ONG CHIA vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No.

127240, March 27, 2000 Facts: Petitioner was born on January 1, 1923 in Amoy, China. In 1932, he arrived at the port of Manila. Since then, he has stayed in the Philippines where he found employment and eventually started his own business, married a Filipina, with whom he had four children. On July 4, 1989, at the age of 66, he filed a verified petition to be admitted as a Filipino citizen under the Revised Naturalization Law. During the hearings, petitioner testified as to his qualifications and presented three witnesses to corroborate his testimony. So impressed was Prosecutor Isaac Alvero V. Moran with the testimony of petitioner, he remarked to the Court: Your Honor, with the testimony of the petitioner himself, we are convinced, Your Honor Please, that petitioner really deserves to be admitted as a citizen of the Philippines. And for this reason, we do not wish to present any evidence to counteract or refute the testimony of the witnesses for the petitioner, as well as the petitioner himself. Accordingly, the trial court granted the petition and admitted petitioner to Philippine citizenship. However, the State, appealed to the CA annexing in its appellant's brief the pertinent documents for naturalization which contends that petitioner failed to support his petition with the appropriate documentary evidence for his naturalization which reversed the same. Hence, petitioner herein in his petition contends that the appellate court erred in considering the documents which had merely been annexed by the State to its appellant's brief and, on the basis of which, justified the reversal of the trial court's decision. Not having been presented and formally offered as evidence, they are mere "scrap(s) of paper devoid of any evidentiary value," Issue: Whether or not petitioner was correct in contending that the documents which had merely been annexed by the State to its appellant's brief should not be considered as evidence because it was not formally offered as such? Ruling: No. In this case, the Supreme Court held that the rule on formal offer of evidence (Rule 132, 34) now being invoked by petitioner is clearly not applicable to the present case involving a petition for naturalization. Under Rule 143 of the Rules of Court which provides that These rules shall not apply to land registration, cadastral and election cases, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not herein provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient. The only instance when said rules may be applied by analogy or suppletorily in such cases is when it is "practicable and convenient." In the case at bar, Petitioner claims that as a result of the failure of the State to present and formally offer its documentary evidence before the trial court, he was denied the right to object against their authenticity, effectively depriving him of his fundamental right to procedural due process. However, the Supreme Court is not persuaded. Ruling that, the reason for the rule prohibiting the admission of evidence which has not been formally offered is to afford the opposite party the chance to object to their admissibility. Petitioner cannot claim that he was deprived of the right to object to the authenticity of the documents submitted to the appellate court by the State. He could have included his objections, as he, in fact, did, in the brief he filed with the Court of Appeals.

BANTOLINO, vs. COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS., INC., G.R. No. 153660, June 10, 2003

Facts: Petitioners are employees of respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers, Inc. Petitioners filed a complaint against respondents for unfair labor practice through illegal dismissal, violation of their security of tenure and the perpetuation of the "Cabo System." For failure to prosecute as they failed to either attend the scheduled mandatory conferences or submit their respective affidavits, the claims of the other complainant-employees were dismissed. Labor Arbiter conducted clarificatory hearings to elicit information from the remaining complainants (petitioners herein). In lieu of a position paper, respondent company filed a motion to dismiss complaint for lack of jurisdiction and cause of action. On 29 May 1998 Labor Arbiter rendered a decision ordering respondent company to reinstate complainants. Thereafter, the NLRC also sustained the findings of the Labor Arbiter. However, Respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers appealed to the Court of Appeals, although the CA affirmed the finding of the NLRC that an employer-employee relationship, but nonetheless agreed with respondent that the affidavits of some of the complainants, namely, Prudencio Bantolino, et al. should not have been given probative value for their failure to affirm the contents thereof and to undergo cross-examination. As a consequence, the appellate court dismissed their complaints for lack of sufficient evidence. Hence, this petition according to petitioners, the Rules of Court should not be strictly applied in this case specifically by putting them on the witness stand to be cross-examined because the NLRC has its own rules of procedure which were applied by the Labor Arbiter in coming up with a decision in their favor. Issue: Whether or not the Rules of Court should be strictly applied in giving evidentiary value to the affidavits despite the failure of the affiants to undergo the test of cross-examination? Ruling: NO. In the oft-cited case of Rabago v. NLRC, the Supreme Court held that "the argument that the affidavit is hearsay because the affiants were not presented for cross-examination is not persuasive because the rules of evidence are not strictly observed in proceedings before administrative bodies like the NLRC where decisions may be reached on the basis of position papers only." Moreover, in Southern Cotabato Dev. and Construction Co. v. NLRC, it held that under Art. 221 of the Labor Code, the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law do not control proceedings before the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. Further, it notes that the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC are authorized to adopt reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively and without regard to technicalities of law and procedure, all in the interest of due process. Hence, to reiterate, administrative bodies like the NLRC are not bound by the technical niceties of law and procedure and the rules obtaining in courts of law. Indeed, the Revised Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence may be given only stringent application, i.e., by analogy or in a suppletory character and effect. In the case at bar, the submission by respondent, that an affidavit not testified to in a trial, is mere hearsay evidence and has no real evidentiary value, cannot find relevance in the present case considering that a criminal prosecution requires a quantum of evidence different from that of an administrative proceeding. Under the Rules of the Commission, the Labor Arbiter is given the discretion to determine the necessity of a formal trial or hearing. Hence, trial-type hearings are not even required as the cases may be decided based on verified position papers, with supporting documents and their affidavits.

EUGENIO R. AVENIDO, vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, [G.R. No. 177666, April 30, 2008]

Facts: Petitioner was employed as an Administrative Officer at the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC). During his employment, he was approached by a town mate, who was a representative of an importer of mobile telephone units and SIM cards. Petitioner personally prepared an Order of Payment of a Permit to Import. Thereafter, petitioner helped processed the permit of said importer thru the office of Marcelo M. Bunag, Jr. (Bunag), the acting assessor and processor of the Amateur, Dealer and Manufacturer Service of the NTC licensing unit. Since petitioner formerly served as an assessor, and is now Bunag's superior, Bunag relied on petitioner's judgment and approved the Order of Payment prepared by the petitioner, which by itself, appeared regular. The cashier received the payment and issued an Official Receipt for the Permit to Import Cellular Phones. However, in a facsimile letter, the Customs Intelligence and Investigation Service of the Bureau of Customs, sought verification of whether Animus International was authorized to import Motorola cellular phones in commercial qualities. It discovered that Animus International was not an accredited distributor's supplier of Motorola Philippines. Further investigation conducted by the NTC, showed that Animus International did not even file any application for a Permit to Import, an important requisite before the preparation of an Order of Payment and the issuance of a Permit to Import. Confronted with the irregularity of the issuance of the Permit to Import in favor of Animus International, petitioner thru a Show Cause Order was formally charged with Dishonesty, Usurpation of Official Function and Falsification of Public Document by the NTC. During the formal investigation conducted by the NTC, petitioner was given an opportunity to present his defense. However, the NTC found petitioner liable for Conduct Grossly Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. On appeal, the CSC affirmed the findings of the NTC with modification which merits the penalty of dismissal. The Court of Appeals also affirmed the Resolution of the CSC. Issue: Whether or not petitioner was accorded with ample due process and was there substantial evidence to support the charges? Ruling: Yes, there was due process and the findings of guilt were supported with evidence. The Supreme Court ruled that Due process mandates that a party be afforded reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence he may have in support of his defense. In administrative proceedings such as the one at bench, due process simply means the opportunity to explain one's side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. In the case at bar, petitioner was furnished a copy of the charges against him and he was able to file an answer and present evidence in his defense. Petitioner asserts that the finding of guilt against him is not supported by substantial evidence. In the case at bar, Petitioner's act of making the assessment implies that he had already examined the required documents and had found them sufficient. Bunag, the acting assessor of the licensing unit concerned, had in fact been misled by this same presumption when petitioner personally delivered to him the Order of Payment. As it turned out, Animus International had not even applied for a Permit to Import and was not an accredited dealer for Motorola, but was nevertheless able to illegally import the SIM cards and cell phones. By willfully turning a blind eye to Animus International's failure to comply with legal requisites and misleading his NTC colleagues, petitioner had not acted as a diligent civil servant as he claimed, but rather a dishonest and dishonorable public official. Under prevailing Jurisprudence in this case, Well-settled in our jurisdiction is the doctrine that findings of fact of administrative agencies must be respected as long as they are supported by substantial evidence, even if such evidence is not overwhelming or preponderant. The quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt in administrative cases is only substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.