No. L-21289. October 4, 1971.

MOY YA LIM YAO alias EDILBERTO AGUINALDO LIM and LAU YUEN YEUNG, petitioners-appellants vs. THE COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION, respondent-appellee.

Citizenship; Alien woman who marries a Filipino citizen ipso facto becomes a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under section 4 of Commonwealth Act 473.Section 15 of the Naturalization Law has been taken directly, copied and adopted from its American counterpart. To be more accurate, said provision is nothing less than a reenactment of the American provision. It is in the best interest of all concerned that Section 15 of the Naturalization Law be given effect in the same way as it was understood and construed when the phrase who may be lawfully naturalized, found in the American statute from which it was borrowed and copied verbatim, was applied by the American courts and administrative authorities. Thus, under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, nativeborn or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4.

Same; Applicability of Section 9 (g) of the Immigration Act.The portion in question of Section 9 (g) of the Immigration Act does not apply to aliens who after coming into the Philippines as temporary visitors, legitimately become Filipino citizens or acquire Filipino citizenship. Such change of nationality naturally bestows upon them the right to stay in the Philippines permanently or not, as they may choose, and if they elect to reside here, the immigration authorities may neither deport them nor confiscate their bonds. REYES, J.B.L., CONCEPCION, C.J., ZALDIVAR and MAKASIAR, JJ., dissenting Same; Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473 requires that an alien woman, married to a Filipino citizen, must prove that she possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifica-tions prescribed by said law, in order to be deemed a Filipino citizen; Reasons.The Philippine statute is not a reproduction in its entirety of the American model and, taken as a whole, is different in requirements and spirit. Section 15 should be construed conformably to the context and intendment of the statute of which it is a part, and in harmony with the whole. Also, our naturalization law separates qualifications from dis-qualifications; the positive qualifications under section 3 thereof express a policy of restriction as to candidates for naturalization as much as the disqualifications under section 4. In other words, by giving to section 15 of our Naturalization Law the effect of excluding only those women suffering from disqualification under section 3 could result in admitting to citizenship women that section 2 intends to exclude. Also, the spirit of the American law, decidedly favorable to the absorption of immigrants, is not embodied in our Constitution and laws, because of the nationalistic spirit of the latter. In effect, the

main decision introduces marriage to a citizen as a means of acquiring citizenship, a way not contemplated by Article IV of the Constitution. APPEAL from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila. Barcelona, J. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Aruego, Mamaril & Associates for petitioners-appel-lants. Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Frine C. Zaballero and Solicitor Sumilang V. Bernardo for respondent-appellee. BARREDO, J.: Appeal from the following decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila in its Civil Case No. 49705 entitled Moy Ya Lim Yao, etc., et al. vs. The Commissioner of Immigration which, brief as it is, sufficiently depicts the factual setting of and the fundamental issues involved in this case thus: In the instant case, petitioners seek the issuance of a writ of injunction against the Commissioner of Immigration, restraining the latter and/or his authorized representative from ordering plaintiff Lau Yuen Yeung to leave the Philippines and causing her arrest and deportation and the confiscation of her bond, upon her failure to do so. The prayer for preliminary injunction embodied in the complaint, having been denied, the case was heard on the merits and the parties submitted their respective evidence.

The facts of the case, as substantially and correctly stated by the Solicitor General are these: On February 8, 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines as a non-immigrant. In the interrogation made in connection with her application for a temporary visitors visa to enter the Philippines, she stated that she was a Chinese residing at Kowloon, Hongkong, and that she desired to take a pleasure trip to the Philippines to visit her great (grand) uncle Lau Ching Ping for a period of one month (Exhibits 1 1-a and 2). She was permitted to come into the Philippines on March 13, 1961, and was permitted to stay for a period of one month which would expire on April 13, 1961. On the date of her arrival, Asher Y, Cheng filed a bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to undertake, among others, that said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart from the Philippines on or before the expiration of her authorized period of stay in this country or within the period as in his discretion the Commissioner of Immigration or his authorized representative might properly allow. After repeated extensions, petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung was allowed to stay in the Philippines up to February 13, 1962 (Exhibit 4). On January 25, 1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino citizen. Because of the contemplated action of respondent to confiscate her bond and order her arrest and immediate deportation, after the expiration of her authorized stay, she brought this action for injunction with preliminary injunction. At the hearing which took place one and a half years after her arrival, it was admitted that petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung could not write either English or Tagalog. Except for a few words, she could not speak either English or Tagalog. She could not name any Filipino neighbor, with a Filipino name except one, Rosa.

She did not know the names of her brothers-in-law, or sisters-inlaw. Under the facts unfolded above, the Court is of the considered opinion, and so holds, that the instant petition for injunction cannot be sustained for the same reasons set forth in the Order of this Court, dated March 19, 1962, the pertinent portions of which read: First, Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law provides: Effect of the naturalization on wife and children.Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines. The above-quoted provision is clear and its import unequivocal and hence it should be held to mean what it plainly and explicitly expresses in unmistakable terms. The clause who might herself be lawfully naturalized incontestably implies that an alien woman may be deemed a citizen of the Philippines by virtue of her marriage to a Filipino citizen only if she possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications specified in the law, because these are the explicit requisites provided by law for an alien to be naturalized. (Lee Suan Ay, Alberto Tan and Lee Chiao vs. Emilio Galang, etc., G. R. No. L-11855). However, from the allegation of paragraph 3 of the complaint, to wit: 3. That plaintiff Lau Yuen Yeung, Chinese by birth, who might herself be lawfully naturalized as a Filipino citizen (not being disqualified to become such by naturalization), is a Filipino citizen by virtue of her marriage on January 25, 1962 to plaintiff MOY YA LIM

YAO alias EDILBERTO AGUINALDO LIM, under the Naturalization Laws of the Philippines. it can be deduced beyond debate that petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung while claiming not to be disqualified, does not and cannot allege that she possesses all the qualifications to be naturalized, naturally because, having been admitted as a temporary visitor only on March 13, 1961, it is obvious at once that she lacks at least, the requisite length of residence in the Philippines (Revised Naturalization Law, Sec. 2, Case No. 2, Sec. 3, Case No. 3). Were if the intention of the law that the alien woman, to be deemed a citizen of the Philippines by virtue of marriage to a Filipino citizen, need only be not disqualified under the Naturalization Law, it would have been worded and who herself is not disqualified to become a citizen of the Philippines. Second, Lau Yuen Yeung, a temporary Chinese woman visitor, whose authorized stay in the Philippines, after repeated extensions thereof, was to expire last Feb-ruary 28, 1962, having married her co-plaintiff only on January 25, 1962, or just a little over one month before the expiry date of her stay, it is evident that said marriage was effected merely for convenience to defeat or avoid her then impending compulsory departure, not to say de-portation. This cannot be permitted. Third, as the Solicitor General has well stated:

5. That petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung, having been admitted as a temporary alien visitor on the strength of a deliberate and voluntary

representation that she will enter and stay only for a period of one month and thereby secured a visa, cannot go back on her representation to stay permanently without first departing from the Philippines as she had promised. (Chung Tiao Bing, et al. vs. Commissioner of Immigration, G. R. No. L-9966, September 29, 1956; Ong Se Lun vs. Board of Commissioners, G. R. No. L-6017, September 16, 1954; Sec. 9, last par., Phil. Immigration Law). The aforequoted argument of the Solicitor General is well buttressed, not only by the decided cases of the Supreme Court on the point mentioned above, but also on the very provisions of Section 9, sub-paragraph (g) of the Phil-ippine Immigration Act of 1940 which reads: An alien who is admitted as a non immigrant cannot remain in the Philippines permanently. To obtain permanent admission, a nonimmigrant alien must depart voluntarily to some foreign country and procure from the appropriate Philippine Consul the proper visa and thereafter undergo examination by the Officers of the Bureau of Immigration at a Phil-ippine port of entry for determination of his admissibility in accordance with the requirements of this Act. (This paragraph is added by Republic Act 503). (Sec. 9, subparagraph (g) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940). And fourth, respondent Commissioner of Immigration is charged with the administration of all laws relating to immigration (Sec. 3, Com. Act No. 613) and in the performance of his duties in relation to alien immigrants, the law gives the Commissioner of Immigration a wide discretion, a quasi-judicial function in determining cases presented to him (Pedro Uy So vs. Commissioner of Immigration CAG. R. No. 23336-R, Dec. 15, 1960), so that his decision thereon may

not be disturbed unless he acted with abuse of discretion or in excess of his jurisdiction. It may also be not amiss to state that wife Lau Yuen Yeung, while she barely and insufficiently talk in broken Tagalog and English, she admitted the she cannot write either language. The only matter of fact not clearly passed upon by His Honor which could have some bearing in the resolution of this appeal is the allegation in the brief olf petinioners-appellants, not denied in the governments brief, that in the hearing * * * * *, it was shown thru the testimony of the plaintiff Lau Yuen Yeung that she does not possess any of the disqualifications for naturalization. Of course, as an additional somehow relevant factual matter, it is also emphasized by said appellants that during the hearing in the lower court, held almost ten months after the alleged marriage of petitioners, Lau Yuen Yeung was already carrying in her womb for seven months a child by her husband. Appellants have assigned six errors allegedly committed by the court a quo, thus: I THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE CLAUSE WHO MIGHT HERSELF BE LAWFULLY NATURALIZED (OF SECTION 15, REVISED NATURALIZATION LAW) INCONTESTABLY IMPLIES THAT AN ALIEN WOMAN MAY BE DEEMED A CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES BY VIRTUE OF HER MARRIAGE TO A FILIPINO CITIZEN, ONLY IF SHE POSSESSES ALL THE QUALIFICATIONS AND NONE OF THE DISQUALIFICATIONS SPECIFIED IN THE LAW. II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT A WOMAN FOREIGNER WHO DOES NOT POSSESS ANY OF THE DISQUALIFICATIONS FOR CITIZENSHIP AND WHO MARRIED A FILIPINO CITIZEN IS STILL CONSIDERED AN ALIEN EVEN AFTER SUCH MARRIAGE AS TO FALL WITHIN THE REQUIREMENT OF SECTION 9, SUB-PARAGRAPH (9) OF THE PHILIPPINE IMMIGRATION ACT OF 1940. III THE COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT LAU YUEN YEUNGS MARRIAGE TO A FILIPINO CITIZEN WAS ONLY FOR CONVENIENCE, MERELY BECAUSE THE SAME WAS CELEBRATED JUST OVER A MONTH BEFORE THE EXPIRY DATE OF HER AUTHORIZED STAY. IV THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND THAT THE COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION ACTED WITH ABUSE OF DISCRETION OR IN EXCESS OF HIS JURISDICTION WHEN SAID OFFICER THREATENED TO SEND OUT OF THE COUNTRY PLAINTIFF LAU YUEN YEUNG WITH WARNING THAT HER FAILURE TO DO SO WOULD MEAN CONFISCATION OF HER BOND, ARREST AND IMMEDIATE DEPORTATION, IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT LAU YUEN YEUNG IS NOW A FILIPINO CITIZEN. V THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING PLAIN-TIFFS-APPELLANTS COMPLAINT AND IN REFUSING TO PERMANENTLY ENJOIN THE COMMISSIONER FROM ORDERING PLAINTIFF LAU YUEN YEUNG TO

LEAVE THE PHILIPPINES AS A TEMPORARY VISITOR WHICH SHE IS NOT. VI THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT PLAINTIFFSAPPELLANTS MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION EMBODIED IN THEIR COMPLAINT, IN AN ORDER DATED MARCH 19, 1962. (PAGES 36-41, RECORD ON APPEAL) We need not discuss these assigned errors separately. In effect, the above decision upheld the two main grounds of objection of the Solicitor General to the petition in the court below, viz: That petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung, having been admitted as a temporary alien visitor on the strength of a deliberate and voluntary representation that she will enter and stay only for a period of one month and thereby secured a visa, cannot go back on her representation to stay permanently without first departing from the Philippines as she had promised (Chung Tiao Bing, et al. vs. Commissioner of Immigration, G.R. No. L-9966, September 29, 1956; Ong Se Lun vs. Board of Commissioners, G.R. No. L-6017, Sept. 16, 1954, Sec. 9, last par. Phil. Immigration Law);

That the mere marriage of a Filipino citizen to an alien does not automatically confer on the latter Philippine citizenship. The alien wife must possess all the qualifications required by law to become a Filipino citizen by naturalization and none of the disqualifications. (Lee Suan Ay, Alberto Tan and Lee Chiao vs. Galang, etc., G. R. No. L11855, Dec. 25, 1959)

It is obvious from the nature of these objections that their piroper resolution would necessarily cover all the points raised in appellants assignments of error, hence, We will base our discussions, more or less, on said objections. I. The first objection of the Solicitor General which covers the matters dealt with in appellants second and fourth assignments of error does not require any lengthy discussion. As a matter of fact, it seems evident that the Solicitor Generals pose that an alien who has been admitted into the Philippines as a non-immigrant cannot remain here permanently unless he voluntarily leaves the country first and goes to a foreign country to secure thereat from the appropriate Philippine consul the proper visa and thereafter undergo examination by officers of the Bureau of Immigration at a Philippine port of entry for determination of his admissibility in accordance with the requirements of the Philippine Immigratioin Act of 1940, as amended by Republic Act 503, is premised on the assumption that petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung is mot a Filipino citizen. We note the same line off reasoning in the appealed decision of the court a quo. Accordingly, it is but safe to assume that were the Solicitor General and His Honor of the view that said petitioner had become ipso facto a Filipina by virtue of her marriage to her Filipino husband, they would have held her as entitled to assume the status of a permanent resident without having to depart as required of aliens by Section 9 (g) of the law. In any event, to set this point at rest, We hereby hold that portion of Section 9(g) of the Immigration Act providing:

An alien who is admitted as a non-immigrant cannot remain in the Philippines permanently. To obtain permanent admission, a nonimmigrant alien must depart voluntarily to some foreign country and procure from the appropriate Philippine consul the proper visa and thereafter undergo examination by the officers of the Bureau of Immigration at a Philippine port of entry for determination of his admissibility in accordance with the requirements of this Act. does not apply to aliens who after coming into the Philippines as temporary visitors, legitimately become Filipino citizens or acquire Filipino citizenship. Such change of nationality naturally bestows upon them the right to stay in the Philippines permanently or not, as they may choose, and if they elect to reside here, ttie immigration authorities may neither deport them nor confiscate their bonds. True it is that this Court has vehemently expressed disapproval of convenient ruses employed by aliens to convert their status from temporary visitors to permanent residents in circumvention of the procedure prescribed by the legal provision already mentioned, such as in Chiong Tiao Bing vs. Commissioner of Immigration, 99 Phil. 1020, wherein, thru Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, the Court, reiterating the ruling in Ong Se Lun vs. Board of Immigration Commissioners, 95 Phil. 785, said:

x x x It is clear that if an alien gains admission to the Islands on the strength of a deliberate and voluntary representation that he will enter only for a limited time, and thereby secures the benefit of a temporary visa, the law will not allow him subsequently to go back on his representation and stay permanently, without first departing from the Philippines as he had promised. No officer can relieve him

of the departure requirements of section 9 of the Immigration Act, under the guise of change or correction, for the law makes no distinctions, and no officer is above the law. Any other ruling would, as stated in our previous decision, encourage aliens to enter the Islands on false pretences; every alien so permitted to enter for a limited time, might then claim a right to permanent admission, however flimsy such claim should be, and thereby compel our government to spend time, money and effort to examining and verifying whether or not every such alien really has a right to take up permanent residence here. In the meanwhile, the alien would be able to prolong his stay and evade his return to the port whence he came, contrary to what he promised to do when he entered. The damages inherent in such ruling are self-evident. On the other hand, however, We cannot see any reason why an alien who has been here as a temporary visitor but who has in the meanwhile become a Filipino should be required to still leave the Philippines for a foreign country, only to apply thereat for a re-entry here and undergo the process of showing that he is entitled to come back, when after all, such right has become incontestible as a necessary concomitant of his assumption of our nationality by whatever legal means this has been conferred upon him. Consider, for example, precisely the case of the minor children of an alien who is naturalized. It is indubitable that they become ipso facto citizens of the Philippines. Could it be the law that before they can be allowed permanent residence, they still have to be taken abroad so that they may be processed to determine whether or not they have a right to have permanent residence here? The difficulties and hardships which such a requirement entails and its seeming unreasonableness argue against such a rather absurd construction.

Indeed, as early as 1957, in Ly Giok Ha vs. Galang, 101 Phil. 459, Mr. Justice Concepcion, our present Chief Justice, already ruled thus: x x x (P)etitioners allege that, upon her marriage to a Filipino, Ly Giok Ha became also a citizen of the Philippines. Indeed, if this conclusion were correct, it would follow that, in consequence of her marriage, she had been naturalized as such citizen, and, hence the decision appealed from would have to be affirmed, for section 40(c) of Commonwealth Act 613 provides that in the event of the naturalization as a Philippine citizen x x x of the alien on whose behalf the bond deposit is given, the bond shall be cancelled or the sum deposited shall be returned to the depositor or his legal representative. (At. pp. 462-463) In other words, the applicable statute itself more than implies that the naturalization of an alien visitor as a Philippine citizen logically produces the effect of conferring upon him ipso facto all the rights of citizenship including that of being entitled to permanently stay in the Philippines outside the orbit of authority of the Commissioner of Immigration vis-a-vis aliens, if only because by its very nature and express provisions, the Immigration Law is a law only for aliens and is inapplicable to citizens of the Philippines. In the sense thus discussed, therefore, appellants second and fourth assignments of error are well taken. II. Precisely, the second objection of the Solicitor General sustained by the trial judge is that appellant Lau Yuen Yeungs marriage to appellant Moya lina Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo whose Filipino citizenship is not denied did not have the effect of making her a

Filipino, since it has not been shown that she might herself be lawfully naturalized, it appearing clearly in the record that she does not possess all the qualifications required of applicants for naturalization by the Revised Naturalization Law, Commonwealth Act 473, even if she has proven that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications thereunder. In other words, the Solicitor General implicitly concedes that had it been established in the proceedings below that appellant Lau Yuen Yeung possesses all the qualifications required by the law of applicants for naturalization, she would have been recognized by the respondent as a Filipino citizen in the instant case, without requiring her to submit to the usual proceedings for naturalization. To be sure, this position of the Solicitor General is in accord with what used to be the view of this Court since Lee Suan Ay, et al. v. Emilio Galang, etc., et al., G.R. No. L-11855, promulgated December 23, 1959, 106 Phil. 706, 713,1 for it was only in Zita Ngo Burca vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-24252 which was promulgated on January 30, 1967 (19 SCRA 186), that over the pen of Mr. Justice Conrado Sanchez, this Court held that for an alien woman who marries a Filipino to be deemed a Filipina, she has to apply for naturalization in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the Revised Naturalization Law and prove in said naturalization proceeding not only that she has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided in the law but also that she has complied with all the formalities required thereby like any other applicant for naturalization,2 albeit said decision is not yet part of our jurisprudence inasmuch as the motion for its reconsideration is still pending resolution. Appellants are in effect urging Us, however, in their first and second assignments of error, not only to reconsider

Burca but to even reexamine Lee Suan Ay which, as a matter of fact, is the prevailing rule, having been reiterated in all subsequent decisions up to Go Im Ty.3 Actually, the first case in which Section 15 of the Naturalization Law, Commonwealth Act 473, underwent judicial construction was in the first Ly Giok Ha case,4 one almost identical to the one at bar. Ly Giok Ha, a woman of Chinese nationality, was a temporary visitor here whose authority to stay was to expire on March 14, 1956. She filed a bond to guaranty her timely departure. On March 8, 1956, eight days before the expiration of her authority to stay, she married a Filipino by the name of Restituto Lacasta. On March 9, 1956, her husband notified the Commissioner of Immigration of said marriage and, contending that his wife had become a Filipina by reason of said marriage, demanded for the cancellation of her bond, but instead of acceding to such request, the Commissioner required her to leave, and upon her failure to do so, on March 16, 1956, the Commissioner confiscated her bond; a suit was filed for the recovery of the bond; the lower court sustained her contention that she had no obligation to leave because she had become Filipina by marriage, hence her bond should be returned. The Commissioner appealed to this Court. In the said appeal, Mr. Justice Roberto Concepcion, our present Chief Justice, spoke for the Court, thus: The next and most important question for determination is whether her marriage to a Filipino justified or, at least, excused the aforesaid failure of Ly Giok Ha to depart from the Philippines on or before March 14, 1956. In maintaining the affirmative view, petitioners alleged that, upon her marriage to a Filipino, Ly Giok Ha became, also, a citizen of the Philippines. Indeed, if this conclusion were correct, it would follow that, in consequence of her marriage,

she had been naturalized as such citizen, and, hence, the decision appealed from would have to be affirmed, for section 40(c) of Commonwealth Act No. 613 provides that in the event of the naturalization as a Philippine citizen x x x of the alien on whose behalf the bond deposit is given, the bond shall be cancelled or the sum deposited shall be returned to the depositor or his legal representative. Thus the issue boils down to whether an alien female who marries a male citizen of the Philippines follows ipso facto his political status. The pertinent part of section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, upon which petitioners rely, reads: Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines. Pursuant thereto, marriage to a male Filipino does not vest Philippine citizenship to his foreign wife, unless she herself may be lawfully naturalized. As correctly held in an opinion of the Secretary of Justice (Op. No. 52, series of 1950),* this limitation of section 15 excludes, from the benefits of naturalization by marriage, those disqualified from being naturalized as citizens of the Philippines under section 4 of said Commonwealth Act No. 473, namely: (a) Persons opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized governments; (b) Persons defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault, or assassination for the success and predominance of their ideas;

(c) Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy; (d) Persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude; (e) Persons suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases; (f) Persons who, during the period of their residence in the Philippines, have not mingled socially with the Filipinos, or who have not evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the customs, traditions, and ideals of the Filipinos; (g) Citizens or subjects of nations with whom the x x x Philippines are at war, during the period of such war; (h) Citizens or subjects of a foreign country other than the United States, whose laws does not grant Filipinos the right to become naturalized citizens or subjects thereof. In the case at bar, there is neither proof nor allegation in the pleadings that Ly Giok Ha does not fall under any of the classes disqualified by law. Moreover, as the parties who claim that, despite her failure to depart from the Philippines within the period specified in the bond in question, there has been no breach thereof, petitioners have the burden of proving her alleged change of political status, from alien to citizen. Strictly speaking, petitioners have not made out, therefore a case against the respondentsappellants. Considering, however, that neither in the administrative proceedings, nor in the lower court, had the parties seemingly felt that there was an issue on whether Ly Giok Ha may be lawfully

naturalized, and this being a case of first impression in our courts, we are of the opinion that, in the interest of equity and justice, the parties herein should be given an opportunity to introduce evidence, if they have any, on said issue. (At pp. 462-464.) As may be seen, although not specifically in so many words, no doubt was left in the above decision as regards the following propositions: 1. That under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, the Revised Naturalization Law, the marriage of an alien woman to a Filipino makes her a Filipina, if she herself might be lawfully naturalized; 2. That this Court declared as correct the opinion of the Secretary of Justice that the limitation of Section 15 of the Naturalization Law excludes from the benefits of naturalization by marriage, only those disqualified from being naturalized under Section 4 of the law quoted in the decision; 3. That evidence to the effect that she is not disqualified may be presented in the action to recover her bond confiscated by the Commissioner of Immigration; 4. That upon proof of such fact, she may be recognized as Filipina; and 5. That in referring to the disqualifications enumerated in the law, the Court somehow left the impression that no inquiry need be made as to qualifications,5 specially considering that the decision cited and footnoted several opinions of the Secretary of Justice, the immediate superior of the Commissioner of Immigration, the most important of which are the following:

Paragraph (a), section 13 of Act No. 2927, as amended, (now section 15, Commonwealth Act No. 473), provided that any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines. A similar provision in the naturalization law of the United States has been construed as not requiring the woman to have the qualifications of residence, good character, etc., as in the case of naturalization by judicial proceedings, but merely that she is of the race of persons who may be naturalized. (Kelly v. Owen [Dist. Col 1868] 7 Wall 496, 5F, 11, 12; ex parte Tryason [D. C. Wash. 1914] 215 F. 449, 27 Op. Atty. Gen. 507). (Op. No. 168, s. 1940 of Justice Sec. Jose Abad Santos.)

In a previous opinion rendered for your Office, I stated that the clause who might herself be lawfully naturalized, should be construed as not requiring the woman to have the qualifications of residence, good character, etc., as in cases of naturalization by judicial proceedings, but merely that she is of the race of persons who may be naturalized. (Op. No. 79, s. 1940) Inasmuch as the race qualification has been removed by the Revised Naturalization Law, it results that any woman who married a citizen of the Philippines prior to or after June 17, 1939, and the marriage not having been dissolved, and on the assumption that she possesses none of the disqualifications mentioned in Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, follows the citizenship of her husband. (Op. No. 176, s. 1940 of Justice Sec. Jose Abad Santos.)

From the foregoing narration of facts, it would seem that the only material point of inquiry is as to the citizenship of Arce Machura. If he shall be found to be a citizen of the Philippines, his wife, Mrs. Lily James Machura, shall likewise be deemed a citizen of the Philippines pursuant to the provision of Section 15, Commonwealth Act No. 473, which reads in part as follows: Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines. The phrase who might herself be lawfully naturalized, as contained in the above provision, means that the woman who is married to a Filipino citizen must not belong to any of the disqualified classes enumerated in Section 4 of the Naturalization Law (Ops., Sec. of Jus., No. 28, s. 1950; No. 43, s. 1948, No. 95, s. 1941; Nos. 79 and 168, s. 1940). Under the facts stated in the within papers, Mrs. Machura does not appear to be among the disqualified classes mentioned in the law. It having been shown that Arce Machura or Arsenio Guevara was born as an illegitimate of a Filipino mother, he should be considered as a citizen of the Philippines in consonance with the well-settled rule that an illegitimate child follows the citizenship of his only legally recognized parent, the mother (Op., Sec. of Jus., Nos. 58, 98 & 281, s. 1948; No. 96, s. 1949). Her husband being a Filipino, Mrs. Machura must necessarily be deemed as a citizen of the Philippines by marriage (Sec. 15, Com. Act No. 473.) (Op. No. 52, s. 1950 of Justice Sec. Ricardo Nepomuceno.) The logic and authority of these opinions, compelling as they are, must have so appealed to this Court that five days later, on May 22,

1957, in Ricardo Cua v. The Board of Commissioners, 101 Phil. 521, Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, reiterated the same ruling on the basis of the following facts: Tjioe Wu Suan, an Indonesian, arrived in Manila on November 1, 1952, but it turned out that her passport was forged. On December 10, 1953, a warrant was issued for her arrest for purposes of deportation. Later, on December 20, 1953, she married Ricardo Cua, a Filipino, and because of said marriage, the Board of Special Inquiry considered her a Filipina. Upon a review of the case, however, the Board of Immigration Commissioners insisted on continuing with the deportation proceedings and so, the husband filed prohibition and mandamus proceedings. The lower court denied the petition. Although this Court affirmed said decision, it held, on the other hand, that:

Granting the validity of marriage, this Court has ruled in the recent case of Ly Giok Ha v. Galang, supra, p. 459, that the bare fact of a valid marriage to a citizen does not suffice to confer his citizenship upon the wife. Section 15 of the Naturalization Law requires that the alien woman who marries a Filipino must show, in addition, that she might herself be lawfully naturalized as a Filipino citizen. As construed in the decision cited, this last condition requires proof that the woman who married a Filipino is herself not disqualified under section 4 of the Naturalization Law. No such evidence appearing on record, the claim of assumption of Filipino citizenship by Tjioe Wu Suan, upon her marriage to petitioner, is untenable. The lower court, therefore, committed no

error in refusing to interfere with the deportation proceedings, where she can anyway establish the requisites indispensable for her acquisition of Filipino citizenship, as well as the alleged validity of her Indonesian passport. (Ricardo Cua v. The Board of Immigration Commissioners, G. R. No. L-9997, May 22, 1957, 101 Phil. 521, 523.) [Italics supplied] For emphasis, it is reiterated that in the above two cases, this Court expressly gave the parties concerned opportunity to prove the fact that they were not suffering from any of the disqualifications of the law without the need of undergoing any judicial naturalization proceeding. It may be stated, therefore, that according to the above decisions, the law in this country, on the matter of the effect of marriage of an alien woman to a Filipino is that she thereby becomes a Filipina, if it can be proven that at the time of such marriage, she does not possess any of the disqualifications enumerated in Section 4 of the Naturalization Law, without the need of submitting to any naturalization proceedings under said law. It is to be admitted that both, of the above decisions made no reference to qualifications, that is, as to whether or not they need also to be proved, but, in any event, it is a fact that the Secretary of Justice understood them to mean that such qualifications need not be possessed nor proven. Then Secretary of Justice Jesus Barrera, who later became a distinguished member of this Courts,6 so ruled in opinions rendered by him subsequent to Ly Giok Ha, the most illustrative of which held: At the outset it is important to note that an alien woman married to a Filipino citizen needs only to show that she might herself be

lawfully naturalized in order to acquire Philippine citizenship. Compliance with other conditions of the statute, such as those relating to the qualifications of an applicant for naturalization through judicial proceedings, is not necessary. (See: Leonard v. Grant, 5 Fed. 11; 27 Ops. Atty. Gen [U.S.] 507; Ops. Sec. of Justice, No. 776, s. 1940, and No. 111, s. 1953. This view finds support in the case of Ly Giok Ha et al. v. Galang et al., G.R. No. L-10760, promulgated May 17, 1957, where the Supreme Court, construing the abovequoted section of the Naturalization Law, held that marriage to a male Filipino does not vest Philippine citizenship to his foreign wife, unless she herself may be lawfully naturalized, and that this limitation of Section 15 excludes, from the benefits of naturalization by marriage, those disqualified from being naturalized as citizens of the Philippines under Section 4 of said Commonwealth Act No. 473. In other words, disqualification for any of the causes enumerated in Section 4 of the Act is the decisive factor that defeats the right of the foreign wife of a Philippine citizen to acquire Philippine citizenship. x x x

Does petitioner, Lim King Bian, belong to any of these groups? The Commissioner of Immigration does not say so but merely predicates his negative action on the ground that a warrant of deportation for overstaying is pending against the petitioner. We do not believe the position is well taken. Since the grounds for disqualification for naturalization are expressly enumerated in the law, a warrant of deportation not based on a finding of unfitness to become naturalized for any of those specified causes may not be

invoked to negate acquisition of Philippine citizenship by a foreign wife of a Philippine citizen under Section 15 of the Naturalization Law. (Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius) (Op. No. 12, s. 1958 of Justice Undersec. Jesus G. Barrera.) Regarding the steps that should be taken by an alien woman married to a Filipino citizen in order to acquire Philippine citizenship, the procedure followed in the Bureau of Immigration is as follows: The alien woman must file a petition for the cancellation of her alien certificate of registration alleging, among other things, that she is married to a Filipino citizen and that she is not disqualified from acquiring her husbands citizenship pursuant to section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. Upon the filing of said petition, which should be accompanied or supported by the joint affidavit of the petitioner and her Filipino husband to the effect that the petitioner does not belong to any of the groups disqualified by the cited section from becoming naturalized Filipino citizen (please see attached CEB Form 1), the Bureau of Immigration conducts an investigation and thereafter promulgates its order or decision granting or denying the petition. (Op. No. 38, s. 1958 of Justice Sec. Jesus G. Barrera.)

under Section 4 of said Commonwealth Act No. 473. In other words, disqualification for any of the causes enumerated in section 4 of the Act is the decisive factor that defeats the right of an alien woman married to a Filipino citizen to acquire Philippine citizenship. (Op. 57, s. 1958 of Justice Sec. Jesus G. Barrera.) The contention is untenable. The doctrine enunciated in the Ly Giok Ha case is not a new one. In that case, the Supreme Court held that under paragraph 1 of Section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, marriage to a male Filipino does not vest Philippine citizenship to his foreign wife unless she herself may be lawfully naturalized , and, quoting several earlier opinions of the Secretary of Justice, namely: No. 52, s. 1950; No. 168, s. 1940; No. 95, s. 1941; No. 63, s. 1948; No. 28, s. 1950, this limitation of section 15 excludes from the benefits of naturalization by marriage, those disqualified from being naturalized as citizens of the Philippines under section 4 of said Commonwealth Act No. 473. (Op. 134, s. 1962 of Justice Undersec. Magno S. Gatmaitan.)

This view finds support in the case of Ly Giok Ha et al., v. Galang et al. (G.R. No. L-10760, promulgated May 17, 1957), where the Supreme Court, construing the above-quoted section in the Revised Naturalization Law, held that marriage to a male Filipino does not vest Philippine citizenship to his foreign wife, unless she herself may be lawfully naturalized, and that this limitation of Section 15 excludes, from the benefits of naturalization by marriage, those disqualified from being naturalized as citizens of the Philippines

It was not until more than two years later that, in one respect, the above construction of the law was importantly modified by this Court in Lee Suan Ay, supra, in which the facts were as follows: Upon expiration of the appellant Lee Suan Ays authorized period of temporary stay in the Philippines (25 March 1955), on 26 March 1955 the Commissioner of Immigration asked the bondsman to present her to the Bureau of Immigration within 24 hours from receipt of notice, otherwise the bond will be confiscated (Annex 1). For failure of the bondsman to comply with the foregoing order, on

1 April 1955 the Commissioner of Immigration ordered the cash bond confiscated (Annex E). Therefore, there was an order issued by the Commissioner of Immigration confiscating or forfeiting the cash bond. Unlike in forfeiture of bail bonds in criminal proceedings, where the Court must enter an order forfeiting the bail bond and the bondsman must be given an opportunity to present his principal or give a satisfactory reason for his inability to do so, before final judgment may be entered against the bondsman, (section 15, Rule 110; U.S. v. Bonoan, 22 Phil. 1.) in forfeiture of bonds posted for the temporary stay of an alien in the Philippines, no court proceeding is necessary. Once a breach of the terms and conditions of the undertaking in the bond is committed, the Commissioner of Immigration may, under the terms and conditions thereof, declare it forfeited in favor of the Government. (In the meanwhile, on April 1, 1955, Lee Suan Ay and Alberto Tan, a Filipino, were joined in marriage by the Justice of the Peace of Las Pias, Rizal.) Mr. Justice Sabino Padilla speaking for a unanimous court which included Justices Concepcion and Reyes who had penned Ly Giok Ha and Ricardo Cua, ruled thus: The fact that Lee Suan Ay (a Chinese) was married to a Filipino citizen does not relieve the bondsman from his liability on the bond. The marriage took place on 1 April 1955, and the violation of the terms and conditions of the undertaking in the bondfailure to depart from the Philippines upon expiration of her authorized period of temporary stay in the Philippines (25 March 1955) and failure to report to the Commissioner of Immigration within 24 hours from receipt of noticewere committed before the marriage. Moreover, the marriage of a Filipino citizen to an alien does not automatically confer Philippine citizenship upon the latter. She must

possess the qualifications required by law to become a Filipino citizen by naturalization.* There is no showing that the appellant Lee Suan Ay possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided for by law to become a Filipino citizen by naturalization. Pertinently to be noted at once in this ruling, which, to be sure, is the one relied upon in the appealed decision now before Us, is the fact that the footnote of the statement therein that the alien wife must possess the qualifications required by law to become a Filipino citizen by naturalization makes reference to Section 15, Commonwealth Act 473 and precisely, also to Ly Giok Ha v. Galang, supra. As will be recalled, on the other hand, in the opinions of the Secretary of Justice explicitly adopted by the Court in Ly Giok Ha, among them, Opinion No. 176, Series of 1940, above-quoted, it was clearly held that (I)n a previous opinion rendered for your Office, I stated that the clause who might herself be lawfully naturalized, should be construed as not requiring the woman to have the qualifications of residence, good character, etc., as in cases of naturalization by judicial proceedings, but merely that she is of the race by persons who may be naturalized. (Op. No. 79, s. 1940) Since Justice Padilla gave no reason at all for the obviously significant modification of the construction of the law, it could be said that there was need for clarification of the seemingly new posture of the Court. The occasion for such clarification should have been in Kua Suy, etc., et al. vs. The Commissioner of Immigration, G.R. No. L-13790, October 31, 1963, penned by Mr. Justice J.R.L. Reyes, who had rendered the opinion in Ricardo Cua, supra, which followed that in Ly Giok Ha, supra, but apparently seeing no immediate relevancy in the case on hand then of the particular

point in issue now, since it was not squarely raised therein similarly as in Lee Suan Ay, hence, anything said on the said matter would at best be no more than obiter dictum, Justice Reyes limited himself to holding that Under Section 15 of the Naturalization Act, the wife is deemed a citizen of the Philippines only if she might herself be lawfully naturalized, so that the fact of marriage to a citizen, by itself alone, does not suffice to confer citizenship, as this Court has previously ruled in Ly Giok Ha v. Galang, 54 O.G. 356, and in Cua v. Board of Immigration Commissioners, 53 O.G. 8567; and there is here no evidence of record as to the qualifications or absence of disqualifications of appellee Kua Suy, without explaining the apparent departure already pointed out from Ly Giok Ha and Ricardo Cua. Even Justice Makalintal, who wrote a separate concurring and dissenting opinion merely lumped together Ly Giok Ha, Ricardo Cua and Lee Suan Ay and opined that both qualifications and non-disqualifications have to be shown without elucidating on what seemed to be departure from the said first two decisions. It was only on November 30, 1963 that to Mr. Justice Roberto Regala fell the task of rationalizing the Courts position. In Lo San Tuang v. Galang, G.R. No. L-18775, November 30, 1963, 9 SCRA 638, the facts were simply these: Lo San Tuang, a Chinese woman, arrived in the Philippines on July 1, 1960 as a temporary visitor with authority to stay up to June 30, 1961. She married a Fili-pino on January 7, 1961, almost six months before the expiry date of her permit, and when she was requested to leave after her authority to stay had expired, she refused to do so, claiming she had become a Filipina by marriage, and to bolster her position, she submitted an affidavit stating explicitly that she does not possess any of the disqualifications enumerated in the Naturalization Law,

Commonwealth Act 473. When the case reached the court, the trial judge held for the government that in addition to not having any of the disqualifications referred to, there was need that Lo San Tuang should have also possessed all the qualifications of residence, moral character, knowledge of a native principal dialect, etc., provided by the law. Recognizing that the issue squarely to be passed upon was whether or not the possession of all the qualifications were indeed needed to be shown apart from non-disqualification, Justice Regala held affirmatively for the Court, reasoning out thus: It is to be noted that the petitioner has anchored her claim for citizenship on the basis of the decision laid down in the case of Leonard v. Grant, 5 Swy. 603, 5 F 11, where the Circuit Court of Oregon held that it was only necessary that the woman should be a person of the class or race permitted to be naturalized by existing laws, and that in respect of the qualifications arising out of her conduct or opinions, being the wife of a citizen, she is to be regarded as qualified for citizenship, and therefore considered a citizen. (In explanation of its conclusion, the Court said: If, whenever during the life of the woman or afterwards, the question of her citizenship arises in a legal proceeding, the party asserting her citizenship by reason of her marriage with a citizen must not only prove such marriage, but also that the woman then possessed all the further qualifications necessary to her becoming naturalized under existing laws, the statute will be practically nugatory, if not a delusion and a snare. The proof of the facts may have existed at the time of the marriage, but years after, when a controversy arises upon the subject, it may be lost or difficult to find.) In other words, all that she was required to prove was that she was a free white woman or a woman of African descent or nativity, in

order to be deemed an American citizen, because, with respect to the rest of the qualifications on residence, moral character, etc., she was presumed to be qualified. Like the law in the United States, our former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927, as amended by Act No. 3448) specified the classes of persons who alone might become citizens of the Philippines, even as it provided who were disqualified. Thus, the pertinent provisions of that law provided: Section 1. Who may become Philippine citizens.Philippine citizenship may be acquired by (a) natives of the Philippines who are not citizens thereof under the Jones Law; (b) natives of the Insular possessions of the United States; (c) citizens of the United States, or foreigners who under the laws of the United States may become citizens of said country if residing therein. Section 2. Who are disqualified.The following cannot be naturalized as Philippine citizens: (a) Persons opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized government; (b) persons defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault or assassination for the success and predominance of their ideas; (c) polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy; (d) persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude; (e) persons suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases; (f) citizens or subjects of nations with whom the United States and the Philippines are at war, during the period of such war.

Section 3. Qualifications.The persons comprised in subsection (a) of section one of this Act, in order to be able to acquire Philippine citizenship, must be not less than twenty-one years of age on the day of the hearing of their petition. The persons comprised in subsections (b) and (c) of said section one shall, in addition to being not less than twenty-one years of age on the day of the hearing of the petition, have all and each of the following qualifications: First. Residence in the Philippine Islands for a continuous period of not less than five years, except as provided in the next following section; Second. To have conducted themselves in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of their residence in the Philippine Islands, in their relation with the constituted government as well as with the community in which they are living; Third. To hold in the Philippine Islands real estate worth not less than one thousand pesos, Philippine currency, or have some known trade or profession; and Fourth. To speak and write English, Spanish, or some native tongue.

In case the petitioner is a foreign subject, he shall, besides, declare in writing and under oath his intention of renouncing absolutely and perpetually all faith and allegiance to the foreign authority, state or sovereignty of which he was a native, citizen or subject. Applying the interpretation given by Leonard v. Grant, supra, to our law as it then stood, alien women married to citizens of the Philippines must, in order to be deemed citizens of the Philippines,

be either (1) natives of the Philippines who were not citizens thereof under the Jones Law, or (2) natives of other Insular possessions of the United States, or (3) citizens of the United States or foreigners who under the laws of the United States might become citizens of that country if residing therein. With respect to the qualifications set forth in Section 3 of the former law, they were deemed to have the same for all intents and purposes. But, with the approval of the Revised Naturalization Law (Commonwealth Act No. 473) on June 17, 1939, Congress has since discarded class or racial consideration from the qualifications of applicants for naturalization (according to its proponent, the purpose in eliminating this consideration was, first, to remove the features of the existing naturalization act which discriminated in favor of the Caucasians and against Asiatics who are our neighbors, and are related to us by racial affinity and, second, to foster amity with all nations [Sinco, Phil. Political Law 50211 ed.]), even as it retained in Section 15 the phrase in question. The result is that the phrase who might herself be lawfully naturalized must be understood in the context in which it is now found, in a setting so different from that in which it was found by the Court in Leonard v. Grant. The only logical deduction from the elimination of class or racial consideration is that, as the Solicitor General points out, the phrase who might herself be lawfully naturalized must now be understood as referring to those who under Section 2 of the law are qualified to become citizens of the Philippines. There is simply no support for the view that the phrase who might herself be lawfully naturalized must now be understood as

requiring merely that the alien woman must not belong to the class of disqualified persons under Section 4 of the Revised Naturalization Law. Such a proposition misreads the ruling laid down in Leonard v. Grant. A person who is not disqualified is not necessarily qualified to become a citizen of the Philippines, because the law treats qualifications and disqua-lifications in separate sections. And then it must not be lost sight of that even under the interpretation given to the former law, it was to be understood that the alien woman was not disqualified under Section 2 of that law. Leonard v. Grant did not rule that it was enough if the alien woman does not belong to the class of disqualified persons in order that she may be deemed to follow the citizenship of her husband: What that case held was that the phrase who might herself be lawfully naturalized, merely means that she belongs to the class or race of persons qualified to become citizens by naturalizationthe assumption being always that she is not otherwise disqualified. We therefore hold that under the first paragraph of Section 15 of the Naturalization Law, an alien woman, who is married to a citizen of the Philippines, acquires the citizenship of her husband only if she has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided by law. Since there is no proof in this case that petitioner has all the qualifications and is not in any way disqualified, her marriage to a Filipino citizen does not automatically make her a Filipino citizen. Her affidavit to the effect that she is not in any way disqualified to become a citizen of this country was correctly disregarded by the trial court, the same being self-serving. Naturally, almost a month later in Sun Peck Yong v. Commissioner of Immigration, G.R. No. L-20784, Decem-ber 27, 1963, 9 SCRA 875, wherein the Secretary of For-eign Affairs reversed a previous

resolution of the preceding administration to allow Sun Peck Yong and her minor son to await the taking of the oath of Filipino citizenship of her husband two years after the decision granting him nationalization and required her to leave and this order was congested in court, Justice Barrera held: In the case of Lo San Tuang v. Commissioner of Immigration (G.R. No. L-18775, promulgated November 30, 1963; Kua Suy vs. Commissioner of Immigration, L-13790, promulgated October 31, 1963), we held that the fact that the husband became a naturalized citizen does not automatically make the wife a citizen of the Philippines. It must also be shown that she herself possesses all the qualifications, and none of the disqualifications, to become a citizen. In this case, there is no allegation, much less showing, that petitioner-wife is qualified to become a Filipino citizen herself. Furthermore, the fact that a decision was favorably made on the naturalization petition of her husband is no assurance that he (the husband) would become a citizen, as to make a basis for the extension of her temporary stay. On the same day, in Tong Siok Sy v. Vivo, G.R. No. L-21136, December 27, 1963, 9 SCRA 876, Justice Barrera reiterated the same ruling and citing particularly Lo San Tuang and Kua Suy, held that the marriage of Tong Siok Sy to a Filipino on November 12, 1960 at Taichung, Taiwan and her taking oath of Filipino citizenship before the Philippine Vice-Consul at Taipeh, Taiwan on January 6, 1961 did not make her a Filipino citizen, since she came here only in 1961 and obviously, she had not had the necessary ten-year residence in the Philippines required by the law.

Such then, was the status of the jurisprudential law on the matter under discussion when Justice Makalintal sought a reexamination thereof in Choy King Tee v. Galang, G.R. No. L-18351, March 26, 1965, 13 SCRA 402. Choy King Tees husband was granted Philippine citizenship on Jan-uary 13, 1959 and took the oath on January 31 of the same year. Choy King Tee first came to the Philippines in 1955 and kept commuting between Manila and Hongkong since then, her last visa before the case being due to expire on February 14, 1961. On January 27, 1961, her husband asked the Commissioner of Immigration to cancel her alien certificate of registration, as well as their childs, for the reason that they were Filipinos, and when the request was denied as to the wife, a mandamus was sought, which the trial court granted. Discussing anew the issue of the need for qualifications, Justice Makalintal not only reiterated the arguments of Justice Regala in Lo San Tuang but added further that the ruling is believed to be in line with the national policy of selective admission to Philippine citizenship.7 No wonder, upon this authority, in Austria v. Conchu, G.R. No. L20716, June 22, 1965, 14 SCRA 336, Justice J.P. Bengzon readily reversed the decision of the lower court granting the writs of mandamus and prohibition against the Commissioner of Immigration, considering that Austrias wife, while admitting she did not possess all the qualifications for naturalization, had submitted only an affidavit that she had none of the disqualifications therefor. So also did Justice Dizon similarly hold eight days later in Brito v. Commissioner, G.R. No. L-16829, June 30, 1965, 14 SCRA 539. Then came the second Ly Giok Ha case8 wherein Justice J. B. L. Reyes took occasion to expand on the reasoning of Choy King Tee by illustrating with examples the danger of relying exclusively on the

absence of disqualifications, without taking into account the other affirmative requirements of the law.9 Lastly, in Go Im Ty v. Republic, G.R. No. L-17919, decided on July 30, 1966,10 Justice Zaldivar held for the Court that an alien woman who is widowed during the pendency of the naturalization proceedings of her husband, in order that she may be allowed to take the oath as Filipino, must, aside from proving compliance with the requirements of Republic Act 530, show that she possesses all the qualifications and does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under the Naturalization Law, citing in the process the decision to such effect discussed above,11 even as he impliedly reversed pro tanto the ruling in Tan Lin v. Republic, G.R. No. L-13786, May 31, 1961, 2 SCRA 383. Accordingly, in Burca, Justice Sanchez premised his opinion on the assumption that the point now under discussion is settled law. In the case now at bar, the Court is again called upon to rule on the same issue. Under Section 15 of the Naturalization Law, Commonwealth Act 473, providing that: SEC. 15. Effect of the naturalization on wife and children.Any woman, who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines. Minor children of persons naturalized under this law who have been born in the Philippines shall be considered citizens thereof. A foreign-born minor child, if dwelling in the Philippines at the time of the naturalization of the parent, shall automatically become a Philippine citizen, and a foreign-born child, who is not in the

Philippines at the time the parent is naturalized, shall be deemed a Philippine citizen only during his minority, unless he begins to reside permanently in the Philippines when still a minor, in which case, he will continue to be a Philippine citizen even after becoming of age. A child born outside of the Philippines after the naturalization of his parent, shall be considered a Philippine citizen, unless within one year after reaching the age of majority he fails to register himself as a Philippine citizen at the American Consulate of the country where he resides, and to take the necessary oath of allegiance. is it necessary, in order that an alien woman who marries a Filipino or who is married to a man who subsequently becomes a Filipino, may become a Filipino citizen herself, that, aside from not suffering from any of the disqualifications enumerated in the law, she must also possess all the qualifications required by said law? If nothing but the unbroken line from Lee Suan Ay to Go Im Ty, as recounted above, were to be considered, it is obvious that an affirmative answer to the question would be inevitable, specially, if it is noted that the present case was actually submitted for decision on January 21, 1964 yet, shortly after Lo San Tuang, Tong Siok Sy and Sun Peck Yong, all supra, and even before Choy King Tee, supra, were decided. There are other circumstances, however, which make it desirable, if not necessary, that the Court take up the matter anew. There has been a substantial change in the membership of the Court since Go Im Ty, and of those who were in the Court already when Burca was decided, two members, Justice Makalintal and Castro concurred only in the result, precisely, according to them, because they wanted to leave the point now under discussion open in so far as they are concerned.12 Truth to tell, the views and arguments discussed at length with copious relevant authorities, in

the motion for reconsideration as well as in the memorandum of the amici curae13 in the Burca case cannot just be taken lightly and summarily ignored, since they project in the most forceful manner, not only the legal and logical angles of the issue, but also the imperative practical aspects thereof in the light of the actual situation of the thousands of alien wives of Filipinos who have so long, even decades, considered themselves as Filipinas and have always lived and acted as such, officially or otherwise, relying on the long standing continuous recognition of their status as such by the administrative authorities in charge of the matter, as well as by the courts. Under these circumstances, and if only to afford the Court an opportunity to consider the views of the five justices who took no part in Go Im Ty (including the writer of this opinion), the Court decided to further reexamine the matter. After all, the ruling first laid in Lee Suan Ay, and later in Lo San Tuang, Choy King Tee and the second (1966) Ly Giok Ha, did not categorically repudiate the opinions of the Secretary of Justice relied upon by the first (1959) Ly Giok Ha. Besides, some points brought to light during the deliberations in this case would seem to indicate that the premises of the later cases can still bear further consideration. Whether We like it or not, it is undeniably factual that the legal provision We are construing, Section 15, aforequoted, of the Naturalization Law has been taken directly, copied and adopted from its American counterpart. To be more accurate, said provision is nothing less than a reenactment of the American provision. A brief review of its history proves this beyond per adventure of doubt. The first Naturalization Law of the Philippines approved by the Philippine Legislature under American sovereignty was that of

March 26, 1920, Act No. 2927. Before then, as a consequence of the Treaty of Paris, our citizenship laws were found only in the Organic Laws, the Philippine Bill of 1902, the Act of the United States Congress of March 23, 1912 and later the Jones Law of 1916. In fact, Act No. 2927 was enacted pursuant to express authority granted by the Jones Law. For obvious reasons, the Philippines gained autonomy on the subjects of citizenship and immigration only after the effectivity of the Philippine Independence Act. This made it practically impossible for our laws on said subject to have any perspective or orientation of our own; everything was American. The Philippine Bill of 1902 provided pertinently: SECTION 4. That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen-hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the protection of the United States, except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight. This Section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902 was amended by Act of Congress of March 23, 1912, by adding a provision as follows: Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby authorized to provide by law for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of other insular possessions of the

United States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who would become citizens of the United States, under the laws of the United States, if residing therein. The Jones Law reenacted these provisions substantially: SECTION 2. That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands, except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight and except such others as have since become citizens of some other country: Provided, That the Philippine Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby authorized to provide by law for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of the insular possessions of the United States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who are citizens of the United States under the laws of the United States if residing therein. For aught that appears, there was nothing in any of the said organic laws regarding the effect of marriage to a Filipino upon the nationality of an alien woman, albeit under the Spanish Civil Code provisions on citizenship, Articles 17 to 27, which were, however, abrogated upon the change of sovereignty, it was unquestionable that the citizenship of the wife always followed that of the husband. Not even Act 2927 contained any provision regarding the effect of

naturalization of an alien upon the citizenship of his alien wife, nor of the marriage of such alien woman with a native born Filipino or one who had become a Filipino before the marriage, although Section 13 thereof provided thus: SEC. 13. Right of widow and children of petitioners who have died.In case a petitioner should die before the final decision has been rendered, his widow and minor children may continue the proceedings. The decision rendered in the case shall, so far as the widow and minor children are concerned, produce the same legal effect as if it had been rendered during the life of the petitioner. It was not until November 30, 1928, upon the approval of Act 3448, amending Act 2977, that the following provisions were added to the above Section 13: SECTION 1. The following new sections are hereby inserted between sections thirteen and fourteen of Act Numbered Twentynine hundred and Twenty-seven:

SEC. 13(a). Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippine Islands and who might herself be lawfully naturalized, shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippine Islands. SEC. 13(b). Children of persons who have been duly naturalized under this law, being under the age of twenty-one years at the time of the naturalization of their parents, shall, if dwelling in the Philippine Islands, be considered citizens thereof.

SEC. 13(c). Children of persons naturalized under this law who have been born in the Philippine Islands after the naturalization of their parents shall be considered citizens thereof. When Commonwealth Act 473, the current naturalization law, was enacted on June 17, 1939, the above Section 13 became its Section 15 which has already been quoted earlier in this decision. As can be seen, Section 13(a) abovequoted was re-enacted practically word for word in the first paragraph of this Section 15 except for the change of Philippine Islands to Philippines. And it could not have been on any other basis than this legislative history of our naturalization law that each and everyone of the decisions of this Court from the first Ly Giok Ha to Go Im Ty, discussed above, were rendered. As stated earlier, in the opinion of Chief Justice Concepcion in the first Ly Giok Ha, it was quite clear that for an alien woman who marries a Filipino to become herself a Filipino citizen, there is no need for any naturalization proceeding because she becomes a Filipina ipso facto from the time of such marriage, provided she does not suffer any of the disqualifications enumerated in Section 4 of Commonwealth Act 473, with no mention being made of whether or not the qualifications enumerated in Section 2 thereof need be shown. It was only in Lee Suan Ay in 1959 that the possession of qualifications were specifically required, but it was not until 1963, in Lo San Tuang, that Justice Regala reasoned out why the possession of the qualifications provided by the law should also be shown to be possessed by the alien wife of a Filipino, for her to become a Filipina by marriage.

As may be recalled, the basic argument advanced by Justice Regala was briefly as fallows: That like the law in the United States, our Naturalization Law specified the classes of persons who alone might become citizens, even as it provided who were disqualified, and inasmuch as Commonwealth Act 473, our Naturalization Law since 1939 did not reenact the section providing who might become citizens, allegedly in order to remove racial discrimination in favor of Caucasians and against Asiatics, the only logical deduction * * * is that the phrase who might herself be lawfully naturalized must now be understood as referring to those who under Section 2 of the law are qualified to become citizens of the Philippines and there is simply no support for the view that the phrase who might herself be lawfully naturalized must now be understood as requiring merely that the alien woman must not belong to the class of disqualified persons under Section 4 of the Revised Naturalization Law.14 A similar line of reasoning was followed in Choy King Tee, which for ready reference may be quoted:

The question has been settled by the uniform ruling of this Court in a number of cases. The alien wife of a Filipino citizen must first prove that she has all the qualifications required by Section 2 and none of the disqualifications enumerated in Section 4 of the Naturalization Law before she may be deemed a Philippine citizen (Lao Chay v. Galang, L-19977, Oct. 30, 1964, citing Lo San Tuang v. Galang, L-18776, Nov. 30, 1963; Sun Peck Yong v. Commissioner of Immigration, L-20784, December 27, 1963; Tong Siok Sy v. Vivo, L21136, December 27, 1963). The writer of this opinion has

submitted the question anew to the court for a possible reexamination of the said ruling in the light of the interpretation of a similar law in the United States after which Section 15 of our Naturalization Law was patterned. That law was section 2 of the Act of February 10, 1855 (Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes of the U.S.). The local law, Act No. 3448, was passed on November 30, 1928 as an amendment to the former Philippine Naturalization Law, Act No. 2927, which was approved on March 26, 1920. Under this Naturalization Law, acquisition of Philippine citizenship was limited to three classes of persons, (a) Natives of the Philippines who were not citizens thereof; (b) natives of the other insular possessions of the United States; and (c) citizens of the United States, or foreigners who, under the laws of the United States, may become citizens of the latter country if residing therein. The reference in subdivision (c) to foreigners who may become American Citizens is restrictive in character, for only persons of certain specified races were qualified thereunder. In other words, in so far as racial restrictions were concerned there was at the time a similarity between the naturalization laws of the two countries, and hence there was reason to accord here persuasive force to the interpretation given in the United States to the statutory provision concerning the citizenship of alien women marrying American citizens. This Court, however, believes that such reason has ceased to exist since the enactment of the Revised Naturalization Law (Commonwealth Act No. 473) on June 17, 1939. The racial restrictions have been eliminated in this Act, but the provision found in Act No. 3448 has been maintained. It is logical to presume that when Congress chose to retain the said provisionthat to be deemed a Philippine citizen upon marriage the alien wife must be

one who might herself be lawfully naturalized, the reference is no longer to the class or race to which the woman belongs, for class or race has become immaterial, but to the qualifications and disqualifications for naturalization as enumerated in Sections 2 and 4 of the statute. Otherwise the requirement that the woman might herself be lawfully naturalized would be meaningless surplusage, contrary to settled norms of statutory construction. The rule laid down by this Court in this and in other cases heretofore decided is believed to be in line with the national policy of selective admission to Philippine citizenship, which after all is a privilege granted only to those who are found worthy thereof, and not indiscriminately to anybody at all on the basis alone of marriage to a man who is a citizen of the Philippines, irrespective of moral character, ideological beliefs, and identification with Filipino ideals, customs and traditions. Appellee here having failed to prove that she has all the qualifications for naturalization, even, indeed, that she has none of the disqualifications, she is not entitled to recognition as a Philippine citizen. In the second Ly Giok Ha, the Court further fortified the argumenits in favor of the same conclusion thus:

On cross-examination, she (Ly Giok Ha) failed to establish that: (1) she has been residing in the Philippines for a continuous period of at least (10) years (p. 27, t.s.n., id.); (2) she has a lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation (p. 13, t.s.n., id.); and (3) she can

speak and write English, or any of the principal Philippine languages (pp. 12, 13, t.s.n., id.). While the appellant Immigration Commissioner contends that the words emphasized indicate that the present Naturalization Law requires that an alien woman who marries a Filipino husband must possess the qualifications prescribed by section 2 in addition to not being disqualified under any of the eight (a to h) subheadings of section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, in order to claim our citizenship by marriage, both the appellee and the court below (in its second decision) sustain the view that all that the law demands is that the woman be not disqualified under section 4. At the time the present case was remanded to the court of origin (1960) the question at issue could be regarded as not conclusively settled, there being only the concise pronouncement in Lee Suan Ay, et al. v. Galang, G. R. No. L-11855, Dec. 23, 1959, to the effect that: The marriage of a Filipino citizen to an alien does not automatically confer Philippine citizenship upon the latter. She must possess the qualifications required by law to become a Filipino citizen by naturalization. Since that time, however, a long line of decisions of this Court has firmly established the rule that the requirement of section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473 (the Naturalization Act), that an alien woman married to a citizen should be one who might herself be lawfully naturalized, means not only woman free from the disqualifications enumerated in section 4 of the Act but also one who possesses the qualifications prescribed by section 2 of

Commonwealth Act 473 (San Tuan v. Galang, L-18775, Nov. 30, 1963; Sun Peck Yong v. Com. of Immigration, L-20784, Dec. 27, 1963; Tong Siok Sy v. Vivo, L-21136, Dec. 27, 1963; Austria v. Conchu, L-20716, June 22, 1965; Choy King Tee v. Galang, L-18351, March 26, 1965; Brito v. Com. of Immigration, L-16829, June 30, 1965). Reflection will reveal why this must be so. The qualifications prescribed under section 2 of the Naturalization Act, and the disqualifications enumerated in its section 4 are not mutually exclusive; and if all that were to be required is that the wife of a Filipino be not disqualified under section 4, the result might well be that citizenship would be conferred upon persons in violation of the policy of the statute. For example, section 4 disqualifies only (c) Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy; and (d) Persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude, so that a blackmailer, or a maintainer of gambling or bawdy houses, not previously convicted by a competent court would not be thereby disqualified; still, it is certain that the law did not intend such person to be admitted as a citizen in view of the requirement of section 2 that an applicant for citizenship must be of good moral character.

Similarly, the citizens wife might be a convinced believer in racial supremacy, in government by certain selected classes, in the right to vote exclusively by certain herrenvolk, and thus disbelieve in the principles underlying the Philippine Constitution; yet she would not

be disqualified under section 4, as long as she is not opposed to organized government, nor affiliated to groups upholding or teaching doctrines opposing all organized governments, nor defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault or assassination for the success or predominance of their ideas. Et sic de caeteris. The foregoing instances should suffice to illustrate the danger of relying exclusively on the absence of disqualifications, without taking into account the other affirmative requirements of the law, which, in the case at bar, the appellee Ly Giok Ha admittedly does not possess. As to the argument that the phrase might herself be lawfully naturalized was derived from the U.S. Revised Statutes (section 1994) and should be given the same territorial and racial significance given to it by American courts, this Court has rejected the same in Lon San Tuang v. Galang, L-18775, November 30, 1963; and in Choy King Tee v. Galang, L-18351, March 26, 1965. It is difficult to minimize the persuasive force of the foregoing rationalizations, but a closer study thereof cannot but reveal certain relevant considerations which adversely affect the premises on which they are predicated, thus rendering the conclusions arrived thereby not entirely unassailable. 1. The main proposition, for instance, that in eliminating Section 1 of Act 2927 providing who are eligible for Philippine citizenship, the purpose of Commonwealth Act 473, the Revised Naturalization Law, was to remove the racial requirements for naturalization, thereby opening the door of Filipino nationality to Asiatics instead of

allowing the admission thereto of Caucasians only, suffers from lack of exact accuracy. Ht is important to note, to start with, that Commonwealth Act 473 did away with the whole Section 1 of Act 2927 which reads thus: SECTION 1. Who may become Philippine citizens.Philippine citizenship may be acquired by: (a) natives of the Philippines who are not citizens thereof under the Jones Law; (b) natives of the other Insular possessions of the United States; (c) citizens of the United States, or foreigners who under the laws of the United States may become citizens of said country if residing therein. and not only subdivision (c) thereof. Nowhere in this whole provision was there any mention of race or color of the persons who were then eligible for Philippine citizenship. What is more evident from said provision is that it reflected the inevitable subordination of our legislation during the pre-Commonwealth American regime to the understandable limitations flowing from our status as a territory of the United States by virtue of the Treaty of Paris. In fact, Section 1 of Act 2927 was precisely approved pursuant to express authority, without which it could not have been done, granted by an amendment to Section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902 introduced by the Act of the United States Congress of March 23, 1912 and which was reenacted as part of the Jones Law of 1916, the pertinent provisions of which have already been quoted earlier. In truth, therefore, it Was because of the establishment of the Philippine Commonwealth and in the exercise of our legislative autonomy on citizenship matters under the Philippine Independence Act that Section 1 of Act 2927 was eliminated,15 and not purposely to eliminate any racial discrimination contained in our Naturalization Law. The Philippine

Legislature naturally wished to free our Naturalization Law from the impositions of American legislation. In other words, the fact that such discrimination was removed was one of the effects rather than the intended purpose of the amendment. 2. Again, the statement in Choy King Tee to the effect that the reference in subdivision (c) (of Section 1 of Act 2927) to foreigners who may become American citizens is restrictive in character, for only persons of certain specified races were qualified thereunder fails to consider the exact import of the said subdivision. Explicitly, the thrust of the said subdivision was to confine the grant under it of Philippine citizenship only to the three classes of persons therein mentioned, the third of which were citizens of the United States and, corollarily, persons who could be American citizens under her laws. The words used in the provision do not convey any idea of favoring aliens of any particular race or color and of excluding others, but more accurately, they refer to all the disqualifications of foreigners for American citizenship under the laws of the United States. The fact is that even as of 1906, or long before 1920, when our Act 2927 became a law, the naturalization laws of the United States already provided for the following disqualifications in the Act of the Congress of June 29, 1906: SEC. 7. That no person who disbelieves in or who is opposed to organized government, or who is a member of or affiliated with any organization entertaining and teaching such disbelief in or opposition to organized government, or who advocates or teaches the duty, necessity, or propriety of the unlawful assaulting or killing of any officer or officers, either of specific individuals or of officers generally, of the Government of the United States, or of any other organized government, because of his or their official character, or

who is a polygamist, shall be naturalized or be made a citizen of the United States. and all these disqualified persons were, therefore, ineligible for Philippine citizenship under Section 1 of Act 2927 even if they happened to be Caucasians. More importantly, as a matter of fact, said American law, which was the first Act to Establish a Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization and to Provide for a Uniform Rule for Naturalization of Aliens throughout the United States contained no racial disqualification requirement, except as to Chinese, the Act of May 6, 1882 not being among those expressly repealed by this law, hence it is clear that when Act 2927 was enacted, subdivision (c) of its Section 1 could not have had any connotation of racial exclusion necessarily, even if it were traced back to its origin in the Act of the United States Congress of 1912 already mentioned above.16 Thus, it would seem that the rationalization in the quoted decisions predicated on the theory that the elimination of Section 1 of Act 2927 by Commonwealth Act 473 was purposely for no other end than the abolition of racial discrimination in our naturalization law has no clear factual basis.17 3. In view of these considerations, there appears to be no cogent reason, why the construction adopted in the opinions of the Secretary of Justice referred to in the first Ly Giok Ha decision of the Chief Justice should not prevail. It is beyond dispute that the first paragraph of Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473 is a reenactment of Section 13 (a) of Act 2927, as amended by Act 3448, and that the latter is nothing but an exact copy, deliberately made, of Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes of the United States as it stood before its repeal in 1922.18 Before such repeal, the phrase who might herself be lawfully naturalized found in said Section 15

had a definite unmistakable construction uniformly followed in all courts of the United States that had occasion to apply the same and which, therefore, must be considered as if it were written in the statute itself. It is almost trite to say that when our legislators enacted said section, they knew of its unvarying construction in the United States and that, therefore, in adopting verbatim the American statute, they have in effect incorporated into the provision, as thus enacted, the construction given to it by the American courts as well as the Attorney General of the United States and all administrative authorities charged with tlie implementation of the naturalization and immigration laws of that country. (Lo Cham v. Ocampo, 77 Phil., 635 [1946]; Laxamana v. Baltazar, 92 Phil., 32 [1952]; Hartley v. Commissioner, 295 U.S. 216, 79 L. ed. 1399, 55 S Ct. 756 [1935]; Helvering v. Winmill, 305 U.S. 79, 83 L ed. 52, 59 S Ct. 45 [1938]; Helvering v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 306 U.S. 110, 83 L ed. 536, 59 S Ct. 423 [1939]. [p. 32, Memo of Amicus Curiae]). A fairly comprehensive summary of the said construction by the American courts and administrative authorities is contained in United States of America ex rel. Dora Sejnensky v. Robert E. Tod, Commissioner of Immigration, Appt., 285 Fed. 523, decided November 14, 1922, 26 A. L. R. 1316 as follows: Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes (Comp. Stat. 3948, 2 Fed. Sta. Anno. 2d ed. p. 117) provides as follows: Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the United States, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized, shall be deemed a citizen.

Section 1944 of the Revised Stat. is said to originate in the Act of Congress of February 10, 1855 (10 Stat. at L. 604, chap. 71), which in its second section provided that any woman, who might lawfully be naturalized under the existing laws, married, or who shall be married to a citizen of the United States, shall be deemed and taken to be a citizen. And the American Statute of 1855 is substantially a copy of the earlier British Statute 7 & 8 Vict. chap. 66, 16, 1844, which provided that any woman married, or who shall be married, to a natural-born subject or person naturalized, shall be deemed and taken to be herself naturalized, and have all the rights and privileges of a natural born subject. The Act of Congress of September 22, 1922 (42 Stat. at L. 1021, chap. 411, Comp. Stat. 4358b, Fed. Stat. Anno. Supp. 1922, p. 255), being An Act Relative to the Naturalization and Citizenship of Married Women, in 2, provides that any woman who marries a citizen of the United States after the passage of this Act, . . . shall not become a citizen of the United States by reason of such marriage . . . Section 6 of the act also provides that 1994 of the Revised Statutes . . . are repealed. Section 6 also provides that such repeal shall not terminate citizenship acquired or retained under either of such sections, . . . meaning 2 and 6. So that this Act of September 22, 1922, has no application to the facts of the present case, as the marriage of the relator took place prior to its passage. This case, therefore, depends upon the meaning to be attached to 1994 of the Revised Statutes.

In 1868 the Supreme Court, in Kelly v. Owen, 7 Wall. 496, 498, 19 L. ed. 283, 284, construed this provision as found in the Act of 1855 as follows: The term, who might lawfully be naturalized under the existing laws, only limits the application of the law to free white women. The previous Naturalization Act, existing at the time, only required that the person applying for its benefits should be a free white person, and not an alien enemy. This construction limited the effect of the statute to those aliens who belonged to the class or race which might be lawfully naturalized, and did not refer to any of the other provisions of the naturalization laws as to residence or moral character, or to any of the provisions of the immigration laws relating to the exclusion or deportation of aliens. In 1880, in Leonard v. Grant (C. C.) 5 Fed. 11, District Judge Deady also construed the Act of 1855, declaring that any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the United States, and might herself be lawfully naturalized, shall be deemed a citizen. He held that upon the authorities, and the reason, if not the necessity, of the case, the statute must be construed as in effect declaring that an alien woman, who is of the class or race that may be lawfully naturalized under the existing laws, and who marries a citizen of the United States, is such a citizen also, and it was not necessary that it should appear affirmatively that she possessed the other qualifications at the time of her marriage to entitle her to naturalization. In 1882, the Act of 1855 came before Mr. Justice Harlan, sitting in the circuit court, in United States v. Kellar, 13 Fed. 82. An alien woman, a subject of Prussia came to the United States and married

here a naturalized citizen. Mr. Justice Harlan, with the concurrence of Judge Treat, held that upon her marriage she became ipso facto a citizen of the United States as fully as if she had complied with all of the provisions of the statutes upon the subject of naturalization. He added: There can be no doubt of this, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Kelly v. Owen, 7 Wall. 496, 19 L. ed. 283. The alien belonged to the class of persons who might be lawfully naturalized. In 1904, in Hopkins v. Fachant, 65 C. C. A. 1, 130 Fed. 839, an alien woman came to the United States from France and entered the country contrary to the immigration laws. The immigration authorities took her into custody at the port of New York, with the view of deporting her. She applied for her release under a writ of habeas corpus, and pending the disposition of the matter she married a naturalized American citizen. The circuit court of appeals for the ninth circuit held, affirming the court below, that she was entitled to be discharged from custody. The court declared: The rule is well settled that her marriage to a naturalized citizen of the United States entitled her to be discharged. The status of the wife follows that of her husband, . . . and by virtue of her marriage her husbands domicil became her domicil. In 1908, the circuit court for the district of Rhode Island in Re Rustigian, 165 Fed. 980, had before it the application of a husband for his final decree of naturalization. It appeared that at that time his wife was held by the immigration authorities at New York on the ground that she was afflicted with a dangerous and contagious disease. Counsel on both sides agreed that the effect of the husbands naturalization would be to confer citizenship upon the wife. In view of that contingency District Judge Brown declined to

pass upon the husbands application for naturalization, and thought it best to wait until it was determined whether the wifes disease was curable. He placed his failure to act on the express ground that the effect of naturalizing the husband might naturalize her. At the same time he expressed his opinion that the husbands naturalization would not effect her naturalization, as she was not one who could become lawfully naturalized. Her own capacity (to become naturalized), the court stated, is a prerequisite to her attaining citizenship. If herself lacking in that capacity, the married status cannot confer it upon her. Nothing, however, was actually decided in that case, and the views expressed therein are really nothing more than mere dicta. But, if they can be regarded as something more than that, we find ourselves, with all due respect for the learned judge, unable to accept them. In 1909, in United States ex rel. Nicola v. Williams, 173 Fed. 626, District Judge Learned Hand held that an alien woman, a subject of the Turkish Empire, who married an American citizen while visiting Turkey, and then came to the United States, could not be excluded, although she had, at the time of her entry, a disease which under the immigration laws would have been sufficient ground for her exclusion, if she had not had the status of a citizen. The case was brought into this court on appeal, and in 1911 was affirmed, in 106 C. C. A. 464, 184 Fed. 322. In that case, however at the time the relators married, they might have been lawfully naturalized, and we said: Even if we assume the contention of the district attorney to be correct that marriage will not make a citizen of a woman who would be excluded under our immigration laws, it does not affect these relators.

We held that, being citizens, they could not be excluded as aliens; and it was also said to be inconsistent with the policy of our law that the husband should be a citizen and the wife an alien. The distinction between that case and the one now before the court is that, in the former case, the marriage took place before any order of exclusion had been made, while in this the marriage was celebrated after such an order was made. But such an order is a mere administrative provision, and has not the force of a judgment of a court, and works no estoppel. The administrative order is based on the circumstances that existed at the time the order of exclusion was made. If the circumstances change prior to the order being carried into effect, it cannot be executed. For example, if an order of exclusion should be based on the ground that the alien was at the time afflicted with a contagious disease, and it should be made satisfactorily to appear, prior to actual deportation, that the alien had entirely recovered from the disease, we think it plain that the order could not be carried into effect. So, in this case, if, after the making of the order of exclusion and while she is permitted temporarily to remain, she in good faith marries an American citizen, we cannot doubt the validity of her marriage, and that she thereby acquired, under international law and under 1994 of the Revised Statutes, American citizenship, and ceased to be an alien. There upon, the immigration authorities lost their jurisdiction over her, as that jurisdiction applies only to aliens, and not to citizens. In 1910, District Judge Dodge, in Ex parte Kaprielian, 188 Fed. 694, sustained the right of the officials to deport a woman under the following circumstances: She entered this country in July, 1910, being an alien and having been born in Turkey. She was taken into custody by the immigration authorities in the following September,

and in October a warrant for her deportation was issued. Pending hearings as to the validity of that order, she was paroled in the custody of her counsel. The ground alleged for her deportation was that she was afflicted with a dangerous and contagious disease at the time of her entry. One of the reasons assigned to defeat deportation was that the woman had married a citizen of the United States pending the proceedings for her deportation. Judge Dodge declared himself unable to believe that a marriage under such circumstances is capable of having the effect claimed, in view of the facts shown. He held that it was no part of the intended policy of 1994 to annul or override the immigration laws, so as to authorize the admission into the country of the wife of a naturalized alien not otherwise entitled to enter, and that an alien woman, who is of a class of persons excluded by law from admission to the United States does not come within the provisions of that section. The court relied wholly upon the dicta contained in the Rustigian Case. No other authorities were cited. In 1914, District Judge Neterer, in Ex parte Grayson, 215 Fed. 449, construed 1994 and held that where, pending proceedings to deport an alien native of France as an alien prostitute, she was married to a citizen of the United States, she thereby became a citizen, and was not subject to deportation until her citizenship was revoked by due process of law. It was his opinion that if, as was contended, her marriage was conceived in fraud, and was entered into for the purpose of evading the immigration laws and preventing her deportation, such fact should be established in a court of competent jurisdiction in an action commenced for the purpose. The case was appealed and the appeal was dismissed. 134 C. C. A. 666, 219 Fed. 1022.

It is interesting also to observe the construction placed upon the language of the statute by the Department of Justice. In 1874, Attorney General Williams, 14 Ops. Atty. Gen. 402, passing upon the Act of February 10, 1855, held that residence within the United States for the period required by the naturalization laws was not necessary in order to constitute an alien woman a citizen, she having married a citizen of the United States abroad, although she never resided in the United States, she and her husband having continued to reside abroad after the marriage. In 1909, a similar construction was given to the Immigration Act of May 5, 1907, in an opinion rendered by Attorney General Wickersham. It appeared an unmarried woman, twenty-eight years of age and a native of Belgium, arrived in New York and went at once to a town in Nebraska, where she continued to reside. About fifteen months after her arrival she was taken before a United States commissioner by way of instituting proceedings under the Immigration Act (34 Stat. at L. 898, chap. 1134. Comp. Stat. 4242, 3 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. p. 637) for her deportation, on the ground that she had entered this country for the purpose of prostitution, and had been found an inmate of a house of prostitution and practising the same within three years after landing. It appeared, however, that after she was taken before the United States commissioner, but prior to her arrest under a warrant by the Department of Justice, she was lawfully married to a native-born citizen of the United States. The woman professed at the time of her marriage an intention to abandon her previous mode of life and to remove with her husband to his home in Pennsylvania. He knew what her mode of life had been, but professed to believe in her good intentions. The question was raised as to the right to deport

her, the claim being advance that by her marriage she had become an American citizen and therefore could not be deported. The Attorney General ruled against the right to deport her as she had become an American citizen. He held that the words, who might herself be lawfully naturalized, refer to a class or race who might be lawfully naturalized, and that compliance with the other conditions of the naturalization laws was not required. 27 Ops. Atty. Gen. 507.

Indeed, We have examined all the leading American decisions on the subject and We have found no warrant for the proposition that the phrase who might herself be lawfully naturalized in Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes was meant solely as a racial bar, even if loose statements in some decisions and other treaties and other writings on the subject would seem to give such impression. The case of Kelley vs. Owen, supra, which appears to be the most cited among the first of these decisions19 simply held: As we construe this Act, it confers the privileges of citizenship upon women married to citizens of the United States, if they are of the class of persons for whose naturalization the previous Acts of Congress provide. The terms married or who shall be married, do not refer, in our judgment, to the time when the ceremony of marriage is celebrated, but to a state of marriage. They mean that, whenever a woman, who under previous Acts might be naturalized, is in a state of marriage to a citizen, whether his citizenship existed at the passage of the Act or subsequently, or before or after the marriage, she becomes, by that fact, a citizen also. His citizenship, whenever it exists, confers, under the Act, citizenship upon her. The construction which would restrict the Act to women whose husbands, at the time of marriage, are citizens, would exclude far the greater number, for whose benefit, as we think, the Act was intended. Its object, in our opinion, was to allow her citizenship to follow that of her husband, without the necessity of any application for naturalization on her part; and, if this was the object, there is no reason for the restriction suggested. The terms, who might lawfully be naturalized under the existing laws, only limit the application of the law to free white women. The previous Naturalization Act, existing at the time only required that

Before concluding this opinion, we may add that it has not escaped our observation that Congress, in enacting the Immigration Act of 1917, so as to provide, in 19, that the marriage to an American citizen of a female of the sexually immoral classes . . . shall not invest such female with United States citizenship if the marriage of such alien female shall be solemnized after her arrest or after the commission of acts which make her liable to deportation under this act. Two conclusions seem irresistibly to follow from the above change in the law: (1) Congress deemed legislation essential to prevent women of the immoral class avoiding deportation through the device of marrying an American citizen. ican citizen with an alien woman of any other of the excluded classes, either before or after her detention, should not confer upon her American citizenship, thereby entitling her to enter the country, its intention would have been expressed, and 19 would not have been confined solely to women of the immoral class.

the person applying for its benefits should be a free white person, and not an alien enemy. Act of April 14th, 1802, 2 Stat. at L. 153. A similar construction was given to the Act by the Court of Appeals of New York, in Burton v. Burton, 40 N. Y. 373; and is the one which gives the widest extension to its provisions.

citizen would be a citizen was dependent, not only on her race and nothing more necessarily, but on whether or not there were other disqualifications under the law in force at the time of her marriage or the naturalization of her husband. 4. As already stated, in Lo San Tuang, Choy King Tee and the second Ly Giok Ha, the Court drew the inference that because Section 1 of Act 2927 was eliminated by Commonwealth Act 473, it follows that in place of the said eliminated section, particularly its subdivision (c), being the criterion of whether or not an alien wife may be lawfully naturalized, what should be required is not only that she must not be disqualified under Section 4 but that she must also possess the qualifications enumerated in Section 2, such as those of age, residence, good moral character, adherence to the underlying principles of the Philippine Constitution, irreproachable conduct, lucrative employment or ownership of real estate, capacity to speak and write English or Spanish and one of the principal local languages, education of children in certain schools, etc., thereby implying that, in effect, said Section 2 has been purposely intended to take the place of Section 1 of Act 2927. Upon further consideration of the proper premises, We have come to the conclusion that such inference is not sufficiently justified. To begin with, nothing extant in the legislative history, which We have already examined above of the mentioned provisions has been shown or can be shown to indicate that such was the clear intent of the legislature. Rather, what is definite is that Section 15 is an exact copy of Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, which, at the time of the approval of Commonwealth Act 473 had already a settled construction by American courts and administrative authorities.

Note that while the court did say that the terms, who might lawfully be naturalized under existing laws only limit the application to free white women20 it hastened to add that the previous Naturalization Act, existing at the time, x x x required that the person applying for its benefits should be (not only) a free white person (but also) x x x not an alien enemy. This is simply because under the Naturalization Law of the United States at the time the case was decided, the disqualification of enemy aliens had already been removed by the Act of July 30, 1813, as may be seen in the corresponding footnote hereof anon. In other words, if in the case of Kelly v. Owen only the race requirement was mentioned, the reason was that there was no other non-racial requirement or no more alien-enemy disqualification at the time; and this is demonstrated by the fact that the court took care to make it clear that under the previous naturalization law, there was also such requirement in addition to race. This is important, since as stated in re Rustigian, 165 Fed. Rep. 980, The expression used by Mr. Justice Field, (in Kelly v. Owen) the terms who might lawfully be naturalized under existing laws only limit the application of the law to free white women, must be interpreted in the application to the special facts and to the incapacities under the then existing laws, (at p. 982) meaning that whether or not an alien wife marrying a

Secondly, as may be gleaned from the summary of pertinent American decisions quoted above, there can be no doubt that in the construction of the identically worded provision in the Revised Statutes of the United States, (Section 1994, which was taken from the Act of February 10, 1855) all authorities in the United States are unanimously agreed that the qualifications of residence, good moral character, adherence to the Constitution, etc. are not supposed to be considered, and that the only eligibility to be taken into account is that of the race or class to which the subject belongs, the conceptual scope of which, We have just discussed.21 In the very case of Leonard v. Grant, supra, discussed by Justice Regala in Lo San Tuang, the explanation for such posture of the American authorities was made thus: The phrase, shall be deemed a citizen, in section 1994 Rev. St., or as it was in the Act of 1855, supra, shall be deemed and taken to be a citizen, while it may imply that the person to whom it relates has not actually become a citizen by ordinary means or in the usual way, as by the judgment of a competent court, upon a proper application and proof, yet it does not follow that such person is on that account practically any the less a citizen. The word deemed is the equivalent of considered or judged; and, therefore, whatever an act of Congress requires to be deemed or taken as true of any person or thing, must, in law, be considered as having been duly adjudged or established concerning such person or thing, and have force and effect accordingly. When, therefore, Congress declares that an alien woman shall, under certain circumstances, be deemed an American citizen, the effect when the contingency occurs, is equivalent to her being naturalized directly by an act of Congress, or in the usual mode thereby prescribed.

Unless We disregard now the long settled familiar rule of statutory construction that in a situation like this wherein our legislature has copied an American statute word for word, it is understood that the construction already given to such statute before its being copied constitute part of our own law, there seems to be no reason how We can give a different connotation or meaning to the provision in question. At least, We have already seen that the views sustaining the contrary conclusion appear to be based on inaccurate factual premises related to the real legislative background of the framing of our naturalization law in its present form. Thirdly, the idea of equating the qualifications enumerated in Section 2 of Commonwealth Act 473 with the eligibility requirements of Section 1 of Act 2927 cannot bear close scrutiny from any point of view. There is no question that Section 2 of Commonwealth Act 473 is more or less substantially the same as Section 3 of Act 2927. In other words, Section 1 of Act 2927 coexisted already with practically the same provision as Section 2 of Commonwealth Act 473. If it were true that the phrase who may be lawfully naturalized in Section 13 (a) of Act 2927, as amended by Act 3448, referred to the so-called racial requirement in Section 1 of the same Act, without regard to the provisions of Section 3 thereof, how could the elimination of Section 1 have the effect of shifting the reference to Section 3, when precisely, according to the American jurisprudence, which was prevailing at the time Commonwealth Act 473 was approved, such qualifications as were embodied in said Section 3, which had their counterpart in the corresponding American statutes, are not supposed to be taken into account and that what should be considered only are the

requirements similar to those provided for in said Section 1 together with the disqualifications enumerated in Section 4? Fourthly, it is difficult to conceive that the phrase who might be lawfully naturalized in Section 15 could have been intended to convey a meaning different than that given to it by the American courts and administrative authorities. As already stated, Act 3448 which contained said phrase and from which it was taken by Commonwealth Act 473, was enacted in 1928. By that time, Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes of the United States was no longer in force because it had been repeated expressly the Act of September 22, 1922 which did away with the automatic naturalization of alien wives of American citizens and required, instead, that they submit to regular naturalization proceedings, albeit under more liberal terms than those of other applicants. In other words, when our legislature adopted the phrase in question, which, as already demonstrated, had a definite construction in American law, the Americans had already abandoned said phraseology in favor of a categorical compulsion for alien wives to be naturalized judicially. Simple logic would seem to dictate that, since our lawmakers, at the time of the approval of Act 3448, had two choices, one to adopt the phraseology of Section 1994 with its settled construction and the other to follow the new posture of the Americans of requiring judicial naturalization, and it appears that they have opted for the first, We have no alternative but to conclude that our law still follows the old or previous American law on the subject. Indeed, when Commonwealth Act 473 was approved in 1939, the Philippine Legislature, already autonomous then from the American Congress, had a clearer chance to disregard the old American law and make one of our own, or, at least, follow the trend of the Act of the U.S.

Congress of 1922, but still, our legislators chose to maintain the language of the old law. What then is significantly important is not that the legislature maintained said phraseology after Section 1 of Act 2927 was eliminated, but that it continued insisting on using it even after the Americans had amended their law in order to provide for what is now contended to be the construction that should be given to the phrase in question. Stated differently, had our legislature adopted a phrase from an American statute before the American courts had given it a construction which was acquiesced to by those given upon to apply the same, it would be possible for Us to adopt a construction here different from that of the Americans, but as things stand, the fact is that our legislature borrowed the phrase when there was already a settled construction thereof, and what is more, it appears that our legislators even ignored the modification of the American law and persisted in maintaining the old phraseology. Under these circumstances, it would be in defiance of reason and the principles of Statutory construction to say that Section 15 has a nationalistic and setetetive orientation and that it should be construed independently of the previous American posture because of the difference of circumstances here and in the United States. It is always safe to say that in the construction of a statute, We cannot fall on possible judicial fiat or perspective when the demonstrated legislative point of view seemls to indicate otherwise. 5. Viewing the matter from another angle, there is need to emphasize that in reality and in effect, the so-called racial requirements, whether under the American laws or the Philippine laws, have hardly been considered as qualifications in the same sense as those enumerated in Section 3 of Act 2927 and later in

Section 2 of Commonwealth Act 473. More accurately, they have always been considered as disqualifications, in the sense that those who did mot possess them were the ones who could not be lawfully naturalized, just as if they were suffering from any of the disqualifications under Section 2 of Act 2927 and later those under Section 4 of Commonwealth Act 473, which, incidentally, are practically identical to those in the former law, except those in paragraphs (f) and (h) of the latter.22 Indeed, such is the clear impression anyone will surely get after going over all the American decisions and opinions quoted and/or cited in the latest USCA (1970), Title 8, section 1430, pp. 598-602, and the first decisions of this Court on the matter, Ly Giok Ha (1959) and Ricardo Cua, citing with approval the opinions of the Secretary of Justice.23 Such being the case, that is, that the so-called racial requirements were always treated as disqualifications in the same light as the other disqualifications under the law, why should their elimination not be viewed or understood as a subtraction from or a lessening of the disqualifications? Why should such elimination have instead the meaning that what were previously considered as irrelevant qualifications have become disqualifications, as seems to be the import of the holding in Choy King Tee to the effect that the retention in Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473 of the same language of what used to be Section 13 (a) of Act 2927 (as amended by Act 3448), notwithstanding the elimination of Section 1 of the latter, necessarily indicates that the legislature had in mind making the phrase in question who may be lawfully naturalized refer no longer to any racial disqualification but to the qualification under Section 2 of Commonwealth Act 473? Otherwise stated, under Act 2927, there were two groups of persons that could not be naturalized, namely, those falling under Section 1 and those falling

under Section 2, and surely, the elimination of one group, i.e. those belonging to Section 1, could not have had, by any process of reasoning, the effect of increasing, rather than decreasing, the disqualifications that used to be before such elimination. We cannot see by what alchemy of logic such elimination could have converted qualifications into disqualifications, specially in the light of the fact that, after all, these are disqualifications clearly set out as such in the law distinctly and separately from qualifications and, as already demonstrated, in American jurisprudence, qualifications had never been considered to be of any relevance in determining who might be lawfully naturalized, as such phrase is used in the statute governing the status of alien wives of American citizens, and our law on the matter was merely copied verbatim from the American statutes. 6. In addition to these arguments based on the applicable legal provisions and judicial opinions, whether here or in the United States, there are practical considerations that militate towards the same conclusions. As aptly stated in the motion for reconsideration of counsel for petitioner-appellee dated February 23, 1967, filed in the case of Zita Ngo Burca v. Republic, supra: Unreasonableness of requiring alien wife to prove qualifications There is one practical consideration that strongly militates against a construction that Section 15 of the law requires that an alien wife of a Filipino must affirmatively prove that she possesses the qualifications prescribed under Section 2, before she may be deemed a citizen. Such condition, if imposed upon an alien wife, becomes unreasonably onerous and compliance therewith

manifestly difficult. The unreasonableness of such requirement is shown by the following: 1. One of the qualifications required of an applicant for naturalization under Section 2 of the law is that the applicant must have resided in the Philippines for a continuous period of not less than ten years. If this requirement is applied to an alien wife married to a Filipino citizen, this means that for a period of ten years at least, she cannot hope to acquire the citizenship of her husband. If the wife happens to he a citizen of a country whose law declares that upon her marriage to a foreigner she automatically loses her citizenship and acquires the citizenship of her husband, this could mean that for a period of ten years at least, she would be stateless. And even after having acquired continuous residence in the Philippines for ten years, there is no guarantee that her petition for naturalization will be granted, in which case she would remain stateless for an indefinite period of time.

income. (Uy v. Republic, L-19578, Oct. 27, 1964; Tanpa Ong vs. Republic, L-20605, June 30, 1965; Li Tong Pek v. Republic, L-20912, November 29, 1965). In other words, the wife must prove that she has a lucrative income derived from sources other than her husbands trade,: profession or calling. It is of common knowledge, and judicial notice may be taken of the fact that most wives in the Philippines do not have gainful occupations of their own. Indeed, Philippine law, recognizing the dependence of the wife upon the husband, imposes upon the latter the duty of supporting the former. (Art. 291, Civil Code). It should be borne in mind that universally, it is an accepted concept that when a woman marries, her primary duty is to be a wife, mother and housekeeper. If an alien wife is not to be remiss in this duty, how can she hope to acquire a lucrative income of her own to qualify her for citizenship? 3. Under Section 2 of the law, the applicant for naturalization must have enrolled his minor children of school age, in any of the public schools or private schools recognized by the Office of the Private Education of the Philippines, where Philippine history, government and civics are taught or prescribed as part of the school curriculum during the entire period of residence in the Philippines required of him prior to the hearing of his petition for naturalization as Philippine citizen. If an alien woman has minor children by a previous marriage to another alien before she marries a Filipino, and such minor children had not been enrolled in Philippine schools during her period of residence in the country, she cannot qualify for naturalization under the interpretation of this Court. The reason behind the requirement that children should be enrolled in recognized educational institutions is that they follow the citizenship of their father. (Chan Ho Lay v. Republic, L-5666, March

2. Section 2 of the law likewise requires of the applicant for naturalization that he must own real estate in the Philippines worth not less than five thousand pesos, Philippine currency, or must have some known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation. Considering the constitutional prohibition against acquisition by an alien of real estate except in cases of hereditary succession (Art. X111, Sec. 5, Constitution), an alien wife desiring to acquire the citizenship of her husband must have to prove that she has a lucrative income derived from a lawful trade, profession or occupation. The income requirement has been interpreted to mean that the petitioner herself must be the one to possess the said

30, 1954; Tan Hi v. Republic, 88 Phil. 117 [1951]; Hao Lian Chu v. Republic, 87 Phil. 668 [1950]; Yap Chin v. Republic, L-4177, May 29, 1953; Lim Lian Hong v. Republic, L-3575, Dec. 26, 1950). Considering that said minor children by her first husband generally follow the citizenship of their alien father, the basis for such requirement as applied to her does not exist. Cessante ratione legis cessat ipsa lex. 4. Under Section 3 of the law, the 10-year continuous residence prescribed by Section 2 shall be understood as reduced to five years for any petitioner (who is) married to a Filipino woman. It is absurd that an alien male married to a Filipino wife should be required to reside only for five years in the Philippines to qualify for citizenship, whereas an alien woman married to a Filipino husband must reside for ten years. Thus under the interpretation given by this Court, it is more difficult for an alien wife related by marriage to a Filipino citizen to become such citizen, than for a foreigner who is not so related. And yet, it seems more than clear that the general purpose of the first paragraph of Section 15 was obviously to accord to an alien woman, by reason of her marriage to a Filipino, a privilege not similarly granted to other aliens. It will be recalled that prior to the enactment of Act No. 3448 in 1928, amending Act No. 2927 (the old Naturalization Law), there was no law granting any special privilege to alien wives of Filipinos. They were treated as any other foreigner. It was precisely to remedy this situation that the Philippine legislature enacted Act No. 3448. On this point, the observation made by the Secretary of Justice in 1941 is enlightening: It is true that under Article 22 of the (Spanish) Civil Code, the wife follows the nationality of the husband; but the Department of State

of the United States on October 31, 1921, ruled that the alien wife of a Filipino citizen is not a Filipino citizen, pointing out that our Supreme Court in the leading case of Rea v. Collector of Customs (28 Phil. 315) held that Articles 17 to 27 of the Civil Code being political have been abrogated upon the cession of the Philippine Islands to the United States. Accordingly, the stand taken by the Attorney-General prior to the enactment of Act No. 3448, was that marriage of alien women to Philippine citizens did not make the former citizens of this country. (Op. Atty. Gen., March 16, 1928) To remedy this anomalous condition, Act No. 3448 was enacted in 1928 adding section 13 (a) to Act No. 2927 which provides that any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippine Islands, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized, shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippine Islands. (Op. No. 22, s. 1941; italics ours). If Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law were to be interpreted, as this Court did, in such a way as to require that the alien wife must prove the qualifications prescribed in Section 2, the privilege granted to alien wives would become illusory. It is submitted that such a construction, being contrary to the manifested object of the statute, must be rejected. A statute is to be construed with reference to its manifest object, and if the language is susceptible of two constructions, one which will carry out and the other defeat such manifest object, it should receive the former construction. (In re National Guard, 71 Vt. 493, 45 A. 1051; Singer v. United States, 323 U.S. 338, 89 L. ed. 285. See also, U.S. v. Navarro, 19 Phil. 134 [1911]; U.S. v. Toribio, 15 Phil. 85 [1910]).

x x x A construction which will cause objectionable results should be avoided and the court will, if possible, place on the statute a construction which will not result in injustice, and in accordance with the decisions construing statutes, a construction which will result in oppression, hardship, or inconveniences will also be avoided, as will a construction which will prejudice public interest, or construction resulting in unreasonableness, as well as a construction which will result in absurd consequences. So a construction should, if possible, be avoided if the result would be an apparent inconsistency in legislative intent, as has been determined by the judicial decisions, or which would result in futility, redundancy, or a conclusion not contemplated by the legislature; and the court should adopt that construction which will be the least likely to produce mischief. Unless plainly shown to have been the intention of the legislature, an interpretation which would render the requirements of the statute uncertain and vague is to he avoided, and the court will not ascribe to the legislature an intent to confer an illusory right. x x x (82 C.J.S., Statutes, sec. 326, pp. 623632).

It seems but natural and logical to assume that Section 15 was intended to extend special treatment to alien women who by marrying a Filipino irrevocably deliver themselves, their possessions. their fate and fortunes and all that marriage implies to a citizen of this country, for better or for worse. Perhaps there can and will be cases wherein the personal conveniences and benefits arising from Philippine citizenship may motivate such marriage, but must the minority, as such cases are bound to be, serve as the criterion for the construction of law? Moreover, it is not farfetched to believe that in joining a Filipino family, the alien woman is somehow disposed to assimilate the customs, beliefs and ideals of Filipinos among whom, after all, she has to live and associate, but surely, no one should expect her to do so even before marriage. Besides, it may be considered that in reality the extension of citizenship to her is made by the law not so much for her sake as for the husband. Indeed, We find the following observations anent the national policy rationalization in Choy King Tee and Ly Giok Ha (the second) to be quite persuasive: We respectfully suggest that this articulation of the national policy begs the question. The avowed policy of selective admission more particularly refers to a case where citizenship is sought to be acquired in a judicial proceeding for naturalization. In such a case, the courts should no doubt apply the national policy of selecting only those who are worthy to become citizens. There is here a choice between accepting or rejecting the application for citizenship. But this policy finds no application in cases where citizenship is conferred by operation of law. In such cases, the courts have no choice to accept or reject. If the individual claiming citizenship by operation of law proves in legal proceedings that he

7. In Choy King Tee and the second Ly Giok Ha, emphasis was laid on the need for aligning the construction of Section 15 with the national policy of selective admission to Philippine citizenship. But the question may be asked, is it reasonable to suppose that in the pursuit of such policy, the legislature contemplated to make it more difficult, if not practically impossible in some instances, for an alien woman marrying a Filipino to become a Filipina than any ordinary applicant for naturalization, as has just been demonstrated above?

satisfies the statutory requirements, the courts cannot do otherwise than to declare that he is a citizen of the Philippines. Thus, an individual who is able to prove that his father is a Philippine citizen, is a citizen of the Philippines, irrespective of his moral character, ideological beliefs, and identification with Filipino ideals, customs, and traditions. A minor child of a person naturalized under the law, who is able to prove the fact of his birth in the Philippines, is likewise a citizen, regardless of whether he has lucrative income, or he adheres to the principles of the Constitution. So it is with an alien wife of a Phil-ippine citizen. She is required to prove only that she may herself be lawfully naturalized, i.e., that she is not one of the disqualified persons enumerated in Section 4 of the law, in order to establish her citizenship status as a fact. A paramount policy consideration of graver import should not be overlooked in this regard, for it explains and justifies the obviously deliberate choice of words. It is universally accepted that a State, in extending the privilege of citizenship to an alien wife of one of its citizens could have had no other objective than to maintain a unity of allegiance among the members of the family. (Nelson v. Nelson, 113 Neb. 453, 203 N. W. 640 *1925+; see also Convention on the Nationality of Married Women: Historical Background and Commentary. UNITED NATIONS, Department of Economic and Social Affairs E/CN, 6/399, pp. 8 et seq.). Such objective can only be satisfactorily achieved by allowing the wife to acquire citizenship derivatively through the husband. This is particularly true in the Philippines where tradition and law has placed the husband as head of the family, whose personal status and decisions govern the life of the family group. Corollary to this, our laws look with favor on the unity and solidarity of the family (Art. 220, Civil Code), in whose

preservation of State as a vital and enduring interest. (See Art. 216, Civil Code). Thus, it has been said that by tradition in our country, there is a theoretic identity of person and interest between husband and wife, and from the nature of the relation, the home of one is that of the other. (See De la Via v. Villareal, 41 Phil. 13). It should likewise be said that because of the theoretic identity of husband and wife, and the primacy of the husband, the nationality of husband should be the nationality of the wife, and the laws upon one should be the law upon the other. For as the court, in Hopkins v. Fachant (9th Cir., 1904) 65 C.C.A., 1, 130 Fed. 839, held: The status of the wife follows that of the husband, x x x and by virtue of her marriage her hus-bands domicile became her domicile. And the presumption under Philippine law being that the property relations of husband and wife are under the regime of conjugal partnership (Art. 119, Civil Code), the income of one is also that of the other. It is, therefore, not congruent with our cherished traditions of family unity and identity that a husband should be a citizen and the wife an alien, and that the national treatment of one should be different from that of the other. Thus, it cannot be that the husbands interests in property and business activities reserved by law to citizens should not form part of the conjugal partnership and be denied to the wife, nor that she herself cannot, through her own efforts but for the benefit of the partnership, acquire such interests. Only in rare instances should the identity of husband and wife be refused recognition, and we submit that in respect of our citizenship laws, it should only be in the instances where the wife suffers from the disqualifications stated in Section 4 of the Revised

Naturalization Law. (Motion for Reconsideration, Burca vs. Republic, supra.) With all these considerations in mind, We are persuaded that it is in the best interest of all concerned that Section 15 of the Naturalization Law be given effect in the same way as it was understood and construed when the phrase who may be lawfully naturalized, found in the American statute from which it was borrowed and copied verbatim, was applied by the American courts and administrative authorities. There is merit, of course, in the view that Philippine statutes should be construed in the light of Philippine circumstances, and with particular reference to our naturalization laws. We should realize the disparity in the circumstances between the United States, as the so-called melting pot of peoples from all over the world, and the Philippines as a developing country whose Constitution is nationalistic almost in the extreme. Certainly, the writer of this opinion cannot be the last in rather passionately insisting that our jurisprudence should speak our own concepts and resort to American authorities, to be sure, entitled to admiration and respect, should not be regarded as source of pride and indisputable authority. Still, We cannot close our eyes to the undeniable fact that the provision of law now under scrutiny has no local origin and orientation; it is purely American, factually taken bodily from American law when the Philippines was under the dominating influence of statutes of the United States Congress. It is indeed a sad commentary on the work of our own legislature of the late 1920s and 1930s that given the opportunity to break away from the old American pattern, it took no step in that direction. Indeed, even after America made it patently clear in the Act of Congress of September 22, 1922 that alien women marrying

Americans cannot be citizens of the United States without undergoing naturalization proceedings, our legislators still chose to adopt the previous American law of August 10, 1855 as embodied later in Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes of 1874, which, it is worth reiterating, was consistently and uniformly understood as conferring American citizenship to alien women marrying Americans ipso facto, without (having Ito submit to any naturalization proceeding and without having to prove that they possess the special qualifications of residence, moral character, adherence to American ideals and American constitution, provided they show they did not suffer from any of the disqualifications enumerated in the American Naturalization Law. Accordingly, We now hold, all previous decisions of this Court indicating otherwise notwithstanding, that under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4. As under any other law rich in benefits for those coming under it, doubtless there will be instances where unscrupulous persons will attempt to take advantage of this provision of law by entering into fake and fictitious marriages or mala fide matrimonies. We cannot as a matter of law hold that just because of these possibilities, the construction of the provision should be otherwise than as dictated inexorably by more ponderous relevant considerations, legal, juridical and practical. There can always be means of discovering

such undesirable practices and every case can be dealt with accordingly as it arises. III. The third aspect of this case requires necessarily a reexamination of the ruling of this Court in Burca, supra, regarding the need of judicial naturalization proceedings before the alien wife of a Filipino may herself be considered or deemed a Filipino, If this case which, as already noted, was submitted for decision in 1964 yet, had only been decided earlier, before Go Im Ty, the foregoing discussions would have been sufficient to dispose of it. The Court could have held that despite her apparent lack of qualifications, her marriage to her co-petitioner made her a Filipina, without her undergoing any naturalization proceedings, provided she could sustain her claim that she is not disqualified under Section 4 of the law. But as things stand now, with the Burca ruling, the question We have still to decide is, may she be deemed a Filipina without submitting to a naturalization proceeding? Naturally, if Burca is to be followed, it is clear that the answer to this question must necessarily be in the affirmative. As already stated, however, the decision in Burca has not yet become final because there is still pending with Us a motion for its reconsideration which vigorously submits grounds worthy of serious consideration by this Court. On this account, and for the reasons expounded earlier in this opinion, this case is as good an occasion as any other to reexamine the issue. In the said decision, Justice Sanchez held for the Court:

We accordingly rule that: (1) An alien woman married to a Filipino who desires to be a citizen of this country must apply therefore by filing a petition for citizenship reciting that she possesses all the qualifications set forth in Section 2 and none of the disqualifications under Section 4, both of the Revised Naturalization Law; (2) Said petition must be filed in the Court of First Instance where petitioner has resided at least one year immediately preceding the filing of the petition; and (3) Any action by any other office, agency, board or official, administrative or otherwiseother than the judgment of a competent court of justicecertifying or declaring that an alien wife of the Filipino citizen is also a Filipino citizen, is hereby declared null and void. 3. We treat the present petition as one for naturalization. Or, in the words of law, a petition for citizenship. This is as it should be. Because a reading of the petition will reveal at once that efforts were made to set forth therein, and to prove afterwards, compliance with Sections 2 and 4 of the Revised Naturalization Law. The trial court itself apparently considered the petition as one for naturalization, and, in fact, declared petitioner a citizen of the Philippines. In other words, under this holding, in order for an alien woman marrying a Filipino to be vested with Filipino citizenship, it is not enough that she possesses the qualifications prescribed by Section 2 of the law and none of the disqualifications enumerated in its Section 4. Over and above all these, the has to pass thru the whole process of judicial naturalization, apparently from declaration of intention to oath-taking, before she can become a Filipina. In plain words, her marriage to a Filipino is absolutely of no consequence to her nationality vis-a-vis that of her Filipino husband; she remains to

be the rational of the country to which she owed allegiance before her marriage, and if she desires to be of one nationality with her husband, she has to wait for the same time that any other applicant for naturalization needs to complete, the required period of ten year residence, gain the knowledge of English or Spanish and one of the principal local languages, make her children study in Filipino schools, acquire real property or engage in some lawful occupation of her own independently of her husband, file her declaration of intention and after one year her application for naturalization, with the affidavits of two credible witnesses of heir good moral character and either qualifications, etc., etc., until a decision is rendered in her favor, after which, she has to undergo the two years of probation, and only then, but not before she takes her oath as citizen, will she begin to be considered and deemed to be a citizen of the Philippines. Briefly she can become a Filipino citizen only by judicial declaration. Such being the import of the Courts ruling, and it being quite obvious, on the other hand, upon a cursory reading of the provision in question, that the law intends by it to spell out what is the effect of naturalization on (the) wife and children of an alien, as plainly indicated by its title, and inasmuch as the language of the provision itself clearly conveys the thought that some effect beneficial to the wife is intended by it, rather than that she is not in any manner to be benefited thereby, it behooves Us to take a second hard look at the ruling, if only to see whether or not the Court might have overlooked any relevant consideration warranting a conclusion different from that contained therein. It is undeniable that the issue before Us is of grave importance, considering its consequences upon tens of thousands of persons affected by the ruling therein

made by the Court, and surely, it is far Us to avoid, whenever possible, that Our decision in any case should produce any adverse effect upon them not contemplated either by the law or by the national policy it seeks to enforce. AMICI CURIAE in the Burca case, respectable and impressive by their number and standing in the Bar and well known far their reputation for Intellectual integrity, legal acumen and incisive and comprehensive resourcefulness in research, truly evident in the quality of the memorandum they have submitted in said case, invite Our attention to the impact of the decision therein thus: The doctrine announced by this Honorable Court for the first time in the present casethat an alien woman who marries a Philippine citizen not only does not ipso facto herself become a citizen but can acquire such citizenship only through ordinary naturalization proceedings under the Revised Naturalization Law, and that all administrative actions certifying or declaring such woman to be a Philippine citizen are null and voidhas consequences that reach far beyond the confines of the present case. Considerably more people are affected, and affected deeply, than simply Mrs. Zita N. Burca. The newspapers report that as many as 15 thousand women married to Philippine citizens are affected by this decision of the Court. These are women of many and diverse nationalities, including Chinese, Spanish, British, American, Columbian, Finnish, Japanese, Chilean, and so on. These members of the community, some of whom have been married to citizens for two or three decades, have all exercised rights and privileges reserved by law to Philippine citizens. They will have acquired, separately or in conjugal partnership with their citizen husbands, real property, and they will have sold and transferred such property. Many of these women

may be in professions membership in which is limited to citizens. Others are doubtless stockholders or officers or employees in companies engaged in business activities for which a certain percentage of Filipino equity content is prescribed by law. All these married women are now faced with possible divestment of personal status and of rights acquired and privileges exercised in reliance, in complete good faith, upon a reading of the law that has been accepted as correct for more than two decades by the very agencies of government charged with the administration of that law. We must respectfully suggest that judicial doctrines which would visit such comprehensive and far-reaching injury upon the wives and mothers of Philippine citizens deserve intensive scrutiny and reexamination. To be sure, this appeal can be no less than what this Court attended to in Gan Tsitung vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-20819, Feb. 21, 1967, 19 SCRA 401when Chief Justice Concepcion observed: The Court realizes, however, that the rulings in the Barretto and Delgado casesalthough referring to situations the equities of which are not identical to those obtaining in the case at barmay have contributed materially to the irregularities committed therein and in other analogous cases, and induced the parties concerned to believe, although erroneously, that the procedure followed was valid under the law. Accordingly, and in view of the implications of the issue under consideration, the Solicitor General was required, not only, to comment thereon, but, also, to state how many cases there are, like the one at bar, in which certificates of naturalization have been issued after notice of the filing of the petition for naturalization had

been published in the Official Gazette only once, within the periods (a) from January 28, 1950 (when the decision in Delgado v. Republic was promulgated) to May 29, 1957 (when the Ong Son Cui was decided) and (b) from May 29, 1957 to November 29, 1965 (when the decision in the present case was rendered). After mature deliberation, and in the light of the reasons adduced in appellants motion for reconsideration and in the reply thereto of the Government, as well as of the data contained in the latter, the Court holds that the doctrine laid down in the Ong Son Cui case shall apply and affect the validity of certificates of naturalization issued after, not on or before May 29, 1957. Here We are met again by the same problem. In Gan Tsitung, the Court had to expressly enjoin the prospective application of its construction of the law made in a previous decision24 which had already become final, to serve the ends of justice and equity. In the case at bar, We do not have to go that far. As already observed, the decision in Burca is still under reconsideration, while the ruling in Lee Suan Ay, Lo San Tuang, Choy King Tee and others that followed them have at the most become the law of the case only for the parties thereto. If there are good grounds therefor, all We have to do now is to reexamine the said rulings and clarify or modify them. For ready reference, We requote Section 15: Sec. 15. Effect of the naturalization on wife and children.Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines. Minor children of persons

naturalized under this law who have been born in the Philippines shall be considered citizens thereof. A foreign-born minor child, if dwelling in the Philippines at the time of naturalization of the parents, shall automatically become a Philippine citizen, and a foreign-born minor child, who is not in the Philippines at the time the parent is naturalized, shall be deemed a Philippine citizen only during his minority, unless he begins to reside permanently in the Philippines when still a minor, in which case, he will continue to be a Philippine citizen even after becoming of age. A child born outside of the Philippines after the naturalization of his parent, shall be considered a Philippine citizen, unless within one year after reaching the age of majority, he fails to register himself as a Philippine citizen at the American Consulate of the country where he resides, and to take the necessary oath of allegiance. It is obvious that the main subject-matter and purpose of the statute, the Raised Naturalization Law or Commonwealth Act 473, as a whole, is to establish a complete procedure for the judicial conferment of the status of citizenship upon qualified aliens. After laying out such a procedure, remarkable for its elaborate and careful inclusion of all safeguards against the possibility of any undesirable persons becoming a part of our citizenry, it carefully but categorically states the consequence of the naturalization of an alien undergoing such procedure it prescribes upon the members of his immediate family, his wife and children,25 and, to that end, in no uncertain terms it ordains that: (a) all his minor children who have been born in the Philippines shall be considered citizens also; (b) all such minor children, if born outside the Philippines but dwelling, here at the time of such naturalization shall automatically

become Filipinos also, but those not born in the Philippines and not in the Philippines at the time of such naturalization, are also deemed citizens of this country provided that they shall lose said status if they transfer their permanent residence to a foreign country before becoming of age; (c) all such minor children, if born outside of the Philippines after such naturalization, shall also be considered Filipino citizens, unless they expatriate themselves by failing to register as Filipinos at the Philippine (American) Consulate of the country where they reside and take the necessary oath of allegiance; and (d) as to the wife, she shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines if she is one who might herself be lawfully naturalized.26 No doubt whatever is entertained, so Burca holds very correctly, as to the point that the minor children, falling within the conditions of place and time of birth and residence prescribed in the provision, are vested with Philippine citizenship directly by legislative fiat or by force of the law itself and without the need for any judicial proceeding or declaration. (At p. 192, 19 SCRA). Indeed, the language of the provision is not susceptible of any other interpretation. But it is claimed that the same expression shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines in reference to the wife, does not necessarily connote the vesting of citizenship status upon her by legislative fiat because the antecedent phrase requiring that she must be one who might herself be lawfully naturalized implies that such status is intended to attach only after she has undergone the whole process of judicial naturalization required of any person desiring to become a Filipino. Stated otherwise, the ruling in Burca is that while Section 15 envisages and intends legislative naturalization as to the minor children, the same section

deliberately treats the wife differently and leaves her out for the ordinary judicial naturalization. Of course, it goes without saying that it is perfectly within the constitutional authority of the Congress of the Philippines to confer or vest citizenship status by legislative fiat. (U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 42 L ed. 890 [1898]; See, 1 Taada & Carreon, Political Law of the Philippines 152 [1961 ed.]) In fact, it has done so for particular individuals, like two foreign religious prelates,27 hence there is no reason it cannot do it for classes or groups of persons under general conditions applicable to all of the members of such class or group, like women who marry Filipinos, whether nativeborn or naturalized. The issue before Us in this case is whether or not the legislature has done so in the disputed provisions of Section 15 of the Naturalization Law. And Dr. Vicente G. Sinco, one of the most respected authorities on political law in the Philippines28 observes in this connection thus: A special form of naturalization is often observed by some states with respect to women. Thus in the Philippines a foreign woman married to a Filipino citizen becomes ipso facto naturalized, if she belongs to any of the classes who may apply for naturalization under the Philippine Laws. (Sinco, Phil. Political Law 498-499 [10th ed. 1954]; emphasis ours; this comment is substantially reiterated in the 1962 edition, citing Ly Giok Ha and Ricardo Cua, supra.) More importantly, it may be stated, at this juncture, that in construing the provision of the United States statutes from which our law has been copied,28a the American courts have held that the alien wife does not acquire American citizenship by choice but by operation of law. In the Revised Statutes the words and taken are omitted. The effect of this statute is that every alien woman who

marries a citizen of the United States becomes perforce a citizen herself, without the formality of naturalization, and regardless of her wish in that respect. (SCRA 8, p. 601 *1970 ed.+, citing Mackenzie v. Hare, 1913, 134 P. 713, 165 Cal. 766, affirmed 36 S. Ct. 106, 239 U.S. 299, 60 L ed. 297.) We need not recount here again how this provision in question was first enacted as paragraph (a) of Section 13, by way of an insertion into Act 2927 by Act 3448 of November 30, 1928, and that, in turn, and paragraph was copied verbatim from Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, which by that time already had a long accepted construction among the courts and administrative authorities in that country holding that under such provision an alien woman who married a citizen became, upon such marriage, likewise a citizen, by force of law and as a consequence of the marriage itself without having to undergo any naturalization proceedings, provided that it could be shown that at the time of such marriage, she was not disqualified to be naturalized under the laws then in force. To repeat the discussion We already made of these undeniable facts would unnecessarily make this decision doubly extensive. The only point which might be reiterated for emphasis at this juncture is that whereas in the United States, the American Congress, recognizing the uniform construction of Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes to be as stated above, and finding it desirable to avoid the effects of such construction, approved the Act of September 22, 1922 explicitly requiring all such alien wives to submit to judicial naturalization, albeit under more liberal terms than those for other applicants for citizenship, on the other hand, the Philippine Legislature, instead of following suit and adopting such a requirement, enacted Act 3448 on November 30, 1928 which

copied verbatim the aforementioned Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes, thereby indicating its preference to adopt the latter law and its settled construction rather than the reform introduced by the Act of 1922. Obviously, these considerations leave Us no choice. Much as this Court may feel that as the United States herself has evidently found it to be an improvement of her national policy vis-a-vis the alien wives of her citizens to discontinue their automatic incorporation into the body of her citizenry without passing through the judicial scrutiny of a naturalization proceeding, as it used to be before 1922, it seems but proper, without evidencing any bit of colonial mentality, that as a developing country, the Philippines adopt a similar policy, unfortunately, the manner in which our own legislature has enacted our laws on the subject, as recounted above, provides no basis for Us to construe said law along the line of the 1922 modification of the American Law. For Us to do so would be to indulge in judicial legislation which it is not constitutionally permissible for this Court to do. Worse, this Court would be going precisely against the grain of the implicit Legislative intent. There is at least one decision of this Court before Burca wherein it seems it is quite clearly implied that this Court is of the view that under Section 16 of the Naturalization Law, the widow and children of an applicant for naturalization who dies during the proceedings do not have to submit themselves to another naturalization proceeding in order to avail of the benefits of the proceedings involving the husband. Section 16 provides: SEC. 16. Right of widow and children of petitioners who have died.In case a petitioner should die before the final decision has

been rendered, his widow and minor children may continue the proceedings. The decision rendered in the case shall, so far as the widow and minor children are concerned, produce the same legal effect as if it had been rendered during the life of the petitioner. In Tan Lin v. Republic, G.R. No. L-13706, May 31, 1961, 2 SCRA 383, this Court held: Invoking the above provisions in their favor, petitioners-appellants argue (1) that under said Sec. 16, the widow and minor children are allowed to continue the same proceedings and are not substituted for the original petitioner; (2) that the qualifications of the original petitioner remain to be in issue and not those of the widow and minor children, and (3) that said Section 16 applies whether the petitioner dies before or after final decision is rendered, but before the judgment becomes executory. There is force in the first and second arguments. Even the second sentence of said Section 16 contemplates the fact that the qualifications of the original petitioner remains the subject of inquiry, for the simple reason that it states that The decision rendered in the case shall, so far as the widow and minor children are concerned, produce the same legal effect as if it had been rendered during the life of the petitioner. This phraseology emphasizes the intent of the law to continue the proceedings with the deceased as the theoretical petitioner, for if it were otherwise, it would have been unnecessary to consider the decision rendered, as far as it affected the widow and the minor children. x x x x x

The Chua Chian case (supra), cited by the appellee, declared that a dead person can not be bound to do things stipulated in the oath of allegiance, because an oath is a personal matter. Therein, the widow prayed that she be allowed to take the oath of allegiance for the deceased. In the case at bar, petitioner Tan Lin merely asked that she be allowed to take the oath of allegiance and the proper certificate of naturalization, once the naturalization proceedings of her deceased husband, shall have been completed, not on behalf of the deceased, but on her own behalf and of her children, as recipients of the benefits of his naturalization. In other words, the herein petitioner proposed to take the oath of allegiance, as a citizen of the Philippines, by virtue of the legal provision that any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines. Minor children of persons naturalized under this law who have been born in the Philippines shall be considered citizens thereof. (Section 15, Commonwealth Act No. 473). The decision granting citizenship to Lee Pa and the record of the case at bar, do not show that the petitioning widow could not have been lawfully naturalized, at the time Lee Pa filed his petition, apart from the fact that his 9 minor children were all born in the Philippines. (Decision, In the Matter of the Petition of Lee Pa to be admitted a citizen of the Philippines, Civil Case No. 16287, CFI, Manila, Annex A; Record on Appeal, pp. 8-11). The reference to Chua Chian case is, therefore, premature. Section 16, as may be seen, is a parallel provision to Section 15, If the widow of an applicant for naturalization as Filipino, who dies during the proceedings, is not required to go through a naturalization proceeding, in order to be considered as a Filipino

citizen hereof, it should follow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be denied the same privilege. This is plain common sense and there is absolutely no evidence that the Legislature intended to treat them differently. Additionally, We have carefully considered the arguments advanced in the motion for reconsideration in Burca, and We see no reason to disagree with the following views of counsel: It is obvious that the provision itself is a legislative declaration of who may be considered citizens of the Philippines. It is a proposition too plain to be disputed that Congress has the power not only to prescribe the mode or manner under which foreigners may acquire citizenship, but also the very power of conferring citizenship by legislative fiat. (U. S. v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 42 L. Ed. 890 [1898]; see 1 Taada and Carreon, Political Law of the Philippines 152 [1961 ed.]). The Constitution itself recognizes as Philippine citizens Those who are naturalized in accordance with law (Section 1[5], Article IV, Philippine Constitution). Citizens by naturalization, under this provision, include not only those who are naturalized in accordance with legal proceedings for the acquisition of citizenship, but also those who acquire citizenship by derivative naturalization or by operation of law, as, for example, the naturalization of an alien wife through the naturalization of her husband, or by marriage of an alien woman to a citizen. (See Taada & Carreon, op. cit. supra, at 152, 172; Velayo, Philippine Citizenship and Naturalization 2 [1965 ed.]; 1 Paras, Civil Code 186 [1967 ed.]; see also 3 Hackworth, Digest of International Law 3). The phrase shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines found in Section 14 of the Revised Naturalization Law clearly manifests an

intent to confer citizenship. Construing a similar phrase found in the old U.S. naturalization law (Revised Statutes, 1994), American courts have uniformly taken it to mean that upon her marriage, the alien woman becomes by operation of law a citizen of the United States as fully as if she had complied with all the provisions of the statutes upon the subject of naturalization. (U.S. v. Keller, 13 F. 82; U.S. Opinions of the US Attorney General dated June 4, 1874 [14 Op. 402], July 20, 1909 [27 Op. 507], December 1, 1910 [28 Op. 508], Jan. 15, 1920 [32 Op. 209] and Jan. 12, 1923 [23 398]). The phrase shall be deemed a citizen, in Section 1994 Revised Statute (U.S. Comp. Stat. 1091, 1268) or as it was in the Act of 1855 (10 Stat. at L. 604, Chapt. 71, Sec. 2), shall be deemed and taken to be a citizen, while it may imply that the person to whom it relates has not actually become a citizen by the ordinary means or in the usual way, as by the judgment of a competent court, upon a proper application and proof, yet it does not follow that such person is on that account practically any the less a citizen. The word deemed is the equivalent of considered or judged and therefore, whatever an Act of Congress requires to be deemed or taken as true of any person or thing must, in law, be considered as having been duly adjudged or established concerning such person or thing, and have force and effect accordingly. When, therefore, Congress declares that an alien woman shall, under certain circumstances, be deemed an American citizen, the effect when the contingency occurs, is equivalent to her being naturalized directly by an Act of Congress or in the usual mode thereby prescribed. (Van Dyne, Citizenship of the United States 239, cited in Velayo, Philippine Citizenship and Naturalization 146-147 [1965 ed.]; italics ours).

That this was likewise the intent of the Philippine legislature when it enacted the first paragraph of Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law is shown by a textual analysis of the entire statutory provision. In its entirety, section 15 reads: (See supra) The phrases shall be deemed, shall be considered, and shall automatically become, as used in the above provision, are undoubtedly synonymous. The leading idea or purpose of the provision was to confer Philippine citizenship by operation of law upon certain classes of aliens as a legal consequence of their relationship, by blood or by affinity, to persons who are already citizens of the Philippines. Whenever the fact of relationship of the persons enumerated in the provision concurs with the fact of citizenship of the person to whom they are related, the effect is for said persons to become ipso facto citizens of the Philippines. Ipso facto as here used does not mean that all alien wives and all minor children of Philippine citizens, from the mere fact of relationship, necessarily become such citizens also. Those who do not meet the statutory requirements do not ipso facto become citizens; they must apply for naturalization in order to acquire such status. What it does mean, however, is that in respect of those persons enumerated in Section 15, the relationship to a citizen of the Philippines is the operative fact which establishes the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by them. Necessarily, it also determines the point of time at which such citizenship commences. Thus, under the second paragraph of Section 15, a minor child of a Filipino naturalized under the law, who was born in the Philippines, becomes ipso facto a citizen of the Philippines from the time the fact of relationship concurs with the fact of citizenship of his parent,

and the time when the child became a citizen does not depend upon the time that he is able to prove that he was born in the Philippines. The child may prove some 25 years after the naturalization of his father that he was born in the Philippines and should, therefore, be considered a citizen thereof. It does not mean that he became a Philippine citizen only at that later time. Similarly, an alien woman who married a Philippine citizen may be able to prove only some 25 years after her marriage (perhaps, because it was only 25 years after the marriage that her citizenship status became in question), that she is one who might herself be lawfully naturalized. It is not reasonable to conclude that she acquired Philippine citizenship only after she had proven that she might herself be lawfully naturalized. The point that bears emphasis in this regard is that in adopting the very phraseology of the law, the legislature could not have intended that an alien wife should not be deemed a Philippine citizen unless and until she proves that she might herself be lawfully naturalized. Far from it, the law states in plain terms that she shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines if she is one who might herself be lawfully naturalized. The proviso that she must be one who might herself be lawfully naturalized is not a condition precedent to the vesting or acquisition of citizenship; it is only a condition or a state of fact necessary to establish her citizenship as a factum probandum, i.e., as a fact established and proved in evidence. The word might, as used in that phrase, precisely implies that at the time of her marriage to a Philippine citizen, the alien woman had (the) power to become such a citizen herself under the laws then in force. (Owen v. Kelly, 6 DC 191 *1867+, affd Kelly v. Owen, 76 US 496, 19 L ed 283 [1869]). That she establishes such power long after her

marriage does not alter the fact that at her marriage, she became a citizen. (This Court has held) that an alien wife of a Filipino citizen may not acquire the status of a citizen of the Philippines unless there is proof that she herself may be lawfully naturalized (Decision, pp. 3-4). Under this view, the acquisition of citizenship by the alien wife depends on her having proven her qualifications for citizenship, that is, she is not a citizen unless and until she proves that she may herself be lawfully naturalized. It is clear from the words of the law that the proviso does not mean that she must first prove that she might herself be lawfully naturalized before she shall be deemed (by Congress, not by the Courts) a citizen. Even the uniform decisions cited by this Court (at fn. 2) to support its holding did not rule that the alien wife becomes a citizen only after she has proven her qualifications for citizenship. What those decisions ruled was that the alien wives in those cases failed to prove their qualifications and therefore they failed to establish their claim to citizenship. Thus in Ly Giok Ha v. Galang, 101 Phil. 459 [1957], the case was remanded to the lower court for determination of whether petitioner, whose claim to citizenship by marriage to a Filipino was disputed by the Government, might herself be lawfully naturalized. for the purpose of proving her alleged change of political status from alien to citizen (at 464). In Cua v. Board, 101 Phil. 521 [1957], the alien wife who was being deported, claimed she was a Philippine citizen by marriage to a Filipino. This Court finding that there was no proof that she was not disqualified under Section 4 of the Revised Naturalization Law, ruled that: No such evidence appearing on record, the claim of assumption of Philippine citizenship by Tijoe Wu Suan, upon her marriage to petitioner, is

untenable. (at 523) It will be observed that in these decisions cited by this Court, the lack of proof that the alien wives might (themselves) be lawfully naturalized did not necessarily imply that they did not become, in truth and in fact, citizens upon their marriage to Filipinos. What the decisions merely held was that these wives failed to establish their claim to that status as a proven fact. In all instances where citizenship is conferred by operation of law, the time when citizenship is conferred should not be confused with the time when citizenship status is established as a proven fact Thus, even a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, whose citizenship status is put in issue in any proceeding would be required to prove, for instance, that his father is a citizen of the Philippines in order to factually establish his claim to citizenship.* His citizenship status commences from the time of birth, although his claim thereto is established as a fact only at a subsequent time. Likewise, an alien woman who might herself be lawfully naturalized becomes a Philippine citizen at the time of her marriage to a Filipino husband, not at the time she is able to establish that status as a proven fact by showing that she might herself be lawfully naturalized. Indeed, there is no difference between a statutory declaration that a person is deemed a citizen of the Philippines provided his father is such citizen from a declaration that an alien woman married to a Filipino citizen of the Philippines provided she might herself be lawfully naturalized. Both become citizens by operation of law; the former becomes a citizen ipso facto upon birth; the later ipso facto upon marriage. It is true that unless and until the alien wife proves that she might herself be lawfully naturalized, it cannot be said that she has established her status as a proven fact. But neither can it be said

that on that account, she did not become a citizen of the Philippines. If her citizenship status is not questioned in any legal proceeding, she obviously has no obligation to establish her status as a fact. In such a case, the presumption of law should be that she is what she claims to be. (U.S. v. Roxas, 5 Phil. 375 [1905]; Hilado v. Assad, 51 O.G. 4527 [1955]). There is a presumption that a representation shown to have been made is true. (Aetna Indemnity Co. v. George A. Fuller, Co., 73 A. 738, 74 A. 369, 111 ME. 321). The question that keeps bouncing back as a consequence of the foregoing views is, what substitute is there for naturalization proceedings to enable the alien wife of a Philippine citizen to have the matter of her own citizenship settled and established so that she may not have to be called upon to prove it everytime she has to perform an act or enter into a transaction or business or exercise a right reserved only to Filipinos? The ready answer to such question is that as the laws of our country, both substantive and procedural, stand today, there is no such procedure, but such paucity is no proof that the citizenship under discussion is not vested as of the date of marriage or the husbands acquisition of citizenship, as the case may be, for the truth is that the same situation obtains even as to native-born Filipinos. Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case, whatever the correspondingcourt or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicate, hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand This, as We view it, is the sense in which Justice Dizon referred to appropriate proceeding in Brito v. Commissioner, supra. Indeed, only the good sense and judgment of those subsequently inquiring into the matter may make the effort

easier or simpler for the persons concerned by relying somehow on the antecedent official findings, even if these are not really binding. It may not be amiss to suggest, however, that in order to have a good starting point and so that the most immediate relevant public records may be kept in order, the following observations in Opinion No. 38, series of 1958, of then Acting Secretary of Justice Jesus G. Barrera, may be considered as the most appropriate initial step by the interested parties: Regarding the steps that should be taken by an alien woman married to a Filipino citizen in order to acquire Philippine citizenship, the procedure followed in the Bureau of Immigration is as follows: The alien woman must file a petition for the cancellation of her alien certificate of registration alleging, among other things, that she is married to a Filipino citizen and that she is not disqualified from acquiring her husbands citizenship pursuant to section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. Upon the filing of said petition, which should be accompanied or supported by the joint affidavit of the petitioner and her Filipino husband to the effect that the petitioner does not belong to any of the groups disqualified by the cited section from becoming naturalized Filipino citizen (please see attached CEB Form 1), the Bureau of Immigration conducts an investigation and thereafter promulgates its order or decision granting or denying the petition. Once the Commissioner of Immigration cancels the subjects registration as an alien, there will probably be less difficulty in establishing her Filipino citizenship in any other proceeding, depending naturally on the substance and vigor of the opposition.

Before closing, it is perhaps best to clarify that this third issue We have passed upon was not touched by the trial court, but as the point is decisive in this case, the Court prefers that the matter be settled once and for all now. IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment of the Court a quo dismissing appellants petition for injunction is hereby reversed and the Commissioner of Immigration and/or his authorized representative is permanently enjoined from causing the arrest and deportation and the confiscation of the bond of appellant Lau Yuen Yeung, who is hereby declared to have become a Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her marriage to her co-appellant Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen on January 25, 1962. No costs.

Dizon, Castro, Teehankee and Villamor, JJ., concur. Concepcion, C.J. and Zaldivar, J., concur in the dissenting opinion of Justice J.B.L., Reyes. Reyes, J.B.L., J., dissents in separate opinion. Makalintal, J., reserves his separate concurring opinion. Fernando, J., concurs except as to the interpretation accorded some American decisions as to which he is not fully persuaded. Makasiar, J., concurs in the dissent of Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes and adds that appellant should file a petition for naturalization. APPENDIX

The following review of all the naturalization statutes of the United States from 1790 to 1970 reveal: (1) that aside from race, various other disqualifications have also been provided for in the said statutes from time to time, although it was only in 1906 that the familiar and usual grounds of disqualification, like not being anarchists, polygamists, etc. were incorporated therein, and (2) that qualifications of applicants for naturalization also varied from time to time. A DISQUALIFICATIONS 1. In the first naturalization statute of March 26, 1790, only a free white person could be naturalized, provided he was not proscribed by any state, unless it be with the consent of such state. (Chap. V. 1 Stat. 103) 2. In the Act of January 29, 1795, to the same provisions was added the disqualification of those legally convicted of having joined the army of Great Britain, during the late war. (Chap. XX, 1 Stat. 414). 3. In the Act of June 18, 1798, Section 1 thereof provided: SECTION 1. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That no alien shall be admitted to become a citizen of the United States, or of any state, unless in the manner prescribed by the act, entitled An Act to establish an uniform rule of naturalization; and to repeal the act heretofore passed on that subject, he shall have declared his intention to become a citizen of the United States, five years, at least, before his admission, and shall, at the time of his application to be admitted, declare and

prove, to the satisfaction of the court having jurisdiction in the case, that he has resided within the United States fourteen years, at least, and within the state or territory where, or for which such court is at the time held, five years, at least, besides conforming to the other declarations, renunciations and proofs, by the said act required, any thing therein to the contrary hereof notwithstanding: Provided, that any alien, who was residing within the limits, and under the jurisdiction of the United States, before the twenty-ninth day of January, one thousand seven hundred and ninety-five, may, within one year after the passing of this actand any alien who shall have made the declaration of his intention to become a citizen of the United States, in conformity to the provisions of the act, entitled An act to establish an uniform rule of naturalization, and to repeal the act heretofore passed on that subject, may, within four years after having made the declaration aforesaid, be admitted to become a citizen, in the manner prescribed by the said act, upon his making proof that he has resided five years, at least, within the limits, and under the jurisdiction of the United States: And provided also, that no alien, who shall be a native, citizen, denizen or subject of any nation or state with whom the United States shall be at war, at the time of his application, shall be then admitted to become a citizen of the United States. There is here no mention of white persons. (Chap. LIV, 1 Stat. 566). 4. In the Act of April 14, 1802, mentioned in Kelly v. Owen, supra, reference was made again to free white persons, and the same enemy alien and state-proscribed disqualifications in the former statutes were carried over. (Chap. XXVIII, 2 Stat. 153.)

5. The Act of March 26, 1804 provided in its Section 1 thus: Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That any alien, being a free white person, who was residing within the limits and under the jurisdiction of the United States, at any time between the eighteenth day of June, one thousand seven hundred and ninetyeight, and the fourteenth day of April one thousand eight hundred and two, and who has continued to reside within the same, may be admitted to become a citizen of the United States, without a compliance with the first condition specified in the first section of the act, entitled An act to establish an uniform rule of naturalization; and to repeal the acts heretofore passed on that subject. In its Section 2, this Act already provided that: SEC. 2. And be it further enacted, That when any alien who shall have complied with the first condition specified in the first section of the said original act, and who shall have pursued the directions prescribed in the second section of the said act, may die, before he is actually naturalized, the widow and the children of such alien shall be considered as citizens of the United States, and shall be entitled to rights and privileges as such, upon taking the oaths prescribed by law. (CHAP. XLVII, 2 Stat. 292) 6. In the Act of July 30, 1813, the disqualification of enemy aliens was removed as follows: CHAP. XXXVI.

An Act supplementary to the acts heretofore passed on the subject of an uniform rule of naturalization. (a) Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That persons resident within the United States, or the territories thereof, on the eighteenth day of June, in the year one thousand eight hundred and twelve, who had before that day made declaration according to law, of their intention to become citizens of the United States, or who by the existing laws of the United States, were on that day entitled to become citizens, without making such declaration, may be admitted to become citizens thereof, notwithstanding they shall be alien enemies at the times and in the manner prescribed by the laws heretofore passed on that subject: Provided, That nothing herein contained shall be taken or construed to interfere with or prevent the apprehension and removal, agreeably to law, of any alien enemy at any time previous to the actual naturalization of such alien. (Chap. XXXVI, 3 Stat. 53) 7. Neither the Act of March 22, 1816 nor those of May 26, 1824 and May 24, 1828 made any change in the above requirements. (Chap. XXXII, 3 Stat 258; Chap. CLXX-XVI, 4 Stat. 69; and Chap. CXVI, 4 Stat. 310). 8. Then the Act of February 10, 1855, important because it gave alien wives of citizens the status of citizens, was enacted providing: CHAP. LXXI. An Act to secure the Right of Citizenship to Children of Citizens of the United States born out of the Limits thereof.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of. America in Congress assembled, That persons heretofore born, or hereafter to be born, out of the limits and jurisdiction of the United States, whose fathers were or shall be at the time of their birth citizens of the United States, shall be deemed and considered and are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States: Provided, however, That the rights of citizenship shall not descend to persons whose fathers never resided in the United States. SEC. 2. And be it further enacted, That any woman who might lawfully be naturalized under the existing laws, married or who shall be married to a citizen of the United States, shall be deemed and taken to be a citizen. (Chap. LXXI, 10 Stat. 604.) 9. The Act of July 14, 1870 mainly provided only for penalties for certain acts related to naturalization, as punished thereby, but added in its Section 7 that the naturalization laws are hereby extended to aliens of African nativity and to African descent. (Chap. CCLIV, 16 Stat. 254.) 10. The Act of February 1, 1876 contained no relevant amendment. (Chap. 5, 19 Stat. 2.) 11. When the statutes of the United States were revised on June 22, 1874, the naturalization law of the country was embodied in Sections 2165-2174 of said Revised Statutes. This contained no racial disqualification. In fact, it reenacted Section 2 of the Act of February 10, 1855 as its Section 1994 thereof, thus:

SEC. 1994. Any person who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the United States, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized, shall be deemed a citizen. (18 Stat. 351.)

12. The Act of May 6, 1882 provided expressly that no State court or court of the United States shall admit Chinese to citizenship. (Chap. 126, Sec. 14, 22 Stat. 61.) 13. The Act of August 9, 1888 extended the benefits of American citizenship to Indian women married to Americans thus: CHAP. 818. An Act in relation to marriage between white men and Indian women. Be it enacted, That no white man, not otherwise a member of any tribe of Indians, who may hereafter marry, an Indian woman, member of any Indian tribe in the United States, or any of its Territories except the five civilized tribes in the Indian Territory, shall by such marriage hereafter acquire any right to any tribal property, privilege, or interest whatever to which any member of such tribe is entitled. SEC. 2 That every Indian woman, member of any such tribe of Indians, who may hereafter be married to any citizen of the United States, is hereby declared to become by such marriage a citizen of the United States, with all the right privileges, and immunities of any such citizen, being, a married woman:

Provided, That nothing in this act contained shall impair or in any way affect the right or title of such married woman to any tribal property or any interest therein. SEC. 2. That whenever the marriage of any white man with any Indian woman, a member of any such tribe of Indians, is required or offered to be proved in any judicial proceeding, evidence of the admission of such fact by the party against whom the proceeding is had, or evidence of general repute, or of cohabitation as married persons, or any other circumstantial or presumptive evidence from which the fact may be inferred, shall be competent. (Aug. 9, 1888) [25 Stat. 392, Suppl. 1.] 14. The Act of April 19, 1900 extended American citizenship to all citizens of the Republic of Hawaii on August 12, 1898 as well as the laws of the United States to said Republic, including, of course, those on naturalization. (Chap. 339, Sec. 4, 31 Stat. 141.) 15. On June 29, 1906. An Act to establish a Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization, and to provide a uniform rule for the naturalization of aliens throughout the United States was approved. No reference was made therein to free white persons; it merely provided in its Section 7 that: SEC. 7. That no person who disbelieve in or who is opposed to organized government, or who is a member of or affiliated with any organization entertaining and teaching such disbelief in or opposition to organized government, or who advocates or teaches the duty, necessity, or propriety of the unlawful assaulting or killing of any officer or officers, either of specific individuals or of officers generally of the Government of the United States, or of any other

organized government, because of his or their official character, or who is a polygamist, shall be naturalized or be made a citizen of the United States. (36 Stat. 598)

Incidentally, the 6th paragraph of its Section 4 provided: Sixth. When any alien who has declared his intention to become a citizen of the United States dies before he is actually naturalized the widow and minor children of such alien may, by complying with the other provisions of this Act, be naturalized without making any declaration of intention. (36 Stat. 598) 16. By the Act of March 2, 1907, alien women who acquired American citizenship by marriage retained said citizenship, if she continued to reside in the United States and did not renounce it, or, if she resided outside of the United States by registering with the U.S. Consul of her place of residence. (CHAP. 2534, Sec. 4, 34 Stat. 1229.) 17. Since United States legislation treats naturalization and citizenship per se separately, Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes remained untouched. In the Act of February 24, 1911, it was provided: Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That when any alien, who has declared his intention to become a citizen of the United States, becomes insane before he is actually naturalized, and his wife shall thereafter make a homestead entry under the land laws of the United States, she and their minor children may, by

complying with the other provisions of the naturalization laws be naturalized without making any declaration of intention. (36 Stat. 929.) 18. The Act of August 11, 1916 merely validated, entries filed in certain countries. (CHAP. 316, 39 Stat. 926.) 19. In the Act of May 9, 1918, the U.S. Congress amended the naturalization laws to make possible the admission of Filipino navy servicemen, and uanderstandably, because of the war then, it provided: Seventh. Any native-born Filipino of the age of twenty-one years and upward who has declared his intention to become a citizen of the United States and who has enlisted or may hereafter enlist in the United States Navy or Marine Corps or the Naval Auxiliary Service, and who, after service of not less than three years, may be honorably discharged therefrom, or who may receive an ordinary discharge with recommendation for reenlistment; or any alien, or any Porto Rican not a citizen of the United States, x x x. (40 Stat. 542.) 20. On September 22, 1922, An Act Relative to the Naturalization and citizenship of married women was approved repealing Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes and otherwise adopting a different attitude as regards the citizenship and naturalization of married women thus: Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the right of any woman to become a naturalized citizen of the United States

shall not be denied or abridged because of her sex or because she is a married woman. Sec. 2. That any woman who marries a citizen of the United States after the passage of this Act, or any woman whose husband is naturalized after the passage of this Act, shall not become a citizen of the United States by reason of such marriage or naturalization; but, if eligible to citizenship, she may be naturalized upon full and complete compliance with all the requirements of the naturalization laws. with the following exceptions: (a) No declaration of intention shall be required; (b) In lieu of the five-year period of residence within the United States and the one-year period of residence within the State or Territory where the naturalization court is held, she shall have resided continuously in the United States, Hawaii, Alaska, or Porto Rico for at least one year immediately preceding the filing of the petition. Sec. 3. That a woman citizen of the United States shall not cease to be a citizen of the United States by reason of her marriage after the passage of this Act, unless she makes a formal renunciation of her citizenship before a court having jurisdiction over naturalization of aliens: Provided, That any woman citizen who marries an alien ineligible to citizenship shall cease to be a citizen of the United States. If at the termination of the marital status she is a citizen of the United States she shall retain her citizenship regardless of her residence. If during the continuance of the marital status she resides continuously for two years in a foreign State of which her husband is a citizen or subject, or for five years continuously outside

the United States, she shall thereafter be subject to the same presumption as is a naturalized citizen of the United States under the second paragraph of section 2 of the Act entitled An Act in reference to the expatriation of citizens and their protection abroad, approved March 2, 1907. Nothing herein shall be construed to repeal or amend the provisions of Revised Statutes 1999 or of section 2 of the Expatriation Act of 1907 with reference to expatriation. Sec. 4. That a woman who, before the passage of this Act, has lost her United States citizenship by reason of her marriage to an alien eligible for citizenship, may be naturalized as provided by section 2 of this Act: Provided, That no certificate of arrival shall be required to be filed with her petition if during the continuance of the marital status she shall have resided within the United States. After her naturalization she shall have the same citizenship status as if her marriage had taken place after the passage of this Act. Sec. 5. That no woman whose husband is not eligible to citizenship shall be naturalized during the continuance of the marital status. Sec. 6. That section 1994 of the Revised Statutes and section 4 of the Expatriation Act of 1907 are repealed. Such repeal shall not terminate citizenship acquired or retained under either of such sections nor restore citizenship lost under section 4 of the Expatriation Act of 1907. Sec. 7. That section 3 of the Expatriation Act of 1907 is repealed. Such repeal shall not restore citizenship lost under such section nor terminate citizenship resumed under such section. A woman who has resumed under such section citizenship lost by marriage shall,

upon the passage of this Act, have for all purposes the same citizenship status as immediately preceding her marriage. (Chap. 411, 42 Stat. 1021-1022.)

21. When The Code of the Laws of the United States of America of a General and Permanent Character in Force on December 7, 1925 was approved, the provisions corresponding to the disqualifications for naturalization and the citizenship and naturalization of women embodied therein were: 367. Naturalization of woman; sex or marriage not a bar.The right of any woman to become a naturalized citizen of the United States shall not be denied or abridged because of her sex or because she is a married woman. (Sept. 22, 1922, c.411, 1, 42 Stat. 1021.) 368. Same; women marrying citizens or persons becoming naturalized; procedure.Any woman who marries a citizen of the United States after September 22, 1922, or any woman whose husband is naturalized after that date, shall not become a citizen of the United States by reason of such marriage or naturalization; but, if eligible to citizenship, she may be naturalized upon full and complete compliance with the following exceptions: (a) No declaration of intention shall be required; (b) In lieu of the five-year period of residence within the United States and the one-year period of residence within the State or Territory where the naturalization court is held, she shall have resided continuously in the United States, Hawaii, Alaska, or Porto

Rico for at least one year immediately preceding the filing of the petition. (Sept. 22, 1922, c. 411, 2, 42 Stat. 1022.) 369. Same; women who have lost citizenship by marrying aliens eligible to citizenship; procedure.A woman, who, before September 22, 1922, has lost her United States citizenship by reason for her marriage to an alien eligible for citizenship, may be naturalized as provided in the preceding section. No certificate of arrival shall be required to be filed with her petition if during the continuance of the marital status she shall have resided within the United States. After her naturalization she shall have the same citizenship status as if her marriage had taken place after September 22, 1922. (Sept. 22, 1922, c. 411, 4, 42 Stat. 1022.) 370. Same; Women married to persons ineligible to citizenship. No woman whose husband is not eligible to citizenship shall be naturalized during the continuance of the marital status. (Sept. 22, 1922, c. 411, 5, 42 Stat. 1022.) 371. Same; wife of alien declarant becoming insane before naturalization; minor children.When any alien, who has declared his intention to become a citizen of the United States, becomes insane before he is actually naturalized, and his wife shall thereafter make a homestead entry under the land laws of the United States, she and their minor children may, by complying with the other provisions of the naturalization laws be naturalized without making any declaration of intention. (Feb. 24, 1911, c. 151, 36 Stat. 929.) (Chap. 9, 44 Stat. 156, 158.)

which, of course, must be read together with the provisions on inadmissibility of Chinese, anarchists, polygamists, non-English speaking persons, etc. in Sections 363-365 of the same Code.

22. The Act of May 26, 1926 extended naturalization privileges to alien veterans of World War I, thus: Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That (a) as used in this Act, the term alien veteran means an individual, a member of the military or naval forces of the United States at any time after April 5, 1917, and before November 12, 1918, who is now an alien not ineligible to citizenship; but does not include (1) any individual at any time during such period or thereafter separated from such forces under other than honorable conditions, (2) any conscientious objector who performed no military duty whatever or refused to wear the uniform, or (3) any alien at any time during such period or thereafter discharged from the military or naval forces on account of his alienage. (b) Terms defined in the Immigration Act of 1924 shall, when used in this Act, have the meaning assigned to such terms in that Act. Sec. 2. An alien veteran shall for the purposes of the Immigration Act of 1924 be considered as a non-quota immigrant, but shall be subject to all the other provisions of that Act and of the immigration laws, except that (a) He shall not be subject to the head tax imposed by section 2 of the Immigration Act of 1917;

(b) He shall not be required to pay any fee under section 2 or section 7 of the Immigration Act of 1924; (c) If otherwise admissible, he shall not be excluded under section 3 of the Immigration Act of 1917, unless excluded under the provisions of that section relating to (1) Persons afflicted with a loathsome or dangerous contagious disease, except tuberculosis in any form; (2) Polygamy; (3) Prostitutes, procurers, or other like immoral persons; (4) Contract laborers; (5) Persons previously deported; (6) Persons convicted of crime. Sec. 3. The unmarried child under eighteen years of age, the wife, or the husband, of an alien veteran shall, for the purposes of the Immigration Act of 1924, be considered as a nonquota immigrant when accompanying or following within six months to join him, but shall be subject to all other provisions of that Act and of the immigration laws.

23. The Act of June 21, 1930 authorized repatriation of certain veterans of World War I. (Chap. 559, 46 Stat. 791.) 24. On March 3, 1931, the Act of September 22, 1922 was amended as follows: Sec. 4. (a) Section 3 of the Act entitled An Act relative to the naturalization and citizenship of married women, approved September 22, 1922, as amended, is amended to read as follows: Sec. 3. (a) A woman citizen of the United States shall not cease to be a citizen of the United States by reason of her marriage after this section, as amended, takes effect, unless she makes a formal renunciation of her citizenship before a court having jurisdiction over naturalization of aliens. (b) Any woman who before this section, as amended, takes effect, has lost her United States citizenship by residence abroad after marriage to an alien or by marriage to an alien ineligible to citizenship may, if she has not acquired any other nationality by affirmative act, be naturalized in the manner prescribed in section 4 of this Act, as amended. Any woman who was a citizen of the United States at birth shall not be denied naturalization under section 4 on account of her race. (c) No woman shall be entitled to naturalization under section 4 of this Act, as amended, if her United States citizenship originated solely by a reason of her marriage to a citizen of the United States or by reason of the acquisition of United States citizenship by her husband.

Sec. 4. The foregoing provisions of this Act shall not apply to any alien unless the immigration visa is issued to him before the expiration of one year after the enactment of this Act. (Chap. 398, 44 Stat. 654-655.)

(b) Section 5 of such Act of September 22, 1922, is repealed. (Chap. 442, 46 Stat. 1511-1512.) 25. The Act of May 25, 1932 contained the following somewhat pertinent provisions: Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That (a) an alien veteran, as defined in section 1 of the Act of May 26, 1926 (ch. 398, 44 Stat. 654; title 8, sec. 241, U.S.C. Supp. 1), if residing in the United States, be entitled at any time within two years after the enactment of this Act to naturalization upon the same terms, conditions, and exemptions which would have been accorded to such alien if he had petitioned before the armistice of the World War, except that (1) such alien shall be required to prove that immediately preceding the date of this petition he has resided continuously within the United States for at least two years, in pursuance of a legal admission for permanent residence, and that during all such period he has behaved as a person of good moral character; (2) if such admission was subsequent to March 3, 1924, such alien shall file with his petition a certificate of arrival issued by the Commissioner of Naturalization; (3) final action shall not be had upon the petition until at least ninety days have elapsed after filing of such petition; and (4) such alien shall be required to appear and file his petition in person, and to take the prescribed oath of allegiance in open court. Such residence and good moral character shall be proved either by the affidavits of two credible witnesses who are citizens of the United States, or by depositions by two such witnesses made before a naturalization examiner, for each place of residence.

(b) All petitions for citizenship made outside the United States in accordance with the seventh subdivision of section 4 of the Naturalization Act of June 29, 1906, as amended, upon which naturalization has not been heretofore granted, are hereby declared to be invalid for all purposes. Sec. 2. (a) The seventh subdivision of section 4 of the Naturalization Act of June 29, 1906, as amended, is amended by striking out the National Guard or Naval Militia of any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia, or the State Militia in Federal Service. (b) This section shall not be applied in the case of any individual whose petition for naturalization has been filed before the enactment of this Act. Sec. 3. The last proviso in the first paragraph of the seventh subdivision of section 4 of such Act of June 29, 1906, as amended, is amended by striking out the period at the end thereof and inserting in lieu thereof a semicolon and the following: except that this proviso shall not apply in the case of service on American-owned vessels by an alien who has been lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent residence. Sec. 4. Section 32 of such Act of June 29, 1906, as amended, is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new subdivisions: (c) If the name of any naturalized citizen has, subsequent to naturalization, been changed by order of a court of competent jurisdiction, or by marriage, the citizen may, upon the payment to the commissioner of a fee of $10, make application (accompanied

by two photographs of the applicant) for a new certificate of citizenship in the new name of such citizen. If the commissioner finds the name of the applicant to have been changed as claimed he shall issue to the applicant a new certificate with one of such photographs of the applicant affixed thereto. (d) The Commissioner of Naturalization is authorized to make and issue, without fee, certifications of any part of the naturalization records of any court, or of any certificate of citizenship, for use in complying with any statute, State or Federal, or in any judicial proceeding. Any such certification shall be admitted in evidence equally with the original from which such certification was made in any case in which the original thereof might be admissible as evidence. No such certification shall be made by any clerk of court except upon order of the court. Sec. 5. So much of subdivision (a) of section 33 of such Act of June 29, 1906, as amended, as reads Upon obtaining a certificate from the Secretary of Labor showing the date, place, and manner of arrival in the United States, is hereby repealed. Sec. 6. Section 4 of the Act entitled An Act to supplement the naturalization laws, and for other purposes, approved March 2, 1929, is amended by striking out the period at the end thereof and inserting in lieu thereof a semicolon and the following: except that no such certificate shall be required if the entry was on or before June 29, 1906.

to enter the United States of America under certain conditions in violation of law, approved March 4, 1929, as amended, an alien, if otherwise admissible, shall not be excluded from admission to the United States under the provisions of such subdivision after the expiration of one year after the date of deportation if, prior to his reembarkation at a place outside of the United States, or prior to his application in foreign contiguous territory for admission to the United States, the Secretary of Labor, in his discretion, shall have granted such alien permission to reapply for admission. Sec. 8. The compilation of the statistics to show races, nationalities, and other information, authorized and directed to be prepared by the Commissioner of Naturalization, shall be completed and published at the same time, as near as practicable, as the publication of the statistics of the 1930 census; except that reports covering the census of 1910 shall be completed and submitted not later than January 31, 1933, and reports covering the census of 1920 not later than December 31, 1938. Such statistics shall show the records of registry made under the provisions of the Act entitled An Act to supplement the naturalization laws, and for other purposes, approved March 2, 1929. Payment for the equipment used in preparing such compilation shall be made from appropriations for miscellaneous expenses of the Bureau of Naturalization. Sec. 9. The Secretary of the Treasury, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Labor, is authorized to provide quarters without payment of rent, in the building occupied by the Naturalization Service in New York City, for a photographic studio operated by welfare organizations without profit and solely for the benefit of

Sec. 7. Despite the provisions of subdivision (a) of section 1 of the Act entitled An Act making it a felony with penalty for certain aliens

aliens seeking naturalization. Such studio shall be under the supervision of the Commissioner of Naturalization. Sec. 10. The tenth subdivision of section 4 of the Act of June 29, 1906 (ch. 3592, 34 Stat. 598), as amended by the Act of May 9, 1918 (ch. 69, 40, 40 Stat. 545; U.S.C., title 8, sec. 377), is hereby amended to read as follows: Tenth. That any person not an alien enemy, who resided uninterruptedly within the United States during the period of five years next preceding July 1, 1920, and was on that date otherwise qualified to become a citizen of the United States, except that he had not made a declaration of intention required by law and who during or prior to that time, because of misinformation regarding his citizenship status erroneously exercised the rights and performed the duties of a citizen of the United States in good faith, may file the petition for naturalization prescribed by law without making the preliminary declaration of intention required of other aliens, and upon satisfactory proof to the court that he has so acted may be admitted as a citizen of the United States upon complying in all respects with the other requirements of the naturalization law. (Chap. 203, 47 Stat. 165-167.) 26. By June 27, 1952, the right of a person to be naturalized could no longer be denied by reason of race or sex or because such person was married, although various disqualifications were still maintained, such as lack of understanding, capacity to read and write English, or of the principles of the constitution and form of government of the United States, being opposed to organized government of law, favoring totalitarian forms of government,

deserters from the armed forces, etc. (Secs. 1422 to 1426, USCA 89, 1953; See also Secs. 1421 et seq., USCA 8, 1970.) B QUALIFICATIONS Apart from the above disqualifications, the statutes referred to contained express requirements as to qualifications as follows: (1) The Act of 1790 required residence, good moral character and adherence to the principles of the United States Constitution. (2) That of 1795 required a declaration of intention, residence, adherence to the U.S. Constitution, good moral character and no title of nobility. (3) That of 1798 referred only to declaration of intention and residence. (4) That of 1802 required residence, renunciation of allegiance to former government, adherence to U.S. Constitution, good moral character and declaration of intention. (5) That of 1804 was practically the same as that of 1802. (6) So also were those of 1813, 1816 and 1824. (7) That of 1828 mentioned only residence and declaration of intention. (8) Those of 1855, 1870 and 1888 amended the law in other respects. (9) That of 1906 contained the following provisions:

SEC. 4. That an alien may be admitted to become a citizen of the United States in the following manner and not otherwise: First. He shall declare on oath before the clerk of any court authorized by this Act to naturalize aliens, or his authorized deputy, in the district in which such alien resides, two years at least prior to his admission, and after he has reached the age of eighteen years, that it is bona fide his intention to become a citizen of the United States, and to renounce forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty, and particularly, by name, to the prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty of which the alien may be at the time a citizen or subject. And such declaration shall set forth the name, age, occupation, personal description, place of birth, last foreign residence and allegiance, the date of arrival, the name of the vessel, if any, in which he came to the United States, and the present place of residence in the United States of said alien: Provided, however, That no alien who, in conformity with the law in force at the date of his declaration, has declared his intention to become a citizen of the United States shall be required to renew such declaration.

the name of the vessel on which he arrived; the time when and the place and name of the court where he declared his intention to become a citizen of the United States; if he is married he shall state the name of his wife and, if possible, the country of her nativity and her place of residence at the time of filing his petition; and if he has children, the name, date, and place of birth and place of residence of each child living at the time of his petition: Provided, That if he has filed his declaration before the passage of this Act he shall not be required to sign the petition in his own handwriting. The petition shall set forth that he is not a disbeliever in or opposed to organized government, or a member of or affiliated with any organization or body of persons teaching disbelief in or opposed to organized government, a polygamist or believer in the practice of polygamy, and that it is his intention to become a citizen of the United States and to renounce absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty, and particularly by name to the prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty of which he at the time of filing of his petition may be a citizen or subject, and that it is his intention to reside permanently within the United States, and whether or not he has been denied admission as a citizen of the United States, and, if denied, the ground or grounds of such denial, the court or courts in which such decision was rendered, and that the cause for such denial has since been cured or removed, and every fact material to his naturalization and required to be proved upon the final hearing of his application. The petition shall also be verified by the affidavits of at least two credible witnesses, who are citizens of the United States, and who shall state in their affidavits that they have personally known the

Second. Not less than two years nor more than seven years after he has made such declaration of intention he shall make and file, in duplicate, a petition in writing, signed by the applicant in his own handwriting and duly verified, in which petition such applicant shall state his full name, his place of residence (by street and number, if possible), his occupation, and, if possible, the date and place of his birth; the place from which he emigrated, and the date and place of his arrival in the United States, and, if he entered through a port,

applicant to be a resident of the United States for a period of at least five years continuously, and of the State, Territory, or district in which the application is made for a period of at least one year immediately preceding the date of the filing of his petition, and that they each have personal knowledge that the petitioner is a person of good moral character, and that he is in every way qualified, in their opinion, to be admitted as a citizen of the United States. At the time of filing of his petition there shall be filed with the clerk of the court a certificate from the Department of Commerce and Labor, if the petitioner arrives in the United States after the passage of this Act, stating the date, place, and manner of his arrival in the United States, and the declaration of intention of such petitioner, which certificate and declaration shall be attached to and made a part of said petition. Third. He shall, before he is admitted to citizenship, declare on oath in open court that he will support the Constitution of the United States, and he absolutely and entirely renounces and abjures all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty, and particularly by name to the prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty of which he was before a citizen or subject; that he will support and defend the Constitution and laws of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic, and bear true faith and allegiance to the same. Fourth. It shall be made to appear to the satisfaction of the court admitting any alien to citizenship that immediately preceding the date of his application he has resided continuously within the United States five years at least, and within the State or Territory where such court is at the time held one year at least, and that

during that time he has behaved as a man of good moral character, attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United States, and well disposed to the good order and happiness of the same. In addition to the oath of the applicant, the testimony of at least two witnesses, citizens of the United States, as to the facts of residence, moral character, and attachment to the principles of the Constitution shall be required, and the name, place of residence, and occupation of each witness shall be set forth in the record. Fifth. In case the alien applying to be admitted to citizenship has borne any hereditary title, or has been of any of the orders of nobility in the kingdom or state from which he came, he shall, in addition to the above requisites, make an express renunciation of his title or order of nobility in the court to which his application is made, and his renunciation shall be recorded in the court. Sixth. When any alien who has declared his intention to become a citizen of the United States dies before he is actually naturalized the widow and minor children of such alien may, by complying with the other provisions of this Act, be naturalized without making any declaration of intention. (34 Stat. 596-98.) 10. Those of 1911 and 1916 contained amendments as to other matters. 11. That of 1918 provided for different qualifications for Filipinos, Porto Ricans, etc. for naturalization in addition to service in the U.S. Navy or Philippine Constabulary. 12. Those of years after 1922 what Section 1994 was repealed would have no material bearing in this case. Amen.

DISSENTING OPINION REYES, J.B.L., dissenting: I regret not being able to assent to the opinion of Mr. Justice Barredo. Without prejudice to a more extended opinion and in order not to delay the release of the decision, I am expressing here the basic reasons for my dis-conformity. The pivotal problem is whether the provision of section 15 of our Naturalization Law (Commonwealth Act No. 473) requires that an alien woman, married to a Filipino citizen, must prove that she possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications prescribed by said law, in order to be deemed a Filipino citizen. The affirmative has been the constant doctrine of this Court since 1957, in the first Ly Giok Ha case (101 Phil. 459) or at the very least since 1959, in Lee Suan Sy vs. Galang, 106 Phil. 713. This established doctrine would now be set aside primarily on the basis that section 15 of our Naturalization Law is a verbatim reproduction or exact copy of section 1994 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (Act of Congress of February 10, 1855); that because said section of the Raised Statutes had been uniformly construed by American courts as requiring merely that the woman marrying a citizen should not be disqualified herself from becoming a citizen, that a similar interpretation must be given to the aforesaid section 15 of our own Naturalization Act. This view might be tenable if the Philippine statute had been in its entirety a reproduction of the American model. But where the coincidence is limited to a section of the Philippine statute, which taken as a whole is different in requirements and spirit, I submit

that the rule advocated by the main opinion does not apply, and that our section 15 should be construed conformably to the context and intendment of the statute of which it is a part, and in harmony with the whole. It is worth noting that the American law of naturalization stresses primarily the disqualifications for citizenship (see USCA, Title 8, secs. 363 to 366 and 378). The only positive qualifications are bona fide intention to become a citizen of the United States amd to renounce forever all allegiance and fidelity to a previous sovereign (Do., sec. 372) and residence for the specified period. This is particularly true of the American law at the time the first law was enacted concerning acquisition of citizenship by alien women married to U.S. citizens (the Act of February 10, 1855). Under such conditions, it is understandable that the interpretation of the words who might herself lawfully be naturalized should be that the marrying alien woman should not be disqualified from becoming a citizen. But our naturalization law separates qualifications from disqualifications; the positive qualifications under section 3 thereof express a policy of restriction as to candidates for naturalization as much as the disqualifications under section 4. And it has been shown in our decision in the second Ly Giok Ha case (Ly Giok Ha vs. Galang, L-21332, March 18, 1966, 16 SCRA 416) that those not disqualified under section 4 would not necessarily qualify under section 3, even if the residence qualification were disregarded. In other words, by giving to section 15 of our Naturalization Law the effect of excluding only those women suffering from disqualification under section 3 could result in admitting to citizenship women that section 2 intends to exclude. In these circumstances, I do not see why the Amer-ican interpretation of the words who might herself

be lawfully naturalized should be considered binding in this jurisdiction. The spirit of the American law, decidedly favorable to the absorption of immigrants, is not embodied in our Constitution and laws, because of the nationalistic spirit of the latter. In effect, the main decision introduces marriage to a citizen as a means of acquiring citizenship, a way not contemplated by Article IV of the Constitution. I am not unaware of the fact that the decisions of this Count have made very difficult the acquisition of citizenship by alien woman marrying Filipinos. But the remedy lies in a change of the statute. And it is not amiss to observe here that since 1959, when the present doctrine an the matter was adopted, the Legislature has not expressed any dissent therefrom, when it could have easily altered or clarified the legal provisions affected if Congress were convinced that this Court had misinterpreted its intent.

Judgment reversed. [Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of Immigration, 41 SCRA 292(1971)]

G.R. No. 120295. June 28, 1996.* JUAN G. FRIVALDO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and RAUL R. LEE, respondents. G.R. No. 123755. June 28, 1996.* RAUL R. LEE, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JUAN G. FRIVALDO, respondents.
Political Law; Citizenship; Having been declared as a non-citizen, it is incumbent upon Frivaldo to show that he has reacquired citizenship.Inasmuch as Frivaldo had been declared by this Court as a non-citizen, it is therefore incumbent upon him to show that he has reacquired citizenship; in fine, that he possesses the qualifications prescribed under the said statute (R.A. 7160). Same; Same; Citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization or by repatriation.Under Philippine law, citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization or by repatriation. Frivaldo told this Court in G.R. No. 104654 and during the oral argument in this case that he tried to resume his citizenship by direct act of Congress, but that the bill allowing him to do so failed to materialize, notwithstanding the endorsement of several members of the House of Representatives due, according to him, to the maneuvers of his political rivals. In the same case, his attempt at naturalization was rejected by this Court because of jurisdictional, substantial and procedural defects.

Same; Same; Statutory Construction; Memorandum dated March 27, 1987 cannot by any stretch of legal hermeneutics be construed as a law sanctioning or authorizing a repeal of P.D. No. 725.This memorandum dated March 27, 1987 cannot by any stretch of legal hermeneutics be construed as a law sanctioning or authorizing a repeal of P.D. No. 725. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones and a repeal may be express or implied. It is obvious that no express repeal was made because then President Aquino in her memorandumbased on the copy furnished us by Leedid not categorically and/or impliedly state that P.D. 725 was being repealed or was being rendered without any legal effect. Same; Same; Same; It is a basic rule of statutory construction that repeals by implication are not favored.On the other hand, it is a basic rule of statutory construction that repeals by implication are not favored. An implied repeal will not be allowed unless it is convincingly and unambiguously demonstrated that the two laws are clearly repugnant and patently inconsistent that they cannot coexist. Same; Same; The law does not specify any particular date or time when the candidate must possess citizenship unlike that for residence and age.From the above, it will be noted that the law does not specify any particular date or time when the candidate must possess citizenship, unlike that for residence (which must consist of at least one years residency immediately preceding the day of election) and age (at least twenty three years of age on election day). Same; Same; Section 39 of the Local Government Code speaks of Qualifications of Elective Officials not of candidates.So too, even

from a literal (as distinguished from liberal) construction, it should be noted that Section 39 of the Local Government Code speaks of Qualifications of ELECTIVE OFFICIALS, not of candidates. Why then should such qualification be required at the time of election or at the time of the filing of the certificates of candidacies, as Lee insists? Literally, such qualificationsunless otherwise expressly conditioned, as in the case of age and residenceshould thus be possessed when the elective *or elected+ official begins to govern, i.e., at the time he is proclaimed and at the start of his termin this case, on June 30, 1995. Paraphrasing this Courts ruling in Vasquez vs. Giap and Li Seng Giap & Sons, if the purpose of the citizenship requirement is to ensure that our people and country do not end up being governed by aliens, i.e., persons owing allegiance to another nation, that aim or purpose would not be thwarted but instead achieved by construing the citizenship qualification as applying to the time of proclamation of the elected official and at the start of his term. Same; Same; Same; The Local Government Code requires an elective official to be a registered voter, it does not require him to vote actually.If the law intended the citizenship qualification to be possessed prior to election consistent with the requirement of being a registered voter, then it would not have made citizenship a SEPARATE qualification. The law abhors a redundancy. It therefore stands to reason that the law intended CITIZENSHIP to be a qualification distinct from being a VOTER, even if being a voter presumes being a citizen first. It also stands to reason that the voter requirement was included as another qualification (aside from citizenship), not to reiterate the need for nationality but to require that the official be registered as a voter IN THE AREA OR

TERRITORY he seeks to govern, i.e., the law states: a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province x x x where he intends to be elected. It should be emphasized that the Local Government Code requires an elective official to be a registered voter. It does not require him to vote actually. Hence, registration not the actual votingis the core of this qualification. In other words, the laws purpose in this second requirement is to ensure that the prospective official is actually registered in the area he seeks to governand not anywhere else. Same; Same; The repatriation of Frivaldo retroacted to the date of the filing of his application on August 17, 1994.But to remove all doubts on this important issue, we also hold that the repatriation of Frivaldo RETROACTED to the date of the filing of his application on August 17, 1994. Same; Same; Frivaldo deserves a liberal interpretation of Philippine laws and whatever defects there were in his nationality should now be deemed mooted by his repatriation.Being a former Filipino who has served the people repeatedly, Frivaldo deserves a liberal interpretation of Philippine laws and whatever defects there were in his nationality should now be deemed mooted by his repatriation. Same; Same; In case of doubt on the interpretation or application of laws, it is to be presumed that the law making body intended right and justice to prevail.Another argument for retroactivity to the date of filing is that it would prevent prejudice to applicants. If P.D. 725 were not to be given retroactive effect, and the Special Committee decides not to act, i.e., to delay the processing of applications for any substantial length of time, then the former Filipinos who may be stateless, as Frivaldohaving already

renounced his American citizenshipwas, may be prejudiced for causes outside their control. This should not be. In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is to be presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail. Same; Same; Decision declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot govern a persons future status with finality. Indeed, decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot govern a persons future status with finality. This is because a person may subsequently reacquire, or for that matter lose, his citizenship under any of the modes recognized by law for the purpose. Election Law; Commission on Elections; The power to annul a proclamation must be done within ten (10) days following the proclamation.The Court however cautioned that such power to annul a proclamation must be done within ten (10) days following the proclamation. Inasmuch as Frivaldos petition was filed only six (6) days after Lees proclamation, there is no question that the Comelec correctly acquired jurisdiction over the same. Same; Same; It is obvious that Section 78 is merely directory as Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 authorizes the Commission to try and decide petitions for disqualifications even after the elections.This claim is now moot and academic inasmuch as these resolutions are deemed superseded by the subsequent ones issued by the Commission (First Division) on December 19, 1995, affirmed en banc on February 23, 1996, which both upheld his election. At any rate, it is obvious that Section 78 is merely directory as Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 authorizes the Commission to try and decide petitions for disqualifications even after the elections.

Same; Same; A decision promulgated by the Comelec even after the elections is valid but Loong held that a petition filed beyond the 25day period is out of time.In dismissing the petition in G.R. No. 120295, we hold that the Comelec did not commit grave abuse of discretion because Section 6 of R.A. 6646 authorizes the Comelec to try and decide disqualifications even after the elections. In spite of his disagreement with us on this point, i.e., that Section 78 is merely directory, we note that just like us, Mr. Justice Davide nonetheless votes to DISMISS G.R. No. 120295. One other point. Loong, as quoted in the dissent, teaches that a petition to deny due course under Section 78 must be filed within the 25-day period prescribed therein. The present case however deals with the period during which the Comelec may decide such petition. And we hold that it may be decided even after the fifteen day period mentioned in Section 78. Here, we rule that a decision promulgated by the Comelec even after the elections is valid but Loong held that a petition filed beyond the 25-day period is out of time. There is no inconsistency nor conflict. DAVIDE, JR., J., Dissenting Opinion: Political Law; Election Law; Local Government Code; Section 39 actually prescribes the qualification of elective local officials and not those of an elected local official.In the first place, Section 39 actually prescribes the qualifications of elective local officials and not those of an elected local official. These adjectives are not synonymous, as the ponencia seems to suggest. The first refers to the nature of the office, which requires the process of voting by the electorate involved; while the second refers to a victorious candidate for an elective office. The section unquestionably refers to electivenot electedlocal officials. It falls under Title Two

entitled ELECTIVE OFFICIALS; under Chapter 1 entitled Qualifications and Election; and paragraph (a) thereof begins with the phrase An elective local official, while paragraphs (b) to (f) thereof speak of candidates. Same; Same; Same; Section 39 refers to no other than the qualifications of candidates for elective local offices and their election.It is thus obvious that Section 39 refers to no other than the qualifications of candidates for elective local offices and their election. Hence, in no way may the section be construed to mean that possession of qualifications should be reckoned from the commencement of the term of office of the elected candidate. Constitutional Law; Citizenship; Steps to reacquire Philippine citizenship by repatriation under P.D. No. 725.Clearly then, the steps to reacquire Philippine citizenship by repatriation under the decree are: (1) filing the application; (2) action by the committee; and (3) taking of the oath of allegiance if the application is approved. It is only UPON TAKING THE OATH OF ALLEGIANCE that the applicant is deemed ipso jure to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. If the decree had intended the oath taking to retroact to the date of the filing of the application, then it should not have explicitly provided otherwise. PUNO, J.: Concurring Opinion: Political Law; Election Law; In election cases, we should strive to align the will of the legislature as expressed in its law with the will of the sovereign people as expressed in their ballots.Clearly then, Frivaldo is the overwhelming choice of the people of Sorsogon. In election cases, we should strive to align the will of the legislature as

expressed in its law with the will of the sovereign people as expressed in their ballots. For law to reign, it must respect the will of the people. For in the eloquent prose of Mr. Justice Laurel, x x x an enfranchised citizen is a particle of popular sovereignty and is the ultimate source of established authority. The choice of the governed on who shall be their governor merits the highest consideration by all agencies of government. In cases where the sovereignty of the people is at stake, we must not only be legally right but also politically correct. We cannot fail by making the people succeed. SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and Preliminary Injunction. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr., Juanito G. Arcilla and Teodoro M. Jumamil for Juan G. Frivaldo. Felix Carao, Jr., Ferdinand Laguna, Gavino Barlin and Bernardo P. Fernandez for Raul Lee. PANGANIBAN, J.: The ultimate question posed before this Court in these twin cases is: Who should be declared the rightful governor of Sorsogon (i) Juan G. Frivaldo, who unquestionably obtained the highest number of votes in three successive elections but who was twice declared by this Court to be disqualified to hold such office due to his alien citizenship, and who now claims to have re-assumed his lost Philippine citizenship thru repatriation;

(ii) Raul R. Lee, who was the second placer in the canvass, but who claims that the votes cast in favor of Frivaldo should be considered void; that the electorate should be deemed to have intentionally thrown away their ballots; and that legally, he secured the most number of valid votes; or (iii) The incumbent Vice-Governor, Oscar G. Deri, who obviously was not voted directly to the position of governor, but who according to prevailing jurisprudence should take over the said post inasmuch as, by the ineligibility of Frivaldo, a permanent vacancy in the contested office has occurred? In ruling for Frivaldo, the Court lays down new doctrines on repatriation, clarifies/reiterates/amplifies existing jurisprudence on citizenship and elections, and upholds the superiority of substantial justice over pure legalisms. G.R. No. 123755 This is a special civil action under Rules 65 and 58 of the Rules of Court for certiorari and preliminary injunction to review and annul a Resolution of the respondent Commission on Elections (Comelec), First Division,1 promulgated on December 19, 19952 and another Resolution of the Comelec en banc promulgated February 23, 19963 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration. The Facts On March 20, 1995, private respondent Juan G. Frivaldo filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the office of Governor of Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995 elections. On March 23, 1995, petitioner Raul R. Lee, another candidate, filed a petition4 with the Comelec docketed as SPA No. 95-028 praying that Frivaldo be disqualified from

seeking or holding any public office or position by reason of not yet being a citizen of the Philippines, and that his Certificate of Candidacy be cancelled. On May 1, 1995, the Second Division of the Comelec promulgated a Resolution5 granting the petition with the following disposition:6 __________________ Desamito, dissenting. 2 In SPC No. 95-317, entitled Juan G. Frivaldo, petitioner, vs. Raul R. Lee, respondent; rollo, pp. 110-129. 3 Signed by Chairman Bernardo P. Pardo, Comms. Regalado E. Maambong, Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando, Manolo B. Gorospe and Teresita Dy-Liaco Flores. Chairman Pardo certified that Commissioner Julio F. Desamito was on official travel at the time of the deliberation and resolution of this case. However, the Commission has reserved to Comm. Desamito the right to submit a dissenting opinion. Rollo, pp. 159-171. 4 Rollo, pp. 46-49. 5 Rollo, pp. 50-55. The Second Division was composed of Pres. Comm. Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando, ponente; Comm. Teresita DyLiaco Flores, concurring, and Comm. Manolo B. Gorospe (on official business).

6 Frivaldo was naturalized as an American citizen on January 20, 1983. In G.R. No. 87193, Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections, 174 SCRA 245 (June 23, 1989), the Supreme Court, by reason of such

naturalization, declared Frivaldo not a citizen of the Philippines and therefore DISQUALIFIED from serving as Governor of the Province of Sorsogon. On February 28, 1992, the Regional Trial Court of Manila granted the petition for naturalization of Frivaldo. However, the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 104654, Republic of the Philippines vs. De la Rosa, et al., 232 SCRA 785 (June 6, 1994), overturned this grant, and Frivaldo was declared not a citizen of the Philippines and ordered to vacate his office. On the basis of this latter Supreme Court ruling, the Comelec disqualified Frivaldo in SPA No. 95-028. WHEREFORE, this Division resolves to GRANT the petition and declares that respondent is DISQUALIFIED to run for the Office of Governor of Sorsogon on the ground that he is NOT a citizen of the Philippines. Accordingly, respondents certificate of candidacy is cancelled.

Juan G. Frivaldo 73,440 Raul R. Lee 53,304 Isagani P. Ocampo 1,925 On June 9, 1995, Lee filed in said SPA No. 95-028, a (supplemental) petition9 praying for his proclamation as the dulyelected Governor of Sorsogon. ________________

The Motion for Reconsideration filed by Frivaldo remained unacted upon until after the May 8, 1995 elections. So, his candidacy continued and he was voted for during the elections held on said date. On May 11, 1995, the Comelec en banc7 affirmed the aforementioned Resolution of the Second Division. The Provincial Board of Canvassers completed the canvass of the election returns and a Certificate of Votes8 dated May 27, 1995 was issued showing the following votes obtained by the candidates for the position of Governor of Sorsogon: Antonio H. Escudero, Jr. 51,060

7 Signed by Chairman Bernardo P. Pardo and the six incumbent commissioners, namely, Regalado E. Maambong, Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando, Manolo B. Gorospe, Graduacion A. ReyesClaravall, Julio F. Desamito and Teresita Dy-Liaco Flores; rollo, pp. 56-57. In an order10 dated June 21, 1995, but promulgated according to the petition only on June 29, 1995, the Comelec en banc directed the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Sorsogon to reconvene for the purpose of proclaiming candidate Raul Lee as the winning gubernatorial candidate in the province of Sorsogon on June 29, 1995 x x x. Accordingly, at 8:30 in the evening of June 30, 1995, Lee was proclaimed governor of Sorsogon.

On July 6, 1995, Frivaldo filed with the Comelec a new petition,11 docketed as SPC No. 95-317, praying for the annulment of the June 30, 1995 proclamation of Lee and for his own proclamation. He alleged that on June 30, 1995, at 2:00 in the afternoon, he took his oath of allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines after his petition for repatriation under P.D. 725 which he filed with the Special Committee on Naturalization in September 1994 had been granted. As such, when the said order (dated June 21, 1995) (of the Comelec) x x x was released and received by Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 at 5:30 oclock in the evening, there was no more legal impediment to the proclamation (of Frivaldo) as governor x x x. In the alternative, he averred that pursuant to the two cases of Labo vs. Comelec,12 the Vice-Governornot Leeshould occupy said position of governor. On December 19, 1995, the Comelec First Division promulgated the herein assailed Resolution13 holding that Lee, not having garnered the highest number of votes, was not legally entitled to be proclaimed as duly-elected governor; and that Frivaldo, having garnered the highest number of votes, and x x x having reacquired his Filipino citizenship by repatriation on June 30, 1995 under the provisions of Presidential ________________ 10 Rollo, pp. 86-87. The Comelec considered the votes cast for Frivaldo as stray votes, and thus Lee was held as having garnered the highest number of votes. Decree No. 725 x x x (is) qualified to hold the office of governor of Sorsogon; thus:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Commission (First Division), therefore RESOLVES to GRANT the Petition. Consistent with the decisions of the Supreme Court, the proclamation of Raul R. Lee as Governor of Sorsogon is hereby ordered annulled, being contrary to law, he not having garnered the highest number of votes to warrant his proclamation.

Upon the finality of the annulment of the proclamation of Raul R. Lee, the Provincial Board of Canvassers is directed to immediately reconvene and, on the basis of the completed canvass, proclaim petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo as the duly elected Governor of Sorsogon having garnered the highest number of votes, and he having reacquired his Filipino citizenship by repatriation on June 30, 1995 under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 725 and, thus, qualified to hold the office of Governor of Sorsogon. Conformably with Section 260 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), the Clerk of the Commission is directed to notify His Excellency the President of the Philippines, and the Secretary of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Sorsogon of this resolution immediately upon the due implementation thereof. On December 26, 1995, Lee filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the Comelec en banc in its Resolution14 promulgated on February 23, 1996. On February 26, 1996, the present petition was filed. Acting on the prayer for a temporary restraining order, this Court issued on February 27, 1996 a Resolution which inter alia directed the parties to maintain the status quo prevailing prior to the filing of this petition.

The Issues in G.R. No. 123755 Petitioner Lees position on the matter at hand may briefly be capsulized in the following propositions:15

in the May 8, 1995 elections on the ground that he is not a citizen of the Philippines; 2. Resolution17 of the Comelec en banc, promulgated on May 11, 1995; and 3. Resolution18 of the Comelec en banc, promulgated also on May 11, 1995 suspending the proclamation of, among others, Frivaldo. _______________ The Facts and the Issue The facts of this case are essentially the same as those in G.R. No. 123755. However, Frivaldo assails the above-mentioned resolutions on a different ground: that under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, which is reproduced hereinunder: Section 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy.A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election. (Italics supplied.) the Comelec had no jurisdiction to issue said Resolutions because they were not rendered within the period allowed by law, i.e., not later than fifteen days before the election.

__________________ FirstThe initiatory petition below was so far insufficient in form and substance to warrant the exercise by the COMELEC of its jurisdiction with the result that, in effect, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and deciding said petition; SecondThe judicially declared disqualification of respondent was a continuing condition and rendered him ineligible to run for, to be elected to and to hold the Office of Governor; ThirdThe alleged repatriation of respondent was neither valid nor is the effect thereof retroactive as to cure his ineligibility and qualify him to hold the Office of Governor; and FourthCorrectly read and applied, the Labo Doctrine fully supports the validity of petitioners proclamation as duly elected Governor of Sorsogon. G.R. No. 120295 This is a petition to annul three Resolutions of the respondent Comelec, the first two of which are also at issue in G.R. No. 123755, as follows: 1. Resolution16 of the Second Division, promulgated on May 1, 1995, disqualifying Frivaldo from running for governor of Sorsogon

Otherwise stated, Frivaldo contends that the failure of the Comelec to act on the petition for disqualification within the period of fifteen days prior to the election as provided by law is a jurisdictional defect which renders the said Resolutions null and void. By Resolution on March 12, 1996, the Court consolidated G.R. Nos. 120295 and 123755 since they are intimately related in their factual environment and are identical in the ultimate question raised, viz., who should occupy the position of governor of the province of Sorsogon. On March 19, 1995, the Court heard oral argument from the parties and required them thereafter to file simultaneously their respective memoranda. The Consolidated Issues From the foregoing submissions, the consolidated issues may be restated as follows: 1. Was the repatriation of Frivaldo valid and legal? If so, did it seasonably cure his lack of citizenship as to qualify him to be proclaimed and to hold the Office of Governor? If not, may it be given retroactive effect? If so, from when? 2. Is Frivaldos judicially declared disqualification for lack of Filipino citizenship a continuing bar to his eligibility to run for, be elected to or hold the governorship of Sorsogon? 3. Did the respondent Comelec have jurisdiction over the initiatory petition in SPC No. 95-317 considering that said petition is

not a pre-proclamation case, an election protest or a quo warranto case? 4. Was the proclamation of Lee, a runner-up in the election, valid and legal in light of existing jurisprudence? 5. Did the respondent Commission on Elections exceed its jurisdiction in promulgating the assailed Resolutions, all of which prevented Frivaldo from assuming the governorship of Sorsogon, considering that they were not rendered within the period referred to in Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, viz., not later than fifteen days before the elections? The First Issue: Frivaldos Repatriation The validity and effectivity of Frivaldos repatriation is the lis mota, the threshold legal issue in this case. All the other matters raised are secondary to this. The Local Government Code of 199119 expressly requires Philippine citizenship as a qualification for elective local officials, including that of provincial governor, thus: Sec. 39. Qualifications.(a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.

(b) Candidates for the position of governor, vice governor or member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, or mayor, vice mayor or member of the sangguniang panlungsod of highly urbanized cities must be at least twenty-three (23) years of age on election day. xxx xxx xxx

Inasmuch as Frivaldo had been declared by this Court20 as a noncitizen, it is therefore incumbent upon him to show that he has reacquired citizenship; in fine, that he possesses the qualifications prescribed under the said statute (R.A. 7160). Under Philippine law,21 citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization or by repatriation. Frivaldo told this Court in G.R. No. 10465422 and during the oral argument in this case that he tried to resume his citizenship by direct act of Congress, but that the bill allowing him to do so failed to materialize, notwithstanding the endorsement of several members of the House of Representatives due, according to him, to the maneuvers of his political rivals. In the same case, his attempt at naturalization was rejected by this Court because of jurisdictional, substantial and procedural defects. Despite his lack of Philippine citizenship, Frivaldo was overwhelmingly elected governor by the electorate of Sorsogon, with a margin of 27,000 votes in the 1988 elections, 57,000 in 1992, and 20,000 in 1995 over the same opponent Raul Lee. Twice, he was judicially declared a non-Filipino and thus twice disqualified from holding and discharging his popular mandate. Now, he comes to us a third time, with a fresh vote from the people of Sorsogon and a favorable decision from the Commission on Elections to boot.

Moreover, he now boasts of having successfully passed through the third and last mode of reacquiring citizenship: by repatriation under P.D. No. 725, with no less than the Solicitor General himself, who was the prime opposing counsel in the previous cases he lost, this time, as counsel for co-respondent Comelec, arguing the validity of his cause (in addition to his able private counsel Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr.). That he took his oath of allegiance under the provisions of said Decree at 2:00 p.m. on June 30, 1995, is not disputed. Hence, he insists that henot Leeshould have been proclaimed as the dulyelected governor of Sorsogon when the Provincial Board of Canvassers met at 8:30 p.m. on the said date since, clearly and unquestionably, he garnered the highest number of votes in the elections and since at that time, he already reacquired his citizenship. En contrario, Lee argues that Frivaldos repatriation is tainted with serious defects, which we shall now discuss in seriatim. First, Lee tells us that P.D. No. 725 had been effectively repealed, asserting that then President Corazon Aquino exercising legislative powers under the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution, forbade the grant of citizenship by Presidential Decree or Executive Issuances as the same poses a serious and contentious issue of policy which the present government, in the exercise of prudence and sound discretion, should best leave to the judgment of the first Congress under the 1987 Constitution, adding that in her memorandum dated March 27, 1987 to the members of the Special Committee on Naturalization constituted for purposes of Presidential Decree No. 725, President Aquino directed them to cease and desist from undertaking any and all proceedings within

your functional area of responsibility as defined under Letter of Instructions (LOI) No. 270 dated April 11, 1975, as amended.23 This memorandum dated March 27, 198724 cannot by any stretch of legal hermeneutics be construed as a law sanctioning or authorizing a repeal of P.D. No. 725. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones25 and a repeal may be express or implied. It is obvious that no express repeal was made because then President Aquino in her memorandumbased on the copy furnished us by Leedid not categorically and/or impliedly state that P.D. 725 was being repealed or was being rendered without any legal effect. In fact, she did not even mention it specifically by its number or text. On the other hand, it is a basic rule of statutory construction that repeals by implication are not favored. An implied repeal will not be allowed unless it is convincingly and unambiguously demonstrated that the two laws are clearly repugnant and patently __________________ 24 The full text of said memorandum reads as follows: MEMORANDUM TO : The Solicitor General

The previous administrations practice of granting citizenship by Presidential Decree or any other executive issuance, and the derivative administrative authority thereof, poses a serious and contentious issue of policy which the present government, in the exercise of prudence and sound discretion, should best leave to the judgment of the first Congress under the 1987 Constitution. In view of the foregoing, you as Chairman and members of the Special Committee on Naturalization, are hereby directed to cease and desist from undertaking any and all proceedings within your functional area of responsibility, as defined in Letter of Instructions No. 270 dated April 11, 1975, as amended, Presidential Decree No. 836 dated December 3, 1975, as amended, and Presidential Decree No. 1379 dated May 17, 1978, relative to the grant of citizenship under the said laws, and any other related laws, orders, issuances and rules and regulations. (Sgd.) Corazon C. Aquino Manila, March 27, 1987. 25 Art. 7, Civil Code of the Philippines. inconsistent that they cannot co-exist.26 The memorandum of then President Aquino cannot even be regarded as a legislative enactment, for not every pronouncement of the Chief Executive even under the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution can nor should be regarded as an exercise of her law-making powers. At best, it could be treated as an executive policy addressed to the Special Committee to halt the acceptance and processing of applications for repatriation pending whatever judgment the first Congress under the 1987 Constitution might

The Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs The Director-General National Intelligence Coordinating Agency

make. In other words, the former President did not repeal P.D. 725 but left it to the first Congressonce createdto deal with the matter. If she had intended to repeal such law, she should have unequivocally said so instead of referring the matter to Congress. The fact is she carefully couched her presidential issuance in terms that clearly indicated the intention of the present government, in the exercise of prudence and sound discretion to leave the matter of repeal to the new Congress. Any other interpretation of the said Presidential Memorandum, such as is now being proffered to the Court by Lee, would visit unmitigated violence not only upon statutory construction but on common sense as well. Second. Lee also argues that serious congenital irregularities flawed the repatriation proceedings, asserting that Frivaldos application therefor was filed on June 29, 1995 x x x (and) was approved in just one day or on June 30, 1995 x x x, which prevented a judicious review and evaluation of the merits thereof. Frivaldo counters that he filed his application for repatriation with the Office of the President in Malacaang Palace on August 17, 1994. This is confirmed by the Solicitor General. However, the Special Committee was reactivated only on June 8, 1995, when presumably the said Committee started processing his application. On June 29, 1995, he filled up and re-submitted the FORM that the Committee required. Under these circumstances, it could not be said that there was indecent haste in the processing of his application. Anent Lees charge that the sudden reconstitution of the Special Committee on Naturalization was intended solely for the personal interest of respondent,27 the Solicitor General explained during the oral argument on March 19, 1996 that such allegation is simply

baseless as there were many others who applied and were considered for repatriation, a list of whom was submitted by him to this Court, through a Mani-festation28 filed on April 3, 1996. On the basis of the parties submissions, we are convinced that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty and the presumption of legality in the repatriation of Frivaldo have not been successfully rebutted by Lee. The mere fact that the proceedings were speeded up is by itself not a ground to conclude that such proceedings were necessarily tainted. After all, the requirements of repatriation under P.D. No. 725 are not difficult to comply with, nor are M A N I F E S T A T I O N The Solicitor General, as Chairman of the Special Committee on Naturalization, hereby manifests that the following persons have been repatriated by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 725, since June 8, 1995: 1. Juan Gallanosa Frivaldo R-000900 2. Manuel Reyes Sanchez 901 3. Ma. Nelly Dessalla Ty 902

4.Terry Herrera and Antonio Ching 903 5.Roberto Salas Benedicto 904 6.Winthrop Santos Liwag 905 7. 906 8.Joselito Holganza Ruiz 907 9.Samuel Villanueva 908 Samuel M. Buyco

________________ 29 The text of P.D. 725 is reproduced below: PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 725 PROVIDING FOR REPATRIATION OF FILIPINO WOMEN WHO HAD LOST THEIR PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP BY MARRIAGE TO ALIENS AND OF NATURAL BORN FILIPINOS. WHEREAS, there are many Filipino women who had lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens; WHEREAS, while the new Constitution allows a Filipino woman who marries an alien to retain her Philippine citizenship unless by her act or omission, she is deemed under the law to have renounced her Philippine citizenship, such provision of the new Constitution does not apply to Filipino women who had married aliens before said constitution took effect; WHEREAS, the existing law (C.A. No. 63, as amended) allows the repatriation of Filipino women who lost their citizenship by reason of their marriage to aliens only after the death of their husbands or the termination of their marital status; and WHEREAS, there are natural born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship but now desire to re-acquire Philippine citizenship; Now, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers in me vested by the Constitution, do hereby decree and order that: (1) Filipino women who lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens; and (2)

10.Juan Leonardo Collas, Jr. 909 11.Felicilda Otilla Sacnanas-Chua 910 they tedious and cumbersome. In fact, P.D. 72529 itself requires very little of an applicant, and even the rules and

natural born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship may reacquire Philippine citizenship through repatriation by applying with the Special Committee on Naturalization created by Letter of Instructions No. 270, and, if their applications are approved, taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, after which they shall be deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. The Commission on Immigration and Deportation shall thereupon cancel their certificate of registration. The aforesaid Special Committee is hereby authorized to promulgate rules and regulations and prescribe the appropriate forms and the required fees for the effective implementation of this Decree. This Decree shall take effect immediately. Done in the City of Manila, this 5th day of June, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-five. regulations to implement the said decree were left to the Special Committee to promulgate. This is not unusual since, unlike in naturalization where an alien covets a first-time entry into Philippine political life, in repatriation the applicant is a former natural-born Filipino who is merely seeking to reacquire his previous citizenship. In the case of Frivaldo, he was undoubtedly a natural-born citizen who openly and faithfully served his country and his province prior to his naturalization in the United Statesa naturalization he insists was made necessary only to escape the iron clutches of a dictatorship he abhorred and could not in conscience embraceand who, after the fall of the dictator and the re-establishment of democratic space, wasted no time in returning to his country of birth to offer once more his talent and services to his people.

So too, the fact that ten other persons, as certified to by the Solicitor General, were granted repatriation argues convincingly and conclusively against the existence of favoritism vehemently posited by Raul Lee. At any rate, any contest on the legality of Frivaldos repatriation should have been pursued before the Committee itself, and, failing there, in the Office of the President, pursuant to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Third. Lee further contends that assuming the assailed repatriation to be valid, nevertheless it could only be effective as at 2:00 p.m. of June 30, 1995 whereas the citizenship qualification prescribed by the Local Government Code must exist on the date of his election, if not when the certificate of candidacy is filed, citing our decision in G.R. 10465430 which held that both the Local Government Code and the Constitution require that only Philippine citizens can run and be elected to public office. Obviously, however, this was a mere obiter as the only issue in said case was whether Frivaldos naturalization was valid or notand NOT the effective date thereof. Since the Court held his naturalization to be invalid, then the issue of when an aspirant for public office should be a citizen was NOT resolved at all by the Court. Which question we shall now directly rule on. Under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code, (a)n elective local official must be: * a citizen of the Philippines; * a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province x x x where he intends to be elected;

* a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; * able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect. * In addition, candidates for the position of governor x x x must be at least twenty-three (23) years of age on election day. From the above, it will be noted that the law does not specify any particular date or time when the candidate must possess citizenship, unlike that for residence (which must consist of at least one years residency immediately preceding the day of election) and age (at least twenty three years of age on election day). Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public office,31 and the purpose of the citizenship qualification is none other than to ensure that no alien, i.e., no person owing allegiance to another nation, shall govern our people and our country or a unit of territory thereof. Now, an official begins to govern or to discharge his functions only upon his proclamation and on the day the law mandates his term of office to begin. Since Frivaldo re-assumed his citizenship on June 30, 1995the very day32 the term of office of governor (and other elective officials) beganhe was therefore already qualified to be proclaimed, to hold such _________________ 31 Cf. Labo, Jr. vs. Comelec, 211 SCRA 297 (July 3, 1992).

32 The term of office of all local elective officials elected after the effectivity of this Code shall be three (3) years, starting from noon of June 30, 1992 or such date as may be provided for by law, x x x. Sec. 43, Local Government Code. office and to discharge the functions and responsibilities thereof as of said date. In short, at that time, he was already qualified to govern his native Sorsogon. This is the liberal interpretation that should give spirit, life and meaning to our law on qualifications consistent with the purpose for which such law was enacted. So too, even from a literal (as distinguished from liberal) construction, it should be noted that Section 39 of the Local Government Code speaks of Qualifications of ELECTIVE OFFICIALS, not of candidates. Why then should such qualification be required at the time of election or at the time of the filing of the certificates of candidacies, as Lee insists? Literally, such qualificationsunless otherwise expressly conditioned, as in the case of age and residenceshould thus be possessed when the elective *or elected+ official begins to govern, i.e., at the time he is proclaimed and at the start of his termin this case, on June 30, 1995. Paraphrasing this Courts ruling in Vasquez vs. Giap and Li Seng Giap & Sons,33 if the purpose of the citizenship requirement is to ensure that our people and country do not end up being governed by aliens, i.e., persons owing allegiance to another nation, that aim or purpose would not be thwarted but instead achieved by construing the citizenship qualification as applying to the time of proclamation of the elected official and at the start of his term.

But perhaps the more difficult objection was the one raised during the oral argument34 to the effect that the citizenship qualification should be possessed at the time the candidate (or for that matter the elected official) registered as a voter. After all, Section 39, apart from requiring the official to be a citizen, ____________________ 33 96 Phil. 447, 453 (1955). 34 The following are excerpts from the transcript of stenographic notes of the oral argument held on March 19, 1996: JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: Mr. Counsel, it is your position then that the candidate should be a citizen at the time of proclamation? ATTY. BRILLANTES: Yes, Your Honor, it is required that he must be a citizen at the time of proclamation and not only that, at the time that he assumes the office he must have the continuing qualification as a citizen. _________________ JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: Should that not be reckoned from the time of filing of certificate of candidacy or at least the day of the election? ATTY. BRILLANTES: Yes, Your Honor, there are positions taken that it should be reckoned from the date of certificate of candidacy as in the case of qualification for Batasang Pambansa before under B.P. 53it says that for purposes of residence it must be reckoned x x x from the time of the filing of the certificate, for purposes of age, from the time of the date of the election. But when we go over all

the provisions of law under current laws, Your Honor, there is no qualification requirement insofar as citizenship is concern(ed) as to when, as to when you should be a citizen of the Philippines and we say that if there is no provision under any existing law which requires that you have to be a citizen of the Philippines on the date of the filing or on the date of election then it has to be equitably interpreted to mean that if you are already qualified at the time that the office is supposed to be assumed then you should be allowed to assume the office. JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: Is it not also true that under the Local Autonomy Code the candidate should also be a registered voter and to be a registered voter one must be a citizen? ATTY. BRILLANTES: Yes, Your Honor, in fact, Mr. Frivaldo has always been a registered voter of Sorsogon. He has voted in 1987, 1988, 1992, then he voted again in 1995. In fact, his eligibility as a voter was questioned but the Court dismissed (sic) his eligibility as a voter and he was allowed to vote as in fact, he voted in all the previous elections including on May 8, 1995. JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: But the fact that he voted does not make him a citizen. The fact is, he was declared not a citizen by this Court twice. ATTY. BRILLANTES: That is true, Your Honor, we admit that he has been twice declared not citizen and we admit the ruling of the Supreme Court is correct but the fact is, Your Honor, the matter of his eligibility to vote as being a registered also specifies as another item of qualification, that he be a registered voter. And, under the law35 a voter must be a citizen of the Philippines. So therefore,

Frivaldo could not have been a votermuch less a validly registered oneif he was not a citizen at the time of such registration. The answer to this problem again lies in discerning the purpose of the requirement. If the law intended the citizenship qualification to be possessed prior to election consistent with the requirement of being a registered voter, then it would not have made citizenship a SEPARATE qualification. The law abhors a redundancy. It therefore stands to reason voter was likewise questioned before the judiciary. There was aruling by the Municipal Court, there was a ruling by theRegional Trial Court and he was sustained as a valid voter, sohe voted. JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: I raised this question in connection with your contention that citizenship should be determined as of the time of proclamation and not as of the time of the election or at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy. ATTY. BRILLANTES: That is true, Your Honor. JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: And is it your contention that under the law, particularly the Local Autonomy Code, the law does not specify when citizenship should be possessed by the candidate, is that not correct? ATTY. BRILLANTES: That is right, Your Honor, there is no express provision. JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: I am also asking you that under the Local Autonomy Code the candidate for governor or for other local positions should be a voter and to be a voter one must be a citizen?

ATTY. BRILLANTES: That is right, Your Honor, but the fact of voting is not an issue here because he was allowed to vote and he did in fact vote and in fact, he was a registered voter. (TSN, March 19, 1996.) 35 Section 117, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as The Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines, as amended, provides for the various qualifications of voters, one of which is Filipino citizenship. that the law intended CITIZENSHIP to be a qualification distinct from being a VOTER, even if being a voter presumes being a citizen first. It also stands to reason that the voter requirement was included as another qualification (aside from citizenship), not to reiterate the need for nationality but to require that the official be registered as a voter IN THE AREA OR TERRITORY he seeks to govern, i.e., the law states: a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province x x x where he intends to be elected. It should be emphasized that the Local Government Code requires an elective official to be a registered voter. It does not require him to vote actually. Hence, registrationnot the actual votingis the core of this qualification. In other words, the laws purpose in this second requirement is to ensure that the prospective official is actually registered in the area he seeks to governand not anywhere else. Before this Court, Frivaldo has repeatedly emphasizedand Lee has not disputedthat he was and is a registered voter of Sorsogon, and his registration as a voter has been sustained as valid by judicial declaration x x x. In fact, he cast his vote in his precinct on May 8, 1995.36

So too, during the oral argument, his counsel steadfastly maintained that Mr. Frivaldo has always been a registered voter of Sorsogon. He has voted in 1987, 1988, 1992, then he voted again in 1995. In fact, his eligibility as a voter was questioned, but the court dismissed (sic) his eligibility as a voter and he was allowed to vote as in fact, he voted in all the previous elections including on May 8, 1995.37 It is thus clear that Frivaldo is a registered voter in the province where he intended to be elected. There is yet another reason why the prime issue of citizenship should be reckoned from the date of proclamation, not necessarily the date of election or date of filing of the certificate of candidacy. Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code38 gives any voter, presumably including the defeated candidate, the opportunity to question the ELIGIBILITY (or the disloyalty) of a candidate. This is the only provision of the Code that authorizes a remedy on how to contest before the Comelec an incumbents ineligibility arising from failure to meet the qualifications enumerated under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code. Such remedy of Quo Warranto can be availed of within ten days after proclamation of the winning candidate. Hence, it is only at such time that the issue of ineligibility may be taken cognizance of by the Commission. And since, at the very moment of Lees proclamation (8:30 p.m., June 30, 1995), Juan G. Frivaldo was already and indubitably a citizen, having taken his oath of allegiance earlier in the afternoon of the same day, then he should have been the candidate proclaimed as he unquestionably garnered the highest number of votes in the immediately preceding elections and such oath had already cured his previous judiciallydeclared alienage. Hence, at such time, he was no longer ineligible.

But to remove all doubts on this important issue, we also hold that the repatriation of Frivaldo RETROACTED to the date of the filing of his application on August 17, 1994. ____________________ Section 253. Petition for quo warranto.Any voter contesting the election of any member of the Congress, regional, provincial, or city officer on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall file a sworn petition for quo warranto with the Commission within ten days after the proclamation of the results of the election. (Art. XIV, Sec. 60, B.P. 697; Art. XVIII, Sec. 189, par. 2, 1978 EC). Any voter contesting the election of any municipal or barangay officer on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall file a sworn petition for quo warranto with the regional trial court or metropolitan or municipal trial court, respectively, within ten days after the proclamation of the results of the election. (Art. XVIII, Sec. 189, par. 2, 1978 EC). It is true that under the Civil Code of the Philippines,39 (l)aws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided. But there are settled exceptions40 to this general rule, such as when the statute is CURATIVE or REMEDIAL in nature or when it CREATES NEW RIGHTS. According to Tolentino,41 curative statutes are those which undertake to cure errors and irregularities, thereby validating judicial or administrative proceedings, acts of public officers, or private deeds and contracts which otherwise would not produce their intended consequences by reason of some statutory disability

or failure to comply with some technical requirement. They operate on conditions already existing, and are necessarily retroactive in operation. Agpalo,42 on the other hand, says that curative statutes are healing acts x x x curing defects and adding to the means of enforcing existing obligations x x x (and) are intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities in existing laws, and curb certain evils. x x x By their very nature, curative statutes are retroactive x x x (and) reach back to past events to correct errors or irregularities and to render valid and effective attempted acts which would be otherwise ineffective for the purpose the parties intended. On the other hand, remedial or procedural laws, i.e., those statutes relating to remedies or modes of procedure, which do not create new or take away vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of such rights, ordinarily do not come within the legal meaning of a retro spective law, nor within the general rule against the retrospective operation of statutes.43 _________________ 39 Art. 4, New Civil Code. See also Gallardo vs. Borromeo, 161 SCRA 500 (May 25, 1988), and Nilo vs. Court of Appeals, 128 SCRA 519 (April 2, 1984). 40 Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. I, 1990 ed., p. 23 states: Exceptions to Rule.Statutes can be given retroactive effect in the following cases: (1) when the law itself so expressly provides, (2) in case of remedial statutes, (3) in case of curative statutes, (4) in case of laws interpreting others, and (5) in case of laws creating new rights.

41 Id., p. 25. 42 Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 1990 ed., pp. 270-271. A reading of P.D. 725 immediately shows that it creates a new right, and also provides for a new remedy, thereby filling certain voids in our laws. Thus, in its preamble, P.D. 725 expressly recognizes the plight of many Filipino women (who) had lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and who could not, under the existing law (C.A. No. 63, as amended) avail of repatriation until after the death of their husbands or the termination of their marital status and who could neither be benefitted by the 1973 Constitutions new provision allowing a Filipino woman who marries an alien to retain her Philippine citizenship x x x because such provision of the new Constitution does not apply to Filipino women who had married aliens before said constitution took effect. Thus, P.D. 725 granted a new right to these womenthe right to re-acquire Filipino citizenship even during their marital coverture, which right did not exist prior to P.D. 725. On the other hand, said statute also provided a new remedy and a new right in favor of other natural born Filipinos who (had) lost their Philippine citizenship but now desire to re-acquire Philippine citizenship, because prior to the promulgation of P.D. 725 such former Filipinos would have had to undergo the tedious and cumbersome process of naturalization, but with the advent of P.D. 725 they could now reacquire their Philippine citizenship under the simplified procedure of repatriation. The Solicitor General44 argues:

By their very nature, curative statutes are retroactive, (DBP vs. CA, 96 SCRA 342), since they are intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities in existing laws (Del Castillo vs. Securities and Exchange Commission, 96 Phil. 119) and curb certain evils (Santos vs. Duata, 14 SCRA 1041). ____________________ 43 73 Am Jur 2d, Sec. 354, p. 489, cited in Castro vs. Sagales, 94 Phil. 208, 210 (1953). 44 Memorandum, p. 9. In this case, P.D. No. 725 was enacted to cure the defect in the existing naturalization law, specifically C.A. No. 63 wherein married Filipino women are allowed to repatriate only upon the death of their husbands, and natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship by naturalization and other causes faced the difficulty of undergoing the rigid procedures of C.A. 63 for reacquisition of Filipino citizenship by naturalization. Presidential Decree No. 725 provided a remedy for the aforementioned legal aberrations and thus its provisions are considered essentially remedial and curative. In light of the foregoing, and prescinding from the wording of the preamble, it is unarguable that the legislative intent was precisely to give the statute retroactive operation. (A) retrospective operation is given to a statute or amendment where the intent that it should so operate clearly appears from a consideration of the act as a whole, or from the terms thereof.45 It is obvious to the Court that the statute was meant to reach back to those persons, events and

transactions not otherwise covered by prevailing law and jurisprudence. And inasmuch as it has been held that citizenship is a political and civil right equally as important as the freedom of speech, liberty of abode, the right against unreasonable searches and seizures and other guarantees enshrined in the Bill of Rights, therefore the legislative intent to give retrospective operation to P.D. 725 must be given the fullest effect possible. (I)t has been said that a remedial statute must be so construed as to make it effect the evident purpose for which it was enacted, so that if the reason of the statute extends to past transactions, as well as to those in the future, then it will be so applied although the statute does not in terms so direct, unless to do so would impair some vested right or violate some constitutional guaranty.46 This is all the more true of P.D. 725, which did not specify any restrictions on or delimit or qualify the right of repatriation granted therein.

At this point, a valid question may be raised: How can the retroactivity of P.D. 725 benefit Frivaldo considering that said law was enacted on June 5, 1975, while Frivaldo lost his Filipino citizenship much later, on January 20, 1983, and applied for repatriation even later, on August 17, 1994? While it is true that the law was already in effect at the time that Frivaldo became an American citizen, nevertheless, it is not only the law itself (P.D. 725) which is to be given retroactive effect, but even the repatriation granted under said law to Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 is to be deemed to have retroacted to the date of his application therefor, August 17, 1994. The reason for this is simply that if, as in this case, it was the intent of the legislative authority that the law

should apply to past eventsi.e., situations and transactions existing even before the law came into beingin order to benefit the greatest number of former Filipinos possible thereby enabling them to enjoy and exercise the constitutionally guaranteed right of citizenship, and such legislative intention is to be given the fullest effect and expression, then there is all the more reason to have the law apply in a retroactive or retrospective manner to situations, events and transactions subsequent to the passage of such law. That is, the repatriation granted to Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 can and should be made to take effect as of date of his application. As earlier mentioned, there is nothing in the law that would bar this or would show a contrary intention on the part of the legislative authority; and there is no showing that damage or prejudice to anyone, or anything unjust or injurious would result from giving retroactivity to his repatriation. Neither has Lee shown that there will result the impairment of any contractual obligation, disturbance of any vested right or breach of some constitutional guaranty. Being a former Filipino who has served the people repeatedly, Frivaldo deserves a liberal interpretation of Philippine laws and whatever defects there were in his nationality should now be deemed mooted by his repatriation. Another argument for retroactivity to the date of filing is that it would prevent prejudice to applicants. If P.D. 725 were not to be given retroactive effect, and the Special Committee decides not to act, i.e., to delay the processing of applications for any substantial length of time, then the former Filipinos who may be stateless, as Frivaldohaving already renounced his American citizenshipwas, may be prejudiced for causes outside their control. This should not be. In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is

to be presumed that the law-making body intended right and justice to prevail.47 And as experience will show, the Special Committee was able to process, act upon and grant applications for repatriation within relatively short spans of time after the same were filed.48 The fact that such interregna were relatively insignificant minimizes the likelihood of prejudice to the government as a result of giving retroactivity to repatriation. Besides, to the mind of the Court, direct prejudice to the government is possible only where a persons repatriation has the effect of wiping out a liability of his to the government arising in connection with or as a result of his being an alien, and accruing only during the interregnum between application and approval, a situation that is not present in the instant case. And it is but right and just that the mandate of the people, already twice frustrated, should now prevail. Under the circumstances, there is nothing unjust or iniquitous in treating Frivaldos repatriation as having become effective as of the date of his application, i.e., on August 17, 1994. This being so, all questions about his possession of the nationality qualificationwhether at the date of proclamation (June 30, 1995) or the date of election (May 8, 1995) or date of filing his certificate of candidacy (March 20, 1995) would become moot. __________________ 47 Art. 10, Civil Code of the Philippines. 48 Based on the Corrected Compliance dated May 16, 1996 filed by the Solicitor General, it appears that, excluding the case of

Frivaldo, the longest interval between date of filing of an application for repatriation and its approval was three months and ten days; the swiftest action was a same-day approval. Based on the foregoing, any question regarding Frivaldos status as a registered voter would also be deemed settled. Inasmuch as he is considered as having been repatriatedi.e., his Filipino citizenship restoredas of August 17, 1994, his previous registration as a voter is likewise deemed validated as of said date. It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo became an American. Would the retroactivity of his repatriation not effectively give him dual citizenship, which under Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code would disqualify him from running for any elective local position?49 We answer this question in the negative, as there is cogent reason to hold that Frivaldo was really STATELESS at the time he took said oath of allegiance and even before that, when he ran for governor in 1988. In his Comment, Frivaldo wrote that he had long renounced and had long abandoned his American citizenshiplong before May 8, 1995. At best, Frivaldo was stateless in the interimwhen he abandoned and renounced his US citizenship but before he was repatriated to his Filipino citizenship.50 On this point, we quote from the assailed Resolution dated December 19, 1995:51 By the laws of the United States, petitioner Frivaldo lost his American citizenship when he took his oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government when he ran for Governor in 1988, in 1992,

and in 1995. Every certificate of candidacy contains an oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government. These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign nationality long before the elections of 1995 have not been effectively rebutted by Lee. Furthermore, it is basic that such findings of the Commission are conclusive upon this Court, absent any showing of capriciousness or arbitrariness or abuse.52 __________________ 49 SEC. 40. Disqualifications.The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position: x x x

(d) Those with dual citizenship; 50 P. 11; rollo, p. 259. 51 Resolution, p. 12; rollo, p. 121. The Second Issue: Is Lack of Citizenship a Continuing Disqualification? Lee contends that the May 1, 1995 Resolution53 of the Comelec Second Division in SPA No. 95-028 as affirmed in toto by Comelec En Banc in its Resolution of May 11, 1995 became final and executory after five (5) days or on May 17, 1995, no restraining order having been issued by this Honorable Court.54 Hence, before Lee was proclaimed as the elected governor on June 30, 1995, there was already a final and executory judgment disqualifying Frivaldo. Lee adds that this Courts two rulings (which Frivaldo now concedes

were legally correct) declaring Frivaldo an alien have also become final and executory way before the 1995 elections, and these judicial pronouncements of his political status as an American citizen absolutely and for all time disqualified (him) from running for, and holding any public office in the Philippines. We do not agree. It should be noted that our first ruling in G.R. No. 87193 disqualifying Frivaldo was rendered in connection with the 1988 elections while that in G.R. No. 104654 was in connection with the 1992 elections. That he was disqualified for such elections is final and can no longer be changed. In the words of the respondent Commission (Second Division) in its assailed Resolution:55 ________________ 52 Cf. Navarro vs. Commission on Elections, 228 SCRA 596 (December 17, 1993); Arao vs. Commission on Elections, 210 SCRA 290 (June 23, 1992). 53 The dispositive portion of said Resolution reads: WHEREFORE, this Division resolves to GRANT the petition and declares that respondent is DISQUALIFIED to run for the office of Provincial Governor of Sorsogon on the ground that he is not a citizen of the Philippines. Accordingly respondents certificate of candidacy is cancelled. 54 Petition, p. 19; rollo, p. 21. The records show that the Honorable Supreme Court had decided that Frivaldo was not a Filipino citizen and thus disqualified for the

purpose of the 1988 and 1992 elections. However, there is no record of any final judgment of the disqualification of Frivaldo as a candidate for the May 8, 1995 elections. What the Commission said in its Order of June 21, 1995 (implemented on June 30, 1995), directing the proclamation of Raul R. Lee, was that Frivaldo was not a Filipino citizen having been declared by the Supreme Court in its Order dated March 25, 1995, not a citizen of the Philippines. This declaration of the Supreme Court, however, was in connection with the 1992 elections. Indeed, decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot govern a persons future status with finality. This is because a person may subsequently reacquire, or for that matter lose, his citizenship under any of the modes recognized by law for the purpose. Hence, in Lee vs. Commissioner of Immigration,56 we held: Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered res judicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again, as the occasion demands. The Third Issue: Comelecs Jurisdiction Over The Petition in SPC No. 95-317 Lee also avers that respondent Comelec had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition in SPC No. 95-317 because the only possible types of proceedings that may be entertained by the ________________

55 Resolution promulgated on December 19, 1995, p. 7; rollo, p. 116. 56 42 SCRA 561, 565 (December 20, 1971), citing Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of Immigration, L-21289, October 4, 1971. Comelec are a pre-proclamation case, an election protest or a quo warranto case. Again, Lee reminds us that he was proclaimed on June 30, 1995 but that Frivaldo filed SPC No. 95-317 questioning his (Lees) proclamation only on July 6, 1995beyond the 5-day reglementary period. Hence, according to him, Frivaldos recourse was to file either an election protest or a quo warranto action. This argument is not meritorious. The Constitution57 has given the Comelec ample power to exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all elective x x x provincial x x x officials. Instead of dwelling at length on the various petitions that Comelec, in the exercise of its constitutional prerogatives, may entertain, suffice it to say that this Court has invariably recognized the Commissions authority to hear and decide petitions for annulment of proclamationsof which SPC No. 95-317 obviously is one.58 Thus, in Mentang vs. COMELEC,59 we ruled: The petitioner argues that after proclamation and assumption of office, a pre-proclamation controversy is no longer viable. Indeed, we are aware of cases holding that pre-proclamation controversies may no longer be entertained by the COMELEC after the winning candidate has been proclaimed. (citing Gallardo vs. Rimando, 187 SCRA 463; Salvacion vs. COMELEC, 170 SCRA 513; Casimiro vs. ________________

57 Art. IX, Sec. 2. 58 SPC No. 95-317 is entitled Annulment of Proclamation and contains the following prayer: WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Commission that after due notice and hearing an Oder (sic)/Resolution/Decision be issued as follows: a) Annulling/setting aside the 30 June 1995 proclamation of respondent as the duly election(sic), Governor of Sorsogon for being contrary to law; b) Ordering the proclamation of the petitioner as duly elected governor of Sorsogon;x x x x x x x x x. 59 229 SCRA 666, 674 (February 4, 1994). COMELEC, 171 SCRA 468.) This rule, however, is premised on an assumption that the proclamation is no proclamation at all and the proclaimed candidates assumption of office cannot deprive the COMELEC of the power to make such declaration of nullity. (citing Aguam vs. COMELEC, 23 SCRA 883; Agbayani vs. COMELEC, 186 SCRA 484.) The Court however cautioned that such power to annul a proclamation must be done within ten (10) days following the proclamation. Inasmuch as Frivaldos petition was filed only six (6) days after Lees proclamation, there is no question that the Comelec correctly acquired jurisdiction over the same. The Fourth Issue: Was Lees Proclamation Valid?

Frivaldo assails the validity of the Lee proclamation. We uphold him for the following reasons: First. To paraphrase this Court in Labo vs. COMELEC,60 the fact remains that he (Lee) was not the choice of the sovereign will, and in Aquino vs. COMELEC,61 Lee is a second placer, x x x just that, a second placer. In spite of this, Lee anchors his claim to the governorship on the pronouncement of this Court in the aforesaid Labo62 case, as follows: The rule would have been different if the electorate fully aware in fact and in law of a candidates disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety, would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate. In such case, the electorate may be said to have waived the validity and efficacy of their votes by notoriously misapplying their franchise or throwing away their votes, in which case, the eligible candidate obtaining the next higher number of votes may be deemed elected. But such holding is qualified by the next paragraph, thus: But this is not the situation obtaining in the instant dispute. It has not been shown, and none was alleged, that petitioner Labo was notoriously known as an ineligible candidate, much less the electorate as having known of such fact. On the contrary, petitioner Labo was even allowed by no less than the Comelec itself in its resolution dated May 10, 1992 to be voted for the office of the city mayor as its resolution dated May 9, 1992 denying due course to petitioner Labos certificate of candidacy had not yet become final and subject to the final outcome of this case.

The last-quoted paragraph in Labo, unfortunately for Lee, is the ruling appropriate in this case because Frivaldo was in 1995 in an identical situation as Labo was in 1992 when the Comelecs cancellation of his certificate of candidacy was not yet final on election day as there was in both cases a pending motion for reconsideration, for which reason Comelec issued an (omnibus) resolution declaring that Frivaldo (like Labo in 1992) and several others can still be voted for in the May 8, 1995 election, as in fact, he was. Furthermore, there has been no sufficient evidence presented to show that the electorate of Sorsogon was fully aware in fact and in law of Frivaldos alleged disqualification as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety; in other words, that the voters intentionally wasted their ballots knowing that, in spite of their voting for him, he was ineligible. If Labo has any relevance at all, it is that the vice-governorand not Leeshould be proclaimed, since in losing the election, Lee was, to paraphrase Labo again, obviously not the choice of the people of Sorsogon. This is the emphatic teaching of Labo: The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office. Second. As we have earlier declared Frivaldo to have seasonably reacquired his citizenship and inasmuch as he obtained the highest number of votes in the 1995 elections, henot Leeshould be proclaimed. Hence, Lees proclamation was patently erroneous and should now be corrected.

The Fifth Issue: Is Section 78 of the Election Code Mandatory? In G.R. No. 120295, Frivaldo claims that the assailed Resolution of the Comelec (Second Division) dated May 1, 1995 and the confirmatory en banc Resolution of May 11, 1995 disqualifying him for want of citizenship should be annulled because they were rendered beyond the fifteen (15) day period prescribed by Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code which reads as follows: Section 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy.A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided after notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election. (italics supplied.) This claim is now moot and academic inasmuch as these resolutions are deemed superseded by the subsequent ones issued by the Commission (First Division) on December 19, 1995, affirmed en banc63 on February 23, 1996, which both upheld his election. At any rate, it is obvious that Section 78 is merely directory as Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 authorizes the Commission to try and decide petitions for disqualifications even after the elections, thus: SEC. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case.Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an

election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. (italics supplied) Refutation of Mr. Justice Davides Dissent In his dissenting opinion, the esteemed Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. argues that President Aquinos memorandum dated March 27, 1987 should be viewed as a suspension (not a repeal, as urged by Lee) of P.D. 725. But whether it decrees a suspension or a repeal is a purely academic distinction because the said issuance is not a statute that can amend or abrogate an existing law. The existence and subsistence of P.D. 725 were recognized in the first Frivaldo case;64 viz, (u)nder CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and P.D. No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by x x x repatriation. He also contends that by allowing Frivaldo to register and to remain as a registered voter, the Comelec and in effect this Court abetted a mockery of our two previous judgments declaring him a non-citizen. We do not see such abetting or mockery. The retroactivity of his repatriation, as discussed earlier, legally cured whatever defects there may have been in his registration as a voter for the purpose of the 1995 elections. Such retroactivity did not change his disqualifications in 1988 and 1992, which were the subjects of such previous rulings. Mr. Justice Davide also believes that Quo Warranto is not the sole remedy to question the ineligibility of a candidate, citing the

Comelecs authority under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code allowing the denial of a certificate of candidacy on the ground of a false material representation therein as required by Section 74. Citing Loong, he then states his disagreement with our holding that Section 78 is merely directory. We really have no quarrel. Our point is that Frivaldo was in error in his claim in G.R. No. 120295 that the Comelec Resolutions promulgated on May 1, 1995 and May 11, 1995 were invalid because they were issued not later than fifteen days before the election as prescribed by Section 78. In dismissing the petition in G.R. No. 120295, we hold that the Comelec did not commit grave abuse of discretion because Section 6 of R.A. 6646 authorizes the Comelec to try and decide disqualifications even after the elections. In spite of his disagreement with us on this point, i.e., that Section 78 is merely directory, we note that just like us, Mr. Justice Davide nonetheless votes to DISMISS G.R. No. 120295. One other point. Loong, as quoted in the dissent, teaches that a petition to deny due course under Section 78 must be filed within the 25-day period prescribed therein. The present case however deals with the period during which the Comelec may decide such petition. And we hold that it may be decided even after the fifteen day period mentioned in Section 78. Here, we rule that a decision promulgated by the Comelec even after the elections is valid but Loong held that a petition filed beyond the 25-day period is out of time. There is no inconsistency nor conflict. Mr. Justice Davide also disagrees with the Courts holding that, given the unique factual circumstances of Frivaldo, repatriation may be given retroactive effect. He argues that such retroactivity dilutes our holding in the first Frivaldo case. But the first (and even the second Frivaldo) decision did not directly involve

repatriation as a mode of acquiring citizenship. If we may repeat, there is no question that Frivaldo was not a Filipino for purposes of determining his qualifications in the 1988 and 1992 elections. That is settled. But his supervening repatriation has changed his political statusnot in 1988 or 1992, but only in the 1995 elections. Our learned colleague also disputes our holding that Frivaldo was stateless prior to his repatriation, saying that informal renunciation or abandonment is not a ground to lose American citizenship. Since our courts are charged only with the duty of the determining who are Philippine nationals, we cannot rule on the legal question of who are or who are not Americans. It is basic in international law that a State determines ONLY those who are its own citizensnot who are the citizens of other countries.65 The issue here is: the Comelec made a finding of fact that Frivaldo was stateless and such finding has not been shown by Lee to be arbitrary or whimsical. Thus, following settled case law, such finding is binding and final. The dissenting opinion also submits that Lee who lost by chasmic margins to Frivaldo in all three previous elections, should be declared winner because Frivaldos ineligibility for being an American was publicly known. First, there is absolutely no empirical evidence for such public knowledge. Second, even if there is, such knowledge can be true post facto only of the last two previous elections. Third, even the Comelec and now this Court were/are still deliberating on his nationality before, during and after the 1995 elections. How then can there be such public knowledge? Mr. Justice Davide submits that Section 39 of the Local Government Code refers to the qualifications of elective local officials, i.e.,

candidates, and not elected officials, and that the citizenship qualification [under par. (a) of that section] must be possessed by candidates, not merely at the commencement of the term, but by election day at the latest. We see it differently. Section 39, par. (a) thereof speaks of elective local official while par. (b) to (f) refer to candidates. If the qualifications under par. (a) were intended to apply to candidates and not elected officials, the legislature would have said so, instead of differentiating par. (a) from the rest of the paragraphs. Secondly, if Congress had meant that the citizenship qualification should be possessed at election day or prior thereto, it would have specifically stated such detail, the same way it did in pars. (b) to (f) for other qualifications of candidates for governor, mayor, etc. Mr. Justice Davide also questions the giving of retroactive effect to Frivaldos repatriation on the ground, among others, that the law specifically provides that it is only after taking the oath of allegiance that applicants shall be deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. We do not question what the provision states. We hold however that the provision should be understood thus: that after taking the oath of allegiance the applicant is deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship, which reacquisition (or repatriation) is deemed for all purposes and intents to have retroacted to the date of his application therefor.

that the very wordings of P.D. 725 suggest non-retroactivity, were already taken up rather extensively earlier in this Decision. Mr. Justice Davide caps his paper with a clarion call: This Court must be the first to uphold the Rule of Law. We agreewe must all follow the rule of law. But that is NOT the issue here. The issue is how should the law be interpreted and applied in this case so it can be followed, so it can rule! At balance, the question really boils down to a choice of philosophy and perception of how to interpret and apply laws relating to elections: literal or liberal; the letter or the spirit; the naked provision or its ultimate purpose; legal syllogism or substantial justice; in isolation or in the context of social conditions; harshly against or gently in favor of the voters obvious choice. In applying election laws, it would be far better to err in favor of popular sovereignty than to be right in complex but little understood legalisms. Indeed, to inflict a thrice rejected candidate upon the electorate of Sorsogon would constitute unmitigated judicial tyranny and an unacceptable assault upon this Courts conscience. EPILOGUE In sum, we rule that the citizenship requirement in the Local Government Code is to be possessed by an elective official at the latest as of the time he is proclaimed and at the start of the term of office to which he has been elected. We further hold P.D. No. 725 to be in full force and effect up to the present, not having been suspended or repealed expressly nor impliedly at any time, and Frivaldos repatriation by virtue thereof to have been properly granted and thus valid and effective. Moreover, by reason of the

In any event, our so too argument regarding the literal meaning of the word elective in reference to Section 39 of the Local Autonomy Code, as well as regarding Mr. Justice Davides thesis

remedial or curative nature of the law granting him a new right to resume his political status and the legislative intent behind it, as well as his unique situation of having been forced to give up his citizenship and political aspiration as his means of escaping a regime he abhorred, his repatriation is to be given retroactive effect as of the date of his application therefor, during the pendency of which he was stateless, he having given up his U.S. nationality. Thus, in contemplation of law, he possessed the vital requirement of Filipino citizenship as of the start of the term of office of governor, and should have been proclaimed instead of Lee. Furthermore, since his reacquisition of citizenship retroacted to August 17, 1994, his registration as a voter of Sorsogon is deemed to have been validated as of said date as well. The foregoing, of course, are precisely consistent with our holding that lack of the citizenship requirement is not a continuing disability or disqualification to run for and hold public office. And once again, we emphasize herein our previous rulings recognizing the Comelecs authority and jurisdiction to hear and decide petitions for annulment of proclamations. This Court has time and again liberally and equitably construed the electoral laws of our country to give fullest effect to the manifest will of our people,66 for in case of doubt, his being still a Filipino. The holding in Aquino was subsequently nullified by the adoption of the 1987 Constitution (Art. VI, Sec. 3), which specified that the age qualification must be possessed on the day of the elections, and not on the day of the proclamation of the winners by the board of canvassers. On the other hand, Sec. 40 of Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991) which took effect on January 1, 1992, provides that those with dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective local position, and effectively overturns the

ruling in Aznar. But the point is that to the extent possible, and unless there exist provisions to the contrary, the laws have always been interpreted to give fullest effect to the political will. _________________ 66 In Espinosa vs. Aquino, (Electoral Case No. 9, Senate Electoral Tribunal [SET]), the election of the late Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. was upheld, despite his not being of the required age on the day of the election, although he celebrated his thirty-fifth birthday before his proclamation. Much later, in 1990, this Court held in Aznar vs. Comelec (185 SCRA 703, May 25, 1990) that even if Emilio Lito Osmea held an Alien Certificate of Registration as an American citizen, he was still not disqualified from occupying the local elective post of governor, since such certificate did not precludepolitical laws must be interpreted to give life and spirit to the popular mandate freely expressed through the ballot. Otherwise stated, legal niceties and technicalities cannot stand in the way of the sovereign will. Consistently, we have held: x x x (L)aws governing election contests must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere technical objections (citations omitted).67 The law and the courts must accord Frivaldo every possible protection, defense and refuge, in deference to the popular will. Indeed, this Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of giving effect to the sovereign will in order to ensure the survival of our democracy. In any action involving the possibility of a reversal of the popular electoral choice, this Court must exert utmost effort to

resolve the issues in a manner that would give effect to the will of the majority, for it is merely sound public policy to cause elective offices to be filled by those who are the choice of the majority. To successfully challenge a winning candidates qualifications, the petitioner must clearly demonstrate that the ineligibility is so patently antagonistic68 to constitutional and legal principles that overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the people, would ultimately create greater prejudice to the very democratic institutions and juristic traditions that our Constitution and laws so zealously protect and promote. In this undertaking, Lee has miserably failed. __________________ 67 Benito vs. Commission on Elections, 235 SCRA 436, 442 (August 17, 1994). 68 This antagonism was clearly present in the two earlier cases involving Frivaldo. See footnote No. 6. ___________________ In Frivaldos case, it would have been technically easy to find fault with his cause. The Court could have refused to grant retroactivity to the effects of his repatriation and hold him still ineligible due to his failure to show his citizenship at the time he registered as a voter before the 1995 elections. Or, it could have disputed the factual findings of the Comelec that he was stateless at the time of repatriation and thus hold his consequent dual citizenship as a disqualification from running for any elective local position. But the real essence of justice does not emanate from quibblings over patchwork legal technicality. It proceeds from the spirits gut

consciousness of the dynamic role of law as a brick in the ultimate development of the social edifice. Thus, the Court struggled against and eschewed the easy, legalistic, technical and sometimes harsh anachronisms of the law in order to evoke substantial justice in the larger social context consistent with Frivaldos unique situation approximating venerability in Philippine political life. Concededly, he sought American citizenship only to escape the clutches of the dictatorship. At this stage, we cannot seriously entertain any doubt about his loyalty and dedication to this country. At the first opportunity, he returned to this land, and sought to serve his people once more. The people of Sorsogon overwhelmingly voted for him three times. He took an oath of allegiance to this Republic every time he filed his certificate of candidacy and during his failed naturalization bid. And let it not be overlooked, his demonstrated tenacity and sheer determination to reassume his nationality of birth despite several legal setbacks speak more loudly, in spirit, in fact and in truth than any legal technicality, of his consuming intention and burning desire to re-embrace his native Philippines even now at the ripe old age of 81 years. Such loyalty to and love of country as well as nobility of purpose cannot be lost on this Court of justice and equity. Mortals of lesser mettle would have given up. After all, Frivaldo was assured of a life of ease and plenty as a citizen of the most powerful country in the world. But he opted, nay, single-mindedly insisted on returning to and serving once more his struggling but beloved land of birth. He therefore deserves every liberal interpretation of the law which can be applied in his favor. And in the final analysis, over and above Frivaldo himself, the indomitable people of Sorsogon must certainly deserve to be governed by a leader of their overwhelming choice.

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing: (1) The petition in G.R. No. 123755 is hereby DISMISSED. The assailed Resolutions of the respondent Commission are AFFIRMED. (2) The petition in G.R. No. 120295 is also DISMISSED for being moot and academic. In any event, it has no merit. No costs. SO ORDERED. Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr. and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur. Narvasa, C.J., No part. Had no participation in deliberations. Padilla, Regalado, Romero and Bellosillo, JJ., Pro hac vice. Davide, Jr., J., Please see dissenting opinion. Melo, Vitug and Kapunan, JJ., In the result.

I I agree with petitioner Lee that Frivaldos repatriation was void, but not on the ground that President Corazon C. Aquinos 27 March 1987 memorandum effectively repealed P.D. No. 725. In my view, the said memorandum only suspended the implementation of the latter decree by divesting the Special Committee on Naturalization of its authority to further act on grants of citizenship under LOI No. 270, as amended; P.D. No. 836, as amended; P.D. No. 1379; and any other related laws, orders, issuances and rules and regulations. A reading of the last paragraph of the memorandum can lead to no other conclusion, thus: In view of the foregoing, you as Chairman and members of the Special Committee on Naturalization, are hereby directed to cease and desist from undertaking any and all proceedings within your functional area of responsibility, as defined in Letter of Instruction No. 270 dated April 11, 1975, as amended, Presidential Decree No. 836 dated December 3, 1975, as amended, and Presidential Decree No. 1379 dated May 17, 1978, relative to the grant of citizenship under the said laws, and any other related laws, orders, issuances and rules and regulations. (emphasis supplied) It is self-evident that the underscored clause can only refer to those related to LOI No. 270, P.D. No. 836, and P.D. No. 1379. There is no doubt in my mind that P.D. No. 725 is one such related law as it involves the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by repatriation and designates the Special Committee on Naturalization created under LOI No. 270 to receive and act on (i.e., approve or disapprove) applications under the said decree. The power of President Aquino to suspend these issuances by virtue of the 27

Puno, J., See concurring opinion. Mendoza, J., No part. Close personal relation to parties. DISSENTING OPINION DAVIDE, JR., J.: After deliberating on the re-formulated issues and the conclusions reached by my distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, I find myself unable to join him.

March 1987 memorandum is beyond question considering that under Section 6, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution, she exercised legislative power until the Congress established therein convened on the fourth Monday of July 1987. I disagree with the view expressed in the ponencia that the memorandum of 27 March 1987 was merely a declaration of executive policy, and not an exercise of legislative power. LOI No. 270, P.D. No. 836, P.D. No. 1379 and any other related laws, such as P.D. No. 725, were issued by President Ferdinand E. Marcos in the exercise of his legislative powersnot executive power. These laws relate to the acquisition (by naturalization) and reacquisition (by repatriation) of Philippine citizenship, and in light of Sections 1(4) and 3, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution (naturalization and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship shall be in accordance with law), it is indubitable that these subjects are a matter of legislative prerogative. In the same vein, the creation of the Special Committee on Naturalization by LOI No. 270 and the conferment of the power to accept and act on applications under P.D. No. 725 are clearly legislative acts. Accordingly, the revocation of the cease and desist order and the reactivation or revival of the Committee can be done only by legislative fiat, i.e., by Congress, since the President had long lost his authority to exercise legislative power. Considering that Congress has not seen it fit to do so, the President cannot, in the exercise of executive power, lift the cease and desist order nor reactivate/reconstitute/revive the Committee. A multo fortiori, the Committee cannot validly accept Frivaldos application for repatriation and approve it. II

Even assuming arguendo that Frivaldos repatriation is valid, it did not cure his lack of citizenship. I depart from the view in the ponencia that Section 39 of the Local Government Code of 1991 does not specify the time when the citizenship requirement must be met, and that being the case, then it suffices that citizenship be possessed upon commencement of the term of the office involved; therefore, since Frivaldo reassumed his Philippine citizenship at 2:00 p.m. on 30 June 1995 and the term of office of Governor commenced at 12:00 noon of that day, he had, therefore, complied with the citizenship requirement. In the first place, Section 39 actually prescribes the qualifications of elective local officials and not those of an elected local official. These adjectives are not synonymous, as the ponencia seems to suggest. The first refers to the nature of the office, which requires the process of voting by the electorate involved; while the second refers to a victorious candidate for an elective office. The section unquestionably refers to electivenot electedlocal officials. It falls under Title Two entitled ELECTIVE OFFICIALS; under Chapter 1 entitled Qualifications and Election; and paragraph (a) thereof begins with the phrase An elective local official, while paragraphs (b) to (f) thereof speak of candidates. It reads as follows: SEC. 39. Qualifications.(a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.

(b) Candidates for the position of governor, vice governor or member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, or mayor, vice mayor or member of the sangguniang panlungsod of highly urbanized cities must be at least twenty-three (23) years of age on election day. (c) Candidates for the position of mayor or vice mayor of independent component cities, component cities, or municipalities must be at least twenty-one (21) years of age on election day. (d) Candidates for the position of member of the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan must be at least eighteen (18) years of age on election day. (e) Candidates for the position of punong barangay or member of the sangguniang barangay must be at least eighteen (18) years of age on election day. (f) Candidates for the sangguniang kabataan must be at least fifteen (15) years of age but not more than twenty-one (21) years of age on election day. (emphasis supplied) It is thus obvious that Section 39 refers to no other than the qualifications of candidates for elective local offices and their election. Hence, in no way may the section be construed to mean that possession of qualifications should be reckoned from the commencement of the term of office of the elected candidate. For another, it is not at all true that Section 39 does not specify the time when the citizenship requirement must be possessed. I submit that the requirement must be satisfied, or that Philippine citizenship must be possessed, not merely at the commencement of the term, but at an earlier time, the latest being election day itself. Section 39 is not at all ambiguous nor uncertain that it meant this to be, as one

basic qualification of an elective local official is that he be A REGISTERED VOTER IN THE BARANGAY, MUNICIPALITY, CITY OR PROVINCE x x x WHERE HE INTENDS TO VOTE. This simply means that he possesses all the qualifications to exercise the right of suffrage. The fundamental qualification for the exercise of this sovereign right is the possession of Philippine citizenship. No less than the Constitution makes it the first qualification, as Section 1, Article V thereof provides: Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the election . . . (emphasis supplied) And Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines (B.P. Blg. 881) expressly provides for the qualifications of a voter. Thus: SEC. 117. Qualifications of a voter.Every citizen of the Philippines, not otherwise disqualified by law, eighteen years of age or over, who shall have resided in the Philippines for one year and in the city or municipality wherein he proposes to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the election, may be a registered voter. (emphasis supplied) It is undisputed that this Court twice voided Frivaldos election as Governor in the 1988 and 1992 elections on the ground that for lack of Philippine citizenshiphe being a naturalized citizen of the United States of Americahe was DISQUALIFIED to be elected as such and to serve the position (Frivaldo vs. Commission on

Elections, 174 SCRA 245 [1989]; Republic of the Philippines vs. De la Rosa, 232 SCRA 785 [1994]). This disqualification inexorably nullified Frivaldos registration as a voter and declared it void ab initio. Our judgments therein were self-executory and no further act, e.g., a COMELEC order to cancel his registration as a voter or the physical destruction of his voters certificate, was necessary for the ineffectivity. Thus, he was never considered a registered voter for the elections of May 1992, and May 1995, as there is no showing that Frivaldo registered anew as a voter for the latter elections. Even if he didin obvious defiance of his decreed disqualification this did not make him a Filipino citizen, hence it was equally void ab initio. That he filed his certificate of candidacy for the 1995 elections and was even allowed to vote therein were of no moment. Neither act made him a Filipino citizen nor nullified the judgments of this Court. On the contrary, said acts made a mockery of our judgments. For the Court now to validate Frivaldos registration as a voter despite the judgments of disqualification is to modify the said judgments by making their effectivity and enforceability dependent on a COMELEC order cancelling his registration as a voter, or on the physical destruction of his certificate of registration as a voter which, of course, was never our intention. Moreover, to sanction Frivaldos registration as a voter would be to sacrifice substance in favor of form (the piece of paper that is the book of voters or list of voters or voters ID), and abet the COMELECs incompetence in failing to cancel Frivaldos registration and allowing him to vote. The second reason in the ponencia as to why the citizenship disqualification should be reckoned not from the date of the election nor the filing of the certificate of candidacy, but from the date of proclamation, is that the only available remedy to question

the ineligibility (or disloyalty) of a candidate is a petition for quo warranto which, under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code, may be filed only within ten days from proclamation and not earlier. I beg to differ. Clearly, quo warranto is not the sole remedy available to question a candidates ineligibility for public office. Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code allows the filing of a petition to deny due course to or cancel the certificate of candidacy on the ground that any material representation contained therein, as required by Section 74, is false. Section 74, in turn, requires that the person filing the certificate of candidacy must state, inter alia, that he is eligible for the office, which means that he has all the qualifications (including, of course, fulfilling the citizenship requirement) and none of the disqualifications as provided by law. The petition under Section 78 may be filed at any time not later than 25 days from the filing of the certificate of candidacy. The section reads in full as follows: SEC. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy.A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election. This remedy was recognized in Loong vs. Commission on Elections (216 SCRA 760, 768 [1992]), where this Court held:

Thus, if a person qualified to file a petition to disqualify a certain candidate fails to file the petition within the 25-day period prescribed by Section 78 of the Code for whatever reasons, the election laws do not leave him completely helpless as he has another chance to raise the disqualification of the candidate by filing a petition for quo warranto within ten (10) days from the proclamation of the results of the election, as provided under Section 253 of the Code. Section 1, Rule 21 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure similarly provides that any voter contesting the election of any regional, provincial or city official on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines may file a petition for quo warranto with the Electoral Contest Adjudication Department. The petition may be filed within ten (10) days from the date the respondent is proclaimed (Section 2).

xxx SECTION 3. Period to File Petition.The petition shall be filed any day after the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy but not later than the date of proclamation. While the validity of this rule insofar as it concerns petitions for disqualification on the ground of lack of all qualifications may be doubtful, its invalidity is not in issue here. In this connection, it would seem appropriate to take up the last issue grappled within the ponencia, viz., is Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code mandatory? The answer is provided in Loong. We also do not find merit in the contention of respondent Commission that in the light of the provisions of Sections 6 and 7 of Rep. Act No. 6646, a petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed even beyond the 25-day period prescribed by Section 78 of the Code, as long as it is filed within a reasonable time from the discovery of the ineligibility. Sections 6 and 7 of Rep. Act No. 6646 are here re-quoted: SEC. 6. Effect of Disqualification case.Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the

Likewise, Rule 25 of the Revised COMELEC Rules of Procedure allows the filing of a petition for disqualification on the ground of failure to possess all the qualifications of a candidate as provided by the Constitution or by existing laws, any day after the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy but not later than the date of proclamation. Sections 1 and 3 thereof provide: Rule 25Disqualification of Candidates SECTION 1. Grounds for Disqualification.Any candidate who does not possess all the qualifications of a candidate as provided for by the Constitution or by existing law or who commits any act declared by law to be grounds for disqualification may be disqualified from continuing as a candidate.

pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. SEC. 7. Petition to Deny Due Course To or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy.The procedure hereinabove provided shall apply to petitions to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy as provided in Section 78 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881. It will be noted that nothing in Sections 6 or 7 modifies or alters the 25-day period prescribed by Section 78 of the Code for filing the appropriate action to cancel a certificate of candidacy on account of any false representation made therein. On the contrary, said Section 7 affirms and reiterates Section 78 of the Code. We note that Section 6 refers only to the effects of a disqualification case which may be based on grounds other than that provided under Section 78 of the Code. But Section 7 of Rep. Act No. 6646 also makes the effects referred to in Section 6 applicable to disqualification cases filed under Section 78 of the Code. Nowhere in Sections 6 and 7 of Rep. Act No. 6646 is mention made of the period within which these disqualification cases may be filed. This is because there are provisions in the Code which supply the periods within which a petition relating to disqualification of candidates must be filed, such as Section 78, already discussed, and Section 253 on petitions for quo warranto. I then disagree with the asseveration in the ponencia that Section 78 is merely directory because Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 authorizes the COMELEC to try and decide petitions for disqualification even after elections. I submit that Section 6 refers to disqualifications under Sections 12 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code and

consequently modifies Section 72 thereof. As such, the proper court or the COMELEC are granted the authority to continue hearing the case after the election, and during the pendency of the case, suspend the proclamation of the victorious candidate, if the evidence against him is strong. Sections 12, 68, and 72 of the Code provide: SEC. 12. Disqualifications.Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty. The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had been removed or after the expiration of a period of five years from his service of sentence, unless within the same period he again becomes disqualified. xxx SEC. 68. Disqualifications.Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a) given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited

under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws. (Sec. 25, 1971 EC)

acquisition or re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship is not a right, but a mere privilege. Before the advent of P.D. No. 725, only the following could apply for repatriation: (a) Army, Navy, or Air Corps deserters; and (b) a woman who lost her citizenship by reason of her marriage to an alien after the death of her spouse (Section 2[2], C.A. No. 63). P.D. No. 725 expanded this to include Filipino women who lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens even before the death of their alien husbands, or the termination of their marital status and to natural-born Filipino citizens who lost their Philippine citizenship but subsequently desired to reacquire the latter. Turning now to the letter of the law, P.D. No. 725 expressly provides that repatriation takes effect only after taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, thus: . . . may reacquire Philippine citizenship . . . by applying with the Special Committee on Naturalization created by Letter of Instruction No. 270, and, if their applications are approved, taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, AFTER WHICH THEY SHALL BE DEEMED TO HAVE REACQUIRED PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP. (italicization and capitalization supplied for emphasis) Clearly then, the steps to reacquire Philippine citizenship by repat11riation under the decree are: (1) filing the application; (2) action by the committee; and (3) taking of the oath of allegiance if the application is approved. It is only UPON TAKING THE OATH OF ALLEGIANCE that the applicant is deemed ipso jure to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. If the decree had intended the

SEC. 72. Effects of disqualification cases and priority.The Commission and the courts shall give priority to cases of disqualification by reason of violation of this Act to the end that a final decision shall be rendered not later than seven days before the election in which the disqualification is sought. Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. Nevertheless, if for any reason, a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, his violation of the provisions of the preceding sections shall not prevent his proclamation and assumption to office. III Still assuming that the repatriation is valid, I am not persuaded by the arguments in support of the thesis that Frivaldos repatriation may be given retroactive effect, as such goes against the spirit and letter of P.D. No. 725. The spirit adheres to the principle that

oath taking to retroact to the date of the filing of the application, then it should not have explicitly provided otherwise. This theory in the ponencia likewise dilutes this Courts pronouncement in the first Frivaldo case that what reacquisition of Filipino citizenship requires is an act formally rejecting *the+ adopted state and reaffirming . . . allegiance to the Philippines. That act meant nothing less than taking of the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. If we now take this revision of doctrine to its logical end, then it would also mean that if Frivaldo had chosen and reacquired Philippine citizenship by naturalization or through Congressional action, such would retroact to the filing of the petition for naturalization or the bill granting him Philippine citizenship. This is a proposition which both the first and second Frivaldo cases soundly rejected. The other reason adduced in the ponencia in support of the proposition that P.D. No. 725 can be given retroactive effect is its alleged curative or remedial nature. Again, I disagree. In the first place, by no stretch of legal hermeneutics may P.D. No. 725 be characterized as a curative or remedial statute: Curative or remedial statutes are healing acts. They are remedial by curing defects and adding to the means of enforcing existing obligations. The rule in regard to curative statutes is that if the thing omitted or failed to be done, and which constitutes the defect sought to be removed or made harmless, is something the legislature might have dispensed with by a previous statute, it may do so by a subsequent one.

Curative statutes are intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities in existing laws, and curb certain evils. They are intended to enable a person to carry into effect that which they have designed and intended, but has failed of expected legal consequence by reason of some statutory disability or irregularity in their own action. They make valid that which, before the enactment of the statute, was invalid. (RUBEN E. AGPALO, Statutory Construction, Second ed. [1990], 270-271, citations omitted). P.D. No. 725 provides for the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship lost through the marriage of a Filipina to an alien and through naturalization in a foreign country of naturalborn Filipino citizens. It involves then the substantive, nay primordial, right of citizenship. To those for whom it is intended, it means, in reality, the acquisition of a new right, as the ponencia cannot but concede. Therefore, it may not be said to merely remedy or cure a defect considering that one who has lost Philippine citizenship does not have the right to reacquire it. As earlier stated, the Constitution provides that citizenship, once lost, may only be reacquired in the manner provided by law. Moreover, it has also been observed that: The idea is implicit from many of the cases that remedial statutes are statutes relating to procedure and not substantive rights. (Sutherland, Statutory Construction, Vol. 3, Third ed. [1943], 5704 at 74, citations omitted). If we grant for the sake of argument, however, that P.D. No. 725 is a curative or remedial statute, it would be an inexcusable error to give it a retroactive effect since it explicitly provides the date of its effectivity. Thus:

This Decree shall take effect immediately. Done in the city of Manila, this 5th day of June, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy five.

Nevertheless, if the retroactivity is to relate only to the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, then nothing therein supports such theory, for as the decree itself unequivocally provides, it is only after taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines that the applicant is DEEMED TO HAVE REACQUIRED PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP. IV Assuming yet again, for the sake of argument, that taking the oath of allegiance retroacted to the date of Frivaldos application for repatriation, the same could not be said insofar as it concerned the United States of America, of which he was a citizen. For under the laws of the United States of America, Frivaldo remained an American national until he renounced his citizenship and allegiance thereto at 2:00 p.m. on 30 June 1995, when he took his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. Section 401 of the Nationality Act of 1940 of the United States of America provides that a person who is a national of the United States of America, whether by birth or naturalization, loses his nationality by, inter alia, (b) Taking an oath or making an affirmation or other formal declaration of allegiance to a foreign state (SIDNEY KANSAS, U.S. Immigration Exclusion and Deportation and Citizenship of the United States of America. Third ed., [1948] 341-342). It follows then that on election day and until the hour of the commencement of

the term for which he was electednoon of 30 June 1995 as per Section 43 of the Local Government CodeFrivaldo possessed dual citizenship, viz., (a) as an American citizen; and (b) as a Filipino citizen through the adoption of the theory that the effects of his taking the oath of allegiance were retrospective. Hence, he was disqualified to run for Governor for yet another reason: possession of dual citizenship, in accordance with Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code. V The assertion in the ponencia that Frivaldo may be considered STATELESS on the basis of his claim that he had long renounced and had long abandoned his American citizenshiplong before May 8, 1985is untenable, for the following reasons: first, it is based on Frivaldos unproven, self-serving allegation; second, informal renunciation or abandonment is not a ground to lose American citizenship; and third, simply put, never did the status of a STATELESS person attach to Frivaldo. Statelessness, may be either de jure, which is the status of individuals stripped of their nationality by their former government without having an opportunity to acquire another; or de facto, which is the status of individuals possessed of a nationality whose country does not give them protection outside their own country, and who are commonly, albeit imprecisely, referred to as refugees (JORGE R. COQUIA, et al., Conflict of Laws Cases, Materials and Comments, 1995 ed., 290). Specifically, under Chapter 1, Article 1 of the United Nations Convention Regarding the Status of Stateless Persons (Philippine

Treaty Series, Compiled and Annotated by Haydee B. Yorac, vol. III, 363), a stateless person is defined as a person who is not considered as a national by any State under the operation of its law. However, it has not been shown that the United States of America ever ceased to consider Frivaldo its national at any time before he took his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on 30 June 1995. VI Finally, I find it in order to also express my view on the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno. I am absolutely happy to join him in his statement that *t+he sovereignty of our people is the primary postulate of the 1987 Constitution and that the said Constitution is more people-oriented, borne *as it is+ out of the 1986 people power EDSA revolution. I would even go further by saying that this Constitution is pro-God (Preamble), pro-people (Article II, Sections 1, 3, 4, 5, 9, 15, 16; Article XI, Section 1; Article XII, Sections 1, 6; Article XIII, Sections 1, 11, 15, 16, 18; Article XVI, Sections 5(2), 6), pro-Filipino (Article XII, Sections 1, 2, 10, 11, 12, 14; Article XIV, Sections 1, 4(2), 13; Article XVI, Section 11), pro-poor (Article II, Sections 9, 10, 18, 21; Article XII, Sections 1, 2(3); Article XIII, Sections 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 13), pro-life (Article II, Section 12), and pro-family (ArticleII, Section 12; Article XV). Nevertheless, I cannot be with him in carrying out the principle of sovereignty beyond what I perceive to be the reasonable constitutional parameters. The doctrine of peoples sovereignty is founded on the principles of democracy and republicanism and refers exclusively to the sovereignty of the people of the Philippines. Section 1 of Article II is quite clear on this, thus:

SECTION 1. The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them. And the Preamble makes it clear when it solemnly opens it with a clause We, the sovereign Filipino people . . . Thus, this sovereignty is an attribute of the Filipino people as one people, one body. That sovereign power of the Filipino people cannot be fragmentized by looking at it as the supreme authority of the people of any of the political subdivisions to determine their own destiny; neither can we convert and treat every fragment as the whole. In such a case, this Court would provide the formula for the division and destruction of the State and render the Government ineffective and inutile. To illustrate the evil, we may consider the enforcement of laws or the pursuit of a national policy by the executive branch of the government, or the execution of a judgment by the courts. If these are opposed by the overwhelming majority of the people of a certain province, or even a municipality, it would necessarily follow that the law, national policy, or judgment must not be enforced, implemented, or executed in the said province or municipality. More concretely, if, for instance, the vast majority of the people of Batanes rise publicly and take up arms against the Government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to the said Government or its laws, the territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any part thereof, or any body of land, naval, or other armed forces, or depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives, then those who did soand which are composed of the vast majority of the people of Batanesa political subdivisioncannot be prosecuted for or be held guilty of rebellion in violation of Article

134 of the Revised Penal Code because of the doctrine of peoples sovereignty. Indeed, the expansion of the doctrine of sovereignty by investing upon the people of a mere political subdivision that which the Constitution places in the entire Filipino people, may be disastrous to the Nation. So it is in this case if we follow the thesis in the concurring opinion. Thus, simply because Frivaldo had obtained a margin of 20,000 votes over his closest rival, Lee, i.e., a vast majority of the voters of Sorsogon had expressed their sovereign will for the former, then this Court must yield to that will and must, therefore, allow to be set aside, for Frivaldo, not just the laws on qualifications of candidates and elective officials and naturalization and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, but even the final and binding decisions of this Court affecting him. This Court must be the first to uphold the Rule of Law. I vote then to DISMISS G.R. No. 120295 and GRANT G.R. No. 123755. CONCURRING OPINION PUNO, J.: I concur with the path-breaking ponencia of Mr. Justice Panganiban which is pro-people and pierces the myopia of legalism. Upholding the sovereign will of the people which is the be-all and the end-all of republicanism, it rests on a foundation that will endure time and its tempest. The sovereignty of our people is the primary postulate of the 1987 Constitution. For this reason, it appears as the first in our declaration of principles and state policies. Thus, section 1 of Article

II of our fundamental law proclaims that *t+he Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them. The same principle served as the bedrock of our 1973 and 1935 Constitutions.1 It is one of the few principles whose truth has been cherished by the Americans as self-evident. Section 4, Article IV of the U.S. Constitution makes it a duty of the Federal government to guarantee to every state a republican form of government. With understandable fervor, the American authorities imposed republicanism as the cornerstone of our 1935 Constitution then being crafted by its Filipino framers.2 Borne out of the 1986 people power EDSA revolution, our 1987 Constitution is more people-oriented. Thus, section 4 of Article II provides as a state policy that the prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. Section 1, Article XI also provides that x x x public officers x x x must at all times be accountable to the people x x x. Sections 15 and 16 of Article XIII define the role and rights of peoples organizations. Section 5(2) of Article XVI mandates that *t+he state shall strengthen the patriotic spirit and nationalist consciousness of the military, and respect for peoples rights in the performance of their duty. And section 2 of Article XVII provides that amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative x x x. All these provisions and more are intended to breathe more life to the sovereignty of our people. To be sure, the sovereignty of our people is not a kabalistic principle whose dimensions are buried in mysticism. Its metes and bounds are familiar to the framers of our Constitutions. They knew that in its broadest sense, sovereignty is meant to

_______________ 1 The 1987 Constitution added the word democratic in the statement of the principle.

of government, sovereignty itself remains with the people, by whom and for whom all government exists and acts. In our Constitution, the people established a representative democracy as distinguished from a pure democracy. Justice Isagani A. Cruz explains:8 x x x A republic is a representative government, a government run by and for the people. It is not a pure democracy where the people govern themselves directly. The essence of republicanism is representation and renovation, the selection by the citizenry of a corps of public functionaries who derive their mandate from the people and act on their behalf, serving for a limited period only, after which they are replaced or retained, at the option of their principal. Obviously, a republican government is a responsible government whose officials hold and discharge their position as a public trust and shall, according to the Constitution, at all times be accountable to the people they are sworn to serve. The purpose of a republican government it is almost needless to state, is the promotion of the common welfare according to the will of the people themselves.

2 Section 24(a) of the Tydings-McDuffie Law which authorized the Filipino people to draft a Constitution in 1934 required that the constitution formulated and drafted shall be republican in form. This Court has observed that even before the Tydings-McDuffie Law, the Philippine Bill and the Jones Law have x x x extended the powers of a republican form of government modeled after that of the United States to the Philippines. Roa v. Collector of Customs, 23 Phil. 315, 340 [1912]; Severino v. Gov. General, 16 Phil. 366, 383 [1910]; US v. Bull, 15 Phil. 7, 27 [1910]. be supreme, the jus summi imperu, the absolute right to govern.3 Former Dean Vicente Sinco4 states that an essential quality of sovereignty is legal omnipotence, viz: Legal theory establishes certain essential qualities inherent in the nature of sovereignty. The first is legal omnipotence. This means that the sovereign is legally omnipotent and absolute in relation to other legal institutions. It has the power to determine exclusively its legal competence. Its powers are original, not derivative. It is the sole judge of what it should do at any given time.5 Citing Barker,6 he adds that a more amplified definition of sovereignty is that of a final power of final legal adjustment of all legal issues. The U.S. Supreme Court expressed the same thought in the landmark case of Yick Wo v. Hopkins,7 where it held that x x x sovereignty itself is, of course, not subject to law, for it is the author and source of law; but in our system, while sovereign powers are delegated to the agencies

I appreciate the vigorous dissent of Mr. Justice Davide. I agree that sovereignty is indivisible but it need not always be exercised by the people together, all the time.9 for this reason, the Constitution and our laws provide when the entire electorate or only some of them can elect those who make our laws and those who execute our laws. Thus, the entire electorate votes for our senators but only our district electorates vote for our congressmen, only our provincial

electorates vote for the members of our provincial boards, only our city electorates vote for our city councilors, and only our municipal electorates vote for our councilors. Also, the entire electorate votes for our President and Vice-President but only our provincial electorates vote for our governors, only our city electorates vote for our mayors, and only our municipal electorates vote for our mayors. By defining and delimiting the classes of voters who can exercise the sovereignty of the people in a given election, it cannot be claimed that said sovereignty has been fragmented. It is my respectful submission that the issue in the case at bar is not whether the people of Sorsogon should be given the right to defy the law by allowing Frivaldo to sit as their governor. Rather, the issue is: whether the will of the voters of Sorsogon clearly choosing Frivaldo as governor ought to be given a decisive value considering the uncertainty of the law on when a candidate ought to satisfy the qualification of citizenship. The uncertainty of law and jurisprudence, both here and abroad, on this legal issue cannot be denied. In the __________________ 3 Words and Phrases, Vol. 39 A., p. 68 citing Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kan. R. Co., 33 F. 900, 906. 4 Dean of the UP College of Law; later President of U.P., and Delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention. 5 Sinco, Philippine Political Law, Principles and Concepts, 1954 ed., p. 22. 6 Barker, Principles of Social and Political Theory, p. 59 (1952 ed.).

7 118 US 356. 8 Cruz, Philippine Political Law, p. 49, [1991 ed.]. 9 Sinco, op. cit., pp. 23-24. ___________________ United States,10 there are two (2) principal schools of thought on the matter. One espouses the view that a candidate must possess the qualifications for office at the time of his election. The other ventures the view that the candidate should satisfy the qualifications at the time he assumes the powers of the office. I am unaware of any Philippine decision that has squarely resolved this difficult question of law. The ponencia of Mr. Justice Panganiban adhered to the second school of thought while Mr. Justice Davide dissents. I emphasize the honest-to-goodness difference in interpreting our law on the matter for this is vital to dispel the fear of Mr. Justice Davide that my opinion can bring about ill effects of the State. Mr. Justice Davides fear is based on the assumption that Frivaldo continues to be disqualified and we cannot allow him to sit as governor without transgressing the law. I do not concede this assumption for as stressed above, courts have been sharply divided by this mind boggling issue. Given this schism, I do not see how we can derogate on the sovereignty of the people by according more weight to the votes of the people of Sorsogon.

Mr. Justice Davide warns that should the people of Batanes stage a rebellion, we cannot prosecute them because of the doctrine of peoples sovereignty. With due respect, the analogy is not appropriate. In his hypothetical case, rebellion is concededly a crime, a violation of Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, an offense against the sovereignty of our people. In the case at bar, it cannot be held with certitude that the people of Sorsogon violated the law by voting for Frivaldo as governor. Frivaldos name was in the list of candidates allowed by COMELEC to run for governor. At that time too, Frivaldo was taking all steps to establish his Filipino citizenship. And even our jurisprudence has not settled the issue when a candidate should possess the qualification of citizenship. Since the meaning of the law is arguable then and now, I cannot imagine how it will be disastrous for the State if we tilt the balance in the case at bar in favor of the people of ________________ 10 3 AM JUR 2d 889-890; 63 AM JUR 2d 653; 67 CJS 926. Sorsogon. In sum, I respectfully submit that the sovereign will of our people should be resolutory of the case at bar which is one of its kind, unprecedented in our political history. For three (3) times, Frivaldo ran as governor of the province of Sorsogon. For two (2) times, he was disqualified on the ground of citizenship. The people of Sorsogon voted for him as their governor despite his disqualification. The people never waffled in their support for Frivaldo. In 1988, they gave him a winning margin of 27,000; in 1992, they gave him a winning spread of 57,000; in 1995, he posted

a margin of 20,000. Clearly then, Frivaldo is the overwhelming choice of the people of Sorsogon. In election cases, we should strive to align the will of the legislature as expressed in its law with the will of the sovereign people as expressed in their ballots. For law to reign, it must respect the will of the people. For in the eloquent prose of Mr. Justice Laurel, x x x an enfranchised citizen is a particle of popular sovereignty and is the ultimate source of established authority.11 The choice of the governed on who shall be their governor merits the highest consideration by all agencies of government. In cases where the sovereignty of the people is at stake, we must not only be legally right but also politically correct. We cannot fail by making the people succeed. Petitions in G.R. No. 123755 and G.R. No. 120295 dismissed. Resolutions affirmed. Note.Only Filipino citizens can run and be elected to public office. (Republic vs. De la Rosa, 232 SCRA 785 [1994]) o0o _______________ 11 Moya v. del Fierro, 69 Phil. 199. [Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections, 257 SCRA 727(1996)]

G.R. No. 119976. September 18, 1995.* IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CIRILO ROY MONTEJO, respondents.
Election Law; Domicile; Residence; Words and Phrases; Residence, for the purpose of meeting the qualification for an elective position, has a settled meaning in our jurisdiction.A perusal of the Resolution of the COMELECS Second Division reveals a startling confusion in the application of settled concepts of Domicile and Residence in election law. While the COMELEC seems to be in agreement with the general proposition that for the purposes of election law, residence is synonymous with domicile, the Resolution reveals a tendency to substitute or mistake the concept of domicile for actual residence, a conception not intended for the purpose of determining a candidates qualifications for election to the House of Representatives as required by the 1987 Constitution. As it were, residence, for the purpose of meeting the qualification for an elective position, has a settled meaning in our jurisdiction. _______________ 33 People v. Jalon, 215 SCRA 680 [1992]; Magat v. People, 201 SCRA 21 [1991]; People v. Marti, 193 SCRA 57 [1991]. * EN BANC. Same; Same; Same; Same; Domicile includes the twin elements of the fact of residing or physical presence in a fixed place and animus manendi, or the intention of returning there permanently.

Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that *f+or the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons is their place of habitual residence. In Ong vs. Republic this court took the concept of domicile to mean an individuals permanent home, a place to which, whenever absent for business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent. Based on the foregoing, domicile includes the twin elements of the fact of residing or physical presence in a fixed place and animus manendi, or the intention of returning there permanently. Same; Same; Same; Same; Domicile and Residence, Distinguished. Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an individual to a certain place. It is the physical presence of a person in a given area, community or country. The essential distinction between residence and domicile in law is that residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which the resident has taken up his abode ends. One may seek a place for purposes such as pleasure, business, or health. If a persons intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is established it is residence. It is thus, quite perfectly normal for an individual to have different residences in various places. However, a person can only have a single domicile, unless, for various reasons, he successfully abandons his domicile in favor of another domicile of choice.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; As these concepts have evolved in our election law, what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for election purposes is used synonymously with

domicile.For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the peculiar criteria of political laws. As these concepts have evolved in our election law, what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for election purposes is used synonymously with domicile. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Constitutional Law; When the Constitution speaks of residence in election law, it actually means only domicile.The deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the residence qualification for certain elective positions have placed beyond doubt the principle that when the Constitution speaks of residence in election law, it actually means only domicile. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the constitutions residency qualification requirement.It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the constitutions residency qualification requirement. The said statement becomes material only when there is or appears to be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It would be plainly ridiculous for a candidate to deliberately and knowingly make a statement in a certificate of candidacy which would lead to his or her disqualification. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The honest mistake in the certificate of candidacy regarding the period of residency does not negate the fact of residence in a congressional district if such fact is established by means more convincing than a mere entry on a piece

of paper.Having been forced by private respondent to register in her place of actual residence in Leyte instead of petitioners claimed domicile, it appears that petitioner had jotted down her period of stay in her actual residence in a space which required her period of stay in her legal residence or domicile. The juxtaposition of entries in Item 7 and Item 8the first requiring actual residence and the second requiring domicilecoupled with the circumstances surrounding petitioners registration as a voter in Tolosa obviously led to her writing down an unintended entry for which she could be disqualified. This honest mistake should not, however, be allowed to negate the fact of residence in the First District if such fact were established by means more convincing than a mere entry on a piece of paper. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; An individual does not lose his domicile even if he has lived and maintained residences in different places.We have stated, many times in the past, that an individual does not lose his domicile even if he has lived and maintained residences in different places. Residence, it bears repeating, implies a factual relationship to a given place for various purposes. The absence from legal residence or domicile to pursue a profession, to study or to do other things of a temporary or semi-permanent nature does not constitute loss of residence. Thus, the assertion by the COMELEC that she could not have been a resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to the time she filed her certificate of candidacy because she became a resident of many places flies in the face of settled jurisprudence in which this Court carefully made distinctions between (actual) residence and domicile for election law purposes.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Domicile of Origin; A minor follows the domicile of his parents.A minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once acquired is retained until a new one is gained, it follows that in spite of the fact of petitioners being born in Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile of origin by operation of law. This domicile was not established only when she reached the age of eight years old, when her father brought his family back to Leyte contrary to private respondents averments. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Requisites for a change of domicile.Domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate: 1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile; 2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and 3. Acts which correspond with the purpose. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; To effect an abandonment requires the voluntary act of relinquishing former domicile with an intent to supplant the former domicile with one of her own choosing (domicilium voluntarium).In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin should be deemed to continue. Only with evidence showing concurrence of all three requirements can the presumption of continuity or residence be rebutted, for a change of residence requires an actual and deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two legal residences at the same time. In the case at bench, the evidence adduced by private respondent plainly lacks the degree of persuasiveness required to convince this court that an abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of choice indeed occurred. To effect an abandonment requires the voluntary act of relinquishing petitioners former domicile with an intent to

supplant the former domicile with one of her own choosing (domicilium voluntarium). Same; Same; Same; Same; Marriages; Husband and Wife; The presumption that the wife automatically gains the husbands domicile by operation of law upon marriage cannot be inferred from the use of the term residence in Article 110 of the Civil Code because the Civil Code is one area where the two concepts are well delineated.In this connection, it cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952. For there is a clearly established distinction between the Civil Code concepts of domicile and residence. The presumption that the wife automatically gains the husbands domicile by operation of law upon marriage cannot be inferred from the use of the term residence in Article 110 of the Civil Code because the Civil Code is one area where the two concepts are well delineated. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A survey of jurisprudence yields nothing which would suggest that the female spouse automatically loses her domicile of origin in favor of the husbands choice of residence upon marriage.A survey of jurisprudence relating to Article 110 or to the concepts of domicile or residence as they affect the female spouse upon marriage yields nothing which would suggest that the female spouse automatically loses her domicile of origin in favor of the husbands choice of residence upon marriage.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is illogical to conclude that Art. 110 of the Civil Code refers to domicile and not to residence.The duty to live together can only be fulfilled if the husband and wife are physically together. This takes into account the situations where the couple has many residences (as in the case of petitioner). If the husband has to stay in or transfer to any one of their residences, the wife should necessarily be with him in order that they may live together. Hence, it is illogical to conclude that Art. 110 refers to domicile and not to residence. Otherwise, we shall be faced with a situation where the wife is left in the domicile while the husband, for professional or other reasons, stays in one of their (various) residences. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; What petitioner gained upon marriage was actual residenceshe did not lose her domicile of origin.Parenthetically when Petitioner was married to then Congressman Marcos, in 1954, petitioner was obligedby virtue of Article 110 of the Civil Codeto follow her husbands actual place of residence fixed by him. The problem here is that at that time, Mr. Marcos had several places of residence, among which were San Juan, Rizal and Batac, Ilocos Norte. There is no showing which of these places Mr. Marcos did fix as his familys residence. But assuming that Mr. Marcos had fixed any of these places as the conjugal residence, what petitioner gained upon marriage was actual residence. She did not lose her domicile of origin. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Family Code; The common law concept of matrimonial domicile appears to have been incorporated, as a result of our jurisprudential experiences after the drafting of the Civil Code of 1950, into the New Family Code.On the other hand, the common law concept of matrimonial domicile

appears to have been incorporated, as a result of our jurisprudential experiences after the drafting of the Civil Code of 1950, into the New Family Code. To underscore the difference between the intentions of the Civil Code and the Family Code drafters, the term residence has been supplanted by the term domicile in an entirely new provision (Art. 69) distinctly different in meaning and spirit from that found in Article 110. The provision recognizes revolutionary changes in the concept of womens rights in the intervening years by making the choice of domicile a product of mutual agreement between the spouses. Same; Same; Same; The term residence may mean one thing in civil law (or under the Civil Code) and quite another thing in political law.Without as much belaboring the point, the term residence may mean one thing in civil law (or under the Civil Code) and quite another thing in political law. What stands clear is that insofar as the Civil Code is concerned-affecting the rights and obligations of husband and wife-the term residence should only be interpreted to mean actual residence. The inescapable conclusion derived from this unambiguous civil law delineation therefore, is that when petitioner married the former President in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home, not a domicilium necessarium. Same; Statutory Construction; Mandatory and directory provisions; It is a settled doctrine that a statute requiring rendition of judgment within a specified time is generally construed to be merely directory.It is a settled doctrine that a statute requiring rendition of judgment within a specified time is generally construed to be merely directory, so that non-compliance with them does not

invalidate the judgment on the theory that if the statute had intended such result it would have clearly indicated it. Same; Same; Same; The difference between a mandatory and a directory provision is often made on grounds of necessity.The difference between a mandatory and a directory provision is often made on grounds of necessity. Adopting the same view held by several American authorities, this court in Marcelino v. Cruz held that: The difference between a mandatory and directory provision is often determined on grounds of expediency, the reason being that less injury results to the general public by disregarding than enforcing the letter of the law. Same; Jurisdiction; Electoral Tribunals; The HRETs jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of members of Congress begins only after a candidate has become a member of the House of Representatives.As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunals supposed assumption of jurisdiction over the issue of petitioners qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections, suffice it to say that HRETS jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections return and qualifications of members of Congress begins only after a candidate has become a member of the House of Representatives. Petitioner not being a member of the House of Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at this point has no jurisdiction over the question. ROMERO, J., Separate Opinion : Husband and Wife; A widow can no longer be bound by the domicile of the departed husband, if at all she was beforeand, exercising free will, she may opt to reestablish her domicile of

origin.I submit that a widow, like the petitioner and others similarly situated, can no longer be bound by the domicile of the departed husband, if at all she was before. Neither does she automatically revert to her domicile of origin, but exercising free will, she may opt to reestablish her domicile of origin. In returning to Tacloban and subsequently, to Barangay Olot, Tolosa, both of which are located in the First District of Leyte, petitioner amply demonstrated by overt acts, her election of a domicile of choice, in this case, a reversion to her domicile of origin. Added together, the time when she set up her domicile in the two places sufficed to meet the one-year requirement to run as Representatives of the First District of Leyte. PUNO, J., Concurring Opinion : Husband and Wife; It is not the mere fact of marriage but the deliberate choice of a different domicile by the husband that will change the domicile of a wife from what it was prior to their marriage.It is not, therefore, the mere fact of marriage but the deliberate choice of a different domicile by the husband that will change the domicile of a wife from what it was prior to their marriage. The domiciliary decision made by the husband in the exercise of the right conferred by Article 110 of the Civil Code binds the wife. Any and all acts of a wife during her coverture contrary to the domiciliary choice of the husband cannot change in any way the domicile legally fixed by the husband. These acts are void not only because the wife lacks the capacity to choose her domicile but also because they are contrary to law and public policy. Same; Family Code; In light of the Family Code which abrogated the inequality between husband and wife as started and perpetuated by

the common law, there is no reason in espousing the anomalous rule that the wife still retains the domicile of her dead husband.In light of the Family Code which abrogated the inequality between husband and wife as started and perpetuated by the common law, there is no reason in espousing the anomalous rule that the wife still retains the domicile of her dead husband. Article 110 of the Civil Code which provides the statutory support for this stance has been repealed by Article 69 of the Family Code. By its appeal, it becomes a dead-letter law, and we are not free to resurrect it by giving it further effect in any way or manner such as by ruling that the petitioner is still bound by the domiciliary determination of her dead husband. Same; Constitutional Law; Equal Protection Clause; It can hardly be doubted that the common law imposition on a married woman of her dead husbands domicile even beyond his grave is patently discriminatory to womenit cannot survive a constitutional challenge.Aside from reckoning with the Family Code, we have to consider our Constitution and its firm guarantees of due process and equal protection of law. It can hardly be doubted that the common law imposition on a married woman of her dead husbands domicile even beyond his grave is patently discriminatory to women. It is a gender-based discrimination and is not rationally related to the objective of promoting family solidarity. It cannot survive a constitutional challenge. Same; Domicile; The better stance is to rule that petitioner reacquired her Tacloban domicile upon the death of her husband in 1989.Prescinding from these premises, I respectfully submit that the better stance is to rule that petitioner reacquired her Tacloban domicile upon the death of her husband in 1989. This is the

necessary consequence of the view that petitioners Batac dictated domicile did not continue after her husbands death; otherwise, she would have no domicile and that will violate the universal rule that no person can be without a domicile at any point of time. This stance also restores the right of petitioner to choose her domicile before it was taken away by Article 110 of the Civil Code, a right now recognized by the Family Code and protected by the Constitution. Constitutional Law; Election Law; Statutory Construction; Political Harassment; Equal Protection; There is but one Constitution for all Filipinospetitioner cannot be adjudged by a different Constitution, and the worst way to interpret the Constitution is to inject in its interpretation bile and bitterness.All these attempts to misuse our laws and legal processes are forms of rank harassments and invidious discriminations against petitioner to deny her equal access to a public office. We cannot commit any hermeneutic violence to the Constitution by torturing the meaning of equality, the end result of which will allow the harassment and discrimination of petitioner who has lived a controversial life, a past of alternating light and shadow. There is but one Constitution for all Filipinos. Petitioner cannot be adjudged by a different Constitution, and the worst way to interpret the Constitution is to inject in its interpretation, bile and bitterness. FRANCISCO, J., Concurring Opinion : Husband and Wife; Domicile; Petitioner reverted to her original domicile upon her husbands death without even signifying her intention to that effect.Tacloban, Leyte, is petitioners domicile of origin which was involuntarily supplanted with another, i.e., Batac,

Ilocos Norte, upon her marriage in 1954 with then Congressman Marcos. By legal fiction she followed the domicile of her husband. In my view, the reason for the law is for the spouses to fully and effectively perform their marital duties and obligations to one another. The question of domicile, however, is not affected by the fact that it was the legal or moral duty of the individual to reside in a given place (28 C.J.S. 11). Thus, while the wife retains her marital domicile so long as the marriage subsists, she automatically loses it upon the latters termination, for the reason behind the law then ceases. Otherwise, petitioner, after her marriage was ended by the death of her husband, would be placed in a quite absurd and unfair situation of having been freed from all wifely obligations yet made to hold on to one which no longer serves any meaningful purpose. It is my view therefore that petitioner reverted to her original domicile of Tacloban, Leyte upon her husbands death without even signifying her intention to that effect. It is for the private respondent to prove, not for petitioner to disprove, that petitioner has effectively abandoned Tacloban, Leyte for Batac, Ilocos Norte or for some other place/s. PADILLA, J., Dissenting Opinion : Election Law; The one year residence period is crucial regardless of whether or not the term residence is to be synonymous with domicilethe candidates intent and actual presence in one district must in all situations satisfy the length of time prescribed by the fundamental law.To my mind, the one year residence period is crucial regardless of whether or not the term residence is to be synonymous with domicile. In other words, the candidates intent and actual presence in one district must in all situations satisfy the length of time prescribed by the fundamental law. And this, because

of a definite Constitutional purpose. He must be familiar with the environment and problems of a district he intends to represent in Congress and the one- year residence in said district would be the minimum period to acquire such familiarity, if not versatility. Same; Statutes; R.A. 6646; The Court should re-examine and consequently abandon the doctrine in the Jun Labo case.It stands to reason that Section 6 of RA 6646 does not make the second placer the winner simply because a winning candidate is disqualified, but that the law considers him as the candidate who had obtained the highest number of votes as a result of the votes cast for the disqualified candidate not being counted or considered. As this law clearly reflects the legislative policy on the matter, then there is no reason why this Court should not re-examine and consequently abandon the doctrine in the Jun Labo case. It has been stated that the qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility most especially when it is mandated by no less than the Constitution. REGALADO, J., Dissenting Opinion : Husband and Wife; Domicile; In the absence of affirmative evidence to the contrary, the presumption is that a wifes domicile or legal residence follows that of her husband and will continue after his death.Thus, the American rule is likewise to the effect that while after the husbands death the wife has the right to elect her own domicile, she nevertheless retains the last domicile of her deceased husband until she makes an actual change. In the absence of affirmative evidence, to the contrary, the presumption is that a

wifes domicile or legal residence follows that of her husband and will continue after his death. DAVIDE, JR., J., Dissenting Opinion : Husband and Wife; Domicile; Evidence; Burden of Proof; Since the widow is presumed to retain her deceased husbands domicile until she exercises her revived power to acquire her own domicile, the burden is upon her to prove that she has exercised her right to acquire her own domicile.The majority opinion also disregards a basic rule in evidence that he who asserts a fact or the affirmative of an issue has the burden of proving it (Imperial Victory Shipping Agency vs. NLRC, 200 SCRA 178 [1991]; P.T. Cerna Corp. vs. Court of Appeals , 221 SCRA 19 [1993]). Having admitted marriage to the then Congressman Marcos, the petitioner could not deny the legal consequence thereof on the change of her domicile to that of her husband. The majority opinion rules or at least concludes that *b+y operation of law (domicilium necesarium ), her legal domicile at the time of her marriage automatically became Batac, Ilocos Norte. That conclusion is consistent with Article 110 of the Civil Code. Since she is presumed to retain her deceased husbands domicile until she exercises her revived power to acquire her own domicile, the burden is upon her to prove that she has exercised her right to acquire her own domicile. She miserably failed to discharge that burden. VITUG, J., Separate Opinion : Election Law; Electoral Tribunals; Commission on Elections; Jurisdiction; The COMELECs jurisdiction, in the case of congressional elections, ends when the jurisdiction of the Electoral

Tribunal concerned begins.The COMELECs jurisdiction, in the case of congressional elections, ends when the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal concerned begins. It signifies that the protestee must have theretofore been duly proclaimed and has since become a member of the Senate or the House of Representatives. The question can be asked on whether or not the proclamation of a candidate is just a ministerial function of the Commission on Elections dictated solely on the number of votes cast in an election exercise. I believe, it is not. A ministerial duty is an obligation the performance of which, being adequately defined, does not allow the use of further judgment or discretion. The COMELEC, in its particular case, is tasked with the full responsibility of ascertaining all the facts and conditions such as may be required by law before a proclamation is properly done. Same; Same; Separation of Powers; The Court should refrain from any undue encroachment on the ultimate exercise of authority by the Electoral Tribunals on matters which, by no less than a constitutional fiat, are explicitly within their exclusive domain.The Court, on its part, should, in my view at least, refrain from any undue encroachment on the ultimate exercise of authority by the Electoral Tribunals on matters which, by no less than a constitutional fiat, are explicitly within their exclusive domain. The nagging question, if it were otherwise, would be the effect of the Courts peremptory pronouncement on the ability of the Electoral Tribunal to later come up with its own judgment in a contest relating to the election, returns and qualification of its members. MENDOZA, J., Separate Opinion :

Election Law; Commission on Elections; Jurisdiction; The COMELEC has no power to disqualify candidates on the ground that they lack eligibility for the office to which they seek to be electedthe qualifications of candidates may be questioned only in the event they are elected, by filing a petition for quo warranto or an election protest, in the appropriate forum.In my view the issue in this case is whether the Commission on Elections has the power to disqualify candidates on the ground that they lack eligibility for the office to which they seek to be elected. I think that it has none and that the qualifications of candidates may be questioned only in the event they are elected, by filing a petition for quo warranto or an election protest in the appropriate forum, not necessarily in the COMELEC but, as in this case, in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. That the parties in this case took part in the proceedings in the COMELEC is of no moment. Such proceedings were unauthorized and were not rendered valid by their agreement to submit their dispute to that body. Same; Same; Same; The Omnibus Election Code, by its silence about a pre-proclamation remedy based on a candidates qualifications, underscores the policy of not authorizing any inquiry into the qualifications of candidates unless they have been elected.By providing in 253 for the remedy of quo warranto for determining an elected officials qualifications after the results of elections are proclaimed, while being conspicuously silent about a preproclamation remedy based on the same ground, the Omnibus Election Code, or OEC, by its silence underscores the policy of not authorizing any inquiry into the qualifications of candidates unless they have been elected.

Same; Same; Same; Administrative Law; The lack of provision for declaring the ineligibility of candidates cannot be supplied by a mere rulesuch an act is equivalent to the creation of a cause of action which is a substantive matter which the COMELEC, in the exercise of its rulemaking power cannot do.Apparently realizing the lack of an authorized proceeding for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, the COMELEC amended its rules on February 15, 1993 so as to provide in Rule 25, 1 the following: Grounds for disqualification.Any candidate who does not possess all the qualifications of a candidate as provided for by the Constitution or by existing law or who commits any act declared by law to be grounds for disqualification may be disqualified from continuing as a candidate. The lack of provision for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, however, cannot be supplied by a mere rule. Such an act is equivalent to the creation of a cause of action which is a substantive matter which the COMELEC, in the exercise of its rulemaking power under Art. IX, A, 6 of the Constitution, cannot do. It is noteworthy that the Constitution withholds from the COMELEC even the power to decide cases involving the right to vote, which essentially involves an inquiry into qualifications based on age, residence and citizenship of voters. (Art. IX, C, 2[3]). Same; Same; Same; Proceedings for disqualification and for a declaration of ineligibility, distinguished; The assimilation in Rule 25 of the COMELEC rules of grounds for ineligibility into grounds for disqualification is contrary to the evident intention of the law.The assimilation in Rule 25 of the COMELEC rules of grounds for ineligibility into grounds for disqualification is contrary to the evident intention of the law. For not only in their grounds but also in their consequences are proceedings for disqualification

different from those for a declaration of ineligibility. Disqualification proceedings, as already stated, are based on grounds specified in 12 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code and in 40 of the Local Government Code and are for the purpose of barring an individual from becoming a candidate or from continuing as a candidate for public office. In a word, their purpose is to eliminate a candidate from the race either from the start or during its progress. Ineligibility, on the other hand, refers to the lack of the qualifications prescribed in the Constitution or the statutes for holding public office and the purpose of the proceedings for declaration of ineligibility is to remove the incumbent from office. SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Estelito P. Mendoza for petitioner. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr. and Gracelda N. Andres for private respondent. KAPUNAN, J.: A constitutional provision should be construed as to give it effective operation and suppress the mischief at which it is aimed.1 The 1987 Constitution mandates that an aspirant for election to the House of Representatives be a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the election.2 The mischief which this provisionreproduced verbatim from the 1973 Constitution seeks to prevent is the possibility of a stranger or newcomer unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community and

not identified with the latter, from an elective office to serve that community.3 Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte with the Provincial Election Supervisor on March 8, 1995, providing the following information in item No. 8:4 RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION:_ _ _ _ _ _ Years and seven Months On March 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and a candidate for the same position, filed a Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification5 with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. In his petition, private respondent contended that Mrs. Marcos lacked the Constitutions one year residency requirement for candidates to the House of Representatives on the evidence of declarations made by her in Voter Registration Record 94-No. 33497726 and in her Certificate of Candidacy. He prayed that an order be issued declaring (petitioner) disqualified and canceling the certificate of candidacy.7 _______________ 2 CONST, art. VI, states: Sec. 6. No person shall be a member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age,

able to read and write, and except the party-list representative, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election. See, Jarrolt v. Mabberly, supra, note 1. 3 Gallego vs. Vera, 73 Phil. 453 (1941). 4 Rollo, p. 114, Annex D. 5 Rollo, p. 110, Annex D. 6 Rollo, p. 113. ______________________ On March 29, 1995, petitioner filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, changing the entry seven months to since childhood in item No. 8 of the amended certificate.8 On the same day, the Provincial Election Supervisor of Leyte informed petitioner that:

Consequently, petitioner filed the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy with the COMELECs Head Office in Intramuros, Manila on March 31, 1995. Her Answer to private respondents petition in SPA No. 95-009 was likewise filed with the head office on the same day. In said Answer, petitioner averred that the entry of the word seven in her original Certificate of Candidacy was the result of an honest misinterpretation10 which she sought to rectify by adding the words since childhood in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy and that she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence.11 Impugning respondents motive in filing _______________ 7 Rollo, p. 111. 8 Rollo, p. 115, Annex E. 9 Signed by Virgilio S. Oledan, Provincial Election Supervisor IV, Leyte; Rollo, p. 116, Annex F. 10 Rollo, p. 117, Annex G. Petitioner explained the circumstances surrounding the filling up of the original certificate thus:

[T]his office cannot receive or accept the aforementioned Certificate of Candidacy on the ground that it is filed out of time, the deadline for the filing of the same having already lapsed on March 20, 1995. The Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy should have been filed on or before the March 20, 1995 deadline.9

1. On March 8, 1995, I filed my certificate of candidacy for Member of the House of Representatives (Congresswoman) of the First Legislative District of the province of Leyte, which was drafted by Mr. Filomeno A. Zeta. 2. I learned lately that Congressman Cirilo Montejo wants to disqualify me as I allegedly lack residence in the constituency

because of the entry of the word SEVEN in Item No. 8 of my certificate of candidacy. 3. I read my certificate of candidacy before signing it and I thought of the word RESIDENCE to mean actual or physical residence, and the word SEVEN merely reflected my actual and physical residence in Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. the petition seeking her disqualification, she noted that: _______________ 3.1. The word SEVEN was placed on my certificate of candidacy to indicate that at least one (1) month had passed from my registration as voter of Tolosa, Leyte, on January 28, 1995, when I wrote 06 months under PERIOD OF RESIDENCE as my actual or physical residence in the town. 4. I thought then that the sense in Item No. 10 of my certificate of candidacy stating THAT I AM eligible for said Office was sufficient to affirm that I possess all the qualifications, including my residence, for Member of the House of Representatives for which I am aspiring in the May 8, 1995 elections. 5. The fact, however, is that my domicile or residence of origin is Tacloban City, a component city of the First Legislative District of Leyte. I never intended to abandon this domicile or residence of origin to which I always intended to return whenever absent; indeed in 1992, I returned to Tacloban City to live and stay there. On November 5, 1992, I bought my Residence Certificate No. 15226186L there, which is made an integral part hereof as Annex I (Annex 2 hereof).

11 Id., at p. 120. See also, Rollo, p. 130-133, Annex I, petitioners Affidavit explaining her residence: 13. I established my domicile, however in Tacloban, Leyte (Tacloban City in 1938, when I was little over eight (8) years old. Shortly after my mother died on April 7, 1938, my widowed father, Vicente Orestes Romualdez, brought me and my brothers... and my sisters to Tacloban, Leyte (now Tacloban City) his hometown. xxx 18. I have always considered Tacloban City as my permanent residence or residence of origin. I have not abandoned and have never intended to abandon my permanent residence or residence of origin there. To it I always intend to return whenever absent. 19. In 1952, I went to Manila to work with my cousin, the late speaker Daniel Z. Romualdez in his office in the House of Representatives. 20. In May, 1954, I married President Ferdinand E. Marcos when he was still the congressman of Ilocos Norte. When respondent (petitioner herein) announced that she was intending to register as a voter in Tacloban City and run for Congress in the First District of Leyte, petitioner immediately opposed her intended registration by writing a letter stating that she is not a resident of said _______________ 21. As a dutiful wife who loved him deeply, I lived with him in Batac, Ilocos Norte and registered as a voter there.

22. In 1965, my husband was elected President of the Republic of the Philippines. Together, we lived in Malacaang Palace and I registered as a voter in San Miguel, Manila. 23. My registration as voter in Batac, Ilocos Norte, San Juan, Rizal (now San Juan, Metro Manila); and San Miguel, Manila, was for convenience because I had to live with my husband to serve him when he was congressman, Senator and President of the Republic of the Philippines. During those years however, I never intended nor desired to abandon my domicile or residence of origin in Tacloban City, which I established since I was a child. xxx 33. Throughout the Marcos Presidency, I spent most of my birthday anniversaries and attended the Sto. Nini Fiesta in Tacloban City. I regularly visited my domicile or residence of origin in Leyte and even held important functions and entertained guests and foreign dignitaries there. 34. After President Ferdinand E. Marcos and I, together with our children and innocent grandchildren were abducted and kidnapped to Honolulu, Hawaii, in February, 1986, my Leyte properties were sequestered by the PCGG, and were destroyed and cannibalized. xxx 38. Upon my return to the country, I wanted to immediately live and reside in Tacloban City or in Olot, Tolosa Leyte even if my residences there were not livable as they had been destroyed and cannibalized. The PCGG, however, did not permit and allow me.

xxx 40. After the 1992 Presidential Elections, I lived and resided in the residence of my brother in San Jose, Tacloban City, and pursued my negotiations with PCGG to recover my sequestered residences in Tacloban City and Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. ________________________ city but of Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. After respondent had registered as a voter in Tolosa following completion of her six month actual residence therein, petitioner filed a petition with the COMELEC to transfer the town of Tolosa from the First District to the Second District and pursued such a move up to the Supreme Court, his purpose being to remove respondent as petitioners opponent in the congressional election in the First District. He also filed a bill, along with other Leyte Congressmen, seeking the creation of another legislative district to remove the town of Tolosa out of the First District, to achieve his purpose. However, such bill did not pass the Senate. Having failed on such moves, petitioner now filed the instant petition for the same objective, as it is obvious that he is afraid to submit along with respondent for the judgment and verdict of the electorate of the First District of Leyte in an honest, orderly, peaceful, free and clean elections on May 8, 1995.12 On April 24, 1995, the Second Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), by a vote of 2 to 1,13 came up with a Resolution 1) finding private respondents Petition for Disqualification in SPA 95-009 meritorious; 2) striking off petitioners Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy of March

31, 1995; and 3) canceling her original Certificate of Candidacy.14 Dealing with two primary issues, namely, the validity of amending the original Certificate of Candidacy after the lapse of the deadline for filing certificates of candidacy, and petitioners compliance with the one year residency requirement, the Second Division held: Respondent raised the affirmative defense in her Answer that the printed word Seven (months) was a result of an honest misinterpretation or honest mistake on her part and, therefore, an amendment should subsequently be allowed. She averred that she thought that what was asked was her actual and physical presence in Tolosa and not residence of origin or domicile in the First Legislative District, to which she could have responded since childhood. In an accompanying _______________ 12 Rollo, p. 122. 13 Commissioners Manolo B. Gorospe and Teresita Dy-Liaco Flores formed the majority opinion. Commissioner Remedios A. SalazarFernando dissented. 14 Rollo, p. 64. ______________ affidavit, she stated that her domicile is Tacloban City, a component of the First District, to which she always intended to return whenever absent and which she has never abandoned. Furthermore, in her memorandum, she tried to discredit petitioners theory of disqualification by alleging that she has been a

resident of the First Legislative District of Leyte since childhood, although she only became a resident of the Municipality of Tolosa for seven months. She asserts that she has always been a resident of Tacloban City, a component of the First District, before coming to the Municipality of Tolosa. Along this point, it is interesting to note that prior to her registration in Tolosa, respondent announced that she would be registering in Tacloban City so that she can be a candidate for the District. However, this intention was rebuffed when petitioner wrote the Election Officer of Tacloban not to allow respondent since she is a resident of Tolosa and not Tacloban. She never disputed this claim and instead implicitly acceded to it by registering in Tolosa. This incident belies respondents claim of honest misinterpretation or honest mistake. Besides, the Certificate of Candidacy only asks for RESIDENCE. Since on the basis of her Answer, she was quite aware of residence of origin which she interprets to be Tacloban City, it is curious why she did not cite Tacloban City in her Certificate of Candidacy. Her explanation that she thought what was asked was her actual and physical presence in Tolosa is not easy to believe because there is none in the question that insinuates about Tolosa. In fact, item No. 8 in the Certificate of Candidacy speaks clearly of Residency in the CONSTITUENCY where I seek to be elected immediately preceding the election, thus, the explanation of respondent fails to be persuasive. From the foregoing, respondents defense of an honest mistake or misinterpretation, therefore, is devoid of merit.

To further buttress respondents contention that an amendment may be made, she cited the case of Alialy v. COMELEC (2 SCRA 957). The reliance of respondent on the case of Alialy is misplaced. The case only applies to the inconsequential deviations which cannot affect the result of the election, or deviations from provisions intended primarily to secure timely and orderly conduct of elections. The Supreme Court in that case considered the amendment only as a matter of form. But in the instant case, the amendment cannot be considered as a matter of form or an inconsequential deviation. The change in the number of years of residence in the place where respondent seeks to be elected is a substantial matter which determines her qualification as a candidacy, specially those intended to suppress, accurate material representation in the original certificate which adversely affects the filer. To admit the amended certificate is to condone the evils brought by the shifting minds of manipulating candidate, to the detriment of the integrity of the election. Moreover, to allow respondent to change the seven (7) month period of her residency in order to prolong it by claiming it was since childhood is to allow an untruthfulness to be committed before this Commission. The arithmetical accuracy of the 7 months residency the respondent indicated in her certificate of candidacy can be gleaned from her entry in her Voters Registration Record accomplished on January 28, 1995 which reflects that she is a resident of Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte for 6 months at the time of the said registration (Annex A, Petition). Said accuracy is further buttressed by her letter to the election officer of San Juan, Metro Manila, dated August 24, 1994, requesting for the cancellation of her registration in the Permanent List of Voters thereat so that she

can be re-registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. The dates of these three (3) different documents show the respondents consistent conviction that she has transferred her residence to Olot, Tolosa, Leyte from Metro Manila only for such limited period of time, starting in the last week of August 1994 which on March 8, 1995 will only sum up to 7 months. The Commission, therefore, cannot be persuaded to believe in the respondents contention that it was an error. xxx Based on these reasons the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy cannot be admitted by this Commission. xxx Anent the second issue, and based on the foregoing discussion, it is clear that respondent has not complied with the one year residency requirement of the Constitution. In election cases, the term residence has always been considered as synonymous with domicile which imports not only the intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. (Perfecto Faypon v. Eliseo Quirino, 96 Phil. 294; Romualdez v. RTC-Tacloban, 226 SCRA 408). In respondents case, when she returned to the Philippines in 1991, the residence she chose was not Tacloban but San Juan, Metro Manila. Thus, her animus revertendi is pointed to Metro Manila and not Tacloban.

This Division is aware that her claim that she has been a resident of the First District since childhood is nothing more than to give her a color of qualification where she is otherwise constitutionally disqualified. It cannot hold ground in the face of the facts admitted by the respondent in her affidavit. Except for the time that she studied and worked for some years after graduation in Tacloban City, she continuously lived in Manila. In 1959, after her husband was elected Senator, she lived and resided in San Juan, Metro Manila where she was a registered voter. In 1965, she lived in San Miguel, Manila where she was again a registered voter. In 1978, she served as member of the Batasang Pambansa as the representative of the City of Manila and later on served as the Governor of Metro Manila. She could not have served these positions if she had not been a resident of the City of Manila. Furthermore, when she filed her certificate of candidacy for the office of the President in 1992, she claimed to be a resident of San Juan, Metro Manila. As a matter of fact on August 24, 1994, respondent wrote a letter with the election officer of San Juan, Metro Manila requesting for the cancellation of her registration in the permanent list of voters that she may be re-registered or transferred to Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. These facts manifest that she could not have been a resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to the time she filed her certificate of candidacy because she became a resident of many places, including Metro Manila. This debunks her claim that prior to her residence in Tolosa, Leyte, she was a resident of the First Legislative District of Leyte since childhood. In this case, respondents conduct reveals her lack of intention to make Tacloban her domicile, she registered as a voter in different places and on several occasions declared that she was a resident of

Manila. Although she spent her school days in Tacloban, she is considered to have abandoned such place when she chose to stay and reside in other different places. In the case of Romualdez v. RTC (226 SCRA 408) the Court explained how one acquires a new domicile by choice. There must concur: (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality; (2) intention to remain there; and (3) intention to abandon the old domicile. In other words there must basically be animus manendi with animus non revertendi. When respondent chose to stay in Ilocos and later on in Manila, coupled with her intention to stay there by registering as a voter there and expressly declaring that she is a resident of that place, she is deemed to have abandoned Tacloban City, where she spent her childhood and school days, as her place of domicile. Pure intention to reside in that place is not sufficient, there must likewise be conduct indicative of such intention. Respondents statements to the effect that she has always intended to return to Tacloban, without the accompanying conduct to prove that intention, is not conclusive of her choice of residence. Respondent has not presented any evidence to show that her conduct, one year prior the election, showed intention to reside in Tacloban. Worse, what was evident was that prior to her residence in Tolosa, she had been a resident of Manila. It is evident from these circumstances that she was not a resident of the First District of Leyte since childhood. To further support the assertion that she could have not been a resident of the First District of Leyte for more than one year, petitioner correctly pointed out that on January 28, 1995; respondent registered as a voter at precinct No. 18-A of Olot,

Tolosa, Leyte. In doing so, she placed in her Voter Registration Record that she resided in the municipality of Tolosa for a period of six months. This may be inconsequential as argued by the respondent since it refers only to her residence in Tolosa, Leyte. But her failure to prove that she was a resident of the First District of Leyte prior to her residence in Tolosa leaves nothing but a convincing proof that she had been a resident of the district for six months only.15 In a Resolution promulgated a day before the May 8, 1995 elections, the COMELEC en banc denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration16 of the April 24, 1995 Resolution declaring her not qualified to run for the position of Member of the House of Representatives for the First Legislative District of Leyte.17 The Resolution tersely stated: After deliberating on the Motion for Reconsideration, the Commission RESOLVED to DENY it, no new substantial matters having been raised therein to warrant re-examination of the resolution granting the petition for disqualification.18 _______________ 15 Rollo, p. 57-64. 16 Petitioner filed a Motion to Recall Resolution Promulgated on April 24, 1995 and to Dismiss the Petition Because of Lapse of Jurisdiction; Alternatively, Motion for Reconsideration. The Commissions May 7, 1995 Resolution treated the same simply as a Motion for Reconsideration.

17 Commissioners Regalado E. Maambong, Remedios A. Salazar Fernando and Julio F. Desamito dissented. All filed separate dissenting opinions. In disqualifying petitioner, the majority held: As it stands now, only the Certificate of Candidacy respondent filed on March 8, 1995, stands, and on the basis of the entries therein, she is disqualified to run for the House of Representatives for failure to meet the constitutional requirement of one (1) year of residence in the place where she wanted to be elected. 18 Rollo, p. 78, Annex B. On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioners proclamation should the results of the canvass show that she obtained the highest number of votes in the congressional elections in the First District of Leyte. On the same day, however, the COMELEC reversed itself and issued a second Resolution directing that the proclamation of petitioner be suspended in the event that she obtains the highest number of votes.19 In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May, 1995, petitioner averred that she was the overwhelming winner of the elections for the congressional seat in the First District of Leyte held May 8, 1995 based on the canvass completed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers on May 14, 1995. Petitioner alleged that the canvass showed that she obtained a total of 70,471 votes compared to the 36,833 votes received by Respondent Montejo. A copy of said Certificate of Canvass was annexed to the Supplemental Petition. On account of the Resolutions disqualifying petitioner from running for the congressional seat of the First District of Leyte and the public

respondents Resolution suspending her proclamation, petitioner comes to this court for relief. Petitioner raises several issues in her Original and Supplemental Petitions. The principal issues may be classified into two general areas: I. The Issue of Petitioners qualifications Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of Leyte for a period of one year at the time of the May 9, 1995 elections. II. The Jurisdictional Issue a) Prior to the elections Whether or not the COMELEC properly exercised its jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioner outside the period mandated by the Omnibus Election Code for disqualification cases under Article 78 of the said Code. b) After the Elections Whether or not the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal assumed exclusive jurisdiction over the question of petitioners qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections. I. Petitioners qualification A perusal of the Resolution of the COMELECs Second Division reveals a startling confusion in the application of settled concepts of Domicile and Residence in election law. While the COMELEC

seems to be in agreement with the general proposition that for the purposes of election law, residence is synonymous with domicile, the Resolution reveals a tendency to substitute or mistake the concept of domicile for actual residence, a conception not intended for the purpose of determining a candidates qualifications for election to the House of Representatives as required by the 1987 Constitution. As it were, residence, for the purpose of meeting the qualification for an elective position, has a settled meaning in our jurisdiction. Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that *f+or the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons is their place of habitual residence. In Ong vs. Republic20 this court took the concept of domicile to mean an individuals permanent home, a place to which, whenever absent for business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent.21 Based on the foregoing, domicile includes the twin elements of the fact of residing or physical presence in a fixed place and animus manendi, or the intention of returning there permanently. Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an individual to a certain place. It is the physical presence of a person in a given area, community or country. The essential distinction between residence and domicile in law is that residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose for _______________ 20 19 SCRA 966 (1967). See also, Corre v. Corre, 100 Phil. 221 (1956).

21 Id., at 969. _______________ which the resident has taken up his abode ends. One may seek a place for purposes such as pleasure, business, or health. If a persons intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is established it is residence.22 It is thus, quite perfectly normal for an individual to have different residences in various places. However, a person can only have a single domicile, unless, for various reasons, he successfully abandons his domicile in favor of another domicile of choice. In Uytengsu vs. Republic, 23 we laid this distinction quite clearly: There is a difference between domicile and residence. Residence is used to indicate a place of abode, whether permanent or temporary; domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the intention of returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a domicile in another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence. His place of residence is generally his place of domicile, but it is not by any means necessarily so since no length of residence without intention of remaining will constitute domicile. For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the peculiar criteria of political laws. As these concepts have evolved in our election law, what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for election purposes is used synonymously with domicile.

In Nuval vs. Guray, 24 the Court held that the term residence . . . is synonymous with domicile which imports not only intention to reside in a fixed place, but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.25 Larena vs. Teves 26 reiterated the same doctrine in a case involving the qualifications of the respondent therein to the post of Municipal President of Dumaguete, Negros Oriental. Faypon vs. _______________ 22 Uytengsu v. Republic, 95 Phil. 890 (1954). 23 Id. 24 52 Phil. 645 (1928). 25 Citing People v. Bender 144 N.Y.S., 145. 26 61 Phil. 36 (1934). _____________________ Quirino,27 held that the absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as a voter other than in the place where one is elected does not constitute loss of residence.28 So settled is the concept (of domicile) in our election law that in these and other election law cases, this Court has stated that the mere absence of an individual from his permanent residence without the intention to abandon it does not result in a loss or change of domicile. The deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the residence qualification for certain elective positions have placed beyond

doubt the principle that when the Constitution speaks of residence in election law, it actually means only domicile to wit: Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional Convention, there was an attempt to require residence in the place not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the elections. So my question is: What is the Committees concept of residence of a candidate for the legislature? Is it actual residence or is it the concept of domicile or constructive residence? Mr. Davide: Madame President, insofar as the regular members of the National Assembly are concerned, the proposed section merely provides, among others, and a resident thereof, that is, in the district for a period of not less than one year preceding the day of the election. This was in effect lifted from the 1973 Constitution, the interpretation given to it was domicile.29 xxx Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on Section 7, page 2. I think Commissioner Nolledo has raised the same point that resident has been interpreted at times as a matter of intention rather than actual residence.

27 96 Phil. 294 (1954). 28 Id., see also Ujano v. Republic, 17 SCRA 147 (1966); Nuval v. Guray, supra note 22. 29 II RECORD OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, 110 (July 22, 1986). _________________ Mr. De los Reyes: But we might encounter some difficulty especially considering that a provision in the Constitution in the Article on Suffrage says that Filipinos living abroad may vote as enacted by law. So, we have to stick to the original concept that it should be by domicile and not physical residence.30 In Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives,31 this Court concluded that the framers of the 1987 Constitution obviously adhered to the definition given to the term residence in election law, regarding it as having the same meaning as domicile.32 In the light of the principles just discussed, has petitioner Imelda Romualdez Marcos satisfied the residency requirement mandated by Article VI, Sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution? Of what significance is the questioned entry in petitioners Certificate of Candidacy stating her residence in the First Legislative District of Leyte as seven (7) months? It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the constitutions residency qualification requirement. The said statement becomes material only when there

Mr. De los Reyes: Domicile Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentleman consider at the proper time to go back to actual residence rather than mere intention to reside? _______________

is or appears to be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It would be plainly ridiculous for a candidate to deliberately and knowingly make a statement in a certificate of candidacy which would lead to his or her disqualification. It stands to reason therefore, that petitioner merely committed an honest mistake in jotting down the word seven in the space provided for the residency qualification requirement. The circumstances leading to her filing the questioned entry obviously resulted in the subsequent confusion which prompted petitioner to write down the period of her actual stay in Tolosa, Leyte instead of her period of residence in the First District, which was since childhood in the space provided. These circumstances and events are amply detailed in the COMELECs Sec ond Divisions questioned resolution, albeit with a different interpretation. For instance, when herein petitioner announced that she would be registering in Tacloban City to make her eligible to run in the First District, private respondent Montejo opposed the same, claiming that petitioner was a resident of Tolosa, not Tacloban City. Petitioner then registered in her place of actual residence in the First District, which was Tolosa, Leyte, a fact which she subsequently noted down in her Certificate of Candidacy. A close look at said certificate would reveal the possible source of the confusion: the entry for residence (Item No. 7) is followed immediately by the entry for residence in the constituency where a candidate seeks election thus: _______________

30 Id. 31 199 SCRA 692 (1991). 32 Id., at 714. ________________ 7. RESIDENCE (complete Address): Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte POST OFFICE ADDRESS FOR ELECTION PURPOSES: Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte 8. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION:_ _ _ _ _ _ _ Years and Seven Months. Having been forced by private respondent to register in her place of actual residence in Leyte instead of petitioners claimed domicile, it appears that petitioner had jotted down her period of stay in her actual residence in a space which required her period of stay in her legal residence or domicile. The juxtaposition of entries in Item 7 and Item 8the first requiring actual residence and the second requiring domicilecoupled with the circumstances surrounding petitioners registration as a voter in Tolosa obviously led to her writing down an unintended entry for which she could be disqualified. This honest mistake should not, however, be allowed to negate the fact of residence in the First District if such fact were established by means more convincing than a mere entry on a piece of paper. We now proceed to the matter of petitioners domicile. In support of its asseveration that petitioners domicile could not possibly be in the First District of Leyte, the Second Division of the

COMELEC, in its assailed Resolution of April 24, 1995 maintains that except for the time when (petitioner) studied and worked for some years after graduation in Tacloban City, she continuously lived in Manila. The Resolution additionally cites certain facts as indicative of the fact that petitioners domicile ought to be any place where she lived in the last few decades except Tacloban, Leyte. First, according to the Resolution, petitioner, in 1959, resided in San Juan, Metro Manila where she was also registered voter. Then, in 1965, following the election of her husband to the Philippine presidency, she lived in San Miguel, Manila where she registered as a voter in 1978 and thereafter, she served as a member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila. She could not, have served these positions if she had not been a resident of Metro Manila, the COMELEC stressed. Here is where the confusion lies.

[T]his court is of the opinion and so holds that a person who has his own house wherein he lives with his family in a municipality without having ever had the intention of abandoning it, and without having lived either alone or with his family in another municipality, has his residence in the former municipality, notwithstanding his having registered as an elector in the other municipality in question and having been a candidate for various insular and provincial positions, stating every time that he is a resident of the latter municipality. More significantly, in Faypon vs. Quirino,34 we explained that: _______________ 33 61 Phil. 36 (1934). 34 96 Phil. 294, 299-300 (1954). _______________

We have stated, many times in the past, that an individual does not lose his domicile even if he has lived and maintained residences in different places. Residence, it bears repeating, implies a factual relationship to a given place for various purposes. The absence from legal residence or domicile to pursue a profession, to study or to do other things of a temporary or semipermanent nature does not constitute loss of residence. Thus, the assertion by the COMELEC that she could not have been a resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to the time she filed her certificate of candidacy because she became a resident of many places flies in the face of settled jurisprudence in which this Court carefully made distinctions between (actual) residence and domicile for election law purposes. In Larena vs. Teves,33 supra, we stressed:

A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look for greener pastures, as the saying goes, to improve his lot, and that, of course includes study in other places, practice of his avocation, or engaging in business. When an election is to be held, the citizen who left his birthplace to improve his lot may desire to return to his native town to cast his ballot but for professional or business reasons, or for any other reason, he may not absent himself from his professional or business activities; so there he registers himself as voter as he has the qualifications to be one and is not willing to give up or lose the opportunity to choose the officials who are to run the government especially in national elections. Despite such registration, the animus revertendi to his home, to his domicile or residence of origin has not forsaken him. This may be the explanation why the

registration of a voter in a place other than his residence of origin has not been deemed sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of such residence. It finds justification in the natural desire and longing of every person to return to his place of birth. This strong feeling of attachment to the place of ones birth must be overcome by positive proof of abandonment for another. From the foregoing, it can be concluded that in its above-cited statements supporting its proposition that petitioner was ineligible to run for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC was obviously referring to petitioners various places of (actual) residence, not her domicile. In doing so, it not only ignored settled jurisprudence on residence in election law and the deliberations of the constitutional commission but also the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. 881).35 What is undeniable, however, are the following set of facts which establish the fact of petitioners domicile, which we lift verbatim from the COMELECs Second Divisions assailed Reso lution:36 _______________ 35 B.P. 881, sec. 117 states: ______________ xxx Any person who transfers residence to another city, municipality or country solely by reason of his occupation; profession; employment in private or public service; educational activities; work in military or naval reservations; service in the army, navy or air force; the

constabulary or national police force; or confinement or detention in government institutions in accordance with law shall not be deemed to have lost his original residence. In or about 1938 when respondent was a little over 8 years old, she established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte (Tacloban City). She studied in the Holy Infant Academy in Tacloban from 1938 to 1949 when she graduated from high school. She pursued her college studies in St. Pauls College, now Divine Word University in Tacloban, where she earned her degree in Education. Thereafter, she taught in the Leyte Chinese School, still in Tacloban City. In 1952 she went to Manila to work with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel Z. Romualdez in his office in the House of Representatives. In 1954, she married ex-President Ferdinand E. Marcos when he was still a congressman of Ilocos Norte and registered there as a voter. When her husband was elected Senator of the Republic in 1959, she and her husband lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965, when her husband was elected President of the Republic of the Philippines, she lived with him in Malacaang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel, Manila. [I]n February 1986 (she claimed that) she and her family were abducted and kidnapped to Honolulu, Hawaii. In November 1991, she came home to Manila. In 1992, respondent ran for election as President of the Philippines and filed her Certificate of Candidacy wherein she indicated that she is a resident and registered voter of San Juan, Metro Manila. Applying the principles discussed to the facts found by COMELEC, what is inescapable is that petitioner held various residences for different purposes during the past four decades. None of these

purposes unequivocally point to an intention to abandon her domicile of origin in Tacloban, Leyte. Moreover, while petitioner was born in Manila, as a minor she naturally followed the domicile of her parents. She grew up in Tacloban, reached her adulthood there and eventually established residence in different parts of the country for various reasons. Even during her husbands presidency, at the height of the Marcos Regimes powers, petitioner kept her close ties to her domicile of origin by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other important personal milestones in her home province, instituting well-publicized projects for the benefit of her province and hometown, and establishing a political power base where her siblings and close relatives held positions of power either through the ballot or by appointment, always with either her influence or consent. These well-publicized ties to her domicile of origin are part of the history and lore of the quarter century of Marcos power in our country. Either they were entirely ignored in the COMELECs Resolutions, or the majority of the COMELEC did not know what the rest of the country always knew: the fact of petitioners domicile in Tacloban, Leyte. Private respondent in his Comment, contends that Tacloban was not petitioners domicile of origin because she did not live there until she was eight years old. He avers that after leaving the place in 1952, she abandoned her residency (sic) therein for many years and . . . (could not) re-establish her domicile in said place by merely expressing her intention to live there again. We do not agree. First, a minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once acquired is retained until a new one is gained, it follows that in spite of the fact of petitioners being born in Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile of origin by operation of law. This domicile was not

established only when she reached the age of eight years old, when her father brought his family back to Leyte contrary to private respondents averments. Second, domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate:37 1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile; 2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and 3. Acts which correspond with the purpose. In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin should be deemed to continue. Only with evidence showing concurrence of all three requirements can the presumption of continuity or residence be rebutted, for a change of residence requires an actual and deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two legal residences at the same time.38 In the case at bench, the evidence adduced by private respondent plainly lacks the degree of persuasiveness required to convince this court that an abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of choice indeed occurred. To effect an abandonment requires the voluntary act of relinquishing petitioners former domicile with an intent to supplant the former domicile with one of her own choosing (domicilium voluntarium ). In this connection, it cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952. For there is a clearly established distinction between the Civil Code concepts of

domicile and residence.39 The presumption that the wife automatically gains the husbands domicile by operation of law upon marriage cannot be inferred from the use of the term residence in Article 110 of the Civil Code because the Civil Code is one area where the two concepts are well delineated. Dr. Arturo Tolentino, writing on this specific area explains: In the Civil Code, there is an obvious difference between domicile and residence. Both terms imply relations between a person and a place; but in residence, the relation is one of fact while in domicile it is legal or juridical, independent of the necessity of physical presence.40 Article 110 of the Civil Code provides: Article 110.The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may exempt the wife from living with the husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of the Republic. A survey of jurisprudence relating to Article 110 or to the concepts of domicile or residence as they affect the female spouse upon marriage yields nothing which would suggest that the female spouse automatically loses her domicile of origin in favor of the husbands choice of residence upon marriage. Article 110 is a virtual restatement of Article 58 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 which states: La mujer esta obligada a seguir a su marido donde quiera que fije su residencia. Los Tribunales, sin embargo, podran con justa causa eximirla de esta obligacion cuando el marido transende su residencia a ultramar o a pais extranjero.

Note the use of the phrase donde quiera su fije de residencia in the aforequoted article, which means wherever (the husband) wishes to establish residence . This part of the article clearly contemplates only actual residence because it refers to a positive act of fixing a family home or residence. Moreover, this interpretation is further strengthened by the phrase cuando el marido translade su residencia in the same provision which means, when the husband shall transfer his residence, referring to another positive act of relocating the family to another home or place of actual residence. The article obviously cannot be understood to refer to domicile which is a fixed, fairly-permanent concept when it plainly connotes the possibility of transferring from one place to another not only once, but as often as the husband may deem fit to move his family, a circumstance more consistent with the concept of actual residence. The right of the husband to fix the actual residence is in harmony with the intention of the law to strengthen and unify the family, recognizing the fact that the husband and the wife bring into the marriage different domiciles (of origin). This difference could, for the sake of family unity, be reconciled only by allowing the husband to fix a single place of actual residence. Very significantly, Article 110 of the Civil Code is found under Title V under the heading: RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE. Immediately preceding Article 110 is Article 109 which obliges the husband and wife to live together, thus: Article 109. The husband and wife are obligated to live together, observe mutual respect and fidelity and render mutual help and support.

The duty to live together can only be fulfilled if the husband and wife are physically together. This takes into account the situations where the couple has many residences (as in the case of petitioner). If the husband has to stay in or transfer to any one of their residences, the wife should necessarily be with him in order that they may live together. Hence, it is illogical to conclude that Art. 110 refers to domicile and not to residence. Otherwise, we shall be faced with a situation where the wife is left in the domicile while the husband, for professional or other reasons, stays in one of their (various) residences. As Dr. Tolentino further explains: Residence and Domicile.Whether the word residence as used with reference to particular matters is synonymous with domicile is a question of some difficulty, and the ultimate decision must be made from a consideration of the purpose and intent with which the word is used. Sometimes they are used synonymously, at other times they are distinguished from one another. xxx Residence in the civil law is a material fact, referring to the physical presence of a person in a place. A person can have two or more residences, such as a country residence and a city residence. Residence is acquired by living in a place; on the other hand, domicile can exist without actually living in the place. The important thing for domicile is that, once residence has been established in one place, there be an intention to stay there permanently, even if residence is also established in some other place.41

In fact, even the matter of a common residence between the husband and the wife during the marriage is not an iron-clad principle. In cases applying the Civil Code on the question of a common matrimonial residence, our jurisprudence has recognized certain situations42 where the spouses could not be com_______________ 41 TOLENTINO, 1 COMMENTARIES AND JURISPRUDENCE ON THE CIVIL CODE, 220 (1987). 42 Under modern laws, it is clear that many exceptions to the rule that the domicile of the wife is determined by that of her husband must obtain. Accordingly, the wife may acquire another and separate domicile from that of her husband where the theoretical unity of the husband and wife is dissolved, as it is by the institution of divorce proceedings; or where the husband has given cause for divorce; or where there is a separation of the parties by agreement, or a permanent pelled to live with each other such that the wife is either allowed to maintain a residence different from that of her husband or, for obviously practical reasons, revert to her original domicile (apart from being allowed to opt for a new one). In De la Vina vs. Villareal43 this Court held that *a+ married woman may acquire a residence or domicile separate from that of her husband during the existence of the marriage where the husband has given cause for divorce.44 Note that the Court allowed the wife either to obtain new residence or to choose a new domicile in such an event. In instances where the wife actually opts, under the Civil Code, to live separately from her husband either by taking new residence or reverting to her domicile of origin, the Court has held that the wife

could not be compelled to live with her husband on pain of contempt. In Arroyo vs. Vasquez de Arroyo 45 the Court held that: Upon examination of the authorities, we are convinced that it is not within the province of the courts of this country to attempt to compel one of the spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other. Of course where the property rights of one of the pair are invaded, an action for restitution of such rights can be maintained. But we are disinclined to sanction the doctrine that an order, enforcible (sic) by process of contempt, may be entered to compel the restitution of the purely personal right of consortium. At best such an order can be effective for no other purpose than to compel the spouses to live under the same roof; and he experience of those countries where the courts of justice have assumed to compel the cohabitation of married people shows that the policy of the practice is extremely questionable. Thus in England, formerly the Ecclesiastical Court entertained suits for the restitution of conjugal rights at the instance of either husband or wife; and if the facts were found to warrant it, that court would make a mandatory decree, enforceable by process of contempt in case of disobedience, requiring the delinquent party to live with the other and render conjugal rights. Yet this practice was sometimes criticized even by the judges who felt bound to enforce such orders, and in Weldon vs. Weldon (9 P.D. 52), decided in 1883, Sir James Hannen, President in the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division of the High Court of Justice, expressed his regret that the English law on the subject was not the same as that which prevailed in Scotland, where a decree of adherence, equivalent to the decree for the restitution of conjugal rights in England, could be obtained by the injured spouse, but could not be enforced by imprisonment.

Accordingly, in obedience to the growing sentiment against the practice, the Matrimonial Causes Act (1884) abolished the remedy of imprisonment; though a decree for the restitution of conjugal rights can still be procured, and in case of disobedience may serve in appropriate cases as the basis of an order for the periodical payment of a stipend in the character of alimony. _______________ separation due to desertion of the wife by the husband or attributable to cruel treatment on the part of the husband; or where there has been a forfeiture by the wife of the benefit of the husbands domicile. 9 R.C.L., 545, cited in De la Vina, supra. If the law allows the wife to automatically revert to her original domicile or acquire a new domicile under these situations, all the more should it sanction a reversionor the acquisition of a new domicile by the wifeupon the death of her husband. 43 41 Phil. 13 (1920). 44 The rule that the wife automatically acquires or follows her husbands domicile is not an absolute one. A specific situation recognized in Spanish jurisprudence involves the one in which husband acquiesces (1 Manresa 223) or gives his tacit consent (Scaevola, (Civil Code, 354). 45 42 Phil. 54 (1921). ________________ In the voluminous jurisprudence of the United States, only one court, so far as we can discover, has ever attempted to make a

preemptory order requiring one of the spouses to live with the other; and that was in a case where a wife was ordered to follow and live with her husband, who had changed his domicile to the City of New Orleans. The decision referred to (Bahn vs. Darby, 36 La. Ann., 70) was based on a provision of the Civil Code of Louisiana similar to article 56 of the Spanish Civil Code. It was decided many years ago, and the doctrine evidently has not been fruitful even in the State of Louisiana. In other states of the American Union the idea of enforcing cohabitation by process of contempt is rejected. (21 Cyc., 1148). In a decision of January 2, 1909, the Supreme Court of Spain appears to have affirmed an order of the Audiencia Territorial de Valladolid requiring a wife to return to the marital domicile, and in the alternative, upon her failure to do so, to make a particular disposition of certain money and effects then in her possession and to deliver to her husband, as administrator of the ganancial property, all income, rents, and interest which might accrue to her from the property which she had brought to the marriage. (113 Jur. Civ., pp. 1, 11). But it does not appear that this order for the return of the wife to the marital domicile was sanctioned by any other penalty than the consequences that would be visited upon her in respect to the use and control of her property; and it does not appear that her disobedience to that order would necessarily have been followed by imprisonment for contempt. Parenthetically when Petitioner was married to then Congressman Marcos, in 1954, petitioner was obligedby virtue of Article 110 of the Civil Codeto follow her husbands actual place of residence fixed by him. The problem here is that at that time, Mr. Marcos had several places of residence, among which were San Juan, Rizal and

Batac, Ilocos Norte. There is no showing which of these places Mr. Marcos did fix, as his familys residence. But assuming that Mr. Marcos had fixed any of these places as the conjugal residence, what petitioner gained upon marriage was actual residence. She did not lose her domicile of origin. On the other hand, the common law concept of matrimonial domicile appears to have been incorporated, as a result of our jurisprudential experiences after the drafting of the Civil Code of 1950, into the New Family Code. To underscore the difference between the intentions of the Civil Code and the Family Code drafters, the term residence has been supplanted by the term domicile in an entirely new provision (Art. 69) distinctly different in meaning and spirit from that found in Article 110. The provision recognizes revolutionary changes in the concept of womens rights in the intervening years by making the choice of domicile a product of mutual agreement between the spouses.46 Without as much belaboring the point, the term residence may mean one thing in civil law (or under the Civil Code) and quite another thing in political law. What stands clear is that insofar as the Civil Code is concernedaffecting the rights and obligations of husband and wifethe term residence should only _______________ 46 Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy recognizes the same Civil Code distinction. However, taking another approach, she writes:

(6) The above Article (Article 69, FC) uses the term family domicile instead of family residence because the spouses may have multiple residences, and the wife may elect to remain in one of such residences, which may destroy the duty of the spouses to live together and its corresponding benefits. SEMPIO-DIY, HANDBOOK ON THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, 102 (1988). be interpreted to mean actual residence. The inescapable conclusion derived from this unambiguous civil law delineation therefore, is that when petitioner married the former President in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home, not a domicilium necessarium . Even assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner gained a new domicile after her marriage and only acquired a right to choose a new one after her husband died, petitioners acts following her return to the country clearly indicate that she not only impliedly but expressly chose her domicile of origin (assuming this was lost by operation of law) as her domicile. This choice was unequivocally expressed in her letters to the Chairman of the PCGG when petitioner sought the PCGGs permission to rehabilitate (our) ancestral house in Tacloban and Farm in Olot, Leyte . . . to make them livable for the Marcos family to have a home in our homeland.47 Furthermore, petitioner obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte, while living in her brothers house, an act which supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested in her letters to the PCGG Chairman. She could not have gone straight to her home in San Juan, as it was in a state of disrepair, having been previously looted by vandals. Her homes and residences following her arrival in various parts of Metro Manila merely qualified as temporary or actual residences, not

domicile. Moreover, and proceeding from our discussion pointing out specific situations where the female spouse either reverts to her domicile of origin or chooses a new one during the subsistence of the marriage, it would be highly illogical for us to assume that she cannot regain her original domicile upon the death of her husband absent a positive act of selecting a new one where situations exist within the subsistence of the marriage itself where the wife gains a domicile different from her husband. In the light of all the principles relating to residence and domicile enunciated by this court up to this point, we are persuaded that the facts established by the parties weigh heavily in favor of a conclusion supporting petitioners claim of legal residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte. II. The jurisdictional issue Petitioner alleges that the jurisdiction of the COMELEC had already lapsed considering that the assailed resolutions were rendered on April 24, 1995, fourteen (14) days before the election in violation of Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.48 Moreover, petitioner contends that it is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and not the COMELEC which has jurisdiction over the election of members of the House of Representatives in accordance with Article VI, Sec. 17 of the Constitution. This is untenable.

It is a settled doctrine that a statute requiring rendition of judgment within a specified time is generally construed to be merely directory,49 so that non-compliance with them does not invalidate the judgment on the theory that if the statute had intended such

result it would have clearly indicated it.50 The difference between a mandatory and a directory provision is often made on grounds of necessity. Adopting the same view held by several American authorities, this court in Marcelino v. Cruz held that:51 The difference between a mandatory and directory provision is often determined on grounds of expediency, the reason being that less injury results to the general public by disregarding than enforcing the letter of the law. _______________ 48 The provision reads: Section 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy.A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election. 49 Marcelino vs. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51 (1983). 50 American Tupe Founders Co. v. Justices Court, 133 Cal. 819, 65 Pac. 742; Heillen v. Phillipps, 88 Cal. 557, 26 Pac. 366; Drake v. Bagley, 69 Mo. App. 39; State v. Davis, 194 Mo. 585. 51 Supra, note 39, citing Huffines v. Gold 154 Tenn. 583, 588; 288 S.W. 353, 354. _________________

In Trapp v. Mc Cormick, a case calling for the interpretation of a statute containing a limitation of thirty (30) days within which a decree may be entered without the consent of counsel, it was held that the statutory provisions which may be thus departed from with impunity, without affecting the validity of statutory proceedings, are usually those which relate to the mode or time of doing that which is essential to effect the aim and purpose of the Legislature or some incident of the essential act. Thus, in said case, the statute under examination was construed merely to be directory. The mischief in petitioners contending that the COMELEC should have abstained from rendering a decision after the period stated in the Omnibus Election Code because it lacked jurisdiction, lies in the fact that our courts and other quasi-judicial bodies would then refuse to render judgments merely on the ground of having failed to reach a decision within a given or prescribed period. In any event, with the enactment of Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. 6646 in relation to Section 78 of B.P. 881,52 it is evident that the respondent Commission does not lose jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending disqualification case under Section 78 of B.P. 881 even after the elections.

As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunals supposed assumption of jurisdiction over the issue of petitioners qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections, suffice it to say that HRETs jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of members of Congress begins

only after a candidate has become a member of the House of Representatives.53 Petitioner not being a member of the House of Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at this point has no jurisdiction over the question. _______________ 52 SEC. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case.Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. ______________ It would be an abdication of many of the ideals enshrined in the 1987 Constitution for us to either to ignore or deliberately make distinctions in law solely on the basis of the personality of a petitioner in a case. Obviously a distinction was made on such a ground here. Surely, many established principles of law, even of election laws were flouted for the sake of perpetuating power during the pre-EDSA regime. We renege on these sacred ideals, including the meaning and spirit of EDSA by ourselves bending established principles of law to deny an individual what he or she

justly deserves in law. Moreover, in doing so, we condemn ourselves to repeat the mistakes of the past. WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELECs questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte. SO ORDERED. Narvasa (C.J.), I join Justice Mendoza in his separate opinion and, for the reasons therein stated, vote to grant the petition. Feliciano, J., On official leave. Padilla, J., See dissenting opinion.

_______________ SEC. 7. Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy . The procedure hereinabove provided shall apply to petitions to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy as provided in Section 78 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881. 53 CONST., art. VI, sec. 11 states:

The Senate and the House of Representatives shall have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all questions relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. x x x. Regalado, J., See dissenting opinion. Davide, Jr., J., I respectfully dissent. Please see dissenting opinion. Romero, J., Please see separate opinion. Bellosillo, J., I join Justice Puno in his concurring opinion. Melo, J., I join Justice Puno in his separate concurring opinion. Puno, J., Please see Concurring Opinion. Vitug, J., Please see separate opinion. Mendoza, J., See separate opinion. Francisco, J., See concurring opinion. Hermosisima, Jr., J., I join Justice Padillas dissent. SEPARATE OPINION ROMERO, J.: Petitioner has appealed to this Court for relief after the COMELEC ruled that she was disqualified from running for Representative of her District and that, in the event that she should, nevertheless, muster a majority vote, her proclamation should be suspended. Not by a straightforward ruling did the COMELEC pronounce its decision

as has been its unvarying practice in the past, but by a startling succession of reverse somersaults. Indicative of its shifting stance vis-a-vis petitioners certificate of candidacy were first, the action of its Second Division disqualifying her and cancelling her original Certificate of Candidacy by a vote of 2-1 on April 24, 1995; then the denial by the COMELEC en banc of her Motion for Reconsideration on May 7, 1995, a day before the election; then because she persisted in running, its decision on May 11, 1995 or three days after the election, allowing her proclamation in the event that the results of the canvass should show that she obtained the highest number of votes (obviously noting that petitioner had won overwhelmingly over her opponent), but almost simultaneously reversing itself by directing that even if she wins, her proclamation should nonetheless be suspended. Crucial to the resolution of the disqualification issue presented by the case at bench is the interpretation to be given to the one-year residency requirement imposed by the Constitution on aspirants for a Congressional seat.1 Bearing in mind that the term resident has been held to be synonymous with domicile for election purposes, it is important to determine whether petitioners domicile was in the First District of Leyte and if so, whether she had resided there for at least a period of one year. Undisputed is her domicile of origin, Tacloban, where her parents lived at the time of her birth. Depending on what theory one adopts, the same may have been changed when she married Ferdinand E. Marcos, then domiciled in Batac, by operation of law. Assuming it did, his death certainly released her from the obligation to live with him at the residence fixed by him during his lifetime. What may confuse the layman at this point is the fact that

the term domicile may refer to domicile of origin, domicile of choice, or domicile by operation of law, which subject we shall not belabor since it has been amply discussed by the ponente and in the other separate opinions. In any case, what assumes relevance is the divergence of legal opinion as to the effect of the husbands death on the domicile of the widow. Some scholars opine that the widows domicile remains unchanged; that the deceased husbands wishes perforce still bind the wife he has left behind. Given this interpretation, the widow cannot possibly go far enough to sever the domiciliary tie imposed by her husband. It is bad enough to interpret the law as empowering the husband unilaterally to fix the residence or domicile of the family, as laid down in the Civil Code,2 but to continue giving the rest of the family,4 he is also empowered to be the administrator of the conjugal property, with a few exceptions5 and may, therefore, dispose of the conjugal partnership property for purposes specified under the law;6 whereas, as a general rule, the wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the husbands consent.7 As regards the property pertaining to the children under parental authority, the father is the legal administrator and only in his absence may the mother assume his powers.8 Demeaning to the wifes dignity are certain strictures on her personal freedoms, practically relegating her to the position of minors and disabled persons. To illustrate a few; The wife cannot, without the husbands consent, acquire any property by gratuitous title, except from her ascendants, descendants, parents-in-law, and collateral relatives within the fourth degree.9 With respect to her employment, the husband wields a veto power in case the wife exercises her profession or

occupation or engages in business, provided his income is sufficient for the family, according to its social standing and his opposition is founded on serious and valid grounds.10 Most offensive, if not repulsive, to the liberal-minded is the effective prohibition upon a widow to get married till after three hundred days following the death of her husband, unless in the meantime, she has given birth to a child.11 The mother who contracts a subsequent marriage loses the parental authority over her children, unless the deceased husband, father of the latter, has expressly provided in his will that his widow might marry again, and has ordered that in such case she should keep and exercise parental authority over their children.12 Again, an instance of a husbands overarching influence from beyond the grave. _______________ 1 Art. VI, Sec. 6, Const.: No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and, except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election . 2 Art. 110: The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may exempt the wife from living with the husband if he obeisance to his wishes even after the rationale underlying the mutual duty of the spouses to live together has ceased, is to close ones eyes to the stark realities of the present.

At the other extreme is the position that the widow automati-cally reverts to her domicile of origin upon the demise of her husband. Does the law so abhor a vacuum that the widow has to be endowed somehow with a domicile? To answer this question which is far from rhetorical, one will have to keep in mind the basic principles of domicile: Everyone must have a domicile. Then one must have only a single domicile for the same purpose at any given time. Once established, a domicile remains until a new one is acquired, for no person lives who has no domicile, as defined by the law he is subject to. At this juncture, we are confronted with an unexplored legal terrain in this jurisdiction, rendered more murky by the conflicting opinions of foreign legal authorities. This being the state of things, it is as imperative as it is opportune to illumine the darkness with the beacon light of truth, as dictated by experience and the necessity of according petitioner her right to choose her domicile in keeping with the enlightened global trend to recognize and protect the human rights of women, no less than men. Admittedly, the notion of placing women on par with men, insofar as civil, political and social rights are concerned, is a relatively recent phenomenon that took seed only in the middle of this century. It is a historical fact that for over three centuries, the Philippines had been colonized by Spain, a conservative, Catholic country which transplanted to our shores the Old World culture, mores, attitudes and values. Through the imposition on our government of the Spanish Civil Code in 1889, the people, both men and women, had no choice but to accept such concepts as the husbands being the head of the family and the wifes subordination to his authority. In such role, his was the right to make vital

decisions for the family. Many instances easily come to mind, foremost being what is related to the issue before us, namely, that the husband shall fix the residence of the family.3 Because he is made responsible for the support of the wife and should live abroad unless in the service of the Republic. _______________ 4 Art. 111, Civil Code.

5 Art. 112, Civil Code. 6 Art. 171, Civil Code. 7 Art. 172, Civil Code. 8 Art. 320, Civil Code. 9 Art. 114, Civil Code. 10 Art. 117, Civil Code. 11 Art. 84, Civil Code. 12 Art. 328, Civil Code. _______________ All these indignities and disabilities suffered by Filipino wives for hundreds of years evoked no protest from them until the concept of human rights and equality between and among nations and individuals found hospitable lodgment in the United Nations Charter of which the Philippines was one of the original signatories. By then,

the Spanish conquistadores had been overthrown by the American forces at the turn of the century. The bedrock of the U.N. Charter was firmly anchored on this credo: to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women. (Italics supplied) It took over thirty years before these egalitarian doctrines bore fruit, owing largely to the burgeoning of the feminist movement. What may be regarded as the international bill of rights for women was implanted in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)) adopted by the U.N. General Assembly which entered into force as an international treaty on September 3, 1981. In ratifying the instrument, the Philippines bound itself to implement its liberating spirit and letter, for its Constitution, no less, declared that The Philippines . . . adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations.13 One such principle embodied in the CEDAW is granting to men and women the same rights with regard to the law relating to the movement of persons and the freedom to choose their residence and domicile.14 (Italics supplied). CEDAWs pro-women orientation which was not lost on Filipino women was reflected in the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines and later, in the Family Code,15 both of which were speedily approved by the first lady President of the country, Corazon C. Aquino. Notable for its emphasis on the human rights of all individuals and its bias for equality between the sexes are the following provisions: The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights16 and The

State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men.17

_______________ 13 Art. II, Sec. 2, Const. 14 Part IV, Art. 15, Paragraph 4, CEDAW. 15 Executive Order No. 209, July 6, 1987, as amended by Executive Order No. 227, July 17, 1987, which took effect on August 3, 1988. _________________ A major accomplishment of women in their quest for equality with men and the elimination of discriminatory provisions of law was the deletion in the Family Code of almost all of the unreasonable strictures on wives and the grant to them of personal rights equal to that of their husbands. Specifically, the husband and wife are now given the right jointly to fix the family domicile;18 concomitant to the spouses being jointly responsible for the support of the family is the right and duty of both spouses to manage the household;19 the administration and the enjoyment of the community property shall belong to both spouses jointly;20 the father and mother shall now jointly exercise legal guardianship over the property of their unemancipated common child21 and several others. Aware of the hiatus and continuing gaps in the law, insofar as womens rights are concerned, Congress passed a law popularly known as Women in Development and Nation Building Act.22

Among the rights given to married women evidencing their capacity to act in contracts equal to that of men are: (1) Women shall have the capacity to borrow and obtain loans and execute security and credit arrangements under the same conditions as men; (2) Women shall have equal access to all government and private sector programs granting agricultural credit, loans and non material resources and shall enjoy equal treatment in agrarian reform and land resettlement programs; (3) Women shall have equal rights to act as incorporators and enter into insurance contracts; and _______________ 16 Art. II, Sec. 11, Const. 17 Art. II, Sec. 14, Const. 18 Art. 69, Family Code. 19 Art. 71, Family Code. 20 Art. 96, Family Code. 21 Art. 225, Family Code.

(4) Married women shall have rights equal to those of married men in applying for passports, secure visas and other travel documents, without need to secure the consent of their spouses.23 As the world draws the curtain on the Fourth World Conference of Women in Beijing, let this Court now be the first to respond to its clarion call that Womens Rights are Human Rights and that All obstacles to womens full participation in decision-making at all levels, including the family should be removed. Having been herself a Member of the Philippine Delegation to the International Womens Year Conference in Mexico in 1975, this writer is only too keenly aware of the unremitting struggle being waged by women the world over, Filipino women not excluded, to be accepted as equals of men and to tear down the walls of discrimination that hold them back from their proper places under the sun. In light of the inexorable sweep of events, local and global, legislative, executive and judicial, according more rights to women hitherto denied them and eliminating whatever pockets of discrimination still exist in their civil, political and social life, can it still be insisted that widows are not at liberty to choose their domicile upon the death of their husbands but must retain the same, regardless? I submit that a widow, like the petitioner and others similarly situated, can no longer be bound by the domicile of the departed husband, if at all she was before. Neither does she automatically revert to her domicile of origin, but exercising free will, she may opt to reestablish her domicile of origin. In returning to Tacloban and subsequently, to Barangay Olot, Tolosa, both of which are located in the First District of Leyte, petitioner amply demonstrated by overt

22 Republic Act No. 7192 approved February 12, 1992. ________________

acts, her election of a domicile of choice, in this case, a reversion to her domicile of origin. Added together, the time when she set up her domicile in the two places sufficed to meet the one-year requirement to run as Representatives of the First District of Leyte. In view of the foregoing expatiation, I vote to GRANT the petition. CONCURRING OPINION PUNO, J.: It was Aristotle who taught mankind that things that are alike should be treated alike, while things that are unalike should be treated unalike in proportion to their unalikeness.1 Like other candidates, petitioner has clearly met the residence requirement provided by Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution.2 We cannot disqualify her and treat her unalike, for the Constitution guarantees equal protection of the law. I proceed from the following factual and legal propositions: First. There is no question that petitioners original domicile is in Tacloban, Leyte. Her parents were domiciled in Tacloban. Their ancestral house is in Tacloban. They have vast real estate in the place. Petitioner went to school, and thereafter worked there. I consider Tacloban as her initial domicile, both her domicile of origin and her domicile of choice. Her domicile of origin as it was the domicile of her parents when she was a minor; and her domicile of choice, as she continued living there even after reaching the age of majority. Second. There is also no question that in May, 1954, petitioner married the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos. By contracting

marriage, her domicile became subject to change by law, and the right to change it was given by Article 110 of the Civil Code to her husband. Article 110 of the Civil Code provides: Art. 110. The husband shall fix the residence of the family.But the court may exempt the wife from living with the husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of the Republic.3 (Italics supplied) _______________ 1 Aristotle, Ethica Nichomachea, bk., v. 3, 1131(a) (W. Ross translation, 1925 ed). 2 It provides: No person shall be a member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural born citizen of the Philippines and on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and except the party list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election . (Emphasis supplied) In De la Via v. Villareal and Geopano,4 this Court explained why the domicile of the wife ought to follow that of the husband. We held: The reason is founded upon the theoretic identity of person and interest between the husband and the wife, and the presumption that, from the nature of the relation, the home of one is the home of the other. It is intended to promote, strengthen, and secure their interests in this relation, as it ordinarily exists, where union and harmony prevail.5 In accord with this objective, Article 109 of the Civil Code also obligated the husband and wife to live together.

Third. The difficult issues start as we determine whether petitioners marriage to former President Marcos ipso facto resulted in the loss of her Tacloban domicile. I respectfully submit that her marriage by itself alone did not cause her to lose her Tacloban domicile. Article 110 of the Civil Code merely gave the husband the right to fix the domicile of the family. In the exercise of the right, the husband may explicitly choose the prior domicile of his wife, in which case, the wifes domicile remains unchanged. The husband can also implicitly acquiesce to his wifes prior domicile even if it is different. So we held in de la Via,6 x x x. When married women as well as children subject to parental authority live, with the acquiescence of their husbands or fathers, in a place distinct from where the latter live, they have their own independent domicile . x x x. _______________

6 Id., at p. 20, citing 1 Manresa 223. ____________________ It is not, therefore, the mere fact of marriage but the deliberate choice of a different domicile by the husband that will change the domicile of a wife from what it was prior to their marriage. The domiciliary decision made by the husband in the exercise of the right conferred by Article 110 of the Civil Code binds the wife. Any and all acts of a wife during her coverture contrary to the domiciliary choice of the husband cannot change in any way the domicile legally fixed by the husband. These acts are void not only because the wife lacks the capacity to choose her domicile but also because they are contrary to law and public policy. In the case at bench, it is not disputed that former President Marcos exercised his right to fix the family domicile and established it in Batac, Ilocos Norte, where he was then the congressman. At that particular point of time and throughout their married life, petitioner lost her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte . Since petitioners Batac domicile has been fixed by operation of law, it was not affected in 1959 when her husband was elected as Senator, when they lived in San Juan, Rizal and where she registered as a voter. It was not also affected in 1965 when her husband was elected President, when they lived in Malacaang Palace, and when she registered as a voter in San Miguel, Manila. Nor was it affected when she served as a member of the Batasang Pambansa, Minister of Human Settlements and Governor of Metro Manila during the incumbency of her husband as President of the nation. Under Article 110 of the Civil Code, it was only her husband who could change the family domicile in Batac and the evidence shows he did not effect any such change.

3 There are two (2) other instances when a married woman may have a domicile different from the husband: (1) if they are legally separated pursuant to par. 1, Art. 106 of the Civil Code, and (2) if the husband forcibly ejects the wife from the conjugal home to have illicit relations with another. (De la Via v. Villareal and Geopano, 41 Phil. 13 [1920]). 4 Op cit. 5 Id., at pp. 16-17.

To a large degree, this follows the common law that a woman on her marriage loses her own domicile and by operation of law, acquires that of her husband, no matter where the wife actually lives or what she believes or intends.7 Fourth. The more difficult task is how to interpret the effect of the death on September 28, 1989 of former President Marcos on petitioners Batac domicile. The issue is of first impression in our jurisdiction and two (2) schools of thought contend for acceptance. One is espoused by our distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Davide, Jr., heavily relying on American authori ties.8 He echoes the theory that after the husbands death, the wife retains the last domicile of her husband until she makes an actual change. _______________ 7 25 AM JUR 2nd S. 48, p. 37. I do not subscribe to this submission. The American case law that the wife still retains her dead husbands domicile is based on ancient common law which we can no longer apply in the Philippine setting today . The common law identified the domicile of a wife as that of the husband and denied to her the power of acquiring a domicile of her own separate and apart from him.9 Legal scholars agree that two (2) reasons support this common law doctrine. The first reason as pinpointed by the legendary Blackstone is derived from the view that the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband.10 The second reason lies in the desirability of having the interests of each member of the family unit governed by the same law.11 The presumption that the

wife retains the domicile of her deceased husband is an extension of this common law concept. The concept and its extension have provided some of the most iniquitous jurisprudence against women . It was under common law that the 1873 American case of Bradwell v. Illinois 12 was decided where women were denied the right to practice law. It was unblushingly ruled that the natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life . . . This is the law of the Creator. Indeed, the rulings relied upon by Mr. Justice Davide in CJS13 and AM JUR 2d14 are American state court decisions handed down between the years 191715 and 1938,16 or before the time when women were accorded equality of rights with men . Undeniably, the womens liberation movement resulted in farranging state legislations in the United States to eliminate gender inequality.17 Starting in the decade of the seventies, the courts likewise liberalized their rulings as they started invalidating laws infected with gender-bias. It was in 1971 when the US Supreme Court in Reed v. Reed,18 struck a big blow for women equality when it declared as unconstitutional an Idaho law that required probate courts to choose male family members over females as estate administrators. It held that mere administrative inconvenience cannot justify a sex-based distinction. These significant changes both in law and in case law on the status of women virtually obliterated the iniquitous common law surrendering the rights of married women to their husbands based on the dubious theory of the parties theoretic oneness. The Corpus Juris Secundum editors did not miss the relevance of this revolution on womens right as they observed: However, it has been declared that under modern statutes changing the status of married women and departing from the common law theory of marriage, there is no reason why a wife

may not acquire a separate domicile for every purpose known to the law.19 In publishing in 1969 the Restatement of the Law, Second (Conflict of Laws 2d) , the reputable American Law Institute also categorically stated that the view of Blackstone x x x is no longer held. As the result of statutes and court decisions, a wife now possesses practically the same rights and powers as her unmarried sister.20 _______________ 8 28 CJS on Domicile, S. 12, 27; 25 AM JUR 2nd on Domicile S. 62, 46. 9 28 CJS, S. 12, p. 24. 10 Restatement of the Law, 2d, Conflict of Laws 2d., S. 21, p. 84. 11 Ibid. 12 83 U.S. 442; 21 Law Ed. 442; S.C. 16 Wall 130. 13 Supra. 14 Supra. 15 In re Greens Estate, 191 N.Y.S. 757, 117 Misc. 800, 165 N.Y.S. 1063, 99 Misc. 582. 16 Clark et al. v. Baker et al., 196 SE 750, 186 Ga 65. In the case at bench, we have to decide whether we should continue clinging to the anachronistic common law that demeans women, especially married women. I submit that the Court has no choice except to break away from this common law rule, the root of

the many degradations of Filipino women. Before 1988, our laws particularly the Civil Code, were full of gender discriminations against women. Our esteemed colleague, Madam Justice Flerida Ruth Romero, cited a few of them as follows:21 _______________ 17 Lefcourt, Women and The Law, 1990 ed. 18 404 US 71. 19 28 CJS S. 12, p. 25 citing Shute v. Sargent, 36 A 282, 67 N.H. 305. 20 Op cit., p. 84. _______________ x x x Legal Disabilities Suffered by Wives Not generally known is the fact that under the Civil Code, wives suffer under certain restrictions or disabilities. For instance, the wife cannot accept gifts from others, regardless of the sex of the giver or the value of the gift, other than from her very close relatives, without her husbands consent. She may accept only from, say, her parents, parents-in-law, brothers, sisters and the relatives within the so-called fourth civil degree. She may not exercise her profession or occupation or engage in business if her husband objects on serious grounds or if his income is sufficient to support their family in accordance with their social standing. As to what constitutes serious grounds for objecting, this is within the discretion of the husband.

x x x Because of the present inequitable situation, the amendments to the Civil Law being proposed by the University of the Philippines Law Center would allow absolute divorce which severes the matrimonial ties, such that the divorced spouses are free to get married a year after the divorce is decreed by the courts. However, in order to place the husband and wife on an equal footing insofar as the bases for divorce are concerned, the following are specified as the grounds for absolute divorce: (1) adultery or having a paramour committed by the respondent in any of the ways specified in the Revised Penal Code; or (2) an attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner which amounts to attempted parricide under the Revised Penal Code; (3) abandonment of the petitioner by the respondent without just cause for a period of three consecutive years; or (4) habitual maltreatment. With respect to property relations, the husband is automatically the administrator of the conjugal property owned in common by the married couple even if the wife may be the more astute or enterprising partner. The law does not leave it to the spouses to decide who shall act as such administrator. Consequently, the husband is authorized to engage in acts and enter into transactions beneficial to the conjugal partnership. The wife, however, cannot similarly bind the partnership without the husbands consent. _______________ 21 Womens Status in Philippine Society, UP Law Center, 1979, pp. 4-6.

______________ And while both exercise joint parental authority over their children, it is the father whom the law designates as the legal administrator of the property pertaining to the unemancipated child. Taking the lead in Asia, our government exerted efforts, principally through legislations, to eliminate inequality between men and women in our land. The watershed came on August 3, 1988 when our Family Code took effect which, among others, terminated the unequal treatment of husband and wife as to their rights and responsibilities.22 _______________ 22 In submitting the draft of the Family Code to President Corazon Aquino, the Civil Code Revision Committee stated: Close to forty years of experience under the Civil Code adopted in 1949 and changes and developments in all aspects of Filipino life since then have revealed the unsuitability of certain provisions of that Code, implanted from foreign sources, to Philippine culture; the unfairness, unjustness, and gaps or inadequacies of others; and the need to attune them to contemporary developments and trends. In particularto cite only a few instances(1) the property regime of conjugal partnership of gains is not in accord with Filipino custom, especially in the rural areas, which is more congenial to absolute community of property; (2) there have considerably been more grounds for annulment of marriage by the Church than those

provided by the Code, thus giving rise to the absurd situation of several marriages already annulled under Canon Law but still considered subsisting under the Civil Law and making it necessary to make the grounds for annulment under both laws to coincide; (3) unequal treatment of husband and wife as to rights and responsibilities, which necessitates a response to the long-standing clamor for equality between men and women now mandated as a policy to be implemented under the New Constitution; (4) the inadequacy of the safeguards for strengthening marriage and the family as basic social institutions recognized as such by the New Constitution; (5) recent developments have shown the absurdity of limiting the grounds for legal separation to the antiquated two grounds provided under the Civil Code; (6) the need for additional safeguards to protect our children in the matter of adoption by foreigners; and (7) to bring our law on paternity and filiation in step with or abreast of the latest scientific discoveries. (Italics supplied) The Family Code attained this elusive objective by giving new rights to married women and by abolishing sex-based privileges of husbands. Among others, married women are now given the joint right to administer the family property, whether in the absolute community system or in the system of conjugal partnership;23 joint parental authority over their minor children, both over their persons as well as their properties;24 joint responsibility for the support of the family;25 the right to jointly manage the household;26 and, the right to object to their husbands exercise of profession, occupation, business or activity.27 Of particular relevance to the case at bench is Article 69 of the Family Code which took away the exclusive right of the husband to fix the family domicile and gave it jointly to the husband and the wife, thus:

Art. 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile . In case of disagreement, the court shall decide. The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter should live abroad or there are other valid and compelling reasons for the exemption. However, such exemption shall not apply if the same is not compatible with the solidarity of the family. (Italics supplied) Article 69 repealed Article 110 of the Civil Code. Commenting on the duty of the husband and wife to live together, former Madam Justice Alice Sempio-Diy of the Court of Appeals specified the instances when a wife may now refuse to live with her husband, thus:28 (2) The wife has the duty to live with her husband, but she may refuse to do so in certain cases like: (a) If the place chosen by the husband as family residence is dangerous to her life; _______________ 23 Article 96, Family Code. 24 Article 225, Family Code. 25 Article 70, Family Code. 26 Article 71, Family Code. 27 Article 73, Family Code.

28 Op cit., Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines, pp. 9899. _________________ (b) If the husband subjects her to maltreatment or abusive conduct or insults, making common life impossible; (c) If the husband compels her to live with his parents, but she cannot get along with her mother-in-law and they have constant quarrels (Del Rosario v. Del Rosario, CA, 46 OG 6122); (d) Where the husband has continuously carried illicit relations for 10 years with different women and treated his wife roughly and without consideration (Dadivas v. Villanueva, 54 Phil. 92); (e) Where the husband spent his time in gambling, giving no money to his family for food and necessities, and at the same time insulting his wife and laying hands on her (Panuncio v. Sula, CA, 34 OG 129); (f) If the husband has no fixed residence and lives a vagabond life as a tramp (1 Manresa 329); (g) If the husband is carrying on a shameful business at home (Gahn v. Darby, 36 La. Ann. 70). The inescapable conclusion is that our Family Code has completely emancipated the wife from the control of the husband , thus abandoning the parties theoretic identity of interest. No less than the late revered Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes who chaired the Civil Code Revision Committee of the UP Law Center gave this insightful view in one of his rare lectures after retirement:29

x x x. The Family Code is primarily intended to reform the family law so as to emancipate the wife from the exclusive control of the husband and to place her at parity with him insofar as the family is concerned. The wife and the husband are now placed on equal standing by the Code. They are now joint administrators of the family properties and exercise joint authority over the persons and properties of their children. This means a dual authority in the family. The husband will no longer prevail over the wife but she has to agree on all matters concerning the family. (Italics supplied) In light of the Family Code which abrogated the inequality between husband and wife as started and perpetuated by the common law, there is no reason in espousing the anomalous rule that the wife still retains the domicile of her dead husband. Article 110 of the Civil Code which provides the statutory support for this stance has been repealed by Article 69 of the Family Code. By its appeal, it becomes a dead-letter law, and we are not free to resurrect it by giving it further effect in any way or manner such as by ruling that the petitioner is still bound by the domiciliary determination of her dead husband. _______________ 29 As cited in Diy, Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines, pp. 184-185. _______________ Aside from reckoning with the Family Code, we have to consider our Constitution and its firm guarantees of due process and equal

protection of law.30 It can hardly be doubted that the common law imposition on a married woman of her dead husbands domicile even beyond his grave is patently discriminatory to women. It is a gender-based discrimination and is not rationally related to the objective of promoting family solidarity. It cannot survive a constitutional challenge. Indeed, compared with our previous fundamental laws, the 1987 Constitution is more concerned with equality between sexes as it explicitly commands that the State x x x shall ensure fundamental equality before the law of women and men. To be exact, section 14, Article II provides: The State recognizes the role of women in nation building, and shall ensure fundamental equality before the law of women and men. We shall be transgressing the sense and essence of this constitutional mandate if we insist on giving our women the cavemans treatment. Prescinding from these premises, I respectfully submit that the better stance is to rule that petitioner reacquired her Tacloban domicile upon the death of her husband in 1989. This is the necessary consequence of the view that petitioners Batac dictated domicile did not continue after her husbands death; otherwise, she would have no domicile and that will violate the universal rule that no person can be without a domicile at any point of time. This stance also restores the right of petitioner to choose her domicile before it was taken away by Article 110 of the Civil Code, a right now recognized by the Family Code and protected by the Constitution. Likewise, I cannot see the fairness of the common law requiring petitioner to choose again her Tacloban domicile before she could be released from her Batac domicile. She lost her Tacloban domicile not through her act but through the act of her deceased husband when he fixed their domicile in Batac. Her

husband is dead and he cannot rule her beyond the grave. The law disabling her to choose her own domicile has been repealed. Considering all these, common law should not put the burden on petitioner to prove she has abandoned her dead husbands domicile. There is neither rhyme nor reason for this gender-based burden. _______________ 30 Section 1, Article III of the Constitution provides: No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. _________________ But even assuming arguendo that there is need for convincing proof that petitioner chose to reacquire her Tacloban domicile, still, the records reveal ample evidence to this effect . In her affidavit submitted to the respondent COMELEC, petitioner averred: x x x 36. In November, 1991, I came home to our beloved country, after several requests for my return were denied by President Corazon C. Aquino, and after I filed suits for our Government to issue me my passport. 37. But I came home without the mortal remains of my beloved husband, President Ferdinand E. Marcos, which the Government unreasonably considered a threat to the national security and welfare.

38. Upon my return to the country, I wanted to immediately live and reside in Tacloban City or in Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, even if my residences there were not livable as they had been destroyed and cannibalized. The PCGG, however, did not permit and allow me. 39. As a consequence, I had to live at various times in the Westin Philippine Plaza in Pasay City, a friends apartment on Ayala Avenue, a house in South Forbes Park which my daughter rented, and Pacific Plaza, all in Makati. 40. After the 1992 Presidential Elections, I lived and resided in the residence of my brother in San Jose, Tacloban City, and pursued my negotiations with PCGG to recover my sequestered residences in Tacloban City and Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. 40.1 In preparation for my observance of All Saints Day and All Souls Day that year, I renovated my parents burial grounds and entombed their bones which had been excavated, unearthed and scattered.

Representative, allowed me to repair and renovate my Leyte residences. I quote part of his letter: Dear Col. Kempis. Upon representation by Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos to this Commission, that she intends to visit our sequestered properties in Leyte, please allow her access thereto. She may also cause repairs and renovation of the sequestered properties, in which event, it shall be understood that her undertaking said repairs is not authorization for her to take over said properties, and that all expenses shall be for her account and not reimbursable. Please extend the necessary courtesy to her. x x x 43. I was not permitted, however, to live and stay in the Sto. Nio Shrine residence in Tacloban City where I wanted to stay and reside, after repairs and renovations were completed. In August 1994, I transferred from San Jose, Tacloban City, to my residence in Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, when PCGG permitted me to stay and live there. It is then clear that in 1992 petitioner reestablished her domicile in the First District of Leyte . It is not disputed that in 1992, she first lived at the house of her brother in San Jose, Tacloban City and later, in August 1994, she transferred her residence in Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. Both Tacloban City and the municipality of Olot are within the First District of Leyte. Since petitioner reestablished her old domicile in 1992 in the First District of Leyte, she more than complied with the constitutional requirement of residence x x x for

41. On November 29, 1993, I formally wrote PCGG Chairman Magtanggol Gunigundo for permissions to x x x rehabilitate x x x (o)ur ancestral house in Tacloban and farm house in Olot, Leyte x x x to make them livable for us the Marcos family to have a home in our own motherland. x x x 42. It was only on 06 June 1994, however, when PCGG Chairman Gunigundo, in his letter to Col. Simeon Kempis, Jr., PCGG Region 8

a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election, i.e., the May 8, 1995 elections. The evidence presented by the private respondent to negate the Tacloban domicile of petitioner is nil. He presented petitioners Voters Registration Record filed with the Board of Election Inspectors of Precinct 10-A of Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte wherein she stated that her period of residence in said barangay was six (6) months as of the date of her filing of said Voters Registration Record on January 28, 1995.31 This statement in petitioners Voters Registration Record is a non-prejudicial admission . The Constitution requires at least one (1) year residence in the district in which the candidate shall be elected. In the case at bench, the reference is the First District of Leyte. Petitioners statement proved that she resided in Olot six (6) months before January 28, 1995 but did not disprove that she has also resided in Tacloban City starting 1992. As aforestated, Olot and Tacloban City are both within the First District of Leyte, hence, her six (6) months residence in Olot should be counted not against, but in her favor. Private respondent also presented petitioners Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 8, 199532 where she placed seven (7) months after Item No. 8 which called for information regarding residence in the constituency where I seek to be elected immediately preceding the election. Again, this original certificate of candidacy has no evidentiary value because on March 1, 1995 it was corrected by petitioner. In her Amended/ Corrected Certificate of Candidacy,33 petitioner wrote since childhood after Item No. 8. The amendment of a certificate of candidacy to correct a bona fide mistake has been allowed by this Court as a matter of course and as a matter of right. As we held in Alialy v. COMELEC,34 viz. :

x x x The absence of the signature of the Secretary of the local chapter N.P. in the original certificate of candidacy presented before the deadline September 11, 1959, did not render the certificate invalid. The amendment of the certificate, although at a date after the deadline, but before the election, was substantial compliance with the law, and the defect was cured. _______________ 31 Exhibit E; see also Exhibit B in SPA No. 95-001. 32 Exhibit A in SPA No. 95-009. 33 Exhibit 2 in SPA No. 95-009. 34 2 SCRA 957, 960 (1961); See Canceran v. COMELEC, 107 Phil. 607 (1960); Gabaldon v. COMELEC, 99 Phil. 898 (1956). ___________________ It goes without saying that petitioners erroneous Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 8, 1995 cannot be used as evidence against her. Private respondents petition for the disqualification of petitioner rested alone on these two (2) brittle pieces of documentary evidencepetitioners Voters Registration Record and her original Certificate of Candidacy. Ranged against the evidence of the petitioner showing her ceaseless contacts with Tacloban private respondents two (2) pieces of evidence are too insufficient to disqualify petitioner, more so, to deny her the right to represent the people of the First District of Leyte who have overwhelmingly voted for her.

Fifth. Section 10, Article IX-C of the Constitution mandates that bona fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination.35 A detached reading of the records of the case at bench will show that all forms of legal and extra-legal obstacles have been thrown against petitioner to prevent her from running as the peoples representative in the First District of Leyte. In petitioners Answer to the petition to disqualify her, she averred:36 xxx xxx xxx

same objective, as it is obvious that he is afraid to submit himself along with respondent (petitioner herein) for the judgment and verdict of the electorate of the First District of Leyte in an honest, orderly, peaceful, free and clean elections on May 8, 1995. _______________ 35 Section 26, Article II of the Constitution also provides: The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service x x x. 36 Annex G, Petition. ___________________ These allegations which private respondent did not challenge were not lost to the perceptive eye of Commissioner Maambong who in his Dissenting Opinion,37 held: x x x Prior to the registration dateJanuary 28, 1995the petitioner (herein private respondent Montejo) wrote the Election Officer of Tacloban City not to allow respondent (petitioner herein) to register thereat since she is a resident of Tolosa and not Tacloban City. The purpose of this move of the petitioner (Montejo) is not lost to (sic) the Commission. In UND No. 95-001 (In the matter of the Legislative Districts of the Provinces of Leyte, Iloilo, and South Cotabato, Out of Which the New Provinces of Biliran, Guimaras and Saranggani Were Respectively Created ), x x x Hon. Cirilo Roy G. Montejo, Representative, First District of Leyte, wanted the Municipality of Tolosa, in the First District of Leyte, transferred to the Second

10. Petitioners (herein private respondent Montejo) motive in filing the instant petition is devious. When respondent (petitioner herein) announced that she was intending to register as a voter in Tacloban City and run for Congress in the First District of Leyte, petitioner (Montejo) immediately opposed her intended registration by writing a letter stating that she is not a resident of said city but of Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. (Annex 2 of respondents affidavit, Annex 2). After respondent (petitioner herein) had registered as a voter in Tolosa following completion of her six-month actual residence therein, petitioner (Montejo) filed a petition with the COMELEC to transfer the town of Tolosa from the First District to the Second District and pursued such move up to the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 118702, his purpose being to remove respondent (petitioner herein) as petitioners (Montejos) opponent in the congressional election in the First District. He also filed a bill, along with other Leyte Congressmen, seeking to create another legislative district, to remove the town of Tolosa out of the First District and to make it a part of the new district, to achieve his purpose. However, such bill did not pass the Senate. Having failed on such moves, petitioner now filed the instant petition, for the

District of Leyte. The Hon. Sergio A.F. Apostol, Representative of the Second District of Leyte, opposed the move of the petitioner (Montejo). Under Comelec Resolution No. 2736 (December 29, 1994), the Commission on Elections refused to make the proposed transfer. Petitioner (Montejo) filed Motion for Reconsideration of Resolution No. 2736 which the Commission denied in a Resolution promulgated on February 1, 1995. Petitioner (Montejo) filed a petition for certiorari before the Honorable Supreme Court (Cirilo Roy G. Montejo vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 118702) questioning the resolution of the Commission. Believing that he could get a favorable ruling from the Supreme Court, petitioner (Montejo) tried to make sure that the respondent (petitioner herein) will register as a voter in Tolosa so that she will be forced to run as Representative not in the First but in the Second District. It did not happen. On March 16, 1995, the Honorable Supreme Court unanimously promulgated a Decision, penned by Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno, the dispositive portion of which reads: _______________ 37 Petition, Annex B-1, pp. 6-7. _______________ IN VIEW WHEREOF, Section 1 of Resolution No. 2736 insofar as it transferred the municipality of Capoocan of the Second District and the municipality of Palompon of the Fourth District to the Third District of the province of Leyte, is annulled and set aside. We also deny the Petition praying for the transfer of the municipality of Tolosa from the First District to the Second District of the province of Leyte. No costs.

Petitioners (Montejos) plan did not work. But the respondent (petitioner herein) was constrained to register in the Municipality of Tolosa where her house is instead of Tacloban City, her domicile. In any case, both Tacloban City and Tolosa are in the same First Legislative District. All these attempts to misuse our laws and legal processes are forms of rank harassments and invidious discriminations against petitioner to deny her equal access to a public office. We cannot commit any hermeneutic violence to the Constitution by torturing the meaning of equality, the end result of which will allow the harassment and discrimination of petitioner who has lived a controversial life, a past of alternating light and shadow. There is but one Constitution for all Filipinos. Petitioner cannot be adjudged by a different Constitution, and the worst way to interpret the Constitution is to inject in its interpretation, bile and bitterness. Sixth. In Gallego v. Vera,38 we explained that the reason for this residence requirement is to exclude a stranger or newcomer, unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community and not identified with the latter, from an elective office to serve that community x x x. Petitioners lifetime contacts with the First District of Leyte cannot be contested. Nobody can claim that she is not acquainted with its problems because she is a stranger to the place. None can argue she cannot satisfy the intent of the Constitution. Seventh. In resolving election cases, a dominant consideration is the need to effectuate the will of the electorate. The election results show that petitioner received Seventy Thousand Four Hundred Seventy-One (70,471) votes, while private respondent got only

Thirty-Six Thousand Eight Hundred Thirty-Three (36,833) votes. Petitioner is clearly the overwhelming choice of the electorate of the First District of Leyte and this is not a sleight of statistics. We cannot frustrate this sovereign will on highly arguable technical considerations. In case of doubt, we should lean towards a rule that will give life to the peoples political judgment. _______________ 38 73 Phil. 453, 459 (1951). _______________ A final point. The case at bench provides the Court with the rare opportunity to rectify the inequality of status between women and men by rejecting the iniquitous common law precedents on the domicile of married women and by redefining domicile in accord with our own culture, law, and Constitution. To rule that a married woman is eternally tethered to the domicile dictated by her dead husband is to preserve the anachronistic and anomalous balance of advantage of a husband over his wife. We should not allow the dead to govern the living even if the glories of yesteryears seduce us to shout long live the dead! The Family Code buried this gender-based discrimination against married women and we should not excavate what has been entombed. More importantly, the Constitution forbids it. I vote to grant the petition. CONCURRING OPINION FRANCISCO, J.:

I concur with Mr. Justice Kapunans ponencia finding petitioner qualified for the position of Representative of the First Congressional District of Leyte. I wish, however, to express a few comments on the issue of petitioners domicile. Domicile has been defined as that place in which a persons habitation is fixed, without any present intention of removing therefrom, and that place is properly the domicile of a person in which he has voluntarily fixed his abode, or habitation, not for a mere special or temporary purpose, but with a present intention of making it his permanent home (28 C.J.S. 1). It denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business, or pleasure, or for like reasons one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances, in the sense that they disclose intent. (Ong Huan Tin v. Republic, 19 SCRA 966, 969). Domicile is classified into domicile of origin and domicile of choice. The law attributes to every individual a domicile of origin, which is the domicile of his parents, or of the head of his family, or of the person on whom he is legally dependent at the time of his birth. While the domicile of origin is generally the place where one is born or reared, it maybe elsewhere (28 C.J.S. 5). Domicile of choice, on the other hand, is the place which the person has elected and chosen for himself to displace his previous domicile; it has for its true basis or foundation the intention of the person (28 C.J.S. 6). In order to hold that a person has abandoned his domicile and acquired a new one called domicile of choice, the following requisites must concur, namely, (a) residence or bodily presence in the new locality, (b) intention to remain there or animus manendi, and (c) an intention to abandon the old domicile or animus non revertendi (Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City , 226 SCRA 408,

415). A third classification is domicile by operation of law which attributes to a person a domicile independent of his own intention or actual residence, ordinarily resulting from legal domestic relations, as that of the wife arising from marriage, or the relation of a parent and a child (28 C.J.S. 7). In election law, when our Constitution speaks of residence for election purposes it means domicile (Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 199 SCRA 692, 713; Nuval v. Guray, 52 Phil. 645, 651). To my mind, public respondent Commission on Elections misapplied this concept of domicile which led to petitioners disqualification by ruling that petitioner failed to comply with the constitutionally mandated one-year residence requirement. Apparently, public respondent Commission deemed as conclusive petitioners stay and registration as voter in many places as conduct disclosing her intent to abandon her established domicile of origin in Tacloban, Leyte. In several decisions, though, the Court has laid down the rule that registration of a voter in a place other than his place of origin is not sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of such residence (Faypon v. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294, 300). Respondent Commission offered no cogent reason to depart from this rule except to surmise petitioners intent of abandoning her domicile of origin. It has been suggested that petitioners domicile of origin was supplanted by a new domicile due to her marriage, a domicile by operation of law. The proposition is that upon the death of her husband in 1989 she retains her husbands domicile, i.e., Batac, Ilocos Norte, until she makes an actual change thereof. I find this proposition quite untenable.

Tacloban, Leyte, is petitioners domicile of origin which was involuntarily supplanted with another, i.e., Batac, Ilocos Norte, upon her marriage in 1954 with then Congressman Marcos. By legal fiction she followed the domicile of her husband. In my view, the reason for the law is for the spouses to fully and effectively perform their marital duties and obligations to one another.1 The question of domicile, however, is not affected by the fact that it was the legal or moral duty of the individual to reside in a given place (28 C.J.S. 11). Thus, while the wife retains her marital domicile so long as the marriage subsists, she automatically loses it upon the latters termination, for the reason behind the law then ceases. Otherwise, petitioner, after her marriage was ended by the death of her husband, would be placed in a quite absurd and unfair situation of having been freed from all wifely obligations yet made to hold on to one which no longer serves any meaningful purpose. It is my view therefore that petitioner reverted to her original domicile of Tacloban, Leyte upon her husbands death without even signifying her intention to that effect. It is for the private respondent to prove, not for petitioner to disprove, that petitioner has effectively abandoned Tacloban, Leyte for Batac, Ilocos Norte or for some other place/s. The clear rule is that it is the party (herein private respondent) claiming that a person has abandoned or lost his residence of origin who must show and prove preponderantly such abandonment or loss (Faypon v. Quirino, supra at 298; 28 C.J.S. 16), because the presumption is strongly in favor of an original or former domicile, as against an acquired one (28 C.J.S. 16). Private respondent unfortunately failed to discharge this burden as the record is devoid of convincing proof that petitioner has acquired,

whether voluntarily or involuntarily, a new domicile to replace her domicile of origin. _______________ 1 See Articles 68-73 of E.O. 209, as amended, otherwise known as The Family Code of the Philippines. _______________ The records, on the contrary, clearly show that petitioner has complied with the constitutional one-year residence requirement. After her exile abroad, she returned to the Philippines in 1991 to reside in Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, but the Presidential Commission on Good Government which sequestered her residential house and other properties forbade her necessitating her transient stay in various places in Manila (Affidavit p. 6, attached as Annex I of the Petition). In 1992, she ran for the position of president writing in her certificate of candidacy her residence as San Juan, Metro Manila. After her loss therein, she went back to Tacloban City, acquired her residence certificate2 and resided with her brother in San Jose. She resided in San Jose, Tacloban City until August of 1994 when she was allowed by the PCGG to move and reside in her sequestered residential house in Olot, Tolosa, Leyte (Annex I, p. 6).3 It was in the same month of August when she applied for the cancellation of her previous registration in San Juan, Metro Manila in order to register anew as voter of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, which she did on January 28, 1995. From this sequence of events, I find it quite improper to use as the reckoning period of the one-year residence requirement the date when she applied for the cancellation of her previous registration in San Juan, Metro Manila. The fact which private

respondent never bothered to disprove is that petitioner transferred her residence after the 1992 presidential election from San Juan, Metro Manila to San Jose, Tacloban City, and resided therein until August of 1994. She later transferred to Olot, Tolosa, Leyte (Annex I, p. 7). It appearing that both Tacloban City and Tolosa, Leyte are within the First Congressional District of Leyte, it indubitably stands that she had more than a year of residence in the constituency she sought to be elected. Petitioner, therefore, has satisfactorily complied with the one-year qualification required by the 1987 Constitution.

I vote to grant the petition. _______________ 2 Residence Certificate No. 15226186L, dated Nov. 5, 1992. 3 PCGG Chairman Gunigundos letter addressed to Col. Kempis. ______________ DISSENTING OPINION PADILLA, J.: I regret that I cannot join the majority opinion as expressed in the well-written ponencia of Mr. Justice Kapunan. As in any controversy arising out of a Constitutional provision, the inquiry must begin and end with the provision itself. The controversy should not be blurred by what, to me, are academic

disquisitions. In this particular controversy, the Constitutional provision on point states thatno person shall be a member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, and on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five (25) years of age, able to read and write, and except the party list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election. (Article VI, section 6) It has been argued that for purposes of our election laws, the term residence has been understood as synonymous with domicile. This argument has been validated by no less than the Court in numerous cases1 where significantly the factual circumstances clearly and convincingly proved that a person does not effectively lose his domicile of origin if the intention to reside therein is manifest with his personal presence in the place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. With this basic thesis in mind, it would not be difficult to conceive of different modalities within which the phrase a resident thereof (meaning, the legislative district) for a period of not less than one year would fit. _______________ 1 Nuval vs. Guray, G.R. No. 30241, December 29, 1928; Larena vs. Teves, G.R. No. 42439, December 10, 1934; Gallego vs. Verra, G.R. No. 48641, November 24, 1941; De los Reyes vs. Solidum, G.R. No. 42798, August 31, 1935; but see Romualdez vs. RTC, Br. 7 Tacloban City, where a sudden departure from the country was not deemed

voluntary so as to constitute abandonment of domicile both in fact and in law. ____________________ The first instance is where a persons residence and domicile coincide in which case a person only has to prove that he has been domiciled in a permanent location for not less than a year before the election. A second situation is where a person maintains a residence apart from his domicile in which case he would have the luxury of district shopping, provided of course, he satisfies the one-year residence period in the district as the minimum period for eligibility to the position of congressional representative for the district. In either case, one would not be constitutionally disqualified for abandoning his residence in order to return to his domicile of origin, or better still, domicile of choice; neither would one be disqualified for abandoning altogether his domicile in favor of his residence in the district where he desires to be a candidate. The most extreme circumstance would be a situation wherein a person maintains several residences in different districts. Since his domicile of origin continues as an option as long as there is no effective abandonment (animus non revertendi), he can practically choose the district most advantageous for him. All these theoretical scenarios, however, are tempered by the unambiguous limitation that for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election, he must be a resident in the district where he desires to be elected.

To my mind, the one year residence period is crucial regardless of whether or not the term residence is to be synonymous with domicile. In other words, the candidates intent and actual presence in one district must in all situations satisfy the length of time prescribed by the fundamental law. And this, because of a definite Constitutional purpose. He must be familiar with the environment and problems of a district he intends to represent in Congress and the one-year residence in said district would be the minimum period to acquire such familiarity, if not versatility. In the case of petitioner Imelda R. Marcos, the operative facts are distinctly set out in the now assailed decision of the Comelec 2nd Division dated 24 April 1995 (as affirmed by the Comelec en banc) In or about 1938 when respondent was a little over 8 years old, she established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte (Tacloban City). She studied in the Holy Infant Academy in Tacloban from 1938 to 1948 when she graduated from high school. She pursued her college studies in St. Pauls College, now Divine Word University of Tacloban, where she earned her degree in Education. Thereafter, she taught in the Leyte Chinese High School, still in Tacloban City. In 1952 she went to Manila to work with her cousin, the late Speaker Daniel Z. Romualdez in his office in the House of Representatives. In 1954, she married ex-President Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a congressman of Ilocos Norte. She lived with him in Batac, Ilocos Norte and registered there as a voter. When her husband was elected Senator of the Republic in 1959, she and her husband lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965 when her husband was elected President of the Republic of the Philippines, she lived with him in Malacaang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel, Manila.

During the Marcos presidency, respondent served as a Member of the Batasang Pambansa, Minister of Human Settlements and Governor of Metro Manila. She claimed that in February 1986, she and her family were abducted and kidnapped to Honolulu, Hawaii. In November 1991, she came home to Manila. In 1992 respondent ran for election as President of the Philippines and filed her Certificate of Candidacy wherein she indicated that she is a resident and registered voter of San Juan, Metro Manila. On August 24, 1994, respondent filed a letter with the election officer of San Juan, Metro Manila, requesting for cancellation of her registration in the Permanent List of Voters in Precinct No. 157 of San Juan, Metro Manila, in order that she may be re-registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. (Annex 2-B, Answer). On August 31, 1994, respondent filed her Sworn Application for Cancellation of Voters Previous Registration (Annex 2-C, Answer) stating that she is a duly registered voter in Precinct No. 157-A, Brgy. Maytunas, San Juan, Metro Manila and that she intends to register at Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. On January 28, 1995 respondent registered as a voter at Precinct No. 18-A of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. She filed with the Board of Election Inspectors CE Form No. I, Voter Registration Record No. 943349772, wherein she alleged that she has resided in the municipality of Tolosa for a period of 6 months (Annex A, Petition). On March 8, 1995, respondent filed with the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor, Leyte, a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte wherein she also alleged that she has been a resident in the constituency where she seeks to be elected for a period of 7 months. The pertinent entries therein are as follows:

7. PROFESSION OR OCCUPATION: Housewife/Teacher/ Social Worker 8. RESIDENCE (complete address): Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte Post Office Address for election purposes: Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte 9. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHEREIN I SEEK TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING ELECTION:_______ Years Seven Months 10. I AM NOT A PERMANENT RESIDENT OF, OR IMMIGRANT TO, A FOREIGN COUNTRY. THAT I AM ELIGIBLE for said office; That I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; That I will obey the laws, legal orders and decrees promulgated by the duly-constituted authorities; That the obligation imposed by my oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and That the facts stated herein are true to the best of my knowledge. (Sgd.) Imelda Romualdez-Marcos (Signature of Candidate)2 Petitioners aforestated certificate of candidacy filed on 8 March 1995 contains the decisive component or seed of her disqualification. It is contained in her answer under oath of seven months to the query of residence in the constituency wherein I seek to be elected immediately preceding the election.

It follows from all the above that the Comelec committed no grave abuse of discretion in holding that petitioner is disqualified from the position of representative for the 1st congressional district of Leyte in the elections of 8 May 1995, for failure to meet the not less than one-year residence in the constituency (1st district, Leyte) immediately preceding the day of election (8 May 1995). Having arrived at petitioners disqualification to be a representative of the first district of Leyte, the next important issue to resolve is whether or not the Comelec can order the Board of Canvassers to determine and proclaim the winner out of the remaining qual ified candidates for representative in said district. I am not unaware of the pronouncement made by this Court in the case of Labo vs. Comelec, G.R. 86564, August 1, 1989, 176 SCRA 1 which gave the rationale as laid down in the early 1912 case of Topacio vs. Paredes, 23 Phil. 238 that: x x x. Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have received the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all republican forms of government that no one can be declared elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the election. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 676) The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to be disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he was elected does not necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes to be declared

the winner of the elective office. The votes cast for a dead, disqualified, or non-eligible person may not be valid to vote the winner into office or maintain him there. However, in the absence of a statute which clearly asserts a contrary political and legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in the sincere belief that the candidate was alive, qualified, or eligible, they should not be treated as stray, void or meaningless. Under Sec. 6 RA 6646, (An Act Introducing Additional Reforms in the Electoral System and for other purposes) (84 O.G. 905, 22 February 1988) it is provided that: x x xAny candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may, during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. There is no need to indulge in legal hermeneutics to sense the plain and unambiguous meaning of the provision quoted above. As the law now stands, the legislative policy does not limit its concern with the effect of a final judgment of disqualification only before the election, but even during or after the election. The law is clear that in all situations, the votes cast for a disqualified candidate SHALL NOT BE COUNTED. The law has also validated the jurisdiction of the Court or Commission on Elections to continue hearing the petition

for disqualification in case a candidate is voted for and receives the highest number of votes, if for any reason, he is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified . Since the present case is an after election scenario, the power to suspend proclamation (when evidence of his guilt is strong) is also explicit under the law. What happens then when after the elections are over, one is declared disqualified? Then, votes cast for him shall not be counted and in legal contemplation, he no longer received the highest number of votes. It stands to reason that Section 6 of RA 6646 does not make the second placer the winner simply because a winning candidate is disqualified, but that the law considers him as the candidate who had obtained the highest number of votes as a result of the votes cast for the disqualified candidate not being counted or considered. As this law clearly reflects the legislative policy on the matter, then there is no reason why this Court should not re-examine and consequently abandon the doctrine in the Jun Labo case. It has been stated that the qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility most especially when it is mandated by no less than the Constitution. ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition and to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte to proclaim the candidate receiving the highest number of votes, from among the qualified candidates, as the duly elected representative of the 1st district of Leyte.

DISSENTING OPINION REGALADO, J.: While I agree with some of the factual bases of the majority opinion, I cannot arrive conjointly at the same conclusion drawn therefrom. Hence, this dissent which assuredly is not formulated on the basis of the personality of a petitioner in a case. I go along with the majority in their narration of antecedent facts, insofar as the same are pertinent to this case, and which I have simplified as follows: 1. Petitioner, although born in Manila, resided during her childhood in the present Tacloban City, she being a legitimate daughter of parents who appear to have taken up permanent residence therein. She also went to school there and, for a time, taught in one of the schools in that city. 2. When she married then Rep. Ferdinand E. Marcos who was then domiciled in Batac, Ilocos Norte, by operation of law she acquired a new domicile in that place in 1954. 3. In the successive years and during the events that happened thereafter, her husband having been elected as a Senator and then as President, she lived with him and their family in San Juan, Rizal and then in Malacaang Palace in San Miguel, Manila. 4. Over those years, she registered as a voter and actually voted in Batac, Ilocos Norte, then in San Juan, Rizal, and also in San Miguel, Manila, all these merely in the exercise of the right of suffrage.

5. It does not appear that her husband, even after he had assumed those lofty positions successively, even abandoned his domicile of origin in Batac, Ilocos Norte where he maintained his residence and invariably voted in all elections. 6. After the ouster of her husband from the presidency in 1986 and the sojourn of the Marcos family in Honolulu, Hawaii, U.S.A., she eventually returned to the Philippines in 1991 and resided in different places which she claimed to have been merely temporary residences. 7. In 1992, petitioner ran for election as President of the Philippines and in her certificate of candidacy she indicated that she was then a registered voter and resident of San Juan, Metro Manila. 8. On August 24, 1994, she filed a letter for the cancellation of her registration in the Permanent List of Voters in Precinct No. 157 of San Juan, Metro Manila in order that she may be re-registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. On August 31, 1994, she followed this up with her Sworn Application for Cancellation of Voters Previous Registration wherein she stated that she was a registered voter in Precinct No. 157-A, Brgy. Maytunas, San Juan, Metro Manila and that she intended to register in Brgy, Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. 9. On January 28, 1995, petitioner registered as a voter at Precinct No. 18-A of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, for which purpose she filed with the therein Board of Election Inspectors a voters registration record form alleging that she had resided in that municipality for six months.

10. On March 8, 1995, petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte wherein she alleged that she had been a resident for Seven Months of the constituency where she sought to be elected. 11. On March 29, 1995, she filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy wherein her answer in the original certificate of candidacy to item 8. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK, TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION: was changed or replaced with a new entry reading SINCE CHILDHOOD. The sole issue for resolution is whether, for purposes of her candidacy, petitioner had complied with the residency requirement of one year as mandated by no less than Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. I do not intend to impose upon the time of my colleagues with a dissertation on the difference between residence and domicile. We have had enough of that and I understand that for purposes of political law and, for that matter of international law, residence is understood to be synonymous with domicile. That is so understood in our jurisprudence and in American Law, in contradistinction to the concept of residence for purposes of civil, commercial and procedural laws whenever an issue thereon is relevant or controlling. Consequently, since in the present case the question of petitioners residence is integrated in and inseparable from her domicile, I am addressing the issue from the standpoint of the concept of the latter term, specifically its permutations into the domicile of origin,

domicile of choice and domicile by operation of law, as understood in American law from which for this case we have taken our jurisprudential bearings. My readings inform me that the domicile of the parents at the time of birth, or what is termed the domicile of origin, constitutes the domicile of an infant until abandoned, or until the acquisition of a new domicile in a different place.1 In the instant case, we may grant that petitioners domicile of origin,2 at least as of 1938, was what is now Tacloban City. Now, as I have observed earlier, domicile is said to be of three kinds, that is, domicile by birth, domicile by choice, and domicile by operation of law. The first is the common case of the place of birth or domicilium originis ; the second is that which is voluntarily acquired by a party or domicilium proprio motu ; the last which is consequential, as that of a wife arising from marriage,3 is sometimes called domicilium necesarium . There is no debate that the domicile of origin can be lost or replaced by a domicile of choice or a domicile by operation of law subsequently acquired by the party. When petitioner contracted marriage in 1954 with then Rep. Marcos, by operation of law, not only international or American but of our own enactment,4 she acquired her husbands domicile of origin in Batac, Ilocos Norte and correspondingly lost her own domicile of origin in Tacloban City. Her subsequent changes of residenceto San Juan, Rizal, then to San Miguel, Manila, thereafter to Honolulu, Hawaii, and back to now San Juan, Metro Manilado not appear to have resulted in her

thereby acquiring new domiciles of choice. In fact, it appears that her having resided in those places was by reason of the fortunes or misfortunes of her husband and his peregrinations in the assumption of new official positions or the loss of them. Her residence in Honolulu and, of course, those after her return to the Philippines were, as she claimed, against her will or only for transient purposes which could not have invested them with the status of domiciles of choice.5 _______________ 2 This is also referred to as natural domicile or domicile by birth (Johnson vs. Twenty-One Bales, 13 Fed. Cas. 863). 3 Story, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 46; Railroad Co. vs. Kimbrough, 115 Ky 512, 74 S.W. 229; and Johnson vs. Harvey, 261 Ky. 522, 88 S.W. 2d 42, 46, 47, as cited in Blacks Law Dictionary, 4th ed. 4 Article 110, Civil Code. 5 Towson vs. Towson, 126 Va. 640, 102 S.E. 48, 52; Fisher vs. Jordan, C.C.A. Tex., 116 F. 2d. 183, 186; Minick vs. Minick, 111 Fla. 469, 149 So. 483, 488; Hartzler vs. Radeka, 265 Mich., 451, 251 N.W. 554. _______________ After petitioners return to the Philippines in 1991 and up to the present imbroglio over her requisite residency in Tacloban City or Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, there is no showing that she ever attempted to acquire any other domicile of choice which could have resulted in the abandonment of her legal domicile in Batac, Ilocos Norte. On that score, we note the majoritys own submission6 that, to

successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate (a) an actual removal or an actual change of domicile, (b) a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one, and (c) acts which correspond with the purpose. We consequently have to also note that these requirements for the acquisition of a domicile of choice apply whether what is sought to be changed or substituted is a domicile of origin (domicilium originis ) or a domicile by operation of law (domicilium necesarium). Since petitioner had lost her domicilium originis which had been replaced by her domicilium necessarium , it is therefore her continuing domicile in Batac, Ilocos Norte which, if at all, can be the object of legal change under the contingencies of the case at bar. To get out of this quandary, the majority decision echoes the dissenting opinion of Commissioner Regalado E. Maambong in SPA 95-009 of the Commission on Elections,7 and advances this novel proposition: It may be said that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952 (sic, 1954). By operation of law (domicilium necesarium), her legal domicile at the time of her marriage became Batac, Ilocos Norte although there were no indications of an intention on her part to abandon her domicile of origin . Because of her husbands subsequent death and through the operation of the provisions of the New Family Code already in force at the time, however, her legal domicile automatically reverted to her domicile of origin. x x x (Italics supplied)

_______________ 6 Citing 18 Am. Jur. 219-220. 7 Montejo vs. Marcos, En Banc, May 10, 1995. _________________ Firstly, I am puzzled why although it is conceded that petitioner had acquired a domicilium necesarium in Batac, Ilocos Norte, the majority insists on making a qualification that she did not intend to abandon her domicile of origin. I find this bewildering since, in this situation, it is the law that declares where petitioners domicile is at any given time, and not her self-serving or putative intent to hold on to her former domicile. Otherwise, contrary to their own admission that one cannot have more than one domicile at a time,8 the majority would be suggesting that petitioner retained Tacloban City as (for lack of a term in law since it does not exist therein) the equivalent of what is fancied as a reserved, dormant, potential, or residual domicile.

find some difficulty in accepting either the logic or the validity of this argument. If a party loses his domicile of origin by obtaining a new domicile of choice, he thereby voluntarily abandons the former in favor of the latter. If, thereafter, he abandons that chosen domicile, he does not per se recover his original domicile unless, by subsequent acts legally indicative thereof, he evinces his intent and desire to establish the same as his new domicile, which is precisely what petitioner belatedly and, evidently just for purposes of her candidacy, unsuccessfully tried to do. Ones subsequent abandonment of his domicile of choice cannot automatically restore his domicile of origin, not only because there is no legal authority therefor but because it would be absurd. Pursued to its logical consequence, that theory of ipso jure reversion would rule out the fact that said party could already very well have obtained another domicile, either of choice or by operation of law, other than his domicile of origin. Significantly and obviously for this reason, the Family Code, which the majority inexplicably invokes, advisedly does not regulate this contingency since it would impinge on ones freedom of choice. Now, in the instant case, petitioner not only voluntarily abandoned her domicile of choice (unless we assume that she entered into the marital state against her will) but, on top of that, such abandonment was further affirmed through her acquisition of a new domicile by operation of law . In fact, this is even a case of both voluntary and legal abandonment of a domicile of origin. With much more reason, therefore, should we reject the proposition that with the termination of her marriage in 1989, petitioner had supposedly

Secondly, domicile once lost in accordance with law can only be recovered likewise in accordance with law. However, we are here being titillated with the possibility of an automatic reversion to or reacquisition of a domicile of origin after the termination of the cause for its loss by operation of law. The majority agrees that since petitioner lost her domicile of origin by her marriage, the termination of the marriage also terminates that effect thereof. I am impressed by the ingeniousness of this theory which proves that, indeed, necessity is the mother of inventions. Regretfully, I

per se and ipso facto reacquired her domicile of origin which she lost in 1954. Otherwise, this would be tantamount to saying that during the period of marital coverture, she was simultaneously in possession and enjoyment of a domicile of origin which was only in a state of suspended animation. Thus, the American rule is likewise to the effect that while after the husbands death the wife has the right to elect her own domicile,9 she nevertheless retains the last domicile of her deceased husband until she makes an actual change.10 In the absence of affirmative evidence, to the contrary, the presumption is that a wifes domicile or legal residence follows that of her husband and will continue after his death.11 I cannot appreciate the premises advanced in support of the majoritys theory based on Articles 68 and 69 of the Family Code. All that is of any relevance therein is that under this new code, the right and power to fix the family domicile is now shared by the spouses. I cannot perceive how that joint right, which in the first place was never exercised by the spouses, could affect the domicile fixed by the law for petitioner in 1954 and, for her husband, long prior thereto. It is true that a wife now has the _______________ 9 Cheely vs. Clayton, D.C., 110 U.S. 701, L. Ed. 298. 10 In re Gates Estate, 191 N.Y.S. 757, 117 Misc. 800In re Greens Estate, 164 N.Y.S. 1063, 99 Misc. 582, affirmed 165 N.Y.S. 1088, 179 App. Div. 890, as reported in 28 C.J.S. 27. 11 Clark vs. Baker, 196 S.E. 750, 186 Ga. 65, op. cit. 37.

_________________ coordinate power to determine the conjugal or family domicile, but that has no bearing on this case. With the death of her husband, and each of her children having gotten married and established their own respective domiciles, the exercise of that joint power was and is no longer called for or material in the present factual setting of this controversy. Instead, what is of concern in petitioners case was the matter of her having acquired or not her own domicile of choice. I agree with the majoritys discourse on the virtues of the growing and expanded participation of women in the affairs of the nation, with equal rights and recognition by Constitution and statutory conferment. However, I have searched in vain for a specific law or judicial pronouncement which either expressly or by necessary implication supports the majoritys desired theory of automatic reacquisition of or reversion to the domicilium originis of petitioner. Definitely, as between the settled and desirable legal norms that should govern this issue, there is a world of difference; and, unquestionably, this should be resolved by legislative articulation but not by the eloquence of the well-turned phrase. In sum, petitioner having lost Tacloban City as her domicile of origin since 1954 and not having automatically reacquired any domicile therein, she cannot legally claim that her residency in the political constituency of which it is a part continued since her birth up to the present. Respondent commission was, therefore, correct in rejecting her pretension to that effect in her amended/ corrected certificate of candidacy, and in holding her to her admission in the original certificate that she had actually resided in that constituency

for only seven months prior to the election. These considerations render it unnecessary to further pass upon the procedural issues raised by petitioner. ON THE FOREGOING PREMISES, I vote to DISMISS the petition for lack of merit. DISSENTING OPINION DAVIDE, JR., J.: I respectfully dissent from the opinion of the majority written by Mr. Justice Santiago M. Kapunan, more particularly on the issue of the petitioners qualification. Under Section 7, Subdivision A, Article IX of the Constitution, decisions, orders, or rulings of the COMELEC may be brought to this Court only by the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Aratuc vs. COMELEC, 88 SCRA 251 [1979]; Dario vs. Mison, 176 SCRA 84 [1989]). Accordingly, a writ of certiorari may be granted only if the COMELEC, has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion (Section 1, Rule 65, Rules of Court). Since the COMELEC has, undoubtedly, jurisdiction over the private respondents petition, the only issue left is whether it acted with grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying the petitioner. My careful and meticulous perusal of the challenged resolution of 24 April 1995 of the COMELEC Second Division and the En Banc resolution of 7 May 1995 discloses total absence of abuse of discretion, much less grave abuse thereof. The resolution of the

Second Division dispassionately and objectively discussed in minute details the facts which established beyond cavil that herein petitioner was disqualified as a candidate on the ground of lack of residence in the First Congressional District of Leyte. It has not misapplied, miscomprehended, or misunderstood facts or circumstances of substance pertinent to the issue of her residence. The majority opinion, however, overturned the COMELECs findings of fact for lack of proof that the petitioner has abandoned Tolosa as her domicile of origin, which is allegedly within the First Congressional District of Leyte. I respectfully submit that the petitioner herself has provided the COMELEC, either by admission or by documentary evidence, overwhelming proof of the loss or abandonment of her domicile of origin, which is Tacloban City and not Tolosa, Leyte. Assuming that she decided to live again in her domicile of origin, that became her second domicile of choice, where her stay, unfortunately, was for only seven months before the day of the election. She was then disqualified to be a candidate for the position of Representative of the First Congressional District of Leyte. A holding to the contrary would be arbitrary. It may indeed be conceded that the petitioners domicile of choice was either Tacloban City or Tolosa, Leyte. Nevertheless, she lost it by operation of law sometime in May 1954 upon her marriage to the then Congressman (later, President) Ferdinand E. Marcos. A domicile by operation of law is that domicile which the law attributes to a person, independently of his own intention or actual residence, as results from legal domestic relations as that of the wife arising from marriage (28 C.J.S. Domicile 7, 11). Under the

governing law then, Article 110 of the Civil Code, her new domicile or her domicile of choice was the domicile of her husband, which was Batac, Ilocos Norte. Said Article reads as follows: ART. 110. The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may exempt the wife from living with the husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of the Republic. Commenting thereon, civilist Arturo M. Tolentino states: Although the duty of the spouses to live together is mutual, the husband has a predominant right because he is empowered by law to fix the family residence. This right even predominates over some rights recognized by law in the wife. For instance, under article 117 the wife may engage in business or practice a profession or occupation. But because of the power of the husband to fix the family domicile , he may fix it at such a place as would make it impossible for the wife to continue in business or in her profession. For justifiable reasons, however, the wife may be exempted from living in the residence chosen by the husband. The husband cannot validly allege desertion by the wife who refuses to follow him to a new place of residence, when it appears that they have lived for years in a suitable home belonging to the wife, and that his choice of a different home is not made in good faith. (Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, vol. 1, 1985 ed., 339). Under common law, a woman upon her marriage loses her own domicile and, by operation of law, acquires that of her husband, no matter where the wife actually lives or what she believes or intends. Her domicile is fixed in the sense that it is declared to be the same

as his, and subject to certain limitations, he can change her domicile by changing his own (25 Am Jur 2d Domicile 48, 37). It must, however, be pointed out that under Article 69 of the Family Code, the fixing of the family domicile is no longer the sole prerogative of the husband, but is now a joint decision of the spouses, and in case of disagreement the court shall decide. The said article uses the term family domicile and not family residence, as the spouses may have multiple residences, and the wife may elect to remain in one of such residences, which may destroy the duty of the spouses to live together and its corresponding benefits (ALICIA V. SEMPIO-DIY, Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines, [1988], 102). The theory of automatic restoration of a womans domicile of origin upon the death of her husband, which the majority opinion adopts to overcome the legal effect of the petitioners marriage on her domicile, is unsupported by law and by jurisprudence. The settled doctrine is that after the husbands death the wife has a right to elect her own domicile, but she retains the last domicile of her husband until she makes an actual change (28 C.J.S. Domicile 12, 27). Or, on the death of the husband, the power of the wife to acquire her own domicile is revived, but until she exercises the power her domicile remains that of the husband at the time of his death (25 Am Jur 2d Domicile 62, 45). Note that what is revived is not her domicile of origin but her power to acquire her own domicile. Clearly, even after the death of her husband, the petitioners domicile was that of her husband at the time of his deathwhich was Batac, Ilocos Norte, since their residences in San Juan, Metro

Manila, and San Miguel, Manila, were their residences for convenience to enable her husband to effectively perform his official duties. Their residence in San Juan was a conjugal home, and it was there to which she returned in 1991 when she was already a widow. In her sworn certificate of candidacy for the Office of the President in the synchronized elections of May 1992, she indicated therein that she was a resident of San Juan, Metro Manila. She also voted in the said elections in that place. On the basis of her evidence, it was only on 24 August 1994 when she exercised her right as a widow to acquire her own domicile in Tolosa, Leyte, through her sworn statement requesting the Election Officer of San Juan, Metro Manila, to cancel her registration in the permanent list of voters in Precinct 157 thereat and praying that she be re-registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, the place of *her+ birth and permanent residence (photocopy of Exhibit B, attached as Annex 2 of private respondent Montejos Comment). Notably, she contradicted this sworn statement regarding her place of birth when, in her Voters Affidavit sworn to on 15 March 1992 (photocopy of Exhibit C, attached as Annex 3, Id.), her Voter Registration Record sworn to on 28 January 1995 (photocopy of Exhibit E, attached as Annex 5, Id.), and her Certificate of Candidacy sworn to on 8 March 1995 (photocopy of Exhibit A, attached as Annex 1, Id.), she solemnly declared that she was born in Manila). The petitioner is even uncertain as to her domicile of origin. Is it Tacloban City or Tolosa, Leyte? In the affidavit attached to her Answer to the petition for disqualification (Annex I of Petition), she declared under oath that her domicile or residence is Tacloban City. If she did intend to return to such domicile or residence of

origin why did she inform the Election Officer of San Juan that she would transfer to Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, and indicate in her Voters Registration Record and in her certificate of candidacy that her residence is Olot, Tolosa, Leyte? While this uncertainty is not important insofar as residence in the congressional district is concerned, it nevertheless proves that forty-one years had already lapsed since she had lost or abandoned her domicile of origin by virtue of marriage and that such length of time diminished her power of recollection or blurred her memory. I find to be misplaced the reliance by the majority opinion on Faypon vs. Quirino (96 Phil. 294 [1954]), and the subsequent cases which established the principle that absence from original residence or domicile of origin to pursue studies, practice ones profession, or engage in business in other states does not constitute loss of such residence or domicile. So is the reliance on Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code which provides that transfer of residence to any other place by reason of ones occupation; profession; employment in private and public service; educational activities; work in military or naval reservations; service in the army, navy or air force, the constabulary or national police force; or confinement or detention in government institutions in accordance with law is not deemed as loss of original residence. Those cases and legal provision do not include marriage of a woman. The reason for the exclusion is, of course, Article 110 of the Civil Code. If it were the intention of this Court or of the legislature to consider the marriage of a woman as a circumstance which would not operate as an abandonment of domicile (of origin or of choice), then such cases and legal provision should have expressly mentioned the same.

This Court should not accept as gospel truth the self-serving claim of the petitioner in her affidavit (Annex A of her Answer in COMELEC SPA No. 95-009; Annex I of Petition) that her domicile or residence of origin is Tacloban City, and that she never intended to abandon this domicile or residence of origin to which [she] always intended to return whenever absent. Such a claim of intention cannot prevail over the effect of Article 110 of the Civil Code. Besides, the facts and circumstances or the vicissitudes of the petitioners life after her marriage in 1954 conclusively establish that she had indeed abandoned her domicile of origin and had acquired a new one animo et facto (KOSSUTH KENT KENNAN, A Treatise on Residence and Domicile, [1934], 214, 326). Neither should this Court place complete trust on the petitioners claim that she merely committed an honest mistake in writing down the word seven in the space provided for the residency qualification requirement in the certificate of candidacy. Such a claim is self-serving and, in the light of the foregoing disquisitions, would be all sound and fury signifying nothing. To me, she did not commit any mistake, honest or otherwise; what she stated was the truth. The majority opinion also disregards a basic rule in evidence that he who asserts a fact or the affirmative of an issue has the burden of proving it (Imperial Victory Shipping Agency vs. NLRC, 200 SCRA 178 [1991]; P.T. Cerna Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 221 SCRA 19 [1993]). Having admitted marriage to the then Congressman Marcos, the petitioner could not deny the legal consequence thereof on the change of her domicile to that of her husband. The majority opinion rules or at least concludes that *b+y operation of law (domicilium necesarium ), her legal domicile at the time of her marriage

automatically became Batac, Ilocos Norte. That conclusion is consistent with Article 110 of the Civil Code. Since she is presumed to retain her deceased husbands domicile until she exercises her revived power to acquire her own domicile, the burden is upon her to prove that she has exercised her right to acquire her own domicile. She miserably failed to discharge that burden. I vote to deny the petition. SEPARATE OPINION VITUG, J.: The case at bench deals with explicit Constitutional mandates. The Constitution is not a pliable instrument. It is a bedrock in our legal system that sets up ideals and directions and render steady our strides hence. It only looks back so as to ensure that mistakes in the past are not repeated. A compliant transience of a constitution belittles its basic function and weakens its goals. A constitution may well become outdated by the realities of time. When it does, it must be changed but while it remains, we owe it respect and allegiance. Anarchy, open or subtle, has never been, nor must it ever be, the answer to perceived transitory needs, let alone societal attitudes, or the Constitution might lose its very essence. Constitutional provisions must be taken to be mandatory in character unless, either by express statement or by necessary implication, a different intention is manifest (see Marcelino vs. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51).

The two provisions initially brought to focus are Section 6 and Section 17 of Article VI of the fundamental law. These provisions read: Sec. 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and, except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election. Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman. The Commission on Elections (the COMELEC) is constitutionally bound to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of election x x x (Art. IX, C, Sec. 2, Constitution) that, there being nothing said to the contrary, should include its authority to pass upon the qualification and disqualification prescribed by law of candidates to an elective office. Indeed, pre-proclamation

controversies are expressly placed under the COMELECs jurisdiction to hear and resolve (Art. IX, C, Sec. 3, Constitution). The matter before us specifically calls for the observance of the constitutional one-year residency requirement. This issue (whether or not there is here such compliance), to my mind, is basically a question of fact or at least inextricably linked to such determination. The findings and judgment of the COMELEC, in accordance with the long established rule and subject only to a number of exceptions under the basic heading of grave abuse of discretion, are not reviewable by this Court. I do not find much need to do a complex exercise on what seems to me to be a plain matter. Generally, the term residence has a broader connotation that may mean permanent (domicile), official (place where ones official duties may require him to stay) or temporary (the place where he sojourns during a considerable length of time). For civil law purposes, i.e., as regards the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of a natural person is the place of his habitual residence (see Article 50, Civil Code). In election cases, the controlling rule is that heretofore announced by this Court in Romualdez vs. Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Tacloban City (226 SCRA 408, 409); thus: In election cases, the Court treats domicile and residence as synonymous terms, thus: (t)he term residence as used in the election law is synonymous with domicile, which imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to

return. x x x. Residence thus acquired, however, may be lost by adopting another choice of domicile. In order, in turn, to acquire a new domicile by choice, there must concur (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality, (2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile. In other words, there must basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi . The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual. Using the above tests, I am not convinced that we can charge the COMELEC with having committed grave abuse of discretion in its assailed resolution. The COMELECs jurisdiction, in the case of congressional elections, ends when the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal concerned begins. It signifies that the protestee must have theretofore been duly proclaimed and has since become a member of the Senate or the House of Representatives. The question can be asked on whether or not the proclamation of a candidate is just a ministerial function of the Commission on Elections dictated solely on the number of votes cast in an election exercise. I believe, it is not. A ministerial duty is an obligation the performance of which, being adequately defined, does not allow the use of further judgment or discretion. The COMELEC, in its particular case, is tasked with the full responsibility of ascertaining all the facts and conditions such as may be required by law before a proclamation is properly done. The Court, on its part, should, in my view at least, refrain from any undue encroachment on the ultimate exercise of authority by the

Electoral Tribunals on matters which, by no less than a constitutional fiat, are explicitly within their exclusive domain. The nagging question, if it were otherwise, would be the effect of the Courts peremptory pronouncement on the ability of the Electoral Tribunal to later come up with its own judgment in a contest relating to the election, returns and qualification of its members. Prescinding from all the foregoing, I should like to next touch base on the applicability to this case of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, in relation to Section 72 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, each providing thusly: REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6646 x x x xxx x x x.

SEC. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case.Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 881 x x x xxx x x x.

SEC. 72. Effects of disqualification cases and priority.The Commission and the courts shall give priority to cases of disqualification by reason of violation of this Act to the end that a final decision shall be rendered not later than seven days before the election in which the disqualification is sought. Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. Nevertheless, if for any reason, a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified, and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, his violation of the provisions of the preceding sections shall not prevent his proclamation and assumption to office. I realize that in considering the significance of the law, it may be preferable to look for not so much the specific instances they ostensibly would cover as the principle they clearly convey. Thus, I will not scoff at the argument that it should be sound to say that votes cast in favor of the disqualified candidate, whenever ultimately declared as such, should not be counted in his or her favor and must accordingly be considered to be stray votes. The argument, nevertheless, is far outweighed by the rationale of the now prevailing doctrine first enunciated in the case of Topacio vs. Paredes (23 Phil. 238 [1912]) which, although later abandoned in Ticson vs. Comelec, (103 SCRA 687 [1981]), and Santos vs. COMELEC (137 SCRA 740 [1985]), was restored, along with the interim case of Geronimo vs. Ramos (136 SCRA 435 [1985]), by the Labo (176 SCRA 1 [1989]), Abella (201 SCRA 253 [1991]), Labo (211 SCRA 297 [1992]) and, most recently, Benito (235 SCRA 436 [1994]) rulings. Benito vs. Comelec was a unanimous decision penned by Justice Kapunan and concurred in by Chief Justice Narvasa, Justices Feliciano, Padilla,

Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Romero, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug and Mendoza (Justices Cruz and Bellosillo were on official leave). For easy reference, let me quote from the first Labo decision: Finally, there is the question of whether or not the private respondent, who filed the quo warranto petition, can replace the petitioner as mayor. He cannot. The simple reason is that as he obtained only the second highest number of votes in the election, he was obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio City. The latest ruling of the Court on this issue is Santos v. Commission on Elections, (137 SCRA 740) decided in 1985. In that case, the candidate who placed second was proclaimed elected after the votes for his winning rival, who was disqualified as a turncoat and considered a non-candidate, were all disregarded as stray. In effect, the second placer won by default. That decision was supported by eight members of the Court then, (Cuevas, J., ponente, with Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Escolin, Relova, De la Fuente, Alampay and Aquino, JJ., concurring.) with three dissenting (Teehankee, Acting C.J ., Abad Santos and Melencio-Herrera, JJ .) and another who reserving their vote. (Plana and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ .) One was on official leave. (Fernando, C.J .) Re-examining that decision, the Court finds, and so holds, that it should be reversed in favor of the earlier case of Geronimo v. Ramos, (136 SCRA 435) which represents the more logical and democratic rule. That case, which reiterated the doctrine first announced in 1912 in Topacio v. Paredes, (23 Phil. 238) was supported by ten members of the Court, (Gutierrez, Jr., ponente, with Teehankee, Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Relova, De la Fuente, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ ., concurring) without

any dissent, although one reserved his vote, (Makasiar, J.) another took no part, (Aquino, J.) and two others were on leave. (Fernando, C.J . and Concepcion, Jr., J.) There the Court held:) x x x it would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and imposed as the representative of a constituency, the majority of which have positively declared through their ballots that they do not choose him. Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have received the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all republican forms of government that no one can be declared elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the election. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 767.)

the candidate was alive, qualified, or eligible, they should not be treated as stray, void or meaningless. (at pp. 20-21) Considering all the foregoing, I am constrained to vote for the dismissal of the petition. SEPARATE OPINION MENDOZA, J.: In my view the issue in this case is whether the Commission on Elections has the power to disqualify candidates on the ground that they lack eligibility for the office to which they seek to be elected. I think that it has none and that the qualifications of candidates may be questioned only in the event that they are elected, by filing a petition for quo warranto or an election protest in the appropriate forum, not necessarily in the COMELEC but, as in this case, in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. That the parties in this case took part in the proceedings in the COMELEC is of no moment. Such proceedings were unauthorized and were not rendered valid by their agreement to submit their dispute to that body. The various election laws will be searched in vain for authorized proceedings for determining a candidates qualifications for an office before his election. There are none in the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), in the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 (R.A. No. 6646), or in the law providing for synchronized elections (R.A. No. 7166). There are, in other words, no provisions for preproclamation contests but only election protests or quo warranto proceedings against winning candidates.

The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to be disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he was elected does not necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes to be declared the winner of the elective office. The votes cast for a dead, disqualified, or non-eligible person may not be valid to vote the winner into office or maintain him there. However, in the absence of a statute which clearly asserts a contrary political and legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in the sincere belief that

To be sure, there are provisions denominated for disqualification, but they are not concerned with a declaration of the ineligibility of a candidate. These provisions are concerned with the incapacity (due to insanity, incompetence or conviction of an offense) of a person either to be a candidate or to continue as a candidate for public office. There is also a provision for the denial or cancellation of certificates of candidacy, but it applies only to cases involving false representations as to certain matters required by law to be stated in the certificates. These provisions are found in the following parts of the Omnibus Election Code: 12. Disqualifications.Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty. The disqualification to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon the declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had been removed or after the expiration of a period of five years from his service of sentence, unless within the same period he again becomes disqualified. (Emphasis added) 68. Disqualification.Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a)

given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate , or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws. (Emphasis added) 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy.A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false . The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election. (Emphasis added) the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 (R.A. No. 6646): 6. Effect of Disqualification Case.Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for , and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be

disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election , the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion for the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. (Emphasis added) 7. Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy.The procedure hereinabove provided shall apply to petitions to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy as provided in Section 78 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881. and the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160): 40. Disqualifications.The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position: (a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence; (b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case; (c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic; (d) Those with dual citizenship; (e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here or abroad;

(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code; and (g) The insane or feeble-minded. The petition filed by private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo in the COMELEC, while entitled For Cancellation and Disqualification, contained no allegation that private respondent Imelda RomualdezMarcos made material representations in her certificate of candidacy which were false. It sought her disqualification on the ground that on the basis of her Voter Registration Record and Certificate of Candidacy, [she] is disqualified from running for the position of Representative, considering that on election day, May 8, 1995, [she] would have resided less than ten (10) months in the district where she is seeking to be elected. For its part, the COMELECs Second Division, in its resolution of April 24, 1995, cancelled her certificate of candidacy and corrected certificate of candidacy on the basis of its finding that petitioner is not qualified to run for the position of Member of the House of Representatives for the First Legislative District of Leyte and not because of any finding that she had made false representations as to material matters in her certificate of candidacy. Montejos petition before the COMELEC was therefore not a petition for cancellation of certificate of candidacy under 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, but essentially a petition to declare private respondent ineligible. It is important to note this, because as will presently be explained, proceedings under 78 have for their purpose to disqualify a person from being a candidate, whereas quo warranto proceedings have for their purpose to disqualify a person

from holding public office . Jurisdiction over quo warranto proceedings involving members of the House of Representatives is vested in the Electoral Tribunal of that body. Indeed, in the only cases in which this Court dealt with petitions for the cancellation of certificates of candidacy, the allegations were that the respondent candidates had made false representations in their certificates of candidacy with regard to their citizenship,1 age,2 or residence.3 But in the generality of cases in which this Court passed upon the qualifications of respondents for office, this Court did so in the context of election protests4 or quo warranto proceedings5 filed after the proclamation of the respondents or protestees as winners. Three reasons may be cited to explain the absence of an authorized proceeding for determining before election the qualifications of a candidate. First is the fact that unless a candidate wins and is proclaimed elected, there is no necessity for determining his eligibility for the office. In contrast, whether an individual should be disqualified as a candidate for acts constituting election offenses (e.g., vote buying, over spending, commission of prohibited acts) is a prejudicial question which should be determined lest he wins because of the very acts for which his disqualification is being sought. That is why it is provided that if the grounds for disqualification are established, a candidate will not be voted for; if he has been voted for, the votes in his favor will not be counted; and if for some reason he has been voted for and he has won, either he will not be proclaimed or his proclamation will be set aside.6

Second is the fact that the determination of a candidates eligibility, e.g., his citizenship or, as in this case, his domicile, may take a long time to make, extending beyond the beginning of the term of the office. This is amply demonstrated in the companion case (G.R. No. 120265, Agapito A. Aquino v. COMELEC) where the determination of Aquinos residence was still pending in the COMELEC even after the elections of May 8, 1995. This is contrary to the summary character of proceedings relating to certificates of candidacy. That is why the law makes the receipt of certificates of candidacy a ministerial duty of the COMELEC and its officers.7 The law is satisfied if candidates state in their certificates of candidacy that they are eligible for the position which they seek to fill, leaving the determination of their qualifications to be made after the election and only in the event they are elected. Only in cases involving charges of false representations made in certificates of candidacy is the COMELEC given jurisdiction. _______________ 1 Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC, 211 SCRA 297 (1992) (for mayor). 2 Loong v. COMELEC, 216 SCRA 760 (1992) (for regional vice governor). 3 Abella v. Larrazabal, 180 SCRA 509 (1989); Abella v. COMELEC, 201 SCRA 253 (1991) (for provincial governor). 4 Co v. HRET, 199 SCRA 692 (1991)(election protest against a Congressman). 5 Faypon v. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294 (1954)(quo warranto against a governor); Gallego v. Verra, 73 Phil. 453 (1941) (quo warranto

against a mayor); Larena v. Teves, 61 Phil. 36 (1934) (quo warranto against a provincial board member); Tanseco v. Arteche, 57 Phil. 227 (1932) (quo warranto against a governor); Yra v. Abao, 52 Phil. 380 (1928) (quo warranto against a municipal president); Vivero v. Murillo, 52 Phil. 694 (1929) (quo warranto against a municipal president. Cf. Aznar v. COMELEC, 185 SCRA 703 (1990) (quo warranto, although prematurely filed, against a governor-elect). 6 R.A. No. 6646, 6; Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC, supra note 1. _________________ Third is the policy underlying the prohibition against preproclamation cases in elections for President, Vice President, Senators and members of the House of Representatives. (R.A. No. 7166, 15) The purpose is to preserve the prerogatives of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and the other Tribunals as sole judges under the Constitution of the election, returns and qualifications of members of Congress of the President and Vice President, as the case may be. By providing in 253 for the remedy of quo warranto for determining an elected officials qualifications after the results of elections are proclaimed, while being conspicuously silent about a pre-proclamation remedy based on the same ground, the Omnibus Election Code, or OEC, by its silence underscores the policy of not authorizing any inquiry into the qualifications of candidates unless they have been elected. Apparently realizing the lack of an authorized proceeding for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, the COMELEC amended its

rules on February 15, 1993 so as to provide in Rule 25, 1 the following: Grounds for disqualification.Any candidate who does not possess all the qualifications of a candidate as provided for by the Constitution or by existing law or who commits any act declared by law to be grounds for disqualification may be disqualified from continuing as a candidate. The lack of provision for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, however, cannot be supplied by a mere rule. Such an act is equivalent to the creation of a cause of action which is a substantive matter which the COMELEC, in the exercise of its rulemaking power under Art. IX, A, 6 of the Constitution, cannot do. It is noteworthy that the Constitution withholds from the COMELEC even the power to decide cases involving the right to vote, which essentially involves an inquiry into qualifications based on age, residence and citizenship of voters. (Art. IX, C, 2[3]) The assimilation in Rule 25 of the COMELEC rules of grounds for ineligibility into grounds for disqualification is contrary to the evident intention of the law. For not only in their grounds but also in their consequences are proceedings for disqualification different from those for a declaration of ineligibility. Disqualification proceedings, as already stated, are based on grounds specified in 12 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code and in 40 of the Local Government Code and are for the purpose of barring an individual from becoming a candidate or from continuing as a candidate for public office. In a word, their purpose is to eliminate a candidate from the race either from the start or during its progress. Ineligibility, on the other hand, refers to the lack of

the qualifications prescribed in the Constitution or the statutes for holding public office and the purpose of the proceedings for declaration of ineligibility is to remove the incumbent from office. Consequently, that an individual possesses the qualifications for a public office does not imply that he is not disqualified from becoming a candidate or continuing as a candidate for a public office and vice versa. We have this sort of dichotomy in our Naturalization Law. (C.A. No. 473) That an alien has the qualifications prescribed in 2 of the law does not imply that he does not suffer from any of disqualifications provided in 4. Indeed, provisions for disqualifications on the ground that the candidate is guilty of prohibited election practices or offenses, like other pre-proclamation remedies, are aimed at the detestable practice of grabbing the proclamation and prolonging the election protest,8 through the use of manufactured election returns or resort to other trickery for the purpose of altering the results of the election. This rationale does not apply to cases for determining a candidates qualifications for office before the election. To the contrary, it is the candidate against whom a proceeding for disqualification is brought who could be prejudiced because he could be prevented from assuming office even though in the end he prevails. To summarize, the declaration of ineligibility of a candidate may only be sought in an election protest or action for quo warranto filed pursuant to 253 of the Omnibus Election Code within 10 days after his proclamation. With respect to elective local officials (e.g., Governor, Vice Governor, members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, etc.) such petition must be filed either with the

COMELEC, the Regional Trial Courts, or Municipal Trial Courts, as provided in Art. IX, C, 2(2) of the Constitution. In the case of the President and Vice President, the petition must be filed with the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (Art. VII, 4, last paragraph), and in the case of the Senators, with the Senate Electoral Tribunal, and in the case of Congressmen, with the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. (Art. VI, 17) There is greater reason for not allowing before the election the filing of disqualification proceedings based on alleged ineligibility in the case of candidates for President, Vice President, Senators and members of the House of Representatives, because of the same policy prohibiting the filing of pre-proclamation cases against such candidates. For these reasons, I am of the opinion that the COMELEC had no jurisdiction over SPA No. 95-009; that its proceedings in that case, including its questioned orders, are void; and that the eligibility of petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos for the office of Representative of the First District of Leyte may only be inquired into by the HRET. Accordingly, I vote to grant the petition and to annul the proceedings of the Commission on Elections in SPA No. 95-009, including its questioned orders dated April 24, 1995, May 7, 1995, May 11, 1995 and May 25, 1995, declaring petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos ineligible and ordering her proclamation as Representative of the First District of Leyte suspended. To the extent that Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure authorizes proceedings for the disqualification of candidates on the ground of ineligibility for the office, it should be considered void.

The provincial board of canvassers should now proceed with the proclamation of petitioner. Resolutions set aside. Comelec ordered to proclaim petitioner as duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte. Notes.A persons immigration to the U.S., with intention to live there permanently as evidenced by his application for an immigrants visa, constitutes an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. (Caasi vs. Court of Appeals, 191 SCRA 229 [1990]) A petition to resume the use of maiden name filed by a Muslim divorcee is a superfluity and unnecessary proceeding since the law requires her to do so as her former husband is already married to another woman after obtaining a decree of divorce from her in accordance with Muslim laws. (Yasin vs. Judge, Sharia District Court, 241 SCRA 606 [1995]) o0o [Romualdez-Marcos vs. Commission on Elections, 248 SCRA 300(1995)]