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February 2010
Southern Africa
Business Monitor Internationals monthly regional report on political risk and macroeconomic prospects
SOuTH afRica
Zambia
After a weak spell, February Brent Crude has edged higher in recent weeks and we continue to target a move to technical resistance around the US$80.00/bbl area. The US$80.00/bbl level will act as significant resistance, although we believe that oil will push higher over the coming weeks. Although inventories as reported by the Energy Information Administration remain high by historical standards, draw downs in recent weeks have seen the oil market tighten slightly, which has been price supportive.
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ISSN: 1472-1805
Alliance Fracturing?
A war of words between the ruling African National Congresss allies in mid-December sparked fears that the alliance is fracturing. At a party congress, youth leader Julius Malema clashed with South African Communist Party members, accusing them of being greedy yellow communists trying to take over the ANC. Kgalema Motlanthe, who is deputy president of both the ANC and the country, has warned that anyone defying a call for unity from the partys national executive committee will face sanctions and possibly suspension.
Our short-term political risk rating is 59.2.
ECONOMIC RISK
Inflation conundrum
Headline inflation came in at 5.8% y-o-y in November 2009, staying within the central banks 3.0-6.0% target band for the second consecutive month. However, the latest readings have been aided by base effects from 2008 and these will soon wear off, meaning that inflation could move back above the 6.0% upper band in the early months of 2010. Given this outlook, we expect the benchmark interest rate to remain on hold at 7.00% over the first half of 2010, before being hiked by a potential 50 basis points by the end of the year.
Our short-term economic risk rating is 48.8.
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT
s&P Assessment
In December, ratings agency standard & Poor s affirmed 2009 South Africas BBB+/A-2 foreign currency rating, highlighting moderate although rising debt and stable political institutions as supporting factors. However, S&P retained its negative outlook and commented that South Africa continued to suffer from a high reliance on external portfolio inflows in the context of a significant current account deficit, and severe structural socioeconomic weaknesses. The agency also warned that South Africas rating could be downgraded should it appear that the government is no longer committed to prudent fiscal management.
Our business environment rating is 58.8.
creating jobs and improving the lives of the poor were the policy priorities of the ruling African National Congress (ANC). Zuma commented that the ANC must now use its victory and control of state power to improve the quality of life of the poor and marginalised. Furthermore, his appointment in May 2009 of Ebrahim Patel as Minister of Economic Development has pleased the unions; Patel is a stalwart of the union movement, having previously held a role as General Secretary of the Southern African Clothing and Textile Workers Union. The president has subsequently consolidated the power of Patel, having remodeled his Cabinet cluster system in late October 2009 to include Patel while excluding the Minister of National Planning and former finance minister, Trevor Manuel. At the same time, President Zuma has maintained market-friendly policies, having avoided the temptation to pander to the left with unsustainable spending or subsidies. Although, as mentioned above, Trevor Manuel has been kept outside of the Cabinet cluster system, Manuels proposal for a National Planning Commission has been supported by Zuma. It is intended that the commission will advise the cabinet directly on policy formation. Furthermore, the chairperson of the commission will receive political backing from a Ministerial Committee on Planning, with technical advice from a small, professional National Planning Secretariat. Through these means, Manuel will continue to exert a tangible influence over economic policy a factor which will likely give investors some reassurance, since he is well-respected by the markets and considered a safe pair of hands. The recent Medium Term Budget Policy Statement (MTBPS) given by Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan on October 27, 2009 should also placate investors. Although spending on education and health will be increased, the authorities will not introduce measures they can ill afford in the forthcoming fiscal year, such as a national health insurance system. Despite managing to strike a balance between opposing constituencies, Zuma cannot afford to become complacent. At COSATUs four-day annual conference held in September 2009, the president of the body, Sidumo Dlamini, warned that Zuma and the government should not take the labour federations support for granted when it came to choosing his successor. Dlamini said that when that debate comes we shall
not be neutral we will be on the side with those who have supported the principles that guided our movement, indicating that COSATU may toughen its stance if its demands are not met. The union federation may further exert its authority by encouraging its members to engage in industrial action. South Africa has been blighted by strikes in recent months, with global mining companies which operate in the nation, such as Lonmin, having suffered particularly badly. Against this backdrop, we believe there are four key issues which are contentious and could upset the political balance in 2010: 1. Employment Policy: The governments target to create 4.5 mn work opportunities by 2014 appears to be very ambitious in light of the sluggish economic recovery that South Africa is likely to experience over the coming years. Although the public works minister, Geoff Doidge, commented in November 2009 that nearly 224,000 job opportunities had been created since April 2009, we remain sceptical that the authorities are on track to meet their target. Indeed, the latest data from Statistics South Africas quarterly labour force survey indicates that the official jobless rate increased to 24.5% in Q309 from 23.6% in Q209, with the total number of unemployed people standing at 4.2mn in the three months to September 2009. With unemployment so high, the governments policy on employment will be crucial. The authorities will be reluctant to back-peddle on their ambitious target, but they may choose to gradually lower expectations of job creation in order to avoid losing credibility. Certainly, there has been a recent shift in this direction: Zuma warned on December 3 that due to the continuing impact of the global economic crisis we may still lose more jobs before we turn the corner on job creation. For the time being, however, the authorities appear to be mainly tackling the issue through stressing spending on education and its consequent impact on employability, as illustrated in the MTBPS. 2. The Rand: The South African rand has strengthened by over 30% against the US dollar between March and December 2009, posing a risk to the competitiveness of the export industry, and jobs therein. Accordingly, the rand has moved up the policy agenda over time to become a major bone of contention. Indeed, COSATU has called for the authorities to actively weaken the rand. The governments policy on the rand
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has been less than clear. In particular, confusion was caused in October 2009 when Minister of Development Ebrahim Patel said that he planned to freeze the currency at a fixed exchange rate. The markets reacted negatively to the news since such a policy would signal a significant shift from previous free-market ideology, and the rand sold off by over 4.0%. Although Patels comments were swiftly dismissed and the rand recovered its lost ground, there remained some uncertainty over policy. Subsequent statements from the authorities indicate that a change in policy on the rand is unlikely. Comments made in the MTBPS recognised that the strong rand was causing pain for exporters, yet the authorities would continue with their current approach to rand management: Finance Minister Gordhan said that the Treasury will support the ongoing accumulation of foreign exchange reserves by the Reserve Bank, which assists in moderating the appreciation of the rand. 3. Inflation Targeting: The South African Reserve Bank has for some time taken an inflation targeting approach to monetary policy. In other words, the main objective is to keep inflation within an agreed band
DATA & FORECASTS
BMI View: South Africa has technically exited recession, having recorded real GDP growth of 0.9% q-o-q (-2.1% y-o-y) in Q309, following a 2.8% q-o-q contraction in Q209. Nevertheless, we retain our outlook for a sluggish economic recovery.
(3.0-6.0% y-o-y in South Africas case), with concerns such as economic growth and job creation not being explicitly factored into monetary policy decisions. This approach has drawn criticism, especially amid the economic pain experienced in 2009, with COSATU having called for the benchmark repo rate to be slashed to 3.0% from its current 7.0% a move which would lower borrowing costs and thereby boost growth, albeit fuelling inflation. Again, the South African authorities have managed to quieten some of the more radical calls, while still maintaining a market-friendly policy. In the MTBPS, the finance minister said that he welcomed debate on monetary policy, while highlighting that our inflation targeting framework is an important element in macroeconomic co-ordination. It has assisted in lowering inflation expectations, and in preventing inflation from undermining our competitiveness. In our view, the most likely change in policy if there is any change at all is a widening of the inflation target band, so that interest rates will not necessarily be hiked as swiftly as they were over 2007 and 2008. 4. Crime And The World Cup South
Africa has a notorious problem with crime, with around 50 people being killed each day. Data show that between April 2008 and March 2009, violent business robberies rose by 41.5% while house robberies climbed by 27.3%. In addition to the insecurity this creates for citizens and businesses, it is damaging for foreign investment, since there is a significant risk premium attached to setting up operations in South Africa. Encouragingly, the authorities have made fighting crime one of their top priorities, with Zuma having set a target of reducing serious and violent crimes by 7-10% per annum. While this ambitious target bodes well, we have yet to see whether or not it is achievable. The authorities tackling of crime will be especially in the spotlight given that South Africa is hosting the 2010 FIFA World Cup with the football matches set to present considerable security challenges. Indeed, we believe the World Cup could prove to be of great political importance, since a competent staging of events would likely shore up support for the ruling African National Congress party, while an incident-riddled World Cup would undermine the electorates confidence in the authorities.
While our forecast for real GDP growth in 2010 has been notched up to 2.6% from 2.2% on the back of an improved outlook for global demand, this will still be a sub-trend level of growth. In our view, a contraction in private investment and
2008 2009e 49.2 288.3 5,863 -1.8 5.8 25.0 -7.4 6.2 9.9 2.8 7.39 71.5 73.3 -2.0 -15.0 -5.2 39.5 5.3 61,039.3 21.2 72.8 49.4 31.9 -2.1 5.8 7.31 35.1 -
a slow recovery for exports and private consumption, will conspire to keep a lid on growth. Over the longer-term we see annual economic expansion edging up to 3.7% by 2013, before moderating to trend growth of around 3.5%.
Latest Period Q309 Nov-09 5-Jan Sep-09 2010f 49.7 348.6 7,020 2.6 7.5 24.0 -6.0 6.2 10.6 5.4 7.50 87.7 88.3 -1.0 -15.0 -4.4 43.4 4.9 64,091.3 18.4 61.8 47.2 31.9 2011f 50.2 371.7 7,409 2.9 8.8 24.0 -4.7 5.9 11.9 5.9 7.70 96.2 96.8 -1.0 -17.0 -4.5 46.9 4.8 69,218.6 18.6 61.0 47.2 31.9
Population, mn [3] Nominal GDP, US$bn [4] GDP per capita, US$ [4] Real GDP growth, % change y-o-y [4] ZAR nominal growth, % change y-o-y [4] Unemployment, % of labour force, eop [5] Budget balance, % of GDP [1,6] Consumer prices, % y-o-y, eop [7] Lending rate, %, eop [8] Real Lending Rate, %, eop [2,9] Exchange rate ZAR/US$, eop [10] Goods Exports, US$bn [4] Goods imports, US$bn [4] Trade balance, US$bn [4] Current account, US$bn [4] Current account, % of GDP [4] Foreign reserves ex gold, US$bn [11] Import cover, months g&s [12] Total external debt stock, US$mn [4] Total external debt stock, % of GDP [4] Total external debt stock % of XGS [4] Short term debt as a % of International reserves [4] Short term foreign debt, % of total [4]
48.7 276.9 5,688 3.1 14.2 23.0 -1.1 9.5 16.0 4.5 9.44 85.4 89.7 -4.0 -20.0 -7.4 30.6 3.5 71,811.0 25.9 73.3 75.0 31.9
Notes: e BMI estimates. f BMI forecasts. 1 Fiscal Years (April March); 2 Real rate strips out the effects of inflation; Sources: 3 IMF WEO. 4 South African Reserve Bank/BMI Calculations; 5 Statistics South Africa; 6 South African Finance Ministry/South African Reserve Bank/BMI Calculations; 7 Statistics South Africa/BMI Calculations; 8 IMF; 9 IMF/BMI; 10 BMI; 11 IMF IFS/BMI Calculations; 12 IMF IFS/South African Reserve Bank/BMI Calculations.
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ZimbabwE
ECONOMIC OUTLOOK
RiSK SummaRY
POLITICAL RISK
Over-Optimistic On Taxes
BMI View: We believe Finance Minister Tendai Bitis budget presentation to parliament overestimates tax revenues in 2010. As a result he will be forced to decrease spending on recurrent expenditure. On the positive side, we expect capital expenditure to be covered by foreign assistance and believe the budget to be broadly supportive of increased foreign investment.
The level of tax revenue that Finance Minister Tendai Biti anticipates is overly optimistic in our view. In his presentation to parliament, Biti said he expects tax receipts of US$1.4bn, equivalent to 29.0% of nominal GDP. Looking to Zimbabwes neighbours, average tax collections as a percentage of GDP in 20012007 ranged from 12.2% in Mozambique to 22.4% in Botswana. We believe the target of 29.0% is not achievable. Rather, we think that tax collections will be in the 19-20% region, equating to US$1.1bn in revenue. In addition to taxes, the government is budgeting a further US$810mn. The presentation stated that US$210mn would be drawn down from the US$510mn allocated by the IMF as part of the institutions external shock facility. There was little detail, however, on where the balance would come from. Indeed, western countries will not give the Zimbabwean government direct budget support, but will rather provide humanitarian assistance to fund developmental projects. Therefore we believe that the balance of US$600mn for capital expenditure will come from foreign sources but is unlikely to be channelled through the government (making its inclusion in the budget questionable). The money will
DATA & FORECASTS
BMI View: We expect Zimbabwe to see a widening trade deficit over the forecast period as growth in imports, necessary for the refurbishment and expansion of domestic industrial capacity, outpaces the growth in exports. Our optimistic real GDP growth forecast for Zimbabwe in 2010 of 15.2% is based largely on growth in private investment which will drive the demand for imports.
2007 Population, mn [6] Nominal GDP, US$bn [1,7] GDP per capita, US$ [8] Real GDP growth, % change y-o-y [8] Budget balance, % of GDP [2,8] Consumer prices, % y-o-y, eop [3,6] Lending rate, %, eop [6] Real Lending Rate, %, eop [4,9] Exchange rate ZWD/US$, eop [5,10] Goods exports, US$bn [7] Goods imports, US$bn [7] Trade balance, US$bn [7] Current account, % of GDP [8] Foreign reserves ex gold, US$bn [6] Total external debt stock, % of GDP [11] 2008 2009e 12.7 3.2 249 4.6 -3.8 -6.0 4,500.0 4,506.0 1.5 2.6 -1.1 -15.0 0.0 212.6 2010f 12.9 3.6 280 15.2 -3.6 4.0 100.0 96.0 1.6 3.0 -1.4 -462.0 0.0 188.7 2011f 13.1 4.3 328 14.6 -3.2 4.0 35.0 31.0 1.9 3.5 -1.5 -2.1 0.3 162.9
ECONOMIC RISK
go towards the types of projects for which the authorities are budgeting. Resources for recurrent expenditure, however, look less forthcoming. Tax revenue of US$1.1bn, combined with US$210mn from the IMF, leaves the government with US$1.31bn while the budget allocates US$1.6bn to recurrent expenditure. Given that the authorities are operating a cash budget, this will entail a cut in recurrent expenditure plans meaning civil servants will not see a significant pay rise in 2010 and basic government services will remain poor. This being said, our positive growth outlook for Zimbabwe in 2010 is based upon strong investment and private consumption growth. We see the governments major role in the recovery as providing a political environment which will attract foreign investment and lead to the resumption of relations with the international community. The budget contributes to the former by reducing corporate tax to 25% and stating that local currency will not be reintroduced in the foreseeable future. Additionally, the authorities plan to cut fees on stock market transactions from 7.5% currently to 3.5% in 2010, reducing one of the barriers to foreign capital funding flowing in.
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT
12.4 12.5 3.6 3.2 285 255 -6.9 -14.1 -28.0 -39.6 35,000.0 5,000,000,000.0 775.0 4,500.0 -34,225.0 -4,999,995,500.0 30,000.00 500,000,000.00 1.8 1.7 2.1 2.6 -0.3 -1.0 -303.4 -19.0 0.0 0.0 148.7 189.5
Notes: e BMI estimates. f BMI forecasts.; 2 IMF figures are used for 2007 & 2008; 3 From 2009 on, inflation is expressed in US dollar terms, as foreign currency became the widely used legal tender in that year; Sources: 6 IMF. 7 Central Statistical Office/IMF; 8 Central Statistical Office/IMF/BMI; 9 IMF/BMI; 10 BMI; 11 World Bank/BMI
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bOTSwaNa
ECONOMIC OUTLOOK
RiSK SummaRY
POLITICAL RISK
average US$85.00/bbl in 2010, about 40% higher than 2009s average of US$61.00 bbl. Given the alcohol levy was set at 30%, the upward pressure from higher oil prices is likely to more than offset the exclusion of the levy. We therefore see inflation moving to the upper limit of the target band and beyond in 2010, likely prompting the BoB to tighten monetary policy from H210. Risks To Outlook The risks to our outlook are balanced. A more robust global economic recovery than we currently envisage would stimulate growth (via demand for diamonds) and would place further upward pressure on prices. This would lead to the central bank beginning the tightening cycle earlier than H210. Conversely, a sluggish global revival would weigh on Botswanan growth but would also mitigate the threat of rising inflation. In this instance we could see the BoB keeping rates at the current levels for the whole of 2010 or even making further cuts in an attempt to support the economy.
ECONOMIC RISK
Q-o-Q Growth In Q3
Figures released by the Central Statistics Office (CSO) show that real GDP contracted by 3.6% y-o-y in Q309 although this figure represents a 3.6% expansion in quarter-onquarter terms. The q-o-q growth was driven by private and government consumption while net exports continued to create a drag. BMI is estimating that the economy contracted by 6.5% in real terms in 2009, and will return to growth in 2010 with a 5.0% real expansion. Over the longer term, sustainable economic growth will be dependent on the countrys ability to diversify away from diamonds.
Our short-term economic risk rating is 58.8.
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT
Notes: e BMI estimates. f BMI forecasts. 1 Real rate strips out the effects of inflation; Sources: 2 World Bank, BMI. 3 BoB, BMI; 4 BMI; 5 CSO, BMI; 6 IMF, BMI.
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aNgOLa
ECONOMIC OUTLOOK
RiSK SummaRY
POLITICAL RISK
Fraudulent Transfers
According to Angolas Attorney General, Joo Maria de Sousa, over 90% of the US$100mn in fraudulent overseas payments executed by the finance ministry has been recovered. Although he provided few details about the case since it is still in the investigation phase, de Sousa revealed that the recovery of the funds was made possible with the help of Banco Nacional de Angola (BNA), which, through international channels, had managed to block the payments and return the money home. The most recent scandal is but one visible example of Angolas longstanding problems with political corruption.
Our short-term political risk rating is 69.0.
ECONOMIC RISK
government receipts and as the primary earner of foreign exchange. Although our medium-term outlook for the oil sector is generally sanguine, many of Angolas oil fields are now reaching maturity, meaning that production is likely to peak sometime around 2015 (assuming no new discoveries are made). Alongside this trend, we expect imports to rise continuously over the forecast period, leading to a gradual decline in Angolas trade and current account surpluses. Second, with the gradual deterioration of Angolas trade position, questions about its management of the exchange rate are also likely to come to the fore. At present, the Banco Nacional de Angola (BNA) operates a managed peg to the US dollar, with forex demand met only to the extent that reserves are in adequate supply. Although the bank has had some success in closing the gap between the official and parallel exchange rates of late, the inherent vulnerability of this system was exposed by the collapse of oil prices in late 2008 and early 2009.
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT
Notes: e BMI estimates. f BMI forecasts. 1 Real rate strips out the effects of inflation; Sources: 2 IMF. 3 African Development Bank; 4 African Development Bank/IMF/BMI; 5 African Development Bank/BMI; 6 Angolan Ministry of Finance/BMI; 7 Banco Nacional de Angola; 8 IMF/BMI; 9 BMI; 10 Banco Nacional de Angola/IMF/BMI; 11 World Bank GDF; 12 World Bank GDF/BMI.
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Zambia
...continued from bottom of front page
late 2009 had begun to show signs of falling. This should ease lending conditions and support growth, but we note that the Banks temptation to keep rates low could fuel existing inflationary pressures. Inflation in Zambia may have belatedly begun to decelerate faster in H209, but, despite Novembers inflation reading of 11.5% year-on-year (y-o-y) being the lowest since May 2008, inflation remains stubbornly in the double digits. We believe CPI will have ended 2009 at 10.0%, but could accelerate again to 14.5% by end-2010. Easing Price Pressures Look Temporary Despite a one-month up-tick in August as state-owned power company ZESCO initiated its first round of tariff hikes, consumer price growth in Zambia has decelerated since December 2008. November inflation came in at 11.5% y-o-y, the lowest in 18 months and the fifth month-on-month fall since May. Most categories continue to show elevated rates of price growth, but the strong deceleration in the largest components food and transport and communications have helped bring down the headline reading. Regarding food prices the heaviest weighting in the overall index at 57.1% strong harvests have led the price deceleration from 21.3% y-o-y in January 2009 to 11.1% y-o-y by November. The bumper 2009 harvest increased food supply, obviating the need for imports. If yields do not continue to impress, pressures will return. As for energy-driven sub-indices, the picDATA & FORECASTS
ture has improved even more. Despite what would have normally been favourable base effects due to the peak in global oil prices in Q2-Q308, the transport and communications sub-index had slowed to an 11-month low of only 10.4% y-o-y in August 2009. In October, this plummeted to -3.2% y-o-y. Given the slow feed-through, the global oil price recovery over 2009 and into 2010, this deflationary period is likely to be temporary. Energy prices are already reeling from the electricity tariffs hikes of 40% in August 2009 and 26% planned for March 2011. Much slower private sector credit growth has also helped ease price pressures, but even here, the impact will be short-lived, and we expect lending/borrowing to recover. The worst fears have proved overblown as the government saved the mining sector, and by extension lots of peripheral businesses dependent on it. With the mining sector set to grow further in 2010 as investment continues, employment and incomes should be supported. Not only will economic growth continue to accelerate into 2010, but a number of commercial banks announced plans to slash lending rates by December 2009 to around 21% from 24% in November. More importantly, the Bank of Zambia has revealed plans to move from an open market system with the introduction of a fixed benchmark interest rate in 2010. Building on the introduction of an overnight lending facility at the start of December, this will allow the BoZ to provide liquidity to the market and bring down commercial lending rates.
RiSK SummaRY
POLITICAL RISK
ECONOMIC RISK
Looking sweet
Zambias largest sugar producer Zambia sugar,owned by South Africa-based sugar producer Illovo sugar,plans to double its annual sugar exports to the EU to 200,000 tonnes over 3-4 years, company spokesperson Lovemore Sievu has said. The expansion of the companys Mazabuka sugar plant helped it to raise sugar exports in 2009 to 100,000 tonnes per year, up from about 30,000 tonnes. Sievu said the company plans further expansion of the plants production capacity to 465,000 tonnes in 2-3 years, up from the existing capacity of 450,000 tonnes.
Our short-term economic risk rating stands at 45.4.
BMI View: With mining output having ridden out the 2008/09 external storm to support growth in 2009, the outlook for Zambia in 2010 looks to be even more positive. We see the economy expanding in the region of 7.9%, supported by an encouraging investment picture and a recovery in domestic spending.
2007 Population, mn [4] Nominal GDP, US$bn [5] GDP per capita, US$ [5] Real GDP growth, % change y-o-y [6] Budget balance, % of GDP [1,7] Consumer prices, % y-o-y, eop [8] Lending rate, %, eop [4] Exchange rate ZMK/US$, eop [4] Goods exports, US$bn [4] Goods imports, US$bn [4] Trade balance, US$bn [4] Current account, % of GDP [7] Foreign reserves ex gold, US$bn [4] Import cover, months g&s [3,7] 12.2 11.7 961 6.2 -1.3 8.9 18.9 3,830.00 4.6 3.6 1.0 -6.7 1.1 2.9 2008 12.5 14.8 1,185 6.0 -1.5 16.6 19.1 4,785.00 5.1 5.0 0.0 -8.7 1.1 2.4 2009e 12.9 13.6 1,054 5.5 -3.7 9.9 18.0 4,400.00 4.3 4.0 0.3 -7.5 1.9 4.7 2010f 13.3 17.7 1,334 7.9 -3.0 14.5 17.0 4,200.00 6.4 5.0 1.4 -5.3 2.0 3.9 2011f 13.6 21.2 1,554 8.3 -1.5 11.0 16.0 4,100.00 7.4 5.8 1.6 -5.4 2.2 3.6
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT
Notes: e BMI estimates. f BMI forecasts. 1 Central Government; 2 Global assumptions correct when forecasts generated.; 3 Goods imports only.; Sources: 4 IMF. 5 IMF/Zambia Central Statistical Office/BMI calculation; 6 IMF/Zambia Central Statistical Office; 7 IMF/BMI calculation; 8 Zambia Central Statistical Office; 9 OPEC.
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mauRiTiuS
ECONOMIC OUTLOOK
RiSK SummaRY
POLITICAL RISK
ECONOMIC RISK
while the treasurys forecast is higher than BMIs forecast of 3.5%, it is below the average 5.0% real expansion seen in 20002008 period. In addition to the uncertainty around Mauritiuss growth rebound, inflation remains at historically low levels. After peaking at 11.7% y-o-y in August 2008, the headline figure has fallen to 0.7% y-o-y in November 2009. While we believe that this has bottomed and will begin to tick up over the course of 2010, we think that this will remain at manageable levels with it forecast to average 3.0% y-o-y over the course of the year. With these two factors in mind, we believe that the central bank will not begin raising interest rates from their historic lows until at least the second half of 2010. The risks to this outlook are tilted slightly to the downside in that if the recovery is seen to falter, the central bank may make one further cut of 50 basis points. Conversely a stronger economic recovery on the back of a more robust global rebound than we anticipate would likely be accompanied by higher inflation and could see the central bank begin tightening earlier.
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT
BMI View: We are currently forecasting the Mauritian rupee to end 2010 at MUR28.00/US$ based on a narrowing current account deficit. The risks to this forecast are tilted to the downside and take stem from the threat of central bank intervention which may step in to weaken the unit in a bid to support exports.
2007 Population, mn [1] Nominal GDP, US$bn [2] GDP per capita, US$ [2] Real GDP growth, % change y-o-y [1] Budget balance, % of GDP [1] Consumer prices, % y-o-y, eop [1] Lending rate, %, eop [3] Real Lending Rate, %, eop [2] Exchange rate MUR/US$, eop [1] Goods exports, US$bn [1] Goods imports, US$bn [1] Trade balance, US$bn [1] Current account, % of GDP [2] Foreign reserves ex gold, US$bn [1] Import cover, months g&s [2] 1.3 7.6 6,027 5.4 -3.0 9.2 21.9 11.8 28.40 2.2 3.7 -1.4 -5.7 1.8 4.8 2008 1.3 9.4 7,425 5.3 -3.4 8.0 21.0 10.2 31.50 2.3 4.3 -2.0 -10.5 2.1 5.2 2009e 1.3 8.7 6,812 2.4 -5.8 2.1 16.8 14.4 29.00 2.0 3.7 -1.7 -8.3 2.2 6.4 2010f 1.3 10.4 8,092 3.5 -6.3 4.0 16.8 12.3 28.00 2.1 4.0 -1.9 -6.3 2.4 6.7 2011f 1.3 12.0 9,218 5.6 -5.0 5.0 17.0 11.4 27.00 2.2 4.2 -2.0 -4.5 2.6 6.5
Notes: e BMI estimates. f BMI forecasts. Sources: 1 IMF. 2 IMF/BMI calculation; 3 IMR.
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maDagaScaR
POLITICAL OUTLOOK
RiSK SummaRY
POLITICAL RISK
civil unrest
Protests erupted in Madagascar in midDecember, sparked by the breakdown in negotiations held between the countrys political elite. Opposition leaders and hundreds of their supporters gathered outside parliament. In response, the security forces fired teargas into the crowds, dispersing them swiftly. We expect similar scenes to unfold over the coming months, as indicated by the low score we assign Madagascar in our short-term political risk ratings.
Our short-term political risk rating is 31.7.
ever, as the power sharing deal fell apart. In mid-December, Rajoelina rejected the peace accords he had previously signed up to, scrapped the posts of two co-presidents, and unilaterally appointed an army colonel as his new prime minister. Furthermore, he announced that Madagascar will hold a parliamentary election on March 20, 2010. If the poll goes ahead, it could prove a flashpoint for civil unrest, and any results will likely lack legitimacy owing to shortcomings in transparency and election monitoring. With the opposition leaders attempting to set up a parallel administration in the meantime, the political outlook is very uncertain. Indeed, we see a strong risk that neither government will be recognised by either the Malagasy populace or the international community, meaning a prolonged period of political stagnation. Against this backdrop, it seems likely that things may get worse before they get better. Frequent episodes of civil unrest, especially in the capital, are on the cards over the coming months.
ECONOMIC RISK
AGOA Off
US President Barack Obama announced on December 23, that he had terminated trade benefits for Madagascar, in addition to Guinea and Niger. In a statement, he commented that the three countries had failed to make continual progress in meeting US requirements for the African Growth and Opportunity Act, which grants preferential access to US markets. This bodes ill for Madagascars exports to the US, since the suspension from AGOA will likely leave the nations products such as textiles uncompetitively priced.
Our short-term economic risk rating is 37.5.
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT
Investors Deterred
The business environment remains blighted by the unstable political backdrop in Madagascar. Indeed, multinational companies such as oil giant Exxon Mobil have suspended their activities while awaiting a stable, legitimate government. Furthermore, inflows of foreign direct investment slowed dramatically in 2009, according to government officials. Given the latest deterioration in political risk, we expect investors to continue to shy away from the Indian Ocean nation, at least over the first half of 2010.
Our business environment rating is 39.1.
Notes: e BMI estimates. f BMI forecasts. 1 Global assumptions correct when forecasts generated.; Sources: 2 IMF. 3 Ministry of Economy, Finance and Budget; 4 Ministry of Economy, Finance and Budget/BMI calculation; 5 Central Bank of Madagascar; 6 IMF/BMI calculation; 7 OPEC.
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ECONOMIC RISK
flects the stimulus measures that have been implemented throughout the year, and is also mirrored in the countrys fiscal accounts, which saw a 37% y-o-y deterioration in the governments fiscal deficit through to Q309. Similarly, financial services, which typically account for a very small part of the economy given the relatively shallow banking sector, saw their contribution to growth increase substantially in Q309. Financial services have historically accounted for about 5.0% of the economy, normally contributing around 4.0pp to the headline growth figure. However, in Q309, this sector accounted for approximately 5.5% of GDP and contributed a startling 0.9pp to growth. This too reflects the rapid credit growth in the economy in recent months. While some weaknesses remain, the expansion of credit should feed its way through the economy and help support private consumption and investment going forward, which will positive for growth. Given these dynamics, we reiterate our view that Mozambique is on a solid footing to post strong growth in 2010 and 2011.
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT
Notes: e BMI estimates. f BMI forecasts. 1 fiscal balance including grants; 2 Global assumptions correct when forecasts generated.; Sources: 3 IMF. 4 Mozambique authorities/IMF/BMI calculation; 5 Mozambique authorities/IMF; 6 INE; 7 IMF/ BMI calculation; 8 OPEC.
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Namibia
ECONOMIC OUTLOOK
RiSK SummaRY
POLITICAL RISK
oil prices will likely play a significant role in keeping CPI levels up in 2010. Indeed, with oil expected to rise to an average of US$85.00/bbl in 2010, the transport index is expected to have greater influence over the headline inflation figure. Given the overall direction of price pressures, we expect CPI growth to be well contained within the 5.0-6.0% range over the coming months. Indeed, even though consumption pressures will be marginally higher in 2010, we agree with central bank authorities that they will have only a minimal effect on price growth, and will more likely than not be drowned out by the high base of the H109 consumer price index. Accordingly, while we have tweaked our average 2009 inflation rate forecast only marginally (from 9.1% to 9.0%) to reflect latest data, CPI growth in 2010 is now expected to drop to an annual average of 6.0%, rather than 7.0%. From there on out, we expect the central bank to begin to gradually pull the reins on its monetary policy with rates peaking at 8.5% in 2012 in an effort to stabilise prices.
ECONOMIC RISK
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT
Notes: e BMI estimates. f BMI forecasts. 1 Real rate strips out the effects of inflation; Sources: 2 IMF. 3 BoN, BMI; 4 BMI; 5 IFS; 6 IMF/BMI; 7 NPC/Central Bureau of Statistics,BMI.
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LESOTHO
ECONOMIC OUTLOOK
RiSK SummaRY
POLITICAL RISK
ECONOMIC RISK
the South African economy forecast to return to growth in 2010 (albeit muted), we expect remittances and by extension, domestic demand in Lesotho to increase. This will place upward pressure on prices. While we believe that prices are likely to tick higher in 2010, we do not think that rampant inflation is on the cards. Indeed, our forecast is for the end-of-period figure to hit 6.2% y-o-y and the headline figure to average 5.3% over the course of the year. This is due to the fairly benign inflation outlook in South Africa combined with the fact that the Lesotho central bank holds sufficient reserves (US$1.1bn or six months of import cover) to maintain the currency peg in the medium term. Risks To Outlook The risks to our outlook are tilted to the upside and stem from the outlook for oil prices and Lesothos foreign reserve position. If global oil prices increase more than we are currently anticipating in 2010, this would push inflation higher. Secondly, while the international reserve position is satisfactory for the time being, a draw-down could see pressure for a currency devaluation, which would lead to higher imported inflation.
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT
Notes: e BMI estimates. f BMI forecasts. Sources: 1 OEF. 2 OEF/BMI; 3 IMF/BMI; 4 WEO; 5 IFS/BMI.
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