Bridge Failures - Lessons learned

George A. Christian, P.E.

Director, Office of Structures New York State Dept. of Transportation Bridge Engineering Course University at Buffalo

March 29, 2010

Bridge Failures Lessons Learned

Outline
Part 1:

Overview of Bridge Failures

Historic Failures in North America Recent U.S. failures that impacted bridge engineering practice Lessons and Response
Part 2:

oRecent NYSDOT Bridge Failure Investigations oDealing with a failure

My general lessons from bridge failures

Bridges can, and will fail, if not properly designed, constructed and maintained We may think we know everything to prevent failures, but we do not. In hindsight, most failures could have been prevented (but not all). Failures generally result from a confluence of contributing events and/or underlying causes. When it comes to underlying causes, history can repeat itself.

Two Historic Bridge Failures

Honest human error in the face of the unforeseenor the unforeseeableis ultimately what brings bridges down.
J.Tarkov, Human Failure In, Bridge Failure Out, Engineering Case Library report ECL 270, Carleton University, CA

Quebec Bridge
1800 ft. main span, collapsed Aug 29, 1907

Buckling Failure of compression chord (A9L) inadequate latticing

Quebec Bridge Collapse -Findings

Higher allowable stresses specified Underestimated dead load ( 18% +/-)
Decision to lengthen span by 200 ft. Error discovered but accepted

Financial pressures Project Management issues

Ceding to Consulting Engineer reputation Lack of experience on site Communication failures

Quebec Bridge Collapse -Findings

Lack of knowledge of behavior of large compression members. Lattice bracing proved to be inadequate.

Second Quebec Bridge - 1917

construction collapse Sept 1914

Tacoma Narrows Bridge collapse- 1940

Advancements in suspension bridge analysis (deflection theory)

Williamsburg Bridge -1903

1600 ft. span, 40 ft. deep stiffening truss (Depth: span = 1: 40)

Manhattan Bridge -1909 1470 ft. span, 27 ft. deep stiffening truss (1: 54)

1920s -- Highway suspension bridges become practical

Bear Mountain Bridge 1924 1632 ft. span

Wurts Street Bridge, Kingston, NY -1921 705 ft. span

1930s--Landmark Bridges

George Washington Bridge 1931 3500 ft. span, d:s = 1: 120 Originally opened with upper level roadway only, no stiffening truss d:s = 1: 350

Golden Gate Bridge - 1937

4200 ft. span, d:s = 1: 168

1930s: maximize structural efficiency, economy, aesthetics

Plate girder in place of truss for deck stiffening

Bronx Whitestone Bridge -1939

-- 2300 ft. span -- 11 ft. girder -- d:s = 1: 209 --77 ft. wide, w:s = 1:31

--BWB and other new suspension bridges with shallow stiffening girders exhibit wind-induced Vertical oscillations --Early retrofits implemented

Tacoma-Narrows Bridge--1940
--2800 ft. span --8 ft. girder --d:s = 1: 350 --39 ft. width, w:s = 1:72

Problem with vertical oscillationsRetrofits: Clamp cable to girder @ midspan Side span tiedowns Wind tunnel studies initiated

Torsional motion of Tacoma Narrows bridge prior to failure Nov 7, 1940

Lessons Learned
Lack of understanding of aerodynamics effects Extrapolated past design successes Economic pressures affecting design Emphasis on structural efficiency Lack of emphasis on designing to avoid failure Inadequate regard to failures of 19th century flexible suspension bridges

Impacts of TNB failure

Intensive research on aerodynamic behavior
Still no unanimous consensus on actual cause Buffeting, Vortex shedding, Torsional flutter

Wind tunnel tests during design for all cable supported structures (suspension and cable stayed) Ended use of stiffening plate girders Stiffening trusses continued to be used until 1970s

Post-Tacoma new bridges

Tacoma-Narrows Bridge Replacement - 1950

Mackinac Straits Bridge 1954

Thousand Islands Bridge -Retrofits

Deer Isle Bridge retrofits

Bronx-Whitestone Bridge retrofits

Tower stays Stiffening truss retrofit Tuned mass Damper at midspan

Bronx-Whitestone Bridge --second retrofit 2007

Reduce Dead load, improve torsional stiffness, improve aerodynamic behavior

Replaced Concrete deck with Orthotropic steel deck Removed Stiffening Trusses Added lateral bracing to lower flanges Added wind fairings on stiffening girders Diagonal stays and tuned mass damper remain

Recent U.S. bridge Failures of significance

(and one less significant failure)

Last 30 years Had Significant impact on Federal and State agency bridge management and safety practices NTSB findings and recommendations

Silver Bridge over Ohio River

Point Pleasant , WV Gallipolis, OH Built 1928 , collapsed Dec. 15, 1967

Silver Bridge collapse

Collapse initiated by eyebar fracture Initiated at a crack Stress corrosion cracking
High residual stress corrosion fatigue

At time of design these phenomena were not known to occur with materials and conditions present. Higher traffic loads than when originally designed New high strength steel had low toughness Flaw was inaccessible to inspection Lack of Redundancy

Silver Bridge Collapse consequences

Burning Question : How many other bridges can have a similar fate?? Resulted in Federal National Bridge Inspection Standards regulations
National bridge inventory Biennial inspections Inspector qualifications Reporting requirements

New research: fracture mechanics, materials

Mianus Bridge
I-95 over Mianus River, Greenwich, CT. Built 1958 , collapsed June 1983

Mianus River Bridge collapse

Failure of pin and hanger assembly supporting suspended span Hanger displaced laterally, worked off the pin Transferred (eccentric)load to other hanger Hanger worked outward, fractured pin Underlying causes Corrosion- unmaintained drainage system Lack of redundancy Skew

Mianus Bridge Collapse Consequences

Fracture Critical Inspection requirements

Visual hands on every 2 years NDT methods

Pin and Hanger inspection NDT methods improved

Mianus Bridge Collapse Consequences

New York DOT Response

Add redundancy to all 2 and 3 girder Pin and Hanger bridges (approx. 24 bridges) Over time, these bridges (or superstructures) have been replaced or made redundant / continuous

Mianus Bridge Collapse Consequences

New York DOT Response

Detailed Inspections of 3 and 3 welded girder bridges (hands-on and NDT)
Found many fatigue prone details, cracks Removed flaws, tab plates, drilled out cracks Some prioritized for replacement Lesson in 1960s welding became popular and economical, however effects of fatigue and unintended structural participation was not fully recognized.

A near collapse

Hoan Bridge, Milwaukee, WI

Built 1970, Failure on Dec. 13, 2000

Brittle fractures that originated at a lateral bracing system connection to the girder, where a horizontal shelf plate intersects a transverse connection plate with intersecting and overlapping welds. 2 of 3 girders completely fractured full depth

Hoan Bridge Failure

Connection detail provided high tri-axial constraint at the web, resulted in very high stress concentration (1.6 x Fy). Very small initiating crack in web, critical crack size not detectable. Cold weather contributed to brittle behavior of steel. Steel toughness met spec. requirements

Hoan Bridge Forensic Investigation, Failure Analysis Final Report; Federal Hwy. Admin. and Wisconson DOT, 2001

(The one less significant failure)

New York County Road Bridge Failure -1986

Significant section loss on trusses ( up to 50%) Lack of redundancy Excessive dead load:
Timber deck replaced by a steel pan deck with asphalt 50 psf from 20 psf

200 ft. deck truss span one lane bridge Load posted for 8 tons Failure initiated by 16 ton truck crossing the bridge

Shows importance of load ratings Bridge should have been closed

Schoharie Creek Bridge

NYS Thruway over Schoharie Creek Built 1954, Collapsed April, 1987

Schoharie Creek Bridge failure

(NTSB Findings)

Caused by scour undermining pier foundation

50 year flood event Spread foundations on dense glacial till Inadequate rip rap protection
Inadequate rip rap size Damage from prior flood events Rip rap not maintained

Schoharie Creek Bridge failure Contributing causes- Lack of:

Redundancy ductility in piers resiliency

Schoharie Creek Bridge failure

Follow Up Actions in NY
Improved hydraulic and scour evaluations
Post flood inspections Flood warning action plan

Bridge Safety Legislation

Uniform Code of bridge inspection
Codified inspection requirements Structural integrity evaluations

NYSDOT oversight of Authorities, local owners NYSDOT authority to close unsafe bridges

Priority given to bridge inspection program

Schoharie Creek Bridge failure Follow Up Actions in NY

Bridge Safety Assurance (BSA) Initiative

Program of assessment of bridges vulnerability to structural failure due to their inherent characteristics or due to extreme events Assessments are made for individual failure modes

Identify causes of failure beyond condition (Why do Bridges Fail?)

Bridge Failures in the US: 1966-2005

Cause of Bridge Failures from 1966 to 2005 Figure courtesy of J-L Briaud, Texas A&M University

NYSDOT Bridge Failure Database

NYSDOT Bridge Safety Assurance Initiative

Vulnerability Assessments
Sytematic evaluations of bridges based on individual failure modes.
Hydraulics Overload Collision Steel Details Concrete Details Earthquake

Evaluate statewide bridge population: Screen Assess Classify Vuln. Classifications consider failure likelihood and consequence. Evaluation data needs collected during bridge inspections

BSA Retrofits
Scour repairs Steel Detail Retrofits Add Redundancy

Vulnerability score may influence rehab / replace decision

I-35W over Mississippi River

Built 1967 , collapsed Aug 1, 2007

I-35W over Mississippi River

NTSB Findings

Inadequate load capacity of gusset plates at U10 joints, attributed to design error Substantial increases in weight of the bridge from prior modifications Concentrated construction loads combined with traffic

I-35W over Mississippi River

Inadequate Gusset plate thicknesses at U10 and L11

NTSB

(NTSB) Contributing Cause: Failure of designer Quality Control Procedures Deficiency seems evident in hindsight. Lesson: Design errors can slip through.

I-35W over Mississippi River

NTSB

(NTSB) Contributing cause: Inadequate attention to gusset plates by transportation agencies during inspections. Bowed gusset plates suggested problem for further investigation.

I-35W over Mississippi River

Response by DOTs and FHWA

Inspections of all non-redundant deck truss bridges (How many other bridges can have a similar fate?) Guidance on construction loads and stockpiling on bridges Gusset plate analysis
Include gusset plate analysis in load capacity evaluations Evaluate gusset plates on all bridges that have undergone a substantial change in load.

Gusset Plate Analysis Research NCHRP 12-84 FHWA Advisory on non-destructive testing of gusset plates

I-35W over Mississippi River

NYSDOT actions
Inspected 50 deck truss bridges in NYS Analyzed Gusset Plates on 133 Trusses that had undergone a substantial change in load. Developed analytical tools for gusset plate design and load capacity checks (LFD and LRFD) Did not find design errors similar to I-35W Found problems due to deterioration Developed gusset repair and replacement procedures Closed / replaced 1 bridge due to gusset evaluations

NYSDOT Gusset repairs

Failures Caused by Extreme Events

Earthquakes Collisions Vessel Vehicle Storm surge Fire

Failures Caused by Extreme Events

Lessons learned result in improved design specifications, detailing practices

Seismic research, AASHTO seismic specifications AASHTO Guide specs. for Vessel Collision AAHSTO Guide specs. For Bridges Vulnerable to Coastal Storms
--NCHRP 12-85:
Highway Bridge Fire Hazard Assessment
--NCHRP 12-72: Blast Resistant Highway Bridges- Design and Detailing Guidelines

Failures during Construction

When a bridge may be most at risk to a structural collapse.

Failures during Construction Rt 470 / I-70 overpass, Golden CO; May 15, 2004
Probable Cause of Failure (NTSB Report): Failure of temporary bracing system due to insufficient planning. Contributing causes: --girder installed out of plumb. --inadequate standards for temporary bracing --inadequate oversight

Only ifs ---Problem reported by passerby, but miscommunication occurred. ---Subsequent girder erection was delayed (NTSB) Recommendations / Lessons: Improve standards for temporary works and erection procedures (FHWA, State DOT, AASHTO, OSHA) -Prequalification -Submit written plan, dwgs. -Certified by a P.E

Failures during construction Potential Issues

Bridges are often in their most failure vulnerable state during construction Considering construction states during design
Design focuses on completed structure in service Specs may be vague in addressing construction states

Division of responsibility between designer and contractor/erector.

Designer responsibility for a constructible bridge Contractor responsible for means and methods for construction.

Failures during construction Lessons

Must provide a constructible design
Contract documents show one feasible method of construction (plans or notes)

Design specs shall address constructability

Design loads, limit states during construction

Structural construction operations shall be designed, certified by a P.E., submitted for approval
Temporary structures, temporary works Erection Drawings Structural lifting

Questions?