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TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSEPH G. BRIMO, JUAN MICIANO, ADMINISTRATOR VS.

ANDRE BRIMO Applicable Law: Article 16 of the New Civil Code Facts of the Case: Juan Miciano filed before the lower court a scheme of partition of the estate le ft behind by the deceased Joseph G. Brimo, over which the former was the duly ap pointed judicial administrator. Appellant Andre Brimo, who is one of the brother s of the deceased, opposed the partition because according to the former the par tition puts into effect the provision of the late Joseph G. Brimo's will which a re not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish nationality, rendering said pr ovisions void for being violative of Article 10 of the Civil Code. In the last p art of the second clause of the said will, it was stated that the late Joseph G. Brimo, although a Turkish national, wanted to dispose of his property and every thing in connection with his will, in accordance with Philippine laws. However, the lower court approved the scheme of partition despite the opposition of Andre Brimo. Issue: Whether or not the will is valid and that Philippine laws should govern the test amentary disposition of the late Joseph G. Brimo? Held: The Supreme Court held that the provision of the will of the late Joseph G. Brim o which provides that it shall be governed by Philippine laws, is null and void for being contrary to law. The condition imposed in the will of the late Joseph G. Brimo is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the testator's nationa l law when, according to Article 10 of the Civil Code, the national law of the t estator is the one to govern his testamentary dispositions. Since the the late J oseph G. Brimo is a Turkish national, his testamentary dispositions should be go verned by Turkish laws and not by Philippine laws. However, with the exception of the last part of the second clause of the will, a ll the remaining clauses of said will with all their dispositions and requests a re perfectly valid and effective it not appearing that said clauses are contrary to the national law of the late Joseph G. Brimo. TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, ET AL. VS. EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL. Facts of the Case: Amos G. Bellis, a citizen of the State of Texas and the United States, executed a will in the Philippines, which distributed his estate in the following order a nd manner: $240,,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen P120,000.00 to his three (3) illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cris tina Bellis & Miriam Palma Bellis or P40,000.00 each; and After satisfying the two (2) foregoing items, the remainder shall go to his seve n surviving children by his first and second wives in equal shares. Subsequently Amos G. Bellis died in San Antonio, Texas and his will was admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila. The People's Bank and Trus t Company, as executor of the will, paid all the bequests, including the amount of $240,000.00 in the form of shares of stock to the first wife and the amount o f P120,000.00, or P40,000.00 each, to the three (3) illegitimate children.

Two of the three (3) illegitimate children, Maria Cristina and Miriam Palma Bell is, filed their respective oppositions to the project of partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children, and theref ore, compulsory heirs of the late Amos G. Bellis. However, the lower court overr uled the oppositions of Maria Cristina and Miriam Palma. The lower court, relyin g on Article 16 of the Civil Code, applied the national law of the late Amos G.. Bellis, which in this case is Texas law, which did not provide for legitimes. Issue: Whether Texas law or Philippine Law should govern the will of the late Amos G. B ellis? Held: The Supreme Court affirmed the order issued by the lower court which states that Texas Law should govern the will of the late Amos G. Bellis. The Supreme Court applied in the present case its ruling in the case of Miciano vs. Brimo, stating that in accordance with Article 10 - now Article 16 - of the Civil Case, the national law of the deceased should govern. Since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of succ essional rights are to be determined under Texas Law, the Philippine law on legi times cannot be applied to the testacy of the late Amos G. Bellis. IN RE: TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED ADOLFO C. AZNAR, appellee vs. HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, appellant Facts of the Case: The late Edward E. Christensen, executed a last will in Manila naming Maria Lucy Christensen (now Mrs. Bernard Daney) not only as his child and only living asce ndant but also bequeathed to the latter all his real and personal properties. Th at in the said will, the late Edward E. Christensen, bequeathed to the appellant , Helen Christensen Garcia, the sum of P3,600.00 only. As a consequence thereof, Helen Christensen Garcia filed before the Court of Fir st Instance of Davao an opposition to the approval of the project of partition i n the last will of the late Edward E. Christensen, because according to the form er it deprived her of her legitime as an acknowledged natural child of the dece ased. The Supreme Court declared in its previous decision that the appellant as an acknowledged natural child of the late Edward E. Christensen. The grounds presented by Helen Christensen Garcia in her opposition are the foll owing: The distribution of the properties of the late Edward E. Christensen should be g overned by the laws of the Philippines; and The order of distribution as stipulated in the last will of the late Edward E. C hristensen is contrary to Philippine laws However, the lower court denied the opposition of Helen Christensen Garcia and a ll succeeding motions for reconsideration. Helen Christensen Garcia appealed the decision of the lower Court to the Supreme Court and one of the errors the former assigned to the lower court was that the

lower court failed to recognize that under international law, particularly unde r the Renvoi Doctrine, the intrinisic validity of the testamentary disposition o f the distribution of the Estate of the deceased Edward E. Christensen should be governed by the laws of the Philippines. Issue: Whether or not Philippine laws should govern the last will of the decease d Edward E. Christensen? Ruling: The Supreme Court held that although Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of the State of California at the time of his death, t here was no question that he was domiciled in the Philippines at the time of his death. In apply the Renvoi Doctrine, the Supreme Court held that ALBENSON ENTERPRISES CORP., JESSE YAP, AND BENJAMIN MENDIONA, PETITIONERS, VS. T HE COURT OF APPEALS AND EUGENIO S. BALTAO, RESPONDENTS Facts of the Case: Albenson Enterprises was the recipient of a bounced check which was used by one Guaranteed Industries, Inc. to pay for the mild steel plates which the latter or dered from the former. After conducting an investigation, Albenson discovered th at the owner/signatory of the bounced check was one Eugenio S. Baltao. After obta ining the foregoing information, Albenson through its counsel made an extrajudic ial demand from Eugenio S. Baltao, president of Guaranteed Industries, Inc. to replace and/or make good the dishonored check. However, Baltao denied that he is sued the check or that it was his signature which appeared thereon. He further a lleged that Guaranteed was already closed and could not have transacted business with Albenson. Consequently, Albenson filed a complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 against Eugenio S. Baltao and an information was filed by the assistant fiscal against the latter for violation of the aforesaid law. In filing said informatio n, the assistant fiscal claimed that he had given Eugenio S. Baltao opportunity to submit controverting evidence, but the latter failed to do so and therefore, was deemed to have waived his right. Respondent Baltao, claiming ignorance of the complaint against him, immediately filed with the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal a motion for reinvestigation, alleging that it was not true that he had been given an opportunity to be heard in the p reliminary investigation conducted, and that he never had any dealings with Albe nson or Benjamin Mendiona, and the check for which he has been accused of having issued without funds was not issued by him and the signature in said check was not his. The Provincial Fiscal reversed the findings of the assistant Fiscal and exonerat ed Baltao. The Provincial Fiscal further moved for the dismissal of the informat ion against Eugenio S. Baltao after it was found out that the signature appearin g on the bounced checke was not the signature of the latter. Alleging that the BP 22 case filed against him was unjust, Eugenio S. Baltao fil ed a complaint for damages against Albenson and its owner and employee before th e Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The trial court ruled in favor of Baltao and the latter awarded damages to the l atter. Albenson appealed the case to the Court of Appeals and the appellate court modif ied the decision of the trial court by lowering the moral damages awarded to Bal tao.

As a consequence of the adverse decisions of both the trial court and the appell ate Court, filed the present petition before the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether or not Eugenio S. Baltao is entitled to payment of damages. Ruling: The petition filed by the Albenson, et al. was granted and the decision of the C ourt of Appeals was reversed and set aside. The Supreme Court held that Albenson did not abuse its right, in violation of Ar ticles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, when it instituted the criminal complaint fi led against private respondent after the latter refused to make good the amount of the bouncing check despite demand. The filing of the criminal complaint was a sincere attempt on the part of Albenson to find the best possible means by whic h they could collect the sum of money due to the latter. Petitioners contend that the civil case filed in the lower court was one for mal icious prosecution. Citing the case of Madera vs. Lopez (102 SCRA 700 [1981]), t hey assert that the absence of malice on their part absolves them from any liabi lity for malicious prosecution. Private respondent, on the other hand, anchored his complaint for Damages on Articles 19, 20, and 21 ** of the Civil Code. Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of ab use of rights, sets certain standards which may be observed not only in the exer cise of one's rights but also in the performance of one's duties. These standard s are the following: to act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to obser ve honesty and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes the primordial limitat ion on all rights: that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself legal because recogniz ed or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegal ity. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is ther eby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. Although the req uirements of each provision is different, these three (3) articles are all relat ed to each other. As the eminent Civilist Senator Arturo Tolentino puts it: "Wit h this article (Article 21), combined with articles 19 and 20, the scope of our law on civil wrongs has been very greatly broadened; it has become much more sup ple and adaptable than the Anglo-American law on torts. It is now difficult to c onceive of any malevolent exercise of a right which could not be checked by the application of these articles" (Tolentino, 1 Civil Code of the Philippines 72). The elements of an abuse of right under Article 19 are the following: (1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. Article 20 speaks of the general sanc tion for all other provisions of law which do not especially provide for their o wn sanction (Tolentino, supra, p. 71). Thus, anyone who, whether willfully or ne gligently, in the exercise of his legal right or duty, causes damage to another, shall indemnify his victim for injuries suffered thereby. Article 21 deals with acts contra bonus mores, and has the following elements: 1) There is an act whi ch is legal; 2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or p ublic policy; 3) and it is done with intent to injure. Thus, under any of these three (3) provisions of law, an act which causes injury to another may be made the basis for an award of damages. There is a common element under Articles 19 and 21, and that is, the act must be intentional. However, Article 20 does not distinguish: the act may be done eith er "willfully", or "negligently". The trial court as well as the respondent appe llate court mistakenly lumped these three (3) articles together, and cited the s ame as the bases for the award of damages in the civil complaint filed against p

etitioners. Assuming, arguendo, that all the three (3) articles, together and not independen tly of each one, could be validly made the bases for an award of damages based o n the principle of "abuse of right", under the circumstances, We see no cogent r eason for such an award of damages to be made in favor of private respondent. Certainly, petitioners could not be said to have violated the aforestated princi ple of abuse of right. What prompted petitioners to file the case for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 against private respondent was their failure to coll ect the amount of P2,575.00 due on a bounced check which they honestly believed was issued to them by private respondent. Petitioners had conducted inquiries re garding the origin of the check, and yielded the following results: from the rec ords of the Securities and Exchange Commission, it was discovered that the Presi dent of Guaranteed (the recipient of the unpaid mild steel plates), was one "Eug enio S. Baltao"; an inquiry with the Ministry of Trade and Industry revealed tha t E.L. Woodworks, against whose account the check was drawn, was registered in t he name of one "Eugenio Baltao"; verification with the drawee bank, the Pacific Banking Corporation, revealed that the signature appearing on the check belonged to one "Eugenio Baltao". In a letter dated December 16, 1983, counsel for petitioners wrote private respo ndent demanding that he make good the amount of the check. Counsel for private r espondent wrote back and denied, among others, that private respondent ever tran sacted business with Albenson Enterprises Corporation; that he ever issued the c heck in question. Private respondent's counsel even went further: he made a warn ing to defendants to check the veracity of their claim. It is pivotal to note at this juncture that in this same letter, if indeed private respondent wanted to clear himself from the baseless accusation made against his person, he should ha ve made mention of the fact that there are three (3) persons with the same name, i.e.: Eugenio Baltao, Sr., Eugenio S. Baltao, Jr. (private respondent), and Eug enio Baltao III (private respondent's son, who as it turned out later, was the i ssuer of the He, however, failed to do this. The last two Baltaos were doing business in the same building Baltao Building located at 3267 V. Mapa Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila. The mild steel plates were ordered in the name of Guaranteed of which responden t Eugenio S. Baltao is the president and delivered to Guaranteed at Baltao build ing. Thus, petitioners had every reason to believe that the Eugenio Baltao who i ssued the bouncing check is respondent Eugenio S. Baltao when their counsel wrot e respondent to make good the amount of the check and upon refusal, filed the co mplaint for violation of BP Blg. 22. Private respondent, however, did nothing to clarify the case of mistaken identit y at first hand. Instead, private respondent waited in ambush and thereafter pou nced on the hapless petitioners at a time he thought was propitious by filing an action for damages. The Court will not countenance this devious scheme. The criminal complaint filed against private respondent after the latter refused to make good the amount of the bouncing check despite demand was a sincere atte mpt on the part of petitioners to find the best possible means by which they cou ld collect the sum of money due them. A person who has not been paid an obligati on owed to him will naturally seek ways to compel the debtor to pay him. It was normal for petitioners to find means to make the issuer of the check pay the amo unt thereof. In the absence of a wrongful act or omission or of fraud or bad fai th, moral damages cannot be awarded and that the adverse result of an action doe s not per se make the action wrongful and subject the actor to the payment of da mages, for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to liti gate (Rubio vs. Court of Appeals, 141 SCRA 488 [1986]). In the case at bar, private respondent does not deny that the mild steel plates

were ordered by and delivered to Guaranteed at Baltao building and as part payme nt thereof, the bouncing check was issued by one Eugenio Baltao. Neither had pri vate respondent conveyed to petitioner that there are two Eugenio Baltaos conduc ting business in the same building he and his son Eugenio Baltao III. Considerin g that Guaranteed, which received the goods in payment of which the bouncing che ck was issued is owned by respondent, petitioner acted in good faith and probabl e cause in filing the complaint before the provincial fiscal. The root of the controversy in this case is founded on a case of mistaken identi ty. It is possible that with a more assiduous investigation, petitioners would h ave eventually discovered that private respondent Eugenio S. Baltao is not the " Eugenio Baltao" responsible for the dishonored check. However, the record shows that petitioners did exert considerable effort in order to determine the liabili ty of private respondent. Their investigation pointed to private respondent as t he "Eugenio Baltao" who issued and signed the dishonored check as the president of the debtor-corporation Guaranteed Enterprises. Their error in proceeding agai nst the wrong individual was obviously in the nature of an innocent mistake, and cannot be characterized as having been committed in bad faith. This error could have been discovered if respondent had submitted his counter-affidavit before i nvestigating fiscal Sumaway and was immediately rectified by Provincial Fiscal M auro Castro upon discovery thereof, i.e., during the reinvestigation resulting i n the dismissal of the complaint. Furthermore, the adverse result of an action does not per se make the act wrongf ul and subject the actor to the payment of moral damages. The law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate, such right is so precious t hat moral damages may not be charged on those who may even exercise it erroneous ly. And an adverse decision does not ipso facto justify the award of attorney's fees to the winning party (Garcia vs. Gonzales, 183 SCRA 72 [1990]). Thus, an award of damages and attorney's fees is unwarranted where the action wa s filed in good faith. If damage results from a person's exercising his legal ri ghts, it is damnum absque injuria (Ilocos Norte Electric Company vs. Court of Ap peals, 179 SCRA 5 [1989]). In the final analysis, there is no proof or showing that petitioners acted malic iously or in bad faith in the filing of the case against private respondent. Con sequently, in the absence of proof of fraud and bad faith committed by petitione rs, they cannot be held liable for damages (Escritor, Jr. vs. Intermediate Appel late Court, 155 SCRA 577 [1987]). No damages can be awarded in the instant case, whether based on the principle of abuse of rights, or for malicious prosecution . The questioned judgment in the instant case attests to the propensity of trial judges to award damages without basis. Lower courts are hereby cautioned anew a gainst awarding unconscionable sums as damages without bases therefor. GLOBE MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORP., and HERBERT C. HENDRY, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and RESTITUTO M. TOBIAS, respondents. Facts of the Case: Respondent Tobias was a former employee of the petitioners. From the facts state d in the case, It appears that Globe Mackay discovered fictitious purchases and other fraudulent transactions which amounted to the loss of several thousands of pesos and although Tobias claimed that it was he who discovered the foregoing a nomalies, he was considered as the primary suspect by petitioner Hendry for said anomalies. Thereafter, Hendry subjected Tobias to various forms of harassment a nd abuse such as: Calling Tobias a crook and a swindler Tobias was also ordered to take a lie detector test Tobias was also required to submit specimen handwritings to police investigators

. The police investigators however, issued a report which cleared Tobias of partic ipation in the aforesaid anomalies. Respondent Hendry was not satisfied with the police report and thereafter hired a private investigator who submitted a report finding Tobias guilty, although th e report expressly stated that further investigation will still be conducted. Another police report found that the handwritings, signatures and initials which appeared in the documents which were involved in the fraudulent transactions we re not those of Tobias. Further the lie detector tests conducted on Tobias also yielded negative results. Despite the negative police repots and incomplete report of the private investi gator, petitioners still filed a complaint for estafa and several other cases ag ainst Tobias. All these cases were dismissed. Thereafter, Tobias received a notice from petitioners that his employment was te rminated for which the former filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. During th e pendency of the case, both petitioner and Tobias entered into a compromise agr eement. Now unemployed, Tobias sought employment with the Republic Telephone Company. Ho wever, petitioner Hendry, without being asked by RETELCO, wrote a letter to the latter stating that Tobias was dismissed by Globe Mackay due to dishonesty. This last act of Henry served as the last straw for Tobias, prompting the latter to file a civil case for damages on the ground of unlawful, malicious, oppressi ve and abusive acts of his former employers, the petitioners Globe Mackay and He rbert C. Hendry before the Regional Trial of Manila, Branch 9. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Tobias and ordered the petitioners to pay Tobias actual, moral, exemplary damages and attorney's fees and costs. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court and den ied the motion for reconsideration filed by Globe and Hendry. Hence the present petition. Issue: Whether or not Globe and Hendry are liable for damages to Tobias? Ruling: The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals VELAYO VS. SHELL COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES Facts of the Case: Prior to 1948, Commercial Airlines (CALI) owed P170k (abt. $79k) to Shell and CA L offered its C-54 plane as payment to Shell Company (the plane was in Californi a) but Shell at that time declined as it thought CALI had sufficient money to pa y its debt. In 1948 however, CALI was going bankrupt so it called upon an infor mal meeting of its creditors. In that meeting, the creditors agreed to appoint r epresentatives to a working committee that would determine the order of preferen ce as to how each creditor should be paid. They also agreed not to file suit aga inst CALI but CALI did reserve that it will file insolvency proceedings should i ts assets be not enough to pay them up. Shell Company was represented by a certa

in Fitzgerald to the three man working committee. Later, the working committee c onvened to discuss how CALI's asset should be divided amongst the creditors but wh ile such was pending, Fitzgerald sent a telegraph message to Shell USA advising the latter that Shell Philippines is assigning its credit to Shell USA in the am ount of $79k, thereby effectively collecting almost all if not the entire indebt edness of CALI to Shell Philippines. Shell USA got wind of the fact that CALI ha s a C-54 plane is California and so Shell USA petitioned before a California cou rt to have the plane be the subject of a writ of attachment which was granted. Meanwhile, the stockholders of CALI were unaware of the assignment of credit mad e by Shell Philippines to Shell USA and they went on to approve the sale of CALI's asset to the Philippine Airlines. In September 1948, the other creditors learne d of the assignment made by Shell. This prompted these other creditors to file t heir own complaint of attachment against CALI's assets. CALI then filed for insolv ency proceedings to protect its assets in the Philippines from being attached. V elayo's appointment as CALI's assignee was approved in lieu of the insolvency procee ding. In order for him to recover the C-54 plane in California, it filed for a w rit of injunction against Shell Philippines in order for the latter to restrain Shell USA from proceeding with the attachment and in the alternative that judgme nt be awarded in favor of CALI for damages double the amount of the C-54 plane. The C-54 plane was not recovered. Shell Company argued it is not liable for dama ges because there is nothing in the law which prohibits a company from assigning its credit, it being a common practice. ISSUE: Whether or not Shell is liable for damages considering that it did not vi olate any law. HELD: Yes. The basis of such liability, in the absence of law, is Article 21 of the Civil Code which states: Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner t hat is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the la tter for the damage. Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the forgoing rule is approved (as it was approved), would vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold numbers of mora l wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes. A moral wrong or injury, even if it does not constitute a violatio n of a statute law, should be compensated by damages. Moral damages (Art. 2217) may be recovered (Art. 2219). In Article 20, the liability for damages arises fr om a willful or negligent act contrary to law. In this article, the act is contr ary to morals, good customs or public policy. HERMOSISIMA VS. COURT OF APPEALS -109 PHIL. 629FACTS: The complainant Soledad Cagigas is thirty six years old, a former high school te acher and a life insurance agent. The petitioner Francisco Hermosisima is ten ye ars younger than complainant, and an apprentice pilot. Intimacy developed betwee n them and thus sometime 1953 after coming from the movies, they had sexual inte rcourse in his cabin. In February 1954, the woman advised the man that she is pr egnant whereupon the man promised to marry her. Their daughter Chris Hermosisima was born June 1954 in a private clinic. However, subsequently the man married o ne Romanita Perez. Hence, Soledad filed a complaint against Francisco for acknow ledgement of her child as a natural child of the petitioner, as well as for supp ort of said child and moral damages for alleged breach of promise to marry. The CFI declared the child a natural daughter of the defendant, ordered Francisco to support the child by giving a monthly alimony, awarded actual damages and moral

damages. On appeal of the petitioner, the CA affirmed the assailed decision how ever increased the amount for actual and moral damages. ISSUE: Whether or not the award for moral damages is valid. RULING: The Supreme Court held that no moral damages can be had in the intant case becau se it was the woman who virtually seduced the man by surrendering herself to him because she a girl ten years older was overwhelmed by her love for him, she wan ted to bind him by having a fruit of their engagement even before they had the b enefit of clergy. GALANG VS. C.A. -4 SCRA 55FACTS: Plaintiff Beatriz Galang and Rodrigo Quinit were engaged, but Rodrigo's parents we re strongly opposed to their marriage. They lived as husband and wife in the hou se of one Adolfo Dagawan until Rodrigo left and never returned. The evidence on other pertinent facts is however conflicting. Plaintiff tried to prove that she and Rodrigo were engaged despite the oppositio n of the latter's mother and that the father of Rodrigo agreed to give dowry and d efray the expenses of the marriage. The father even took them to the house of Da gawan for them to stay as husband and wife. However when Rodrigo was not able to secure a marriage license for lack of a residence certificate, he went back to his hometown to get such certificate but never returned. On the other hand, the defendants sough to establish that he and plaintiff were engaged but his parents were opposed to the marriage. Rodrigo was agreeable to m arry the plaintiff after his graduation but the latter was impatient and wanted the marriage to take place so oner. Because of continued relationships with the plaintiff, Rodrigo's parents tol d him to leave the parental home. He later told this to plaintiff. The plaintiff convinced him to go to Dagawan's ho use where she followed and stayed thereafter. Because of his continued refusal t o marry the plaintiff, the latter's relatives, accompanied by policemen and constabulary soldiers intimidated him. H e was allowed to go home and was then placed under the custody of a town mayor b y his parents. He refused to acknowledge the marriage application, which was provided by Dagawan for him to s ign, when he did not appear before a notary public. Plaintiff filed an action against Rodrigo and his father Maximo Quinit to recove r damages for breach of promise on the part of Rodrigo to marry her. The trial c ourt rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff, which on appeal, was reversed by the Court of Appeals. ISSUE: Whether or not plaintiff may recover damages for breach of promise to marry. RULING: It is urged by the ages to her. She insists that moral our laws, but this ense in Hemosisima plaintiff that said Court had erred in not awarding moral dam damages for breach of promise to marry are collectible under question has already been settled adversely to plaintiff's pret vs. Court of

Appeals. Moral damages for breach of promise to marry are not collectible. TANJANCO vs. COURT OF APPEALS L-18630 December 17, 1966 FACTS: Petitioner Apolonio Tanjanco courted respondent Araulli Santoshe expressed and professed his undying love and affection towards her which she eve ntually reciprocated. For one year from Dec. 1953-Dec. 1954, petitioner succeed ed in having carnal access to her, because of his protestation of love and promi se of marriage. She got pregnant, for which she resigned from her work as IBM s ecretary to avoid embarrassment. He refused to marry her nor give support. Thus, she filed for an action before the trial court to compel him to recognize the unborn child and provide support. The complaint was dismissed for failure t o state the cause of action. Upon appeal, the CA ruled that cause of action exi sted for damages as premised on Art. 21. ISSUE: Whether or not breach of a promise to marry is an actionable wro ng. HELD: The case under Art. 21, cited as an example by the Code Commissi on, refers to a tort upon a minor who has been seduced. The essential feature i s seduction, that in law is more than sexual intercourse, or a breach or promise of marriage; it connotes essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of confidence on the part of the seducer, to which the woman has yielded. Where for one whole year, a woman of adult age maintained intimate sex ual intercourse, such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plain ly, there is voluntariness and mutual passion. Hence, no case is made under Art . 21, and no other cause of action being alleged, no error was committed by CFI in dismissing the complaint. In US v. Bustamante, 27 Phil 121: To constitute seduction, ther e must in all cases be some sufficient promise or inducement and the woman must yield because of the promise or other inducement. If she consents merely from c arnal lust and the intercourse is from mutual desire, there is no seduction. Decision of CA reversed; that of CFI affirmed.

GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MARILOU T. GONZA LES, respondents February 19, 1993 FACTS: Petitioner was a medicine student at Lyceum Northwestern Colleges at Dagupan Cit y. He was an Iranian exchange student and was 29 years old. Respondent was a for mer waitress on a luncheonette, and was 22 years old. Petitioner was allegedly the lover of the re spondent, and was said to promise marriage to the latter, which convinced her to

live with him in his apartment. It was even alleged that the petitioner went to the house of the respondent to i nform her family about the marriage on the end of the semester. However, the mar riage did not materialize, with several beatings and maltreatment experienced by the respondent from the petitio ner. The case was filed in the RTC of Pangasinan, and the decision was held in favor of the respondent. However, the petitioner claimed that the judgment of the RTC was an error, for the claims of the respondent are not true, and that he did not know about the custom of the Filipinos; his acts were in accordance of his cust om. The decision of the RTC was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals. Hence, the petitioner filed an appeal to the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent could claim payment for the damages incurred by th e petitioner. RULING: Mere breach of marriage is not punishable by law. However, since the respondent was proved to have a good moral character, and that she had just let her virgini ty be taken away by the petitioner since the latter offered a promise of marriag e, then she could ask for payment for damages. Furthermore, since she let her lover, the petitioner, deflowered her since she bel ieved that his promise to marry was true, and not due to her carnal desire, then she could have her claims against the petitioner. Moreover, the father of the r espondent had already looked for pigs and chicken for the marriage reception and the sponsors for the marriage, and then damages were caused by the petitioner a gainst the respondents, which qualified the claims of the respondent against the petitioner. PE ET. AL. VS. PE G.R. NO. L-17396. 30 MAY 1962. Appeal from a decision of the CFI Mla. Facts: Plaintiffs are parents, brothers and sisters of Lolita Pe, an unmarried w oman 24 years of age. Defendant, a married man, frequently visited Lolita's house on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him to pray the rosary. They fell in love and conducted clandestine trysts. When the parents learned about this they prohibited defendant from going to their house. The affair continued just the sa me. On April 14, 1957 Lolita disappeared from her brother's house where she was li ving. A note in the handwriting of the defendant was found inside Lolita's aparado r The present action was instituted under Article 21 of the Civil Code. The lowe r court dismissed the action and plaintiffs appealed. Issue: W/N the defendant committed injury to Lolita's family in a manner contrar y to morals, good customs and public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the New Civil Code. Held: The circumstances under which defendant tried to win Lolita's affection canno t lead to any other conclusion than that it was he who, thru an ingenious scheme or trickery, seduced the latter to the extent of making her fall in love with h im. Indeed, no other conclusion can be drawn from this chain of events than that defendant not only deliberately, but through a clever strategy, succeeded in wi

nning the affection and love of Lolita to the extent of having illicit relations with her. The wrong he has caused her and her family is indeed immeasurable con sidering the fact that he is a married man. Verily, he has committed and injury to Lolita's family in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the New Civil Code. TENCHAVEZ VS. ESCANO In February 1948, Tenchavez and Escao secretly married each other and of course w ithout the knowledge of Escao's parents who were of prominent social status. The ma rriage was celebrated by a military chaplain. When Escao's parentslearned of this, they insisted a church wedding to be held but Escao withdrew from having a recele bration because she heard that Tenchavez was having an affair with another woman . Eventually, their relationship went sour; 2 years later, Escao went to the US w here she acquired a decree of absolute divorce and she subsequently became an Am erican citizen and also married an American. In 1955, Tenchavez initiated a case for legal separation and further alleged tha t Escao's parents dissuaded theirdaughter to go abroad and causing her to be estran ged from him hence he's asking for damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00. The low er court did not grant the legal separation being sought for and at the same tim e awarded a P45,000.00 worth of counter-claim by the Escaos. ISSUE: Whether or not damages should be awarded to either party in the case at b ar HELD: Yes. On the part of Tenchavez: His marriage with Escao was a secret one and the failure of said marriage did not result to public humiliation; that they never lived together and he even consen ted to annulling the marriage earlier (because Escao filed for annulment before s he left for the US but the same was dismissed due to her non-appearance in court ); that he failed to prove that Escao's parents dissuaded their daughter to leave T enchavez and as such his P1,000,000.00 claim cannot be awarded. HOWEVER, by reason of the fact that Escao left without the knowledge of Tenchavez and being able to acquire a divorce decree; and Tenchavez being unable to remar ry, the SC awarded P25,000.00 only by way of moral damages and attorney's fees to be paid by Escao and not her parents. On the part of Escao's parents: It is true that the P1,000,000.00 for damages suit by Tenchavez against the Escao s is unfounded and the same must have wounded their feelings and caused them an xiety, the same could in no way have seriously injured their reputation, or othe rwise prejudiced them, lawsuits having become a common occurrence in present soc iety. What is important, and has been correctly established in the decision of the cou rt below, is that they were not guilty of any improper conduct in the whole depl orable affair. The SC reduced the damages awarded from P45,000.00 to P5,000.00 o nly.