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66 DE GUZMAN VS.

GUADIZ (CIRCUMSTANCES WARRANTING APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL ADMIN) FACTS: Petitioner filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch V, Gapan for the probate of a will alleged to have been executed by one Catalina Bajacan instituting the herein petitioner as sole and universal heir and naming him as executor; that Catalina Bajacan died on February 3, 1977; that on May 10, 1977, the private respondents filed a motion to dismiss and/or opposition contending, among others, that all the real properties of Catalina Bajacan are now owned by them by virtue of a Deed of Donation Inter vivos executed on June 19, 1972 by Arcadia Bajacan and Catalina Bajacan in their favor; that on September 30, 1977, the respondent judge resolved to defer resolution on the said motion to dismiss until the parties shall have presented their evidence; that a motion for the appointment of a special administrator was filed by the petitioner on September 23, 1977 alleging that the unresolved motion to dismiss would necessarily delay the probate of the will and the appointment of an executor; that the decedent's estate consists of eighty (80) hectares of first class agricultural rice land, more or less, yielding fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) worth of rice harvested twice a year; that somebody representing the estate should collect and receive the palay harvests pending the probate of the will; that on December 23, 1977, the repondent judge issued an order denying the motion for appointment of a special administrator. Motion for Recon. DENIED. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the order dated December 23, 1977 denying petitioner's motion for the appointment of a special administrator and the order dated June 9, 1978, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration. HELD: Certiorari granted. Rule 80, Sec. 1, of the Revised Rules of Court provides: Section 1 Appointment of Special Administrator When there is delay in grantingletters testamentary or of administration by any cause including an appeal from the allowance or disallowance of a will, the court may appoint a special administrator to take possession and charge of the estate of the deceased until the questions causing the delay are decided and executors or administrators appointed. Under the above rule, the probate court may appoint a special administrator should there be a delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration occasioned by any cause including an appeal from the allowance or disallowance of a will. Subject to this qualification, the appointment of a special administrator lies in the discretion of the Court. This discretion, however, must be sound, that is, not whimsical, or Contrary to reason, justice, equity or legal principle. The basis for appointing a special administrator under the Rules is broad enough to include any cause or reason for the delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration as where a contest as to the will is being carried on in the same or in another court, or where there is an appeal pending as to the proceeding on the removal of an executor or administrator, or in cases where the parties cannot agree among themselves. Likewise, when from any cause general administration cannot be immediately granted, a special administrator may be appointed to collect and preserve the property of the deceased. It is obvious that the phrase "by any cause" includes those incidents which transpired in the instant case clearly showing that there is a delay in the probate of the will and that the granting of letters testamentary will consequently be prolonged necessitating the immediate appointment of a special administrator. All the facts which warrant the appointment of a special administrator in accordance with Rule 80, Sec. 1 of the Revised Rules of Court are present in the case at bar. The only way to test the validity of the alleged donation in favor of the private respondents is to appoint a special adiu administrator who will have the personality to file the corresponding action. In view of all the foregoing, respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in denying the petitioner's motion for appointment of a special administrator.

67 RELUCIO VS. SAN JOSE (circumstances warranting appointment of special admin) FACTS: Petitioner, Julita Relucio, was appointed administratrix of the testate estate of Felipe Relucio, Sr., qualifying as such on August 24, 1925. Upon petition filed on June 27, 1950 by Lorenzo, Rolando and Leticia Relucio, to which the petitioner filed an opposition, the Court of First Instance of Manila issued an order on January 15, 1951, appointing Rolando Relucio as administrator in substitution of the petitioner. The latter, failing to obtain a reconsideration, filed a notice of appeal. Before the appeal could be perfected, Rolando Relucio moved for the immediate execution of the order appointing him as administrator. In the order of March 20, 1951, however, the court merely made reference to the letters of administration issued in favor of Rolando Relucio and did not pass on the motion for immediate execution. On April 3, 1951, Rolando Relucio filed a motion praying that the petitioner be declared in contempt of court for failing to deliver to him, after demand, all papers, documents, titles and properties of the estate under her administration. In the order dated April 10, 1951, the Court of First Instance of Manila denied this motion for contempt and appointed the Equitable Banking Corporation as special administrator pending the appeal of the petitioner from the order of January 15, 1951. The court ruled that the appeal suspended the appointment of Rolando Relucio as administrator; but in the same breath it justified the appointment of the special administrator by arguing that, if the petitioner has to remain as administratrix during the pendency of her appeal, "a removed administrator may easily nullify such removal by interposing an appeal." Upon denial of her motion for reconsideration, the petitioner instituted in this Court the present petition for certiorari. ISSUE: Whether or not a Special Admin may be appointed HELD: NO. The cases in which a special administrator may be appointed are specified in section 1 of Rule 81 of the Rules of Court which provides as follows: 1. "When there is delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration occasioned by an appeal from the allowance or disallowance of a will, or from any other cause, the court may appoint a special administrator to collect and take charge of the estate of the deceased and executors or administrators thereupon appointed." 2. A special administrator may also be appointed in a case covered by section 8 of Rule 87 which provides as follows: "If the executor or administrator has a claim against the estate he represents, he shall give notice thereof, in writing, to the court, and the court shall appoint a special administrator who shall, in the adjustment of such claim, have the same power and be subject to the same liability as the general administrator or executor in the settlement of other claims. The court may order the executor or administrator to pay to the special administrator necessary funds to defend such claim." There is no pretense that the case at bar is one falling under either section 1 of Rule 81 or section 8 of Rule 87. In any view of the case, there is a regular administrator. Pending her appeal from the order of January 15, 1951, the petitioner had the right to act as administratrix. If the respondent Judge had decreed the immediate execution of the order of January 15, 1951, Rolando Relucio would then be the administrator pending petitioner's appeal. Consequently, the respondent Judge exceeded his jurisdiction in appointing the respondent Equitable Banking Corporation as special administrator.

68 ALCASID VS. SAMSON FACTS: On October 18, 1954, herein respondents filed an application in the Court of First Instance of Albay for the issuance of letters of administration in favor in one of them, Jesus V. Samson, for the estate of the late Jose V. Samson. On the same date, Jesus V. Samson was appointed special administrator of the estate. The application was opposed by petitioners Josefina N. Samson, the widow of Jose V. Samson and her three minor children Glenda N. Samson, Manuel N. Samson and Felix N. Samson. They

asked for the granting of letters of administration in favor of Josefina N. Samson, in the place of Jesus V. Samson. Judge Alcasid, on March 12, 1956, issued an order appointing Antonio Conda, Municipal Treasurer of Libon, Albay, as regular administrator. In that order the special administrator Jesus V. Samson was instructed at the same time, the "twenty (20) days from the receipt of this order he shall turn over all the properties and funds of the estate in his possession to the regular administrator as soon as the latter qualified." Antonio Conda put up the bond fixed by the court and letters of administration were issued in his favor. On April 3, 1956, upon motion of the widow, the court issued an order requiring the special administrator to "deliver the properties and funds of the estate now in his possession to the regular administrator within three (3) days from receipt of this order". It also appears that on March 27, 1956, respondents filed an appeal from the order of the court granting letters of administration in favor of Antonio Conda and their record on appeal was approved on April 17, 1956. On April 20, 1956, they filed a motion seeking to set aside the approval of the bond posted by Antonio Conda as well as the letters of administration issued in his favor. This motion having been denied through an order issued on May 9, 1956, respondents resorted to the appellate courts. On Appeal, the CA set aside the appointment of Conda and annulled his bond. Hence this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the CFI judge (Alcasid) committed abuse of discretion HELD: Negative. It is well to mark that, in the present case, the special administrator was not actually removed by the court, but that he was superseded by the regular administrator by operation of law. Rule 81, section 3, of the Rules of Court specifically provides that When letters testamentary or of administration are granted on the estate of the deceased, the power of the special administrator shall cease, and shall forthwith deliver to the executor or administrator the goods, chattels, money and estate of the deceased in his hands. All told, the case boils down to this: The removal of the special administrator is at the court's sound discretion, and the orders of March 12, and May 9, 1956 show that there were good reasons to terminate the special administration. This being so, the heirs cannot seek to prolong the tenure of the removed special administrator by appealing Conda's appointment as regular administrator. It may be argued that during the appeal, the estate should be under special administration; but it does not appear that Amadeo Samson and his partisans have so asked the court nor have they proposed another administrator and therefore, their complaint against the court's action is unmeritorious. We see no abuse of discretion in the orders of the Court of First Instance complained of. The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the original petition for certiorari filed by the special administrator is ordered dismissed, and the writ denied, with costs against the respondents in this Court, Jesus V. Samson at al. So ordered. 69 De Guzman vs. Angeles 20 June 1988 Facts. Manolito de Guzman died Intestate. Respondent Ellaine , decedents spouse petitioned for the settlement of the intestate estate of Manolito. Alleging all jurisdictional facts and that she is the most qualified and entitled to the grant of letters of administration. Ellaine also filed a motion for Writ of Possession over 5 vehicles, alleged to be conjugal properties of the de Guzmans but in the possession of her Pedro de Guzman, her father in law. The motion stated that as co-owner and heir, she must have possession to preserve the said assets. The lower court granted and appointed the same as special administratrix. Another order was issued clarifying that the order was merely for the preservation of the said assets, since the petitioner resisted the enforcement alleging that they were his personal properties. Pedro then filed the instant petition to annul both orders and a TRO was issued.

Issue WON a probate court may appoint a special administratrix and issue a writ of possession of alleged properties of a decedent for the preservation of the estate in a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of the said deceased person even before the probate court causes notice to be served upon all interested parties pursuant to section 3, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court. Ruling There is no doubt that the respondent court acquired jurisdiction over the proceedings upon the filing of a petition for the settlement of an intestate estate by the private respondent since the petition had alleged all the jurisdictional facts, the residence of the deceased person, the possible heirs and creditors and the probable value of the estate of the deceased Manolito de Guzman pursuant to Section 2, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court. Between the jurisdiction of the probate court over the proceedings for the administration of an estate and its jurisdiction over the persons who are interested in the settlement of the estate of the deceased person. The court may also have jurisdiction over the "estate" of the deceased person but the determination of the properties comprising that estate must follow established rules. In the instant case, no notice as mandated by section 3, Rule 79 of the ROC was caused to be given by the probate court before it acted on the motions of the private respondent to be appointed as special administratrix, to issue a writ of possession of alleged properties of the deceased person in the widow's favor, and to grant her motion for assistance to preserve the estate of Manolito de Guzman. The need for the proper notice even for the appointment of a special administrator is apparent from the circumstances of this case.. Since emergency situations threatening the dissipation of the assets of an estate is not shown in this case, temporary action even w/o required notice is not needed. The instant petition is GRANTED. The questioned orders are hereby set aside. The case is ordered remanded to the lower court for the hearing of the petition with previous notice to all interested parties as required by law. In view of the voluntary inhibition of the respondent Judge, the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Makati is directed to re-raffle the case to another branch of the court. The TRO is made permanent. No costs.

70 Jamero vs. Melicor 26 May 2005 Facts Margarito Jamero, filed for the administration and settlement of the Estate of her deceased mother while respondent Ernesto Jamero his brother opposed the latters petition for appointment as regular administrator of the estate. Respondent court, appointed Atty. Alberto Bautista as special administrator pending the appointment of a regular administrator. Petitioner the filed a motion, past the 15 day reglementary period, said date falling on a Saturday which was denied. Petitioner then filed for certiorari which was denied. He then filed a motion and was also denied. Issue WON the appointment of special administrator is discretionary to the appointing court and that being an interlocutory order, the same is not appealable nor subject to certiorari Ruling The appointment of a special administrator is interlocutory, discretionary on the part of the RTC and non-appealable. However, it may be subject of certiorari if it can be shown that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion or lack of or in excess of jurisdiction. As the Court held in Pefianco vs. Moral, even as the trial courts order may merely be interlocutory and non-appealable, certiorari is the proper remedy to annul the same when it is rendered with grave abuse of discretion. The petition is partially granted. The assailed Resolutions are SET ASIDE and the case is remanded to the CA for further proceedings. No pronouncement as to costs.

71 Heirs of Castillo v Gabriel 11 November 2005 Facts Crisanta Gabriel, wife of Lorenzo died, and her mother commenced an intestate proceeding before the RTC, alleging that the estate is managed by Lorenzo. However, RTC appointed Lorenzo as administrator. The marriage of Crisanta and Lorenzo being bigamous was declared void. Lorenzo was the removed and appointed Mariano Jr. in his stead. Belinda, claiming to be the only legitimate child of the couple filed a motion for intervention. Later Roberto Gabriel, legally adopted son of Crisanta, filed for a petition for probate of an alleged will and for the issuance of letters of testamentary in his favor. Alleging that he was instituted as sole heir of the testatrix and designated as alternate executor for the named executor Francisco, brother of Crisanta, who had predeceased the latter. The 2 special proceedings was consolidated and the probate court appointed Roberto as special administrator. Belinda died and her heirs (Bena Jean et.al.) filed for a motion that they be substituted as party litigants. Roberto also died and his widow filed a Manifestation and Motion and prayed that she be admitted as substitute of her husband. Ben Jean et.al. opposed the manifestation and motion. They averred that Dolores was not Crisantas next of kin, let alone the lawful wife of Roberto thus Dolores refuted in her reply. Mariano Jr.s petiton for certiorari was dismissed. Dolores was appointed by the lower court as special administrator. The probate court merely noted the motion of Bena Jean stating they were mere strangers to the case and their cause could be ventilated in a separate proceeding. Bena Jean filed a petition to the CA and was denied. Hence this petition. Issue WON Dolores appointment as special administrator is in the sound discretion of the court. Ruling The facts of this case show that Roberto the legally adopted son of Crisanta survived Crisantas death. When Crisanta died her estate passed on to her surviving adopted son Roberto. When Roberto himself later died pursuant to the law on succession, his own estate which he inherited from Crisanta passed on to his surviving widow, private respondent. Under Section 1 Rule 80. the probate court may appoint a special administrator should there be a delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration occasioned by any cause including an appeal from the allowance or disallowance of a will. Subject to this qualification, the appointment of a special administrator lies in the discretion of the Court. This discretion, however, must be sound, that is, not whimsical, or contrary to reason, justice, equity or legal principle. It is obvious that the phrase "by any cause" includes those incidents which transpired in the instant case clearly showing that there is a delay in the probate of the will and that the granting of letters testamentary will consequently be prolonged necessitating the immediate appointment of a special administrator. Petition is denied.

72 VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE vs C.A (G.R. No. L-40502 November 29, 1976) Virginia G. Fule filed with the Court of First Instance of Laguna, at Calamba, presided over by Judge Malvar, a petition for letters of administration alleging that Amado G. Garcia, a property owner of Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in the City of Manila, leaving real estate and personal properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in other places, within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court." At the same time, she moved ex parte for her appointment as special administratrix over the estate. Judge Malvar granted the motion. A motion for reconsideration was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia contending that the order appointing Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix was issued without jurisdiction, since no notice of the petition for letters

of administration has been served upon all persons interested in the estate; there has been no delay or cause for delay in the proceedings for the appointment of a regular administrator as the surviving spouse of Amado G. Garcia, she should be preferred in the appointment of a special administratrix; and, Virginia G. Fule is a debtor of the estate of Amado G. Garcia. Preciosa B. Garcia, therefore, prayed that she be appointed special administratrix of the estate, in lieu of Virginia G. Fule While this reconsideration motion was pending resolution before the Court, Preciosa B. Garcia filed a motion to remove Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix alleging, besides the jurisdictional ground her appointment was obtained through erroneous, misleading and/or incomplete misrepresentations; that Virginia G. Fule has adverse interest against the estate; and that she has shown herself unsuitable as administratrix and as officer of the court. An omnibus motion was filed by Virginia G. Fule praying for authority to take possession of properties of the decedent allegedly in the hands of third persons as well as to secure cash advances from the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. Preciosa B. Garcia opposed the motion, calling attention to the limitation made by Judge Malvar on the power of the special administratrix, viz., "to making an inventory of the personal and real properties making up the state of the deceased." Three motions were filed by Preciosa B. Garcia to enjoin the special administratrix from taking possession of properties in the hands of third persons which have not been determined as belonging to Amado G. Garcia; another, to remove the special administratrix for acting outside her authority and against the interest of the estate; and still another, filed in behalf of the minor Agustina B. Garcia, to dismiss the petition for want of cause of action, jurisdiction, and improper venue. Preciosa B. Garcia's challenge to Virginia G. Fule's appointment as special administratrix is another issue of perplexity. Preciosa B. Garcia claims preference to the appointment as surviving spouse. Section 1 of Rule 80 provides that "(w)hen there is delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration by any cause including an appeal from the allowance or disallowance of a will, the court may appoint a special administrator to take possession and charge of the estate of the deceased until the questions causing the delay are decided and executors or administrators appointed. ISSUE WON FULE should be appointed as Special Administrator RULING - Formerly, the appointment of a special administrator was only proper when the allowance or disallowance of a will is under appeal. The new Rules, however, broadened the basis for appointment and such appointment is now allowed when there is delay in granting letters testamentary or administration by any cause e.g., parties cannot agree among themselves. 14 Nevertheless, the discretion to appoint a special administrator or not lies in the probate court. 15 That, however, is no authority for the judge to become partial, or to make his personal likes and dislikes prevail over, or his passions to rule, his judgment. Exercise of that discretion must be based on reason, equity, justice and legal principle. Under the law, the widow would have the right of succession over a portion of the exclusive property of the decedent, besides her share in the conjugal partnership. For such reason, she would have as such, if not more, interest in administering the entire estate correctly than any other next of kin. The good or bad administration of a property may affect rather the fruits than the naked ownership of a property. Virginia G. Fule, however, disputes the status of Preciosa B. Garcia as the widow of the late Amado G. Garcia. With equal force, Preciosa B. Garcia maintains that Virginia G. Fule has no relation whatsoever with Amado G. Garcia, or that, she is a mere illegitimate sister of the latter, incapable of any successional rights. 19 On this point, We rule that Preciosa B. Garcia is prima facie entitled to the appointment of special administratrix. It needs be emphasized that in the issuance of such appointment, which is but temporary and subsists only until a regular administrator is appointed, 20 the appointing court does not determine who are entitled to share in the estate of the decedent but who is entitled to the administration. The issue of heirship is one to be determined in the decree of distribution, and the findings of the court on the relationship of the parties in the administration as to be the basis of distribution. 21 The preference of Preciosa B. Garcia is with sufficient reason. In a Donation Inter Vivos executed by the deceased Amado G. Garcia on January 8, 1973 in favor of Agustina B. Garcia, he indicated therein that he is married to Preciosa B. Garcia. 22 In his certificate of candidacy for the office of Delegate to the Constitutional Convention for the First District of Laguna filed on September 1, 1970, he wrote therein the name of Preciosa B. Banaticla as his spouse

73 TESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED CARLOS GURREA Y MONASTERIO. MARCELO PIJUAN, special administrator-appellee, vs.MANUELA RUIZ VDA. DE GURREA (G.R. No. L-21917 November 29, 1966 Facts: In 1932, appellant Manuela Ruiz hereinafter referred to as Mrs. Gurrea and Carlos Gurrea were married in Spain, where they lived together until 1945, when he abandoned her and came, with their son Teodoro, to the Philippines. Here he lived maritally with Rizalina Perez by whom he had two (2) children. Presently, or on July 29, 1960, she instituted,against Carlos Gurrea a Civil Case of the CFI of Negros Occidental, for support and the annulment of some alleged donations of conjugal property, in favor of his common-law wife, Rizalina. Court issued an order granting Mrs. Gurrea a monthly alimony, pendente lite, of P2,000.00which, was reduced by the C.A to P1,000.00. Carlos Gurrea died on March 7, 1962, leaving a document purporting to be his last will and testament, in which he named Marcelo Pijuan as executor thereof and disinherited Mrs. Gurrea and their son, Teodoro. Thereafter Pijuan was, upon his ex parte motion, appointed special administrator of the estate, without bond. Oppositions to the probate of the will were filed by Mrs. Gurrea, her son, Teodoro, and one Pilar Gurrea, as an alleged illegitimate daughter of the deceased. Mrs. Gurrea filed Special Proceedings a motion alleging that the aforementioned alimony, pendente lite, of P1,000 a month, had been suspended upon the death of Carlos, and praying that the Special Administrator be ordered to continue paying it pending the final determination of the case. This motion having been, she moved for her appointment as administratrix of the estate of the deceased. In an order said motion for reconsideration was denied. The lower court, likewise, denied, for the time being, the motion of Mrs. Gurrea for her appointment as administratrix, in view of the provision of the will of the deceased designating another person as executor thereof. Hence this appeal from said orders It is next urged by Mrs. Gurrea that the lower court erred in denying her petition for appointment as administratrix, for, as widow of the deceased, she claims a right of preference under Section 6 of Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court. ISSUE WON Mrs Gurrea can question the appointment of Special Administrator RULING In the language of this provision, said preference exists "if no executor is named in the will or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate." None of these conditions obtains, however, in the case at bar. The deceased Carlos Gurrea has left a document purporting to be his will, seemingly, is still pending probate. So, it cannot be said, as yet, that he has died intestate. Again, said document names Marcelo Pijuan as executor thereof, and it is not claimed that he is incompetent therefor. What is more, he has not only not refused the trust, but, has, also, expressly accepted it, by applying for his appointment as executor, and, upon his appointment as special administrator, has assumed the duties thereof. It may not be amiss to note that the preference accorded by the aforementioned provision of the Rules of Court to the surviving spouse refers to the appoint of a regular administrator or administratrix, not to that of a special administrator, and that the order appointing the latter lies within the discretion of the probate court,5 and is not appealable.6 WHEREFORE, the orders appealed from are hereby modified, in the sense that Manuela Ruiz Vda. de Gurrea shall receive from the estate of the deceased a monthly allowance of P1,000.00, by way of support, from March 7, 1962, and that, in all other respects, said orders are hereby affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.

74 ROWENA F. CORONA, petitioner, vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. L-59821 August 30, 1982 Facts: Dolores Luchangco Vitug died in New York, U.S.A., leaving two Wills: one, a holographic Will dated October 3, 1980, which excluded her husband, respondent Romarico G. Vitug, as one of her heirs, and the other, a formal Will sworn to on October 24, 1980, or about three weeks thereafter, which expressly disinherited her husband Romarico "for reason of his improper and immoral conduct amounting to

concubinage, which is a ground for legal separation under Philippine Law"; bequeathed her properties in equal shares to her sisters Exaltacion, Vicenta her nieces Rowena and Jennifer ; and appointed Rowena herein petitioner, as her Executrix. Rowena filed a petition for the probate of the Wills before the CFI of Rizal, and for the appointment of Nenita P. Alonte as Administrator because she (Rowena) is presently employed in the United Nations in New York City. The surviving husband, Romarico Vitug, filed an "Opposition and Motion" and prayed that the Petition for Probate be denied and that the two Wills be disallowed on the ground that they were procured through undue and improper pressure and influence, having been executed at a time when the decedent was seriously ill and under the medical care of Dr. Antonio P. Corona,, petitioner's husband, and that the holographic Will impaired his legitime. Romarico further prayed for his appointment as Special Administrator because the Special Administratrix appointed is not related to the heirs and has no interest to be protected, besides, the surviving spouse is qualified to administer. Oppositions to probate with almost Identical arguments and prayers were also filed by respondent (full blood sister, and brother of decedent) The Probate Court set aside its Order appointing Nenita as Special Administratrix, and appointed instead the surviving husband, Romarico as Special Administrator with a bond of P200,000.00, essentially for the reasons that under Section 6, Rule 78, of the Rules of Court, the surviving spouse is first in the order of preference for appointment as Administrator as he has an interest in the estate; that the disinheritance of the surviving spouse is not among the grounds of disqualification for appointment as Administrator; that the next of kin is appointed only where the surviving spouse is not competent or is unwilling to serve besides the fact that the Executrix appointed, is not the next of kin but merely a niece, and that the decedent's estate is nothing more than half of the unliquidated conjugal partnership property. Petitioner (Rowena) resorted to a Petition for certiorari before the C.A to annul, for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion, the Order setting aside the appointment of Nenita as Special Administratrix and appointing in her stead the surviving spouse Romarico. Petitioner stresses that the order of preference laid down in the Rules should not be followed where the surviving spouse is expressly disinherited, opposes probate, and clearly possesses an adverse interest to the estate which would disqualify him from the trust. ISSUE WON lower court is correct in appointing Nenita as Special Administrator? RULING This Court, in resolving to give due course to the Petition taking into account the allegations, arguments and issues raised by the parties, is of the considered opinion that petitioner's nominee, Nenita F. Alonte, should be appointed as co-Special Administrator. The executrix's choice of Special Administrator, considering her own inability to serve and the wide latitude of discretion given her by the testatrix in her Will (Annex "A-1"), is entitled to the highest consideration. Objections to Nenita's appointment on grounds of impracticality and lack of kinship are over-shadowed by the fact that justice and equity demand that the side of the deceased wife and the faction of the surviving husband be represented in the management of the decedent's estate. I t is apropos to remind the Special Administrators that while they may have respective interests to protect, they are officers of the Court subject to the supervision and control of the Probate Court and are expected to work for the best interests of the entire estate, its smooth administration, and its earliest settlement. WHEREFORE, modifying the judgment under review, the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch VI, is hereby ordered, in Special Proceedings No. 9398 pending before it, to appoint Nenita F. Alonte as coSpecial Administrator, properly bonded, who shall act as such jointly with the other Special Administrator on all matters affecting the estate.

81 Liwanag v. Hon. Court of Appeals Facts:

Petitioner Gliceria C. Liwanag was the special administratrix of the estate of Pio D. Liwanag. On 1962, private respondent Manuel Agregado commenced an action for the foreclosure of a real estate mortgage constituted in his favor by said Pio D. Liwanag during his lifetime against her as such special administratrix. Petitioner moved to dismiss Agregado's complaint, upon the ground that as special administratrix she cannot be sued by a creditor of the deceased. The lower court denied the motion. So an appeal to the CA was made. The Court of Appeals issued a writ of preliminary injunction directing respondent Judge to refrain from proceeding with the trial of that case, until further orders. However, on December 3, 1962, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision denying the writ prayed for and dissolving said writ of preliminary injunction, with costs against the petitioner. Hence this appeal taken by petitioner upon the theory that, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 81 of the (old) Rules of Court, "a special administrator shall not be liable to pay any debts of the deceased," and that, accordingly, Agregado has no cause of action against her as a special administratrix. Issue: Whether Liwanag may not be sued as a special administratrix? (yes) Ruling: Section 7 of Rule 86 of the New Rules of Court provides that a creditor holding a claim against the deceased, secured by a mortgage or other collateral security, may pursue any of these remedies: (1) abandon his security and prosecute his claim and share in the general distribution of the assets of the estate; (2) foreclose his mortgage or realize upon his security by an action in court, making the executor or administrator a party defendant, and if there is a deficiency after the sale of the mortgaged property, he may prove the same in the testate or intestate proceedings; and (3) rely exclusively upon his mortgage and foreclose it any time within the ordinary period of limitations, and if he relies exclusively upon the mortgage, he shall not...share in the distribution of the assets. Hence, the Rules of Court do not expressly prohibit making the special administratrix a defendant in a suit against the estate as in this case when respondent has chosen the second remedy by filing an action for foreclosure against the administratrix of the property. Otherwise, creditors would find the adverse effects of the statute of limitations running against them in cases where the appointment of a regular administrator is delayed and the very purpose for which the mortgage was constituted will be defeated 82 Anderson v. Perkins Facts: On 1956, a special proceeding was commenced for the probate of the will of the late Eugene Perkins and for the appointment of Alfonso Ponce Enrile as special administrator of the estate by petitioner Anderson which the CFI of Manila granted even there was an opposition of the surviving spouse, Idonah Slade Perkins. And so, the special administrator submitted an inventory of all the assets which have come to his knowledge as belonging to the deceased. On 1958, the special administrator submitted to the court a petition seeking authority to sell, or give away to some charitable or educational institution or institutions, certain personal effects left by the deceased, which were allegedly deteriorating both physically and in value, in order to avoid their further deterioration and to save whatever value might be obtained in their disposition. On July 9, 1956, Idonah Slade Perkins filed an opposition to the proposed sale. Reasons, for the opposition were that (1) most of the properties sought to be sold were conjugal properties of herself and her deceased husband; and (2) that unauthorized removal of fine pieces of furniture belonging to the estate had been made. The lower court, on December 2, 1958, approved the proposed sale, authorizing the Sheriff of Manila to conduct the same. Oppositor Idonah Slade Perkins moved to reconsider this order on the grounds (1) that said order in effect authorized the special administrator to sell the entire personal estate of the deceased, contrary to Rule 81, section 2. Rules of Court; (2) that said order was issued without a showing that the goods and chattels sought to be sold were perishable, pursuant to Rule 81, section 2, Rules of Court; (3) that the personalty sought to be sold represented the lifetime savings and collections of oppositor; (4) that there is evidence on record showing unauthorized withdrawals from the properties of the estate, and the sale of the inventoried lot would prevent identification and recovery of the articles removed; and (5) that there is also evidence showing oppositor's separate rights to a substantial part of the personal estate.

On February 23, 1959, the lower court denied the above motion for reconsideration. Whereupon, oppositor Idonah Slade Perkins appealed to this court, contending that the personal properties sought to be sold not being perishable, the special administrator has no legal authority to sell them. Issue: Whether the special administrators power to sell is limited to perishable property only. Ruling: The Court stated that the oppositors argument is untenable. Under section 2, Rule 81, of the Rules of Court, the special administrator "may sell such perishable and other property as the court orders sold", which shows that the special administrator's power to sell is not limited to "perishable" property only. It is true that the function of a special administrator is only to collect and preserve the property of the deceased until a regular administrator is appointed. But it is not alone the specific property of the estate which is to be preserved, but its value as well, as shown by the legal provision for the sale by a special administrator of perishable property. It is in line with this general power of the special administrator to preserve not only the property of the estate but also its value, that section 2, Rule 81, also empowers such administrator to sell "other property as the court ordered sold;". However in this case, the proposed sale cannot be made because there is a question of ownership. Until the issue of the ownership of the properties sought to be sold is heard and decided, and the conjugal partnership liquidated; or, at least, an agreement be reached with a appellant as to which properties of the conjugal partnership she would not mind being sold to preserve their value the proposed sale is clearly premature. WHEREFORE, the lower court's order of December 2, 1958 authorizing the special administrator to sell certain personal properties of the estate is set aside, with costs against the special administrator Alfonso Ponce Enrile and petition-appellee Dora Perkins Anderson.

83 Co vs. Rosario et al Facts: Alvin Co was made substitute for Vicente Yu as co-administrator of the estate of Co Bun Chun on 1998. After four years, the RTC revoked the appointment of Alvin Co on the ground that he had become unsuitable to discharge the trust given to him as special co-administrator because his capacity, ability or competence to perform the functions of co-administrator had been beclouded by the filing of several criminal cases against him even there was no conviction yet, had provided the heirs ample reason to doubt his fitness to handle the subject estate with utmost fidelity, trust and confidence. Petitioner moved for a reconsideration but it was denied. An appeal was made to the CA but to no avail. Hence, this appeal under Rule 45. Issue: Whether the RTC erred in removing Alvin Co as a special administrator? No Ruling: The trial court did not act with grave abuse of discretion in revoking Alvin's appointment as special co-administrator. Settled is the rule that the selection or removal of special administrators is not governed by the rules regarding the selection or removal of regular administrators. Courts may appoint or remove special administrators based on grounds other than those enumerated in the Rules, at their discretion. As long as the said discretion is exercised without grave abuse, higher courts will not interfere with it. This, however, is no authority for the judge to become partial, or to make his personal likes and dislikes prevail over, or his passions to rule, his judgment. The exercise of such discretion must be based on reason, equity, justice and legal principles. Thus, even if a special administrator had already been appointed, once the court finds the appointee no longer entitled to its confidence, it is justified in withdrawing the appointment and giving no valid effect

thereto.The special administrator is an officer of the court who is subject to its supervision and control and who is expected to work for the best interest of the entire estate, especially with respect to its smooth administration and earliest settlement. In this case, we find that the trial court's judgment on the issue of Alvin's removal as special coadministrator is grounded on reason, equity, justice and legal principle. It is not characterized by patent and gross capriciousness, pure whim and abuse, arbitrariness or despotism, as to be correctible by the writ of certiorari. In the case at bar, the lower court took into consideration the fiduciary nature of the office of a special administrator which demands a high degree of trust and confidence in the person to be appointed. Since he was burdened with the criminal charges of falsification of commercial documents and that he has the corresponding profound duty to defend himself in these proceedings, Alvin Milton Co's ability and qualification to act as special co-administrator of the estate of the decedent are beclouded, and the recall of his appointment is only proper under the attendant circumstances. Such reasoning by the court a quo finds basis in actual logic and probability. Without condemning the accused man (sic) as guilty before he is found such by the appropriate tribunal, the court merely declared that it is more consistent with the demands of justice and orderly processes that the petitioner's son, who is already bidden to defend himself against criminal charges for falsification in other fora be relieved of his duties and functions as special administrator, to avoid conflicts and possible abuse.

84 ALCASID VS. SAMSON Facts: On October 18, 1954, herein respondents filed an application in the Court of First Instance of Albay for the issuance of letters of administration in favor in one of them, Jesus V. Samson, for the estate of the late Jose V. Samson. On the same date, Jesus V. Samson was appointed special administrator of the estate. The application was opposed by petitioners Josefina N. Samson, the widow of Jose V. Samson and her three minor children Glenda N. Samson, Manuel N. Samson and Felix N. Samson. They asked for the granting of letters of administration in favor of Josefina N. Samson, in the place of Jesus V. Samson. Judge Alcasid, on March 12, 1956, issued an order appointing Antonio Conda, Municipal Treasurer of Libon, Albay, as regular administrator. In that order the special administrator Jesus V. Samson was instructed at the same time, the "twenty (20) days from the receipt of this order he shall turn over all the properties and funds of the estate in his possession to the regular administrator as soon as the latter qualified." Antonio Conda put up the bond fixed by the court and letters of administration were issued in his favor. On April 3, 1956, upon motion of the widow, the court issued an order requiring the special administrator to "deliver the properties and funds of the estate now in his possession to the regular administrator within three (3) days from receipt of this order". It also appears that on March 27, 1956, respondents filed an appeal from the order of the court granting letters of administration in favor of Antonio Conda and their record on appeal was approved on April 17, 1956. On April 20, 1956, they filed a motion seeking to set aside the approval of the bond posted by Antonio Conda as well as the letters of administration issued in his favor. This motion having been denied through an order issued on May 9, 1956, respondents resorted to the appellate courts. On Appeal, the CA set aside the appointment of Conda and annulled his bond. Hence this petition.

Issue: WON there is removal of special administrator? Ruling: The SC ruled in the negative. According to the Court, "It is well to mark that, in the present case, the special administrator was not actually removed by the court, but that he was superseded by the regular administrator by operation of law. The removal of the special administrator is at the court's sound discretion, and the orders of March 12, and May 9, 1956 show that there were good reasons to terminate the special administration. This being so, the heirs cannot seek to prolong the tenure of the removed special administrator by appealing Conda's appointment as regular administrator. It may be argued that during the appeal, the estate should be under special administration; but it does not appear that Amadeo Samson and his partisans have so asked the court nor have they proposed another administrator and therefore, their complaint against the court's action is unmeritorious. 85 Junquera vs Borromeo, et al. Facts: On May 17, 1945, Vito Borromeo executed a testament naming therein Jose H. Junquera as executor. On March 13, 1952, Junquera filed in the CFI of Cebu a petition for probate of said will. The lower court granted said petition. Crispin and Teofilo both surname Borromeo filed separately an opposition to the petition for the probate of the will and they also filed a motion for the removal of herein petitioner as special administrator on the ground that the latter failed to submit an inventory of the estate as required by law. After due hearing, the lower court granted the motion removing the petitioner as special administrator. Hence, this appeal. Issue: WON the court of origin erred when it granted the motion of herein appellees? Ruling: No. The SC affirmed the decision of the lower court and held that the claim of herein petitioner that he has not been able to submit earlier an inventory of the estate because the papers and documents relative thereto were in the possession of one of the heirs who was in Manila and claims to be the owner of one half of the conjugal properties, is TOO FLIMSY to justify the long delay he has incurred in the submission of the requisite inventory. The rule is that, according to the SC, " The appointment and removal of a special administrator lies ENTIRELY in the SOUND DISCRETION of the court". 86 Cosme de Mendoza vs Pacheco Facts: Manuel Soriano was former administrator of the estate of Baldomero Cosme. To assure faithful performance of his duties as such administrator, he filed a bond for P5,000, with the herein appellants, as sureties. Soriano's account, upon approval, showed him indebted to the estate in the sum of P23,603.21. Unable to turn this amount over to the estate upon demand of Rosario Cosme, the new administratrix, the lower court ordered the execution of his bond on November 4, 1932. Sometime later, the court approved a settlement had between the adminstratrix and the ex-administrator, whereby the latter ceded certain real properties to the estate reducing on that account his indebtedness to the estate from P23,603.21 to P5,000. Subsequently, the administratrix had the public sale thereof to collect this amount of P5,000. Separate motions to he discharged from the bond were filed by sureties Pacheco and Cordero. Both motions were denied. A motion by Cordero to reconsider the order of denial met a like fate. Brought on appeal to this court, the appeal was dismissed. When the case was remanded to the lower court, the sureties filed a motion challenging, for the first time, the jurisdiction of the trial court to issue the order of November 4, 1932, executing the bond. The trial court denied the motion in view of the decision of this court. The case is elevated here for the second time on appeal.

Issue: WON the order of the execution of the bond should be declared null and void? Ruling: The order appealed from is affirmed. To begin with, it lies within discretion of the court to select an administrator of the estate of a deceased person (Capistrano vs. Nadurata, 46 Phil., 726, 727). Before an administrator, or an executor, enters upon the execution of his trust, and letters testamentary or of administration are issued, the person to whom they are issued is required to give a bond in such reasonable sum as the court directs, with one or more sufficient sureties, conditioned upon the faithful performance of his trust (Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 643, 662). The administrator is accountable on his bond along with the sureties for the performance of certain legal obligations. It is clear that a Court of First Instance, exercising probate jurisdiction, is empowered to require the filing of the administrator's bond, to fix the amount thereof, and to hold it accountable for any breach of the administrator's duty. Possessed, as it is, with an all-embracing power over the administrator's bond and over administration proceedings, a Court of First Instance in a probate proceeding cannot be devoid of legal authority to execute and make that bond answerable for the very purpose for which it was filed. 91 SEBIAL VS. SEBIAL (1975) On R83.1: The 3 month period provided is not mandatory and the court retains jurisdiction even if the inventory is filed after said period, but such delay, if not satisfactorily explained, may be a ground for the removal of the administrator under R82.2 Short summary: child from decedents second family filed for settlement of estate of her dad and prayed that she be made the administratrix 17 years after death of dad. Child from 1st marriage opposed, saying that the estate was already partitioned among heirs and that they had already disposed of the said properties in favor of 3P and that the estates value was small that it can be settled amicably. CFI ruled in favor of the petitioner 2nd family child making her the administratrix, even ordering that the 3P and the children of the 1st marriage to deliver the property to the administratrix appointed. Court held that 1st, even if the appointed administratrix filed the inventory more than 3 months from appointment, the court still had jurisdiction. 2nd, it ruled that the trial court should first determine the value of the estate, receiving evidence for it, and the ownership of the said properties covered by the estate, it being argued that 3P already own it. It being unsure of WON the properties still belonged to the heirs of the decedent, it was improper for the TC to order the delivery of said properties to the administratrix. Facts: Intestate decedent: Gelacio Sebial (1943) -2 wives 1st marriage: w/ Leoncia Manikis (died 1919) -Had 3 children: Roberta Balbina Juliano 2nd marriage: w/ Dolores Enad (allegedly married, 1927) -Had 6 children: Benjamina Valentina Ciriaco Gregoria Esperanza Luciano 1960: BENJAMINA filed verified petition for settlement of Gelacios estate -prayed that she be made Administratrix

>>ROBERTA OPPOSED: 1. Gelacios estate already partitioned 2. If ever administration proceedings necessary, Roberta was qualified and not Benjamina Roberta Benjamina 1st family 2nd family Resident of Guimbawian, remote town of Housemade working at Talisay, Pinamugajan where the decedents estate was Cebu (70km from Pinamugajan) supposedly located 3. Benjaminas only remedy was to rescund the partition TC: appointed BENJAMINA (so granted the petition of Benjamina) 1. Decedent left an estate consisting of lands 21 ha, valued at more than P6k 2. The alleged partition was invalid and ineffective >>>letters of administration issued to BENJAMINA (January 19, 1961) >>>notice to creditors issued >>>Roberta et. Al filed MR: 1. Estate already partitioned on August 1945 2. Action to recind the partition already prescribed >>>MR denied -Roberta filed MOTION TO TERMINATE ADMIN PROCEEDING 1. Estate valued at less than P6k 2. Estate already partitioned so no necessity for administration proceeding APRIL 27, 1961: BENJAMINA filed inventory and appraisal of decedents estate -7 unregistered parcels of land w/ total of P9k, all located in Guimbawian, Pinamugajan OPPOSITORS: registered opposition to inventory: 7 parcels of land enumerated NO LONGER formed part of decedents estate MAY 1961: administratrix filed MOTION to require Rematado, Demetrio Camillo and Roberta Sebial and spouse to deliver some of the parcels of land covered in the inventory JUNE 1961: PROBATE court suspended action for possibility of amicable settlement, ordered parties to submit own inventories NOV 1961: OPPOSITORS filed own inventory Gelacio and Leoncia (1st wife) acquired 2 parcels of land in 1912 and 1915 The conjugal estate of Gelacio and Dolores consisted only of 1 parcel of land of 7 hectares, and this property was even bought from the conjugal assets of the 1st marriage. This land was also already bought by Cortado 2 parcels of land already partitioned among children: to children of 1st marriage while to children of 2nd marriage 3rd already bought some of the portions of land in the estate TC required administratrix to submit new inventory NOVEMBER 17, 1961 >>>amended inventory: included 2 houses allegedly valued at P8k approved: prima facie evidence that 7 parcels of land and the 2 houses belonged to the decedents estate then later ordered the delivery of certain parcels of land to the administratrix and the claimants should not disturb her in possession and administration of the same 1. 2. The oppositors filed a motion for revision of partition but was not granted ROBERTA filed for MR: Court has NO JURISDICTION: inventory filed beyond 3-m period fixed in R84.1 Inventory is not supported by documentary evidence

3. The 2 houses included in the amended inventory were already demolished during the Japanese invasion and the materials for it were already appropriated by the children of 2nd marriage 4. Valuation in the inventory was fake (it should be P3,080 instead of P17k) 5. Since value of estate is small, it should be settled summarily as provided inR74.2 6. Ordinary action to recover lands in possession of 3P should be resorted to by child of 2nd marriage ... but w/o waiting for resolution of the MR, they filed a notice of appeal w/CA CA: certified case to SC because it involves legal issues ISSUES: 1. WON COURT LOST ITS JURISDICTION TO APPROVE THE INVENTORY WHICH WAS FILED MORE THAN 3 MONTHS FROM DATE OF APPOINTMENT OF ADMINISTRATRIX? NO here: 2. WON THE SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE SHOULD BE DONE SUMMARILY IN ACCORDANCE W/ R74.2 ? 3. WON THE ORDER TO DELIVER PROPERTIES IN QUESTION TO ADMINISTRATRIX WAS PROPER? HELD: As regards to the first issue, 2nd inventory was filed November 17 but administratrix appointed January 19. * The three month period prescribed in section 1, Rule 83 (formerly Rule 84) of the Rules of Court is not mandatory. After the filing of a petition for the issuance of letters of administration and the publication of the notice of hearing, the proper Court of First Instance acquires jurisdiction over a decedents estate and retains that jurisdiction until the proceeding is closed. The fact that an inventory was filed after three month period would not deprive the probate court of jurisdiction to approve it. However, an administrators unexplained delay in filing the inventory may be a ground for his removal (Sec. 2, Rule 82, Rules of Court). With regard to the second issue, the lower court FAILED TO ASCERTAIN by preponderance of evidence THE ACTUAL VALUE OF THE ESTATE, and if there is still an estate to be administered ...approval of the amended inventory is not such administration: such a determination is only PROVISIONAL in character and w/o prejudice to a judgement in a separate action on the issue of title or ownership ...probate court should proceed summarily and expeditiously to terminate the proceedings should strive for an AMICABLE SETTLEMENT (using Article 222, NCC: note however that in the case of Vda de Manalo vs. CA, it was held that there was no need for effort to settle in settlement of estate because said condition precedent was only needed for ordinary civil actions Lastly, NO lower court did not receive evidence to determine who really owns the properties in question! if parties are ALL HEIRS, optional to submit to probate question of ownership and so probate may pass judgement on said question. If fraudulent conveyance: these 3P may be examined under oat as to how they came into possession BUT still, a separate action would be necessary to recover said assets ... 92 GARCIA vs. GARCIA Facts: After Luisa Garcia was appointed special administratrix of the properties left by the deceased Paulina Vasquez Vda. de Garcia, she filed with the competent court an inventory thereof on May 13, 1936 which Teresa Garcia objected and took exception to various items therein. The court denied the same.

Teresa then filed a motion asking that she be appointed special administratrix of the intestate which was after opposition by the administratrix denied by the Court. As Teresa Garcia withdrew her opposition after evidence was adduced tending to show whether or not certain properties belonged to the intestate and, hence, whether they should be included in the inventory, alleging that the lower court had no jurisdiction to do so, the trial court suspended the trial of her opposition. Her motion for consideration was again denied. From the foregoing order Teresa Garcia took this appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not a court has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon the exceptions which an heir takes to an inventory of the properties left by a deceased referring to the inclusion or exclusion of certain properties and credits. HELD: The lower court, therefore, had jurisdiction to hear the opposition of the heir Teresa Garcia to the inventory filed by the special administratrix Luisa Garcia, as well as the observations made by the former as to certain properties and credits, and to determine for purposes of the inventor alone if they should be included therein or excluded there from. In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion and so hold, that a court which takes cognizance of testate or intestate proceedings has power and jurisdiction to determine whether or not the properties included therein or excluded there from belong prima facie to the deceased, although such a determination is not final or ultimate in nature, and without prejudice to the right of the interested parties, in proper action, to raise the question bearing on the ownership or existence of the right or credit. Appealed order affirmed. 93 OCAMPO vs. OCAMPO Facts: Petitioners Dalisay, Vince, Melinda and Leonardo Jr. were the surviving wife and children of the deceased Leonardo. Leonardo and his siblings, respondents Renato and Erlinda were the legitimate children and only heirs of the spouses Vicente and Maxima, who both died intestate. Vicente and Maxima left several properties, mostly situated in Binan, Laguna. Vicente and Maxima left no will and no debts. After the death of Leonardo, petitioners initiated a petition for intestate proceedings in the RTC of Binan Laguna. Through an order, the RTC appointed Dalisay and Renato as special joint administrators of the estate of the deceased spouses, and required them to post a bond of P200,000.00 each. Pending the resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondents, petitioners filed a Motion to Submit Inventory and Accounting, praying that the RTC issue an order directing respondents to submit a true inventory of the estate of the decedent spouses and to render an accounting thereof from the time they took over the collection of the income of the estate. Respondents filed their Comment and Manifestation, claiming that they could not yet be compelled to submit an inventory and render an accounting of the income and assets of the estate in as much as there was still a pending motion for reconsideration of the RTC Order appointing Dalisay as co special administratrix with Renato. The RTC then revoked the appointment of Dalisay as co special administratrix, substituting her with Erlinda. The RTC took into consideration the fact that respondents were the nearest of kin of Vicente and Maxima. After respondents appointment as joint special administrators, petitioners filed a Motion for an Inventory and to Render Account of the Estate, reiterating their stance that respondents, as joint special administrators, should be directed to submit a true inventory of the income and assets of the estate. The

RTC granted petitioners Motion, revoking and terminating the appointment of Renato and Erlinda as joint special administrators, on account of their failure to comply with its Order, particularly the posting of the required bond, and to enter their duties and responsibilities as special administrators, i.e.. the submission of an inventory of the properties and of an income statement of the estate. Upon appeal, the CA found that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in revoking respondents appointment as joint special administrators without first ruling on their motion for exemption from bond. According to the CA, the posting of the bond is a prerequisite before respondents could enter their duties and responsibilities as joint special administrators, particularly their submission of an inventory of the properties of the estate and an income statement thereon. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the probate court, in its discretion, may revoke the appointment of a co special administratrix. HELD: YES, while the RTC considered that respondents were the nearest of kin to their deceased parents in their appointment as joint special administrators, this is not a mandatory requirement for the appointment. It has long been settled that the selection or removal of special administrators is not governed by the rules regarding the selection or removal of regular administrators. The probate court may appoint or remove special administrators based on grounds other than those enumerated in the Rules at its discretion, such that the need to first pass upon and resolve the issues of fitness or unfitness and the application of the order of preference under Section 6 of Rule 78, as would be proper in the case of a regular administrator, do not obtain. As long as the discretion is exercised without grave abuse, and is based on reason, equity, justice and legal principles, interference by higher courts is unwarranted. The appointment or removal of special administrators, being discretionary, is thus interlocutory and may be assailed through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. This Court finds no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC when it revoked the appointment of respondents as joint special administrators, the removal being grounded on reason, equity, justice and legal principle. Indeed, even if special administrators had already been appointed, once the probate court finds the appointees no longer entitled to its confidence, it is justified in withdrawing the appointment and giving no valid effect thereto.

No. 99 Jaroda v. Cusi, Jr. (July 30, 1969) FACTS The Special Proceeding was commenced by Antonio Tan(Tan) alleging in the petition that Carlos Villa Abrille died intestate and that his heirs are his surviving spouse, 9children (among them is petitioner Natividad Jaroda) and 4 grandsons, among them respondent Tan. Tan was appointed special administrator. Tan filed a petition for the withdrawal of sums from PNB alleging that these sums were registered in the name of the deceased but they were actually held in trust for co-owners of Juna Subdivision. CFI granted this motion. CFI issued to Tan letters of administration. Tan filed a petition alleging that the deceased was a manager and co-owner of Juna Subdivision and praying for approval by the court of the power of attorney executed by him, in behalf of the intestate estate, appointing himself to sell share of the estate in the subdivision lots. CFI granted the petition. Jaroda moved to nullify the 2 CFI orders. CFI denied the motion for lack of merit. Jaroda elevated the case to theSC. ISSUES (1) W/N the CFI Order allowing the withdrawal of bank deposits was in abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction?

(2) W/N the CFI Order approving the power of attorney is valid. HELD: 1. YES. Said withdrawal is foreign to the powers and duties of a special administrator (Rule 80.2) The CFI order was issued without notice to, and hearing of, the heirs of the deceased. The withdrawal of the bank deposits may be viewed as within the powers and duties of a special administrator; but actually, it is a waiver by the special administrator of a prima facie exclusive right of the intestate estate to the bank deposits in favor of the co-owners of the Juna Subdivision. The bank deposits were in the name of the deceased so they belong prima facie to his estate after his death. And until the contrary, the special administrator is without power to make the waiver or to hand over part of the estate to other persons on the ground that the estate is not the owner thereof. 2. NO. The CFI order is void for want of notice and for approving an improper contract or transaction. Section 4 of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court, relied on by respondent Tan to sustain the power of attorney for the sale of the pro-indiviso share of the estate in the subdivision requires "written notice to the heirs, devisees, and legatees who are interested in the estate to be sold" and, admittedly, administrator Tan did not furnish such notice. Without such notice, the order of the court authorizing the sale is void. An administrator is not permitted to deal with himself as an individual in any transaction concerning trust property. This is because of the view of the fiduciary relationship that they occupy with respect to the heirs of the deceased and the irresponsibilities toward the probate court. By the CFIs order, administrator Tan came to be the agent of two different principals: the court and the heirs of the deceased on the one hand, and the majority co-owners of the subdivision on the other, in managing and disposing of the lots of the subdivision. This dual agency of Tan rendered him incapable of independent defense of the estate's interests against those of the majority co-owners. No. 100 MAURO P. MANANQUIL vs. ATTY. CRISOSTOMO C. VILLEGAS [A.M. No. 2430 August 30, 1990]

FACTS: Villegas was retained as counsel of record for Felix Leong, who was appointed as administrator of the Testate Estate of the Felomina Zerna. A lease contract dated August 13, 1963 was executed between Felix Leong and the "Heirs of Jose Villegas" involving, sugar lands of the estate. Formal partnership of HIJOS DE JOSE VILLEGAS was formed amongst the heirs of Jose Villegas, of which Atty. Villegas was a member. Atty. Villegas was appointed manager of HIJOS DEJOSE VILLEGAS by the majority of partners. Renewals of the lease contract were executed between Felix Leong and HIJOS DE JOSE VILLEGAS in 1975 and in 1978, with respondent signing therein as representative of the lessee. Mananquil alleges that over a period of 20 years, Villegas allowed lease contracts to be executed between his client Felix Leong and a partnership, HIJOS DE JOSE VILLEGAS, of which he (Villegas) is one of the partners, covering several parcels of land of the estate under iniquitous terms and conditions. Moreover, Mananquil charges that these contracts were made without the approval of the probate court and in violation of Articles 1491 and 1646 of the new Civil Code. The Sol. Gen. found that Villegas committed a breach in the performance of his duties as counsel of administrator Felix Leong when he allowed the renewal of contracts of lease for properties involved in the testate proceedings to be undertaken in favor of HIJOS DE JOSE VILLEGAS without notifying and securing the approval of the probate court. However, the Solicitor General opined that there was no sufficient evidence to warrant a finding that Villegas had allowed the properties to be leased in favor of his family partnership at a very low rental or in violation of Articles 1491 and 1646 of the new Civil Code. Thus, the Sol. Gen recommended his suspension from the practice of law for a period of THREE (3) months with a warning that future misconduct on respondent's part will be more severely dealt with. ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent committed acts of misconduct in failing to secure the approval of the court in Special Proceedings No. 460 to the various lease contracts executed between Felix Leong and respondent's family partnership. HELD: The Court finds no merit to complainant's charge. Pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 84 of the Revised Rules of Court, a judicial executor or administrator has the right to the possession and management of the real as well as the personal estate of the deceased so long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts and the expenses of administration. He may, therefore, exercise acts of administration without special authority from the court having jurisdiction of the estate. It has long been settled that an administrator has the power to enter into lease contracts involving the properties of the estate even without prior judicial authority and approval. Thus, Villegas validly executed the contracts. Nevertheless, the SC finds sufficient evidence to hold Villegas subject to disciplinary sanction for having, as counsel of record for the administrator in Special Proceedings No. 460, participated in the execution in 1975 and 1978 of renewals of the lease agreement involving properties of the estate in favor of the partnership HIJOS DE JOSE VILLEGAS, of which Villegas is a member and in 1968 was appointed managing partner. By virtue of Article 1646 of the new Civil Code, the persons referred to in Article 1491 are prohibited from leasing, either in person or through the mediation of another, the properties or things mentioned in that article, to wit: xxx (3) Executors and administrators, the property of the estate under administration xxx The Court cannot ignore the obvious implication that respondent as one of the heirs of Jose Villegas and partner, later manager of, in HIJOS DE JOSEVILLEGAS stands to benefit from the contractual relationship created between his client Felix Leong and his family partnership over properties involved in the ongoing testate proceedings. The prohibition referred to in Articles 1491 and 1646 of the new Civil Code, as far as lawyers are concerned, is intended to curtail any undue influence of the lawyer upon his client on account of his fiduciary and confidential association. Thus, the law makes the prohibition absolute and permanent. The Court finds sufficient grounds to suspend respondent from the practice of law for a period of three (3) months.

No. 101 FELICISIMO C. JOSON, vs. EDUARDO JOSON, ET AL FACTS Tomas Joson died in Nueva Ecija leaving behind heirs and properties. He married three times and was survived by nine (9) heirs. His will was presented to the CFI Nueva Ecija by his son Felicisimo Joson for probate. Felicisimo Joson was appointed administrator of the estate and, accordingly, he filed an inventory of the properties left by the deceased. The administrator filed his first account and second account for the year 1945-1947 and was ordered by the court to be examined but the same has never been approved. For the third time he filed another account for the year 1947-1948 and, upon motion of the heirs, he was ordered to file an accounting covering the properties under his administration. Eduardo Joson, one of the heirs, filed an opposition to all the accounts filed by the administrator where he alleged that the administrator diminished the shares of the heirs and filed another motion praying the court to order the administrator to post a bond. The administrator submitted an amended statement of accounts for the same years which were objected by two more heirs on the ground that the income short of what was actually received and expenses much bigger than those actually incurred by him.

For the meantime, the heirs were able to compromise and entered into an extrajudicial settlement. But, the court was never informed of this extrajudicial settlement. It issued an order requiring the administrator to file an accounting of his administration, which accordingly the administrator complied with. The administrator filed a motion to declare the proceedings closed and terminated and to relieve him of his duties as such. Heir Eduardo Joson filed an opposition. The court issued an order declaring the proceedings terminated and relieving the administrator not only of his duties as such but also of his accounts notwithstanding the heirs' opposition to said accounts. Hencethisappeal. ISSUES: (1) W/N the duty of an administrator to make an accounting of his administration a mere incident which can be avoided once the estate has been settled?; (2) W/N the proceedings deemed terminated by the mere execution of an extrajudicial partition of the estate without the necessity of having the accounts of the administrator heard and approved by the court?; and (3) W/N the administrator ipso facto relieved of his duty of proving his account from the moment said partition has been executed? HELD: Section 1 of Rule 86 categorically charges an administrator "with the whole of the estate of the deceased which has come into his possession at the value of appraisement contained in the inventory; with all the interest, profit, and income of such an estate; and with the proceeds of so much of the estate as is hold by him, at the price at which sold." Section 8 of the same rule imposes upon him the duty to render an account of his administration within one year from his appointment, unless the court otherwise directs, as well as to render such further accounts as the court may require until the estate is fully settled. Section 10 likewise provides that before an account of the administrator is allowed notice shall be given to all persons interested of the time and place of examining and allowing the same. And finally Section 9 expressly directs that the court shall examine the administrator upon oath with respect to every matter relating to his account except when no objection is made to the allowance of the account and its correctness is satisfactorily established by competent testimony. It thus appears that the duty of an administrator to render an account is not a mere incident of an administration proceeding which ran be waived or disregarded when the same is terminated, but that it is a duty that has to be performed and duly acted upon by the court before the administration is finally ordered closed and terminated. In this case, the administrator has submitted his accounts for several years upon requirement of the court, to which accounts the heirs have seasonably submitted their opposition. And when the administrator moved the court to close the proceedings and relieve him of his administration and of his accounts, the heirs objected to the closing of the proceedings but the court ignored their opposition and granted the motion. Verily, the trial court erred in acceding to the motion for in doing so it disregarded the express provisions of our rules relative to the settlement of accounts of a judicial administrator. The extrajudicial settlement and partition cannot in any way be interpreted as a waiver of the objections of the heirs to the accounts submitted by the administrator because there is nothing provided in said partition that the aforesaid accounts shall be deemed waived or condoned and cannot be considered as release of the obligation of the administrator to prove his accounts.

102

TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE DOMINADOR TUMANG, MAGDALENA A. TUMANG, administratrixappellee, vs. GUIA T. LAGUIO AND HER MINOR CHILDREN, movants-appellants. G.R. No. L-50277 February 14, 1980 FACTS: This case involved the estate of the late Dominador Tumang in which the widow of the deceased, Magdalena A. Tumang, administratrix and executrix of the will, filed a petition to declare the testate proceedings definitely terminated and closed with respect to herself and two of her children Melba Tumang Ticzon and Nestor A. Tumang. The petition was premised on the fact that the aforesaid heirs had already acknowledged receipt of the properties adjudicated to them, and in order for such properties to be transferred in their names, there was need for an order of the court declaring the proceedings closed with respect to the aforesaid heirs. The petition was opposed by appellant Guia T. Laguio and her children on the ground that appellee, as administratrix and executrix, had not yet delivered all properties adjudicated to them. Moreover, the oppositors contended that there could be no partial termination of the proceedings. During the hearing of the motion to withdraw petition, Magdalena Tumang, as required by the court, filed a pleading captioned "Compliance", alleging that as shown by the attached receipts issued by the BIR, the estate and inheritance taxes had been fully paid; that as certified by the Deputy Clerk of Court, no claim has been presented that has not already delivered all the properties and dividends of the shares of stock adjudicated to her and her minor children since the approval of the original and amendatory projects of partition; and that with such admission, the court no longer has jurisdiction to entertain the motion under consideration. The trial court considered the motion to require administratrix to render an accounting untenable, as the final accounting of the administratrix was already approved and therefore denies the motion of oppositor and counter-petitioner dated Jan. 25, 1971. A motion for reconsideration of the foregoing Order was filed by Guia T. Laguio and her minor children. On August 16, 1971, the court a quo issued the second questioned Order denying the motion for reconsideration. ISSUE: Whether or not the court should have required the executrix to render an accounting of the cash and stock dividends received after the approval of her final accounts. HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that Section 8 of Rule 85 provides that the "executor or administrator shall render an account of his administration within one (1) year from the time of receiving letters testamentary or of administration ..., and he shall render such further accounts as the court may require until the estate is wholly settled." In the instant case, further accounts by the executrix appear to be in order, in view of the fact that the dividends sought to be accounted for are not included in the final accounts rendered by the executrix. It appears that the interests of all the parties will be better served and the conflict between petitioners and respondent will be resolved if such additional accounting is made. Further, "it has been held that an executor or administrator who receives assets of the estate after he has filed an account should file a supplementary account thereof, and may be compelled to do so, but that it is only with respect to matters occurring after the settlement of final account that representatives will be compelled to file supplementary account." It is only in a case where the petition to compel an executor to account after he has accounted and has been discharged fails to allege that any further sums came into the hands of the executor, and the executor specifically denies the receipt of any further sums that the accounting should be denied. There is no question that in the instant case, the fact that the executrix received funds of the estate after the approval of her final accounts and before the issuance of an order finally closing the proceedings is

admitted. She must, therefore, account for the same, in consonance with her duty to account for all the assets of the decedent's estate which have come into her possession by virtue of her office. 6 An executor should account for all his receipts and disbursements since his last accounting. 7

103 RODRIGUEZ V SILVA 90 PHIL 752 FACTS: This appeal is from a decision made by the Court of First Instance of Manila authorizing the cancellation of the bond of Pablo M. Silva who had resigned as joint administrator of the intestate estate of Honofre Leyson, deceased, and allowing Silva P600 as compensation for his services. The appellants are the remaining administrator and an heir of the deceased. It was elevated to the Supreme Court on pure questions of law as manifested by the disputing parties. ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in granting Pablo M. Silva's motion and ordering the cancellation of his bond and authorizing him to collect from the estate the sum of P600.00 as his administrator's fees, inasmuch as said order is not in accordance with the provisions section 7, Rule 86 of the rules of Court. RULING: The Supreme Court cited Sections 7, Rule 86 which provides: SEC. 7. What expenses and fees allowed executor or administrator. Not to charge for services as attorney. Compensation provided by will controls unless renounced. An executor or administrator shall be allowed the necessary expenses in the care, management, and settlement of the estate, and for his services, four pesos per day for the time actually and necessarily employed, or a commission upon the value of so much of the estate as comes into his possession and is finally disposed of by him in the payment of debts, expenses, legacies, or distributive shares, or by delivery to heirs or devises, of two per centum of the first five thousand pesos of such value, one per centum of such value as exceeds five thousand pesos and does not exceed thirty thousand pesos, one-half per centum of so much of such value as exceeds thirty thousands pesos and does not exceed one hundred thousand pesos, and one-quarter per centum of so much of such value as exceeds one hundred thousand pesos. But in any special case, where the estate is large, and the settlement has been attended with great difficulty, and has required a high degree of capacity on the part of the executor or administrator, a greater sum may be allowed. If objection to the fees allowed be taken, the allowance may be reexamined on appeal. If there are two or more executors or administrators, the compensation shall be apportioned among them by the court according to the services actually rendered by them respectively. When the executor or administrator is an attorney he shall not charge against the estate any professional fees for legal services rendered by him. When the deceased by will makes some other provision for the compensation of his executor, that provision shall be a full satisfaction for his services unless by a written instrument filed in the court he renounces all claim to the compensation provided by the will. The High Court stated that the cited provision showed that a greater sum may be allowed "in any special case, where the estate is large, and the settlement has been attended with great difficulty, and has required a high degree of capacity on the part of the executor or administrator." And so it has been held that "the amount of an executor's fee allowed by the Court of first Instance in any special case under the provisions of Section 680 of the Code of Civil Procedure is a matter largely in the discretion of the probate court, which will not be disturbed on appeal, except for an abuse of discretion." The order of which the appellants complain does not state the work performed by the appellee, but the inventory shows the appraised value of the estate to be P22,116.46, itemized as follows: Cash on deposit in the Philippine National Bank P8,159.43 ....................... Accounts receivable 500.00

....................................................................... Real Estate ........................................................................................ 12,061.03

Personal Property 1,291.00 ............................................................................ And it is stated in the appellee's brief that prior to his appointment and that of Victorio L. Rodriguez as joint administrators, Justa Gomez, the decedent's cousin with whom Leyson lived was special administratrix; that during Justa Gomez's incumbency which lasted till December 8, 1947, the lease holdings of the said estate were renting about 900.00 a month; that after appellee's appointment, and through his initiative, their income was increased to P1,300.00 and two parcels of land located in San Juan, Rizal, were paid for in full and the corresponding certificates of title secured. It also asserted, and not denied, that the appellee was instrumental in the gathering of decedent's personal effects, and that as the result of his motion a court order, whereby Margarita Leyson Laurente, one of the now appellants, had been authorized to withdraw from the bank P3,400 as advance payment of her share of the inheritance, was reconsidered and set aside. The fact that the appellee is an attorney-at-law has served the estate in good stead, has served the estate in good stead, and this ought not be lost sight it. Although being a lawyer is by itself not a factor in the assessment of an administrator's fee, it should be otherwise as in this case the administrator was able to stop what appeared to be an improvident disbursement of a substantial amount without having to employ outside legal help at an additional expense to estate. 104 PHILTRUST CO. V LUZON SURETY (2 SCRA 122) FACTS: The Court of First Instance of Manila appointed Francis R. Picard, Sr. as Administrator the Intestate Estate of the deceased James R. Burt upon a bond of P1,000.00. Thereafter he submitted and the Court approved his bond in the required amount, with appellant Luzon Surety Co., Inc. as his surety. For reasons that do not fully appear of record, on May 1, 1948 the Court dismissed Picard as administrator and appointed the Philippine Trust Co. in his place. After qualifying for the position, the latter, submitted an inventory-report showing that the only asset of the Intestate Estate of Burt that came into its possession was the sum of P57.75 representing the balance of the checking account of said deceased with the Philippine National Bank. The Court reviewed the inventory of the estate from which it appeared that the sole property Picard found was the amount of P8,873.73 in current account with the Philippine National Bank. This amount was reduced to P7,986.53 after deducting therefrom his expenses in the amount of P887.22; and as reported by him in his petition, the further expenses in the amount of P865.20 were deducted, thereby leaving the balance of P7,121.33 as of May 27, 1948. The Court ordered Picard, to deliver within forty-eight hours (48) from the receipt of a copy of the order the difference of P7,063.58 to the present Administrator, Philippine Trust Company. In compliance with the courts order, Picard, submitted an itemized statement of disbursements made by him as administrator of the estate, showing that as of February 6, 1947 the estate funds amounted to P7,986.53; that on June 8, 1948 he reported to the Court additional expenses incurred amounting to P865.20, thus leaving a balance of P7,121.33; that thereafter he disbursed the sum of P250.00 to defray the burial expenses of the deceased, thus leaving a balance of P6,871.33; that on several occasions during the period from February 22, 1946 to May 14, 1947, he had delivered to Feliciano Burt adoptive son of the deceased James R. Burt different sums of money totalling P5,825.00, thus leaving a balance of P972.33. After considering this statement, the Court issued an order finding Picard, guilty of having disbursed funds of the estate amounting to about P8,000.00, without authority. The Court issued an order requiring appellant Luzon Surety Co., Inc. to show cause why the administrator's bond filed by it on behalf of Picard would not be confiscated. Appellant filed a motion to set aside said order upon the following grounds: firstly, that the Court cannot order the confiscation of the administrator's bond, on prejudice or injury to creditors, legatees or heirs of the estate of James R. Burt having been shown, and secondly, that "a probate court cannot, ex proprio motu, prosecute the probate

bond." On August 3, 1957 the Court denied appellant's motion and ordered the confiscation of its bond. After the denial of appellant's lotion for reconsideration, it took the present appeal. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the probate court can order the confiscation or forfeiture of an administrators bond? 2. Whether or not appellant is absolved from liability as surety due to absence of notice of the proceedings? RULING: 1. The Supreme Court held that appellant's contention that the probate court, ex proprio motu, cannot order the confiscation or forfeiture of an administrator's bond, is clearly without merit. It ruled that a probate court is possessed with an all-embracing power not only in requiring but also in fixing the amount, and executing or forfeiting an administrator's bond. The execution or forfeiture of an administrator's bond, is deemed be a necessary part and incident of the administration proceedings as much as its filing and the fixing of its amount. The rule, therefore, is that the probate court may have said bond executed in the same probate proceeding. Moreover, the condition of the administrator's bond in question is that Francis L. Picard shall faithfully execute the orders and decrees of the court; that if he did so, the obligation shall become void, otherwise it shall remain in full force and effect. In having been established that Picard disbursed funds of the estate without authority, the conclusion follows that he had and his surety became bound upon the terms of their bond. 2. The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. The High Court reasoned that from the nature of the obligation entered into by the surety on an administrator's bond which makes him privy to the proceedings against his principal he is bound and concluded, in the absence of fraud and collusion, by a judgment against his principal, even though said surety was not a party to the proceeding. It cited Section 11, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court which provides that upon the settlement of the account of an executor or administrator, his sureties "may upon application, be admitted as a party to such accounting." The import of this provision is that the sureties are not entitled to notice but may be allowed to intervene in the settlement of the accounts of the executor or administrator if they ask for leave to do so in due time. 105 QUASHA PENA VS. LCN CONST. G.R No. 174873 August 26, 2008 FACTS: Raymond Triviere passed away on December 14, 1987. On January 13, 1988, proceedings for the settlement of his intestate estate were instituted by his widow, Amy Consuelo Triviere, before the RTC of Makati City Atty. Enrique P. Syquia and Atty. William H. Quasha of the Quasha Law Office, representing the widow and children of the late Raymond Triviere, respectively, were appointed administrators of the estate of the deceased in April 1988. As administrators, Atty. Syquia and Atty. Quasha incurred expenses for the payment of real estate taxes, security services, and the preservation and administration of the estate, as well as litigation expenses. In February 1995, Atty. Syquia and Atty. Quasha filed before the RTC a Motion for Payment of their litigation expenses but the RTC denied the said motion in May 1955. In 1996, Atty. Quasha also passed away. Atty. Redentor Zapata also of the Quasha Law Office, took over as the counsel of the Triviere children, and continued to help Atty. Syquia in the settlement of the estate. On 6 September 2002, Atty. Syquia and Atty. Zapata filed another Motion for Payment, for their own behalf and for their respective clients. On the other hand, LCN, the only remaining claimant against the Intestate Estate of the Late Raymond Triviere filed its Comment on/Opposition to the Motion on 2. LCN countered that the RTC had already resolved the issue of payment of litigation expenses when it denied the first Motion for Payment filed by Atty. Syquia and Atty. Quasha for failure of the administrators to submit an accounting of the assets and expenses of the estate as required by the court. Eventually, the RTC granted the second Motion for Payment; however, it reduced the sums to be paid. LCN, then filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied by the RTC. Recourse was then resorted to the Court of Appeals. On May 2006, the Court of Appeals promulgated a Decision

essentially ruling in favor of LCN. While the Court of Appeals conceded that Atty. Syquia and the Quasha Law Office, as the administrators of the estate of the late Raymond Triviere, were entitled to administrator's fees and litigation expenses, they could not claim the same from the funds of the estate. ISSUE: Whether or not Quasha Law Office is entitled to payment of the expenses incurred as executor or administrator of the estate of Triviere. HELD: No. Section 7, Rule 85 of the Revised Rules of Court, which reads: Section 7. What expenses and fees allowed executor or administrator. Not to charge for services as attorney. Compensation provided by will controls unless renounced. When the executor or administrator is an attorney, he shall not charge against the estate any professional fees for legal services rendered by him. The afore-quoted provision is clear and unequivocal and needs no statutory construction. Here, in attempting to exempt itself from the coverage of said rule, the Quasha Law Office presents conflicting arguments to justify its claim for attorney's fees against the estate. At one point, it alleges that the award of attorney's fees was payment for its administration of the estate of the late Raymond Triviere; yet, it would later renounce that it was an administrator. 106 SISON VS. TEODORO 100 Phil 1055 FACTS: On December 20, 1948, the Court of First Instance of Manila, which has jurisdiction over the estate of the late Margarita David, issued an order appointing Carlos Moran Sison as judicial administrator, without compensation, after filing a bond in the amount of P5,000. The next day, Carlos Moran Sison took his oath of office and put up the requisite bond which was duly approved by the court. On the same day, letters of administration were issued to him. On January 19, 1955, the judicial administrator filed an accounting of his administration which contains, among others, the following disbursement items: 13. Paid to Visayan Surety & Insurance Corporation on August 6, 1954, as renewal premiums on the Administrator's bond of Judicial Administrator Carlos Moran Sison covering the period from December 20, 1949 to December 20, 1954, inclusive ................................. P380.70 15. Paid to Visayan Surety & Insurance Corporation on December 21, 1954, for premiums due on the Administrator's bond of judicial Administrator Carlos Moran Sison for the period from December 21, 1954 to December 21, 1955 ............................................................... 76.14 Narcisa F. Teodoro, one of the heirs, objected to the approval of the above- quoted items on the grounds that they are not necessary expenses of administration and should not be charged against the estate. On February 25, 1955, the court approved the report of the administrator but disallowed the items objected to on the ground that they cannot be considered as expenses of administration. The administrator filed a motion for reconsideration and when the same was denied, he took the present appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not a judicial administrator, serving without compensation, is entitled to charge as an expense of administration the premiums paid on his bond. HELD: No. Expense incurred by an executor or administrator to produce a bond is not a proper charge against the estate. Section 680 of the Code of Civil Procedure (similar to section 7, Rule 86) does not authorize the executor or administrator to charge against the estate the money spent for the presentation, filing, and substitution of a bond.

107 UY TIOCO vs. IMPERIAL 53 Phil 802 FACTS: Respondent Panis was counsel for the administration of said estate and that he on October 31, 1927, before the final settlement of accounts, presented a motion in the probate proceedings for the allowance of attorney's fees in the sum of P15,000. On December 5, 1927, the respondent judge, over the objections in writing presented by the administrator, granted the motion and allowed the fees claimed by Panis. The administrator, herein petitioner, did not appeal from the order of the court, but on February 8, 1928, Jacinto Yangco, in his capacity as guardian ad litem of the minors Pedro and Bruno Uy Tioco, the sons and then the only heirs of the deceased, presented a motion for reconsideration under section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure on the grounds that he was not notified of the motion for the allowance of fees and had no knowledge thereof or of the order granting the motion until a few days before the filing of there motion for reconsideration; that the fees allowed Panis were excessive and prejudicial to the interest of the estate. But this motion was denied. On February 23, 1928, the guardian ad litem excepted to the order of February 15, 1928, and gave notice of his intention to appeal to the Supreme Court. On the 28th of the same month, Attorney Felix Wijangco, on behalf of Panis, filed a motion in the probated proceedings in which be set forth that the minor Bruno Uy Tioco is now deceased and that his share of inheritance will go to his father, the herein petitioner. To this motion the guardian ad litem objected. The respondent judge ordered the administrator to make payment of three-fourths of P15,000 within five days. The administrator refused to make such payment. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner may be compelled to pay the sum of Php11,250 to the respondent out of the funds of the estate of the deceased. HELD: No. The arguments submitted indicate a misconception of the character of the liability for the attorney's fees are claimed are supposed to have been rendered to the executor or administrator to assist him in the execution of his trust. The attorney can therefore not hold the estate directly liable for his fees; such fees are allowed to the executor or administrator and not to the attorney. The liability for the payment rests on the executor or administrator, but if the fees paid are beneficial to the estate and reasonable, he is entitled to the reimbursement from the estate. Such payment should be included in his accounts and the reimbursement therefore settled upon the notice prescribed in section 682 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 108 RODRIGUEZ VS. YNZA November 18, 1955 FACTS: Appeal from the orders of the CFI of Iloilo authorizing payment to Atty. Benjamin H. Tirol for professional services. Appelant objects to said payment on the ground that Hugo p. Rodriguez, trustee of the estate of Julia Ynza, being a member of the bar, he did not need the assistance of Atty. Tirol, and that, at any rate, the latter had rendered legal services, not to the estate of Julia Ynza, but to said Hugo Rodriguez in his individual capacity. ISSUE: Whether or not the objection is tenable. HELD:

No. Rodriguez was named trustee by reason of his qualifications, not as a lawyer, but as administrator. It appears that Rodriguez was involved in eight cases, not in his private capacity, but as trustee or administrator of the estate of Julia Ynza, deceased and the properties constituting said estate were being claimed by appellant, therefore, that as counsel for Rodriguez in said cases, Atty. Tirol had rendered services for the benefit of the estate of Julia Ynza, which obtained a favorable decision in every one of said cases.