An Undeleter for Criticism Author(s): Simon Jarvis Reviewed work(s): Source: Diacritics, Vol. 32, No.

1, Rethinking Beauty (Spring, 2002), pp. 3-10+12-18 Published by: The Johns Hopkins University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1566358 . Accessed: 15/06/2012 17:16
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AN

UNDELETERFOR

CRITICISM
SIMONJARVIS

Is there experience of beauty,or is it only that we sometimes choose to sort and name certainexperiences by using a set of terms, originatingoften in ancient and medieval philosophy and theology and by a long process of mutationand manipulationarriving This questionasks for at least two kinds underthe disciplinaryheadingof "aesthetics"? of information.It does not only ask for informationaboutthe historyof the formationof the conceptsof aesthetics;it also asksfor information aboutexperiences.But information aboutexperiencesis hardto come by. This is not only, perhaps,for the largereasonthat "informationis concernedwith alien objects,"ratherthan with experiences,' but also for the morelocal one that"aesthetics" does not oftenattempt describeanyexperiences to with determinedfidelity.2 I can illustrate withreferenceto a branch aestheticsin whichI have a particular this of interest,the aesthetics of prosody.A good deal of subtle and sometimes brilliantwork exists in this field. It is rare,however,to find writing which describesin any detail the particular experienceswhich a particular living individualhas hadin relationto a line of One is much morelikely to find such descriptionsin worksof fiction (or,rarely, poetry.3 in brief reviews) thanin professionalwritingon the topic of prosody.Thereseem at first to be some obvious and good reasonsfor this. Professionalwritingdemandsnot thatwe merely reportour own subjectiveexperiences,but that we produceknowledge. Critics are not paid to be artistsbut to be a kind of scientists of art.But what if thereis no such science? Whatif "thereis no science of the beautiful"[Kant,CJ 172]?Wouldthatmean that the whole subjectareashould simply be-deleted? That this is a possibility is confirmedby the fact thatin one areaof thinkingabout aesthetic experience,it has almost happenedalready.While thereare still a numberof who understand of theirvocationto be boundup withinvestigating part paidprofessionals the experienceof the beautyor othervalueof worksof art,therearefew paidaestheticians There have been historicalperiods in which numbersof printednonfiction of nature.4
1. Hegel, The Difference 85. Here it will be evident that this essay, in the company of a numberof theoriesof knowledge,but especially those represented Adorno,NegativeDialektik, by and Michel Henry, Ph6nomenologiemat6rielle,does not take that "linguisticturn" sometimes regardedas a universallynecessary feature of advanced thinking.For an especially powerful critiqueof manyof the assumptionsconnectedwith that turn,see RuthrofI wish to acknowledge the influence of work undertakenby Ross Wilson toward his doctoral thesis on subjective universalityin Kant; it has been of central importanceto the line of thinkingbehind this article, thoughI alone am to blamefor theparticular direction it has takenhere. 2. For a notable exception,cf De Bolla, Art Matters. 3. Some importantwork which discusses the needfor a morephenomenologicallydetailed account of prosodic experiencecan, however,be found in Grimaud,Oliver,and Scott. 4. For a justification for continuing to use the word "nature"despite the culturalistic prohibitionon it, see Jarvis, "'Old idolatry'" 28-36. Readers who knowof the existence of paid aestheticians of natureare urgedto contact the editor with evidence.

diacritics / spring 2002

32.1:3-18 diacritics

textsweredevotedbothto experiencesof natural beautyandalso to therelativepropensity of natural to occasion such experiences.Such descriptionsarenow thought appearances to be, insofar as they are of interest at all, the province of artists.5This is indeed a consequenceof somethinglike an acceptancethat,in the sphereof experiencesof nature, at least, "thereis no science of the beautiful."Most agree that "anideal of a beautiful view is unthinkable"[CJ 80]. Yet few, perhaps,would now argue that an ideal of a beautifulpoem is quite thinkableeither. We are thus returnedto the question posed above. If there is no science of the beautiful,must claims to experiencesof beauty be treatedas fictional-in the specific sense thatthey are mattersfor fiction, and not for science? Why should the concept not be altogethereliminated? Perhapsfor this reason.Let us imaginethatI thinkI have had an experience.I have been walking along a street at night, say, head down as though scrutinizingthe quite kerbstone,paintedparkingand motoringinstructions, complex surfaceof tarmacadam, draincovers and grilles, althoughperhapsin distractionI may have been allowing my addressed eyes simplyto pass lightlyover all this while I thinkabouta mortifyingremark to me at a recentcommitteemeeting,or attempt identifythe cataloguenumber to relevant to a fragmentof piano music which has come into my head; may, for example, as if startledby a call or a cry of pain have raisedmy look from the wet pavement-which I now possibly "see" for the first time (since it is the soul which sees, and not the eye [Descartes 1: 172])-and now indeed see at a greatdistanceaheadof me, almost at the horizonof my vision, a small line of white points of light making a slight curve upjust in a little above the rest of the horizon and then stoppingapparently midair,a little like a rope ladderleading nowhereand supported nothing;an awe which is not quite the by same as fear, a strangepleasure or a delightful horrorcomes over me; a minute, an almost imperceptiblechange to my heartbeatand breathing,certainly,but at the same time a minute,an almostimperceptiblechange to my thinking;perhapsit feels not only as though I have had a feeling but as though I have had an idea; perhapsit feels as though somethinghas happenedto me. I stop walking. Let us imagine furtherthat you aremy good friend.Ouraffectionateintimacyallows us candidlyto differwithoutgiving offense. You are walkingby my side and at the moment when I stop and say, "Lookat that!,"you look up, too, and reply,"What,do you mean the bridge?""Oh,it's a bridge. It's beautiful.""Whatdo you mean?" How can I answeryour last question?If I simply tell you a story abouteverything that I have experiencedI have not really answeredthe question at all, because what I said was that the bridge was beautiful. But if I simply tell you something about the bridge,I have not really answeredthe questioneither,not only because whatI said was that the bridgewas beautiful,but because I may not have meantthe bridge at all. Anotherway of puttingthis difficultyis this: No one can use reasons or principles to talk us into a judgment on whether some garment,house, or flower is beautiful.Wewant to submitthe object to our own eyes,just as if our liking of it dependedon that sensation.Andyet, if we thencall the objectbeautiful,we believe we have a universalvoice, and lay claimto theagreement everyone,whereasanyprivatesensationwoulddecide of solelyfor the observerhimselfand his liking. [CJ59-60] What is being pointed out here is that judgments about beauty have a peculiar philosophicalgrammar. They are notjudgmentsof knowledge,because it is foolish for
5. Forvaluablereflectionson the demiseof explicitreflectionuponnaturalbeauty,cf Adorno,

Aesthetic 61-78. Theory

me to think that I can by reasoningcompel anybody to find somethingbeautiful-for the very reason that to find something beautiful is not to know a fact about it, but to place a value upon it. Yet they are not (this view goes on) merely reportsof a purely subjectiveexperienceeither,because when I makethe claim thatthis or thatappearance is beautiful,the form of my claim makes no referenceto any experience of mine, but claims somethingaboutthe appearance. According to this view, then, most theories of judgments about beauty go wrong from the beginning, because they resolve such judgments into one or anotherof these categories.The fragile and equivocal middle which opens up in this thoughtof Kant's has been closed time and again ever since. Every time a debate gets underway on "whether"aesthetic evaluationscan be proven, or "whether" they are on the contrary of the possibilityof hearingthe peculiargrammar thiskindof judgment merelysubjective, has alreadybeen foreclosed.WhenI say thatsomethingis beautifulI am--despite Kant's language-making a claim thatis oddly resistantto being sortedinto the machineryof subject and object as that machineryis usually set up. Because it is not really a claim aboutan object, butnot really a claim abouta subjecteither,it has a peculiarstatus.It is to not reallya claim to know something-I could not compel you by argument feel what I feel, and thusjudge as I judge-yet it is not simply a reportof a subjectivepreference either: in claiming that what I have seen is beautiful, I am making a claim about something,a claim thatasks for yourassent.Thatis, when I make a judgmentthattakes the form thatsomethingor otheris beautiful-or wondrous,sublime, amazing,etc.6-I am bound to claim an assent thatI can never compel. But perhapsI have a duty or a contractto make only those claims to which I can compel assent.In thatcase I (andall boundlike me) must professthose hopes deridedin the preface to the Lyrical Ballads: the foolish hope of reasoning the reader into 742]. Or, insofar as I am unable so to compel others, I am approbation[Wordsworth boundto fall silent on the entiresubject.Then, since I can nevercompel othersto share this kind of experience, to feel as I feel, I must profess what I think it may be in my power to compel othersto believe: that, for example, a certainpatternof phonemes or graphemes"has"a certaineffect upon "the"reader. Let us returnto the experimentof imagining that I have had an experience or a series of experiences.I am not going to describean imaginaryexperiencehere-since I contend not only thatthe phenomenologyof aestheticexperiencestill barelyexists, but also thatits absence cannotbe suppliedin a day [Jarvis,"Prosodyas Cognition"]-but to sketch it. Suppose that, in the course of a long meeting, I find myself in a state of dejection.A phrasefrom a poem comes into my head: "No worst,thereis none,"say, or "A grief without a pang, dark,void and drear," "Theeldest have borne most."How or little of our most criticalexperienceof poems in fact comes when doing what is called "actuallyreading"-the readerfacing the text, for all the worldas thoughher eyes were a microscope and the book a specimen-and how much of it comes in recollection, voluntaryor involuntary!But supposeI am to write aboutone of the poems from which one of these lines emerges.I of course wish to begin fromthe experiencewhich I believe I have had. If not to bore any possible readerswith the detritusof my own life, I am to delete from this experienceeverythingthatis merely personal:not merely thatwhich is obviously so-the meeting, the mild melodramaof implicitly comparingboredomin a
6. It will be clear from this that this essay comprehendsunder "the beautiful" wonder in general. In Longinus's treatiseOf Loftiness the systematicdistinctionlaterproposedby theories or of taste,supported variousphilosophicalanthropologies by transcendental-idealist by categorial separations, between "the beautiful" and "the sublime" does not yet pertain; likewise, that and philosophicalanthropology those categorialseparationsno longerpertaining,the distinction no longerpertains in this essay.

diacritics / spring 2002

meeting to real dejectionor religious crisis or nationaldisaster,etc.-but also anything thatcannotalso be provento be an experiencethatall rightreadersof these lines should have. So I must replacethe lines in theircontext, within the concept of the entiretyof a poem; I mustreplacethatpoem withinthe concepts of the entiretyof a book, a genre, an a horizons of authorship, historicalperiod-and so on throughall the four-and-twenty philological totality. Now I have done all this, and I may think that I have made knowledge, of a kind. This making has depended upon the deletion of everything idiosyncraticabout my experience and, with it, upon the deletion of everythingthat makes thatexperiencean experience.In its place sits a grinningor mopingmannequin, the reader:the placeholderfor my self-disowning,my idea of what "they"will allow to be what "everyone"must feel.7 What has happened here? The field of criticism has been deleted. The field of criticism:thatfield which lies betweenor beyond a rationalismwhich can prove whatis beautiful,and a relativismwhich knows what it likes [Caygill, Art of Judgment].The troubling equivocality of this field demands that it be carved up among evaluative aesthetics(wherevera headlike thatstill surfaces)andthe descriptivesciences of culture. None shall startfrom the singularin searchof the concept, unless happyto be put in the And here we indeed find one importantreason why (at the creative writing program.8 hour when "thick description"of historical-materialspecificity and otherwise very thick descriptionof experiencesof beauty crunchystuff is a professionaldesideratum) is strictlyfor the poets. Few things are less tolerableto modem protocol than equivocality;and since this equivocalfield, the field of criticism,was firstdiscovered,its fate has usuallybeen to be destroyed.This is by no meansbecauseof the indolence,foolishness,or poorscholarship of those who have come afterwards could moreproperlybe thoughtof as the resultof (it the way in which a busy and learnedcleverness needs to suppresssome fundamental becauseit is an essentialcharacteristic questionsin orderto get on with its job) butrather of any field thatis equivocalthatit cannotbe preserved being turnedinto a "position." by It must be renewedin orderto be preserved. The essays collected in this volume offer resourcesfor such a renewal.They do not adhereto any single program;but in each case, I believe, the attemptis made to think what the relation between the aesthetic and the cognitive might be-if it be neither sheer unlikeness, nor perfect identity,nor, on the other hand, an analogy supposed to bridge a gulf which has alreadybeen assumed. Which is to say that all the essays in differentways interrogatethe way in which these terms, "aesthetic"and "cognitive," have been used to discipline certain kinds of experience. This interrogationmay be explicit, as it is in PeterDe Bolla's attemptto workthroughkey elementsof the tradition of aestheticstowarda missing dimension,"thematerialityof aestheticexperience";or implicit, as it is in HowardCaygill's rereadingof one aspect of the contoursof a single manner whichin its understated RolandBarthes's-a rereading criticalauthorship, opens fundamentalquestions about what is known in art and in writing about art. The up collectionaddressesonce morethe questionas to why aestheticsshouldhave so narrowed its attentionas to consider as its eminent subject the results of human work: why it should have so lost the world. Denise Riley's thinkingaboutthe beautyof faces adds a new developmentto her recent work [Riley]: it looks steadily into a joyful or painful borderregion between the made and the unmade.The length of the respectivetexts7. Here I wish to acknowledgethe influenceof KestonSutherland'sworktowardhis doctoral thesis, "J.H. Prynneand Philology,"to some aspects of which this essay represents preparation for a possible response. and duration datum"but "unique indubitable 8. Where"thesingular"meansnot "particular section 2 below. Cf of qualitativeaffectivity."

and all the more so because this is a collection in which beautyis in question-has been not determined by an idea of thatbulkwhich a good-sizedunitof professionalproduction to possess, butby the space neededin each instanceto unfoldthe centralthoughts. ought One size could not possibly fit both Drew Milne's tenaciousrethinkingof the idea of the "beautifulsoul" and Jay Bernstein'sacute renewalof Adorno's aesthetictheory. like the one above have the ugliness of a brochure-say, "a Piece of Paragraphs of Points of light to be put into a dark hole" [Blake 599]-because they Machinery select from each essay only thatwherebyit contributesto the cover-conceptprosecuted for some local purpose.Everythingpeculiarabouteach, thatin which its essential value resides, is lost when it is made to fit the agenda.If it is the case in any branchof inquiry that the importantthing is to get together with people who agree with you about essay everything,it is certainlynot the case in aesthetics.Accordinglythis introductory of threatensreaderswith no further paragraphs this kind. It forgoes the usualprocedure, by which the editor of a collection of essays twists himself and them into a position of there are very few beliefs that all the or false reconciliation.Fortunately unfortunately, contributorsto this volume share. But perhapsone small doubt is common to all: the doubtas to whetherquestionsaboutartand beautyare adequatelydealt with simply by the or of to Suppressing question beingreferred therubrics "ideology" "symboliccapital." of art, we suppress the ability to think how our own making may be anything but Suppressingthe questionof beauty,we suppressthe ability to thinkhow "production." Paidthinkershave a particular ourown experiencemay be anythingbut "consumption." of responsibilityto challenge the mistransfiguration productionand consumptioninto the permanentand universallineamentsof experience. 1 For Kanthimself the thesis I havejust been describing,thatthe pureaestheticjudgment of beautyis subjectivelyuniversal,could not withoutdamagebe detachedfroma number of otherclaims. Here I want to focus on two of these in particular. 1. When I claim that an appearancelooks beautiful, I can't help implying that everyoneelse oughtto agreewith me. KantthinksthatthismustmeanthatI amconscious thatI make such claims only when I am awareof feeling a pleasurethatdoes not depend upon any merely private interest. For Kant, the pure aestheticjudgment of taste is a subjectiveuniversalif and only if I am conscious thatI like withoutany merely private gratification[CJ53-54]. As soon as we take this step, however, we are in Kant up to our necks. We are committedto a radicaldistinctionbetween pathologicalfeeling, feeling thatcan only be understoodas partof a determiningchain of causes andeffects andthatis consequently necessarily perfectly distinct from cognition, on the one hand; and, on the other, a feeling, feeling that is of the only troubling and difficult category of "disinterested" kindthatcan give rise to the only "freeliking"[CJ52], since it is not only not determined by by the interestsof the flesh, but also not determined moralinterests.This categoryof feeling stands in an ambiguous relation to cognition since, while it produces no accompanied theplayof thosefacultieswhose cooperation by knowledge,it is inseparably Withthis is necessaryto the productionof knowledge,imagination,and understanding. commitmentis implied another,a commitmentto thatwhole conceptionof subjectivity developed in the Critique of Pure Reason, in which the step from cogito to sum is treatedalternatelyas a paralogism,a species of false reasoning [CPR411-58]. The trueobjectionto this is not the one familiarfrom ideology critique,viz. thatthe fails for two reasons is very idea of disinterestedness ideological. Thatline of argument

diacritics / spring 2002

which I have set out at length elsewhere:firstly,thatperfect interestednessand perfect disinterestednessare twinnedand mutuallydependentconcepts, emerginghistorically togetherandeach relianton the otherfor its own intelligibility[Jarvis,"TheGift"];and secondly, thatthe applicationof the concept of ideology to this problemmisconstrues the ironic andrestrictedconcept of ideology as a literalanduniversalone [Jarvis,"'Old in Idolatry'"].The problemlies, rather, the decision thathas alreadybeen takenherenot by means of a phenomenologyproperlyspeaking, but ratherby means of a legal "deduction" categories-about the radicalseparatenessof thinkingand feeling and, of accordingly,aboutthe expulsion of all affectivityinto an object for a thinkingwhich is presumed,insofaras it is thinking,to treataffectivityas what it thinksabout. 2. More broadly, this idea, that the pure aesthetic judgment of the beautiful is is in assertion: universal, determined Kant'sworkby the centralarchitectonic subjectively that the good, the true, and the beautifulare perfectly distinct from each other.9 This categorial separationof these three orders, which is of course by no means Kant's or invention, but a station on a long path of disenchantment enlightenment,conceals, moreover,a hierarchical asymmetry.Since "thereare only two kinds of concepts,""the and to conceptof nature the conceptof freedom" 9]-the formerproper understanding [CJ and the latterto reason-the beautiful, unlike the true and the good, has no concepts but properto it. Not only is this why "thereis no science of the beautiful," it is precisely because of this that judgments about the beautiful can be described as subjectively universal.They are subjectivelyuniversalbecause, unlikejudgementsabouttheoretical reason,they cannotbegin fromthe universal,the concept.Instead knowledgeor practical they always begin from an appearanceand searchfor a concept-a concept, however, that can only be provided from one of two arrays,the only two arraysof concepts of available,those of natureand freedom.The way the categorialseparation true,good, and beautifulis specified is both what deprivesbeauty of any concepts of its own and whatrequires beautybe explainedby analogies withthe only two sourcesof concepts that available.'0 Since both these featuresof Kant'streatment beautyaredependenton the of he specifies the categorial separation, it becomes clear that the constitutive way equivocalityof the field of aestheticjudgmentdiscussed above is intimatelyconnected not only to the categorialseparation hierarchical character. itself, butalso to its internally Of course there are also many other ways in which Kant would considerthe very idea of subjective universalityto imply a series of other Kantiancommitments;but these two are pivotal. If an idea of subjectiveuniversalitycan be framedthat does not rely on the belief thatI mustbe conscious thatmy pleasureis free from interestin order to occasion such a judgment;if an idea of subjective universalitycan be framedthat does not rely on the belief that the true,good, and beautifulare constitutivelyseparate
9. Central to an assessment of the importanceof this separationfor art and aesthetics is Bernstein. 10. Especially skepticalcommentary the role of analogy in the Critiqueof Judgmentcan on befound in Derrida.Insofaras its objectionto analogy conjures(whetheras quotedand disowned or as directlybelieved and upheld)a sharply insuperabledifferencebetweenthe logical and the nonlogical, that treatmentdeletes, rather than renews, Kant's insight. "Kantthus imports this table, this tableau (Tafel),this board[, this borderinto the analytic of aestheticjudgment.Thisis ] a legitimateoperationsince it is a questionof judgments.But it is a transportationwhich is not withoutitsproblemsand artfulviolence: a logicalframe is transposedandforced in to be imposed on a nonlogical structure,a structurewhich no longer essentially concerns a relation to the object as an object of knowledge. The aestheticjudgment, as Kant insists, is not a knowledgejudgment. Theframe fits badly" [69]. But it is just the point that subjectiveuniversalitycannot readily be classified either as logical or as nonlogical. So what is here diagnosed as an alien and as "importation" as "artfulviolence" mightno less properlybe understood whatthe critique openly confesses and exposes as its own centralproblem.

ordersof judgment,among which the beautifulis the only one lacking concepts proper to it; then there is a good chance that this central equivocality,which I have earlier described as characterizingthe terrain of criticism itself, does not require Kantian epistemology and Kantianantimetaphysical metaphysicsto sustainit. Thus, (1) Can the claim that aesthetic judgments are subjectively universal be detached from another,that they are promptedby a feeling of disinteresteddelight? Perhapsso, if affectivityis not an object. Then I would no longer imagine that I really am splitinto a communicableandan incommunicable part.Thenthejudgmentof beauty would no longer be my attemptto give utteranceonly to those feelings which I must suppose that others will approve, but, instead, to "that secret which is known to everyone.""(2) Can the claim that aestheticjudgments are subjectively universalbe detachedfrom others, that they are not cognitive but are analogous to cognition; that they are not moralbut analogous to morality?Perhapsso, if the patternof participation is other than the categorialseparationsuggests; if it is not only, in that separation,the beautifulthatis indigentandthatmustborrowor smuggleits concepts fromthe trueand that the good, but also the trueandthe good, in this separation, cannothelp appealingto the beautiful.Then theoryandpracticewould no longerbe able to suppress,conceal, or delete their own artifices of articulation.The next two sections of the essay explain these propositionsin attemptingthese two detachments.

2 I am in pain, with toothacheor melancholy.How certainam I of that?Perhapsuncertain of what melancholymeans, I may not be uncertainof my pain. It would be good to be a lot less certainof being in pain;it is possible to thinkof certainvarietiesof skepticism as would-be analgesics. But what kind of certaintyis this? Is it the kind of certaintyI experiencewhen I am asked to assent to the proposition7 + 5 = 12? Is it, thatis to say, somethingthatis broughtbefore a consciousness, a consciousnessthatis not previously awareof it, for assent or denial?Not at all. It is alreadywhateverwould assent or deny. Pain is not an object. It is not something I know when it is referredlike a set of data given from outside to a "consciousness"that is inside and considered as in advance perfectly purged of such affectivity; it is already and immediately the most certain knowledge I can have-or rather,be. It is knowledge so certainthathowever hardmy skepticismtries to help me out, I am incapableof doubtingit. Is this, then, a varianton the familiarcomplaint about "dualism,""Cartesian" or otherwise?So little so thatit completely rejectsthis complaint.The problemwith what is usually referredto as Cartesianism-and which in fact takes up with only one aspect of Descartes'sthinking-is not its dualismbut the way in which the (illusory)dualityis drawnup. When affectivity is awardedto "the body" and when "the body" is made a transcendent objectwhose realityI am at leisureto doubt;when freedom-from-affectivity is is awardedto the mind and when freedom-from-affectivity made into a condition of what it would more nearlybe, the conditionof the possibility of experience,insteadof, its impossibility;thenthis mischaracterization in no way be obviatedby yet another can bridging or overcoming or subversion of "binaryoppositions."'2Instead, we are to
11. Viz.,life. Jarvis, "TheFutureof Monologue" 30. 12. Caygill, in "LifeandAestheticPleasure,"makesan intriguingargumentfortraces (only) of the possibility of a "materialistaesthetics" in Kant's ThirdCritique.It is intriguingbecause and disfiguration "materialism"is imagined there not as a momentof perfect disenchantment [de Man, Aesthetic Ideology 70-90 and 119-28, esp. 82, 88, and 90: "Thebottomline, in Kantas well as Hegel, is theprosaic materialityof the letter" For a discussion of this in the contextof an

diacritics / spring 2002

understand radicalgulf between two bodies: the subjectiveand the objectivebody, the between thatthinkingbody the last singularhue or odor of whose experience I cannot possibly doubt, since it is what I am, and whateverthat body points at or refers to or surmises about.Would we bridge, overcome, or subvertthat difference,we would, so often as we make the attempt,add nothing to nothing so as to make something: the evacuated subject, whose aprioritycan be secured only at the price of its having no affectivity and finally no substance-which is to say, whose aprioritycan be secured only at the price of its annihilation-is to be added, or forced, or blurred into the to phenomenalized object, whose realityis permitted permanently be suspendedby that the evacuatedsubject.Whatis essential here, that is, is not the number, other nothing, whetherit be 1, 2, 3, or more. What is essential, instead, is to keep open a difference which can only ever be closed in favorof one of the terms.The differencebetween life and deathcan only ever be closed in favor of death."Leaveout this line, and you leave out life itself' [Blake 585]. We are here on the path of a materialphenomenology.This is not to be confused with merely"hyletic" phenomenology,as thatwas understood Husserl,for the reason by thathyletic phenomenologyconstitutesits hyle, its matter,as a pole opposedto the pole as of intentionality: therefore a momentnot properly and at phenomenological all [Henry, Phenomenologie materielle, 13-59]. It does so by a self-misrecognitionof what the original insight of phenomenologymeant.The phenomenologicalreductionsuspends no detail of what is perceived, nothing at all of its concretion. It suspends only its transcendence.But in the way in which Husserl comes to understandwhat he calls "hyletic" phenomenology, as the only material phenomenologist of our era has demonstrated, "Sensibledata are given as matterswith respect to intentional formations or to donations of meaning of differentdegrees. .. ." Matteris not the matterof the impression,the impressional,and impressionalityas such, it is the matter of the act which informs it, a matterfor that form. The disposition of that matterdoes not belong to it any longer: it is not matteritself which gives, which itself gives itself, by virtue of what it is, throughits own impressional It character. gives itself to form, thatis to say by form.It gives itself toform to be in-formed,constituted,apprehendedbyform. But to constitute,even if we abstractfrom transcendentapprehensions,means to make visible, to make
account of the birthof the conceptof ideology out of that of idolatry,cf Jarvis, "'Oldidolatry'"] butas a momentof corporealknowledge,in whichthe body is not opposedto knowingas its only possible object. Caygill commentsthat Kant'suse of the termGemiitin section 29 of the Critique of Judgmentimpliesa modelof the bodyat variance with thatoften impliedin his thinking:"The fit body is no longer external dead materiality, only to be expelled by life, but the site of the movementof life in receivingand expelling,a movementdistributedtopologically in termsof an identical inside/outside.Whilefurther specificationof this concept of the Gemiitmustbe sought outside of the Critique,in the Lectureson Metaphysics from the 1790s, it is clear that it is quite distinctfrom any view of the representational'mind'or 'soul' as the site of commerciobetween opposedmaterialand intelligiblesubstances"[Caygill, "LifeandAestheticPleasure" 89]. From thepoint of view of myargument,however this variance, while it certainlyintroducescomplexity into Kant's ontology of the body, is of no help, since what is argued here is that no movement "distributed topologically in termsof an identical inside/outside"can capturethe materialityof affectivity.Only when the age-old prejudice that what is real must be displayedas an object is brokencan affectivitybe granted the ontological dignityproper to it. A willingness to breakthe

or monism de L'essence la [Adorno, Dialektik] theontological [Henry, logicof identity Negative

manifestation]effective even in many supposed radical dualisms is instead indispensablehere. My thanksto Ross Wilson drawingmy attentionto this article. for

10

advance into the condition of phenomena, means to give. "Sensiblegivens, sensible data" must be understoodin this sense, in the sense of that which, formations,"is infact given "givingitself as matterwith respectto intentional in such a way that an intentionallook crosses it and, throwingit before itself gives it to be seen. [Henry,Phenomenologiematerielle;my trans.] In the original insight of phenomenology, matter, as affective concretion, is phenomenologically fundamental. It is not a "content" which is processed by an intentionalform; it is not given to intentionalitybut is itself that which gives and to which anything can be given. As soon as this matter is turned into data, its is of phenomenologicalcharacter lost. Whathas happenedhere is thatthe character the reductionhas been subreptitiously twisted.The idea of "hyletic"phenomenologyserves the function of locking affectivity back into that context of exteriority-the body as data for intentionality-handed down by tradition.And for this reason, the eminently comes to be blurredand in phenomenologicalgestureof suspendingall transcendence the end identifiedwith an eminentlyunphenomenological gesture,the suspensionof all affectivity. Perhapsat first this must feel to many of you like merelytechnicaltalk:the kindof "nicety of detail"which "disguststhe greatestpartof readers,"and which, in thinking about aesthetic experience in particular, can take or leave.'3Perhapsthis account one feels as thoughit is concernedwith such supertechnical questionsthatnothingaboutso fundamental aspectof experienceas aestheticexperiencecould possibly dependupon an it. In truth,the opposite is the case. Phenomenologyis not epistemology.All "readings" appealto phenomenologies,whetherconsciously or not. But currently they do not really appeal to phenomenology proper,but instead to that placeholderof phenomenology which serves up the dummy subject, the subject from which all singularityhas been predeleted. Until affective impressionalityis recognized as the substance that most certainlyexists, it will continueto be ruledout of courtas merely idiotic, as singular,as personal, as subjective, and it will continue to be the case that the first move in any account of aesthetic experience will be to cross out, to fail accuratelyto listen to, the has experiencethe inquirer actuallyhad, in favor of an experienceshe thinksshe ought to have had, because she thinks other people are likely to have had it. Material phenomenologydoes not so muchdemandthatwe assentto a complex line of argument, as it demandsthat we stop disowning the complexity of our own experience. Let us return,then, to the question: Can the claim that aestheticjudgments are subjectivelyuniversalbe detachedfrom another,thatthey arepromptedby a feeling of disinteresteddelight? If the subject is no longer to be understoodas defined by being what affectivity and substanceare given to, then what the claim describes would also change. The truejudgment of beauty,the moment at which shock or awe break into utterance,will no longer be the expressionof a subjectwhich has first checked thatno pathologicalor moral feeling is at work and which thereforemust suppose that others will sharethisjudgment;it will be insteadmore like the half-involuntary expressionof an impressionwhose singularityor universalitycan never be known in advance.It will of be, that is, truerto Kant'sown insight into the structure reflectivejudgmentthan is his accountof "disinterested whereastheretheparticular searchesfor a universal delight": thatit thinksits own consciousnessof disinterestedness oughtto have securedin advance (even thoughit has not the force to compel this universal),here the singularsearchesfor a universalthat is not only not guaranteedto appear,but not even promised to it. Its propermeasurewill no longerbe the conceptualarraysprovidedby natureandfreedom,
13. Johnson [109]. Johnson went on to offer a qualifieddefense of disgustingdetail.

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but the neither perfectly voluntarynor perfectly involuntarycry of pain or delight: that providedthatone remember painanddelightareamongthe most subtleandcomplex known in us and that such a cry may take the form of a four-hundred-page phenomena philosophicalcomposition.

3 But now we are alreadybroachingour second question. Can this claim, that aesthetic judgmentsaresubjectivelyuniversal,be detachedfromothers,thatthey arenot cognitive but are analogous to cognition;thatthey are not moralbut analogous to morality?The material phenomenologyoutlinedabove necessarilygives an apophaticrole to language. to Languagecould not be, in such a phenomenology,the mediumguaranteed speakthe but ratherthe very element of difficulty,what strives,both in its eloquence and in truth, its stammeringtowardmimesis of an affectivityit can neverperfectlyeitherbe or copy. The question of the fidelity or otherwise of language to experience can only even be raised if it is not presupposedin advance that nothing is hidden, that the truthcannot run awayfrom us. It is a phenomenologyin which, althoughwe cannotrun away from our own experiences,the truthcan very well run away from us: in which, indeed, only this possibility of flight makes it possible for languageto be more or less faithfulto our experience."Faithful" alreadygives the clue thatthe model of truthat workhere is one in which supposedly "aesthetic" and supposedly "ethical" elements are in fact ineliminablefrom the very concept of truthitself. As a clue, thoughby no means as the decisive fact, they are embedded in that word's long career and in our most intimate experiences of it. We speak as readily of a true virtuoso or of a true labor activist, as readily of being trueto an ethical commitmentor to anotherperson, as we do of a true and often thoughtof as "aesthetic" a notion and proposition: thusa notionof authenticity of fidelity often thoughtof as "ethical"are alreadypartof what truthmeans. It is not necessarilycorrectto claimthatonly one of these senses, the correspondence of a propositionto a state of affairs, is the fundamentalor literal sense and that the others are only analogies or metaphors.The long trajectory[cf. Detienne] by which Kantarrivesat his determined of separation the true,good, andbeautifulis an ambivalent one. Fromone point of view some such separationis what makes possible our freedom from certainpresuppositionswhich would now seem quite obviously superstitious: the idea that personal beauty might be a sign of moral worth, for example. Without the categorialseparation,it is hardto avoid theodicy of one kind or another:the categorial separationmakes it possible for ugly truthsto be told. Yet, from anotherpoint of view, this separationis not without its own superstitions:the superstition,for example, that the formal and rhetoricaland prosodic articulation a scientific work form no partof of its truthproperlyso called, but are rather,as it were, mere clothing to a body, body to a soul, ornamentto semanticcontent. Here it will be useful to considerin more detail one example of a way in which an area of experience is remade by the repeated imposition of different aspects of the categorial separation:of a way in which an area of experience is, on the one hand, opened up in such a way as to allow it to be investigated to proceed in detail, and withoutthe considerationof variouscurrentlyinsolublephilosophicalproblemsgetting in the way; and, on the otherhand,to have questionsfundamental it closed down by to The areain questionis experienceof prosody. precisely the same maneuver. When Lord Kames got aroundto "Versification" his Elementsof Criticism,he in considered himself to be embarking,not upon a dryly technical topic, but upon one which would test the critic's highest intellectual powers. "This subject is intimately

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connected with human nature;and to explain it thoroughly,several nice and delicate feelings must be employ'd" [Kames 2: 98]. For Kames versificationhas an intimate connectionwith a most philosophicallyperplexingand difficult subject,humannature. Thinking about versificationwill thereforecontinuallybe to think aboutfundamental questions of psychology and perhapsof philosophy.'4His contemporarycounterpart can remark,by contrast,that"[a]lthough people readandwriteverse, humanbeings are not in themetricians' becausemetricians notknowhow to includethem.Language do loop in the main literaryand linguistic traditionsremainsuncognitive;. . . mind-freerather than cognitive and mindful" [Grimaud 236]. As Giorgio Agamben has noted, "a philosophyof meteris almost altogetherlackingin our age" [Agamben34]. But another moreobviousdifferencebetweenKamesandthe contemporary metriciansis thatKames is trying to tell us how to write good verse, something thought of as falling largely outside the job description arrived at by contemporary metrics. Are these two developmentsconnected?Mightthe shift froman openlyprescriptive practiceof writing about versificationto an insistently descriptivepracticeof writing aboutversification be in some way connectedto the way in which fundamental philosophicalquestionsnot only aesthetic but also ethical, epistemological and metaphysical-are at once (1) conceived of as only a marginalpart of my job as a metricianand (2) nevertheless continuallypresentin the form of only partiallyinvestigatedpresuppositions? Imaginethat I am writing an attemptto formulatethe rules of English meter.It is alreadycontainedin the vocationalidea of such a task at this date thatI am not tryingto say whatthe rules of Englishmeteroughtto be, butto describewhat they are. I may,for example, drawan analogy(which I may admitis a loose analogy)betweengrammatical and metricalcompetence.To formulatethe rules of English meter,in this analogy,will not be like writinga treatiseon usage. It will be like what one does when one writes an account of grammar: to make explicit the knowledge that everyone who is a grammaticallycompetentspeakerof that language alreadyimplicitly has. Just as I do in not need to be able to formulatethe rules of a grammar orderto be able to reador to or write grammatically,so I do not need to be able to formulatethe rules of a speak metric in orderto be able to read or compose metrically. The equivocal word here is "competent." Although it comes forwardas though it were merely descriptive,it is also ineliminablyevaluative.Claims to be grammatically competentin a language may founderfor many reasons. The claimantmay be judged the illiterate,foreign,a poet, or mad.Certainly, vocationalprotocolof puredescriptivism has widened the circle of the permissibly competent. Claims to competence will not now usually founder,as they might once have done, because of the claimant'sclass or geographicallocation. Nevertheless,it is clear thatthe accountof what languageought to be is not so easily deleted from the accountof what it is as would be convenientfor normlessattemptsat linguisticdescription.In practice(a phrasethatappearswith telling frequencyin the studyof prosody,as if to say: stop rockingthe boat) this has causedfew If problemsfor, e.g., generativegrammar. we move to the analogy with metricswe can see that the problembecomes, if not more acute, more visible. Here, for example, is a passage from an outstandingwork which remainsby some distancethe best attemptat the currently no doubt impossible task (for reasons set out in Jarvis, "Prosody as Cognition")of an accountof the rhythmsof English poetry: A metricalform whichbecame verypopular in the sixteenthcentury,at a time when rhythmicregularitywas at a premium,and has been used sporadically
14. Although it cannot quite be said that Kames lives up to this demand, his analysis of versificationis neverthelessof real interest-much moreso thanone wouldhave any idea offrom, for example,Fussell.

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since then, is the "fourteener"; is exactly the samepattern,manifestedas this couplets of seven beats each, and exhibitinga strict syllable count (yielding fourteen syllables per line): No image carved with cunning hand, no cloth of purple dye, B B B B B B B No precious weight of metal bright,no silver plate give I. B B B B B B B Here one canfeel the strongpauses afterfour beats, correspondingto the lineends in thefour-lineform. Do all these examples representa rhythmic form distinctfrom the 4 x 4 structure?Carefulintrospectionas one reads reveals that the answer is no. If one chants ["Mary had a little lamb"] very rhythmically, beating time as one does so, onefinds that it is muchmorenaturaltofollow the second line with a beat in silence, giving the line four beats, than to go straight on to the next line; and thefinal line obviously follows the samepattern,makingup thefull 4 x 4 structure.[Attridge87]. When I firstreadthis passage I was delighted,since I had been making-in a muchless lucid way, no doubtresponsiblefor my failureto persuade-much the same point about one of Cowper'shymnsto a skepticalteacherof practicalcriticism.The teacher'scareful introspection clearly did not producethe same resultsas mine.Whatwas I then to do? If this were science, I could show her the evidence. But "careful introspection"is not science. It is, of course,phenomenology. phenomenologyis presupposed all writings A in aboutrhythmand meter,whetherit is, as quite often, kept quiet about, or whether(as here and elsewhere in Attridge's study) its indispensability,under the term "careful is introspection," admitted.The very attemptto describea metricsplaces a value, then, It uponthe critic'sown introspection. makesthe experimentof supposingthatthe results of this introspectionwill be sharedby that of all competentintrospectors.It is by no meanswrongto do this.Only,a certaindiformationprofessionelle alreadydetermined has thatthis carefulintrospectionwill not be phenomenologyproper,because it will decide in advancethatonly those featuresof what is found in introspectionwhich I can expect to be what others find when they too introspectwill get into the book; because it will decide in advancethatonly those aspectsof introspection fallingundera given vocational demand are relevant introspection.The good and the beautiful are held at the limit. They show up only at the framethatholdsthe inquiryin place:competenceandjudgment are their placeholders.This just because the good has already shrunkor hardenedto vocationalreason;a narrowingor a specificationto contest which, it has alreadybeen admitted, may possibly in a given case be merely superstitious. This organized instrumental rationality,however,is aporetic.Any account of prosody now which did not take into accountthe work of twentieth-century linguistics, in many of its various would be manifest myth-making.Yet who really believes that the truth departments, aboutourexperienceof verse is to be obtainedby addingup the laborsof the phonologist and the phoneticianwith those of the philosopherandthe psychologist?Workproceeds under the rationalethat these departmentsare all ultimately in cooperation,whereas everyone knows thatthe fields arejust as much constitutedby mutualantagonisms. Kant'scategorialseparation raises an aspectof modemrn common sense to a concept, andproducesmoremodemrn common sense in its turn.But whatif truthis not susceptible to this kind of architectonicplacement?What if it is internallyconstellated, so that and moments mimetic, intersubjective, systematicdemandsare each equally important of it? Whatif it participates those otherorderswith which it is not identical,the good in

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fromthemonly thento "bridge" thanbeing merelyinertlyseparated andbeautiful,rather this separation analogy?In thatcase truthmakesa differentdemanduponourwriting by and thinking:one that, as I shall now go on to suggest, has led to the most unexpected kinds of shelterfor the vulnerableequivocalityof the criticalfield.

4 "So, what'snext?Let's assumeI give you all this:yes, we can thinkthatthejudgmentof the beautifulis subjectivelyuniversalwithoutbelieving thatit mustbe occasionedby an experienceof disinteresteddelight;yes, we can thinkthatthejudgmentof the beautiful is subjectively universalwithout thinkingthat it must be noncognitive but analogous with cognition.Thenwhat?What'sourmethodin this case?"But it is preciselymethodwhereverthatmeans a procedureinvariantly appliedto differingobjects-which would delete just the equivocalitythat has here been arguedto be constitutiveof the field of into criticism.Method,thatfearof errorhardened an imaginary againstmaking guarantee mistakes,is in this case the erroritself. An essay,just insofaras it is not a treatise,does but not startfrom presuppositionlessness, from an experience.What I have so far been calling the "equivocal"characterof criticismcould equally be called its "speculative" character. Although Kant'sThirdCritiquehas been shown to have had a centralrole in the formation of Hegel's idea of the speculative proposition [Wohlfart], it is not in speculative the sense thatit, for example,assertsthe identityof identityandnonidentity. It is, in fact, speculativein a sense closer to thatwhich has become primarilypejorative: as whereverspeculationis opposedto certainknowledge.Thereis a long historyto this, a historyby which a word thatat certaintimes and in certainplaces has nameda higher form of cognition has become (above all in nominalist and then Protestantand then Criticism [Ebbersmeyer]. polemic)twinnedwithcredulityor superstition Enlightenment or is speculative:in the eminentsense that,startingwithoutany guarantee even promise of truth,it looks (out) for truth.'5 in "Isn'tall thisjust going to end up with moreparagraphs which SirArthur QuillerCouch examines his own slippers? Is that the kind of stuff you want?"No; just the reverse.Certainly,the diagnosis here is thata belletristicelement to the essay has been of justified in thatit shelters,in an epoch of scientism,the equivocalcharacter partially the field of criticismitself: a field the protocolsof scientismwould ignore, suppress,or critics of the nineteenthor twentiethcenturies delete. Hence it is thatthe most important those who forcedeverythingthatwas once implicitto become explicit, wereby no means nor even always those who were able to give detailedreasonsfor everyjudgment.One trait critics otherwise so quite unalike as Hazlitt and de Man and Adorno share is a weakness for the indemonstrable(or even perhapsfor the demonstrablyfalse) large claim:"Fearis poetry,hope is poetry,love is poetry,hatredis poetry;contempt, jealousy, wonder,pity,despair,or madness,areall poetry";"TheTriumph of remorse,admiration, Life warnsus thatnothing,whetherdeed, word,thought,or text, everhappensin relation, positive or negative,to anythingthatprecedes,follows, or exists elsewhere,but only as a randomevent whose power, like the power of death, is due to the randomnessof its occurrence";"AfterAuschwitz all culture, including its urgent critique, is garbage" [Hazlitt 165; de Man, "ShelleyDisfigured"122;Adorno,NegativeDialektik359]. The scrupulousreading which replies that these claims cannot really be proved, or which as shows thatthereis a good chanceof disprovingthem,is less thanscrupulous a reading
15. Before Latin speculariwas recruitedinto philosophical lexicons, itsfirst sense was "to look outfrom or reconnoiter from a watchtoweror point of vantage" [Ebbersmeyer1355].

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of these claims, because it mishears what might be described, not as their literally syntactical, but as their cognitive, mood. They are not really propositions offered as correspondingadequatelywith a state of affairs.They are a kind of disenchantedecho or of performative apotropaicspeech: they describe a certainstate of affairsas already existing, in orderto bring it about or avert it. In this as in all magnanimitythere is a claims may hidden cost. Yet the criticism that takes care to delete all indemonstrable also have takencare to delete the field of criticismitself. in The pointof the attempt this essay,to set out the equivocalor speculativecharacter of the field of criticismitself, is by no means to pretendto have inventeda new method that for guaranteeing criticismwill be true,noreven a new way of writingcriticism.It is not a new set of protocols but an undeleter:its sole hope is to introducesome small doubts about some of the falsely absolutizedprohibitionsby which critics may come unnecessarilyto preevacuatethe content, the materials,the experiences;the ideas, the concepts,the wishes; the form,the moods, the eloquence-allowed place in theircritical writing. It by no means seeks to object to the circuit of violent or performativeor apotropaicassertion under which the equivocal characterof criticism has sheltered. Indeed it suggests that almost all modem criticism of value has been characterized by its entry into this circuit. It asks, however,underwhat conditions such armormight be doffed. If criticism were no longer to rule nugatoryall propositionsotherthanthose to which it can compel assent, might its mood have less need to be defendedin assertion, If more often subjunctiveor hypotheticalor optativeor interrogative? thatwere so, we to acceptthe way in which the vocationalpersonaecarve up what shouldno longerhave is in truth"one and the same territoryof experience"[CJ 13]. Keston Sutherland,in a adventurous recentstudyof one of ourmost intellectually contemporary poets,has drawn attentionto the marriageof phenomenology and philology in that poet's work. There could be worse models for criticism itself, always rememberingthat marriage,"not a contractualrelationship as far as its essential basis is concerned," is not seamless cooperation,but at once supersedesandpreservesantagonismin love [Hegel, Elements 203]. Such a criticismwould by no means imply a retreatfrom the minuteparticularity of works of artor of nature.Instead,it would no longer need to insist that access to the complexity of phenomenaarises in proportionto the deletion of everything singular aboutmy responseto them.

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