia-Russia has made it clear that its intent is to use its oil and gas reserves to promote its global interests. It does so in its
exports of natural gas to Western Europe and Eastern Europe. It does so in the placing of its new pipelines in the Central Asian
region and pipelines which will be going east to China and to Japan. That is a wailer (ph). Congressman Klein mentioned that is
a wailer, quite properly the case of Chavez's oil revenues -- permits Chavez to pursue domestic policies and foreign policies in
South America which are not in the democratic tradition of that country and not of an interest of the United States. But there are
four new elements that I want to draw your attention to that I think I believe make this oil dependence a more serious security
issue. The first is the increasing demand from the rapidly emerging economies such as China and India. They are now projected
to become the central, new consumers of oil in world oil markets. They are making extensive efforts in Africa, elsewhere in the
world, Cuba -- to lock up oil supplies in that area. The second trend is a move from the role of international oil companies such
as ExxonMobil or Chevron to national oil companies that represent the interests of the major resource holding states. When I
joined the Department of Energy in 1977, about 15 or 20 percent of the reserves in production of oil in the world were in the
hands of national oil companies. The remainder were in the hands of international, private corporations. Today that percentage is
about reversed, and national oil companies pursue their interests in production, in production arrangements, which fulfill and
advance the political ambitions of their countries, of course. The consequence of this rapid growth in demand for energy from
emerging economies and from the control of the national oil companies increasing has been a growth in state to state
arrangements where there are arrangements between producers and these new consumers, which are not arrive that in
commercial terms but include political and other aspects which influence the relationship: military assistance, economic
assistance, trade, concessions. The purpose of these concessions are to establish a new political relationship between the
producing countries and the new importing countries that will secure advantageous access to resources on the one hand and
political advantage on the other. The role of India and China are especially aggressive in this new state to state trend, and China's
activities, both in Sudan and in Angola, illustrate the nature of having great concern about the rise and ascent of arrangements
that move us away from transparent international oil markets where oil is allocated on the basis of prices openly arrived at. And
finally I note, as have others on the committee here this morning, that oil is being produced in progressively more remote parts of
the world. The security of the energy infrastructure is becoming progressively endowed. Oil facilities, pipelines, control systems
for the energy distribution system-are all very much more vulnerable to terrorist attack and to national disaster. These are the
four elements that are different in our import dependence.

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US dependence on oil force the US to ignore anti-American policies


Dow Jones Newswires 07
(“Oil Dependency Weakens Foreign Policy of the US”, Alexander’s Oil and Gas Connections)
<http://www.gasandoil.com/goc/news/ntn70389.htm>

US dependence on oil imports has weakened the nation’s foreign policy influence, while the sway of crude producers such as
Iran, Russia and Venezuela has grown, a Council on Foreign Relations report said. Former US Secretary of Defence James
Schlesinger, the co-chairman of the group writing the report, said the oil dependence of China and India should be a concern,
noting Beijing has already negotiated with rogue and “near-rogue” states like Iran and Sudan to secure future oil resources. It
also puts the United States in competition with China and India for oil imports, said the report titled: “National security
consequences of US oil dependency”. “At best these trends will challenge US foreign policy; at worst, they will seriously strain
relations between the US and these countries,” the 26-member group wrote in the report. Schlesinger, who served as the first US
secretary of energy in the 1970s, said a spike in the price of oil of more than 40 % during the past two years had also further
undercut Washington’s power. “What it has done is weaken our foreign policy influence and that of course is a national security
problem,” Schlesinger told a meeting of the Council on Foreign Relations, an influential New York-based foreign policy think
tank. “Importing countries have much less leverage.” The report said imported oil currently meets 60 % of US demand, which --
with 4.6 % of the global population -- accounts for 25 % of world’s oil consumption. “The central task for the next two decades
m ust be to manage the consequences of dependence on oil, not to pretend the United States can eliminate it,” the report said,
adding that energy issues must be integrated with -- but not be central to -- US foreign policy. The report found the oil wealth of
exporters such as Iran, Russia and Venezuela had allowed these countries to pursue and adopt policies that oppose US interests
and values and that oil dependence was also causing political realignments that constrain the US ability to form partnerships.
“For example, China is aligning its relationships in the Middle East and Africa because of its desire to secure oil supplies,” the
report said.

Oil Dependency funds terrorism, limits foreign policy, undermines local governance, and promotes instability
Congressional Documents and Publications 08 (“Bush Republican Policies Have Weakened America’s
Energy Security”, Congressional Documents and Publications, May 5, LexisNexis)

Dependence on Foreign Oil Compromises U.S. National Security. "Since 2001, America's dependency on foreign oil has steadily
increased even as the cost of oil has more than doubled.[America is] compromising its foreign policy objectives by funding
unstable or hostile regimes in oil rich regions that threaten its national security." [Center for American Progress, Energy Security
in the 21st Century, 7/2006] U.S. Oil Dependence Finances Terror. American oil dependence enriches countries such as Saudi
Arabia which harbor charities, nongovernmental organizations, mosques, and banks that have funded terrorist groups around the
world. Former CIA director James Woolsey described the Saudi-sponsored Wahhabism and Islamist extremism as "the soil in
which Al-Qaeda and its sister terrorist organizations are flourishing." [Institute for the Analysis of Global Security] Dependence
on Global Oil Supply Limits Strategic Options. "All consuming countries, including the United States, are more constrained in
dealing with producing states when oil markets are tight. To cite one current example, concern about losing Iran's 2.5 million
barrels per day of world oil exports will cause importing states to be reluctant to take action against Iran's nuclear program."
[Council on Foreign Relations, National Security Consequences of U.S. Oil Dependency, 10/12/06]
Hostile Nations Are Enriched by Flood of Oil Revenue from Sales to America. "The control over enormous oil revenues gives
exporting countries the flexibility to adopt policies that oppose U.S. interests and values. Iran proceeds with a program that
appears to be headed toward acquiring a nuclear weapons capability. Russia is able to ignore Western attitudes as it has moved to
authoritarian policies in part because huge revenues from oil and gas exports are available to finance that style of government.
Venezuela has the resources from its oil exports to invite realignment in Latin American political relationships and to fund
changes such as Argentina's exit from its International Monetary Fund (IMF) standby agreement and Bolivia's recent decision to
nationalize its oil and gas resources. Because of their oil wealth, these and other producer countries are free to ignore U.S.
policies and to pursue interests inimical to our national security." [National Security Consequences of U.S. Oil Dependency,
10/12/06]Revenue from Oil Sales to America Has Been Used to Undermine Local Governance and Promote Instability.
"Revenues from oil and gas exports can undermine local governance. The United States has an interest in promoting good
governance both for its own sake and because it encourages investment that can increase the level and security of supply. States
that are politically unstable and poorly governed often struggle with the task of responsibly managing the large revenues that
come from their oil and gas exports. The elements of good governance include democratic accountability, low corruption, and
fiscal transparency. Production in fragile democracies, such as in Nigeria, can be undermined when politicians or local warlords
focus on ways to seize oil and gas rents rather than on the longer-term task of governance. Totalitarian governments that have
control over those revenue flows can entrench their rule." [National Security Consequences of U.S. Oil Dependency, 10/12/06]

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Heg Extension 17

US protection of oil producing countries allows Mideast countries to become superpowers that contest the US
Stern 06 (Roger, Department of Geography and Environmental Engineering, Johns Hopkins University, Edited by Ronald W. Jones, Xerox Professor of Economics. Economics
Department. University of Rochester, “Oil Market Power and United States National Security”, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America)
<http://www.pnas.org/content/103/5/1650.full>

Cartel states' military strength is attributable to market power by their ratio wt/state revenue (r). In Iran's case, for example, if p c
= $4 and p m = $25.17 as above, then wt/r Iran2003 = 0.48. However, Iran's energy consumption equals 0.092 gross domestic product
(GDP) (39) and is nearly 100% state-subsidized (40). If the value of this subsidy is added to both wt and r, a ratio of total market
power effects (mp) to r can be derived; mp/r Iran2003 = 0.63 (from wt estimate and ref. 39). U.S. defense effort to contain military
power acquired with wt proceeds has been substantial. In 1992, the Defense Planning Guidance (or Wolfowitz Doctrine)
recognized this imperative: ... the new regional defense strategy... requires that we endeavor to prevent any hostile power from
dominating a region whose resources would, under consolidated control, be sufficient to generate global power. (41) Thus the
rationale for Gulf force projection was no longer to protect supply, as is still commonly supposed, but to preempt the superpower
that would emerge if one firm-state could aggregate monopoly rents of its neighbors via wars of seizure. Although a reasonable
policy in most ways, Wolfowitz has one outstanding flaw. While force projection has deterred wars of seizure, in so doing it
inadvertently guarantees an orderly market for wt cOPEC collections. Wolfowitz thus protects a status quo in which monopolist
firm-states can accumulate wt sufficient to acquire weapons that confer near-superpower status, even without prerequisite wars of
seizure. The U.S. has thereby been drawn to the web of market power as its protector, while within the protected states wt
underwrites novel threats. Precisely these threats have compelled transformation of security doctrine from a defensive to an
offensive basis. The new National Security Strategy seems to grasp that security consequences associated with oil are no longer
conditional, threats that might arise if one Gulf state could aggregate production of some others. Rather, threat is ever-present,
even from a single firm-state (42). As Vice-President Cheney interpreted the National Security Strategy on the eve of the second
Gulf War:

Oil dependence devastates the military


Sandalow 5-22-8 –Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy @ Brookings
[David B., “Rising Oil Prices, Declining National Security”,http://www.brookings.edu/testimony/2008/0522_oil_sandalow.aspx]

Third, oil dependence endangers our men and women in uniform. Oil dependence jeopardizes the safety of our troops. In Iraq
during the past five years, many brave men and women in have died in fuel convoys, which are often vulnerable to attack. Diesel
generators display a heat signature easily detected by some enemies. In July 2006, Major General Richard Zilmer, commander
of coalition forces in western Iraq, made a “Priority 1” request for combat-ready renewable energy systems. Maj. Gen. Zilmer
noted the need for frequent resupply convoys, in particular for petroleum, and wrote that without renewable energy systems: “…
personnel loss rates are likely to continue at their current rate...[with the] potential to jeopardize mission success.” Rising oil
prices also put budgetary strains on the Pentagon, a leading purchaser of petroleum products.

Oil dependence kills US military capabilities


Smith and Kelley 06
[Frederick W. and P.X., 8/11/06, "Are We Ready for the Next Oil Shock?" http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/08/10/AR2006081001316.html]

The magnitude of our dependence on oil puts stress on our military, strengthens our strategic adversaries and undermines our
efforts to support democratic allies. Each year the United States expends enormous military resources protecting the chronically
vulnerable oil production and distribution network while also preparing to guarantee international access to key oil-producing
regions. This allocation of forces and dollars diminishes the military's capability for dealing with the war on terrorism and other
defense priorities.

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National Security Extensions 18

Oil dependency threatens national security


Gal Luft 2005, Co-Director @ Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, Committee on Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South
Asian Affairs
[“THE U.S., THE MIDDLE EAST AND PETROLEUM”, CAPITOL HILL HEARING TESTIMONY, October 20, 2005, Lexis]

For decades, the goal of reducing the Nation's dependence upon foreign energy sources has been a matter on which virtually all
Americans could agree. Unfortunately, differences about how best to accomplish that goal, with what means, how rapidly and at
what cost to taxpayers and consumers have, to date, precluded the sort of progress that might have been expected before now.
Today, we can no longer afford to allow such differences to postpone urgent action on national energy independence. After all,
we now confront what might be called a "perfect storm" of strategic, economic and environmental conditions that, properly
understood, demand that we affect over the next four years a dramatic reduction in the quantities of oil imported from unstable
and hostile regions of the world. America consumes a quarter of the world's oil supply while holding a mere 3% of global oil
reserves. It is therefore forced to import over 60% of its oil, and this dependency is growing. Since most of the world's oil is
controlled by countries that are unstable or at odds with the United States this dependency is a matter of national security. At the
strategic level, it is dangerous to be buying billions of dollars worth of oil from nations that are sponsors of or allied with radical
Islamists who foment hatred against the United States. The petrodollars we provide such nations contribute materially to the
terrorist threats we face. In time of war, it is imperative that our national expenditures on energy be redirected away from those
who use them against us. Even if the underwriting of terror were not such a concern, our present dependency creates
unacceptable vulnerabilities. In Iraq and Saudi Arabia, America's enemies have demonstrated that they can advance their
strategic objective of inflicting damage on the United States, its interests and economy simply by attacking critical overseas oil
infrastructures and personnel. These targets are readily found not only in the Mideast but in other regions to which Islamists have
ready access (e.g., the Caspian Basin and Africa). To date, such attacks have been relatively minor and their damage easily
repaired. Over time, they are sure to become more sophisticated and their destructive effects will be far more difficult, costly and
time-consuming to undo. Another strategic factor is China's burgeoning demand for oil. Last year, China's oil imports were up
30% from the previous year, making it the world's No. 2 petroleum user after the United States. The bipartisan, congressionally
mandated U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission reported that: "China's large and rapidly growing demand for
oil is putting pressure on global oil supplies. This pressure is likely to increase in the future, with serious implications for U.S. oil
prices and supplies."

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Foreign Policy- Vacillations 19

Oil dependency is projected to increase, causing vacillations of passivity and aggressiveness from the United States.
Gal Luft 2005, Co-Director @ Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, Committee on Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South
Asian Affairs
[“THE U.S., THE MIDDLE EAST AND PETROLEUM”, CAPITOL HILL HEARING TESTIMONY, October 20, 2005, Lexis]

As consumer of a quarter of the world's oil supply and holder of a mere three percent of global oil reserves the U.S. is heavily
dependent on foreign oil and a growing share of this oil comes from the Persian Gulf. America's dependence on foreign oil has
increased from 30 percent in 1973, when OPEC imposed its oil embargo, to 60 percent today. According to the Department of
Energy this dependence is projected to reach 70 percent by 2025. In the wake of the war on terrorism, the rise of China and India
and growing voices within the oil industry that "the era of easy oil is over" it has become apparent to many that America's oil
policy is unsustainable and that such a policy subjects the nation to grave risks. Since the 1945 meeting between President
Franklin Roosevelt and King Abdul Aziz ibn Saud, the founder of the Saudi monarchy, U.S. foreign policy has been subservient
to the nation's energy needs. Access to the Persian Gulf oil required robust and costly military presence in the region and frequent
interventions. Worse, the U.S. has been forced to coddle some of the world's worst despots just because they held the key to our
prosperity hence compromising American values and principles. Of the 11 million barrels per day (mbd) the U.S. imports today
close to 3mbd come from the Middle East. But in the years to come dependence on the Middle East is projected to increase by
leaps and bounds. The reason is that reserves outside of the Middle East are being depleted at a much faster rate than those in the
region. The overall reserves-to-production ratio -- an indicator of how long proven reserves would last at current production rates
- outside of the Middle East is about 15 years comparing to roughly 80 years in the Middle East. According to Exxon
Corporation and PFC Energy, non-OPEC production, including Russia and West Africa will peak within a decade.1--At that
point the amount of oil found outside of the Middle East will decline steeply, putting OPEC in the driver seat of the world
economy.

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Foreign Policy- Passivity 20

Foreign oil dependency makes the US turn a blind eye to violations of oil-producing nations
Gal Luft 2005, Co-Director @ Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, Committee on Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South
Asian Affairs
[“THE U.S., THE MIDDLE EAST AND PETROLEUM”, CAPITOL HILL HEARING TESTIMONY, October 20, 2005, Lexis]

Only three of the world's ten largest oil producers are democracies and only 9 percent of the world's proven oil reserves are in the
hands of countries ranked free by Freedom House. America's current oil policy is inconsistent with the hallmark of the Bush
Administration's foreign policy: bringing democracy and political reform to areas where democracy is in deficit. Oil revenues
help despots sustain anti democratic social and political systems giving them disincentives to embrace social and economic
reforms. Our dependence on foreign oil often prevents the U.S. from expressing its true feelings about the some of the conducts
and practices of oil producing countries. Only last month the Bush Administration waived sanctions against Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait and Ecuador, three of the world's worst offenders in human trafficking. In the case of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait the
administration's explanation was that it was "in U.S. interest to continue democracy programs and security cooperation in the war
on terrorism." One could only wonder if those two countries would have received the same treatment had they been major
exporters of watermelons. While in many cases the U.S. can turn a blind eye to human rights violations by major energy
producers, in some cases the violations are so blunt and atrocious that a strong castigation is unavoidable. But with China joining
the great oil game such incidents result in significant weakening of U.S. geopolitical posture. In the most recent incident when
the U.S. had to choose between oil and its values the cost was high: the U.S. publicly expressed dismay over the killing of
hundreds of demonstrators in Uzbekistan only to be asked to remove its military forces from there within 180 days. A $600
million gas deal signed between Uzbekistan and China bolstered Islam Karimov's confidence in China's diplomatic support to the
degree that he was willing to show the U.S. the door.

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Foreign Policy- Military Intervention 21

Oil dependency causes Western intervention


Waller & Gerson, The Globe and Mail, 04
[HAROLD WALLER, professor of political science at McGill University, HOWARD GERSON, practises law in Toronto, “Warning: Don't count on Saudi Arabia”, December 17,
2004, lexis]

Earlier this month, al-Qaeda carried out a deadly attack on the U.S. consulate in Jeddah. Such attacks warrant the serious
attention of governments and citizens in every industrialized nation. The preoccupation with record-high gasoline prices pales in
comparison to the ominous possibility of instability within the Saudi kingdom. The Saudi relationship with the West is predicated
on the stability of the Saudis' regime and the output of their oil fields, both of which are now questionable. As a result, Western
policy-makers must consider their options, including military intervention, should a worst-case scenario unfold. Consuming
nations assume that the oil supply will be sufficient to meet their requirements at acceptable price levels. Saudi Arabia, with the
largest output and the greatest flexibility, plays the role of swing producer. Therefore, any adverse development involving Saudi
Arabia affects the international oil market and all countries that participate in the world economy.

Foreign oil dependency leads to military action


Michael Klare 08 - Prof of Peace and World Security Studies @ Five Colleges
[“The Pentagon as Energy Insecurity Inc.”, Atlantic Free Press, Lexis]

The sanctions are ineffective." -- helped send the price of crude oil soaring. Imagine what an actual air attack might do.You know
that old joke: military justice is to justice as military music is to music; well, someday, not so far into the future, a similar, though
far grimmer joke, is likely to be made about Washington's attempts to secure the U.S. oil supply by military means. In the
meantime, Michael Klare, author most recently of Rising Powers, Shrinking Planet: The New Geopolitics of Energy, considers
the madness of Washington's long-term militarization of oil delivery and the devastating oil wars that have resulted. (His
previous book, Blood and Oil, by the way, has recently been turned into a documentary film. Check it out.) Tom Garrisoning the
Global Gas Station Challenging the Militarization of U.S. Energy Policy By Michael T. Klare American policymakers have long
viewed the protection of overseas oil supplies as an essential matter of "national security," requiring the threat of Ã,Â-- and
sometimes the use of military force. This is now an unquestioned part of American foreign policy. On this basis, the first Bush
administration fought a war against Iraq in 1990-1991 and the second Bush administration invaded Iraq in 2003. With global oil
prices soaring and oil reserves expected to dwindle in the years ahead, military force is sure to be seen by whatever new
administration enters Washington in January 2009 as the ultimate guarantor of our well-being in the oil heartlands of the planet.
But with the costs of militarized oil operations in both blood and dollars rising precipitously isn't it time to challenge such
"wisdom"? Isn't it time to ask whether the U.S. military has anything reasonable to do with American energy security, and
whether a reliance on military force, when it comes to energy policy, is practical, affordable, or justifiable?

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The US is paranoid about Saudi Arabia losing import capacity and is willing to go to war to maintain it
Rutledge 06
(Ian, graduated in Economics and Social Science in the University of Cambridge in 1968. receiving his PhD in Economic History in 1973. He has taught both economics and
sociology in the Universities of London and Sheffield, as well as spending three years working for the British Coal Corporation, “Addicted to Oil: America’s Relentless Drive for
Energy Security”)

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Foreign Policy- Military Intervention- Iraq proves [1/3] 23

Iraq was invaded to reduce dependence on Saudi oil


Rutledge 06 (Ian, graduated in Economics and Social Science in the University of Cambridge in 1968. receiving his PhD in
Economic History in 1973. He has taught both economics and sociology in the Universities of London and Sheffield, as well as
spending three years working for the British Coal Corporation, “Addicted to Oil: America’s Relentless Drive for Energy
Security”)

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Iraq was invaded as a hedge against a collapse of Saudi Oil; the plan was written 10 years ago.
Rutledge 06
(Ian, graduated in Economics and Social Science in the University of Cambridge in 1968. receiving his PhD in Economic History in 1973. He has taught both economics and
sociology in the Universities of London and Sheffield, as well as spending three years working for the British Coal Corporation, “Addicted to Oil: America’s Relentless Drive for
Energy Security”)

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Foreign Policy- Middle East 26

Dependence on oil restricts US foreign policy in the Middle East


Kraemer 06 Commander in the U.S. Navy, 22-year veteran of the U.S. Navy Submarine Force, entered under the Nuclear Power
Officer Program, and has served on four different nuclear powered fast attack submarines. He has deployed seven times to every
ocean in the world, including under the polar ice cap. He is a veteran of both Operation DESERT STORM and Operation IRAQI
FREEDOM, has served in the Pentagon for the Director of Naval Intelligence and at Submarine Group Two and Submarine Tactical
Development Squadron Twelve in Groton, Connecticut, received a bachelor’s degree in Chemical Engineering from the University of
Notre Dame, and is a graduate of the U.S. Army War College
[Thomas D., "ADDICTED TO OIL: STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF AMERICAN OIL POLICY" Mayhttp://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB705.pdf

Besides financing the enemy, American overdependence on oil has led to a hapless foreign policy in the Arab world. It has
weakened our nation’s international leverage and empowered exactly the wrong countries. Iran is using oil revenues to finance
development of nuclear weapons and to insulate themselves from the economic sanctions that could result. In his State of the
Union speech, President Bush told America that “the nations of the world must not permit the Iranian regime to gain nuclear
weapons,”15 but, in effect, the world is paying for these weapons with oil revenues. In our foreign policy with Iran, we are
forced to speak loudly while carrying no stick. Although America claims Saudi Arabia as an ally in the war on terror, the United
States is powerless to force Saudi action when members of its elite help Osama bin Laden and his network of terror. It is unclear
how involved Saudi Arabians are in backing terrorism because the Saudi government turns a blind eye, and the United States is
powerless to provoke action.16 Many of the sources of global terrorism spring from the archaic social conditions within Saudi
Arabia and the vast stores of oil money that the royal family controls. The consequences of the destructive Wahhabi Islamic
ideology that spins from Saudi Arabia to fuel terrorism is something the Saudi government is unwilling to address, and the
United States is unwilling to take a stand on. The Saudis are tolerant of a jihadist culture, and the United States is tolerant of our
oil supplier. America is hamstrung because any forceful action on our part against nations like Iran and Saudi Arabia could result
in the disruption of oil supplies that the world economy completely depends on. We cannot stand up to those who support our
enemies because we rely upon those supporters for the fuel that is our own lifeblood.

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Dependence on foreign oil fuels terrorism- funding


IAGS 04
,
(Institute for the Analysis of Global Security non-profit public educational organization focusing on energy security. “Fueling Terror”) <http://www.iags.org/fuelingterror.html>

It is no coincidence that so much of the cash filling terrorists' coffers come from the oil monarchies in the Persian Gulf. It is also
no coincidence that those countries holding the world's largest oil reserves and those generating most of their income from oil
exports, are also those with the strongest support for radical Islam. In fact, oil and terrorism are entangled. If not for the West's
oil money, most Gulf states would not have had the wealth that allowed them to invest so much in arms procurement and sponsor
terrorists organizations. Consider Saudi Arabia. Oil revenues make up around 90-95% of total Saudi export earnings, 70%-80%
of state revenues, and around 40% of the country's gross domestic product (GDP). In 2002 alone, Saudi Arabia earned nearly $55
billion in crude oil export revenues. Most wealthy Saudis who sponsor charities and educational foundations that preach religious
intolerance and hate toward the Western values have made their money from the petroleum industry or its subsidiaries. Osama
bin Laden's wealth comes from the family's construction company that made its fortune from government contracts financed by
oil money. It is also oil money that enables Saudi Arabia to invest approximately 40% of its income on weapons procurement. In
July 2005 undersecretary of the Treasury Stuart Levey testifying in the Senate noted “Wealthy Saudi financiers and charities
have funded terrorist organizations and causes that support terrorism and the ideology that fuels the terrorists' agenda. Even
today, we believe that Saudi donors may still be a significant source of terrorist financing, including for the insurgency in Iraq."
If Saudi Arabia is the financial engine of radical Sunni Islam, its neighbor Iran is the powerhouse behind the proliferation of
radical Shiite Islam. Iran, OPEC’s second largest oil producer, is holder of 10 percent of the world’s proven oil reserves and has
the world’s second largest natural gas reserve. With oil and gas revenues constituting over 80 percent of its total export earning
and 50 percent of its gross domestic product, Iran is heavily dependent on petrodollars. It is a hotbed of Islamic fundamentalism
and supporter of some of the world’s most radical Islamic movements such as the Lebanese Hizballah. Iran’s mullahs are fully
aware of the power of their oil. Its supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei warned in 2002: “If the West did not receive oil, their
factories would grind to a halt. This will shake the world!” As the world’s demand for oil increases, Iran grows richer --Iran’s oil
revenues have jumped 25 percent in 2005—and more than able to snub the U.S. and its allies in their efforts to prevent Tehran
from developing nuclear weapons. The line between the barrel and the bomb is clear. It is oil wealth that enables dictatorial
regimes to sustain themselves, resisting openness, progress and power sharing. Some semi-feudal royal families in the Gulf buy
their legitimacy from the Muslim religious establishment. This establishment uses oil money to globally propagate hostility to
the West, modernity, non-Muslims, and women. This trend is likely to continue. Both the International Energy Agency and the
Energy Information Agency of the U.S. Department of Energy currently project a steady increase in world demand for oil
through at least 2020. This means further enrichment of the oil-producing countries and continued access of terrorist groups to a
viable financial network which allow then remain a lethal threat to the U.S. and its allies. Drying the swamp There are many
strategies proposed by counter-terrorism experts to obstruct terrorist financing. Many of them are effective and, indeed, some of
the steps that have been taken since September 11, such as freezing bank accounts and improving the scrutiny over international
monetary transfers, contributed to a reduction in Al-Qaeda's financial maneuverability. But the only way to deal with the problem
strategically is to reduce the disposable income and wealth generation capacity of terrorist supporters. Hence, America's best
weapon against terrorism is to decrease its dependency on foreign oil by increasing its fuel efficiency and introducing next-
generation fuels. If the U.S. bought less oil, the global oil market would shrink and price per-barrel would decline. This would
invalidate the social contract between the leaders and their people and stem the flow of resources to the religious establishment.
It will likely increase popular pressure for political participation, modernity and reformed political and social institutions.

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Oil dependency causes resentment which creates terrorism


Michael T. Klare 04 – Prof of Peace and World Security Studies @ Five Colleges
[“Oil: The real threat to national security”, October 4, Lexis]

But this is only part of the problem. Many of these countries were once occupied or controlled by the major colonial powers, and
so harbor deep resentments toward any remnant or reminder of colonialism. As the leading Western power, the United States has
become a magnet for much of this wrath. And because the most visible expressions of American involvement in these countries
are the large U.S.-based energy firms, anything to do with oil -- pipelines, pumping stations, refineries, tankers and so on --
becomes a legitimate target of attack. The lethal threat from terrorism, therefore, cannot be separated from our reliance on
foreign oil. American leaders are not unaware of this danger. Months before Sept. 11, 2001, President Bush warned of the
dangers associated with growing U.S. dependence on imports from the developing world. "If we fail to act," he declared on May
17 of that year, "our country will become more reliant on foreign crude oil, putting our national energy security into the hands of
foreign nations, some of whom do not share our interests." The logical response, of course, would have been to take swift action
to diminish America's dependence on imports. But this would have required a substantial reduction in our consumption of oil and
a dramatic improvement in the fuel efficiency of American automobiles -- steps that Bush was clearly unwilling to take,
presumably because this would jeopardize the profits of his friends and associates in the petroleum industry. As a result, we are
far more dependent on imported oil today than we were in 2001.

Terrorism causes extinction


Alexander 03. (Yonah, Prof and Director of Inter-University for Terrorism Studies, Washington Times, August 28, lexis)
Unlike their historical counterparts,
contemporary terrorists have introduced a new scale of violence in terms of conventional and
unconventional threats and impact. The internationalization and brutalization of current and future terrorism make it clear we
have entered an Age of Super Terrorism [e.g. biological, chemical, radiological, nuclear and cyber] with its serious implications
concerning national, regional and global security concerns. Two myths in particular must be debunked immediately if an effective
counterterrorism "best practices" strategy can be developed [e.g., strengthening international cooperation]. The first illusion is that terrorism can be greatly
reduced, if not eliminated completely, provided the root causes of conflicts - political, social and economic - are addressed. The conventional illusion is that
terrorism must be justified by oppressed people seeking to achieve their goals and consequently the argument advanced by "freedom fighters" anywhere, "give
me liberty and I will give you death," should be tolerated if not glorified. This traditional rationalization of "sacred" violence often conceals that the real purpose
of terrorist groups is to gain political power through the barrel of the gun, in violation of fundamental human rights of the noncombatant segment of societies. For
instance, Palestinians religious movements [e.g., Hamas, Islamic Jihad] and secular entities [such as Fatah's Tanzim and Aqsa Martyr Brigades]] wish not only to
resolve national grievances [such as Jewish settlements, right of return, Jerusalem] but primarily to destroy the Jewish state. Similarly, Osama bin Laden's
international network not only opposes the presence of American military in the Arabian Peninsula and Iraq, but its stated objective is to "unite all Muslims and
establish a government that follows the rule of the Caliphs." The second myth is that strong action against terrorist infrastructure [leaders, recruitment, funding,
propaganda, training, weapons, operational command and control] will only increase terrorism. The argument here is that law-enforcement efforts and military
retaliation inevitably will fuel more brutal acts of violent revenge. Clearly, if this perception continues to prevail, particularly in democratic societies, there is the
danger it will paralyze governments and thereby encourage further terrorist attacks. In sum, past experience provides useful lessons for a realistic future strategy.
The prudent application of force has been demonstrated to be an effective tool for short- and long-term deterrence of terrorism. For example, Israel's targeted
killing of Mohammed Sider, the Hebron commander of the Islamic Jihad, defused a "ticking bomb." The assassination of Ismail Abu Shanab - a top Hamas
leader in the Gaza Strip who was directly responsible for several suicide bombings including the latest bus attack in Jerusalem - disrupted potential terrorist
operations. Similarly, the U.S. military operation in Iraq eliminated Saddam Hussein's regime as a state sponsor of terror. Thus, it behooves those
countries victimized by terrorism to understand a cardinal message communicated by Winston Churchill to the House of Commons on May 13,
1940: "Victory at all costs, victory in spite of terror, victory however long and hard the road may be: For without victory, there is no
survival."

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And Terrorists will disrupt oil supplies


Gal Luft 2005, Co-Director @ Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, Committee on Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South
Asian Affairs
[“Terrorist threats to energy security”, July 27 http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/congress/2005_h/050727-luft.pdf]

What makes oil interesting for terrorists are the unique conditions that have been created in the oil market in recent years. Until
recently, the oil market had sufficient wiggle room to deal with occasional supply disruptions. Such disruptions could be offset
by the spare production capacity owned by some OPEC producers, chiefly Saudi Arabia. This spare capacity has been the oil
market's main source of liquidity. But due to the sudden growth in demand in developing Asia this liquidity mechanism has
eroded from 7mbd in 2002 which constituted 9% of the market to about 1.5 mbd today, less than 2%. As a result, the oil market
today resembles a car without shock absorbers: the tiniest bump on the road can send a passenger to the ceiling. Without
liquidity, the only one mechanism left to bring the market to equilibrium is rapid and uncontrolled price increases. This reality
plays into the hands of terrorists who want to hurt the Western economy. The war on radical Islam is often described as an
ideological or even religious war. But for the jihadists it is also an economic war. Osama bin Laden’s strategy is based on the
conviction that the way to bring down a superpower is to weaken its economy through protracted guerilla warfare. We "bled
Russia for ten years until it went bankrupt and was forced to withdraw [from Afghanistan] in defeat. […] We are continuing in
the same policy to make America bleed profusely to the point of bankruptcy," bin Laden boasted in his October 2004 videotape.
His logic, while based on faulty assumptions, is simple: To bring the U.S. to suffer a fate similar to that of the Soviet Union, the
terrorists need to drain America's resources and bring it to the point it can no longer afford to preserve its military and economic
dominance. As the U.S. loses standing in the Middle East, the jihadists can gain ground and remove from power regimes they
view as corrupt and illegitimate while defeating other infidels who inhabit the land of Islam. One of the Islamists’ methods to
achieve this goal is to attack oil, which jihadists call "the provision line and the feeding to the artery of the life of the crusader's
nation." Even though the Islamist goal of bankrupting the U.S. stretches the imagination, the fact that they strive for it means we
must take it into account in planning a counter-strategy. Striking pipelines, tankers, refineries and oil fields is easy and effective.
Terrorists no longer need to come to the U.S. and wreak havoc in our cities. They can cause enormous economic damage by
hitting our energy supply at the generating points, where they enjoy strong support on the ground. These attacks have already
imposed a "fear premium" in the oil market of $10-$15. For the U.S., an importer of more than 11 million barrels a day, this fear
premium alone costs $40-$60 billion a year. The cause and effect are not lost on terrorists. "We call our brothers in the
battlefields to direct some of their great efforts towards the oil wells and pipelines," reads a jihadist website. "The killing of 10
American soldiers is nothing compared to the impact of the rise in oil prices on America and the disruption that it causes in the
international economy."

And any terrorist disruption of oil will kill the economy


Cohen 07
(Ariel, Ph.D ; area of expertise is International Energy Security, “The National Security Consequences of Oil Dependency”, The Heritage Foundation)
< http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/hl1021.cfm>

Terrorist attacks that have been carried out to date on the oil infrastructure have clearly caught oil producers unprepared. For
example, al-Qaeda's February 24, 2005, attack on the Aramco facility in Abqaiq, Saudi Arabia, sent shock waves through the
world's financial markets. On the same day, the price of oil on international markets jumped nearly $2 per barrel, despite the
attack's complete failure (the terrorists and two security guards were killed.)[3] Most analysts agree that the February attack, an
additional attempt on March 28, 2005, and a 9/11-style assault in April 2007, all of which were successfully averted, were merely
trial runs in a much longer campaign designed to disrupt the global economy in general, and the oil and gas industry in
particular.[4] As the September 11, 2001, World Trade Center attacks demonstrated, al-Qaeda tends to return to the scene of the
crime, so another strike on Abqaiq and other oil targets is likely. Both Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri have repeatedly
called for attacks on key Western economic targets, especially energy sources.[5] In a tape aired by Al-Jazeera in February 2006,
Zawahiri said: I call on the mujahideen to concentrate their attacks on Muslims' stolen oil, most of the revenues of which go to
the enemies of Islam while most of what they leave is seized by the thieves who rule our countries.[6] The unfortunate reality is
that the Middle East remains the strategic center of gravity of the global oil market--a position that is not likely to change in the
medium term. As long as radical Islamists, China, Russia, India, and Europe continue the struggle for the world's limited oil
supply, the region will remain unstable. If the U.S. is to protect itself from these economic and political threats, it must use all the
tools at its disposal to protect energy assets around the globe, while decreasing the world's dependence on Middle Eastern oil as
quickly and efficiently as possible.

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Even if a terrorist attack failed, it would still have consequences for the global economy
CSIS 05
[Anthony H. Cordesman & Khalid R. Al-Rodhan "The Changing Risks in Global Oil Supply and Demand: Crisis or Evolving Solutions?" Center for Strategic and International
Studies 10/3/05 http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/050930_globaloilrisks.pdf

Moreover, given the interdependence of the global market, perceptions of instability are as important as realities. To reassure
markets, producers have to build confidence not only in their capability to prevent attacks, but also in their ability to contain the
damage of unexpected violence through building redundancy in production and export systems. Since the start of terrorist
attacks in the Kingdom in May 2003, Saudi Arabia has increased security and redundancy of its oil infrastructure including its oil
reservoirs, export terminals, and refineries on the Red Sea and the Gulf. The attempted attacks in the Saudi cities of Yanbu and
Al-Khubar in the summer of 2004 sent ripples through out the global energy market. The redundancy of the Saudi export and
production systems in addition to the swiftness in which the Saudi forces suppressed the attacks reassured the global markets.75
Attempts against Saudi oil, however, continue to worry the global energy market and the Saudi leadership. Following a siege and
a raid by the Saudi security forces against extremists in Dammam, the Saudi security forces discovered more than 60 hand
grenades and pipe bombs, pistols, machine guns, RPGs, two barrels full of explosives, and video equipment. The Saudi Minister
of Interior, Prince Nayef al-Saud, was quoted saying that the al-Qaeda cell had planned to attack Saudi oil and gas infrastructure,
but Prince Nayef added, “There isn’t a place that they could reach that they didn’t think about,” and insisted that al-Qaeda’s
ultimate goal has been to cripple the global economy.76 Oil fields are large area targets with many redundant facilities. While
fires can be set in many areas of a working field, including at oil wells, fires do not produce critical or lasting damage. Unless
wells are attacked with explosives deep enough in the wellhead to result in permanent damage to the well, most facilities can be
rapidly repaired. There are, however, larger items of equipment and central facilities whose damage would do far more to
interrupt production, and many of which require months of manufacturing time to replace. Such facilities include central
pumping facilities, gas-oil separators (GOSPs), related power plants, water injection facilities, and desalination plants.
Vulnerability also increases sharply if key targets in a field are attacked as a system, rather than as individual elements, and if
expert assistance is available to saboteurs or attackers.

Economic collapse causes numerous scenarios for nuclear Armageddon


Bearden – Retired U.S. Army Colonel - 2000
[Bearden (Ret.), US Army, 6/24/2000 (“The Unnecessary Energy Crisis: How to Solve in Quickly” (http://www.seaspower.com/EnergyCrisis-Bearden.htm) ]

History bears out that desperate nations take desperate actions. Prior to the final economic collapse, the stress on nations will have increased the
intensity and number of their conflicts, to the point where the arsenals of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) now possessed by some 25
nations, are almost certain to be released. As an example, suppose a starving North Korea {[7]} launches nuclear weapons upon Japan and
South Korea, including U.S. forces there, in a spasmodic suicidal response. Or suppose a desperate China — whose long-range nuclear missiles
(some) can reach the United States — attacks Taiwan. In addition to immediate responses, the mutual treaties involved in such scenarios will
quickly draw other nations into the conflict, escalating it significantly. Strategic nuclear studies have shown for decades that, under such
extreme stress conditions, once a few nukes are launched, adversaries and potential adversaries are then compelled to launch on perception of
preparations by one's adversary. The real legacy of the MAD concept is this side of the MAD coin that is almost never discussed. Without
effective defense, the only chance a nation has to survive at all is to launch immediate full-bore pre-emptive strikes and try to take out its
perceived foes as rapidly and massively as possible. As the studies showed, rapid escalation to full WMD exchange occurs. Today, a great
percent of the WMD arsenals that will be unleashed, are already on site within the United States itself {[8]}. The resulting great Armageddon
will destroy civilization as we know it, and perhaps most of the biosphere, at least for many decades.

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Oil facilities and transport are vulnerable to attack- makes our impacts more likely
Gartenstein-Ross 7/21/08
[Daveed, "The Strategic Vulnerabilities of Oil Dependence" 7/21/08 FDD http://www.defenddemocracy.org/publications/publications_show.htm?doc_id=696237&attrib_id=7393

Could a catastrophic attack against Saudi oil production actually succeed? Past attempts against Saudi facilities provide reason
for concern. Moreover, such a catastrophic attack could be executed using tactics that al-Qaeda has successfully employed in the
past. Consider, for example, how an airplane was used as a guided missile on September 11, 2001. It would be difficult to
safeguard major facilities against such an attack. Thus, former CIA case officer Robert Baer wrote in his 2003 book Sleeping
with the Devil: “A single jumbo jet with a suicide bomber at the controls, hijacked during takeoff from Dubai and crashed into
the heart of Ras Tanura, would be enough to bring the world’s oil-addicted economies to their knees, America’s along with
them.” In addition to the offshore loading facility at Ras Tanura, the Abqaiq processing facility is also an obvious target. Baer
writes: At the least, a moderate-to-severe attack on Abqaiq would slow average production there from 6.8 million barrels a day to
roughly a million barrels for the first two months postattack, a loss equivalent to approximately one-third of America’s current
daily consumption of crude oil. Even as long as seven months after an attack, Abqaiq output would still be about 40 percent of
preattack output, as much as 4 million barrels below normal—roughly equal to what all of the OPEC partners collectively took
out of production during the devastating 1973 embargo. Nor do terror groups necessarily need to carry out a dramatic attack
inside Saudi Arabia to have a significant effect on the oil supply. The world has a limited number of chokepoints, narrow
channels by which oil reaches global markets. The Energy Information Administration has noted that “[t]he blockage of a
chokepoint, even temporarily, can lead to substantial increases in total energy costs.” Thus, these chokepoints are another of the
energy supply’s vulnerabilities. Al-Qaeda has carried out attacks at sea in the past, most notably the October 2000 attack on the
USS Cole. Luft and Korin warn that if terrorists attacked an oil tanker in a critical chokepoint, “the resulting explosion and
spreading stain of burning oil could shut down the channel for weeks, with a profound impact on global markets and the
maritime insurance industry.” If an attack is successfully executed according to one of these scenarios, the substantially reduced
worldwide supply of oil would be joined by an inflated risk premium. Julian Lee, a senior energy analyst at the Centre for Global
Energy Studies in London, told the Guardian in 2004 that following a significant loss of Saudi oil, “it would be difficult to put an
upper limit on the kind of panic reaction you would see in the global oil markets.” The ramifications would be not only economic
but also military: Sawt al-Jihad may well be correct that such an attack could spell doom for the U.S. ventures in Afghanistan and
Iraq. Disruptive Terrorism In addition to catastrophic attacks, terrorists can disrupt the global oil supply by targeting specific
nodes of production networks. In contrast to catastrophic terrorism, this approach does not require significant resources, a large
organization, or complex planning. Disruptive attacks on oil production are regularly conducted by a variety of terrorist and
insurgent groups throughout the world. For example, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) has been
waging a campaign of pipeline, refinery, and oil field attacks since its February 2006 declaration of “total war” against the oil
companies operating in Nigeria. The group’s recent activities show the effect that disruptive attacks can have on global markets.
Saudi Arabia pledged to produce an extra 200,000 barrels of oil per day beginning in July 2008 to curb record prices, yet MEND
and its copycats were able to knock more than that offline in a single week: an attack on Shell’s Bonga field coupled with two
attacks on Chevron’s Abiteve Olero crude oil line cut Nigeria’s output by about 400,000 bpd. Though the Nigerian facilities will
be repaired, this demonstrates how disruptive attacks can scotch the market’s supply expectations. Iraq also demonstrates the
potential impact of disruptive attacks. Since the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom, there have been over 450 attacks on
Iraq’s pipelines, oil installations, and oil personnel. Though none of these attacks could be categorized as catastrophic, only in
2008—five years after Saddam Hussein’s regime fell—has Iraq been able to return to a production level of 2.5 million bpd. (It
produced an average of 2.3 million barrels of oil per day during the last five years of Saddam’s rule.)

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Oil dependence strengthens terrorists- resentment


Sandalow 5-22-08 –Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy @ Brookings
[David B., “Rising Oil Prices, Declining National Security”,http://www.brookings.edu/testimony/2008/0522_oil_sandalow.aspx]

First, oil dependence strengthens Al Qaeda and other Islamic terrorists. The United States is in a long war. Islamic
fundamentalists struck our shores and are determined to do so again. Like the Cold War, this struggle has many causes and will
last for generations. Unlike the Cold War, oil dependence plays a central role in the struggle. For more than 50 years, the need to
protect oil flows has shaped U.S. policy and relationships in the Persian Gulf. During the Cold War, we supported the Shah of
Iran in part to keep oil flowing from the region. In 1980, President Carter declared that attempts by outside forces to gain control
of the Persian Gulf would be “repelled by any means necessary, including military force.” In 1991, with Saddam Hussein in
Kuwait, President George H.W. Bush told Congress that war was necessary because “[v]ital economic interests are at risk…Iraq
itself controls some 10% of the world’s proven oil reserves. Iraq plus Kuwait controls twice that.” After removing Saddam from
Kuwait in 1991, U.S. troops remained in Saudi Arabia where their presence bred great resentment. These steps to secure oil
flows have come at a cost. By making us central players in a region torn by ancient rivalries, oil dependence has exposed us to
resentment, vulnerability and attack. Osama bin Laden’s first fatwa, in 1996, was titled “Declaration of War against the
Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places.” Today, deep resentment of the U.S. role in the Persian Gulf remains a
powerful recruitment tool for Islamic fundamentalists. Yet the United States faces severe constraints in responding to this
resentment. With half the world’s proven oil reserves, the world’s cheapest oil and the world’s only spare production capacity, the
Persian Gulf will remain an indispensable region for the global economy so long as modern vehicles run only on oil. To protect
oil flows, the U.S. policymakers will feel compelled to maintain relationships and exert power in the region in ways likely to fuel
Islamic terrorists.

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Oil money funds terrorists


Committee on International Relations 02 House of Representatives Committee
[“OIL DIPLOMACY: FACTS AND MYTHS BEHIND FOREIGN OIL DEPENDENCY” HEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION 6/20/02 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS, Washington, DC.]

Let me first express my appreciation for your holding this very important hearing. Since the horrific events of last September, we
have held a number of important hearings to assess how we can most effectively defeat global terrorism. Until today, we have not
examined how our reliance on Middle Eastern oil handicaps our ability to combat international terrorism. Mr. Chairman, today
America’s dwindling oil reserves provide less than half of the oil our economy uses. This leaves us heavily dependent on the
Middle Eastern regimes that control the vast majority of the world’s known oil reserves. Many of these regimes are either
actively hostile to the United States, as is the case with Iran, Iraq, and Lybia, or unsteady, autocratic regimes beholden to Islamic
fundamentalists like Saudi Arabia. Not surprisingly, many of these same regimes funnel oil revenues into support for global
terrorist organizations. The Saudi royal family, for instance, pumps millions of dollars into radical religious schools and mosques
across the Middle East that spread the puritanical teachings of the Wahabbi sect of Islam. These schools preach hate toward
America. Many of these schools trained the very al Qaeda terrorists who struck America on September 11th. Mr. Chairman, our
dependence on Middle East oil severely undermines our ability to combat international terrorism. Fearing another Arab embargo,
some of our diplomats kowtow to Middle East autocrats and permit their antidemocratic, anti-American practices to go
unanswered. It is distressing that U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East is often held hostage to oil interests. The question we
must ask ourselves is how can we break free of this crippling dependence? The title of today’s hearing is ‘‘The Facts and Myths
Behind Foreign Oil Dependency.’’ The fact is that we will remain beholden to these Middle Eastern suppliers until we scale back
America’s addiction to oil. The myth is that we can drill our way out of dependency.

Oil dependency devastates the economy and funds terrorism and dictatorial regimes
Terrorism- funding
Gal Luft 2005, Co-Director @ Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, Committee on Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South
Asian Affairs
[“THE U.S., THE MIDDLE EAST AND PETROLEUM”, CAPITOL HILL HEARING TESTIMONY, October 20, 2005, Lexis]

These projections require that we take a sober long term look at the impact of our growing dependence on our strategic posture in
the Middle East. Oil prices are not going down any time soon. The rise in oil prices will yield large financial surpluses to the
Middle Eastern oil producers. This petrodollar windfall will strengthen the jihadists while undermining the strategic relationship
the region's oil producers have with the U.S. As President Bush said last April, U.S. dependence on overseas oil is a "foreign tax
on the American people." Indeed, oil imports constitute a quarter of the U.S. trade deficit and are a major contributor to the loss
of jobs and investment opportunities. According to a study on the hidden cost of oil by the National Defense Council Foundation,
the periodic oil shocks the U.S. has experienced since the 1973 Arab oil embargo cost the economy almost $2.5 trillion. More
importantly, while the U.S. economy is bleeding, oil-producing nations increase their oil revenues dramatically to the detriment
of our national security. The numbers speak for themselves: In November 2001, a barrel of oil was selling for $18. In less than
four years the price jumped to $70. This means that Saudi Arabia, which exports about 10 mbd, receives an extra half billion
dollars every day from consuming nations and Iran, which exports 2.5 mbd, an extra $125 million. This windfall benefits the
non-democratic governments of the Middle East and other producers and finds its way to the jihadists committed to America's
destruction as petrodollars trickle their way through charities and government handouts to madrassas and mosques, as well as
outright support of terrorist groups. It is widely accepted that Saudi Arabia's oil wealth has directly enabled the spread of
Wahhabism around the world. The Saudis use oil funds to control most of the Arabic language media and are now moving to
gain growing control over Western media. Only last month Saudi Prince Al-Waleed bin Talal, the world's fifth richest man,
purchased 5.46 percent of Fox News corporation. Petrodollars garnered from the U.S. and other countries are also being used
by Saudi Arabia systematically to provide social services, build "Islamic centers" and schools, pay preachers' salaries and, in
some cases, fund terror organizations. In July 2005 undersecretary of the Treasury Stuart Levey testifying before the Senate
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs noted "Wealthy Saudi financiers and charities have funded terrorist
organizations and causes that support terrorism and the ideology that fuels the terrorists' agenda. Even today, we believe that
Saudi donors may still be a significant source of terrorist financing, including for the insurgency in Iraq." The U.S. in an odd
situation in which it is funding both sides in the war on terrorism. We finance the defense of the Free World against its sworn
enemies through our tax dollars. And at the same time we support hostile regimes through the transfer of petrodollars. If we don't
change course we will bleed more dollars each year as our enemies gather strength. Steady increase in world demand for oil
means further enrichment of the corrupt and dictatorial regimes in the Persian Gulf and continued access of terrorist groups to a
viable financial network which allows them to remain a lethal threat to the U.S. and its allies.

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Oil money funds terrorists; reducing dependence is key- funding


Zuckerman 06 (Mortimer, B. “Let’s Get Serious About Oil. Four Key Steps Can Stop America from Fueling Hate, One Barrel
At A Time”, Daily News July 31, Lexis Nexis Academic)

Here's a nasty thought: Every day you and I subsidize the propagators of terrorism. To import oil for our cars, homes and
workplaces, America now spends and borrows a staggering $1 billion every single day. In the past four years alone, oil
producers' revenues have grown from $300 billion a year to $800 billion. When oil goes up by a dollar a barrel, it costs us an
additional $7.4 billion! An increasing share of that money goes to countries in the Middle East, especially Saudi Arabia, and
through that nation to extremist religious groups who support Islamist militancy throughout the Middle East and beyond,
disseminating a message of hatred and violence against Western influence and ideas. Small wonder, then, that the overwhelming
judgment from a hundred foreign policy experts polled in Foreign Policy magazine is that the highest priority in fighting
terrorism must be to reduce America's dependence on foreign oil. Everyone knows that over the past three years the price we
pay at the pump has doubled. The populist rant that this is the fault of "rapacious" oil companies is a glib and false response, and
it's especially unattractive when it comes from Democrats, who have systematically blocked attempts to increase domestic oil
production. Oil prices, in fact, are determined by a complex, and increasingly competitive, global market. The roots of our
predicament don't lie in the boardrooms of Big Oil but at our own back door. In the two decades following 1980, when gas was
still cheap, Americans switched from cars to minivans and SUVs, and they moved from the cities to the suburbs and then to the
exurbs. Now three out of every four Americans commute to work, many spending hours on the road each day. In Europe, one in
five workers, by contrast, gets to work by rail and bus; only 5% of Americans rely on public transport. Two-thirds of our
petroleum consumption is for transportation. We live in a car-driven culture, relying more and more on large, heavy vehicles for
getting to work, running errands and taking our kids to school. Consumers enjoy the size, power and sense of security from their
SUVs, which now account for roughly half of all cars in the United States, compared with just 7% in 1990. Every day 200
million cars in America guzzle about 11% of the world's daily oil output. We are the only industrialized country that is less
energy-efficient than it was two decades ago. It's going to cost us billions and billions more because the supply-demand equation
is going to get worse, not better.

Oil money funds terrorist organizations and anti-Americanism; dependency means we can’t act- funding
Washington Times 06 (“Fueling War on the West”, Milton Couplos, September 10, 2006, LexisNexis)

But even the nominal rise in prices doesn't tell the full story. There are hidden costs what economists call "externalities" that
come with our excessive import dependence. These range from loss of basic economic activity that would occur if the money
were spent here to lost investments, to the added military burden that is part and parcel of our import vulnerability. Taken
together, these will total $825 billion this year, and that's just the monetary effect. Of even greater concern, it will also rob
America of more than 2.4 million jobs. But there's another aspect of this outflow of capital some portion of every dollar we
spend on imported oil finds its way into the hands of nations who wish us ill. Oil money is funding groups like Hamas,
Hezbollah and al Qaeda, enabling them to plan and perhaps execute the next September 11-type attack. It is also oil money much
of it from Saudi Arabia funding the madrassas or Islamic schools that spread the radical, militant Islamist viewpoint that gave us
the Taliban and September 11 and is now feeding civil strife throughout the Islamic world. Five years into the war on terrorism, it
has become increasingly apparent that OPEC's main players are also the main drivers of anti-Americanism. They have worked
tirelessly to undermine U.S. foreign policy objectives such as promoting democracy, preventing nuclear proliferation and
defeating terrorism, and the danger they pose grows daily. Iran, OPEC's second-largest producer, is on a collision course with
the U.S. over its nuclear ambitions and genocidal agenda. Its leader Ali Khameni brags, "The U.S. will never be able to guarantee
a safe supply of energy in this region." Venezuela's Hugo Chavez uses his nation's petrodollars to foster anti-Americanism in our
own hemisphere, and the Saudis continue advancing global Islamist militancy.

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Oil dependence makes us vulnerable to terrorist attacks and instability- disruption


Sandalow & O’Hanlon 2006- Both Senior Fellows, Foreign Policy @ Brookings
[“Iran: Regaining Energy Leverage”, January 31, The Washington Times, http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2006/0131iran_ohanlon.aspx]

More than ever, the world needs an energy cushion that will allow it to consider sanctions against a major oil-exporting country
such as Iran that so flagrantly defies the international community. Such a cushion is also needed to prevent political instability on
the Arabian Peninsula or terrorist attacks on major oil fields from leading quickly to full-scale global crisis. We are taking a
foolish and unnecessary risk by remaining so dependent on every drop of oil pumped that the global economy shudders and
political leaders tremble the moment any major source is threatened.

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A terrorist attack on oil supplies would be disastrous for the world economy; the terrorists have already started attacking
Cohen 07
(Ariel, Ph.D ; area of expertise is International Energy Security, “The National Security Consequences of Oil Dependency”, The Heritage Foundation)
< http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/hl1021.cfm>

Oil as a Weapon. Many Arab leaders understand the dynamic of the world's oil dependence. For example, as early as 1990, the
late Yassir Arafat said: When the North Sea oil dries up in 1991, the United States will want to buy Arab petroleum. And when
the American oil fields themselves run dry and oil consumption in the United States increases, the American need for the Arabs
will grow greater and greater.[7] This observation has not been lost on the current generation of politicians and terrorist leaders.
However, bin Laden and Zawahiri are not satisfied with the unwieldy weapons of oil boycotts and buying political influence in
the West. Instead, they are clearly zeroing in on the oil-rich kingdoms of Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf as their principal
targets. They also appear increasingly interested in attacking the entire global oil industry, from wells to wheels. The failed
February 2005 strike and the prevented March 2005 attack on Abqaiq, mentioned earlier, were not the first times that al-Qaeda
has targeted energy assets in the region. In October 2002, al-Qaeda attacked the Limbourg, a French oil tanker, off the coast of
Yemen with a suicide boat filled with explosives. In 2002, American and Saudi intelligence agencies uncovered a plot by al-
Qaeda sympathizers inside Saudi Aramco to destroy key Saudi oil facilities. In 2003-2004, al-Qaeda attacked the Saudi port of
Yanbu and murdered five Western engineers working there.[8] Some analysts have warned that a carefully targeted terrorist
attack on oil facilities in Saudi Arabia could reduce Saudi oil production to 4 million barrels per day or less for up to three
months, which would have disastrous results for the global economy.

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Oil facilities are easy to attack- and even if an attack fails the consequences would still be devastating
Cook 08 Ph.D., Associate Professor of Religious Studies @ Rice University, undergraduate degrees at the Hebrew University in
Jerusalem, and received his Ph.D. from the University of Chicago
["The Global Energy Market: Comprehensive Strategies to Meet Geopolitical and Financial Risks—The G8, Energy Security, and Global Climate Issues" May THE JAMES A.
BAKER III INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY AND THE INSTITUTE OF ENERGY ECONOMICS http://www.rice.edu/nationalmedia/multimedia/oilterrorism.pdf]

Oil is also vulnerable. The oil infrastructure is usually concentrated in a few places within a given country, and while this fact
makes protecting it theoretically easier, it also ensures that if an attack is successful, the destruction can have wide-ranging
consequences. Additionally, the volatility of the oil market makes it particularly vulnerable to any threats—real or imagined.
Therefore, even a failed hit or one on a subsidiary part of the oil industry (e.g., an oil tanker on the high seas) can have
ramifications far beyond the actual importance of the event by raising oil prices or causing the market to fluctuate. All of these
subsidiary elements within the oil industry—oil tankers, refineries, storage areas, headquarters of companies, quarters for oil
workers, etc.—cannot be protected on a permanent basis. An additional difficulty stems from the ideological insidiousness of
radical Islam. Indeed, it is by no means clear who precisely is a radical Muslim. Because the nature of this ideology is to gain
converts (primarily among Muslims, but also by converting non-Muslims who increasingly form an important part of radical
Islam), it is theoretically possible that trusted members of security forces or management could be suborned into betraying the
facilities they are supposed to protect. This possibility exists in addition to the standard methods of gaining access through force,
blackmail or bribery, which are all too common in and of themselves. For all of these reasons, discussion of the radical Muslim
threat to the oil infrastructure in the Muslim world is important.

Oil flows are vulnerable to attack and interruption


Ariel Cohen 2007—Ph.D. Senior Research Fellow, Russian and Eurasian Studies and International Energy Security, Heritage Foundation
[“HEARING OF THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE; SUBJECT: FOREIGN POLICY AND NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF OIL DEPENDENCE; ”,
Lexis]

We also cannot forget that the leadership of the global Jihadi movements, specifically Osama Bin Laden and Ayman Al-Zawahiri,
have repeatedly called for attacks on key Western economic targets including energy infrastructure. Just one quote from Zawahiri
from February 2006 -- quote, "I call on Muja Hadeen to concentrate their attacks on Muslim stolen oil. Most of the revenues
owage (ph) go to the enemies of Islam, while most of what they leave is seized by the thieves who rule our countries." As a long
term project, the Jihadi movement is aiming to overthrow the current regimes of the Middle East to create a global Halifat, the
Islamist empire based on Sharia, and then push for Islamization of the rest of the world. For them, it's real, Mr. Chairman, as
chilling as it may sound to us. And as long as they believe in success of their project, unless they're dissuaded, they'll continue
these attacks, and the oil infrastructure in the Middle East will be at risk. I talked already about Iran, and specifically on the
disruption issue. Iran today has a much larger arsenal than it had during the Iran-Iraq War, including anti-ship cruise missile
arsenal and sophisticated mines, mainly designed or produced in China, that can be used by the Islamic Republic to interrupt the
flow of oil. In terms of our policy, we should definitely make all the efforts, including the efforts by this committee, to limit the
ability of Iran to reek havoc in the oil markets. We need to boost or to diversify further geographic sources of U.S. energy
imports and open our resources for more exploration and exploitation.

Oil infrastructure is vulnerable


Lando 06 Jerusalem Post correspondent
["Former CIA chief: 'Oil dependence threatens US, Israel'" 11/3/06 http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1162378316436&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull]

Roughly two-thirds of the world's known oil reserves are in the greater Middle East. Demand is expected to increase by more
than 50% in the next two decades from 78 million barrels per day (MBD) in 2002 to 118 MBD in 2025, according to the federal
Energy Information Administration. "It will mean higher prices and potential supply disruptions and will put considerable
leverage in the hands of governments in the greater Middle East," Woolsey said. Woolsey pointed to the attack at Abquaiq earlier
this year as an example of America's vulnerability. A well planned attack could take some six million barrels per day off the
market sharply increasing petroleum prices and damaging the world economy, according to Woolsey. "We have succeeded in
constructing an international trading system for energy and everything else, that operates like a beautiful, fine, Swiss watch, and
it works very well as long as there is no interference," Woolsey said. An accident last summer in the Texas City refinery as well
as hurricane damage in the Gulf, point out the potential infrastructure vulnerabilities. "The transfer of funds from industrial
countries to the Middle East is a source of enormous strength for them and particularly for autocracies, whether it be the Iranian
government or Whahadi infrastructure," said Daniel Pipes director of the Middle East Forum. "Therefore cutting back on those
transfers is of vital importance and high priority."

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Oil is a target for attack- makes our impact the most probable
Gal Luft 2005, Co-Director @ Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, Committee on Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South
Asian Affairs
[“Terrorist threats to energy security”, July 27 http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/congress/2005_h/050727-luft.pdf]

The most popular targets are pipelines, through which about 40% of world's oil flows. They run over thousands of miles and
across some of the most volatile areas in the world. Pipelines are very easily sabotaged. A simple explosive device can put a
critical section of pipeline out of operation for weeks. This is why pipeline sabotage has become the weapon of choice of the
insurgents in Iraq. The Institute for the Analysis of Global Security maintains a database of all attacks against energy facilities.
According to the Institute’s Iraq Pipeline Watch (www.iags.org/iraqpipelinewatch.htm) there have been more than 250 pipeline
attacks in Iraq since President Bush declared the end of major hostilities in April 2003. These attacks have strategic impact on
U.S. efforts in Iraq. They undermined the prospects of Iraqi construction by denying the Iraqi economy much needed oil
revenues. They also have a corrosive influence on the morale of the Iraqis and their attitude toward the presence of U.S. forces in
their country. Iraqis are growing increasingly vexed by the slow progress in the reconstruction effort and the inability of the
government to guarantee a reliable supply of electricity, which is primarily derived from oil. Worse, the sabotage campaign has
created an inhospitable investment climate in Iraq and scared away oil companies that were supposed to develop its oil and gas
industry. Emulating the success of the saboteurs in Iraq, terrorists in many oil-producing countries have set their sights on and
attacked pipelines and other oil installations in Sudan, Chechnya, India, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Turkey, Colombia, Nigeria,
Azerbaijan, Indonesia and the Philippines. Terror at sea There is growing evidence that terrorists find the unpoliced sea to be
their preferred domain of operation. Terrorist groups such as al Qaeda, Hezbollah, Jemaah Islamiyah, the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine-General Command, and Sri Lanka's Tamil Tigers have long sought to develop a maritime capability.
Today, over 60% of the world's oil and almost all of its liquefied natural gas is shipped on 3,500 tankers through a small number
of 'chokepoints' – straits and channels narrow enough to be blocked, and vulnerable to piracy and terrorism. The most important
chokepoints are the Strait of Hormuz, through which 13 million barrels of oil are moved daily, Bab el-Mandab, which connects
the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea, and the Strait of Malacca, between Indonesia and Malaysia. Thirty percent
of the world's trade and 80% of Japan's crude oil passes through the latter, including half of all sea shipments of oil bound for
East Asia and two-thirds of global liquefied natural gas shipments. The Bosporus, linking the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, is
less than a mile wide in some areas and is one of the most threatened chokepoints. Ten percent of the 50,000 ships that pass
through it each year are tankers carrying Russian and Caspian oil. Most of the critical chokepoints are located in areas where
Islamic fundamentalism is prevalent. The Strait of Hormuz is controlled by Iran; Bab el-Mandab is controlled by Yemen, the
ancestral home of bin Laden. Part of the 500-mile long Strait of Malacca courses through Indonesia's oil rich province Aceh,
inhabited by one of the world’s most radical Muslim populations. Many terror experts have expressed concern that al Qaeda
might seize a ship or a boat or even a one-man submarine and crash it into a supertanker in one of the chokepoints. Were
terrorists to attack such a vessel the resulting explosion and spreading stain of burning oil could shut down the channel with a
profound impact on the oil market. Tankers are too slow and cumbersome to maneuver away from attackers; they have no
protection and they have nowhere to hide. al Qaeda terrorists have demonstrated repeatedly their intent and ability to strike them.
In January 2000 al Qaeda attempted to ram a boat loaded with explosives into the USS The Sullivans in Yemen. The attack was
aborted when the boat sank under the weight of the explosives. Later, in October, al Qaeda suicide bomber in high-powered
speedboat packed with explosives blew a hole in the USS Cole, killing 17 sailors. In June 2002, a group of al Qaeda operatives
suspected of plotting raids on British and American tankers passing through the Strait of Gibraltar was arrested by the Moroccan
government; and in October that year, the organization badly holed a French supertanker off the coast of Yemen. According to
FBI DirectorRobert Mueller "any number of [terror] attacks on ships…have been thwarted." To make things worse, there are
increasing signs of collaboration between terrorists and pirates. According to International Maritime Bureau (IMB), pirate attacks
on ships have tripled in the last decade. Each year 350-400 piracy attacks take place worldwide in which hundreds of seafarers
are being killed, assaulted, or kidnapped. The majority of the attacks take place in the Philippines, Indonesia, Bangladesh and
Nigeria. Most of the ships attacked are oil and chemical tankers. Maritime security experts have repeatedly warned about the
collusion between piracy and terror, voicing concerns that Islamist groups operating in these regions could capitalize on the
disorder and target strategic chokepoints by placing a bomb on a supertanker or ramming a ship into one.

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Oil = Vulnerable to attack [3/3] 39

A terrorist attack on Saudi Arabia’s oil facilities is highly probable and would devastate the economy
Gal Luft 2005, Co-Director @ Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, Committee on Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South
Asian Affairs
[“Terrorist threats to energy security”, July 27 http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/congress/2005_h/050727-luft.pdf]

But one scenario our economy cannot withstand is a major attack on one of Saudi Arabia’s oil facilities. In addition to being
holder of a quarter of the world’s oil reserves holder of most of the world’s spare production capacity Saudi Arabia is the only
country in the world that has facilities that process more than 3mbd. Over half of Saudi Arabia’s oil reserves are contained in just
eight fields and about two-thirds of Saudi Arabia's crude oil is processed in a single enormous facility called Abqaiq, 25 miles
inland from the Gulf of Bahrain. On the Persian Gulf, Saudi Arabia has just two primary oil export terminals: Ras Tanura - the
world's largest offshore oil loading facility, through which a tenth of global oil supply flows daily - and Ras al-Ju'aymah. On the
Red Sea, a terminal called Yanbu is connected to Abqaiq via the 750-mile East–West pipeline. The Saudi oil system is target rich
and extremely vulnerable to terrorist acts. This is not only due to al Qaeda’s strong presence in the kingdom and its ability to
carry out coordinated attacks but also because of the number of strategic targets. A terrorist attack on each one of the hubs of the
Saudi oil complex or a simultaneous attack on a few of them is not a fictional scenario. In summer 2002, a group of Saudis was
arrested for involvement in a plot to sabotage Ras Tanura and pipelines connected to it. A single terrorist cell hijacking an
airplane in Kuwait or Dubai and crashing it into Abqaiq or Ras Tanura, could turn the complex into an inferno. This could take
up to 50% of Saudi oil off the market for at least six months and with it most of the world’s spare capacity. Such an attack could
be more economically damaging than a dirty nuclear bomb set off in New York City. Since September 11 it has become apparent
that there is no shortage of suicide terrorists who are willing to sacrifice their lives for the sake of killing the infidel but recent
events in Iraq and Saudi Arabia show that there are those who are also willing to give away their lives for the sake of denying us
oil.

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Terrorists want to attack oil


Cohen 07
[Ariel "The National Security Consequences of Oil Dependency" Heritage Lecture #1021 3/22/07 http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/hl1021.cfm]

Terrorist attacks that have been carried out to date on the oil infrastructure have clearly caught oil producers unprepared. For
example, al-Qaeda's February 24, 2005, attack on the Aramco facility in Abqaiq, Saudi Arabia, sent shock waves through the
world's financial markets. On the same day, the price of oil on international markets jumped nearly $2 per barrel, despite the
attack's complete failure (the terrorists and two security guards were killed.)[3] Most analysts agree that the February attack, an
additional attempt on March 28, 2005, and a 9/11-style assault in April 2007, all of which were successfully averted, were merely
trial runs in a much longer campaign designed to disrupt the global economy in general, and the oil and gas industry in
particular.[4] As the September 11, 2001, World Trade Center attacks demonstrated, al-Qaeda tends to return to the scene of the
crime, so another strike on Abqaiq and other oil targets is likely. Both Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri have repeatedly
called for attacks on key Western economic targets, especially energy sources.[5] In a tape aired by Al-Jazeera in February 2006,
Zawahiri said: I call on the mujahideen to concentrate their attacks on Muslims' stolen oil, most of the revenues of which go to
the enemies of Islam while most of what they leave is seized by the thieves who rule our countries.[6] The unfortunate reality is
that the Middle East remains the strategic center of gravity of the global oil market--a position that is not likely to change in the
medium term. As long as radical Islamists, China, Russia, India, and Europe continue the struggle for the world's limited oil
supply, the region will remain unstable. If the U.S. is to protect itself from these economic and political threats, it must use all the
tools at its disposal to protect energy assets around the globe, while decreasing the world's dependence on Middle Eastern oil as
quickly and efficiently as possible. Oil as a Weapon. Many Arab leaders understand the dynamic of the world's oil dependence.
For example, as early as 1990, the late Yassir Arafat said: When the North Sea oil dries up in 1991, the United States will want to
buy Arab petroleum. And when the American oil fields themselves run dry and oil consumption in the United States increases,
the American need for the Arabs will grow greater and greater.[7] This observation has not been lost on the current generation of
politicians and terrorist leaders. However, bin Laden and Zawahiri are not satisfied with the unwieldy weapons of oil boycotts
and buying political influence in the West. Instead, they are clearly zeroing in on the oil-rich kingdoms of Saudi Arabia and the
Persian Gulf as their principal targets. They also appear increasingly interested in attacking the entire global oil industry, from
wells to wheels. The failed February 2005 strike and the prevented March 2005 attack on Abqaiq, mentioned earlier, were not the
first times that al-Qaeda has targeted energy assets in the region. In October 2002, al-Qaeda attacked the Limbourg, a French oil
tanker, off the coast of Yemen with a suicide boat filled with explosives. In 2002, American and Saudi intelligence agencies
uncovered a plot by al-Qaeda sympathizers inside Saudi Aramco to destroy key Saudi oil facilities. In 2003-2004, al-Qaeda
attacked the Saudi port of Yanbu and murdered five Western engineers working there.[8] Some analysts have warned that a
carefully targeted terrorist attack on oil facilities in Saudi Arabia could reduce Saudi oil production to 4 million barrels per day or
less for up to three months, which would have disastrous results for the global economy.

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AT: Attack would fail 41

Even an indirect terrorist attack could devastate oil supply


Gartenstein-Ross 7/21/8 -Vice President of Research at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, Subject Matter Expert for the
U.S. Dep of State’s office of antiterrorism assistance, conducted law enforcement training for the Dep of Homeland Security and local
agencies
[Daveed, “The Strategic Vulnerabilities of Oil Dependence”, http://www.defenddemocracy.org/publications/publications_show.htm?doc_id=696237]

But others think that indirect attacks (as opposed to catastrophic strikes on Ras Tanura or Abqaiq) could have a significant effect
on Saudi production. John Robb, the author of Brave New War, has constructed a scenario detailing how attacks on Saudi power
generation could have a “downstream” effect on the country’s oil production: The electricity cell was the first to take action with
an attack on one of the two high voltage power lines from the Ghazlan power complex. Since Ghazlan provides over 40% of the
power in the eastern province and the electrical network is sparse (and except for a single connection to the central region,
isolated), this attack caused over voltages that resulted in a system wide blackout that lasted two days. Oil production from the
province was cut in half as systems (refineries, pumping stations, port facilities, etc.) that supported the huge Ghawar oil field
were unable to acquire the power necessary for full production. While analysts disagree over the extent, it is clear that disruptive
attacks influence global oil markets and thus provide terrorists with another means of damaging the U.S. (and global) economy.

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AT: Small funding 42

Terrorists need massive funding for attacks; their cards don’t assume the preparation necessary to ready an attack
Ehrenfield 03
(Rachel, Director of the American Center for Democracy and an author who writes on terrorism and corruption, “Turning Off the Tap of Terrorist Funding”, Middle East Forum,
September 19) <http://www.meforum.org/article/572>

Media sources have often stated that the September 11th attacks cost the Al-Qaida terrorists a mere $250,000 to $500,000. In
reality, however, the few hundred thousand dollars used for flight training, reconnaissance, transportation, and box cutters
represent only a small portion of the funds spent by Al-Qaida on terrorist activities. The attacks would not have been possible
without the prior development of the group's global infrastructure, which cost perhaps billions of dollars to set up and maintain.
Vast sums of money have been spent on recruitment, training camps, conventional and unconventional weapons, intelligence
gathering, various forms of Islamist propaganda, and other activities.

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Terrorism Impact- War on Terror 43

Oil dependence will cost the US the WOT


Parmley 06
[Julia "U.S. must end dependency on oil, expert says" 4/6/06 http://www.udel.edu/PR/UDaily/2006/apr/global040606.html

Depending on volatile countries in the Middle East for oil poses a threat to national security, Gal Luft, co-director of the Institute
for the Analysis of Global Security, said Wednesday evening, April 5, during a Global Agenda series lecture at UD. “The reality
is most of the world's oil is concentrated in areas and countries that are unstable, corrupt, dictatorial and, in some cases, deeply
resentful of the United States,” he said. “Seventy-one percent of the world's oil reserves are in the hands of Muslim countries at a
time in which our relationship with the Muslim world is at an all-time low.” In his lecture, Luft said lack of oil in the U.S.
increases its dependency on other countries. Although the U.S. possesses only 3 percent of the world's oil, it consumes 25
percent. Luft, co-chairperson of the Set America Free Coalition, said the U.S. is supporting terrorism by paying Middle Eastern
countries for their oil. “We are funding those countries that are the richest proliferators of radical Islam,” he said. “We are
fighting the war on terrorism, and we are paying for both sides of the war. On one hand, we are sending our troops and daughters
all over the world to fight for freedom and democracy. At the same time, every time we arrive into a gas station, we end up
sending dollars and cents to those who don't like us.” Luft: “Sixty percent of our oil is coming from abroad, and this figure is
growing by the day.” Luft said the U.S. cannot win the war on terror while relying so heavily on the Middle East. “I do not think
we can meet these goals as long as we are dependent on oil, to the degree that we are today,” he said. “Sixty percent of our oil is
coming from abroad, and this figure is growing by the day.” Luft said terrorists are targeting the U.S. through oil pipeline
sabotage. More than 1.5 billion barrels of oil have been lost as a result of sabotage. Luft also said the U.S. could be exhausting
the reserve of cheap oil and that oil prices could rise in the next five years.

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Oil dependence undermines democracy


Sandalow 5-22-08 –Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy @ Brookings
[David B., “Rising Oil Prices, Declining National Security”,http://www.brookings.edu/testimony/2008/0522_oil_sandalow.aspx]

Finally, oil dependence undermines democracy and good governance around the world. Oil wealth corrodes democratic
institutions. This dynamic is not inevitable, but it is widespread. A growing body of scholarly work explores this topic,
concluding that oil wealth is strongly associated with corruption and authoritarian rule. New York Times Foreign Affairs
columnist Tom Friedman has written about the “First Law of Petropolitics” -- that the price of oil and pace of freedom move in
opposite directions. A few examples underscore these trends. Bahrain, the Persian Gulf country with the smallest oil reserves,
was also the first to hold free elections. As oil prices climbed in recent years, both Vladmir Putin and Hugo Chavez moved away
from democratic institutions and toward more authoritarian rule. In Nigeria, oil abundance contributes to widespread corruption.

Democracy promotion is essential to prevent many scenarios for war and extinction.
Diamond, 95 (Larry Diamond, senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, December 1995, Promoting Democracy in the 1990s,
http://wwics.si.edu/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/di/1.htm)

OTHER THREATS This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and decades. In
the former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs
intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian
regimes and have utterly corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons
continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these
new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its
provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness. LESSONS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY The
experience of this century offers important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to
war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic
governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency.
Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build weapons of mass destruction to use on or to
threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they
offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more environmentally responsible because they must answer to
their own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments. They are better bets to honor international
treaties since they value legal obligations and because their openness makes it much more difficult to breach agreements in
secret. Precisely because, within their own borders, they respect competition, civil liberties, property rights, and the rule of law,
democracies are the only reliable foundation on which a new world order of international security and prosperity can be built.

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Dependence kills democracy promotion


Luft 05 executive director of the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, associate fellow at the Washington Institute for
Near East Policy, former lieutenant colonel in the Israel Defense Forces, holds degrees in international relations, international
economics, Middle East studies and strategic studies, holds a doctorate in strategic studies from Johns Hopkins University.
[Dr. Gal Luft, “America’s oil dependence and its implications for U.S. Middle East policy” Testimony presented before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on near Eastern and
South Asian Affairs 10/20/05 http://www.senate.gov/~foreign/testimony/2005/LuftTestimony051020.pdf ]

The sudden enrichment of OPEC members will undercut efforts to promote democracy and political and economic reforms
in the Middle East. It is a sad fact of life that most of the world's leading oil producing countries are either politically
unstable and/or at serious odds with the U.S. With the exception of Canada and Norway, all major oil-exporting
countries suffer from severe social illnesses due to their failure to absorb the shock of an oil jackpot and distribute the wealth on
an equitable basis. This is not an accident. Countries rich in easily extracted and highly lucrative natural resources do not
have to invest in education, productivity, or economic diversification. In addition, the government does not feel obligated to be
accountable or transparent to its people and it denies them representation. They also have no imperative to educate women and
grant them equal rights. While their oil wealth allows them to be the strategic pivot of world politics and economy, these “trust
fund states’” record on human rights, political stability and compliance with international law is abysmal. Only three of the
world's ten largest oil producers are democracies and only 9 percent of the world's proven oil reserves are in the hands of
countries ranked free by Freedom House. America’s current oil policy is inconsistent with the hallmark of the Bush
Administration’s foreign policy: bringing democracy and political reform to areas where democracy is in deficit. Oil revenues
help despots sustain anti democratic social and political systems giving them disincentives to embrace social and economic
reforms. Our dependence on foreign oil often prevents the U.S. from expressing its true feelings about the some of the
conducts and practices of oil producing countries. Only last month the Bush Administration waived sanctions against
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Ecuador, three of the world’s worst offenders in human trafficking. In the case of Saudi Arabia
and Kuwait the administration’s explanation was that it was “in U.S. interest to continue democracy
programs and security cooperation in the war on terrorism.” One could only wonder if those two
countries would have received the same treatment had they been major exporters of watermelons.
While in many cases the U.S. can turn a blind eye to human rights violations by major energy
producers, in some cases the violations are so blunt and atrocious that a strong castigation is
unavoidable. But with China joining the great oil game such incidents result in significant weakening of U.S. geopolitical
posture. In the most recent incident when the U.S. had to choose between oil and its values the cost was high: the U.S. publicly
expressed dismay over the killing of hundreds of demonstrators in Uzbekistan only to be asked to remove its military forces from
there within 180 days. A $600 million gas deal signed between Uzbekistan and China bolstered Islam
Karimov’s confidence in China’s diplomatic support to the degree that he was willing to show the U.S.
the door. The Uzbek case is a harbinger of things to come. Unlike the U.S. which bars companies from doing
business with some unsavory regimes China’s state-owned companies turn a blind eye to the way
petrodollars are used by the local governments. In the global contest for oil the U.S. loses ground as a result of its
pressure for government reform. Dictators who view democracy with suspicion don’t like to be pressured to reform especially
when U.S. pressure can bring an end to their regimes. They much more prefer selling their oil to countries which turn a blind
eye to the way petrodollars are used and who are willing to pay top dollars for oil and not lecture to them on
democracy and human rights.

Revenue from oil undermine democracies


Deutch & Schlesinger October 06
[John (Former Director of Central Intelligence and Undersecretary of Energy) & James R. (Former Defense and Energy Secretary), “national security consequences of u.s. oil
dependency”,Council on Foreign Relations Press, http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/EnergyTFR.pdf]

Fourth, revenues from oil and gas exports can undermine local governance. The United States has an interest in promoting good
governance both for its own sake and because it encourages investment that can increase the level and security of supply. States
that are politically unstable and poorly governed often struggle with the task of responsibly managing the large revenues that
come from their oil and gas exports. The elements of good governance include democratic accountability, low corruption, and
fiscal transparency. Production in fragile democracies, such as in Nigeria, can be undermined when politicians or local warlords
focus on ways to seize oil and gas rents rather than on the longer-term task of governance. Totalitarian governments that have
control over those revenue flows can entrench their rule. When markets are tight, large oil consumers have tended to become
especially focused on securing supply and ignore the effects of their investments on corruption and mismanagement. In Sudan,
for example, despite civil war and widespread human rights abuses, the Chinese government and its oil enterprises are funding
extensive oil supply and infrastructure projects. China has used its threat of a veto in the UN Security Council to thwart

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collective efforts by other countries to manage the Darfur crisis in Sudan. Similarly, China, India, and several Western
46
European countries continue to invest in Iran despite the need to contain its nuclear aspirations.
Democracy Impact- Extensions [2/2]
Oil dependency kills democracy
Council on Foreign Relations 06
[“National Security Consequences of U.S. Oil Dependency: Report of an Independent Task Force” http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/EnergyTFR.pdf]

Fourth, revenues from oil and gas exports can undermine local governance. The United States has an
interest in promoting good governance both for its own sake and because it encourages investment that
can increase the level and security of supply. States that are politically unstable and poorly governed often
struggle with the task of responsibly managing the large revenues that come from their oil and gas
exports. The elements of good governance include democratic accountability, low corruption, and fiscal
transparency. Production in fragile democracies, such as in Nigeria, can be undermined when politicians or
local warlords focus on ways to seize oil and gas rents rather than on the longer-term task of governance.
Totalitarian governments that have control over those revenue flows can entrench their rule. When
markets are tight, large oil consumers have tended to become especially focused on securing supply and
ignore the effects of their investments on corruption and mismanagement. In Sudan, for example, despite
civil war and widespread human rights abuses, the Chinese government and its oil enterprises are funding
extensive oil supply and infrastructure projects. China has used its threat of a veto in the UN Security
Council to thwart collective efforts by other countries to manage the Darfur crisis in Sudan. Similarly,
China, India, and several Western European countries continue to invest in Iran despite the need to contain
its nuclear aspirations.

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Democracy Impact- Middle East 47

Democratic reform won’t occur in the Middle East unless the US changes its oil policy
Kraemer 06 Commander in the U.S. Navy, 22-year veteran of the U.S. Navy Submarine Force, entered under the Nuclear Power
Officer Program, and has served on four different nuclear powered fast attack submarines. He has deployed seven times to every
ocean in the world, including under the polar ice cap. He is a veteran of both Operation DESERT STORM and Operation IRAQI
FREEDOM, has served in the Pentagon for the Director of Naval Intelligence and at Submarine Group Two and Submarine Tactical
Development Squadron Twelve in Groton, Connecticut, received a bachelor’s degree in Chemical Engineering from the University of
Notre Dame, and is a graduate of the U.S. Army War College
[Thomas D., "ADDICTED TO OIL: STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF AMERICAN OIL POLICY" Mayhttp://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB705.pdf

Besides contaminating our intent to bring freedom and democracy to the region, American oil money actually is bolstering
governments which are diametrically opposed to American values. In places like Saudi Arabia, Iran, and the Sudan, oil revenues
are used to insulate the regimes from any pressure to open up their economies, liberate their women, or modernize their schools.
Huge oil windfalls have created societies led by the wealthy few where there is no incentive for reform. The National Security
Strategy lays the foundation for the type of government which reflects U.S. democratic values: The great struggles of the 20th
century between liberty and totalitarianism ended with a decisive victory for the forces of freedom—and a single sustainable
model for national success: freedom, democracy, and free enterprise.32 The problem with the totalitarian governments of the oil
states is that the people have been suppressed to the point that they do not have the power, education, or will to participate in the
governance of their countries. In the Arab-Muslim world, the ruling elite have been able to sustain themselves in power without
ever empowering their people—without ever allowing progressive parties to emerge—because they have massive oil revenues to
keep their people quiet and themselves in power. They have never had to tap their people’s energy and creativity because they
simply had to tap an oil well. Therefore, politics in these states has never been about building a society or an educational system
that maximizes people’s ability to innovate, export, and compete. Politics has simply been about controlling oil. Some fear that
there is nothing below the ruling elite, no educated middle class, on which to form a foundation to build a democracy. Without a
ruling elite, the next level of society below the ruling class in the Arab world is the mosque, and this is where the Islamic
extremist ideals foment. U.S. national security may be no better off, or perhaps worse, with the extremists in charge. The
emergence of zealots to power certainly has been the case in the few Arab countries which have held free and fair elections. In
Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood won 20 percent of the seats; and, in Palestine, Hamas went from nowhere to a governing
majority. This is not necessarily a bad thing for two reasons. First, the perspective of an opposition ideological group is different
when it is in charge. Rather than being the people “sticking it to the man,” the group finds itself as “the man.” Perhaps running a
country will pacify the extremist nature of the group. At a minimum, it will bring these organizations to the level of a nation-state
where the international community has means to deal with their radical behavior. Second, the only way that new leadership in the
Arab world will allow for real democracy, political parties, institutions, free press, competitive free markets, and proper
education—a free, civil society built on values we promote—is if they no longer have unlimited oil revenues and are forced to
make internal reform in order to sustain themselves. These nations will change when they have to, not when we tell them to. If
building governments based on U.S. democratic values means having to go through interim regimes led by the religious zealots,
then perhaps this is a necessary evil. Unless the United States changes its policy on oil, though, there will be no impetus for
reform.

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Decreasing our oil dependency would improve other nations opinions of American foreign policy
Kraemer 06 Commander in the U.S. Navy, 22-year veteran of the U.S. Navy Submarine Force, entered under the Nuclear Power
Officer Program, has served on four nuclear powered fast attack submarines, has deployed seven times to every ocean in the world,
including under the polar ice cap, veteran of Operation DESERT STORM and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, served in the Pentagon
for the Director of Naval Intelligence and at Submarine Group Two and Submarine Tactical Development Squadron Twelve, received
a bachelor’s degree in Chemical Engineering from Notre Dame, graduate of the U.S. Army War College
[Thomas D., "ADDICTED TO OIL: STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF AMERICAN OIL POLICY" Mayhttp://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB705.pdf

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has said that “to win the war on terror, we must also win the war of ideas.”17 The ideas
the United States promotes are spelled out in the National Security Strategy: Freedom is the non-negotiable demand of human
dignity; the birthright of every person—in every civilization. Throughout history, freedom has been threatened by war and terror;
it has been challenged by the clashing wills of powerful states and the evil designs of tyrants; and it has been tested by
widespread poverty and disease. Today, humanity holds in its hands the opportunity to further freedom’s triumph over all these
foes. The United States welcomes our responsibility to lead in this great mission.18 The war of ideas, however, has produced a
growing gap between much of the world’s perception of the United States and America’s self-perception as being the purveyor of
freedom. While America sees its actions as being in the global interest, the world views America’s interests as self-serving.
Unless this “perception gap” is eliminated, America will have a difficult time winning this war of ideas. In 2002, the Pew Global
Attitudes Project found that 79 percent of U.S. citizens believe it is good that “American ideas and customs are spreading around
the world,” and more than 70 percent think that U.S. foreign policy “takes the interests of other states into account.”
Unfortunately, this rosy view of U.S. power is not shared overseas, where, according to the survey, overwhelming majorities say
that the United States considers the interests of others “not much” or “not at all.”19 A January 2005 BBC survey of 21 countries
found only five—India, the Philippines, Poland, South Africa, and South Korea—where a majority of people had “positive”
attitudes toward the United States.20 Although the U.S. global standing has rebounded slightly since the invasion of Iraq, Pew
reported in June 2005 that majorities in all 15 countries it surveyed “favor another country challenging America’s global military
supremacy,” and that support for the U.S.-led “war on terror” is declining on every continent.21 The U.S. image is especially
bleak in the Arab world. Although Arab populations view U.S. popular culture, U.S. science and technology, and the American
people somewhat favorably, a 2004 Zogby International poll found that fewer than 10 percent of those surveyed in Egypt,
Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates approved of U.S. policy. Indeed, when asked to indicate
their “first thought” about the United States, the most common response was “unfair foreign policy.”22 If the United States is a
force for good—as the country’s leaders proclaim and its citizens overwhelmingly believe—why do even its allies have concerns
about its foreign policy? The short answer is that they distrust American motives. In a 2004 Pew survey, majorities in six of the
nine countries surveyed did not believe that the U.S.-led war on terrorism was a sincere effort to reduce international terrorism.
Even in Russia and Great Britain, where there was strong support for the fight against terrorism, many people were skeptical of
U.S. motives.23 When people who expressed doubts about U.S. sincerity in the terrorism effort were asked about other possible
reasons for the war on terrorism, oil was mentioned most often as a U.S. motive for the policy. Majorities in seven of the nine
nations surveyed believed that controlling Middle Eastern oil supplies was an important reason why the United States is
conducting the war on terrorism. This view was not only widespread in Jordan, Morocco, and Pakistan, but also in Turkey,
Germany, and France. While Russians strongly back the war on terrorism, half of Russians said controlling oil was an important
U.S. motivation. Great Britain and the United States, where relatively few doubt America’s sincerity in the first place, were the
only countries where relatively small minorities held this opinion.24 Proponents of U.S. foreign policy tend to portray anti-
Americanism as hostility toward American values or simple resentment of U.S. dominance. President Bush has said that
“America was targeted for attack because we’re the brightest beacon of freedom . . . in the world.”25 He later explained, “The
terrorists who attacked our country on September 11, 2001, were not protesting our policies. They were protesting our
existence.”26 The Pentagon’s National Defense Strategy, issued in March 2005, states: “Our leading position in the world will
continue to breed unease, a degree of resentment, and resistance.”27 There is a grain of truth in this argument, but foreign
opposition to the United States is mostly a reaction to specific U.S. policies. The United States has been the sole great power for
nearly 15 years, but its international standing remained fairly high through the late 1990s. Although some foreign leaders
expressed concerns about the power imbalance, most nations—their people and their governments— looked favorably on the
United States and welcomed Washington’s global leadership.28 Attributing the current unpopularity of the United States solely
to its power or values cannot explain the sharp decline in its image that has occurred since 2003, or especially the intense
antipathy toward President Bush. According to the 2002 Pew survey, “Antipathy toward the United States is shaped more by
what it does in the international arena than by what it stands for politically and economically.”29 Similarly, a 2004 study by the
Pentagon’s Defense Science Board concluded that “Muslims do not ‘hate our freedom,’ but rather they hate our policies.”30 And
the State Department’s Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy concluded in 2003 that “Arabs and Muslims . . . support our values
but believe that our policies do not live up to them.”31 Disagreement with U.S. foreign policy does not mean the policy is wrong,

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[Kraemer continues- no text deleted]

but it does mean U.S. actions come with a price. America’s war on terror requires action, but our addiction to oil only serves to
contaminate our true objectives when acting in the Middle East. For half a century, the United States made Persian Gulf oil a
primary security interest, boldly allying with these Muslim states to defend them from the godless Soviets. Our defense was a
small price to pay for the uninterrupted flow of oil. Today, as the world’s lone superpower, America is seen as a threat to Muslim
sovereignty. Middle Eastern states see America’s great need for their oil, but they see no clear-cut policy on how the United
States intends to fill this need. Our “dirty little secret” of oil dependency only serves to build mistrust and distain. When battling
a war of ideas in this region, these are not the foundations on which to fight this battle.

Soft power is key to multilateral cooperation, climate, disease, crime, and terrorism.
Joseph S. Nye, Sultan of Oman Professor of International Relations at Harvard, Summer 2004
“Soft Power and American Foreign Policy,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 119, Iss.2; pg. 255, proquest, accessed 07/10/07

Power depends on context, and the distribution of power differs greatly in different domains. In the global information age, power is distributed among countries
in a pattern that resembles a complex three-dimensional chess game. On the top chessboard of political-military issues, military power is largely unipolar, but on
the economic board, the United States is not a hegemon or an empire, and it must bargain as an equal when Europe acts in a unified way. And on the bottom
chessboard of transnational relations, power is chaotically dispersed, and it makes no sense to use traditional terms such as unipolarity, hegemony, or American
empire. Those who recommend an imperial American foreign policy based on traditional military descriptions of American power
are relying on woefully inadequate analysis. If you are in a three-dimensional game, you will lose if you focus only on one board
and fail to notice the other boards and the vertical connections among them-witness the connections in the war on terrorism
between military actions on the top board, where we removed a dangerous tyrant in Iraq, but simultaneously increased the ability
of the al Qaeda network to gain new recruits on the bottom, transnational board.25 Because of its leading edge in the
information revolution and its past investment in military power, the United States will likely remain the world's single most
powerful country well into the twenty-first century. French dreams of a multipolar military world are unlikely to be realized
anytime soon, and the German Foreign Minister, Joschka Fischer, has explicitly eschewed such a goal.26 But not all the
important types of power come out of the barrel of a gun. Hard power is relevant to getting the outcomes we want on all three
chessboards, but many of the transnational issues, such as climate change, the spread of infectious diseases, international crime,
and terrorism, cannot be resolved by military force alone. Representing the dark side of globalization, these issues are inherently
multilateral and require cooperation for their solution. Soft power is particularly important in dealing with the issues that arise
from the bottom chessboard of transnational relations. To describe such a world as an American empire fails to capture the real
nature of the foreign policy tasks that we face.

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Soft Power Impact- Extension 50

Oil dependence hurts soft power


The Brookings Institution 04
[Event summary of the joint Conference on Global Challenges for U.S. Energy Policy, “Event Summary: Global Challenges for U.S. Energy Policy: Economic, Environmental, and
Security Risks”, March 5, http://www.brookings.edu/search.aspx?doQuery=1&sort=date:D:S:d1&q=energy+dependency&start=0&num=10]

William K. Reilly, co-chair of the National Commission on Energy Policy and a former EPA administrator, said he understood
the frustrations of both Congress and the Bush administration, saying that the United States has been "struggling to get the
energy policy right for decades." He also worried that the growing demand for energy has hurt the United States' standing
overseas. "People abroad think we're gas guzzards and unilateralists who walked away from international climate change
negotiations," Reilly said, referring to the Bush administration's decision to reject the Kyoto treaty, which sought to reduce total
carbon dioxide emissions around the world. Reilly called for increased government and private sector funding for development
of alternative fuel sources and more efficient extraction and use of current supplies. Additionally, Reilly said that the United
States had to be more willing to work with other nations on global solutions "if we are to see tangible and lasting results."

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Middle East Impact- Instability 51

Oil dependence kills Middle East stability


Cohen 07
[Ariel "The National Security Consequences of Oil Dependency" Heritage Lecture #1021 3/22/07 http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/hl1021.cfm]

The Middle East's Persian Gulf is the richest and most important oil province in the world. Forty percent of the daily shipment of
oil passes through the Gulf. Approximately 20 percent of U.S. oil comes from the Gulf. Currently, the security and stability of
Middle East oil is threatened by ongoing conflicts in Iraq; an aggressive and nuclear Iran; and radical Islamist movements, with
their terrorist arms, whose goals include toppling regimes throughout the Gulf, including the swing producer of oil, Saudi Arabia.
Islamist movements, nurtured to a great extent by oil revenues from Gulf states, aim to eventually create a global Islamic
empire--the Caliphate. These movements ultimately strive to subjugate and convert non-Islamic countries to their brand of Islam.
This is a very long-term project, and ultimately, it will hopefully be a futile one. However, in the meantime, the existence and the
goals of these movements pose an immediate threat to the security of some of the most crucial sectors of the world oil supply.

Middle East conflict will escalate – causes worldwide nuclear war


Steinbach 02
[Steinbach, “Israeli Weapons of Mass Destruction: A threat to peace,” March 2002 www.wagingpeace.org/articles/02.03/0331steinbachisraeli.htm]

Meanwhile, the existence of an arsenal of mass destruction in such an unstable region in turn has
serious implications for future arms control and disarmament negotiations, and even the threat of
nuclear war. Seymour Hersh warns, "Should war break out in the Middle East again,... or should any
Arab nation fire missiles against Israel, as the Iraqis did, a nuclear escalation, once unthinkable except
as a last resort, would now be a strong probability."(41) and Ezar Weissman, Israel's current President
said "The nuclear issue is gaining momentum (and the) next war will not be conventional."(42) Russia
and before it the Soviet Union has long been a major (if not the major) target of Israeli nukes. It is
widely reported that the principal purpose of Jonathan Pollard's spying for Israel was to furnish satellite
images of Soviet targets and other super sensitive data relating to U.S. nuclear targeting strategy. (43)
(Since launching its own satellite in 1988, Israel no longer needs U.S. spy secrets.) Israeli nukes aimed
at the Russian heartland seriously complicate disarmament and arms control negotiations and, at the
very least, the unilateral possession of nuclear weapons by Israel is enormously destabilizing, and
dramatically lowers the threshold for their actual use, if not for all out nuclear war. In the words of
Mark Gaffney, "... if the familar pattern(Israel refining its weapons of mass destruction with U.S.
complicity) is not reversed soon - for whatever reason - the deepening Middle East conflict could
trigger a world conflagration." (44)

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Middle East Impact- Extensions 52

Oil dependency causes Middle East Instability


Ezekiel Watch no date
["Global Oil Dependency: A Growing Threat" http://www.ezekielwatch.com/CurrentTrends/OilDependencyoftheWorld/tabid/1404/Default.aspx

The growing dependency of every nation on earth upon oil for their economic stability only causes the problems in the Middle
East to boil and bubble. Some of the most tyrannical, poorest nations in the world find themselves being courted by the world
powers simply because of their petroleum reserves. The United States, Europe, China, and even Russia have dramatically
changed their foreign policies toward the various oil producing nations over the last 10 years, as their own oil supplies are used
up. Many times, their foreign policies have become slanted against Israel for the sole reason of making the radical Islamic, oil-
exporting nations happy, and keeping the oil wells pumping. In only the last 30 years, oil has become the greatest influence upon
economies, industries, politics, and stability of every nation in the world. Oil is the lifeblood of both the manufacturing industry
and the military, and since the majority of transportation in the world relies upon fossil fuel, the steady supply of oil influences
every apect of industrialized nations. The majority of the world's oil supplies are currently controlled by the handful of Islamic
nations in the Middle East, such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Iraq. Many other nations have oil supplies, but the quantities,
capabilities to extract and refine the oil, or the political climates prevent these nations from becoming independent of the Islamic
oil supply.

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Iran Impact- Nuclear Iran 53

Oil dependence strengthens Iran and allows them to build nuclear weapons
Sandalow 5-22-8 –Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy @ Brookings
[David B., “Rising Oil Prices, Declining National Security”,http://www.brookings.edu/testimony/2008/0522_oil_sandalow.aspx]

Second, oil dependence strengthens oil-exporting nations that oppose U.S. interests. Several leading oil exporters pursue policies
that threaten the United States. Today, the most serious threat comes from Iran, whose nuclear ambitions could put terrifying new
weapons into the hands of terrorists. Yet efforts to respond to this threat with multilateral sanctions have often foundered on fears
that Iran would retaliate by withholding oil from world markets. Indeed Iran does not even need to withhold oil from world
markets to play its “oil card.” The mere fear it might do so can cause oil prices to climb, as traders build a “risk premium” into
the cost of every barrel. This puts pressure on governments around the world to minimize “saber-rattling” against Iran, in order
to help control oil prices. The result – an emboldened Iran, more confident in its ability to pursue policies that threaten U.S.
national security. In short, three decades after the first oil shocks -- and a quarter-century after the humiliating capture of U.S.
diplomats in Tehran – we remain hostage to the world’s continuing dependence on oil.
Iran does not need to withhold oil, only threaten to in order to raise prices; this gives it leverage over other nations like the US
Sandalow 08 (David B., Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies The Brookings Institution, in congressional testimony for
Committee of House Foreign Affairs, May 22, Lexis Nexis)
Second, oil dependence strengthens oil-exporting nations that oppose U.S. interests. Several leading oil exporters pursue policies
that threaten the United States. Today, the most serious threat comes from Iran, whose nuclear ambitions could put terrifying new
weapons into the hands of terrorists. Yet efforts to respond to this threat with multilateral sanctions have often foundered on fears
that Iran would retaliate by withholding oil from world markets. Indeed Iran does not even need to withhold oil from world
markets to play its "oil card." The mere fear it might do so can cause oil prices to climb, as traders build a "risk premium" into
the cost of every barrel. This puts pressure on governments around the world to minimize "saber-rattling" against Iran, in order to
help control oil prices. The result - an emboldened Iran, more confident in its ability to pursue policies that threaten U.S. national
security. In short, three decades after the first oil shocks -- and a quarter-century after the humiliating capture of U.S. diplomats
in Tehran - we remain hostage to the world's continuing dependence on oil.
Even a slightly reduced oil dependence would allow the US to control Iran without attacking
The Atlantic 06
(Jonathan Rauch, “For an Iran Strategy, Look to JFK”, September 5) <http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200609u/nj_rauch_2006-09-05>

Third, the United States urgently needs instruments that can hurt Tehran short of launching a major war. Those include
propaganda and aid campaigns, support for the mullahs' domestic political opponents, and economic pressure. All are easier said
than done, but the cumulative effect even of flawed efforts can be significant, as the Soviets learned. In particular, Iran's fragile
and unbalanced economy depends on oil exports. Today's tight oil markets allow Iran to use oil as a weapon, but the leverage,
argues Michael O'Hanlon, a Brookings senior fellow, could be reversed if some slack were introduced in the market. To be in a
position to threaten Tehran with an oil embargo—which would hurt Iran even if not all countries participated—"all we would
need is about 5 million barrels a day of spare pumping capacity, which is about 5 to 6 percent of the world total." That would
take some time but is do-able with help from, for example, biofuels, O'Hanlon says.
A nuclear Iran would escalate to global nuclear war
Steinbach 02
[Steinbach, “Israeli Weapons of Mass Destruction: A threat to peace,” March 2002 www.wagingpeace.org/articles/02.03/0331steinbachisraeli.htm]

Meanwhile, the existence of an arsenal of mass destruction in such an unstable region in turn has serious implications for
future arms control and disarmament negotiations, and even the threat of nuclear war. Seymour Hersh warns, "Should
war break out in the Middle East again,... or should any Arab nation fire missiles against Israel, as the
Iraqis did, a nuclear escalation, once unthinkable except as a last resort, would now be a strong
probability."(41) and Ezar Weissman, Israel's current President said "The nuclear issue is gaining
momentum (and the) next war will not be conventional."(42) Russia and before it the Soviet Union has
long been a major (if not the major) target of Israeli nukes. It is widely reported that the principal
purpose of Jonathan Pollard's spying for Israel was to furnish satellite images of Soviet targets and
other super sensitive data relating to U.S. nuclear targeting strategy. (43) (Since launching its own
satellite in 1988, Israel no longer needs U.S. spy secrets.) Israeli nukes aimed at the Russian heartland
seriously complicate disarmament and arms control negotiations and, at the very least, the unilateral
possession of nuclear weapons by Israel is enormously destabilizing, and dramatically lowers the
threshold for their actual use, if not for all out nuclear war. In the words of Mark Gaffney, "... if the

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familar pattern(Israel refining its weapons of mass destruction with U.S. complicity) is not
54
reversed soon - for whatever reason - the deepening Middle East conflict could trigger a world
conflagration." (44)

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Iran Impact- Heg and Terror 55

A nuclear Iran would pose significant dangers for heg and cause terror
Clawson & Sokolski 05
[Patrick, deputy director for research at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, & Henry D., Executive Director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, “GETTING
READY FOR A NUCLEAR-READY IRAN”, October, Strategic Studies Institute, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub629.pdf]

Arab states traditionally have worked to balance Iranian power in the Persian Gulf and Middle East. Most of the Arab
states, with the notable exceptions of Syria and Yemen, politically, economically, and militarily backed Iraq in its war with
Iran out of concern that Iranian forces threatened at various stages in the 1980-88 war to overwhelm Iraqi forces, thus
gaining a strategic foothold in southern Iraq from which Tehran could exercise a stranglehold on Kuwait and Saudi
Arabia. Such a course of events would have positioned Tehran to better export its then revolutionary zeal to undermine
moderate Arab states throughout the region and to dominate the regional distribution of power. The Iran-Iraq war depleted Iranian political,
military, and economic power and reduced the acuteness of Arab threat perception of Iran during the 1990s. The substantial American military
presence in the region as a legacy of the 1990-91 war to monitor and deter any renewed Iraqi military ambitions in the Gulf, reassured Arab
Gulf states that neither Iraq nor Iran would be able to mount an ambitious military campaign to upset the regional balance of power. Iran’s
election in 1997 of President Khatami, who was widely perceived as a moderating political influence in Tehran, dampened Iran’s zeal for
exporting the Islamic revolution and led to a further easing of the Arab threat perception of Iran. The American ouster of Saddam Hussein’s
regime in Iraq may have diminished further Arab concern about Iran’s ability to leverage its geopolitical mass to dominate the Gulf. Arab states
are in awe, if only privately, of American military capabilities that they witnessed slash through the massive Iraqi forces widely regarded as the
most formidable Arab military forces in 1990. Arab military forces too must be impressed with the relative ease with which American and
British forces smashed through Iraq to occupy Baghdad. Arab states must calculate that as long as American forces occupy Iraq, Tehran would
not dare to undertake any conventional military operations to challenge the Gulf distribution of power. Indeed, many Arab officers and
diplomats today are more concerned about American political and military intentions in the Gulf than they are about Iran in its weakened
political, military, and economic condition. The public disclosures in 2002 and 2003 about the scope and sophistication of Iran’s nuclear
weapons program is just beginning to seep into the strategic calculations of Arab diplomats, officials, and military officers. The Arab states
have been slow to perceive the strategic threat posed by Iranian nuclear weapons. As Judith Yaphe observes, the Gulf Cooperation Council
states, “have shrugged off dire predictions of the dangers of a nuclear armed Iran.”1 The author’s discussions with a wide array of senior
military officers and diplomats from the Middle East reveal a fairly commonly held view that Iranian nuclear weapons would have a stabilizing
effect on the region. These officials and officers observe that Israel and the United States both have robust nuclear weapons capabilities while
Arab states do not, and only one Muslim state, Pakistan, does. They reason that Iranian nuclear weapons would have salutary effects on
regional security because Tehran’s nuclear arsenal would “balance” Israeli and American nuclear weapons. The implicit assumption of this line
of reasoning is that Israel and the United States have political, military, and economic ambitions in the region that could only be checked by
Muslim nuclear weapons, even if in the hands of the Farsi-speaking Islamic regime in Tehran. The superficial reasoning behind this Arab
strategic thought may reflect the equivalent of an intellectual “knee jerk” reaction. As time passes and the reality of an Iran armed with
nuclear weapons comes into sharper focus, Arab diplomats and officers are more likely to come to grips with the
dilemmas posed by a nuclear-armed Iran. They will have to worry that American security backing of Arab states may lessen
in the face of Iranian nuclear weapons. Arab security policy officials would have to concede that the United States might be
less willing to come to Arab states’ aid in the event of a future regional crisis in which Iran wields nuclear weapons. Had Iraq had
nuclear weapons in 1990, for example, the risks and potential costs of an American military campaign to liberate Kuwait would
have been greater and might have led the United States to accept Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait as a fiat accompli. In a future
regional contingency, the Iranians could make limited land grabs in the Persian Gulf―whether against Iraq, Kuwait, or the
United Arab Emirates―and hope to hold American conventional forces at bay with the threat of Iranian nuclear weapons.
Iranian nuclear weapons too would afford Tehran the titular leadership role in the Gulf and give it substantial political sway
with the Arab Gulf States. Arab states also will have to worry that Iran’s possession of nuclear weapons will embolden Tehran to
revert to a more aggressive foreign policy. The clerical regime might calculate, for example, that it could give more material
assistance and lessen restrictions on Hezbollah to engage in operations against Israeli and American interests. The Iranians
have supported Hezbollah operations against American forces as an appendage of Iranian foreign policy to push the
Americans out of the Gulf, most notably in assisting Saudi Hezbollah attacks against the Khobar Towers. Tehran might
calculate that it could support an even more ambitious unconventional terrorist campaign against American forces in the
Gulf and the smaller Arab Gulf states that host American forces if it has a nuclear weapons arsenal. Tehran might assess
that, even if its hand is exposed, the risks of American military retaliation would be minimal, given Iranian nuclear
weapons. If push came to shove, Tehran could use nuclear weapons against American military assets or hosting countries
in the region with Iranian ballistic missiles, or clandestinely insert them into the United States to directly target American
cities and citizens.

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Iran Impact- Iraq war 56

Iran is able to fund Iraq war due to oil dependence


Gartenstein- Ross 4/20/08
[Daveed “The High Cost of Oil Dependence” http://www.defenddemocracy.org/publications/publications_show.htm?doc_id=686169

Woolsey and Korin are correct that the U.S.’s oil dependence causes it to fund both sides of the terror war. This can be seen in the
purchasing power that petroleum gives to oil-rich Middle Eastern states like Iran and Saudi Arabia. Iran’s oil sector accounts for
85% of its government revenues. One thing Iran has done with this money is provide weapons, training, funding, and safe haven
to a variety of terrorist groups. Iranian support for anti-U.S. violence has been particularly problematic in Iraq: Ambassador Ryan
C. Crocker made this clear in April 8 Senate testimony, where he stated that “Iran continues to undermine the efforts of the Iraqi
government to establish a stable, secure state through the authority and training of criminal militia elements engaged in violence
against Iraqi security forces, coalition forces and Iraqi civilians.” One weapon that Iran has been responsible for providing to
insurgents in Iraq is the explosively formed projectile (EFP), which has been described as uniquely dangerous because “when it
detonates, the concave end blows outward and melts into a bullet-shaped fragment that slices through armor and flesh.” Iran
provides as much as $200 million a year to Hizballah—as well as tens of millions of dollars and militant training to anti-Israel
Palestinian terrorist groups.

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Iran Impact - Heg 57

Due to oil dependence, Iran could takeover world oil supplies and threaten US dominance
Cohen 07
[Ariel "The National Security Consequences of Oil Dependency" Heritage Lecture #1021 3/22/07 http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/hl1021.cfm]

The leadership of the Islamic Republic of Iran is engaged in operational planning to intercept the flow of oil in the Gulf. Despite
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's earnest and ongoing attempt to project the image of an irrational leader of what
international relations theorists have called a "crazy state," many analysts have yet to recognize fully the dire ramifications of
Iran's professed intention to develop a nuclear weapons program. If diplomacy fails, Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons will leave
the U.S. and its allies with few choices, all of them unpalatable. In June 2006, Iran's oil minister cautioned, "If the country's
interests are attacked, we will use all our capabilities, and oil is one of them." Perhaps most alarming are the remarks of Iran's
Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in the same month: "If the Americans make a wrong move toward Iran, the shipment of
energy will definitely face danger, and the Americans would not be able to protect energy supply in the region."
The economic consequences of a military strike on Iran's nuclear facilities to the world energy market would likely be
significant, if not disastrous. Immediately following military action, according to a Turkish assessment, uncertainty about Iran's
ability to sustain oil production at the current level of 4 mbd could drive oil prices above $80 per barrel.[9] If Iran retaliated and
escalated by shutting down the Strait of Hormuz, which would merely require placing anti-ship mines in the strait,[10] the
temporary loss of more that 15 million barrels of oil to the international market could drive oil prices above $83 per barrel, the
historic height of the 1970s (adjusted for inflation).[11] In fact, a recent Heritage Foundation war game and economic study
speculated that oil prices could go as high as $120/barrel for a limited time. On the other hand, Iran's aspirations in the region are
far-reaching. Allowing Iran to join the nuclear club introduces the possibility of Iranian interference throughout the Middle East,
especially given Iran's proximity to so many of the world's largest oil fields. The large Iranian military, if amply supplied by
Russia and China, would be in a position to dominate the Persian Gulf under a nuclear umbrella, particularly if U.S. ground
forces were pinned down in Iraq. Currently, Iran enjoys the support of some Shi'a forces in Iraq, especially Muqtada al-Sadr's
Mahdi Army, and in the Shi'ite-populated Ash Sharqiyah (Eastern) Province of Saudi Arabia. This could facilitate a pro-Iranian
Shi'a takeover of some of the largest oil fields in the world. In a worst-case scenario, a nuclear Iran could threaten the United
Arab Emirates and Kuwait. If this were to happen, the Islamic Republic could quickly secure a sizable part of the world's oil
supply, bringing the nuclear-armed militant Iran close to a virtual monopoly over the world's energy market. Iran's Dangerous
Arsenal. Since the 1990s, Iran has been upgrading its military with a host of new weapons from China, Russia, and North Korea,
as well as with weapons manufactured domestically. Today, Iran boasts an arsenal of Iranian-built missiles based on Russian and
Chinese designs that are difficult to counter both before and after launch. Of particular concern are reports that Iran has
purchased the SS-N-22 Moskit/Sunburn anti-ship missile. The supersonic Sunburn is specifically designed "to reduce the target's
time to deploy self-defense weapons" and "to strike ships with the Aegis command and weapon control system and the SM-2
surface-to-air missile."[12] Iran is also well stocked with older Chinese HY-1 Seersucker and HY-2 Silkworm missiles and the
more modern C-802 anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM)--designs that Iran has successfully adapted into their own Ra'ad ad Noor
ASCMs. Iran has a large supply of anti-ship mines, including modern mines that are far superior to the simple World War I-style
contact mines that Iran used in the 1980s. They include the Chinese-designed EM-52 "rocket" mine, which remains stationary on
the sea floor and fires a homing rocket when a ship passes overhead. In the deep waters in the Strait of Hormuz, such a weapon
could destroy ships entering or exiting the Persian Gulf. According to one expert, Iran "can deploy mines or torpedoes from its
Kilo-class submarines, which would be effectively immune to detection when running silent and remaining stationary on a
shallow bottom just outside the Strait of Hormuz."[13] Iran could also deploy mines by helicopter or small boats disguised as
fishing vessels. Mines are only one of a host of potential Iranian threats to shipping in the Persian Gulf. The naval commandos of
Iran's Revolutionary Guards are trained to attack using fast attack boats, mini-submarines, and even jet skis. The Revolutionary
Guards also have underwater demolition teams that are trained to attack offshore oil platforms and other facilities. Finally,
Tehran could use its extensive terrorist network in the region to sabotage oil pipelines and other infrastructure or to strike oil
tankers in port or at sea.

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Iran Impact- Shields/ Leverage 58


Oil dependence shields Iran
Sandalow & O’Hanlon 2006- Both Senior Fellows, Foreign Policy @ Brookings
[“Iran: Regaining Energy Leverage”, January 31, The Washington Times, http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2006/0131iran_ohanlon.aspx]

Yet far from being a sword the world community can brandish against a recalcitrant Iran, oil is a shield Iran can use to protect
itself. Analysts predict interruption in Iranian crude to world markets would send oil prices to more than $100 per barrel,
weakening the resolve of governments around the world to take on the security challenge of Iran's nuclear ambitions. This is
unacceptable. Three decades after the first oil shocks—and a quarter-century after the humiliating capture of U.S. diplomats in
Tehran—the world community remains hostage to its continuing dependence on Mideast oil. Tough-talking leaders are unable to
match words with action because the hard work of reducing our oil dependence remains undone.

Oil dependence bad—kills economic leverage that deals with Iran


O’Hanlon 2007 – Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy @ Brookings
[Michael E. , “National Security Challenges of Energy Policy”, http://www.brookings.edu/multimedia/video/2007/1017ohanlon.aspxOCTOBER 17]

Senior Fellow Michael O'Hanlon discusses the national security challenges of energy policy at an Opportunity 08 forum in Iowa.
"I want to say from a national security perspective what can we realistically hope that energy policy will allow us to do in the
next one to two decades to give us more of an ability to distance ourselves from the turbulence and the troubles of the Middle
East region in particular. "To what extent can we increase our own options for national security by mitigating our dependence
on foreign oil? I'm struck along the line of prices. I know you know at a time when we're importing more than twelve million
barrels a day. If you do the math 12 million times $85 a barrel we as a nation are importing more than $1 billion of oil a day; that
math I can do. I'm not enough of an expert to do more than that. $1 billion a day is staggering. I'm not talking about the money
we spend in military preparation. I'm not even mentioning the ongoing daily cost of operations in Iraq. If you add those two
things together that's roughly another half billion dollars a day. Our energy habit by this very crude math is a billion dollars a day
worth of imports and a half billion dollars a day in military expenditure. "I don't want to over-dramatize how much we can
reduce that simply by going towards alternative sources of energy. I think our panelists will give a sober accounting. I would like
to present this thought. Wouldn't it be nice if, in a current stand off with Iran—wouldn't it be nice if we the world had the
capacity to tell Iran we're not going to import your oil anymore until you stop trying to build nuclear weapons? Wouldn't it be
nice if we felt we had that leverage? "We don't. We're already tired of escalating oil prices. We're tired of spending $3 or $3.25
or $3.50 a gallon at the pump. Iran, which has this complete dependence on oil for its national economy, almost has the upper
hand with the United States and other democracies. "I'm proposing we have the ability—if we can even mitigate our national oil
dependence by a few million barrels a day over time and if other western industrial economies and China and Russia and India
can do the same collectively—if we can do that, we begin to have a world in which a crisis in the Middle East doesn't have to
present us with the options of doing virtually nothing or doing a bombing campaign. We can use economics as leverage. Other
than having a dictator with the upper hand over us."

Oil dependence compromises our foreign policy objectives with Iran


John Deutch 7-Prof @ MIT, former director of the CIA, DOE & DOD staff
[“HEARING OF THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE; SUBJECT: FOREIGN POLICY AND NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF OIL DEPENDENCE; ”,
March 22, Lexis]

I want to just simply cite three examples. The first is Iran. Clearly, the fact that Iran is providing 2.5 million barrels of oil per day
to world oil markets means that that dependence has to be taken into account as we consider the other policy-important policy-
foreign policy-objectives we have with respect to Iran, principally and foremost, to keep them from acquiring a nuclear weapon,
and secondly, to stop them from fiddling around in Iraq. So the fact that we and our allies and our closest partners are dependent
on oil imports means that we must compromise our foreign policy objectives, and that is a very bad thing for our country.

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AT: Iran Sanctions 59

Iran is becoming energy independent; means sanctions will become ineffective within 5 years
Luft 08
(Gal, Executive director of the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, Washington Post, “Iran and Brazil Can Do It. So Can We.”, July 6, LexisNexis)

The first country, surprisingly enough, is Iran. The Islamic republic has lots of crude but little capacity to refine it, leaving Tehran
heavily dependent on gasoline imports. The country's blustery president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, is fully aware that this is Iran's
Achilles' heel and worries that a comprehensive gasoline embargo could cause enough social unrest to undermine his regime. So
Ahmadinejad has launched an energy-independence program designed to shift Iran's transportation system from gasoline to
natural gas, which Iran has plenty of. "If we can change our automobiles' fuel from gasoline to [natural] gas during the next
three-four years," he said last July, "we won't need gasoline anymore." His plan includes a mandate for domestic automakers to
make "dual-fuel" cars that can run on both gasoline and natural gas, a crash program to convert used vehicles to run on natural
gas and a program to convert Iranian gas stations to serve both kinds of fuel. According to the International Association of
Natural Gas Vehicles, more than 100 conversion centers have been built throughout the country: Iranians can drive in with their
gasoline-only cars, pay a subsidized fee equivalent to $50 and collect their newly dual-fuelled cars several hours later.
Ahmadinejad's plan, which has been largely ignored by the West, means that within five years or so, Iran could be virtually
immune to international sanctions.

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AT: US would win against Iran 60

Even if the US could defeat Iran, there would still be oil implications
Ariel Cohen 2007—Ph.D. Senior Research Fellow, Russian and Eurasian Studies and International Energy Security, Heritage Foundation
[“Foreign Policy and National Security Implications of Oil Dependency”, March 22, 2007, Lexis]

U.S. military forces in the Persian Gulf could quickly establish superiority over Iran's conventional ground, air, and naval forces
in any crisis, but Iranian mobile missiles, mines, commando attacks, unconventional warfare, and terrorist sabotage would pose
more persistent threats that would be much harder to neutralize. The United States and its allies could eventually defeat Iranian
attempts to close the Strait of Hormuz. Yet Iran could intensely threaten Gulf shipping for short periods, deter commercial ships
from entering the Gulf, drive up insurance rates for Gulf shipping, and boost world oil prices on nervous markets.

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Saudi Arabia Impact- Terror Shell [1/2] 61

Oil dependence allows Saudi Arabia to fund terrorists


Gartenstein- Ross 4/20/08
[Daveed “The High Cost of Oil Dependence” http://www.defenddemocracy.org/publications/publications_show.htm?doc_id=686169

The connection between oil revenues and terrorist funding is less direct for Saudi Arabia. Its most prominent contribution to the terrorist
threat has been ideological—through the funding of charities, mosques, and preachers who propagate an extreme form of Islam.
Shortly after the 9/11 attacks, former New York Times Middle East correspondent Youssef M. Ibrahim wrote in the Washington
Post: “The money that brought Wahhabis to power throughout the Arab world ... financed networks of fundamentalist schools
from Sudan to northern Pakistan.” These networks have perceptibly tilted the practice of Islam in a more violent and anti-social
direction in many places beyond those mentioned by Ibrahim, including the Balkans, the former Soviet republics, Southeast Asia, and parts of
sub-Saharan Africa. Saudi-funded institutions that promote an extremist form of Islam have also been active in Europe and even America—as I
have written about in my book My Year Inside Radical Islam, which documents my time inside a Saudi-funded charity in Oregon that the U.S.
Treasury Department has named a specially-designated global terrorist entity. Beyond the Saudi state, financiers and charities from that
country have been significant sources of funds for the insurgency in Iraq and Palestinian terrorist groups. Though the U.S.’s
relationship with Saudi Arabia is complex and it would be overly simplistic to declare the two countries enemies, a significant
portion of the oil revenue that flows into Saudi Arabia clearly works against U.S. strategic interests. But the impact of oil
dependence on terrorism extends beyond the financial windfall it entails for terrorist groups and the ideology that drives them:
terrorists also understand that our oil dependence is our greatest strategic vulnerability. Although Osama bin Laden initially
declared Saudi Arabia’s oil resources off limits as a military target because they were “a great Islamic wealth,” his thinking on
the matter shifted as he came to understand how much the U.S.’s fortunes were tied to its access to cheap oil. In a mid-December
2004 audiotape, he instructed al-Qaeda operatives: One of the main causes for our enemies’ gaining hegemony over our country is their stealing
our oil; therefore, you should make every effort in your power to stop the greatest theft in history of the natural resources of both present and
future generations, which is being carried out through collaboration between foreigners and [native] agents. . . . Focus your operations on it
[oil production], especially in Iraq and the Gulf area, since this [lack of oil] will cause them to die off [on their own]. Since then,
other prominent voices within al-Qaeda have affirmed the group’s desire to strike the oil supply. In a December 2005 video,
Ayman al-Zawahiri stated: “I call on the holy warriors to concentrate their campaigns on the stolen oil of the Muslims, most of
the revenues of which go to the enemies of Islam.” Sawt al-Jihad, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s online magazine, noted
in February 2007 that “cutting oil supplies to the United States, or at least curtailing it, would contribute to the ending of the
American occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan.” Actual terrorist targeting has made clear that this is not empty rhetoric. After a
September 2005 shootout between militants and Saudi police in the seaport of al-Dammam, police found forged documents that
would have provided the terrorists access to some of the country’s key oil and gas facilities. Saudi interior minister Prince Nayef
told the daily newspaper Okaz that the cell had planned to attack these facilities. In April 2007, Saudi Arabia announced that “it
foiled an al Qaeda-linked plot to attack oil facilities and military bases.” Indeed, former CIA agent Robert Baer warned back in 2003
that tactics in which al-Qaeda already had a demonstrated proficiency could succeed in taking a great deal of Saudi oil off the market
instantaneously. He stated that “a single jumbo jet with a suicide bomber at the controls . . . would be enough to bring the world’s
oil-addicted economies to their knees” if crashed into a major offshore loading facility. Following such an attack, the
substantially reduced worldwide supply of oil would be joined by an inflated risk premium. While it is difficult to determine the
ceiling for oil prices if such a scenario unfolded, Sawt al-Jihad may have been correct: diminished access to the military’s
lifeblood could spell doom for the U.S. ventures in Afghanistan and Iraq.

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Saudi Arabia Impact- Terror Shell [2/2] 62

Terrorism causes extinction


Alexander 03. (Yonah, Prof and Director of Inter-University for Terrorism Studies, Washington Times, August 28, lexis)
Unlike their historical counterparts,
contemporary terrorists have introduced a new scale of violence in terms of conventional and
unconventional threats and impact. The internationalization and brutalization of current and future terrorism make it clear we
have entered an Age of Super Terrorism [e.g. biological, chemical, radiological, nuclear and cyber] with its serious implications
concerning national, regional and global security concerns. Two myths in particular must be debunked immediately if an effective
counterterrorism "best practices" strategy can be developed [e.g., strengthening international cooperation]. The first illusion is that terrorism can be greatly
reduced, if not eliminated completely, provided the root causes of conflicts - political, social and economic - are addressed. The conventional illusion is that
terrorism must be justified by oppressed people seeking to achieve their goals and consequently the argument advanced by "freedom fighters" anywhere, "give
me liberty and I will give you death," should be tolerated if not glorified. This traditional rationalization of "sacred" violence often conceals that the real purpose
of terrorist groups is to gain political power through the barrel of the gun, in violation of fundamental human rights of the noncombatant segment of societies. For
instance, Palestinians religious movements [e.g., Hamas, Islamic Jihad] and secular entities [such as Fatah's Tanzim and Aqsa Martyr Brigades]] wish not only to
resolve national grievances [such as Jewish settlements, right of return, Jerusalem] but primarily to destroy the Jewish state. Similarly, Osama bin Laden's
international network not only opposes the presence of American military in the Arabian Peninsula and Iraq, but its stated objective is to "unite all Muslims and
establish a government that follows the rule of the Caliphs." The second myth is that strong action against terrorist infrastructure [leaders, recruitment, funding,
propaganda, training, weapons, operational command and control] will only increase terrorism. The argument here is that law-enforcement efforts and military
retaliation inevitably will fuel more brutal acts of violent revenge. Clearly, if this perception continues to prevail, particularly in democratic societies, there is the
danger it will paralyze governments and thereby encourage further terrorist attacks. In sum, past experience provides useful lessons for a realistic future strategy.
The prudent application of force has been demonstrated to be an effective tool for short- and long-term deterrence of terrorism. For example, Israel's targeted
killing of Mohammed Sider, the Hebron commander of the Islamic Jihad, defused a "ticking bomb." The assassination of Ismail Abu Shanab - a top Hamas
leader in the Gaza Strip who was directly responsible for several suicide bombings including the latest bus attack in Jerusalem - disrupted potential terrorist
operations. Similarly, the U.S. military operation in Iraq eliminated Saddam Hussein's regime as a state sponsor of terror. Thus, it behooves those
countries victimized by terrorism to understand a cardinal message communicated by Winston Churchill to the House of Commons on May 13,
1940: "Victory at all costs, victory in spite of terror, victory however long and hard the road may be: For without victory, there is no
survival."

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Saudi Arabia provides the majority of terrorism funding but dependence prevents the US from acting
Kaplan 03(David E. Investigative reporter and director of the Center for Public Integrity's International Consortium of Investigative Journalists., “The Saudi Connection”, 12/7, US News)
< http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/031215/15terror.htm>
The CIA's Illicit Transactions Group isn't listed in any phone book. There are no entries for it on any news database or Internet
site. The ITG is one of those tidy little Washington secrets, a group of unsung heroes whose job is to keep track of smugglers,
terrorists, and money launderers. In late 1998, officials from the White House's National Security Council called on the ITG to
help them answer a couple of questions: How much money did Osama bin Laden have, and how did he move it around? The
queries had a certain urgency. A cadre of bin Laden's al Qaeda terrorists had just destroyed two of America's embassies in East
Africa. The NSC was determined to find a way to break the organization's back. Working with the Illicit Transactions Group, the
NSC formed a task force to look at al Qaeda's finances. For months, members scoured every piece of data the U.S. intelligence
community had on al Qaeda's cash. The team soon realized that its most basic assumptions about the source of bin Laden's
money--his personal fortune and businesses in Sudan--were wrong. Dead wrong. Al Qaeda, says William Wechsler, the task force
director, was "a constant fundraising machine." And where did it raise most of those funds? The evidence was indisputable:
Saudi Arabia. America's longtime ally and the world's largest oil producer had somehow become, as a senior Treasury
Department official put it, "the epicenter" of terrorist financing. This didn't come entirely as a surprise to intelligence specialists.
But until the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, U.S. officials did painfully little to confront the Saudis not only on financing terror but on
backing fundamentalists and jihadists overseas. Over the past 25 years, the desert kingdom has been the single greatest force in
spreading Islamic fundamentalism, while its huge, unregulated charities funneled hundreds of millions of dollars to jihad groups
and al Qaeda cells around the world. Those findings are the result of a five-month investigation by U.S. News. The magazine's
inquiry is based on a review of thousands of pages of court records, U.S. and foreign intelligence reports, and other documents.
In addition, the magazine spoke at length with more than three dozen current and former counterterrorism officers, as well as
government officials and outside experts in Riyadh, the Saudi capital. Among the inquiry's principal findings: Starting in the late
1980s--after the dual shocks of the Iranian revolution and the Soviet war in Afghanistan--Saudi Arabia's quasi-official charities
became the primary source of funds for the fast-growing jihad movement. In some 20 countries, the money was used to run
paramilitary training camps, purchase weapons, and recruit new members. The charities were part of an extraordinary $70 billion
Saudi campaign to spread their fundamentalist Wahhabi sect worldwide. The money helped lay the foundation for hundreds of
radical mosques, schools, and Islamic centers that have acted as support networks for the jihad movement, officials say. U.S.
intelligence officials knew about Saudi Arabia's role in funding terrorism by 1996, yet for years Washington did almost nothing
to stop it. Examining the Saudi role in terrorism, a senior intelligence analyst says, was "virtually taboo." Even after the embassy
bombings in Africa, moves by counterterrorism officials to act against the Saudis were repeatedly rebuffed by senior staff at the
State Department and elsewhere who felt that other foreign policy interests outweighed fighting terrorism.
Saudi Oil money funds terrorism: Al Qaeda acknowledges that it is their primary source of funding
Stern 06
Roger, Department of Geography and Environmental Engineering, Johns Hopkins University, Edited by Ronald W. Jones, Xerox Professor of Economics. Economics Department.
University of Rochester, “Oil Market Power and United States National Security”, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the USA
http://www.pnas.org/content/103/5/1650.full

The more serious threat is not that a radical Saudi Arabia might cease exporting but that it might continue. Tens of billions per
year in wt proceeds could then be put to realization of global Wahabist ambitions. Terror via weapons of mass destruction seems
the likely method, with a nuclear deterrent protecting the terror state. No U.S. policy exists to prevent or forestall this outcome.
Such a scenario differs from the present only in degree as wt already underwrites terrorism. A global religious propaganda
network funded by the Saudi state promotes jihad against non-Muslims (52, 53). Secretary Rumsfeld considers this among the
most formidable U.S. security problems (54). As derived above, 78% of Saudi state support for it is attributable to market power.
Saudi state contributions to terror organizations (53) and quasi-states like the former Taliban government of Afghanistan (55)
also derive from market power at this ratio. Private Saudi contributions to terror organizations are attributable to market power at
wt/GDPSaudi2002 = 0.29. However, the ratio of public to private contributions to such groups is unknown. Our point is that market
power underwrites terror via wt, although how important wt may be compared to other funding we do not know. However, an al
Qaeda discussion of its policy options toward Saudi Arabia is suggestive: There were those who said we must attack the
invading forces that defile the land of the two holy places, and that we must turn the Americans' concerns to themselves and their
bases, so they would not take off from there to crush Muslim lands and countries, one by one. There were others who said we
had to preserve the security of this base and this country, from which we recruit the armies, from which we take the youth, from
which we get the backing. It must therefore remain safe. It is also true that we must use this country because it is the primary
source of funds for most Jihad movements.... (53)** Of course, many potential threats to U.S. security have no relation to market
power. For example India, Pakistan, and North Korea developed nuclear weapons as relatively poor countries. Moreover,
weapons of mass destruction might be sold by or stolen from any state that has them, thence to become threats. Nonetheless,

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64
terrorism is funded and directed.

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US-Saudi relations are strained over oil production; dependence gives Saudis leverage over the US
Daily Telegraph 08
(“Day of truth for US-Saudi axis Bush's warm relationship with King Abdullah is starting to cool down, as he seeks Riyadh's help over oil prices. Ambrose Evans-Pritchard reports”
March 16 LexisNexis)

The US-Saudi tango has been on thin ice ever since the terrorist attacks of 9/11. Sixteen of the hijackers were Saudi nationals.
The Bush family has cleaved closely to the Saudi monarchy, but strong factions in Washington see Riyadh's Wahabi monarchy is
part of the Middle East problem - not the solution. Saudi Arabia's one saving grace - in the eyes of US critics - is that it has over
the years been willing to cap extreme surges in the price of oil, deploying its power as the world's swing producer. This time,
Riyadh is giving no ground. Oil minister Ali al-Naimi insists that there is plenty of oil about, blaming the latest rise on "the
internal logic of the financial markets'', meaning hedge funds and speculators. The US Congress gave its riposte this week. New
York Senator Charles Schumer is pushing for sanctions against Saudi Arabia, targeting $1.4bn in sales of bomb kits, light
armoured vehicles, as well as gear for AWACS aircraft and F-15 fighters. "You need our arms, but we need you to co-operate and
not strangle American consumers. Saudi Arabia could do a lot more than they have done,'' he said. The Democrats are also
pushing legislation that would penalise the Opec producers cartel for "anti-competitiveness practices''. The Bush White House
has rolled its eyes in exasperation at such blunt methods, but hot feelings are aroused in American public discourse. There have
been calls for a food blockade of the Arabian peninsular on the US talk radio circuit. "Let them eat sand'', has been the rallying
cry of the shock-jocks. Opec has - in effect - cut production repeatedly. The Saudis have let their output fall from 9.5m to 8.5m
barrels per day over the past two years, camouflaging the move behind the accession of Ecuador and Angola to the group (which
boosted nominal supply). Opec failed to compensate for a 330,000 bpd drop in Nigerian production in April, allowing the market
to tighten further.

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US Dependence on Saudi Oil gives Saudi Arabia enormous leverage in deals; allows them to acquire nuclear weapons
Washington Times 08 (“To Give America Freedom”, Frank J. Gaffney Jr. May 20, Lexis Nexis)

What do the following recent events have in common?*The president of the United States has prostrated himself for the second
time in five months before the king of Saudi Arabia, pleading for more oil. Despite George Bush's inducements - an array of
advanced, offensive arms; the promise of nuclear technology with which the Saudis can expect (like the North Koreans, Iranians,
Pakistanis, etc.) to acquire the ultimate weapons; and U.S. help securing Saudi Arabia's borders (something the president has
declined to do at home) - the American plea was spurned. The contempt felt by the House of Saud was captured in its oil
minister's quip, "If you want more oil, buy it."

The US protects Saudi Arabia at all costs to preserve its supply of oil
Rutledge 06
(Ian, graduated in Economics and Social Science in the University of Cambridge in 1968. receiving his PhD in Economic History in 1973. He has taught both economics and
sociology in the Universities of London and Sheffield, as well as spending three years working for the British Coal Corporation, “Addicted to Oil: America’s Relentless Drive for
Energy Security”)

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Saudi Arabia Impact- Heg Extensions [2/2] 67

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Environment Impact- Shell 68

Oil dependence will cause dramatic climate change that leads to extinction
Joseph Romm 7/10/08 - senior fellow at the Center for American Progress
[“Takes: The U.S. Needs to End Its Energy Dependence”, http://www.usnews.com/articles/opinion/2008/07/10/two-takes-the-us-needs-to-end-its-energy-dependence.html]

Americans will spend more on oil this year than on the Pentagon, homeland security, and Iraq, sending more than half a trillion
dollars abroad, much of it to undemocratic countries. This figure could rise 50 percent if, as cbic World Markets predicts, gas
prices climb to nearly $7 a gallon by 2010. This dependence is economically unsustainable and ruinous for our children.
Emissions of heat-trapping carbon dioxide have us on track to raise global temperatures 10 degrees above preindustrial levels by
century's end. Such warming would melt the world's ice, raising sea levels and destroying inland glaciers that provide water to a
billion people. It could turn one third of the planet into desert and make the U.S. Southwest a dust bowl. It would wipe out most
species and leave oceans hot, acidified, and largely lifeless.

A loss of biodiversity causes the extinction of humanity


Genesis of Eden Diversity Encyclopedia, 2003
http://www.dhushara.com/book/diversit/saceve.htm

Biodiversity is not just some benign backdrop for hiking holidays, but the very substance and foundation of our survival,
whether we realize it or not. We are entirely dependent upon the plants, animals, fungi, and micro-organisms that share the
world with us. Individually, they alone feed us, and without them we would starve. Yet we frequently act to undermine these
very species essential to our welfare. In addition to food, they provide many of the drugs and other medicinal and industrial
products on which the quality of our liv+es increasingly depends. They offer the promise of sustainable economy -
productivity that the Earth can support on a continuing basis, so our children and, in turn, their children will survive and be
able to live peaceful lives of abundant splendour.

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Environment Impact- Extensions 69

Oil Dependency leads to global warming and extinction


David Scott 07-Committee of Agriculture, US House of Representatives
[“HEARING OF THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE; SUBJECT: FOREIGN POLICY AND NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF OIL DEPENDENCE; ”,
March 22, Lexis]

REP. DAVID SCOTT (D-GA): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. This is indeed a very important and essential hearing. Let
me start off by saying that we did not leave the Stone Age because we ran out of stone nor we leave Oil Age because we run out
of oil. What will happen first is we will run out of civilization. If we continue to premise our energy policy on not only on a
dwindling non-repetitive resource like oil but a very destructive element such as oil, civilization will not last. Oil will be here and
mankind will be gone. Simply because if we continue with our predominance of our energy needs on oil the heating impact the
carbon dioxides that are put into the air. Scientist after scientist have told us the earth will not survive as long as we have this
over dependence on oil as our energy. Civilization will not be around that is how profound this is. It's beyond the Middle East
now. It's beyond all of that. It is with our collective will to look beyond oil and to understand that our future does not rest in
drilling into the earth but being able to use the bountiful crops the alternative means of energy, that do not damage this earth, that
do not damage the atmosphere, but provide for a way such as cellulosic and glandular ethanol such as using hydrogen, such as
using those kinds of clean renewable energies. That will not only fulfill our energy needs but will allow us to maintain the flow
of human life on this planet for which oil dependency will destroy.

Oil dependence kills the environment


Gal Luft 2005, Co-Director @ Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, Committee on Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South
Asian Affairs
[“THE U.S., THE MIDDLE EAST AND PETROLEUM”, CAPITOL HILL HEARING TESTIMONY, October 20, 2005, Lexis]

Finally, environmental considerations argue for action to reduce imports of foreign oil. While experts and policy-makers disagree
about the contribution the burning of fossil fuels is making to the planet's temperatures, it is certainly desirable to find ways to
obtain energy while minimizing the production of greenhouse gases and other pollutants. The combined effects of this "perfect
storm" require concerted action, at last, aimed at reducing the Nation's reliance on imported oil from hostile or unstable sources
and the world's dependence on oil at large. Fortunately, with appropriate vision and leadership, we can make major strides in this
direction by exploiting currently available technologies and infrastructures to greatly diminish oil consumption in the
transportation sector, which accounts for two thirds of our oil consumption.

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Economy Impact- Shell 70

Foreign energy dependence collapses the economy


Lugar 07-Former vice-chair Commission on Intergovernmental Relation, Foreign Relations Committee, former chair of the
Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry Committee
[Richard, “ENERGY SECURITY, ENERGY URGENCY: KEY ISSUES FACING THE NEXT PRESIDENT”, Dec. 18,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/events/2007/1218_lugar/20071218lugar.pdf]

Second, transformational energy policies are likely to be a requirement for achieving our own economic and social aspirations
here at home. In an era when exploding global demand for energy creates high prices and fears of scarcity, the United States’
economy is likely to continue to underperform. Our ability to address social security, healthcare, education and overall budget
problems will be heavily encumbered over both the short and the long run if we do not mitigate our energy import dependence.
Almost any scenario for recession will be deepened by high energy costs. Moreover, many of the most severe recession scenarios
involve sustained energy disruptions due to terrorism, war, embargo or natural disaster.

Economic collapse causes present numerous scenarios for nuclear Armageddon


Bearden – Retired U.S. Army Colonel - 2000
[Bearden (Ret.), US Army, 6/24/2000 (“The Unnecessary Energy Crisis: How to Solve in
Quickly” (http://www.seaspower.com/EnergyCrisis-Bearden.htm) ]

History bears out that desperate nations take desperate actions. Prior to the final economic collapse, the stress on nations will
have increased the intensity and number of their conflicts, to the point where the arsenals of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) now possessed by some 25 nations, are almost certain to be released. As an example, suppose a starving North Korea
{[7]} launches nuclear weapons upon Japan and South Korea, including U.S. forces there, in a spasmodic suicidal response. Or
suppose a desperate China — whose long-range nuclear missiles (some) can reach the United States — attacks Taiwan. In
addition to immediate responses, the mutual treaties involved in such scenarios will quickly draw other nations into the conflict,
escalating it significantly. Strategic nuclear studies have shown for decades that, under such extreme stress conditions, once a
few nukes are launched, adversaries and potential adversaries are then compelled to launch on perception of preparations by
one's adversary. The real legacy of the MAD concept is this side of the MAD coin that is almost never discussed. Without
effective defense, the only chance a nation has to survive at all is to launch immediate full-bore pre-emptive strikes and try to
take out its perceived foes as rapidly and massively as possible. As the studies showed, rapid escalation to full WMD exchange
occurs. Today, a great percent of the WMD arsenals that will be unleashed, are already on site within the United States itself
{[8]}. The resulting great Armageddon will destroy civilization as we know it, and perhaps most of the biosphere, at least for
many decades.

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Economy Impact- Extensions 71

Oil dependence destroys the economy


Gal Luft 2005, Co-Director @ Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, Committee on Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South
Asian Affairs
[“THE U.S., THE MIDDLE EAST AND PETROLEUM”, CAPITOL HILL HEARING TESTIMONY, October 20, 2005, Lexis]

Oil dependence has considerable economic implications. Shrinking supply and rising demand translate into higher costs. Both
American consumers and the U.S. economy are already suffering from the cumulative effect of recent increases in gas prices.
Even now, fully one-quarter of the U.S. trade deficit is associated with oil imports. By some estimates, we lose 27,000 jobs for
every billion dollars of additional oil imports. Serious domestic and global economic dislocation would almost certainly attend
still-higher costs for imported petroleum and/or disruption of supply.

Oil dependence kills global markets


Deutch & Schlesinger October 2006
[John (Former Director of Central Intelligence and Undersecretary of Energy) & James R. (Former Defense and Energy Secretary), “national security consequences of u.s. oil
dependency”,Council on Foreign Relations Press, http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/EnergyTFR.pdf]

Third, high prices and seemingly scarce supplies create fears— especially evident in Beijing and New Delhi, as well as in
European capitals and in Washington—that the current system of open markets is unable to ensure secure supply. The present
competition has resulted in oil and gas deals that include political arrangements in addition to commercial terms. Highly
publicized Chinese oil investments in Africa have included funding for infrastructure projects such as an airport, a railroad, and a
telecommunications system, in addition to the agreement that the oil be shipped to China. Many more of these investments also
include equity stakes for state-controlled Chinese companies. Another example is Chinese firms taking a position in Saudi
Arabia, along with several Western firms, in developing Saudi Arabia’s gas infrastructure. At present, these arrangements have
little effect on world oil and gas markets because the volumes affected are small. However, such arrangements are spreading.
These arrangements are worrisome because they lead to special political relationships that pose difficulties for the United States.
And they allow importers to believe that they obtain security through links to particular suppliers rather than from the proper
functioning of a global market. We note that the United States, in the past, has also taken decisions to restrict markets partly due
to similar concerns about energy security. For example, when the trans-Alaska pipeline opened, it included a prohibition against
exporting the oil. The hostility toward proposals by the Chinese National Overseas Oil Company (CNOOC) to purchase Union
Oil of California is seen by some as denying investment opportunity in the U.S. market in a similar manner to what the United
States decries about other nations’ conduct. The Task Force believes that foreign entities should be able to purchase U.S. assets
provided that the acquisitions meet the criteria established by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States
(CFIUS).12 Opening a dialogue with rapidly growing consumers, notably China and India, can help those consumers gain
confidence that will lead to a greater willingness to allow markets to operate. (We return to this policy recommendation later.)
The United States and other consuming countries have a tremendous interest in maintaining the present open market oil
commodity trading rules.

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Famine Impact- Shell 72

Oil dependency causes famine


Tom Pelton, The Baltimore Sun, 7/20/8
[“The coming black plague?”, http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/ideas/bal-id.oil20jul20,0,1606377.story]

The farmer drove a diesel-powered hay baler in a circuit around his field, followed by his son on a clattering machine that
grabbed the bales with metal fingers. Edward F. Stanfield, 77, and his son, Edward B. Stanfield, 49, have followed this oil-
inspired choreography for decades on their 600-acre farm in the Randallstown area of Baltimore County. Like farmers around
the world, they grow their hay, corn and soybeans with petrochemical fertilizers and pesticides, harvest them with diesel
combines, pack them with oil-based plastic and ship them in diesel trucks. The mechanized "Green Revolution" the family
joined after World War II created an explosion in food productivity that allowed global populations to multiply. But it also forged
a dependence on oil that could now lead to a food crisis, a small but growing number of scholars and activists warn. Dr. Brian
Schwartz, co-director of the program on global sustainability and health at the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public
Health, said governments should start planning for a worst-case scenario, with soaring oil prices disrupting food supplies, just as
they plan for other possibilities like nuclear war and bioterrorism. "We have an industrial model of food production that requires
intense amounts of fossil fuels," Schwartz said. "Food is going to be a huge problem for us." Dale Allen Pfeiffer, author of the
recent book Eating Fossil Fuels: Oil, Food and the Coming Crisis in Agriculture, goes even further in his warnings. With global
oil production soon sliding into decline, fuel prices might continue to skyrocket until the world's food system collapses, causing
starvation, he wrote.

Foods security outweighs all other impacts – it makes every impact inevitable
Trudell, J.D. Candidate 2006, 05
(Robert H., Fall, Food Security Emergencies And The Power Of Eminent Domain: A Domestic Legal Tool To Treat A Global Problem, 33 Syracuse J. Int'l L. & Com. 277, Lexis)

Today, more than 842 million people - nearly three times the population of the United States - are chronically hungry. 43
"Chronic hunger is a profound, debilitating human experience that affects the ability of individuals to work productively, think
clearly, and resist disease. It also has devastating consequences for society: it drains economies, destabilizes governments, and
reaches across international boundaries." 44 The enormous number of chronically hungry people conjures up a critical question:
how can we feed these people? While the rate of population growth has been leveling off in the developed, wealthy countries of
the world, the populations of the poorest countries and regions of the world still grow at an alarming pace. 45 Population
statisticians refer to this phenomenon as population momentum. 46 Of the seventeen countries whose women average six or more
births in a lifetime, all but two are in Africa. 47 In sub-Saharan Africa, millions are undernourished and millions more live on a
dollar a day, making it the most poverty-stricken region in the world today. 48 [*285] Chronic hunger and poverty are the rock-
and-a-hard-place in between which the people of sub-Saharan Africa find themselves today. One tragedy endlessly feeds upon
and exacerbates the other because a person needs money to buy food, but she (or he) cannot earn money when she is chronically
hungry. 49 The food security issues of this region are a global concern. Silvio Berlusconi, Prime Minister of Italy, and
Chairperson of the 2002 World Food Summit in Rome said, "Together with terrorism, hunger is one of the greatest problems the
international community is facing." 50 Human security is a value which can be broadly defined as both the "freedom from fear"
and the "freedom from want." 51 Until recently, security was largely a concern arising out of the conflict among states, i.e. state
security, which can be summed up in the phrase "military preparedness." 52 Today, it is recognized that the achievement of
freedom from want is as important a goal as the achievement of freedom from fear and countries must arm themselves against
such fear by addressing food insecurity. 53 In an editorial in the Economist, Kofi Annan, Secretary General of the United Nations,
wrote that today's threats to security - terrorism, food security and poverty - are all interrelated so that no one country can tackle
them alone. 54 For example, keeping our food supply secure plays a direct role in achieving freedom from fear. The State
Department has been studying the possibilities of food-borne bioterrorism, introducing the national security element to food
security concerns. 55 Likewise, in December [*286] 2004, during his resignation announcement, Tommy Thompson, the former
Secretary of the Health and Human Services Department, stated: "For the life of me, I cannot understand why the terrorists have
not attacked our food supply, because it is so easy to do." 56 Yet it is a mistake to think of global security only in military terms. 57
Food security deserves its place in any long-term calculation regarding global security. Widespread chronic hunger causes
widespread instability and debilitating poverty and decreases all of our safety, for example from the increased threat from global
terrorism. 58 Widespread instability is an unmistakable characteristic of life in sub-Saharan Africa. 59 Food insecurity, therefore,
causes global insecurity because widespread instability in places like sub-Saharan Africa threatens all of our safety. Food
insecurity in the unstable regions of the world must be taken on now lest we find ourselves facing some far worse danger in the
days to come.

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73

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Disruption Impact- cooperation 74

Disruption in oil supply hurts cooperation with other countries


Deutch & Schlesinger October 2006
[John (Former Director of Central Intelligence and Undersecretary of Energy) & James R. (Former Defense and Energy Secretary), “national security consequences of u.s. oil
dependency”,Council on Foreign Relations Press, http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/EnergyTFR.pdf]

Fifth, a significant interruption in oil supply will have adverse political and economic consequences in the United States and in
other importing countries. When such a disruption occurs, it upends all ongoing policy activity in a frantic effort to return to
normal conditions. Inevitably, those efforts include matters of foreign policy, such as coordination with other countries to find
measures that will mitigate the consequences of the supply disruption. Some of these responses may be preplanned, such as the
coordinated release of strategic reserves, but other responses will be hurried, ineffectual, or even counterproductive.

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List of Possible Disruptions 75

There is a laundry list of possible disruptions to the oil supply


Fattouh 07 (Bassam, Consultant Senior Research Fellow at Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, specialist in the international oil
pricing system, “How Secure are Middle East Oil Supplies?”, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, September)
<http://www.oxfordenergy.org/pdfs/WPM33.pdf>

First, there are fears that oil-exporting countries from the region could be hit by wars or internal conflicts. Second, there are fears
that these countries may witness long periods of instability that could cripple their oil industry. The sources of instability are
various but the main focus is usually on the growing anti-Western feelings and the rise of Islamic radicalism. It is argued that the
rise of Islamic radicalism would eventually bring Islamist regimes to power that may intentionally decide to restrict oil supplies
to the West. Third, there are fears that terrorist networks will succeed in hitting oil installations and pipelines. Fourth, there are
concerns that some countries in the region may be tempted to use the oil weapon and restrict trade routes to force importing
nations to yield political concessions. Finally, there are concerns that the West may react to political developments in the Middle
East by imposing sanctions on some oil exporters.4 We shall explore each of these in detail.

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AT: Domestic Production CP [1/2] 76

Foreign Oil dependency can’t be solved by domestic production- foreign supplies far outnumber US supplies
Committee on International Relations 02 House of Representatives Committee
[“OIL DIPLOMACY: FACTS AND MYTHS BEHIND FOREIGN OIL DEPENDENCY” HEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION 6/20/02 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS, Washington, DC.]

Mr. Chairman, our dependence on Middle East oil severely undermines our ability to combat international terrorism. Fearing
another Arab embargo, some of our diplomats kowtow to Middle East autocrats and permit their antidemocratic, anti-American
practices to go unanswered. It is distressing that U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East is often held hostage to oil interests.
The question we must ask ourselves is how can we break free of this crippling dependence? The title of today’s hearing is ‘‘The
Facts and Myths Behind Foreign Oil Dependency.’’ The fact is that we will remain beholden to these Middle Eastern suppliers
until we scale back America’s addiction to oil. The myth is that we can drill our way out of dependency. The Administration’s
plan stresses decreasing our dependence on foreign oil. Underlying the logic of the plan’s supply side approach is the fantasy that
we can significantly reduce our reliance on imported oil simply by bringing more domestic production on line. But simply saying
that increased domestic drilling will reduce our dependence on foreign oil does not make it so. According to the Department of
Energy’s own analysis, domestic oil production is in a steep and steady decline as the easily accessible sources of American oil
have already been tapped. The Department of Energy estimates that Saudi Arabia, the other Gulf states, Iran and Iraq, combined
hold about 65 percent of the world’s proven oil reserves while our share amounts to no more than 3 percent.
ANWR drilling won’t solve oil dependency
NRDC 01 National Resources Defense Council
[“Reducing U.S. Oil Dependence A Real Energy Security Policy” 10/3/01 http://www.nrdc.org/air/energy/fensec.asp]

Since the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the security of our nation, the safety of our people, and
the stability of our economy have become paramount concerns for the American public and our elected leaders. Americans are
justifiably worried about energy security, especially our vulnerability to a disruption in oil supplies or a surge in world oil prices.
In the weeks following the attacks, some members of Congress have called for immediate action to open the Arctic National
Wildlife Refuge to oil drilling. Framing our energy security narrowly as a question of how much oil we import, they argue for
more domestic drilling, even in our last pristine wilderness areas. This path, however, would not ensure our energy security or
national security. Our vulnerability to oil price spikes and supply disruptions is due to our excessive dependence on oil from all
sources, foreign and domestic. The first Bush administration acknowledged this fact in its 1991 National Energy Strategy, which
said: "Popular opinion aside, our vulnerability to price shocks is not determined by how much oil we import." The number one
factor making us vulnerable: "how oil dependent our economy is."[1] Americans consume 25 percent of the world's produced oil,
but our nation holds less than 3 percent of the world's proven oil reserves.[2] The amount of economically recoverable oil in the
Arctic Refuge, according to U.S. Geological Survey estimates, would increase world reserves by just 0.3 percent[3] -- not nearly
enough to make a significant dent in our imports or to influence petroleum prices. Over the Arctic Refuge field's 50-year life, it
would likely produce less than what our country now consumes in six months, and less than 1 percent of the oil we are projected
to consume over those 50 years.[4] Drilling in the refuge would have no effect on our current situation. If we opened the area to
oil development today, it would take seven to 10 years for refuge crude to begin arriving at refineries.[5] Nor would refuge oil play
a significant role in decades to come. Even at the point of its peak production rate in 2027, it would likely equal less than 2
percent of projected U.S. consumption for that year.[6]

There’s not enough oil in the Western Hemisphere; the only way to solve is to switch to alternative energy
Gal Luft 2005, Co-Director @ Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, Committee on Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South
Asian Affairs
[“THE U.S., THE MIDDLE EAST AND PETROLEUM”, CAPITOL HILL HEARING TESTIMONY, October 20, 2005, Lexis]

Myth 2: The U.S. can drill its way out of its energy problem. Tapping our domestic reserves which, all included, amount to less
than 3% of the world's reserves, is no more than a stopgap solution. Considering America's vast long term needs our domestic
reserves are a drop in the bucket. Assuming that all the oil that is claimed to be in Alaska is indeed there, the U.S.' share of world
oil would increase by less than half of a percent. No doubt unconventional petroleum sources available in the Western
Hemisphere like Canadian tar sands and Venezuelan extra heavy crude could provide some relief but by no means can they
significantly reduce America's dependence on the Middle East. While there is no alternative to dependence on Middle Eastern
oil, there are clearly alternatives to oil, particularly in the transportation sector, where two-thirds of U.S. oil is consumed.

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AT: Domestic Production CP [2/2] 77


Drilling won't solve oil dependence
The Boston Globe 6/20/08
["New offshore drilling not a quick fix, analysts say: Start-up delays, global market pressures cited",
http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2008/06/20/new_offshore_drilling_not_a_quick_fix_analysts_say/]

But analysts say that renewed offshore drilling would have little impact on gas prices anytime soon. It would take at least a
decade for oil companies to obtain permits, procure equipment, and do the exploration necessary to get the oil out of the ground,
most industry analysts say. And even then, they add, the amount of new oil produced would probably be too small to
significantly affect world oil prices. Some analysts point out that the wells the United States now depends on are being depleted,
and that new exploration could at least help offset that decline in supply from existing wells. Expanded offshore exploration also
carries with it some environmental risks, from oil spills to destruction of habitat to vibrations that damage sea life, which
environmentalists say could have catastrophic consequences that far outweigh any potential benefit from further offshore
drilling. But other analysts say that improved technology means the risks are much smaller than a generation ago. In this view, a
sensible compromise approach would be to make decisions on potential drilling sites on a case-by-case basis.

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AT: Diversifying Oil Resources Solve Middle East [1/2] 78

Diversifying oil doesn’t decrease dependency—high demands would still be put on the Middle East
Gal Luft 2005, Co-Director @ Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, Committee on Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South
Asian Affairs
[“THE U.S., THE MIDDLE EAST AND PETROLEUM”, CAPITOL HILL HEARING TESTIMONY, October 20, 2005, Lexis]
Myth 1: The U.S. can end its dependence on the Middle East by diversifying its sources beyond the region. Since oil is a
fungible commodity, it does not matter what proportion of the oil the U.S. imports comes from the Middle East, what matters is
the share of Middle East producers in overall supply. The oil market is like a huge pool: producers pour in oil while consumers
draw it out. Prices and supply levels are determined in the international markets. If all we do is shuffle around our sources of oil
supply, but demand for oil does not drop, the influx of petrodollars to proliferators and apologists for radical Islam as well as the
vulnerability of the U.S. to international oil terrorism would remain the same even if the U.S. did not import a drop of oil from
the Middle East.

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AT: Diversifying Oil Resources Solve Middle East [2/2] 79

We must end all dependence, not just dependence on the Middle East in order to protect us from price changes
Rutledge 06
(Ian, graduated in Economics and Social Science in the University of Cambridge in 1968. receiving his PhD in Economic History in 1973. He has taught both economics and
sociology in the Universities of London and Sheffield, as well as spending three years working for the British Coal Corporation, “Addicted to Oil: America’s Relentless Drive for
Energy Security”)

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AT: SQ solves [1/2] 80

Oil dependency drags down the economy and status quo lobbying prevents action
NDRC no date
(Natural Resources Defense Council, “Safe, Strong and Secure: Reducing America's Oil Dependence: America's rising consumption of oil threatens the economy and national
security.”) < http://www.nrdc.org/air/transportation/aoilpolicy2.asp>

With U.S. gasoline consumption accounting for 11 percent of world oil production, the U.S. has been hit hard by our dependence on
oil, intensifying our economic and political vulnerability. Of the $54 billion trade deficit reported in August, more than a fifth or $12
billion is from imported crude oil.3 Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan has called the higher value of imported oil a tax on
U.S. citizens that has cost us three quarters of a percent of our economic output in 2004, and warned economic impacts for the U.S.
will intensify if current trends in oil demand and prices continue.4 Countries on U.S. oil purchases are spending heavily in Washington
to make sure the party doesn't end: Since December 2003, OPEC has spent $13.3 million on federal lobbying, $6.6 million of which
from Saudi Arabia alone.5 U.S. energy companies are jumping on the political bandwagon too, spending $59.4 million on lobbying in
2003 and $29 million on campaign contributions in the 2002 and 2004 election cycles.

Status Quo alternative energy will not solve dependence: lack of investment and market cycles will cause a massive global
economic depression
Energy Bulletin 04
(Richard Heinsburg, “The Consequences of Oil Dependency” < http://www.energybulletin.net/node/2431>

Economists tell us that higher oil prices will stimulate investment in energy alternatives. However, the prospects for a painless
market-driven transition away from fossil fuels are hardly encouraging. Globally, trillions of dollars will have to be spent on
research and on new infrastructure; tens or hundreds of billions per year, starting immediately. We are not seeing anything like
that level of investment now; we have to assume that it will begin after the global oil peak (that is, after an obvious price signal
making alternatives more attractive). But then, with less energy available to fuel the economy, we will have trouble simply
maintaining basic services. There won’t be any surplus to jumpstart the new energy infrastructure, which will take decades to
build. High energy prices will cause recessions, destroying demand. Then, reduced demand will lead to partial relaxations of
energy prices. Temporarily lowered prices will stimulate economic recovery and hence renewed demand, which will again be
constrained by declining rates of oil extraction, leading to more recessions, and so on. In other words, as demand begins to
exceed supply, expect increasing price volatility, with a general upward and steepening underlying price trend. The ultimate
consequence will be a global depression worse than that of the 1930s.

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AT: SQ solves [2/2] 81

Our dependence is already in the worst-case scenario; economic disaster is imminent.


Rutledge 06
(Ian, graduated in Economics and Social Science in the University of Cambridge in 1968. receiving his PhD in Economic History in 1973. He has taught both economics and
sociology in the Universities of London and Sheffield, as well as spending three years working for the British Coal Corporation, “Addicted to Oil: America’s Relentless Drive for
Energy Security”)

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AT: Can’t be completely independent of oil 82

Even if energy independence can’t be completely achieved- we must manage oil dependence
Deutch, Schlesinger and Victor 06
[national security consequences of u.s. oil dependency JOHN Deutch and James R. Schlesinger david victor INDEPENDENT TASK FORCE REPORT No. 58 10/12/06
http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/EnergyTFR.pdf]

The challenge over the next several decades is to manage the consequences of unavoidable dependence on oil and gas that is
traded in world markets and to begin the transition to an economy that relies less on petroleum. The longer the delay, the greater
will be the subsequent trauma. For the United States, with 4.6 percent of the world’s population using 25 percent of the world’s
oil, the transition could be especially disruptive. This report concentrates on the next twenty years, a period long enough to put
necessary policy measures into place but not so distant as to encounter a wider range of future geopolitical or technological
uncertainties. During this next twenty years (and quite probably beyond), it is infeasible to eliminate the nation’s dependence on
foreign energy sources. The voices that espouse ‘‘energy independence’’ are doing the nation a disservice by focusing on a goal
that is unachievable over the foreseeable future and that encourages the adoption of inefficient and counterproductive policies.
Indeed, during the next two decades, it is unlikely that the United States will be able to make a sharp reduction in its dependence
on imports, which currently stand at 60 percent of consumption. The central task for the next two decades must be to manage the
consequences of dependence on oil, not to pretend the United States can eliminate it.

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No link to DAs 83

No link to your DAs- it would take 20 years to replace oil but we have to start acting now
Parmley 06
[Julia "U.S. must end dependency on oil, expert says" 4/6/06 http://www.udel.edu/PR/UDaily/2006/apr/global040606.html

The U.S. needs to find alternatives to oil, Luft said. Instead of gasoline, flexible fuels--such as ethanol, methane and electricity--
can be used to power cars, he said. Noting that it could take 20 years to replace an oil-dependent economy, Luft said that it is
critical to the country's safety and prosperity to begin the transformation now. “Everyday we delay the beginning of the process
is one more day, in the future, we will have to be under severe adversity,” he said. Luft said the U.S. should take the lead in
lessening its dependence on oil and that other countries will follow.

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AT: Spending 84

Just because it’s expensive isn’t a reason not to do it—past costly programs prove
Gal Luft 2005, Co-Director @ Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, Committee on Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South
Asian Affairs
[“THE U.S., THE MIDDLE EAST AND PETROLEUM”, CAPITOL HILL HEARING TESTIMONY, October 20, 2005, Lexis]

In 1942, President Roosevelt launched the Manhattan Project to build an atomic weapon to be ready by 1945 because of threats
to America's and to explore the future of nuclear fission. The cost in today's prices was $20 billion. The outcome was an end to
the war with Japan, and the beginning of a wide new array of nuclear- based technologies in energy, medical treatment, and other
fields. In 1962, President Kennedy Launched the Man to the Moon Project to be achieved by 1969 because of mounting threats
to U.S. and international security posed by Soviet space-dominance and to explore outer space. The cost of the Apollo program
in today's prices would be well over $100 billion. The outcome was an extraordinary strategic and technological success for the
United States. It engendered a wide array of spin-offs that improved virtually every aspect of modern life, including but not
limited to transportation, communications, health care, medical treatment, food production and other fields. The security of the
United States, and the world, is no less threatened by oil supply disruptions, price instabilities and shortages. It is imperative that
America provide needed leadership by immediately beginning to dramatically reduce its dependence on imported oil. This can be
done by embracing the concepts outlined above with a focus on fuel choice, combined with concerted efforts at improving
energy efficiency and the increased availability of energy from renewable sources.
Hidden costs of oil will make it worthwhile to spend money on the plan now
Lugar 06-Former vice-chair Commission on Intergovernmental Relation, Foreign Relations Committee, former chair of the
Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry Committee
[“'THE HIDDEN COST OF OIL'”, March 30, Lexis]

The Foreign Relations Committee meets today to consider the externality costs of U.S. dependence on fossil fuels. The gasoline
price spikes following the Katrina and Rita hurricanes underscored for Americans the tenuousness of short-term energy supplies.
Since these events, there is a broader understanding that gasoline and home heating prices are volatile and can rapidly spike to
economically damaging levels due to natural disasters, terrorist attacks, or other world events. But, as yet, there is not a full
appreciation of the hidden costs of oil dependence to our economy, our national security, our environment, and our broader
international goals. Today, with the help of experts who have thought a great deal about these issues, we will attempt to more
clearly define some of these costs. We are cognizant that this is a difficult and imprecise exercise. We are also aware that most, if
not all, energy alternatives have some externality costs. But we are starting from the presumption that if we blithely ignore our
dependence on foreign oil, we are inviting an economic and national security disaster. With less than five percent of the world's
population, the United States consumes 25 percent of its oil. If oil prices remain around $60 a barrel through 2006, we will
spend approximately $320 billion on oil imports this year. Most of the world's oil is concentrated in places that are either hostile
to American interests or vulnerable to political upheaval and terrorism. More than three-quarters of the world's oil reserves are
controlled by national oil companies. And within 25 years, the world will need 50 percent more energy than it does now. These
basic facts demand a major reorientation in U.S. policy aimed at reducing U.S. dependence on fossil fuels. Our goals must be to
mitigate the short term costs of our dependence on oil, while pursuing energy alternatives that would reduce the international
leverage of petro-superpowers, improve environmental quality, cushion potential oil price shocks, stimulate new high-tech
energy industries, and ground the American economy on energy sources that will neither run out nor be cut off by a foreign
supplier. There are at least six basic threats associated with our dependence on fossil fuels. First, oil supplies are vulnerable to
natural disasters, wars, and terrorist attacks that can produce price shocks and threats to national economies. This threat results in
price instability and forces us to spend billions of dollars defending critical fossil fuel infrastructure and choke points. Second,
over time, finite fossil fuel reserves will be stressed by the rising demand caused by explosive economic growth in China, India,
and many other nations. This is creating unprecedented competition for oil and natural gas supplies that drives up prices and
widens our trade deficit. Maintaining fossil fuel supplies will require trillions in new investment - much of it in unpredictable
countries that are not governed by democracy and market forces. Third, energy rich nations are using oil and natural gas supplies
as a weapon against energy poor nations. This threatens the international economy and increases the risk of regional instability
and military conflict. Fourth, even when energy is not used overtly as a weapon, energy imbalances are allowing oil-rich
regimes to avoid democratic reforms and insulate themselves from international pressure and the aspirations of their own people.
In many oil rich nations, oil wealth has done little for the people, while ensuring less reform, less democracy, fewer free market
activities, and more enrichment of elites. It also means that the United States and other nations are transferring billions of dollars
each year to some of the least accountable regimes in the world. Some of these governments are using this money to invest
abroad in terrorism, instability, or demagogic appeals to anti-Western populism. Fifth, reliance on fossil fuels contributes to
environmental problems, including climate change. In the long run, this could bring drought, famine, disease, and mass
migration, all of which could lead to conflict and instability.

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Non-Unique- Dependency decreasing 85

Non-Unique: The US is reducing its oil dependency


CBNnews.com May 20 (“US Cuts Foreign Oil Dependency” 2008)
< http://www.cbn.com/CBNnews/378585.aspx>

For the first time in more than 30 years, the United States is reducing its dependency on foreign oil. That trend is expected to
continue. Currently, the U.S. receives approximately 60 percent of its oil from other countries. That figure is expected to drop to
50 percent by 2015. The Financial Times attributes the drop in part, to the increased use of ethanol and more efficient cars. The
government expects fuel efficiency to keep improving, as well as a substantial increase in U.S. biofuel production over the next
20 years.

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AT: Dependence constrains Foreign Policy 86

Sanctions, embargos and Israel prove that the US values its foreign policy objectives over oil
Sutterfield 06
[Lauren E. “United States Oil Dependency: An Overview of the Desperate Times that have Imprisoned Our Foreign Policy and the Desperate Measures that May Be Required to
Liberate it.” http://bakercenter.utk.edu/main/files/baker_journals/Volume1/Sutterfield.pdf]

The US oil objectives have “frequently conflicted with other US foreign policy interests. The greater need for oil in the future is
at odds with some of the US-driven policies towards ‘rogue’ petro-states” (LeBillion & El Khatib, 2004, p. 126). In some
distinct cases the United States foreign policy goes directly against what would benefit U.S. oil companies and the United States’
acquisition of foreign oil. “Sanctions—imposed notably by the US on Iran, Libya, or Sudan— . . . reflect the fact that energy
policy and business interests are not the only factors in determining foreign policy towards oil-producing states” (LeBillion and
El Khatib, 2004, p. 113). Sanctions throughout history have resulted in significant profit losses for oil companies and have
considerably cut the amount of oil available for import to the United States. United States foreign policy towards Israel is the
most definitive case of political policy factors taking precedence over oil dependence. Washington has continuously supported
Israel in its defense against Arab countries (many of which are major oil exporting nations). As a result, the United States has at
times suffered extreme economic losses and been subject to embargoes. The pro-Israeli position has been an area of contention
with Arab producing nations. U.S. oil companies have even lobbied on behalf of the Arab position in disputes with Israel in order
to improve their standing with these petroleum producers. Yet, the United States has remained steadfast in support of Israel. If
this condition changes, one factor in the transformation might be that “the stability of the oil area is acquiring greater importance
for U.S. strategic interests as Israel’s strategic value as an anti-Soviet bulwark in the Middle East becomes less relevant” (Lesch,
2003, p. 279). Washington is compelled to energetically pursue a resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict that will satisfy both
sides. A resolution to the Arab-Israeli problem will alleviate pressures from the Middle Eastern oil exporters and will improve
Washington’s reputation in the region.

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AT: Dependence collapses Econ 87

Disruptions would cause minimal economic damage and can be easily avoided
Gal Luft 2005, Co-Director @ Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, Committee on Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South
Asian Affairs
[“Terrorist threats to energy security”, July 27 http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/congress/2005_h/050727-luft.pdf]

Mr. Chairman, The threat against energy facilities worldwide is severe and not a day goes by without us being reminded of it.
Governments, oil companies and pipeline operators are seeking to put in place mechanisms to reduce the impact of the scourge.
They are forced to invest increasing sums of money to improve security in their oil installations. We are paying for this at the
pump. No doubt supply disruptions described above could drive oil prices further to where they are today and take a toll of our
economy. But the impact of such disruptions is not likely to be long lasting. The average duration of the 14 supply disruptions as
a result of accidents and internal political struggles of the past 55 years is 6 months with loss of no more than 2.5% of the
market. Most pipelines and pumping stations can be repaired within few days or weeks. A blockage of a chokepoint by a burning
tanker is not likely to last more than a couple of weeks. Once the disruption ends prices are likely to be gradually restored. It is
important to remember that a loss of 4-5% of supply to the U.S. market can be offset by the 700mb Strategic Petroleum Reserve
(SPR). At a rate of 1 million barrels per day the SPR can supply U.S. needs for more than a year and a half. The Energy Policy
and Conservation Act (EPCA), which governs the usage of the SPR, allows for a limited drawdown for circumstances which
constitute "a domestic or international energy supply shortage of significant scope or duration." In addition, simple behavioral
changes which can be introduced in a time of emergency. According to the International Energy Agency a number of measures
like sensible driving, car pooling, removal of excess weight, engine tuning, tire inflation, replacement of air filters and idling
reduction of trucks and planes could provide substantial reductions in transport oil use quickly and cheaply. It has been
demonstrated that a speed reduction of 12mph can reduce fuel consumption by approximately 20% and a tire inflation public
awareness campaign could save approximately 3%.

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AT: Dependence  Famine 88

No famine—technology and new sources prove


Tom Pelton, The Baltimore Sun, 7/20/8
[“The coming black plague?”, http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/ideas/bal-id.oil20jul20,0,1606377.story]

The idea of starvation triggered by oil prices sounds outlandish - and indeed, it is dismissed by many economists, farmers and
petroleum producers. John Felmy, chief economist at the American Petroleum Institute, said the world's oil supply would not
decline at any foreseeable time. The only risk of economic collapse and hunger, he said, will come if the government tries to
intervene with price controls. Felmy said that more offshore oil drilling, as advocated by President Bush last week, could help
with oil and food prices. "Economists say you never run out of anything - it's just how costly it gets," said Felmy. "Technology
continues to improve, and we continue to find new sources of oil. There is every indication that there is sufficient oil in the
ground that could be recovered."

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AT: Countries disrupt Oil 89

It’s irrelevant whether or not countries disrupt oil; rising prices now are scaring the market
Sandalow, CNN News, 07-Senior Fellow, Foreign Affairs @ Brookings
[This Week At War, Nov 24, http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0711/24/tww.01.html]

FOREMAN: David, is this a bit of a false threat from these countries though? Because the truth is Iran and Venezuela, if they
tried to disrupt the international flow of oil, would hurt as well, very quickly. SANDALOW: I don't think it is a false threat.
They don't have to play the oil card to send jitters to international financial markets. Prices rise and that worries leaders. And
look at what's happening in the dynamics right now, in negotiations over the nuclear program that Iran is pursuing. We have a
harder time putting together a multilateral coalition because of the fear of playing the oil card from Iran and Venezuela.

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AT: Disruptions- Strategic Reserves Solve 90

Strategic reserves prevent significant impacts from supply disruptions


Fattouh 07 (Bassam, Consultant Senior Research Fellow at Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, specialist in the international
oil pricing system, “How Secure are Middle East Oil Supplies?”, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, September)
<http://www.oxfordenergy.org/pdfs/WPM33.pdf>

If oil-importing countries are concerned about supply disruptions from the Middle East, then the maintenance of strategic
reserves is the only concrete and effective instrument available to them. Any shortfall of oil supplies due to political instabilities,
wars and terrorist attacks can be straightforwardly dealt with by calling on strategic reserves. Strategic reserves also provide time
for governments to determine whether the causes for disruption are short term and to consider the available options.
The guidelines under which these reserves should be released have been heavily criticized as being unclear and outdated. A
common argument is that in many occasions in the past, oil-importing countries have been reluctant to release strategic
reserves to calm down the market, inflicting unnecessary cost on their economies. These shortcomings do not, however, negate
the effectiveness of this policy instrument in dealing with oil disruptions. An important objective of energy security should be to
revise the guidelines under which stocks could be released. Furthermore, the so-called ‘producer–consumer’ dialogue should aim
at coordinating efforts in the area of strategic reserves, for example by coordinating efforts on the volume of strategic stocks that
should be kept, the timing of filling and releasing of strategic stocks and whether new countries should aim at holding strategic
stocks.

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AT: Specific Country is corrupt 91

A US shift from oil dependency wouldn’t solve for ____[insert country]___—other oil dependent nations turn a blind eye and
continue their demands
Gal Luft 2005, Co-Director @ Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, Committee on Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South
Asian Affairs
[“THE U.S., THE MIDDLE EAST AND PETROLEUM”, CAPITOL HILL HEARING TESTIMONY, October 20, 2005, Lexis]

The Uzbek case is a harbinger of things to come. Unlike the U.S. which bars companies from doing business with some unsavory
regimes China's state-owned companies turn a blind eye to the way petrodollars are used by the local governments. In the global
contest for oil the U.S. loses ground as a result of its pressure for government reform. Dictators who view democracy with
suspicion don't like to be pressured to reform especially when U.S. pressure can bring an end to their regimes. They much more
prefer selling their oil to countries which turn a blind eye to the way petrodollars are used and who are willing to pay top dollars
for oil and not lecture to them on democracy and human rights.

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Tommy, Fan, Megan Northwestern 08

AT: Iran would block Straits of Hormuz 92

Iran would not and could not block the Straits of Hormuz: Empirical examples and allies prove
Fattouh 07
(Bassam, Consultant Senior Research Fellow at Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, specialist in the international oil pricing system, “How Secure are Middle East Oil Supplies?”,
Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, September) http://www.oxfordenergy.org/pdfs/WPM33.pdf

Many believe that the narrowness of shipping lanes and the difficulty of oil tankers to manoeuvre make the Straits of Hormuz
vulnerable to politically-motivated disruptions. However, history suggests otherwise. In 1983, the Iranians threatened to close the
Straits of Hormuz following the delivery of French planes to Iraq. In a radio announcement, Hashimi Rafsanjani (the Speaker of
the Parliament) threatened that Iran would block the Straits of Hormuz by sinking a VLCC at the mouth of the Persian Gulf (El-
Shazly, 1998). In what was known as the Iraq–Iran ‘Tanker War’, there were 554 attacks on oil tankers in the Straits of Hormuz
which resulted in the deaths of 400 sailors and the wounding of 400 more. These attacks did not result in a full blockage of
transit. Even when the fight was at its most intense, it disrupted no more than 2% of ships passing through the Persian Gulf (Blair
and Lieberthal, 2007). In the current confrontations between the US and Iran on Iran’s nuclear program, threats to block the
straits of Hormuz are again being made. In 2006, the Iranian deputy Basij commander, General Majid Mir Ahmadi, threatened to
block oil traffic if the West hurt Iran’s economy over its nuclear program. It is, however, very difficult to envisage a scenario in
which the Straits of Hormuz would be blocked for a long period of time. Blocking the Straits of Hormuz would defy
international conventions and would increase Iran’s isolation. The closure of this oil transit route would alienate Iran’s allies in
Asia and elsewhere as the adverse impacts of the blockade would spread across the globe. In other words, the use of this
‘weapon’ is completely indiscriminate and if Iran attempted to block international shipping, it would face a very wide and
powerful coalition.

NU 4 LIFE 92
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AT: Iran Disruption 93

Iran will not disrupt oil flows – Statement from Iran’s Oil Minister
Dalmia 05
(Shikha, Senior analyst at the Reason Foundation, former editorial writer at the Detroit News, covering a variety of policy issues, including the environment, immigration, Social
Security, welfare reform, health care and foreign policy, The Reason Foundation, “Defend America, Buy More Iranian Oil”)
<http://www.reason.org/commentaries/dalmia_20060505.shtml>

But beneath all of Iran's saber-rattling and its threat to retaliate against Israel in the event of a U.S. attack, it realizes how suicidal
such a move would be. During a recent OPEC meeting, Karem Vaziri Hamaneh, Iran's oil minister, went out of his way to
reassure the world that Iran had no intention of disrupting the oil market. "The need of the world for energy is soaring and, if Iran
is taken out of the equation, prices will shoot up," he told the Wall Street Journal. "But we don't want to cause hardship for any
consumers around the world." Vaziri's concern is not so much for the world's oil consumers, of course, as for the economic
consequences for his own country. The Iranian government depends on oil exports for nearly half of its total revenues. If it cuts
these exports, buyers could go to other suppliers. But there is not much else that Iran could sell to other countries to replace its
lost oil revenues.

Even if Iranian oil was cut off, reserves could make up for it
Associated Press 07
(“Iran’s Double Edged Oil Weapon”, Dec. 1 < http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/22056178/>)

With the USS Enterprise carrier battle group already in the region — and Navy minesweepers and other support vessels ready for
quick deployment — Cordesman estimates a full Iranian blockade could not last more than two weeks. The passage was
navigable during the 1984-87 “Tanker War” between Iran and Iraq, during which each side fired on the other’s oil tankers — and
sometimes on foreign flagged ships. Still, the hostilities led to a 25 percent drop in shipping in the region and forced the U.S. to
secure shipping lanes. “The problem is not Iranian oil alone,” said Michael Klare, author of “Blood and Oil: The Dangers and
Consequences of America’s Growing Petroleum Dependency.” “People can live with that for a while. The question is if — and
for how long — Iran can disrupt the flow of oil from other countries.” To accomplish that, Iran has weapons at hand beyond a
Strait of Hormuz blockade that could account for serious cumulative damage. Tehran, for instance, could opt to use its suspected
influence among Shiite militias in neighboring Iraq. Sabotage of oil pipelines and facilities could cripple much of Iraq’s oil
exports, now at close to 2 million barrels a day. With the world already consuming close to all the oil being produced, an Iranian
and Iraqi shortfall approaching 4 million barrels a day would leave demand far outstripping supply. But Iran would also pay a
hefty price if the petrodollars that now represent 80 percent of export revenues are reduced, potentially stirring civil unrest in a
nation with an official unemployment rate of 14 percent — but which some analysts say could be far higher. “They would shoot
themselves in the foot,” said Mustafa Alani, director of national security and terrorism studies at the Dubai-based Gulf Research
Center. “It’s one thing to test the market psychology, it’s another to take the actual step and stop oil exports.” The U.S.
Department of Energy estimates oil exports finance about half of the Iranian government’s budget. And while high oil prices
have boosted the annual growth rate to about 5 percent, Iran’s economy has weak spots from trade restrictions on sensitive
technologies. They include U.N. sanctions levied as a result of its refusal to halt uranium enrichment, decades of slowly
tightening U.S. economic restrictions — including tough new sanctions against Iran’s military, banks and industries Washington
imposed last month — and reduced trade and financial links with Europe due to U.S. pressure. Oil consuming nations,
meanwhile, have at least one ace up their sleeves: crude reserves. The United States and other members of the International
Energy Agency last year had a combined 1.48 billion barrels of oil in their emergency stocks. That’s equivalent to about 600 days
of Iran’s net oil exports. At close to 700 million barrels, U.S. strategic reserves alone are enough to make up for more than two
months of total crude imports — and America depends on Middle East oil for only 15 percent of its needs.

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AT: Dependence  Terror 94

Terrorist attacks do not significantly affect supply even though prices increase slightly
Fattouh 07
(Bassam, Consultant Senior Research Fellow at Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, specialist in the international oil pricing system, “How Secure are Middle East Oil Supplies?”,
Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, September) <http://www.oxfordenergy.org/pdfs/WPM33.pdf>

Concerns that terrorist attacks can force the oil industry to its knees are, however, exaggerated. Terrorist attacks usually have
temporary effects and damage is rapidly repaired. Despite the numerous threats,11 only a few have been translated into attacks,
highlighting the difficult logistical challenges involved in hitting oil installations. Furthermore, the degree of vulnerability is not
the same across all parts of the oil supply chain. For example, it may be relatively easy to blow up a pipeline. However, the
impact is minimal as attacks on pipelines usually result in limited losses. In the Saudi context, an attack on a pipeline would have
no impact as there is plenty of spare capacity in the transport infrastructure which makes it straightforward to bypass the
damaged pipeline. To cause large disruptions, terrorists therefore need to cause damage to key installations such as oil processing
complexes, or to set oilfields ablaze. Hitting such key targets is very difficult and should not be compared to attacks on a
pipeline. Given the importance of the oil industry to the Saudi economy, bottlenecks are heavily guarded. In the context of the
Kingdom, one commentator notes that “over the past two years, the Saudi government has also allocated an extra $750 million to
enhance security at all of its oil facilities. At any one time, there are up to 30 000 guards protecting the Kingdom’s oil
infrastructure, while high technology surveillance and aircraft patrols are common at the most important facilities. Anti-aircraft
installations defend key locations” (Obaid, 2004). Regardless, terrorist attacks on oil targets remain a menace to the oil market.
Although their impacts are limited, terrorist acts affect the psychology of market players and tend to place a premium on oil
prices.

Stopping oil dependence does not solve terrorism


Washington Post 08 (“Myths About Breaking Our Foreign Oil Habit”, Robert Bryce, January 13, LexisNexis)

But the hype doesn't match reality. Remember, the two largest suppliers of crude to the U.S. market are Canada and Mexico --
neither exactly known as a belligerent terrorist haven. Moreover, terrorism is an ancient tactic that predates the oil era. It does not
depend on petrodollars. And even small amounts of money can underwrite spectacular plots; as the 9/11 Commission Report
noted, "The 9/11 plotters eventually spent somewhere between $400,000 and $500,000 to plan and conduct their attack." G.I.
Wilson, a retired Marine Corps colonel who has fought in Iraq and written extensively on terrorism and asymmetric warfare,
calls the conflation of oil and terrorism a "contrivance." Support for terrorism "doesn't come from oil," he says. "It comes from
drugs, crime, human trafficking and the weapons trade."

US Energy Independence doesn’t stop funding terrorists; the oil will just be sold elsewhere
Washington Post 08 (“Myths About Breaking Our Foreign Oil Habit”, Robert Bryce, January 13, LexisNexis)

Fans of energy independence argue that if the United States stops buying foreign energy, it will deny funds to petro-states such as
Iran, Saudi Arabia and Hugo Chávez's Venezuela. But the world marketplace doesn't work like that. Oil is a global commodity.
Its price is set globally, not locally. Oil buyers are always seeking the lowest-cost supplier. So any Saudi crude being loaded at
the Red Sea port of Yanbu that doesn't get purchased by a refinery in Corpus Christi or Houston will instead wind up in
Singapore or Shanghai.

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AT: oil infrastructure vulnerable 95

Saudi Arabia oil facilities are resilient to attack


Gartenstein-Ross 7/21/8 -Vice President of Research at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, Subject Matter Expert for the
U.S. Dep of State’s office of antiterrorism assistance, conducted law enforcement training for the Dep of Homeland Security and local
agencies
[Daveed, “The Strategic Vulnerabilities of Oil Dependence”, http://www.defenddemocracy.org/publications/publications_show.htm?doc_id=696237]

Saudi Arabia has gone to great lengths to guard against attacks on its oil infrastructure. As of 2005, precautions included a $1.5
billion energy security budget, round-the-clock helicopter and F-15 patrols, and the deployment of National Guard battalions.
Moreover, most observers believe that disruptive attacks against Saudi Arabia’s oil infrastructure would not be crippling. Kevin
Rosser, an analyst with Control Risks Group, has stated: “There’s quite a bit of redundancy built into the [Saudi] network. So
even if you manage to stage a successful attack against a single node or maybe even more than one, it wouldn’t be enough to
disable the entire system. It’s actually quite resilient to losing one piece.” Kyle Cooper, an energy analyst at CitiGroup Global
Markets, has noted: “Saudi Arabia has multiple facilities—if one were damaged, it’s most likely another one would be able to
come on line very quickly and replace the lost production.”

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AT: Instability 96

Instability that would affect oil output in the middle east is very unlikely – empirical proof
Fattouh 07
(Bassam, Consultant Senior Research Fellow at Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, specialist in the international oil pricing system, “How Secure are Middle East Oil Supplies?”,
Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, September) <http://www.oxfordenergy.org/pdfs/WPM33.pdf>

However, the fact remains that political regimes in the Middle East have maintained power and stability in the most challenging
circumstances: Assad in Syria, Mubarak in Egypt, Qaddafi in Libya, Hussein in Jordan, Zain Al-Abideen Ben Ali in Tunisia and
Saleh in Yemen. In the Arab-Persian Gulf, the ruling families have survived many assaults ranging from Arab nationalism to
Islamic extremism. Most often, the change in power in Persian Gulf states occurs smoothly with a king or prince being replaced
by another from within the close ruling family. In the rare case of coup d’etat such as that in Qatar, the son replaced the father,
with limited effects on the functioning of the state. It is true that the stability of these Gulf States has not been perfect. For
instance, in Saudi Arabia the royal family has been challenged on more than one occasion: a coup attempt in 1960; the Juhayman
revolt and the seizure of the holy mosque in 1979; sporadic protests by the Shi’a minority in the 1980s (Ibrahim, 2006); and
more recently a series of terrorist attacks against government and civilian targets. Nevertheless, these events do not seem to have
shaken the regime and the Al-Saud family still holds firmly onto power.8 By most accounts, the armed forces and the religious
class remain loyal to the ruling family and so far it is difficult to see an alternative to the current regime (Herb, 1999; Ayoob,
2006). Scenarios of bloody and violent changes in political regimes in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States which could break the
social fabric of the country (Herb, 1999) and pose risk to oil exports are therefore highly improbable.

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AT: Independence= Social Reform 97

Low oil prices will not cause social reform in the Mideast; Empirically proven
Washington Post 08
(“Myths About Breaking Our Foreign Oil Habit”, Robert Bryce, January 13, LexisNexis)

The most vocal proponent of this one is New York Times columnist Thomas L. Friedman, who argues that the United States
should build "a wall of energy independence" around itself and thereby lower global oil prices: "Shrink the oil revenue and they
will have to open up their economies and their schools and liberate their women so that their people can compete. It is that
simple." When the petro-states are effectively bankrupt, Friedman argues, we'll see "political and economic reform from Algeria
to Iran." If only it were that easy. Between about 1986 and 2000, oil prices generally stayed below $20 per barrel; by the end of
1998, they were as low as $11 per barrel. As Alan Reynolds pointed out in May 2005 in the conservative National Review
Online, this prolonged period of "cheap oil did nothing to promote economic or political liberty in Algeria, Iran, or anywhere
else. This theory has been tested -- and it failed completely."

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AT: Withdraw from Middle East if decrease oil dependence 98

The US has other strategic interests in the Middle East besides ensuring our oil supply
Council on Foreign Relations 06
[“National Security Consequences of U.S. Oil Dependency: Report of an Independent Task Force” http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/EnergyTFR.pdf]

Even if the Persian Gulf did not have the bulk of the world’s readily available oil reserves, there would
be reasons to maintain a substantial military capability in the region. The activities of Iran today and
Iraq, especially prior to 1991, underline the seriousness of threats from weapons of mass destruction.
Combating terrorism also requires a presence in the Gulf. In addition to military activities, a U.S.
presence in the region can help to improve political stability. At least for the next two decades, the
Persian Gulf will be vital to U.S. interests in reliable oil supply, nonproliferation, combating terrorism,
and encouraging political stability, democracy, and public welfare. Accordingly, the United States
should expect and support a strong military posture that permits suitably rapid deployment to the
region, if required.

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AT: US will Attack Iran Post-Energy Security 99

The US won’t attack Iran—Iraq


Clawson & Sokolski 05
[Patrick, deputy director for research at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, & Henry D., Executive Director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, “GETTING
READY FOR A NUCLEAR-READY IRAN”, October, Strategic Studies Institute, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub629.pdf]

Iran’s confidence that it can pursue a clandestine nuclear weapons program under the watchful eye of the IAEA may be
bolstered by American preoccupation with Iraq. The American military is stretched thin with operations against insurgents
in Iraq and would be poorly suited to undertake yet another ambitious military campaign against neighboring Iran.
American political legitimacy also is strained over the course of events in Iraq. Moreover, domestic and international
confidence in the quality of American intelligence is in doubt after an apparently less than stellar performance against
Saddam’s Iraq. For all of these reasons, Iran might calculate that the Americans are illprepared to move militarily against its
nuclear weapons program.

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Switch to Alt Energy fails 100

Alternative energy fails—US infrastructure and markets are entrenched in expectation of oil
Lugar 07-Former vice-chair Commission on Intergovernmental Relation, Foreign Relations Committee, former chair of the
Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry Committee
[Richard, “ENERGY SECURITY, ENERGY URGENCY: KEY ISSUES FACING THE NEXT PRESIDENT”, Dec. 18,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/events/2007/1218_lugar/20071218lugar.pdf]

Domestically, new energy technologies face hurdles well beyond price. Our nation’s infrastructure has been built around the
premise of cheap and accessible oil, a premise that is no longer valid. Aside from the rare E85 pump, Americans are not free to
choose fuels other than those based on petroleum. Likewise, markets have failed to internalize the costs of climate change, a
huge challenge. The market needs clear signals to guide investment and innovation toward the national interest. New energy
technologies need a hand-up to prove their validity and to become price competitive over entrenched market biases

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Switch  Oil Scarcity 101

Demand to reduce oil dependence will make oil supplies scarce


Christopher Torchia, Associated Press, 2007
[“OPEC president: calls to reduce dependence on oil could lead to scarcity of supply”, Lexis]

The president of OPEC said Wednesday that repeated calls by industrialized countries to reduce dependence on oil could lead to
a reduction in supplies from the cartel. "Today's policy announcements could translate into scarcity of supplies in the future,"
Mohamed Al Hamli, president of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, said at an energy conference. He noted that
OPEC members are developing nations with limited resources, and it would be a "waste of badly needed funds" to invest heavily
in oil production if demand is unclear. "We need to have some sort of transparency to know what the plans are," he said. "The
security of demand is a key issue for us." Fossil fuels currently provide more than 90 percent of the world's commercial energy
needs, according to OPEC. The United States and the European Union seek to increase the supply of renewable and alternative
fuels such as ethanol as a way to reduce dependence on foreign oil and cut greenhouse gas emissions. Al Hamli, who is also oil
minister of the United Arab Emirates, said he welcomed diversity in fuel sources, but said fuels derived from petroleum have
become cleaner over the years. He said oil was a force for alleviating poverty because many people lack access to modern fuels
for cooking and heating.

Reducing dependence causes producers to slow production despite calls to increase it


Daily Telegraph 08 (“Day of truth for US-Saudi axis Bush's warm relationship with King Abdullah is starting to cool down, as
he seeks Riyadh's help over oil prices. Ambrose Evans-Pritchard reports” March 16 LexisNexis)

"They have about half a million barrels a day of good crude that they could put on the market. The puzzle is why they are not
doing it. The soaring price is obviously telling us that the world needs more oil,'' he said. "I can't understand why the Saudis
would risk their strategic relationship with the US over this. They need the US more than ever, given the growing influence of
Iran in the region,'' he said. One clue comes from the March bulletin of Oapec, the Arab sub-group of the Opec producers' cartel.
It notes sourly that President Bush is aiming to reduce US dependency on oil imports "particularly from the Middle East'', by
75pc by the year 2025. "This has created some ambiguity in the US position on the future of oil consumption,'' it said. Touché.
King Abdullah's retort to the Bush speech was to announce that Saudi Arabia would stop developing big projects after the
Khurais field comes on stream in next year with 1.2m bpd, leaving the country's oil in the ground for future generations.

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Reducing Dependency Fails- Middle East 102

Attempts to reduce Mideast dependency only displace the dependency and inevitably fail
Fattouh 07
(Bassam, Consultant Senior Research Fellow at Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, specialist in the international oil pricing system, “How Secure are Middle East Oil Supplies?”,
Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, September) <http://www.oxfordenergy.org/pdfs/WPM33.pdf>

On the other hand, measures to enhance oil independence from the Middle East are unrealistic, costly and counter-productive.17
First, politically-induced oil disruptions in the Middle East have been the exception rather than the rule in the long history of the
oil market. Second, reducing dependency on Middle East oil implies higher dependency on other exporting countries which are
also unstable and suffer from the same problems that plague the region. Third, policies aimed at reducing dependency on the
Middle East can backfire as countries may not feel the pressure to invest to increase production. In fact, it is an irony that many
Western governments call for reducing dependency on Middle East, while at the same time are urging Middle East producers to
increase investment in their oil sector to meet the expected rise in demand. In any case, policies to reduce dependency on the
Middle East have all failed in the past and will meet the same fate if applied in the future.

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Reducing Dependence Turns Case- backstopping 103

Policy-induced dependence reduction causes backstopping; turns the case


Longmuir 07
(a Stanley, NM-based consulting petroleum engineer, affiliated with International Petroleum Consultants Association Inc. of Evergreen, Colo., with over 25 years of worldwide
experience in the upstream oil and gas industry. He has worked in the appraisal and development of onshore and offshore oil and gas fields, economic evaluation of exploration and
acquisition opportunities, assessment of new technologies, and the resolution of contractual and regulatory disputes. Prior to his association with IPCA, he worked in a variety of
technical and commercial functions with BP, Sohio Petroleum, and Occidental Petroleum. He earned BS (First Class Honors) and PhD degrees at the University of Strathclyde in
Scotland, and an MBA at the University of New Mexico., “West Should Consider Ramifications of its Off-Oil Rhetoric”, Oil and Gas Journal, Lexis Nexis Academic)

Environmental and political enthusiasm in the West for getting rid of oil as an energy source may have major unintended
consequences through its impact on decisions by a handful of key oil exporters. Such consequences could paradoxically include
increased Western dependence on oil and higher energy prices. An energy crisis is imminent if oil-exporting countries believe
Western rhetoric and decide to reduce their investment in capacity expansions at a time when the West is failing to find a suitable
substitute. In this case, consumers will pay a dear price for the ill-considered statements of their leaders.
If, by contrast, oil producers attempt to counter a policy-induced decline in demand and kill oil substitutes by raising production
to lower crude oil prices, or if demand actually declines, a different set of problems might emerge. Either scenario could wreak
havoc on the economies in the Middle East, supposedly one of the least stable areas in the world. The cost of such political
instability in terms of lives, money, and pollution will render all the positive results from weaning consuming countries off oil
negligible.

Oil Independence turns the case in every case; causes backstopping and economic undercutting if it works and an energy crisis
if it doesn’t
Longmuir 07
(a Stanley, NM-based consulting petroleum engineer, affiliated with International Petroleum Consultants Association Inc. of Evergreen, Colo., with over 25 years of worldwide
experience in the upstream oil and gas industry. He has worked in the appraisal and development of onshore and offshore oil and gas fields, economic evaluation of exploration and
acquisition opportunities, assessment of new technologies, and the resolution of contractual and regulatory disputes. Prior to his association with IPCA, he worked in a variety of
technical and commercial functions with BP, Sohio Petroleum, and Occidental Petroleum. He earned BS (First Class Honors) and PhD degrees at the University of Strathclyde in
Scotland, and an MBA at the University of New Mexico., “West Should Consider Ramifications of its Off-Oil Rhetoric”, Oil and Gas Journal, Lexis Nexis Academic)

Oil exporters could take Western commentators seriously and assume that oil importers will indeed reduce their demand for oil,
leaving them with then-unmarketable oil in the ground. Their logical response to this threat would be to accelerate production of
oil while their resources still have value. This would of course drive down the price of oil and undermine the economic
feasibility of alternative energies. A collapse in the price of oil would kill several new energy technologies and ultimately
increase demand for oil. In fact, the oil-producing countries might view increasing oil production and lowering prices as a logical
policy to counter the antioil policies of the governments of consuming countries. Historical data from periods of oil price
collapses support this point: Low oil prices increase oil demand, decrease efficiency improvements, choke alternative energy
resources, and increase waste. Alternatively, expecting a decline in demand for their oil, oil-producing countries might decide to
reduce their planned investments in production capacity expansion and maintenance and mothball some planned projects, which
would shortly lead to declining oil supplies. If new technologies do not come on line by the time oil production starts declining,
the world will face a serious energy crisis, probably unparalleled in history. Reversing such a trend of declining investments
would take years, despite massive increases in oil prices. This alternative is not a mere possibility: Several major projects have
been mothballed in the past when the oil-producing governments deemed these projects not needed. If oil-consuming countries
do begin to reduce their dependence on oil, major oil exporters could seek to use their now less-valuable oil within their own
borders as cheap fuel with which to expand heavy industries. Instead of exporting oil directly, they could export the energy from
that oil embedded in metals, chemicals, and manufactured products at prices that far undercut Western products, constrained as
Western manufacturers would be by having to use higher-cost alternative energy sources. The net result would be a loss of jobs
and economic strength by the West without having any impact on the overall global consumption of fossil fuels. Even if Western
countries successfully replaced imported oil with indigenous alternative energy sources, they would still have to live on the same
planet as oil-exporting countries, whose fragile societies would then face the loss of their main source of revenue. Energy
independence for current oil importers, if somehow achieved, would aggravate political instability in oil-exporting countries.

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Dependence Good- Heg 104

Dependence on oil maintains US heg and deters conflict


Deutch & Schlesinger October 2006
[John (Former Director of Central Intelligence and Undersecretary of Energy) & James R. (Former Defense and Energy Secretary), “national security consequences of u.s. oil
dependency”,Council on Foreign Relations Press, http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/EnergyTFR.pdf]

Sixth, some observers see a direct relationship between the dependence of the United States on oil, especially from the Persian
Gulf, and the size of the U.S. defense budget. Such a relationship invites the inference that if it were not dependent on this oil,
the United States and its allies would have no interest in the region, and hence it would be possible to achieve significant
reductions in the U.S. military posture. In the extreme, this argument says that if the nation reduced its dependence, then the
defense budget could be reduced as well. U.S. strategic interests in reliable oil supplies from the Persian Gulf are not
proportional with the percent of oil consumption that is imported by the United States from the region. Until very low levels of
dependence are reached, the United States and all other consumers of oil will depend on the Persian Gulf. Such low levels will
certainly not be reached during the twenty-year time frame of this study. Even if the Persian Gulf did not have the bulk of the
world’s readily available oil reserves, there would be reasons to maintain a substantial military capability in the region. The
activities of Iran today and Iraq, especially prior to 1991, underline the seriousness of threats from weapons of mass destruction.
Combating terrorism also requires a presence in the Gulf. In addition to military activities, a U.S. presence in the region can help
to improve political stability. At least for the next two decades, the Persian Gulf will be vital to U.S. interests in reliable oil
supply, nonproliferation, combating 30 terrorism, and encouraging political stability, democracy, and public welfare.
Accordingly, the United States should expect and support a strong military posture that permits suitably rapid deployment to the
region, if required. It is worthwhile to explain what should and should not be expected from this military force, and how it
serves U.S. interests. Most importantly, the conventional force of the United States deters aggression in the region. Any nation
(or subnational group) that contemplates violence on any scale must take into account the possibility of U.S. preemption,
intervention, or retaliation. Deterrence is powerful, but it does not always work (especially if the possibility of a military
response is not raised). For example, deterrence did not prevent the Iran-Iraq war of the early 1980s. Because no clear and
credible signal was sent of a possible response in 1990, Saddam Hussein was not deterred from invading Kuwait. Nevertheless,
the U.S. military posture with its capacity to intervene, if managed wisely, can play a role in stabilizing this highly fragile region
and make many countries in the region more secure from hostile action by their neighbors.

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Dependence Good- Economy 105

Oil is key to the economy


Michael Klare 05 - Prof of Peace and World Security Studies @ Five Colleges
[“Blood and Oil: The Dangers and Consequences of America's Growing Dependency ...”, pg. 8]

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Dependence Good- Stabilize Iraq 106

Foreign oil dependency would lead to multilateral efforts to stabilize Iraq


Waller & Gerson, The Globe and Mail, 04
[HAROLD WALLER, professor of political science at McGill University, HOWARD GERSON, practises law in Toronto, “Warning: Don't count on Saudi Arabia”, December 17,
2004, lexis]

Assumptions about the kingdom's oil reserves have recently been questioned. The Saudis are renowned for their reserves,
generally estimated to be from 260 billion barrels to as much as 400 billion. The perception of vast proven reserves fosters belief
in the country's ability to ramp up production to substantially higher levels than today's nine million barrels a day to meet
increased world demand. But Houston-based oil analyst Matthew Simmons recently concluded that the reserves are only 108
billion barrels and that production could decline substantially and dramatically in the future. When questions of productive
capacity are coupled with the succession issue, there is a pressing need to plan for contingencies. In the longer term, the
petroleum-based economy will have to change, even if there are significant reserves outside the Middle East. But there are few
short-term options because energy policy cannot be turned around overnight. Policy-makers have to be prepared for reduced or
even interrupted Saudi oil production. Rationally, any group controlling Saudi Arabia would want to sell its oil on the market; but
internal fighting could damage the oil-field infrastructure or a radical group could gain power and withhold oil to punish
industrialized nations. If Iraq descends further into chaos, Iran will continue to make headway among the Shiites of southern
Iraq and might then try to extend its influence down the western shore of the Persian Gulf and into the oil-producing areas of
Saudi Arabia, where the population is also Shiite. The United States and its allies went to war in 1991 to check the extension of
Iraqi influence to Kuwait and beyond. Iranian control would be equally threatening. Military action to prevent world economic
decline or a strategic threat has to be considered. After the Iraq experience, the U.S. would not likely favour unilateral military
intervention in another Arab country. But a sufficiently grave situation might leave little choice. Also, before the Iraq war, there
were sharp policy divergences between the U.S. and the continental Europeans, who perceived that it was not in their interests to
go to war. But if faced with the prospect of the economic calamity threatened by a suspension of Saudi oil production, Europe's
interests would converge with those of the United States, paving the way for multilateral action. Moreover, this scenario is
different from that existing before the Iraq war, when ties between the Russian, German and French oil industries and Saddam
Hussein's regime militated against European intervention with the Americans. Indeed, the destabilization of the Saudi regime
might also promote multilateral efforts to stabilize Iraq as a key alternative source of oil.

NU 4 LIFE 106
OIL DEPENDENCY AMP
Tommy, Fan, Megan Northwestern 08

Dependence Good- US control over Iran 107

Oil Dependence gives the US leverage over Iran; Iran’s economy is dependent on exports
Dalmia 05
(Shikha, Senior analyst at the Reason Foundation, former editorial writer at the Detroit News, covering a variety of policy issues, including the environment, immigration, Social
Security, welfare reform, health care and foreign policy, The Reason Foundation, “Defend America, Buy More Iranian Oil”)
<http://www.reason.org/commentaries/dalmia_20060505.shtml>

Our dependence on Middle Eastern oil is only the flip side of their dependence on our purchases. But given the narrow base of Middle
Eastern economies, the power in the relationship is firmly on the side of the oil buyers. If that relationship were to end because of
"energy independence," we would give up crucial leverage to control the worst behavior of some of the world's worst regimes. Of
course, this leverage is no magic wand that would protect us from a totally irrational regime willing to absorb the economic cost of
using the oil weapon. But the more oil we get from such a regime, the higher the price it would have to pay.

NU 4 LIFE 107
OIL DEPENDENCY AMP
Tommy, Fan, Megan Northwestern 08

Dependence Good - Sanctions 108

Oil Dependence gives importers leverage over the producing countries through sanctions
Fattouh 07
(Bassam, Consultant Senior Research Fellow at Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, specialist in the international oil pricing system, “How Secure are Middle East Oil Supplies?”,
Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, September) <http://www.oxfordenergy.org/pdfs/WPM33.pdf>

The dependence of oil-exporting countries on oil revenues implies that consuming nations also possess an oil weapon. Unlike the
oil weapon in the hands of oil producers, consuming countries can use sanctions to target specific countries. Furthermore, when
implementing sanctions, they can choose the timing. Sanctions can be imposed when markets are well supplied such that the
impact is minimal, such as happened in the 1980s and 1990s when the US imposed economic sanctions on Libya, Iran and Iraq.
In the long history of oil, unilateral and multilateral sanctions have been widely used against oil-exporting countries. The US has
been the most active in using sanctions as a tool of foreign policy to induce change behaviour in regimes (Canes, 1997). The
effect of sanctions depends on their type and oil market conditions. Multilateral sanctions under the UN umbrella can be very
harmful as they have the effect of curtailing oil exports from the targeted country. Multilateral sanctions adversely affect the
country’s productive capacity by limiting foreign investment and technology transfer in the oil sector. Unilateral sanctions, on the
other hand, do not necessarily affect the flow of oil from the country under sanctions. This would cause some temporary
inconvenience as the oil exporter establishes new trade partners and seeks new customers. In the short term, therefore, the impact
of unilateral sanctions is rather limited. However, if unilateral sanctions are kept for a long time, they would ultimately affect the
productive capacity of exporters. For instance, the Iran–Libya Sanction Act (ILSA) imposed by the US against Iran and Libya (it
no longer applies to Libya) prohibited international oil companies from investing in the oil sectors of these countries, curtailing
their long-term production capacity.

NU 4 LIFE 108
OIL DEPENDENCY AMP
Tommy, Fan, Megan Northwestern 08

Dependence Good for Iran 109

Oil dependence itself gives Iran leverage, even though we don’t buy oil from Iran
Sandalow 07
(David, Energy and Environment Scholar at The Brookings Institution, “Ending Oil Dependence”, January 22
http://www.brookings.edu/views/papers/fellows/sandalow20070122.pdf)

Unfortunately, many national security vulnerabilities created by oil would remain even if U.S. oil imports fell. The United States
hasn’t purchased a drop of oil from Iran in 25 years, but that fact doesn’t prevent Iran from playing its oil card to advance its
nuclear ambitions. In an interdependent global economy, in which our prosperity depends on the economic well-being of allies
and trading partners, the U.S. will retain a vital interest in the Persian Gulf so long as global transportation fleets run almost
entirely on oil.

NU 4 LIFE 109
OIL DEPENDENCY AMP
Tommy, Fan, Megan Northwestern 08

Investment Key for Oil 110

(Counterplan?) Oil production is able to keep up with demand; only more investment is needed
Fattouh 07
(Bassam, Consultant Senior Research Fellow at Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, specialist in the international oil pricing system, “How Secure are Middle East Oil Supplies?”,
Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, September) <http://www.oxfordenergy.org/pdfs/WPM33.pdf>

The issue of underinvestment in the oil sector has become central to the energy policy debate.15 The main fear is that the necessary
investment in the oil sector would not be forthcoming and supply would then fall short of demand. Given that the bulk of oil reserves
are in the Middle East, the issue of investment in the oil sectors of the region receives special attention. Many international
organizations such as the IEA and EIA project that most of the increase in global demand for oil would be met by OPEC and
especially the Middle East producers within OPEC. This would require that these Middle East oil exporters increase their investment
outlays or open their oil and gas sectors to foreign investment. In an exercise which focused on Middle East and North Africa
(MENA) oil and gas resources, the IEA (2005) projected a rise in MENA oil production from the 2004 level of 29 mb/d to 33 mb/d in
2010 and 50 mb/d in 2030 in the reference scenario. In this scenario, Saudi Arabia will remain the largest supplier, increasing its
output from 10.4 mb/d in 2004 to 11.9 mb/d in 2010 and over 18 mb/d in 2030. A second important player would be Iraq which is
expected to witness the second fastest production growth after Saudi Arabia. The IEA envisages that the MENA share of world oil
production would increase from 35% in 2004 to 44% in 2030 with four countries (Iraq, Kuwait, the UAE and Libya) increasing their
shares. The IEA warns, however, that this requires doubling of annual upstream investment in MENA which may not take place
because “MENA governments could choose deliberately to develop production capacity more slowly…or external factors such as
capital shortages could prevent producers from investing as much in expanding capacity as they would like” (IEA, 2005).

NU 4 LIFE 110
OIL DEPENDENCY AMP
Tommy, Fan, Megan Northwestern 08
OPEC Bad (Terror and Economy) 111

OPEC’s high oil prices funds terrorism and prevents economic reform
Cohen 07
(Ariel, Ph.D, expert in Russia and former Soviet Union, Ukraine, Central Asia and the Caucasus; Central and Eastern Europe; International Energy Security; Arab-Israeli conflict,
Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen), Hamas Islamic Jihad, “State of the Union 2007: Recognizing the Threat of Oil Dependency”, The Heritage Foundation)
http://www.heritage.org/Research/EnergyandEnvironment/wm1324.cfm]

High oil prices, which OPEC facilitates, serve to transfer wealth from Western consumers to petroleum producers. This wealth
transfer, among other things, funds terrorism through individual oil wealth and government-controlled foundations. It also
permits hundreds of millions of dollars to be spent on radical Islamist education in madrassahs (Islamic religious academies).
Furthermore, the oil-cash glut in the Gulf states and elsewhere blocks much-needed economic reform in oil-producing countries.
State subsidies for everything from health care to industry to bloated bureaucracy continue unabated, funded by Western
consumers.

Oil dependence hurts the economy and allows OPEC to set artificially high prices
Congressional Documents and Publications 08
(“Bush Republican Policies Have Weakened America’s Energy Security”, Congressional Documents and Publications, May 5, LexisNexis)

Bush Has Failed to Reduce the Nation's Oil Dependency. "America's oil addiction has worsened. Since 2001, America's
dependency on foreign oil has steadily increased even as the cost of oil has more than doubled. The Bush administration's
approach to this challenge has been to concede that there is a crisis while opposing new policies or strategies that would change
the status quo. In his 2006 State of the Union address, President Bush declared that America is addicted to oil, but in the days and
weeks that followed his administration failed to adopt a new energy policy or support adequate funding for new initiatives that
would significantly reduce the country's oil dependency." [Center for American Progress, 8/06] High Oil Prices Can Cripple the
American Economy "America now faces a crisis of historic proportion: a liquid transportation fuels crisis. Oil, the lifeblood of
our economy, is in increasingly short supply and oil and derivative product prices have recently soared to record levels."
[Southern States Energy Board, Building a Bridge to Energy Independence and to a Sustainable Energy Future, 7/06] U.S. Oil
Dependence Allows OPEC to Set and Sustain High Oil Prices. "Global oil reserves are concentrated in a volatile region of the
world, with 60% of reserves in the Persian Gulf region. Partly as a consequence of this concentration of low cost reserves, OPEC
producers are able to exercise market power, functioning as an imperfect ("clumsy") cartel and at times maintaining oil price well
above estimated competitive levels. The strength and influence of this cartel grows and declines, largely in relation to cycles of
growth in global import demand and OPEC market share. Nonetheless, OPEC's production or pricing decisions can impose
sustained economic costs over many years and can exacerbate, or ameliorate, short-run supply shocks." [U.S. Department of
Energy, Estimating the Energy Security Benefits of Reduced U.S. Oil Imports, 2/28/07]

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