The Nigeria Christian Pilgrim Commission (NCPC) has inaugurated the Anti-Corruption and Transparency Monitoring Unit (ACTU).

The unit is to serve as a prelude to the Federal Governments directive that Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) should set up a unit to serve as one of the implementation mechanisms for the corruption prevention mandate of the Independent Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Commission (ICPC). Speaking during the inauguration in Abuja, recently, the Executive Secretary, Nigeria Christian Pilgrims Commission (NCPC), Mr. John Kennedy Opara, commended the efforts of the ICPC in fighting corruption in Nigeria since its establishment in 2000, adding that with the ICPC and EFCC, it had become possible to prosecute public officials, which he described as stood the ICPC and the EFCC in very good light. Opara described corruption as a thing of the mind, while stressing the need for vigorous sensitisation of the people about the evil called corruption because, according to him, when people were sensitised, they would be more informed about the dangers inherent in the act. The NCPC boss affirmed that the idea by the Federal Government to set up the ACTUS in MDAs was to enable the government to checkmate corrupt officials vis-a-vis sensitising public officials on the menace of corruption and how to sanitise the system. Opara further stated that ACTU would now serve as the watchdog of the commission; he, therefore, urged them to live up to expectation. He stressed the need for ACTU to sensitise staff of the Commission because, according to him. If people are sensitized, their conscience will come alive and they will become careful about what they do. In his goodwill message, the chairman of the ICPC, who was represented by Mr Kuatsea Justin, congratulated the management of the pilgrims Commission and the just constituted members of the Anti-corruption unit on this defining initiative. The chairman listed some of the functions of ACTUs such as conducting preliminary investigations into petitions received about the activities in their organisations and make reports to their management and the ICPC for further action. He further enjoined the ACTU members to eschew corrupt tendencies in their various areas of responsibility and strive to be models of integrity if they must succeed in their new assignment.

Operational Guidelines and Modalities of the Anti-Corruption and Transparency Units

1. Following government's acceptance of the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC)'s recommendation that an Anti-Corruption and Transparency Unit should be set up in each Ministry, Agency and Parastatal and since such Units are already in operation in, at least fifty eight (58) Ministries, Agency, etc, it has become necessary to put in place uniform operational guidelines/modalities for their use. 2. Also, in view of certain developments, it has not been possible for the Commission to implement fully, the prescriptions in the Head of Service of the Federation's Circular No. OHCSF/MSO/192/94 of 02/10/01; consequently, the Commission has recently advised the Head of Service as follows:

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the total staff composition of each Unit should be between four (4) and seven (7), depending on the size or other peculiarities of the Ministry or Agency concerned; both the financial and other associated needs of the Units should continue to be met by the respective Ministries and Agencies; and the Units should have their budgets separately reflected in the Approved Book of Estimates with separate sub-heads.

3. As anti-corruption monitoring outfits, the Units shall function as the main link between Ministries and Government Agencies on the one hand and the Commission on the other. They will also assist the Commission in the following specific areas: (i) Receive oral and/or written reports of conspiracy to commit/attempt to commit an offence of corruption. (ii) To Submit both the initial report and their comments to the Secretary of the Commission with copies to the Permanent Secretary/Chief Executive. All these shall be completed within thirty (30) working days. (iii) To examine the practices, systems and procedures in the Ministries, Agencies, etc., and where in the opinion of the Unit, such practices, systems or procedures aid facilitate fraud or corruption, it shall submit a detailed report with recommendations to the Secretary of the Commission for appropriate action with copies to the Permanent Secretary/Chief Executive. (iv) Arising from (iii) above, proffer recommendations with regard to the specific number of days a file should spend or stay on officer's desk. In arriving at the recommendations, the special

peculiarity of each subject matter should be borne in mind. (v) To educate all officials of the Ministries, Agencies, etc., on and against bribery, corruption and related offences by organizing seminars, lectures, placing of appropriate and well reasoned anti-corruption posters in very conspicuous places within the Ministries' premises and also the distribution of anti-corruption handbills to visitors to the Ministries, Agencies, etc. (vi) To meet at least once every month to discuss/review its activities. Minutes of such meetings shall be forwarded to the Secretary of the Commission. (vii) To submit at the end of every quarter, a Report of its activities to the Secretary of the Commission. (viii) To submit at the end of every year, a detailed Annual Report of its activities to the Secretary of the Commission. (ix) To prepare Action Plan for the Unit's activities before the beginning of every year and make copies available to the Secretary of the Commission for approval. (x) Without prejudice to sub-paragraph 3 (iv) (viii) above, the Units shall have constant consultations with the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission. PLANING, RESEARCH AND REVIEW DEPARTMENT

The company revised the Code in 2005 to adapt it to the requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which provides the approach of specific items for companies in the New York Stock Exchange. During its update, seminars were held to build the new Code in various units and subsidiaries, involving clients, suppliers, executive board, board of directors and the entire workforce in a transparent and participative process. The document includes the members of the boards of directors, fiscal councils, executive boards, managers, employees, interns and services providers in the Petrobras System. The Code is available for download on the Petrobras worldwide web site.

PETROBRAS COMMITTEE OF ETHICS

In 2008, the Executive Board formed the Committee of Ethics in order to foster, guide and fulfill the ethical principles and commitments of conduct set in the Petrobras Code of Ethics. The Committee is linked to the Petrobras CEOs Office and has an executive secretariat that helps compliance with the working plan and provides material and technical support for doing its duties. With meetings held every two months, and extraordinary meetings being called to address specific or emergency matters, the Committee of Ethics handles all minutes of meetings in accordance with the information secrecy regulations adopted by the company. All acts, proposals and/or recommendations to adopt disciplinary measures are as stated in Petrobras corporate regulations. The Committee consists of seven members, all company employees, and its duties are:

> to guide, disseminate and encourage compliance with the ethical principles and commitments of conduct established by the Code of Ethics, accompanying its implementation, development and monitoring in the company; > to guide the Committees of Ethics of the subsidiaries in the Petrobras System; > to propose updates of the Code of Ethics by including new concepts and new practices, guaranteeing alignment to the Code of Professional Ethics of the Federal Executive Civil Servant; > to propose the creation or update of the company regulations with focus on improving the ethics management; > to investigate, by denunciation or official order, any conduct failing to adopt the relevant ethical standards in situations that go beyond the jurisdiction of the executive managers or that present a risk for the company image or business and issue recommendations.

TRANSPARENCY AND CORPORATE INTEGRITY

Petrobras investigates denunciations forwarded by the Ombudsmans Office, CAS, external control entities the Federal Audit Court and Federal General Controllership and by the Department of Justice. The Business Protection management investigates the involvement of

employees in any deviation of conduct, preventing the occurrence of acts of corruption. When situations that require special attention arise, audits in the units are proposed. At the same time, the Information Security area takes actions relating to the preservation and enhancement of internal controls, which contributes to preventing undue practices. Petrobras employee training is based on anti-corruption policies and procedures. All the companys business units undergo actions to assess corruption-related risks. During the year, talks were given to new managers, supervisors and new employees, to reinforce the topics and curb any practices harmful to Petrobras. The company also carries out corporate campaigns to disseminate the principles expressed in its Code of Ethics, countering nepotism and refusing actions of favoring or receiving undue benefits. Petrobras follows the guidelines of its Code and does not contribute to political parties or campaigns of candidates to elective positions. Conducting company business requires transparency in the actions and positions adopted, especially with regard to information passed on to society. Petrobras rejects any practice of corruption and bribery, and uses management tools such as the codes of Competitive Conduct and Best Practices, as well as the Federal Senior Administration Code of Conduct, whose application is controlled by the Committee of Public Ethics of the President of the Republics Office. Petrobras is signatory of the Partnering against Corruption Initiative (Paci), with the objective of harmonizing the handling of corruption-related problems. To do this, there is a zero-tolerance policy against bribery and corruption. The company is also committed to Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (Eiti), a voluntary initiative that supports the efforts of countries rich in natural resources for better governance with the complete publication and verification of payment of companies and income of governments from the oil, gas and mining sectors. Petrobras contributes by preparing and adopting general public policies and programs and specific projects focusing on sustainable development. In addition, it valorizes the involvement of its employees in discussions for drafting proposals, which encourages social projects, in actions combined with public and private, governmental and non-governmental organizations. The Petrobras Business Committee approved the process of relating to the Legislative Power and the creation of the Permanent Advisory Group (GPA) for coordinating the defense of the companys interests in this sphere. In 2008, priority was given to 168 proposals comprising the Petrobras Legislative Agenda, 97 of which being processed (57.7% of the Agenda). The idea of the relationship of Petrobras with federal authorities is to provide experience and skills for enhancing Brazilian policies in the companys areas of influence. During the year, Petrobras participated in Conama committees and technical chambers and helped coordinate the

IND P&G-8 Project Enhancing Environmental Licensing of Prominp for activities in the oil and natural gas sector, and which seeks to effectively contribute to developing the oil industry in Brazil. At public hearings, Petrobras was represented in Congress to gather information about the actions underway in the Executive sphere. The company accompanied processes such as major setbacks for accepting the rights of those who received amnesty, explanations about the leak of information on the discovery in Santos Basin, discussions on postponing the implementation of the Vehicle Emission Control Program (Proconve) and discussions on the Discovery and development of new oil basins in the pre-salt layer. Petrobras has strict internal and external controls and seeks to reach efficient solutions for all conduct deviations, punishing those involved in conformity with the law and corporate regulations. Cases registered in 2008 did not configured a crime; their authors were sanctioned and the processes were enhanced to restrict other occurrences.
Bangladesh places at the bottom of many corruption and governance indexes. Transparency International (TI) ranked Bangladesh as the most corrupt country in the world for five consecutive years (2001-2005). TI considers both political and administrative corruption in its index. The World Bank identified Bangladesh as the 12th and 17th among the most corrupt countries in 2004 and 2005 in the corruption index of the governance indicators (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2006). Furthermore, the World Economic Forum identified Bangladesh as the most corrupt country among 125 in the corruption sub-index of the Global Competitiveness Report for 2006-07. Corruption directly affects the cultural, political, and economic fabric of society; it damages vital organs of the state and poses a threat to national security Corruption increases the transaction cost of business that negatively impacts international competitiveness of the state. Corruption also reduces the sense of security for foreign and domestic investors, as it often leads to extortion, protection rackets, delays in implementation, and rise in the infrastructure costs. The impediments to economic growth are considered a threat to national security. Corruption in political and bureaucratic system poses a risk to economic development. Establishing rule of law and a structure for good governance capable of curbing corruption are, therefore, necessary.

A nation, where black money nurtures corruption through politics and bureaucracy, subverts democratic values to undemocratic governance. Klitgaard (1997: 492) commented, when government agencies suffer from systematic corruption and inefficiency, most citizens lose, even though corrupt politicians, business and officials may gain. Kofi Annan, the former Secretary General of the United Nations, stated

(Cited in GTZ 2004: 6): Corruption hurts poor people in developing countries disproportionately. It affects their daily life in many different ways, and tends to make them even poorer, by denying them their rightful share of economic resources or life-saving aid. Corruption puts basic public services beyond the reach of those who cannot afford to pay bribes. By diverting scarce resources intended for development, corruption also makes it harder to meet fundamental needs such as those for food, health and education. It creates discrimination between the different groups in society, feeds inequality and 3 injustice, discourages foreign investment and aid, and hinders growth. It is, therefore, a major obstacle to political stability, and to successful social and economic development. Corruption is creating barrier to access to education, health, and justice among others. Thus corruption is creating a threat to economic security, food security, health security, environment security, personal security and political security This paper identifies the nature and extent of political and bureaucratic corruption and their effects on national, as well as, human security. This paper is structured into six sections. First, the concepts of political and bureaucratic corruption are discussed. Second, the meanings of human and national security are outlined. The nature and extent of political and administrative corruption in Bangladesh are analyzed in the third section. The fourth section presents three examples of how corruption impacts livelihoods in Bangladesh. The fifth section discusses ways of tackling political and administrative corruption. The sixth section is about recommendations and conclusion. POLITICAL AND BUREAUCRATIC CORRUPTION Commonly used definitions of corruption are: Misuse of public office for private gain (Andvig et. al 2001) Abuse of public office for private gain (TI 2006) Misuse of office for unofficial ends (Klitgaard 1997: 500) Violation of rules of public office motivated by private gain (Kurer 2005: 225) Abuse of legal or social standard for private benefit (Johnston 1996 cited in Kurer 2005) A society or a state that has lapsed from a standard of goodness (Johnston 1996 cited in Kurer 2005) Some examples of corruption are: bribery, extortion, influence-peddling, nepotism, fraud, speed money, and embezzlement (Klitgaard 1997: 500). Corruption may be categorized as political, administrative or bureaucratic. Political corruption can be defined as corruption that happens at the highest levels of political authority. Political corruption occurs when the politicians and political decision-makers, such as heads of state, ministers and other top officials with mandates for formulating and implementing laws, are engaged in corruption. It also happens when policies are formulated to benefit the politicians and the legislators. In contrast, bureaucratic corruption occurs in the public administration and is often an impediment to service delivery. The citizens encounter this bureaucratic corruption, known as petty corruption, daily at hospitals, police stations, and public offices, among others. Bureaucratic and political corruption tends to go hand in hand and are mutually reinforcing. In fact, there are a number of ways through which these two forms of corruption, i.e. political and administrative, complement each other. This paper focuses on how the politicians of Bangladesh

contributed to the spread of corruption in the administrative arena through both (i) the process of recruitment to the public service and (ii) by the practice of corruption in cases of service delivering to the poor. Of these two, encouraging civil servants to be involved in corruption is not new in Bangladesh. In fact, each successive government since early 1980s used it as an effective instrument to build partnership with the bureaucracy. On the other hand, controlling the recruitment process is a new instrument of political corruption which has enabled the recent spread of administrative corruption within the bureaucracy (Annexure 1). NATIONAL AND HUMAN SECURITY The scholars of the realist and neo-realist school defined national security in terms of external threats lead by armed aggressions. In early 1990s, with the dominant explanatory paradigm of Cold War shifting, concept of national security gradually expanded beyond the narrow scope of territorial security, external aggression, interest in foreign policy, or global security threat of due to nuclear weapons. The new understanding of security, in terms of human security, encompasses protection from the threat of disease, hunger, unemployment, crime, social conflict, political repression, and environmental hazards. The UNDP Human Development Report 1994 listed several components of human security: economic security, food security, health security, environment security, personal security, and political security (UNDP 1994). In Bangladesh, there is an acknowledged gap in the empirical evidence on human insecurity, which impedes advocacy and policymaking on these issues1. Major assessments of the state of human security to date have not contributed significantly to the knowledge of the levels or dimensions of human insecurity. The first major assessment of human security was UNDPs Human Security in Bangladesh: In Search of Justice and Dignity (UNDP 2002), which treated human insecurity in Bangladesh as firmly rooted in failures of the justice system, exploring the legal and institutional framework, including attitudes and experiences of victims, stakeholders and service-providers police, shalishkars (customary legal authorities) and the judiciary. More recently, the State of Governance in Bangladesh 2006 report which reviewed the evidence on the conditions of governance over the period 1991-2006 also noted the weakness of the 1 For full discussion of human security in Bangladesh see, State of Governance in Bangladesh 2007, forthcoming empirical evidence and reliance on problematic official statistics for assessments of how rule of law failures were impacting on wellbeing in Bangladesh. The DFID-funded Bangladesh Human Security Assessment 2005 (or BHSA 2005, published in 2007) attempted to analyse the dimensions, trends and drivers of human insecurity in Bangladesh, and to develop a conceptual framework and methodology for monitoring and assessing human security levels and trends (Khan 2006). Recognising that economic insecurity is already adequately addressed, particularly through poverty monitoring activities, the focus of BHSA 2005 was on adding value to policy development and economic assessments of wellbeing in Bangladesh by recording and monitoring aspects of human security that are usually excluded.

Based on stakeholder consultation and literature review, six dimensions of human insecurity were identified as relevant to the Bangladesh context: the impacts on insecurity of 1) politics and the political system; 2) conflicts over land and assets; 3) the administrative and judicial system; 4) violence and discrimination against women; 5) violence and oppression of minorities; and 6) crime. This paper focuses on the impact of political and administrative corruption on human security. POLITICAL AND BUREAUCRATIC CORRUPTION IN BANGLADESH Since the independence of Bangladesh in 1971, the political leaders have used their position or power to grant undue favors or benefits to their friends, relatives and supporters. In the post independence period, the country saw a growth of a class of nouveaux riches.who receive*d+ government patronage (Maniruzzaman 1975: 895). The political activists were also awarded with licenses to distribute locally produced and imported goods. However, most of these permit holders were fake importers and they simply sold permits at higher prices to traders and merchants. Money thus earned was safely deposited in foreign banks (Maniruzzaman 1975). From 1975 to 1990, the country experienced institutionalization of corruption. The patronage system continued during that period with almost 40% of resources allocated to development wasted due to corrupt practices (Kochanek 1993). The practice continued later under subsequent regimes. Khan (1999) commented corruption prevailed in each and every section of national life and the forms of corruption included petty corruption, project corruption and programmatic corruption. The decade of 1980 was also credited with the institutionalization of electoral corruption (Zafarullah et al. 2001). The entire electoral system became a farce and money was widely circulated for vote buying, vote rigging or taking control of vote centres. During the same period we saw the emergence of a politics-business nexus that added further corruption to the already heavily corrupt environment. 6 The beginning of the democratic era, since 1991, showed no indication of reduction in corruption. The extent of corruption actually grew and the allegation of illegal acquisition of wealth by high public officials became quite rampant. Since 11 January 2007 a number of stories captured publics attention and showed how political positions were utilized in making money from shady businesses, through opaque procurement decisions, and by making partisan appointments to public posts. The presence of corruption became so evident that nothing seemed immune from it. In a number of cases the donors

openly criticized the former democratic governments for their involvement in corrupt practices. A notable example was the allegation made by the Danish government accusing a cabinet minister of corruption. When no action was taken against the accused minister, the Danish government decided to withdraw a significant amount of aid money. Another significant feature of the corrupt practices of the politicians during the democratic period was that the political elites were not only engaged in misappropriating money but they were sending the plundered money abroad. This reflected their lack of intention in associating their future with that of the country that they were looting. Through recruitment of party bureaucrats irrespective of their qualifications, the democratic governments took control of the bureaucracy. The ongoing process of politicization of bureaucracy effectively utilized its participation in corruption by the successive governments (Jahan 2006). During the last elected democratic government, it crossed all limit as the government initiated a new process of politicization. With the consent of Prime Ministers Office (PMO), an unofficial cell was created to ensure that no civil servant who is or was sympathetic to the previous regime was promoted (Khan 2003). The Superior Selection Board (SSB) became dysfunctional due to the decisions made by the PMO; the SSBs only duty was to approve the list supplied by the PMO (CGS 2006). This process of politicization had a significant impact in curbing the thinking capacity and independence of the bureaucracy (Jahan 2006). Through partisan influence, a new accountability mechanism was introduced: the civil servants performance was measured for their political loyalty. This further accelerated the process of administrative corruption. The civil servants partnership or nexus with the politicians provided a winwin situation for both the parties where the patrons (politicians) succeeded in satisfying their clients (party loyalists or supporters) and the civil servants gained from their own patron-client relationship. Furthermore, recruitment within the civil service became a major source of corruption. The immediate past government actually facilitated the process as it served their partisan interest. A study conducted by IGS pointed out how the Public Service Commission (PSC) BD, a constitutional body, was used by the political leaders in making recruitment within civil service a private business. Recruitment for certain cadres was decided by money and those who were recruited 7 considered it an investment which they were supposed to recover once in the civil service (IGS 2007). The politicians and the administrators of Bangladesh actually worked hand in hand in order to continue the corrupt practices (Haque et al 2003; Jahan 2006). Corruption nexus between the politicians and administrators was not random: the political leaders used their power and position to control the recruitment procedure and also to encourage civil servants to be engaged in corrupt practices. Thus, people who entered the civil service in exchange of money found it necessary to make profit through abuse of the existing service delivery systems. Further, it was complemented by the bureaucrats whose propensity to corruption laid the foundation for a politician-bureaucrat partnership. When these two factors were combined the cost for the poor to get the services, which they were supposed to receive free or almost free of charge, increased. It also hindered access by the poor to basic necessities which the state is constitutionally bound to provide. The poor found that no place existed to submit their

grievances as the public institutions, supposed to receive them and take necessary actions on receiving their complaints, were not immune from corruption either. HOW CORRUPTION IMPACTS LIVELIHOOD: THREE EXAMPLES Corruption poses a threat to human security as this tends to hinder access of the poor to resources and, at the same time denies them to access to justice. Studies conducted by Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB) provide examples of impact of administrative corruption on incomes of poor households. These studies reflect on peoples suffering, deprivation of basic necessities (health and education) and access to justice. As part of poverty eradication strategy, the Bangladesh government has started compulsory free primary education. It also started providing stipends to poor primary school students to reduce their dropout rates. TIB (2002) found that poor people are the direct beneficiary of these programmes. But TIB (2005) revealed that 40% students paid for the admission, and 32% for enrolling in the stipend list. Five percent of those enrolled for the stipends reported that they were not receiving full amount of the stipend. To achieve the Millennium Development Goals, the government also initiated stipend programme for the secondary school female students. But TIB uncovered that this initiative was infected with corruption as well. Twenty two percent had to pay illegal tax for enrolling in the stipend programme and 38% of them reported to receive less money than the amount of stipend stated. TIB (2002) also disclosed that the average monthly income of victims of corruption was less than the income of household not victimized by corruption. The health sector is widely affected by corruption in Bangladesh. The poorest segments of the society use public hospital services as they do not have incomes to seek services of private doctors and hospitals (TIB 2002). TIB study (2002) found that the average monthly income of the corruption victims in public hospital was less than those who were not the victims of corruption. TIB (2005) uncovered that 26% patients paid illegal tax for treatment in the outdoor and 20% in indoor, 37% for surgery, 57% for X-ray and 60% for pathology test in public hospital. Therefore, the poor were paying illegal tax to get essential health services which are supposed to be delivered free of cost. Economic condition of service recipient from public hospital (Monthly income in US$) 72 70 74 Household who received services from public hspital Household the victims of corruption in public hispital Household not the victims of corruption in public hospital (TIB 2002) 9 Finally, TIB (2005) showed that 92% of the households had to pay bribes for recording First Information (FIR) and 91% for General Diary (GD) in the police stations. Sixty six percent of plaintiffs and 65% of the accused had to pay bribes in the lower courts. In both cases, people with lower incomes had to suffer due to corruption (Figure 1.3). Figure 1.3 Economic condition of service recipient from police and lower judiciary (Monthly income in US$) 84 86 73 82 80 91 Household who received services Household the victims of corruption Household not the victims of corruption Police Lower Judiciary The three studies lead to a number of findings. First, in most cases, people with lower income suffered most due to corruption. Second, the poor were forced to pay to get services which are to be delivered to them free of cost. Third, the additional spending to get services may hinder the poors access to these services. Finally, corruption deprives the poor of their rights: the poor had to pay to gain access to public institutions of justice.

TACKLING POLITICAL AND BUREAUCRATIC CORRUPTION Political will and political capacity to govern are required to control administrative corruption. In many liberal democratic countries, administrative corruption has been curbed through legislation and institutional reforms. Political corruption may also be addressed by reforming, strengthening and vitalizing the existing political, judicial and administrative institutions of accountability. The experience of different countries informs us that broad social changes, supported by specific anti-corruption efforts, can make a difference to the fight against corruption. But the threat of exposure or exemplary punishment of corrupt officials is not enough to stop the abuse of power. All institutional incentives and disincentives for abuse of public office for private gain should be confronted. However, if the public officials do not have incentives to change, they would not stop abusing public power as they profit from the status quo (Brinkerhoff 2000). Brinkerhoff (2000) suggested the following when designing an anticorruption programme: 10 Corruption is a complex issue with intricate linkages to other political and economic factors, both within a country and internationally Tackling corruption is not a one-shot endeavor, but a challenging, long-term undertaking Successful anti-corruption efforts depend upon political will to initiate the fight against corruption in the first place, and subsequently, the will to sustain the battle over time until results are achieved. There are different approaches to fighting corruption that focuses on the role of the economy, the state, and the society in anti-corruption programmes (Michael 2004). The universalistic approach emphasizes political will and an overhaul of state institutions: parliament, executive, judiciary, supreme audit institutions, ombudsmans office, independent anti-corruption agencies, and local government. It requires engagement of media, civil society, private sector, and international actors. Further, changes may be necessary in the election processes, administrative law, public service ethics, financial management systems, competition policies, and laws. In the state-centric approach, fighting corruption requires reform of economic policy, public expenditure/financial management, administrative/civil service reform, legal and judicial systems, and public oversight mechanisms. This approach emphasizes increasing accountability and transparency of the public sector processes and services. The Society centric approach stresses the role of civil society and NGOs in the fight against corruption. Klitgaard (1997) argued that minimizing monopoly, clarifying discretion and ensuring accountability reduces corruption and that more democracy, limited state, and freer markets will help in curbing corruption. Privatization may also help, but it may re-install another monopoly. If fighting corruption is to be successful, the probability of being caught for corruption must increase and punishment must rise because corruption is a crime of calculation, not of passion. Klitgaard identified three steps for designing anti-corruption programme: problem assessment, development of strategy

and implementation. The nature and extent of corruption in different sectors should be assessed first. The actors and victims of corruption and the conditions that are contributing to corruption would also have to be identified. The second step is the development of a strategy against corruption with focus on corrupt systems, not just corrupt individuals. Finally, initiatives should be taken for implementing the strategy. Hart (2001) divided anti-corruption strategies into three categories: (i) reducing the scope for corruption through policy change, (ii) increasing the costs of corruption through external monitoring and sanctioning; and (iii) devising systems to induce self-restraint within government organizations. RECOMMENDATION AND CONCLUSIONS Addressing corruption in Bangladesh will require a comprehensive strategy because of the issues raised in this paper the core reason being the collusive nature of political and administrative elites and their relationships, which in turn has maintained its debilitating hold on state institutions and process. Given the extent of the problem and its impact on economic and political life in Bangladesh, it is unrealistic to expect a reform agenda which will reduce the level of corruption in a few years. What the paper proposes is a two-step reform agenda: (i) reform of the state institutions with focus on the accountability of the executive (to prevent political corruption) and (ii) reform of the civil service recruitment process and a review of its norms and regulations to ensure greater accountability, transparency, efficiency and effectiveness. Recommendations In order to tackle political and bureaucratic corruption in Bangladesh, the following measures can be undertaken: Bureaucratic and Political Corruption Making the Anti-Corruption Commission independent, effective, efficient and accountable (See IGS Policy Note) Bureaucratic Corruption Increase horizontal accountability Transparent procurement systems Create public service ethics and standards Improve financial management systems Making Public Service Commission effective Creating transparency and simplifying administrative procedures Political Corruption Making the executive accountable through strengthening the Parliament, assuring independence of the judiciary, and appointing the Ombudsman Making the Election Commission effective, efficient, accountable and independent for holding free and fair elections. 36 years after independence, it is unfortunate that Bangladesh is still known in the world as a country of floods, cyclones, disasters and corruption. It is also unfortunate that prior to 2007 nobody notable from

the political/administrative domain, other than a former president, had been punished for the offence of corruption. Nevertheless, corruption is considered to be a key deterrent for development in Bangladesh. But, unlike natural disasters, corruption may be prevented and removed from a list of threats to human security and development in Bangladesh.

Respect for the public service matters Low public respect for the public service is more than the response of disappointed consumers to an inadequate level of service. Government is more than a service provider; and finding the right balance between skepticism and confidence in government will always be difficult. Certainly, though, very low confidence and widespread cynicism about the performance of government can have pernicious consequences, undermining democratic institutions and reducing the attractiveness of the public service as a career to those with talent. Survey evidence in OECD countries has shown some troubling signs that public cynicism about the public service is increasing. However, the picture is distinctly nuanced. The public in many countries appears to be expressing more disillusionment with the performance of politicians than of the permanent civil service. Research in the USA on trust in government has highlighted that public confidence in government and the image of the public sector are inextricably linked (Kamarck 1998). Clearly, the public's negative view of political wrongdoing has a spill-over effect on the reputation of public servants. Survey data indicate that citizens oftentimes have more confidence in public servants than in politicians. Still, there is only modest comfort in this finding. Citizens tend to rate the ethical standards of both public servants and politicians less highly than other professions. In Canada, for example, 87% of citizens have a high trust in nurses, compared to 46% for business leaders, 30% for federal public servants, and 13% for politicians (Ekos Research Associates, "Rethinking Government," March 1999). The same survey found 83% of Canadians rank the ethical standards of NGO volunteers as high, compared to 65% for small business people, 42% for public servants, and 17% for politicians. The incentives for media to emphasize critiques in their reporting of government, and the problem of scale whereby relatively small government payment errors can be presented as huge dollar amounts both fuel public cynicism, reinforcing a genuine sense of a performance deficit in government. Yet, the failure to identify specific services when surveying public opinion can also produce survey results that suggest an unrealistically low evaluation of government service quality. Some recent research in Canada undertaken by the Canadian Centre for Management Development has shown that Canadians rate the quality of many government services as high or higher than private sector services. Citizens understand that government has a more difficult role than the private sector, balancing efficiency with the public interest. Nevertheless, Canadians expect the quality of government services to be as high or higher than that of private sector services. Indeed, 95% of Canadians believe that, compared to the private

sector, government should provide higher (42%) or about the same (53%) level of service. Public concern about corruption A common definition of corruption is "the abuse of public office for private gain." Clearly, corruption (both political and bureaucratic) can have a devastating social and economic impact. (Click here to access the World Banks website on Anticorruption.) The recent World Bank report "Anticorruption in Transition: Confronting the Challenge of State Capture" has usefully distinguished between state capture and administrative corruption. "State capture" refers to the actions of individuals, groups or firms both in the public and private sectors to influence the formation of laws, regulations, decrees and other government policies to their own advantage as a result of the illegal transfer or concentration of private benefits to public officials." By contrast, "administrative corruption" refers to the intentional imposition of distortions in the prescribed implementation of existing laws, rules and regulations to provide advantages to either state or non-state actors as a result of the illegal transfer or concentration of private gains to public officials." The "Voices of the Poor" study, carried out by the World Bank, found that the poor, in particular, often suffer "pervasive low-level corruption and lack of access to justice Even humanitarian assistance is often waylaid when channeled through corrupt state systems." In absence of hard data (in virtually all countries) on the connection between perceived corruption and low public respect for public servants, proxy measures can be helpful. Among these measures, as noted above, are citizens' views on service quality, their trust in public servants, and their perception of public servants' contributions to the wellbeing of society. While country-specific data of this kind are useful for diagnosing the reasons for low public respect for public servants, cross-national data also help to illuminate the diagnosis in individual states. For example, the 1990 World Values Surveys showed that 56 percent of Americans had a great deal or quite a lot of confidence in the public service compared to 50 percent in France, 49 percent in Canada, 47 percent in Britain, 30 percent in Japan, and 27 percent in Italy. Other measures of public and business concern about state capture and administrative corruption can be found in investor risk ratings and in the World Business Environment Survey. Improving perceptions of the public service There is abundant anecdotal evidence that the publics respect for government is eroded by political and bureaucratic corruption. Available evidence and common sense suggest that reducing official corruption can enhance respect for government. Canadian research concludes that citizens assessments of service quality are determined primarily by five factors: timeliness, knowledge and competence of staff,

courtesy/comfort, fair treatment, and outcome. The Institute of Public Administration of Canada has developed these ideas through dialogue with public officials and community groups into a set of practical proposals for rebuilding trust in the public service. Initiatives to enhance public respect for public service are likely to enhance public servants respect for themselves, and are thus likely to improve their morale and performance. Governments around the world have adopted new organizational forms and new management approaches, partly in the belief that improved performance in policymaking and service delivery will enhance the public's perception of government. The ability of the public service to perform at a level sufficient to enhance its public image depends significantly on the quality of its human resource management, especially in the areas of recruitment and retention, reward and recognition, and employee empowerment. The public's trust in public servants is likely to be higher if the public service is perceived to be non-partisan and professional rather than politicized. Politicians often criticize publicly the performance of public servants; yet a high level of trust between politicians and public servants is essential to better public service performance through innovative and risk-taking behavior. The public service faces a huge public relations challenge. Research indicates that most citizens are happy with their individual contacts with public servants, but that many of these citizens still have a negative view of the "bureaucracy" as a whole. Ways must be found to dispel the myths about the public service and to promote its successes. In particular, politicians, business people and the media must take the lead in developing collaborative arrangements that will help to restore and enhance public respect for the public service. These partnerships can also be invaluable to attract and keep highquality employees, improve rewards and recognition for public servants (including proper compensation), encourage greater acceptance of innovation and responsible risk-taking, enhance politicians' appreciation for public employees, and help the media to understand the nature and challenges of public service.

Mal-administration and administrative corruption such as unfair dismissal of employees, discrimination and unfair promotions at work places are the highest forms of corruption registered, and stand at 82.37 percent, according to the 2009-2010 Ombudsman's report. Augustin Nzindukiyimana, the deputy Ombudsman in charge of Preventing and fighting Corruption yesterday presented the report to delegates from the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) and United Nations Office of Drug Crimes (UNODC). The delegates are in the country to assess the implementation of the international anti-corruption instruments as requested by the convention. The same report indicates that 53.24 percent corruption cases were recorded in the local administration while 43.19 percent was registered in the justice sector during the same period. In public procurement, 28.12 percent cases were registered. Nzindukiyimana told the delegates that raising public awareness is one of the major strategies the Ombudsman's Office uses to prevent and fight against corruption and injustice. The UNCAC, the first legally binding international anti-corruption tool adopted by the UN General Assembly Resolution 58/4 of October 2003, obliges member states to implement a wide and detailed range of anti-corruption measures. However, the UN anti corruption body is currently evaluating two of its four major tools in the fight against corruption including criminalisation and international cooperation. Other tools are prevention and asset recovery. In a separate interview, Nzindukiyimana said that most of the tools were achieved in Rwanda. "We did not achieve this to the maximum; there are some laws that need to be introduced," he noted. He outlined laws on international cooperation and investigating corruption as some of the acts that need to be introduced to further enhance the anti corruption campaign in the country.

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"We cannot define the number of laws that should be introduced now, but after we get their (UNCAC) report, we will work on the required laws to be submitted to parliament for approval," he added. The delegates are also assessing the laws used in the anti corruption campaign.

Nzindukiyimana, however, said that the Ombudsman office still face challenges such as limited staff to accomplish its mission coupled with limited powers. The efforts of the corruption watchdog's body are complemented by a national anti-corruption advisory council composed of the Office of the Ombudsman, National Public Prosecution Authority (NPPA), Supreme Court, National Police and the Ministry of Justice among others.

TAIPEI Taiwan's President Ma Ying-jeou Wednesday inaugurated a special anti-corruption body, renewing a pledge of clean government that helped bring him to power more than three years ago. The unit, whose official English name is the Agency Against Corruption, was hailed by justice ministry officials as a "milestone" in the island's efforts to fight graft. Calls for establishing a unit along the lines of Hong Kong's Independent Commission Against Corruption emerged more than 10 years ago. But concerns about possible overlaps with the work of other law-enforcement bodies delayed preparations for the agency, until the discovery in 2010 of corruption at the island's High Court added new momentum to the plans. "The scandal last year implicating several High Court judges enabled me to make the decision," Ma told a gathering of about 200 officials and business leaders invited to witness the opening ceremony in Taipei. Ma, who was elected in 2008 partly on a promise to weed out corruption, was referring to the island's worst graft scandal ever to implicate the island's top judiciary. Prosecutors have indicted three High Court judges for taking bribes, seeking jail terms of up to 24 years and asking each to be fined as much as Tw$1.5 million ($50,000). The scandal brought down the judicial chief in July last year. Ma said he did not expect the unit to immediately start arresting large numbers of corrupt officials, arguing he hoped the unit would rather play a role by deterring graft in the future. The move came as the island was hit by a string of high-profile corruption cases implicating top officials from two former presidents to senior judges and generals. Lee Teng-hui, who was president during 1988-2000, was indicted earlier this month for allegedly embezzling $7.79 million from the government -- charges Lee flatly rejected. His successor Chen Shui-bian is currently serving a prison term of 17 years and six months for two bribery convictions. Chen, who stepped down in 2008, has insisted that he is a victim of a political witch-hunt.