Harvard-Yenching Institute

Ayn Jlt: Mamlk Sucess or Mongol Failure? Author(s): John Masson Smith, Jr. Source: Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, Vol. 44, No. 2 (Dec., 1984), pp. 307-345 Published by: Harvard-Yenching Institute Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2719035 . Accessed: 18/01/2011 08:20
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Jalit: CAyn MamliukSuccess or Mongol Failure?

JOHN MASSON SMITH, JR.
Berkeley University California, of

Plus grant pens6e avoient les Tartars de leur chevaus que de soi
meismes....

Haithon, p. 200.

of Jalit, wherethe Mamluiks Egyptdefeated battleof cAyn 1260,is usuallypresented the invadingMongols 3 September on This,it is usually as the turningpointin the tide of Mongolconquest. to Mongols'only opportunity completethe subwas the suggested, was jugation of the Middle East, and the opportunity lost. Hulegu had to withdrawmostof his troopsfromSyriaowingto the deathof the supreme khan, Mongke,and the incipientstruggleover the sucsmallarmyhe left underKedbuqato secureand extend cession;the his conquestsin the Levantwas then overwhelmed the numeriby becauseof the divisiveoutcome Thereafter, Mamluiks. cally-superior of of the succession the struggle, hostility the GoldenHordeprevented the Mongolsof Persiafromusingtheirfull poweragainstthe Mamwill in liks.1 Examination the Mongolcampaigns detail,however, of showthat theseinterpretations inaccurate inadequate. are or
1 R. Grousset, The Empire of the Steppes (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, New Jersey, 1970), pp. 363-366; S. Runciman, A HistoryoftheCrusades, vols. (Cambridge: 3 Cambridge University Press, 1951-1955) 3:309-313; C. Brockelmann, History of the

THE

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Let us look at first into the numbers of troops engaged in the cAyn Jaluit campaign, and into the sizes of the Mongol and Mamluik armies. The Mamliuk victory is usually attributed to superior numbers. This supposed superiority seems to derive from Howorth's mistranslation or misprinting of information from D'Ohsson, that makes 120,000 Mamlfiks out of "douze mille."2 This mistake has in turn escaped notice, I believe, because most modern scholars have concluded that the Mongols were often, if not usually, outnumbered by their enemies.3 However this may have been, at cAyn Jaliit they
Islamic Peoples, J. Carmichael and M. Perlmann, trans. (New York: Capricorn, 1960), p. 251; B. Spuler, The Muslim World,vol. 2: The Mongol Period (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1960), p. 20; 0. Lattimore, "Chingis Khan and the Mongol Conquests," ScientificAmerican (August 1963), pp. 55-68, see p. 55; L. Kwanten, Imperial Nomads (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1979), p. 160. 2 H. H. Howorth, Historyof the Mongols, 4 parts in 5 vols. (London: Longmans, Green, 1888), pt. 3:167; C. D'Ohsson, Histoiredes Mongols, 4 vols. (The Hague and Amsterdam: Van Cleef freres, 1834), 3:334. 3 This conclusion stems from misunderstandings in, and misinterpretations of, the sources. The Mongols made estimates (and in conquered lands took censuses) of the adult male enemy population, and these data were sometimes understood as meaning military manpower (as they did for nomads). This is why Rashiduddin, in The Successors Genghis of Khan, J. A. Boyle, trans. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), p. 57, claims that the Mongols in Eastern Europe faced Hungarian forces of 400,000 men. The 400,000 troops of Khwarezm, cited originally by Rashiddudin, according to H. Desmond Martin, in TheRise ofChingisKhan andHis Conquest NorthChina(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1950), of p. 333, n. 15-although I have not tracked this down-probably also derive from a Mongol estimate or census of the nomads of the Tien-shan/Chaghatai region that is reflected in Haithon, Flos HistoriarumTerre Orientis,in Recueildes Hiutriens des Croisades, Documents 2 Armeniens, vols. (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1906), 2:214; all of these were then retrospectively and mistakenly made subjects and soldiers of the Khwarezmshah. Modern scholars have made similar misinterpretations. Martin has Chingis facing superior forces, first of Hsi-hsia (p. 115), and then of Chin (p. 126) because he counted their useless infantry together with their cavalry, and overestimates their cavalry as well. Their cavalry, consisting of nomads from Inner Mongolia (about equal in number to those of Outer Mongolia) and sedentaries from Manchuria, would have outnumbered Chingis'except that it was divided between Hsi-hsia and Chin, and probably underutilized and immobilized within Chin by the distrust and antagonism between its principal contributors, Jurchen and Kitan. A more sensibly skeptical approach to the idea of large Mongol forces is taken by D. 0. Morgan, in "The Mongol Armies in Persia," Der Islam 56 (1979): 85-86 and n. 35 who cites a text assigning each campaigning Mongol 5 horses and 30 sheep, and wonders whether (to take his example) an army of 300,000 men could find pasture for 1.5 million horses and 9 million sheep. They could do so, I believe, on the steppes of Inner Asia and its extensions into the Middle East-with exceptions to be noted below. On the Khwarezm campaign, for instance, the Mongol forces were dispersed to a degree in various task forces, so that the pastoral burden would have been distributed and diminisbed, and moved, in proper nomadic fashion, from lowland winter pastures to summer highlands. And they were campaigning in country that still supported some 1.1 million nomads in 1897:

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were not. Several sources state or imply the size of the Mongol force. Bar Hebraeus and Haithon give 10,000 men; Kirakos has 20,000;4
some 900,000 Kazaks along the northwestern flanks of the Tien-shan, and 249,000 Turkmen, as I calculate from the data in L. Krader, Peoplesof CentralAsia (Bloomington and The Hague: Mouton for Indiana University, 1963), pp. 199-200, reworking it to fit the regions attacked by the Mongols, and omitting the out-of-the-way Kirgiz and Karakalpaks. A population of 1.1 million nomads should have as a decent minimum of animal capital (assuming 5 persons per family) some 22 million sheep or their equivalent, and they probably had something like this in fact as well as theory. Russian Central Asia in 1911 had a total of 85.9 million sheep-equivalents (s-e): 28.5 million sheep, 2.9 million goats, 5.6 million cattle, and 5.3 million horses, taking 1 horse or cow as the Asia (Berkeley and equivalent of 5 sheep or goats: data from R. A. Pierce, RussianCentral Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1960), pp. 160-61. Although the animal population is not broken down by region or people, we might subdivide it in accordance with the proportions of the nomad populations. The 1.1 million Kazaks and Turkmen were about 26% of the total nomad population of Russian Central Asia (Kazak, Kirgiz, Turkmen and Karakalpak); 26% of the 85.9 sheep-equivalents would be 22.3 million s-e. Chingis would not have had difficulty campaigning in a region that could support such numbers when the "ecological weight" of his own force (at 5 horses and 30 sheep-or 55 s-e--per man) would have been only 5.5 million s-e per 100,000 men-16.5 million s-e for Morgan's 300,000, and 22 million exactly for 400,000 (which I suggest, in an article forthcoming in one of the Oxford-Pennsylvania Middle East conference volumes, to be Juvaini's veiled estimate of the size of the Mongol army used against Khwarezm). As for Iran, the figures cited by Morgan for the animal population in 1970, 48 million sheep and goats, reveal a theoretical capacity for the country as a whole to support (at 100 s-e per family) 480,000 nomad families or 48 tamens.Excluding southern Iran, and allowing it half of these animals (which is probably too many, since northern Iran has the best pastures), would still give the parts occupied by the Mongols 24 million sheep and goats-about the same number as the total population of all animals in Outer The sheep and goat populaMongolia-which could support 240,000 families or 24 tumens. tion of Turkey in 1965 was 53 million, plus 13 million cattle and 1.2 million horses, these latter the equivalent of 71 million more sheep; I have not counted in the buffaloes, mules, donkeys and camels. These figures can only be used suggestively, since the Mongols did not occupy the whole of Anatolia, and the modern Turks provide some fodder as well as pasture for some of these animals (although not the sheep and goats): see J. D. Dewdney, Turkey(London: Chatto and Windus, 1971), pp. 107-10. The Syrian animal population in 1949, according to Syria, Ministry of National Economy, Department of Statistics, Statistical Abstract of Syria, 1950, pp. 158-59, was some 8 million sheep-equivalents, enough to support 80,000 nomad families or 8 tumens.The pastures in Afghanistan that the Mongols also used are not counted. Morgan's observation that the Mongols needed pastures along their invasion routes, which would seem to deny them much of the pasture supporting these modern animal populations, puts the matter backwards. The Mongols had to route their invasions through pasture, but, not being road-bound, could move wherever there was pasture and thus use much, rather than just a little, of it. 4 Kirakos of Ganja in At. Dulaurier, "Les Mongols d'apres les historiens Arm6niens," Journal Asiatique, 5th ser., 11 (1858): 498; Haithon, p. 172; Gregory Abu'l-Faraj Barhebraeus, TheChronography, A. W. Budge, trans. (London: Oxford University Press, E. 1932), p. 436.

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JR.

Rashiduddin does not enumerate the Mongols directly, but describes the campaign and the army in a way that makes possible the reconstruction not only of the size of the army, but of the changes in that size during the campaign. For the convenience of their generally illiterate commanders, the Mongol armies consisted of decimal units, Tens, Hundreds, Thousands and Ten Thousands. Therefore when we have enumerations of Mongol commanders in the sources we usually have also the "order of battle"-the number and frequently the disposition of the major military units involved, which are normally tiumens, Ten Thousands. Thus we can count Htilegii's troops. For the campaign of 1257-58 against Baghdad, 15 commanders are named, implying a force of 15 tiumensand 150,000 men.5 For Htilegui's Syrian campaign that ended at cAyn Jluit, six commanders are named, including Htilegii himself and Kedbuqa, the loser at cAyn Jalilt.6 Accordingly the Mongol force at the outset was six tumens or 60,000 men. Htilegii opened his attack on Syria in September of 1259, about a year before cAyn Jluit, and marched from the Alatagh in eastern Anatolia via Diyarbekir and Edessa to Aleppo, a distance of 575 miles covered in some four months. He took and frightfully sacked the city of Aleppo after a short siege in late January 1260. The citadel held out for another month, but upon its fall the other rulers and commanders in Syria gave up the struggle and fled to Egypt or joined the Mongols. Their cities, U[oms, IjamTh and Damascus, yielded to Htilegui. In late April, probably, while the Mongols were still consolidating and rounding out their conquests, and despite the presence of the undefeated Mamluiks in Egypt, Huilegii withdrew to Iran, taking many of his troops with him, and leaving Kedbuqa to hold
5 I have discussed the reconstruction of the Mongol "order of battle" further in "Mongol Historyof the Orient Manpower and Persian Population," Journal of the Social and Economic 18 (1975). Those who doubt that Mongol tumensactually included ten thousand men should consider the information in V. Minorsky, "A Civil and Military Review in Fars in 881/1476," Bulletin of the Schoolof Orientaland African Studies, 10.1 (1939), and J. E. (Minneapolis and Chicago: Bibliotheca Islamica, 1976), pp. 122 Woods, The Aqquyunlu and 131, n. 122, which shows that the actual numbers in Aqquyunlu tiimensclosely up approximated their nominal manpower. If the Aqquyunlu could keep their tiimens to strength, so surely could the Mongols. B. Karimi, ed. (Tehran: Eqbal, 1338/1957), p. 719; 6 Rashiduddin, Jdmic al- Tawdrzkh, (hereinafter RaD/K).

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Syria.7 In July or August, having made sure that Hilegu was gone, the Mamliiks came out of Egypt to cAyn Jalit.8 Kedbuqa had been named among the commanders at the beginning of the campaign, and thus he must have commanded a tumen of Ten Thousand. Associated with him in the garrison of Syria after Hiilegui's departure was another commander, Baidar, who was not named in the initial order of battle, and whose ordinary position may have been that of commander of a Thousand in Kedbuqa's tumen. But since he is named in both Mongol and Mamliuk accounts of cAyn Jaliut, he must by then have had a greater military importance.9 He had been made governor of Damascus, as Kedbuqa was governor of Aleppo, and I imagine that he led not only a Mongol contingent but also the Syrian, ex-Ayytibid troops that had gone over to the Mongols, and locally-recruited nomads, Turkish and perhaps Arab. Baidar was probably promoted to commander of a tamenand authorized to raise the men needed to make one. Accordingly the Mongols at cAyn Jluit from the original invading army, Kedbuqa's tiumen, numbered 10,000, and the total Mongol force, including Baidar's nominal locally-recruited tiimen, was supposed to be 20,000.10 Bar Hebraeus, Haithon and Kirakos were all correct in different ways. The Mamluiks had 12,000 men at cAyn Jliit, according to D'Ohsson, apparently citing Nuwairl, an historian of Mamliuk Egypt who died in 1332. 11The most nearly contemporaneous account of cAyn Jliit, by Baybars' biographer, Ibn cAbduzzahir, gives no

7 RaD/K, pp. 718-20.

Maqrizi, Histoire des Sultans Mamlouks, M. Quatremere, trans., 4 vols. in 2 (Paris: Oriental Translation Fund of Great Britain and Ireland, 1837, 1845), 1:103. 9 Ibid., pp. 100, 104; RaD/K, p. 722. 10 Owen Lattimore, in "Chingis Khan," p. 55, attempts to excuse the Mongol defeat at CAynJaliit by claiming that the "Mongols" involved were in fact only Turkish auxiliaries. The sources say nothing of the ethnic composition of Kedbuqa's force; Lattimore is only making a guess based on the known Mongol practice of recruiting non-Mongol troops, and on the general scholarly opinion that most of the "Mongol" soldiery in the westerly parts of the empire were derived in this way from the local Turkish nomads. Lattimore's more serious mistake is to undervalue these Turks, whose nomad and warrior background was the same as the Mongols', and who, under Mongol organization, command and inspiration, were quite the equals of the Mongols themselves. 11D'Ohsson, 3:334.
8

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numbers for the Mamliiks in the version that has been translated.12 The figure of 12,000 is a plausible one. The studies of the Mamliuk army by Poliak and Ayalon have shown that the nominal forces of the Egyptian Mamliiks, as of their Ayyuibid predecessors, were 24,000 cavalry based on 24 military districts (qirat) supplying 1,000 troops each. These forces seem, judging especially by the assignments of the qirdts during the second half of the thirteenth century, to have been composed of some 4,000 royal mamliiks, 10,000 amirs' mamluiks, and 10,000 men of the 4alqa (regular troops of various origins).1-3 In addition there were soldiers from defeated Khwarezmian, Ayyuibid and Kurdish forces that had taken refuge in Egypt from the Mongols. 14 The armies of Egypt would thus in theory somewhat have outnumbered those of Kedbuqa. But although Maqrizl says that Qutuz led the whole power of Egypt against the Mongols,16 we may doubt, I believe, that the actual numbers approached the theoretical. Some
12 Ibn cAbduzzahir, BaybarsI of Egypt, F. Sadeque, trans. (Dacca: Oxford University Press, 1956). Hereinafter material from Ibn cAbdu zahir will be cited under his name, and information provided by his translator under Sadeque. 18 During the second half of the thirteenth century, the numbers of royal mamluks seems to have varied between 2 (an-Nasir, beginning of the fourteenth century) and 4 thousand (Baybars); of amirs' between 10 and 13 thousand; and of talqa between 9 and 10 thousand. Syria, which did not become part of the Mamlu:k realm until after CAyn Jaluit, nevertheless contributed some, although probably not much, further manpower for the Mamluiks. Although az-ZAhiri's list (in Ayalon, "Studies", pt. 3) enumerates 23,000 Syrian halqa, this figure seems implausibly large. The list was compiled (at an unknown date) to daunt a potential (but unnamed) Mongol invader, and systematically overstates Mamlfik strength: the Egyptian forces, for instance, were inflated by doublecounting the mamlfiks, who were tacitly included among the 24,000 halqa, and then counted again as a separate and seemingly additional item of 18,000. See A. N. Poliak, Feudalismin Egypt, Syria, Palestine, and the Lebanon, 1250-1900 (London: Royal Asiatic Society, 1939), pp. 6-9, and the three articles of D. Ayalon entitled "Studies on the Structure of the Mamluk Army," of which Parts 1 and 2 are in BSOAS 15 (1953) and Part 3 in BSOAS 16 (1954), especially 1:222-223, 2:452, and 3:70-72. In Saladin's time and the later Ayyuibid period, Syrian forces appear to have numbered about 4,000 men, according to H. A. R. Gibb, "The Armies of Saladin," Cahiersd'histoireigyptienne,ser. 3, fasc. 4 (May, 1951), and a similar strength is suggested for Mamlik Syria in the early fourteenth century by the Mamlhk order of battle at Shaqbab in 1303, in which only four of the 18 amirs-nominally doubtless commanders of a Thousand-led Syrian troops (Maqrizi, 2.4:199-200). At the time of cAyn Jiluit these forces would have been reduced by the destruction of a considerable fraction at the siege of Aleppo, by the attrition of retreat to Egypt, and by the conscription of many into the Mongol army. 14 For the Khwarezmians, see RaD/K, pp. 721-22; for the Kurds, Maqrizi, 1:79-80; for the Syrians, ibid., pp. 91-95.

16

Maqrizi, 1:103.

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force would surely have been left behind to guard Egypt against any renewed Christian assault after the manner of the recent Crusade of Saint Louis; Saladin, earlier, had left half of his Egyptian manpower behind for such defense.16 Then, too, it is questionable how far the various troops in Egypt were able and willing to campaign abroad. Most of the fugitives, after the attrition of defeat and retreat on equipment and especially mounts, would not have been equipped the Mamliuk arsenals and adequately to take on the Mongols-and studs probably lacked the resources to make good these losses. Moreover, the soldiers in Egypt knew the Mongols' record and feared meeting them; many surely evaded doing so. Finally, the figure of 12,000 coincides, probably for logistic reasons, with that of the Ayyuibid period: Saladin had already found that an army of this size was the largest that he could field in Palestine17-and that this was large enough. Hiilegti obviously believed that Kedbuqa could hold Syria with his own tiimenand the odd ex-Ayyiibid trooper. He would probably not have done so had he thought the Egyptian army to be up to its nominal strength or known the quality of its mamliiks. Mongol military intelligence, questioning captive and allied soldiers from Syria (doubtless including some of the exiled Bahr! mamliuks), would have discovered the numbers and kinds of troops before them in Egypt. The good ones were mamliiks, perhaps 14,000 in number; the rest were the 4alqa, whom the mamliks seem to have looked down on, and unreliable, underequipped fugitives. Almost all of them were Turks apparently of the same sort that the Mongols had met from Central Asia to Russia and Anatolia and had always beaten. Because of this experience they could not evaluate their information about Egypt properly. They could count, but not appraise, the mamluks. The Mongols had not, in fact, met the Egyptian kind of mamliuk army before. They had encountered some small mamluakcontingents in Ayyiibid service, and probably some more among the Khwarezmians, but most of their Turkish opponents, and the bulk of the Khwarezmian forces, had been nomad tribal troops, mass armies indifferently equipped and haphazardly trained, much like those of
10
17

Gibb, "The Armies of Saladin," pp. 310-11. Ibid., p. 315.

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the Mongols themselves. The mamlulks in Egypt were different. The difficulty of procuring and mounting suitable troops in Egypt, distant from the Turkish lands and lacking the great pastures needed by a large cavalry, made the Egyptian governments rely on small armies of picked men, finely armed and highly trained in tactics conceived to withstand the Mongols. In fact, the Mamlfiks used methods that were part of an ancient Middle Eastern military tradition for coping with Inner Asian nomads, of whom the Mongols were only the latest, if worst. The Mongols' tactics may best be understood first by counting their horses and inspecting their arrows. Each Mongol had from six to eight, to as many as 18 horses, according to Marco Polo; the troops mobilized by Ghazan to invade Syria in 1299 were ordered to bring five horses each.18 All these horses made it possible for the Mongols to keep up a fast pace in cavalry combat. Other nomads with similar numbers of horses could match this pace-it is nomadism, not being a Mongol, that provides abundant horses-but the armies of sedentary powers, including Mamluik Egypt, could not. John of Plano Carpini counselled avoidance of any long pursuit of retiring Mongols ". . . so as not to tire the horses, for we have not the great quantity which they have." 19 This horsepower superiority enabled the Mongols, like other nomads in similar circumstances, to outmaneuver, outflank and surround their sedentary enemies, and to outpace them,
18 Marco Polo, The Travels (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1958), pp. 100, 152. Vaif, Kitdb-i Va,s.df(Tehran: Ibn Sina, 1338/1959), p. 373, lines 20-22. 19John of Plano Carpini, Historyof the Mongols, in C. Dawson, ed., The Mongol Mission (London: Sheed and Ward, 1955), p. 47. The rules and requirements of the equestrian game of polo suggest, I believe, the capacities of horses in high-paced cavalry combat. Polo demands much all-out effort of the horses, and accordingly the game is divided into "chukkas" reflecting the length of time that a horse can keep up with the demand. As the modern game was developing, at the turn of this century, a chukka ended with the first out-of-bounds ball struck after 10 minutes of play, resulting often in play lasting for 12 or 13 minutes; this soon came to be recognized as placing an excessive strain on both horses and men, and so the chukka was reduced to 10 minutes, and later to the present standard of 71 minutes. During this time a horse may cover as much as 3 miles at the gallop. Since there are 6 chukkas to the game, each player must have, at minimum, 3 horses to be able to participate effectively: each horse is ridden for 2 chukkas, with a rest for some 36 minutes between them. Players prefer to use more than 3 horses. See The Encyclopaedia Britannica(191 1; 1973), "Polo". Consider also the remuda system employed in Western American cattle round-ups and requiring seven mounts per cowboy: see C. Chenevix-Trench, A Historyof Horsemanship (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1970), p. 231.

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avoiding their charges and hounding their retreats.20 It gave the Mongols the tactical initiative. Mongol arrows suggest the uses made of these advantages. "Every [Mongol] is ordered to carry into battle sixty arrows, thirty smaller ones for piercing and thirty larger with broad heads for discharging at close quarters. With these latter they wound one another in the face or arms and cut through bow-strings and inflict heavy losses.''21 It is clear that for Polo the heavy arrows were much the more important, and I believe that in fact the "smaller" arrows for "piercing" may be largely disregarded. Contemporary depictions of Mongol combat exclusively show the heavy arrows, with the broad heads Polo mentions, and with long, high-standing feathers.22 The Mongols knew and to some extent doubtless used light arrows for long-range shooting, as in the sport of flight-shooting or especially during sieges.23 But most of their shooting was done at short ranges to which the heavy arrows were better suited. Hunting with the bow is usually done at ranges under thirty yards; since the Mongols usually shot from horseback, and usually at the gallop, whether hunting or fighting, they had little occasion for long-range shooting, which is effective only against very large targets, and consequently little need for arrows suited to it. And since most Mongols made their own arrows, they would not have made many of a kind very limited in utility.24 Arrows of the heavy kind that they did make and use in large numbers are very-and almost only-good for close range shooting. Large arrowheads and heavy shafts increase the weight, cutting and penetration of an arrow, but reduce its effective range; heavy fletching in
20 The same methods were used by the first Turkish nomad invaders of the Middle East: see R. D. Smail, Crusading Warfare (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1956), pp. 77-83. 21 Polo, p. 314. 22 E. D. Phillips, The Mongols (New York: Praeger, 1969), plates 19, 20, 21, 25; M. S. Ip?iroglu, Painting and Cultureof the Mongols (New York: Abrams, 1966), plates 8 (= Phillips' plate 19), 9 (= 20), 10 (= 25), 43. 23 Different kinds of arrows for long- and close-range shooting are named, and performances with them described in hyperbolic terms in the SecretHistory of the Mongols, sect. 195. A Mongol stele of the early thirteenth century commemorates achievement in a flight-shooting competition of a shot of 335 alda (fathoms), perhaps 530 meters: see Igor de Rachewiltz, "Some Remarks on the Stele of Yisiingge," in the volume, Tractata Altaica (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1976), honoring Denis Sinor. 24 Plano Carpini, p. 18; William of Rubruck, Journey,in Dawson, p. 103.

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particular improves accuracy but increases drag and reduces both range and penetrating power.25 These heavy Mongol arrows would probably carry and strike to some effect, out to perhaps 150 yards,26 but they were designed to be accurate and deadly at about 30 yards or less. Such design made sense because a galloping archer could not hope to shoot straight, even with the finest equipment, at any range much greater than this, and because most Mongols did not have Mongols] all have to possess . . . two or fine equipment-"[The three bows, or at least one good one.. .".. They counted on getting so close that they could not miss, even with poor weapons, and made arrows that would fly straight and hit hard at nearby targets.28
25 See the archery experiments of Saxton Pope in his Bows and Arrows (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1962), pp. 43, 47-48. 26 My guess is based on the depiction of Mongol arrows in Phillips, plate 20 (= Ip?iroglu, plate 9); the depictions and data of Pope, pp. 76-77 and plate 12; and the consideration of arrow weights and range in Arab Archery,N. Faris and R. Elmer ed. and trans. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1945), pp. 77 and 115. 27 Plano Carpini, p. 33. 28 Scholars unwilling to accept Mongol numbers as the explanation of their victories have had to attribute them to special military virtues and capabilities, and their archery practice and equipment have accordingly often been overestimated. Owen Lattimore, in MongolJourneys(New York: Doubleday, Doran, 1941), p. 133, has claimed that "The nomads were . .. the best bowmen in the world." As applied to whole peoples, there is something to this: all adult male nomads were warriors and archers, which could not be said for many other societies. However, compared with other bodies of archers (ancient Persian? medieval English?), the nomads with their mediocre equipment and limited, unsystematic training, would not appear so remarkable. As for the Mongols' equipment, Desmond Martin (pp. 19-20) has uncritically accepted the implausible report that the Mongols all used bows with a drawing weight of "at least" 166 lbs.! Saxton Pope, an experienced archer, found that he could not string a 98 lb. "Tartar" bow without help, and having strung it with help, could not draw it except by using both hands and feet while lying on his back (p. 25). Unless the Mongols are to be made out as supermen, Martin's superbows must be discounted. Medieval sources do mention superbows. Besides Martin's Far Eastern source we have, for instance, the author of Arab Archeryspeaking (p. 102) of bows drawing 200 ratls, which Faris and Elmer (p. 172) gloss as 150 lbs. But such bows were not standard military issue, and were probably not even used for conventional archery, but for the odd Middle (and Far?) Eastern sport that involved drawing a bow-without arrows-as a form of weight-lifting: see P. E. Klopsteg, Turkish Archeryand the CompositeBow (Evanston, Illinois: P. E. Klopsteg, 1947), p. 107. In any case, the drawing-weight of a bow does not regularly correlate with its performance. J. D. Latham and W. F. Paterson, editors Archery (London: The Holland Press, of Taybugha's work on archery, translated as Saracen 1970), p. 170, report that a bow they had made to Mamluik specifications shot full-length arrows a very creditable 285 yards although it drew only 50 lbs. (Martin's superbow was only accorded a "destructive range" of 200-300 yards.)

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Describing Mongol combat methods, Plano Carpini said that .. . when they come in sight of the enemy they attack at once, each one shooting three or four arrows at their adversaries; if they see that they are not going to be able to defeat them, they retire, going back to their own line."29 We are intended, I believe, to see two armies in line facing one another, with some units of the Mongol force advancing to shoot at the enemy, and if withstood, withdrawing to rejoin their main body while, presumably, other fresh units take their place in attacking. The details of this advancing, shooting and withdrawing may be better understood by observation of the training of Inner Asian horse-archers-not, as it happens, of Mongols, but of the Mamliiks, whose methods, however, were in some respects similar to the Mongols' when shooting at a gallop. This training is described in part by Taybugha, who tells us that the mamluiks in Egypt practiced shooting at the gallop on courses varying in length between 284 and 131 yards. They used one-third of this distance (95 to 44 yards) to get their horses into a gallop and going in a straight line. It was essential that the horse go straight because the rider had to drop the reins to shoot, and because the horse must have been trained not to change directions in response to leg pressures since some shots-the have "Parthian" shot straight to the rear, for instance-would generated leg pressures that might otherwise have been misunderstood by the horse. Over the second third of the course the rider prepared and shot his bow and arrow, drawing the arrow from his waist-quiver; thus a skilled horse-archer would have covered some 44 yards between shots if he were shooting repeatedly and not, as on these Egyptian courses, only once. On the last third of the course the rider secured his bow, picked up his reins, and slowed and turned his horse off the course.30 We can see from this that a Mongol attack with the shooting of three or four arrows would have involved a complex evolution. The Mongols could not simply have charged, shooting a series of arrows at the enemy before them. Before the first shot could have been loosed, the horsemen would have covered at least 88 yards (by Taybugha's best standard), and between each subsequent shot (assuming no steering and changing in direction meanwhile) 44
29 Plano Carpini, p. 36.
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SaracenArchery, Ch. 15.

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yards more, so that a straight charge with three shots would have to cover more than 176 yards (allowing a certain distance, though perhaps not Taybugha's 44 yards, for turning away after the last shot). This means that the first two shots would have been delivered at ineffectively long range, considering the Mongols' heavy arrows and unstable aim. If the final shot were loosed at 15 yards, the first and second would have been let off at 105 and 60 yards, distances that the arrows would have carried, but not with accuracy or much penetrating power. And if each charging rank of Mongols shot several arrows, the interval between charges would either have to be lengthy, to get the first rank out of the way of the next, or the following ranks would have to shoot over the heads of those in front-or try to do so a dangerous as well as wasteful and ineffectual practice. Instead, the Mongols, I imagine, sent unit after unit galloping at the enemy as fast as could be with each man shooting one heavy arrow from as close as possible; each unit would then turn away and out of the path and line of fire of the next unit, which could follow almost on its heels. Thus the enemy would be repeatedly pounded by the Mongols' best shots, delivered by a quick and confusing succession of attacking units, each concealing the next until the last moment. Each unit would charge, shoot, turn and gallop away, and then circle into position for another charge, in this way making several attacks and "shooting three or four arrows" as Plano Carpini describes.31 The

31 Plano Carpini, p. 36. This description appears to be supported by the depictions of Mongol quivers (in Phillips, plates 20, 21 and 25, and Ip,iroglu, plates 9, 10 and 43) that seem to hold no more than six arrows. Taybugha's evidence also shows that the "Parthian shot" could only be used against pursuing enemies, since a retiring archer would be at least 44 yards away from an unmoving enemy, and thus well out of effective range, before he would be ready to shoot. It also shows that shooting at an unmoving enemy force to the (left) side, while galloping in file along, rather than in line at, the enemy line would have made little tactical sense. Only one file could shoot, since shots from a second file would pass through the first on a flat short-range trajectory. Shooting, with 44 yards (at least) between shots, would be intermittent, while the enemy could shoot back faster (because unmoving), with more concentrated volleys (because his archers are in line, not file, with less space between them), and at a fixed range (since the galloping attackers cannot change course while shooting). Finally, concentration and repetition of volleys against a single target-zone (as in the head-on attack) would probably be impossible for attackers in file, owing to differences in rate of reloading, to the greater separation of the horses (and their riders) in file, and to the greater relative movement of attackers and targets. Attack by file would amount to sniping, not bombardment.

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attacking units would then give place to fresh forces and retire to rest, rearm, and remount. The Mongols hoped by these methods, enhanced usually by efforts to outflank and surround the enemy, to wear down their opponents with archery, and, in the case of enemy cavalry, to provoke pursuit that would exhaust their opponents' horses. If the enemy could be made to charge the attacking ranks of Mongols, these would retreat, shooting behind them, until they reached their own rear lines. Then, if the enemy were light cavalry like themselves, the retreating Mongols would turn, reinforced by their rear ranks, some of them heavy cavalry and all of them on fresh horses, to counterattack their pursuers. Attacks and counterattacks could go on in alternation until numbers and condition of horses, or outflanking and encirclement, prevailed. Against heavy cavalry the Mongols would not attempt to stand, but would continue to retreat until the enemy's pursuit broke off, or his horses broke down; then the Mongols, with fresh units or on fresh horses, would harass the enemy as he withdrew.32 It should be mentioned that the Mongols' tactics were intended not only to exploit their assets and advantage in horsepower, but to offset certain deficiencies. Close-range shooting helped make up for the indifferent quality, on average, of the Mongols' bows and arrows. And their avoidance of hand-to-hand combat, remarked on by Plano Carpini and Marco Polo,33 compensated for their lack, for the most part, of adequate arms apart from the bow and arrow. Plano most of the Carpini observed that the ordinary Mongols-thus army-bore only bows, arrows and axes; only the rich had in addition swords, lances and armor.34 When Rubruck's escort armed itself, only two out of twenty had armor.35 The pictorial record confirms
82 These tactics had been employed by the Inner Asian nomads for time out of mind, as noted by Grousset (p. 224) and Lattimore ("Chingis Khan"). They made even relatively small forces of Turks very dangerous to the Crusaders, as shown by Smail (pp. 75-83 and passim); applied by much larger numbers of Mongols, they became irresistible. Extraordinary claims about these ordinary tactics have been made by B. H. Liddell Hart in GreatCaptains Unveiled(Boston: Little, Brown, 1928), Ch. 1, and especially pp. 9-10 and 28; and by K. Wittfogel in TheHistoryof Chinese Society:Liao (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1940), p. 553, again, because of the need they felt to explain Mongol victories over supposedly superior enemy forces. 88 Plano Carpini, p. 37; Polo, p. 101. 84 Plano Carpini, p. 33. 85 Rubruck, pp. 210-11.

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this lack of shock weaponry: although heavy-armed Mongols are shown, so also are Mongols equipped only with bows and arrows, who must be taken as the ordinary soldiers.36 The Mongols' archery equipment was mediocre, on average, because each man made his own,37 and they lacked shock weaponry, for the most part, because most of them could not make their own. The Mongols could and did construct armor at home using heavy leather strips,38and made heavy clubs to strike with.39 But these alone did not amount to very effective equipment for hand-to-hand fighting. What was needed in addition were lances and swords, and these demanded specialist skills that were available to the nomads only to a very limited extent. The rich might commission local craftsmen to make these arms, or pay to import them,40 but the ordinary nomad probably could not afford them, and the sources, whether craftsmen or merchants, probably would not have been able to supply the hundreds of thousands of, for instance, swords that would have been wanted if the ordinary nomad could have afforded them. The importance of heavy weaponry was also limited, it should be noted, by its very heaviness, which would have handicapped severely the ponies upon which the Mongols had to rely. The Mamliiks could not take direct advantage of the Mongols' weakness in heavy arms even though the Mamluiks were much better equipped in this regard. The Mamlfiks had bows and arrows, and, in addition, helmets, armor for body, arms and legs, and lances, javelins, swords, axes, maces and daggers.41 But they could not usually bring all this weaponry to bear because they did not have enough horses to keep up with the Mongols. Keeping horses in a sedentary
86 The heavy-armed soldiery is seen in Phillips, plates 15, 17, 19, 25 and 39; the light in plates 20, 24, 28 and 29. Martin (p. 33) would have all the Mongols armored and heavily-armed, by invalid analogy to the non-nomad Jurched. 87 Plano Carpini, p. 18; Rubruck, p. 103. 88 Plano Carpini, pp. 33-34; Polo, p. 99. 89 Polo, p. 99. Plano Carpini (p. 33) has the axe as the Mongols' basic shock weapon. 40 Plano Carpini, p. 33. 41 H. Nickel, in "A Mamluik Axe," Islamic Arms and Armour,R. Elgood, ed. (London: Scolar Press, 1979), p. 161 (note 19 to p. 159), cites material derived by H. Wiistenfeld from a source of, probably, the early fourteenth century. Mamliik practice in the use of lance and sword is described by Hassanein Rabie in "The Training of the Mamlfik Faris," in V. J. Parry and M. E. Yapp, eds., War, Technology Societyin the Middle East and (London: Oxford University Press, 1975), pp. 153-63.

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society is very expensive, especially by contrast with the cheap methods of the nomads, and in Egypt there are the special problems of the debilitating climate and the limited pasture (which is good, what there is of it, only in winter). Since the smallest allotment of royal pasture to a mamlfik was half a feddan (about half an acre),42 which could only have provided for a single horse during the winter season, some-probably most-mamluiks must have had only one warhorse. Some had more: reserve mounts are often mentioned.43 But the tactics of the Mamlfik army as a whole would have had to be based on the capacities of the common, the least-well-equipped, mamlfik and his single warhorse. This meant that the Mamlfiks could not catch the Mongols and crush them with their superior shock weapons, nor chase them shooting in the style of the Mongols themselves. Such methods would have exhausted most of the Mamliuks' horses before the Mongols had tired out more than a fraction of theirs. We can see that Mongol-style hit-and-run horse archery was not a major component of Mamlfik tactics from consideration of the way they were trained to shoot at the gallop. As Taybugha described it, their exercise involved shooting at a variety of difficult targets, including, par excellence, the qabaq,a gourd or similar object hung high on a pole, requiring the rider to shoot more or less straight up from his galloping mount.44 The importance of the exercise is suggested by the application of its name to Baybars' training field, the

42 Poliak, p. 5. The limited horsepower of the Mamlfiks is also indicated by the statement of Ibn cAbduzzAhir (p. 107) that "the sultan (Baybars) needs every year, for the exclusive use of himself and his mamliks, . . . one hundred and twenty thousand ardabs as fodder for his horses." According to W. Hinz, in Islamische Masse undGewichte(Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1955), p. 39, the irdabbof the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries contained 56 kg (123.2 lbs.) of barley (grain). Assuming that Ibn CAbdu?zAhir was speaking of the grain component in horse-feed that should be 10 lbs. each of barley grain and barley straw, a diet that would have provided a 1,000 lb. horse with maintenance and compensated for about an hour a day of exercise at a fast trot and canter (J. Warren Evans, et al., The Horse [San Francisco: W. F. Freeman, 1977], pp. 261 and 286), the quantity in question would have supported only about (120,000 irdabbs x 56 kg x 2.2 = 14,784,000 lbs. + 365 days = 40,504 lbs. . 10 lbs./horse =) 4,050 horses. Ayalon (in "Studies" Part 1, p. 223) cites Ibn Taghribirdi as saying Baybars' mamlfiks numbered 4,000. 48 Ibn CAbduz.zhir, p. 226, for instance; Maqrizi, 2.4:202. 44 Saracen Archery,Ch. 15.

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Maydan al-Qabaq.45 But Taybugha's description also indicates its limitations. Practice took place on fields, already described, of from 131 to 284 yards in length, down which a single rider and his horse would gallop in a straight line, letting off one shot at the target twothirds of the way down the field4" and then slowing and turning off the course. By Inner Asian standards this was a rudimentary exercise, making for dexterity with the bow, but providing no training in evolutions with the horse in conjunction with the shootingTaybugha says only that the rider should not let the horse run into the pole-and no practice in coordinated movement and shooting by groups of horse-archers. The Mamliiks did not practice the repeated "charge-and-shoot" tactics used by the Mongols because, unlike the Mongols, they could not keep galloping long enough to make such tactics worthwhile. Since the Mamluiks could not compete with the Mongols on the Mongols' tactical terms, they changed the terms. The Mamluiks concentrated on methods which the Mongols could not match, and which made a virtue of the Mamluiks' limitation. Since they had to conserve the energy of the few horses they had, the Mamluiks practiced doing especially well what could best be done from an unmoving mount. Where the Mongols made the most of their horses, the Mamluiks made the most of their archery. If nomads can produce more horses than sedentaries, sedentaries can make more and better bows and arrows (to say nothing of other weapons), and spend more time learrning to use them. Bows and arrows were made by trained artisans for the soldiers to high standards set either by individual specification or by the order of the government arsenals.47 This gave
45 Ayalon, "Notes on the Furtsfyya Exercises and Games in the Mamluik Sultanate," 9 ScriptaHierosolymitana (1961): 38-39. 46 Saracen pp. 76-77. Archery, 47 D. Ayalon, in "Aspects of the Mamluik Phenomenon," Part 1, Der Islam 53 (1976): 222-23, cites a letter of 1191 from Saladin to the Caliph that complained that the artisans of Egypt and Syria could not make arrows fast enough to keep up with expenditure by his armies. Ayalon also mentions the large numbers of arrows used by the Muslims at Hattin: 400 "loads" plus (or perhaps including) 70 camel-loads. If the 400 loads were pack-horse loads of 200 lbs., and the 70 camel-loads, weighing 400 lbs. each, were in addition to the other 400 loads, and if we calculate that the arrows weighed 12 dirhams (the heaviest mentioned by Latham and Paterson, p. 30) or about 1% ounces and 12 arrows to the pound, then Saladin provided about 1.3 million arrows for this battle. For the Mamluiks' weapons industry, see Ibn cAbduahir, pp. 215-16.

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sedentary armies better quality in, and larger supplies of, archery equipment. Moreover, sedentary societies could support professional soldiers, while nomads had to support themselves. Sedentary cavalry thus had more time, and better opportunities for training. Mongol men spent their time, when not on campaign, "hawking and huntother ing," making weapons, caring for their horses, and-like They did some shooting with their bows and nomads-migrating. arrows, no doubt, but surely did not draw their bows at least five hundred times a day as did serious Ottoman archers, or practice as constantly as the Mamluiks must have done to achieve their extraordinary levels of standard performance.48 The Mamliiks could and did work very hard on their archery, which had been promoted in Egypt since the coming of Saladin with his Turkish mamluiks. From at least the 1240s and the time of the Ayyiibid a?-$dlib, training had been enhanced by the building of practice fields, and encouraged, at least by Baybars, by the sultan's personal attendance at the daily practice sessions, to the point that participation on the field under the sultan's eye had to be rotated among the troops at a daily rate of two men out of every ten.49 The emphasis on regular training was not simply an idiosyncrasy of Baybars'. Taybugha's training manual demands "hard and regular practice"50 and sets standards that indicate that the Mamluiks did indeed practice as bidden. Taybugha expected a trained mamluik to be able consistently to shoot aimed arrows into a 38-inch circle at a range of 75 yards, a standard consistent with the best performance in modern archery. But Taybugha also expected a mamluik to get off three arrows in one and a half seconds (probably without aiming so carefully), a standard far beyond the achievement of modern archers, one of whom has
After establishing themselves in Iran (but perhaps only in Ghazan's time) the Mongols also developed a "military-industrial complex" to supply weapons: see Rashiduddin, Historyof Ghdzdn Khdn, K. Jahn, ed. (London: Luzac, 1940), p. 336ff; (hereinafter RaD/ J). Supplying the huge Mongol army of the Middle East (170,000 men in my estimate) would, however, have been a larger job (perhaps too large) by comparison with the equipping of Saladin's 12,000-man expeditions and the similarly-sized Mamilk forces. 48 Polo, p. 98; Plano Carpini, p. 18; Rubruck, p. 103; Klopsteg, p. 109ff; Saracen Archery, pp. 7-8. 49 Ayalon, "Notes," pp. 37-39. 50 Saraen Archery, 153. p.

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managed eight shots in seven seconds.51 To be sure, modern archers do not consider rapid shooting a competitive category. But neither did the Mongols, who concentrated on aimed shooting from galloping horses. The Mamliiks may not have been able to shoot quite so fast from horseback as when dismounted, but they could shoot much faster and straighter, and to better effect at longer ranges, from standing horses than could the Mongols from their fast-moving ponies. Unless the Mongols could use their greater mobility to outflank and surround the Mamliiks, or superior numbers to wear them down, Mamliuk archery would balance and overbalance the Mongols' horsepower. And the Mongols could not compete with the Mamluiks by adopting the same tactics and engaging in a stationary shoot-out. The Mongols understood shooting from a standstill. They had lost the battle of Parvan to Khwarezmians who had dismounted to improve their archery,52 and part of their own army dismounted to defend itself against the Mamliiks during the battle near [joms in 1299.53 But the Mongols used this method against the Mamliiks only
51 Ibid., pp. 138, 141-42. According to J. R. Partington, in A Historyof Greek Fire and (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960), p. 129, the English archers Gunpowder at Agincourt shot at a rate of 12 arrows a minute. J. 52 Juvaini, The History of the World-Conqueror, A. Boyle, trans., 2 vols. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958), 2:406-07. The battle of Parvan is probably illustrated in the painting of folio 72 recto, MS Suppl. Persan 1113, Bibliotheque Nationale, Paris, cited and reproduced by Phillips, plate 7 and p. 193. 53 Haithon, pp. 191-93; RaD/J, pp. 124-30; Vassaf, p. 378. The Mamliiks surprised the Mongols in 1299, joining battle while the Mongols were dispersed to pasture and water their horses, and attacking Ghazan and Qutlughshah while they had only part of their force around them. The Mamluiks tried to come to grips with the Mongols using mace and sword (Maqrizi, 2.2:146), which suggests that they believed their shock weapons were better, and their horses stronger, than the Mongols'. However, Qutlughshah diverted some of the attackers upon himself by beating drums as if from headquarters, and Ghazan's men defended themselves against the rest by dismounting, putting their horses in front of them as a barrier, and shooting down the charging Mamluaks.Haithon says the first rank of Mamluiks fell beneath the Mongols' salvo and impeded or tripped up the subsequent waves of attackers. Then soon the rest of the Mongols came up and won the battle; the dispersal of the Mongol forces to pasture was no greater than permitted its reconcentration within a few hours' time, since the battle commenced at sunrise and was decided by noon. The dismounted fighting in this battle is probably illustrated in an MS of Rashiddudin's work at Tubingen: see Phillips, plate 20 (with the picture reversed) and p. 195; also Ip?iroglu, p. 50, plate 9. Note the use of unsaddled horses as an obstacle against the attacking cavalry, as in Haithon's description (p. 192), and the fact that the attackers seem to be preparing to use shock weapons, as in Maqrizi's account (2.4:146), since

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as a last resort, since by then they understood also that the Mamliiks did it better; the battle in 1299 was eventually won by superior Mongol numbers rather than archery. The Mamliiks also had the advantage of being a standing army composed of select personnel. Slave-recruits for the Mamlulk system were chosen for physical excellence (Baybars nearly failed to qualify) and were therefore much more apt for athletic training in general, and high-standard archery in particular, than the average man.54 The Mongols, however, were average men. They were citizensoldiers rather than professionals, militia rather than regulars; all adult males rather than a select few, collectively therefore of no more than average athletic aptitude, and individually often of much less.55 The general standard of performance of the Mongols would consequently have been lower than that of the Mamluiks. Moreover, the Mamliiks' conditions of service gave them better opportunities, not only for intensive archery practice, but for drill and exercise in largeunit tactics. The Mamluiks lived in, or were attached to, barracks in Cairo (of which there were twelve in the fifteenth century, each housing a thousand men) so that the assembly and deployment for training of troops, squadrons and regiments was a simple matter.56 The Mongols, on the other hand, lived dispersed with their families and animals, like other Inner Asian nomads, who typically live in groups of from two to five families, with one adult male per family.57 Under the ordinary conditions of nomadic life, therefore, the Monthey are within arrow range, but are still holding their reins, which they would have had to drop to use the bow. Phillips says the Mongols are shooting "from walls," but to me the Mongols look merely to be behind a fold of ground; in any case, the Mongol in the foreground is on foot, behind the loose horses, directly facing the charging cavalry, exactly as described by Haithon. 54 Ayalon, "Aspects," Part 1, pp. 206-08; Sadeque, pp. 29-32. 55 Smith, "Mongol Manpower."
56
57

Rabie, p. 153.

H. H. Vreeland, MongolCommunity KinshipStructure, ed. (New Haven: Human and 3rd Relations Area Files (HRAF) Press, 1962), p. 36; F. Barth, Nomadsof SouthPersia (Oslo: Oslo University Press; London: Allen and Unwin; New York: Humanities Press, 1964), pp. 25-26; W. Irons, "Variations in Economic Organization: A Comparison of the Pastoral Yomut and the Basseri," in W. Irons and N. Dyson-Hudson, eds., Perspectives on Nomadism(Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1972), p. 92; D. G. Bates, Nomads and Farmers(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1973), p. 121; A. E. Hudson, Kazak Social Structure (New Haven: HRAF Press, 1938), p. 24.

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gols would have been hard put to assemble enough men to practice even the smallest, ten-man unit tactics. Those nomads, including the Mongols, whose political circumstances permitted, made special arrangements for the assembly of large groups for training purposes, holding great quasi-military hunts, or organizing summer camps for military exercises (a practice suggestive of, and probably similar in quality of product to, modern military reserve organizations). From employment of such methods, and because of their hard, simple life and their long experience in the saddle and on campaign, the Mongols made excellent amateur soldiers. But when these excellent amateurs met an equal force of the fine Mamliuk professionals, the result was predictable. The battle of cAyn Jliit takes its name from a spring by the modern settlement of Gidona, lying beneath the westernmost end of the Gilboa highlands, in the Jezreel valley. The Mongols probably chose to await the Mamluiks at this place because it was the position farthest advanced to the south and west along the main route from Egypt to Damascus that provided adequate water and grazing in full summer, and that offered good ground for cavalry maneuvers.58 The Mongols may also have hoped to catch the Mamluiks undeployed, emerging by Armageddon onto the Esdraelon plain from the constricted, rocky country along the road from Hadera (as other Mongols seem to have caught the Seljuks coming down from Kosedagh to the plain of Sfishehri in 1243). But the Mamluiks, by arrangement with the local Crusaders, went around behind Mt. Carmel past Acre instead. Rashiduddin describes the battle as a Mamlfik ambush of the Mongols: Qutuz deploys most of his force out of sight of the Mongols, and then leads a small party to provoke them into charging after him into the midst of the concealed Mamlfiks.59 Maqrlzl, on the other hand, has a Mamluik patrol led by Baybars encounter and skirmish with Mongol outposts, apparently on the day before the main battle,
$8 The Jezreel Valley is watered by the Harod (formerly Jalut) River, which is fed by numerous large springs (including cAyn Jaluit) and is therefore a reliable, year-round water-source. The Muqatta' River of the Esdraelon plain to the west, on the other hand, tends to dry up in summer, so that it "may merely contain pools of water in its muddy of bed." See A Handbook Syria (includingPalestine) (London: Naval Intelligence Division, 1920), p. 519. 59 Rashiduddin, Histoire des Mongols de la Perse, E. Quatremere, ed. and trans. (Paris: Imprimerie royale, 1836), pp. 348-49; (hereinafter RaD/Q).

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which commenced at daybreak following the deployment of the two armies; no surprise nor surrounding occurs in his account.60 The lie of the land around cAyn Jliit and the approximate equality in numbers of the opposing forces makes Rashiduddin's story appear somewhat implausible. The Mamliiks could have approached the Mongol camp (along the route of the present road that connects the Hadera-Afula and Afula-Bet She'an roads, passing Afula to the south) and remained unseen beyond the southwestern rim of the a Jezreel valley up to a couple of miles from cAyn Jliit-assuming poor lookout by the Mongols. But the rim of the valley is not so sharp as to hide an army in ambush; the approaching Mongols would have seen the waiting Mamliiks in time to have taken their usual evasive measures. The accounts of Maqrlzl and Rashiduddin can be conflated, however, with some minor adjustments. The Mamliiks could have advanced along the route mentioned, alarming and driving in the Mongol outposts (presumably on the rim of the valley), and forming a front north to south across the western end of the valley somewhat east of the point where a road now branches right (ESE) to Nurit and the Gilboa heights. The Gilboa hills begin at this point to rise and fringe the southern side of the valley, and the Mamliuks could have used them to anchor their Right Wing. Moreover, the Mamluiks could have placed a force in ambush behind the first (northwesternmost) Gilboa hills, along the (present) Nurit track, ready to take the Mongol Left in flank should it push the Mamluik Right back (to the west) past the end of the hills. The Mamluiks were pushed back, by all accounts. The Mongols took the initiative and the offensive, and, according to Maqrlzl, broke one wing of the Mamliik army.61 They were finally held only by the spirited resistance of Qutuz and his entourage in the Centerand, perhaps, by our scaled-down version of Rashiduddin's ambush on the Right. All this time, we may imagine, the Mongols and their horses were exposed to that fast, straight Mamliuk shooting, while the Mamliiks conserved their horses' strength. When the Mongols were at last fought to a standstill, their horses exhausted or shot down, the Mamliiks went over to the attack on their bigger, fresher horses, and drove the Mongols back. Some fled to a hilltop, only to
60

Maqrizi, 1:104-06. See also Ibn cAbduzzahir, p. 93.

61 Maqrizi, 1:104.

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be followed and killed by Baybars.62 Others beat a fighting retreat all the way to the Antioch region, where their families and herds were at pasture, and where Baybars caught and crushed them too. 63 Kedbuqa was killed, probably in action,64 but possibly after capture. Rashiduddin's account has Kedbuqa led captive before Qutuz, whom he belittles and insults before being executed.65 So far, the Mongol reverse seems to be a case of strategic miscalculation based on inadequate intelligence. Hulegu should have left a larger force in Syria, and his successors, to repair his error, should have brought and kept one there. Hulegu did not, it is usually alleged, because he had to prepare to go East to attend the assembly that was supposed to settle the succession to Mongke Khan, and he and his heirs could not thereafter, it is claimed, because of the threat from the Golden Horde consequent upon the failure to settle that succession. In fact, Hulegu and his successors were not thus constrained. Hulegu would not have taken his whole army to the quriltai, and if he wanted to attend in some force, he had at least nine tumens still in Iran to choose among. Nor did he need to reconcentrate his armies in Iran against the Golden Horde. When Hiilegii moved out of Syria in May, 1260, the usurpations of Qubilai and Arighboke that led to conflict with the Golden Horde had not yet taken place; this conflict broke out only in 1262.66 And even when the Golden Horde did attack, in 1262 and on later occasions, it seems never to have used more than three tiimens,67 and thus scarcely challenged the power, but rather tested the loyalties, of the Mongols of the Middle East. Hulegu had no political or military need to withdraw five of the six tiimensin Syria. Huilegui's successors undertook six more campaigns against Syria. They used armies just as large as Htilegii's on four of them, so that it is obvious that the hostility of the Golden Horde did not inhibit their strategy. Yet their invasions were no more successful than had been Hiilegu's. Given Kedbuqa's fiasco, we would expect that they would have kept their full force in Syria longer-and perhaps advanced
Ibn cAbduz.zhir, pp. 93-94; Maqrizi, 1:104-06; RaD/Q, pp. 346-51. Ibn cAbduzzahir, pp. 93-94. 64 Ibid., p. 93; Maqrizi, 1:105. 65 RaD/K, pp. 723-24. 66 Rashiduddin, Successors, pp. 123, 252-53. 67 Howorth, 3:197, 321-22.
62 63

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against Egypt-and this they did not do. Their methods resembled Hiilegii's, as we can see by considering the campaigns of Ghazan, who made the most sustained (and best documented) of the Mongol efforts.68 These campaigns began in 1299, when Ghazan called up five men out of every ten from 13 tiumens, had each bring five horses and six months' rations, and set out for Syria in October.69 Ghazan's forces thus included 65,000 men and 325,000 horses. This army started a month later than Hiulegiu's had, but moved faster, crossing the Euphrates on 7 December. Then Ghazan demonstrated that the Mongols' strategic plan was correct in part: an army of the size usually sent into Syria could take on the Mamliiks-if they would accept battle. In 1299 the Mamliuks did accept battle with Ghazan's full force, and the Mongols won. But in the end, the Mamliiks did not lose. On February 5th, 1300, Ghazan withdrew from Syria, leaving
68 The only major Mongol campaign that departed from the pattern set- by Hulegu was that of 1281, which brought the army into Syria in early fall, to be defeated on 15 that October. Abaqa appears to have mobilized 8 tuimens year, and considerable Armenian, Georgian and other vassal contingents, but sent only a fraction of this force, perhaps a nominal half, all the way to Syria under the command of Mengu Timur (compare Ghazan's partial mobilization in 1299). Thus the Mongol order of battle as reported by der Rashiduddin, in K. Jahn, ed., Geschichte Ilhdne Abdad bis Gaihdtii ('S-Gravenhage: Mouton, 1957), pp. 40-41, included 8 Mongol commanders (not counting Mengu Timur, who was only a youth), but appears from other sources to have numbered only 25-30 thousand men. This force, like Kedbuqa's in 1260 and like those later left behind by Ghazan on his campaigns, was a relatively small one as necessitated by the logistic factors discussed later. These factors seem also to have produced an overdispersal of the Mongols, whose line of battle, according to Rashiduddin, extended over 4 farsakls (1520 miles) ! Overdispersal then led to loss of tactical control. The Mongol Right drove the Mamluik Left from the field to the vicinity of Homs, and then dismounted to rest, lunch and pillage, leaving the rest of the army (proportionately perhaps three-fourths of the Mongol troops; thus maybe 15-20 thousands, if the total was 25-30 thousands) to face the unusually-strong Mamlfik Center, possibly 7-8 thousands (if the jdlfsh and #alqa mentioned by Maqrizi are separate forces), and Right with perhaps 5 thousand regulars (under five named amirs) plus several thousand in beduin vassal contingents (including 4 thousand "armored lancers" from "Mora" alone). The Mongol Center and Left were forced to retreat, and the Mongol Right, now unsupported in its turn, had to retire. As at cAyn Jaluit, the Mongols found themselves unable to deal with the Mamluiks when fighting on approximately equal terms. See also Abul al-Fida' in Recueildes Historiensdes Croisades,Historiens Orientaux,5 vols. (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1872-1906), 1:159; Haithon, pp. 182-84; Barhebraeus, p. 464; Maqrizi, 2.1:34-39. 69 For the level of mobilization and the ratio of horses, see Vas.sf, p. 373, lines 20-22. History The other Mongol campaigns in Syria are treated by J. A. Boyle in The Cambridge of Iran, vol. 5: The Saljuq and Mongol Periods (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), pp. 352, 361, 363-64, and 403.

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behind three tuimens under Qutlughshah, Chulban and Miilai, and ordering Qutlughshah and Chfiban to stay until spring, and Mtila1, with his tuimen, to stay through the summer. Qutlughshah and Chfuban retired toward the beginning of April, and Miilad, doubtless thinking that he would do no better against a renewed Mamluik offensive with his single tumen and locally-recruited troops than Kedbuqa had in 1260 with his, retreated a little later, permitting an uncontested Mamluik reoccupation.70 In September 1300, Ghazan set off to restore the position in Syria abandoned in the spring. He marched into Syria with six tumens late in October, but was unable to accomplish much because of heavy rains, and withdrew in early February, 1301, again leaving Qutlughshah, who again retired a little later, toward the end of March.71 Ghazan's last attack, in 1302-1303, involved a different approach. Instead of moving all his forces across northern Mesopotamia and Syria, he sent only one corps of three tumens by that route, and, starting in late December, 1302, led his own corps of three more tumens from Iraq along the Euphrates into Syria in early March, 1303. Thereafter, however, things went as usual. Ghazan retired early in April before reaching Syria, sending forces from his own corps to reinforce Qutlughshah. But these forces, led by Sfitai and another commander whose name has not been preserved consistently in the sources, never joined Qutlughshah. Consequently, when he met the Mamlfiks south of Damascus on April 20th, he had to rely on his own corps, which could not overcome the Mamluik defense. His subsequent attempt to disengage, retire, recuperate and reinforce failed, and Qutlughshah then beat a very rapid retreat, leaving his subordinate commander, Chuiban, to distinguish himself in a unique way for a Mongol general, by leading a body of defeated Mongols out of Syria on foot.72 Ghazan's campaigns, then, are in most respects repetitions of Hulegu's. Ghazan used about the same numbers, which means that he was no more immobilized by the Golden Horde than Hiilegii had been. And he retained Hiilegii's obviously defective strategy as well. He (or his commanders) failed to keep, or failed properly to use, the
70 RaD/J, pp. 124-30. The battle is described in note 53 above. "I Ibid., pp. 131-33. 72 Ibid., pp. 143-49.

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suaperiornumbers they always had in Syria at the beginning of each campaign. These similarities suggest that the defective strategy was imposed upon, rather than chosen by, the Mongols. The controlling factors seem to be the climatic conditions in Syria and the limits of its pasture and water. The Mongol armies were the Mongol people in arms: all adult males were soldiers, and all women, children of age to do herding, and animals served as the logistic "tail" of the army. A tuimenwas not just 10,000 men, but perhaps 50,000 people and 600,000 animals (assuming families of five, each owning 10 horses and 50 sheep-the equivalent of 100 sheep at one horse to five sheep).7 The logistic requirements of such a force are very large. On many occasions, including, I think, most of the Syrian campaigns, the Mongols left their women and children, and most of their animals, at home, so as to cut down on this high logistic overhead.74 But the Mongols had to have enough mounts to be able to outlast the Mamliks in high-speed engagements, or else the Mamliiks would catch and crush them as they tried to do near Ijoms in 1299; even though the Mamluiks were relatively horse-poor, such warhorses as they did have were larger, stronger and more enduring than the ponies of the Mongols. Nomads can produce more horses, sedentaries better ones.75
73

See the discussion in Smith, "Mongol Manpower."

74 The exception is the first, 1259-60, campaign in which at least Kedbuqa and his

troops were accompanied by their families; a permanent occupation of Syria was intended, and for this a full nomadic establishment was needed. Ghazan took his family on the 13021303 campaign, but neither he nor they went all the way to Syria. The families and subsistence herds of Kedbuqa's army are mentioned by Ibn cAbduzzahir, pp. 93-94; the people with Ghazan in RaD/J, pp. 124-30. Whether or not a Mongol army was accompanied by women, children and subsistence herds can be determined if its itinerary and timetable are known. Sheep and goats should only be moved 3-4 miles a day, whereas larger animals can travel much faster. See the Encyclopaedia Britannica (1973), "Sheep." Hulegu, in 1259, travelled at about 4y miles a day on his way to Aleppo. 75 The Mamluiks presumably rode locally-raised horses of Arabian stock for the most part, although a Papal edict of 1291 forbade European exports to the Muslims of horses among other strategic goods: see Ibn cAbduzzahir, pp. 227-28, and W. Heyd, Histoire du Commerce Levantau Moyen-Age,2 vols. (Leipzig: Harrassowitz, 1885-86), 2:25. The du modern Arabian horse (in its American version, to be sure) measures 141 151 hands (57-61 inches), weighs 800-1,000 lbs., and is "a general-purpose, light horse with an unsurpassed reputation for endurance." See The Horse, p. 20. The modern Mongolian pony is much smaller, about 12' hands (50 inches) and 600 lbs. See H. Epstein, Domestic Animalsof China(Farnham Royal: Commonwealth Agricultural Bureaux, 1969), pp. 100-

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T herefore, each Mongol soldier was to bring five horses on Ghazan's a smaller number than usual, considering first campaign-possibly Polo's evidence, but probably an irreducible minimum.76 Thus each tiumenwith Ghazan had 50,000 horses, and the customary six tumens of the Mongol forces invading Syria would have had some 300,000. The requirements of these horses determined the nature of the campaigns. On many of their expeditions, especially those enlarging the Mongol empire to the west, the need for large numbers of horses and even of other animals posed no logistic problem. Most of Inner Asia and much of the Middle East is steppe country that provides plentiful grazing, and the Mongols were able to support their animals on these pastures. As Marco Polo noticed, this relieved Mongol armies in these regions of the immense logistic burdens of conventional armies: "Their horses . . . support themselves by grazing, so that there is no need to carry barley or straw."77 This barley and straw, had it been required, would have meant transporting about five lbs. each of hay and barley for each horse per day; for a tilmenwith 50,000 horses, 250 tons of hay and barley per day.78
101. No doubt the American Arabian horses are larger than most of their ancestors because of lavish feeding, but the Mamluiks would have fed their warhorses very well too, so that the average American dimensions probably suggest the size of select Mamluik stock. The Mongolian pony is also said to be "unsurpassed the world over for stamina" (Martin, p. 18)-but partisans of one or another breed of horse are always saying this sort of thing. What tells against this claim is the fact that the pony in Mongolia is nourished entirely by grazing, and veterinary scholars are agreed that grazing does not provide sufficient nutrition under all conditions. "Hard-working horses, lactating mares and weanlings may require nutrient intakes greater than that provided by pasture." (The Horse, p. 311.) The problem is not one of pasture quality, but of the physical limitations on the amount of grass that a horse can consume. A hard-working horse or lactating mare may expend three or more times the energy it requires for simple maintenance. If the maintenance requirement of a 600 lb. pony is 10.35 million calories (Mcal)-see the calculations in the text below-then the hard-work, etc., requirements might be 31.05 Mcal. To obtain this from grazing on bromusinermiswould require over 89 lbs of fresh bromegrass and might take about 30 hours of steady grazing. 76 Vassaf, p. 373. 77 Polo, p. 99. The pastoral and logistic capacity of Hungary is appraised for the Mongols by D. Sinor, in "Horse and Pasture in Inner Asian History," OriensExtremus 19 (1972), and for the Huns by R. Lindner in "Nomadism, Horses and Huns," Past and Present92 (August 1981). 78 Calculations based on data for brome hay and barley: see The Horse, pp. 299-300 and 324.

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The grazing made the horses independent of supply trains, and the horses in turn made the Mongols themselves independent. The Mongols brought various foods with them on campaign: sheep are mentioned, and when available (as in the Middle East) grain may have been packed on some of the spare horses.79 Dried milk was prepared in advance and carried along; wild animals were hunted along the way; and the army's horses provided both milk and blood for food.80 But such supplies were not always available, appropriate, or sufficient. Herding sheep drastically cut down the (already none too rapid) rate of march. Grain might well not be available-as in inarable Outer Mongolia-and game might not be found. Dried milk supplies seem to have sufficed, perhaps because of perishability, for only 20 days' partial rations.81 Complete reliance on mares' milk,
79 Morgan (p. 86 and n. 35) cites al-cUmari as describing a force of the Golden Horde campaigning with 30 sheep and goats per soldier-or rather, I think, 10 sheep and goats per man, since each soldier had two "slaves." Ten sheep and goats per man would nicely approximate the 6 months' rations that the Mongols were told to bring to Syria in 1299. A ewe, under normal migratory conditions, produces about 1 pint of milk a day in excess of her lamb's requirements (more, perhaps, if the lamb is eaten early); 10 ewes' production, 5 quarts of milk, would provide upwards of 3,000 calories. If slaughtered, a sheep weighing 100 lbs. would produce some 48 lbs. of meat (ignoring edible offal and tallow that the Mongols would not have ignored), or, at 2.5 lbs. per man per day, about 19 days' rations; the meat of 10 sheep would thus provide something a bit over 6 months' rations. "Ten sheep for 6 months" also has the ring of the sort of rule of thumb that the Mongols and the Inner Asian nomads generally must have relied on in strategic planning. For the milk production of nomad sheep, see Bates, pp. 8, 12-20, 156; for the weight of Inner Asian nomad sheep, see L. Krader, "Ecology of Central Asian Pastoralism," Journal of Anthropology, 11.4 (Winter, 1955): 320; for the meat yields and the Southwestern Britannica movement of sheep, see the articles "Meat" and "Sheep" in the Encyclopaedia (1973); and for caloric requirements, see C. Clark and M. Haswell, The Economicsof Subsistence Agriculture,2nd ed. (New York: St. Martins; London: Macmillan, 1966), pp. 11-15, and 48-51. Since grain enough for six months' rations would have weighed some 585 lbs. (taking 3.25 lbs. of grain as yielding about 3,000 calories), it would have made a full load for each of the spare horses among the five that every Mongol soldier brought on the Syrian campaigns. The horses could easily enough have borne these loads, but in doing so they would have become pack-horses as well as remounts, and would have lost those several days of rest between mountings-"The horses the Tartars ride on one day they do not (Plano Carpini, p. 47)-that were mount again for the next three or four days....." necessary to maintain their tactical stamina on nutritionally marginal grazing. See D. W. Engels, Alexanderthe Great and the Logistics of the MacedonianArmy (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1978), p. 124; and Clark and Haswell, loc. cit. 80 Polo, pp. 99-101. Cf. Plano Carpini, pp. 16-17, and Rubruck, pp. 97-101. 81 Polo, p. 100.

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although theoretically possible, would not have been feasible because of the long planning in advance needed to provide enough lactating mares at the right times.82 Horse-blood, because of its low caloric content, could not have served as a regular ration.83 Horse-meat, however, could be provided easily and amply: the carcass of a 600 lb. pony would yield about 240 lbs. of meat (to say nothing of edible organs, etc.), and would support one soldier for at least three monthsor, considering the problem of perishability and phrasing it as the Mongol logistic planners would have done: "one horse per Hundred per day."84 Two extra horses per man, in addition to the string required for tactical purposes, would thus have kept a Mongol army in food for six months without significantly increasing its labor or transport problems; Ghazan's "five mounts and six months' rations" is thus the equivalent of Polo's "six to eight horses per man."85 A Mongol army traveling in the steppe was therefore logistically selfsufficient, even discounting the proceeds in food and fodder from successful warfare. Such an army also had the strategic advantage of it as it were "pre-positioned" in enemy supplies-pasture-awaiting
82 Modern Mongolian ponies produce some 2* to 21 quarts of milk a day in excess of their foals' needs during a 5 months' lactation. Judging by the standards for cow's milk, this would yield about half of a daily 3,000 (k)cal. ration, so that 2 milking mares would be needed by each soldier for each 5 months of campaigning. As the gestation period in horses is 11 months, the logistic preparations for milk supplies would have to begin 11 months in advance of a campaign. See Epstein, p. 101; Vreeland, p. 40; The Horse, p. 309. 83 Horses can "donate" up to a third of their blood "without showing signs of distress" (Schalm, p. 37); a 600 lb. Mongolian pony containing 42 lbs. of blood (7% of its live weight) could thus provide 14 pounds or pints. But the nutritional value of blood is low, and a considerable interval must be allowed between large "donations". Although data are not available for horse-blood and horse-bleeding, African cattle provide blood yielding only 156 (k)calories per pint, at intervals of 4-6 weeks. Moreover, the blood "donors," if not "distressed," would be debilitated to some degree, and the Mongols would not have wanted this for their tactical mounts. See 0. W. Schalm, Veterinary Hematology,2nd ed. (Philadelphia: Lea and Febiger, 1965), p. 37; and G. Dahl and A. Hjort, Having Herds (Stockholm: University of Stockholm Press, 1976), p. 172. 84 Mongol consumption of horse-meat is mentioned in all the usual sources: see Plano Carpini, p. 16, Rubruck, p. 97, and Polo, p. 98. Armenian prisoners were offered horsemeat by their Mongol captors: 1&.Dulaurier, "Les Mongols d'apres les historiens horses amounts Arm6niens," Journal Asiatique (1858): 228. Muscle tissue-meat-in to about 40% of their live weight: W. Martin-Rosset, et al., "Rendement et composition Centre Recherches des Zootechniques des carcasses du poulain de boucherie," Bulletin Technique, de et Veterinaires Theix 41 (Beaumont, 1980), p. 58. 86 See Va**df, p. 373, for Ghazan's requirements; Marco Polo's estimate is on p. 152.

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territory. The far-flung campaigns of the Mongols and the extraordinary extent of their empire were to a considerable degree the products of this great logistical boon. Steppe logistics had its limitations. It did not work well in nonsteppe regions, although growing grain crops might be substituted for grass where available. Mongol logistics in China-especially South China-and Europe needs study. Even on the steppe, the Mongol armies had to travel slowly if they were to be independent. It is worth making this point in some detail because the common-and mistaken-impression of Mongol campaigning is one of very rapid movement. Desmond Martin's close study of Samukha's North China campaign of 1216-17 has shown that the average daily march was 14 miles.86 And the Mongol invasions of Syria were similar, as may be seen most clearly from the itinerary and timetable of Ghazan's march in 1299-1300. He started from Tabriz on 15 October 1299 and travelled via Kushaf to Nusaybin, which he reached on 21 November. Kushaf is said to be somewhat west of Irbil, so the route passed around Lake Urmiye through Maragheh into Iraq and past Ruwandiz, Irbil, M6sul and Tell Kuichek. The distance (via Maragheh) is about
86 Martin (p. 191) thought the distance covered about 700 miles and the marching time about 50 days. He considered this "an amazing feat," but did not do the arithmetic that yields only 14 mpd. Martin (p. 18) cites other examples of apparently extraordinary Mongol marches where appearances do not reflect reality. The example taken from Juvaini suffers from mistranslation: it is not "Bamiyan to Ghazna in two days" but by double-stages, i.e. at something like 30 mpd, not 65 mpd. See Juvaini, text: Mhd. E. Qazwini, ed., Ta'rikh-iJahan-Gushd, J. W. Gibb Mem. Vol. 16/1 (Leiden: E. J. Brill; London: Luzac, 1912): 106; and Boyle's translation, 1:133. The example from the Hungarian campaign has Mongol forces defeat an Hungarian army in the Carpathian mountains on 12 March 1241, and then appear in the environs of Pest, some 180 miles away, on 15 March. Although both Martin and Liddell Hart assume that the same Mongols are involved in both incidents, it is both possible on strategic grounds, and probable on logistic ones, that they were not. The organization and strategy of the Mongol campaign is succinctly and plausibly set forth in the biography of Subedei in the Yuanshih: see P. Pelliot, Notes sur l'histoirede la HordeD'Or (Paris: Adrien-Maisonneuve, 1949), pp. 130-33. It has the army divided into five commands, each of which proceeded into Hungary by a different route. Two of these commands marched (respectively) via Poland and Transylvania. The other three crossed the Carpathians, each, I believe, by a different pass (there seem, by the look of modern maps, to be at least five major passes that could have been used). The Hungarians, I imagine, tried to block one of these on 12 March, while the other two Mongol commands meanwhile moved unimpeded over the other routes and pressed on past the Hungarians to Pest. See also Rashiduddin, Szucessors, pp. 56-57 and 69-70. Martin derived his understanding of the Hungarian campaign from Liddell Hart (pp. 25-27), who unfortunately did not make clear his sources.

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540 miles, covered in 37 days, at an average pace of 14.6 miles per day (mpd). From Nusaybin, Ghaz-an proceeded to, and crossed the Euphrates at, Raqqa, a distance of some 242 miles, covered in 16 days (21 November-7 December) at 15.1 mpd. The journey from Raqqa to lIoms (via Aleppo and IjIamTh) of about 246 miles, took 15 days at 16.4 mpd.8' The average pace for the whole journey was 15.1 mpd. Fifteen miles a day is not a fast pace for cavalry. The infantry of Alexander the Great managed 13 mpd, and in modern times cavalry has been expected to travel about 32 mpd.88 The Mongols had to move relatively slowly because they grazed rather than fed their horses, and horses need much more time to consume the large quantity of fresh grass they require than they do for its far more compact equivalent in grain and dry fodder. The Mongols' horses, judging by their modern descendants, weighed about 600 lbs. on averageand were in fact only ponies, standing about 121 hands or 50 inches high (the horse-pony divide is at 14 or 141 hands, 56-58 inches).89 The "maintenance ration" for such an animal should provide 10.35 million calories (Mcal), according to modern calculations, plus 0.1365 Mcal for each hour of walking (at 4 mph); consequently, on an "average day" of Mongol campaigning, the average pony would need 10.9 Mcal. To obtain these calories from the common, goodquality steppe grass smooth brome (bromus inermis),for instance, which provides 2.36 Mcal/kg of dry matter, and has 32.5% of dry matter in its fresh form, the pony would have to consume (10.9 + 2.36 = 4.62 : 32.5 x 100 = 14.21 kg =) 31.3 lbs. of fresh bromegrass.90 And horses-or ponies-graze slowly.91 One authority calculates that
87 The itinerary and timetable are given in RaD/J, pp. 125-26. The probable location of Kushaf is mentioned by Boyle (in the Cambridge Historyof Iran, 5:394). I have worked out the approximate distances from Turkish road maps and various of Les GuidesBleus (Hachette). 88 Engels, pp. 15, n. 15 and 154-56. Chenevix-Trench, pp. 179-80, gives examples from World War I of cavalry campaigns in which units covered 40-60 mpd on occasion.

89 Epstein,

p. 100. 90 The Horse, pp. 259-62, 286, 288, 298-300 and 324-29. I have estimated the main-

tenance needs for a 600 lb. pony using the data in The Horse,p. 286, and taking an average of the requirements obtained by scaling up from the needs of a 200 kg. animal and down from those of one of 400 kg. 91This fact was first brought to my attention by my equine informants, the bay mare, Shalimar, and the gray gelding, McLeod, whose inspiration and very willing collabora-

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a horse eats cut hay at a rate of 3 lbs. per hour and that grazing would go slower still.92 Even at 3 lbs. per hour, however, consumption of 31.3 lbs. would take almost 104 hours. This lengthy grazing time accounts for the apparently leisurely pace of Mongol campaigns.93 The large number of ponies taken on campaign by the Mongols did not enable them to evade these pastoral limitations, as some have mistakenly supposed.94 Use of a series of mounts in combat made it possible for the Mongols to keep up a fast tactical pace, but in these circumstances only one of each rider's several ponies is working at any given moment. On the march all the ponies, mounts and remounts, are marching; the mount expends more energy, but only fractionally more than the remounts, which must travel the same distance and graze at the same time. If the rider and his mount travel an exceptional distance, so must his remounts; they too will expend abnormal amounts of energy and will have less time than usual (and perhaps less than necessary) to recoup this expenditure by grazing. To maintain a fast pace over long distances, the Mongols had to be able to obtain fresh ponies as each mount tired, and they could not do this by bringing extra ponies with them, but only by positioning them along the route in advance, as they did with the yam, their pony express system.95 They could not do this in enemy territory. Nomads in general accommodate this lengthy requirement of graztion in my studies of the grazing and feeding of horses I wish to acknowledge here, as I do also the more costly contribution of other horses to the knowledge cited above in notes 83 and 84. 92 Chenevix-Trench, p. 310. 93 The time involved in grazing also explains why the Mongols had to use ponies. Larger horses, with proportionately larger nutritional needs, would have had to spend more time grazing. A 1,000 lb. horse undertaking the same modest activity as the Mongol pony discussed above-maintenance plus 4 hours of walking-would require 15.34 Mcal, 44 lbs. of fresh bromegrass, and nearly 15 hours of grazing. I have calculated the caloric requirement in the way described in the text above. 94 Martin (p. 18), after describing Mongolian journeys of 600 miles done in 9 days, says "If greater speed is necessary, one or more spare mounts are led." Lattimore (in "Chingis Khan") also connects the large numbers of horses used by the Mongols with strategic movement, rapid travel over long distances, rather than tactical activity. 95 The yam, according to Polo (pp. 150-55), had post-stations providing fresh horses at intervals of 25-30 miles along well-established routes, and the messengers using them could cover 200-250 miles a day. The American Pony Express also had 25-mile stages and covered 200 miles a day, according to Chenevix-Trench (p. 227).

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ing by moving their animals in the morning, grazing them in the afternoon, and resting them at night,96 and the Mongols were no exception. When Ibn Battiuta accompanied the Persian Mongol ruler, Abui Sacid, as he travelled with his entourage from Baghdad to Tabriz, he observed that "It is their custom to set out with the rising of the dawn and to encamp in the late forenoon."'7 The campaigning Mongols clearly did the same, and their military movements should not, therefore, be thought of as lightning sweeps, but as marches of, at most, only somewhat greater rapidity than those of their enemies, insofar as these were encumbered by foot soldiers, donkeys, wagons and suchlike. An all-cavalry force that carried grain and fodder for its horses with it could have travelled much faster than the Mongols, although not for far before using up the rations it could carry. Reliance on grazing not only meant that the Mongols had to move slowly, but that they had to keep moving. Each horse required grazing sufficient to provide (in bromegrass) about 93 lbs. (dry weight) of grass each day; 300,000 horses needed about 2.8 million lbs. a day. Good Inner Asian pastures (Syrian data are not available) yield some 534 lbs. (dry weight) per acre per year, but the amount available on such pastures on any given day depends on season, climate, etc.98 Assuming the arrival of a Mongol army just as such pastures completed growing their 534 lbs./acre, the 300,000 horses would need 5243 acres or about 8 square miles of grazing a day. But few days during a Mongol campaign would coincide with peak growth. On the Syrian campaigns, the Mongol forces reached the easterly parts
96 Barth, pp. 15-16. See also M. Cooper, Grass(New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1925), p. 241. L. Krader, "Ecology," pp. 321-22, has various nomad groups covering rather greater daily distances (up to 15-25 mpd for the Kalmuks), but does not say how long they keep up this pace. His Kazak examples involve a spurt of travel over 15-20 miles followed by a week or so of encampment, rest and grazing. The small animals may also be moved separately and more slowly. 97 Ibn Battuita, Travels,H. A. R. Gibb, ed. and trans., vol. 2, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962), p. 342. 98 I. V. Larin, PastureEconomy and Meadow Cultivation(Moscow and Leningrad: State Press for Agricultural Literature, 1956), trans. by the Israel Program for Scientific Translations (Jerusalem, 1962), pp. 470 and 539. Larin uses pasture yields of 600 kilograms per hectare for sample calculations for livestock pasturing in the Soviet Union. Sketch of the Mongolian People's Republic I. Kh. Ovdiyenko, Economic-Geographical (Bloomington: Mongolian Society Occasional Papers, no. 3, 1965), p. 59, says that about t of the pastures in Outer Mongolia yield an average of 540 kg/ha; I yield 420 kg/ha; and the remaining * yield only 210 kg/ha.

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of the Fertile Crescent in mid-fall, at about the beginning of the rains and the start of the growing season; until mid-spring (about the time that most of them usually started home from Syria) their horses would be grazing on growing rather than fully-grown grass, and so would require much more acreage than the figure derived from total production. The Mongol armies in and on their way to and from Syria therefore needed access to more than (and often, no doubt, much more than) 8 square miles of pasture each day-and to a different 8-plus square miles each day. Mongol armies were thus constrained to stay spread out and keep moving. This constraint made concentration and positioning for battle or siege problematic, and occupation or garrisoning awkward. A final consideration of pastoral logistics, and the decisive one in the Mongols' Syrian campaigning, is that of water-supply. Ordinarily, the Mongols could count on water being available along with suitable grazing, since grass grows in response to rain. This meant that when the Mongols campaigned in the same fashion as nomads migrated (as for instance we see them doing by spending the winters in the lowlands and the summers in the highlands during their Central Asia-Afghanistan-Northwest India campaign) they had no problem finding grass and water. The Mongols could not do this in Syria, which has good steppes but a bad climate, providing rain from late fall through early spring, and drought from late spring through early fall. The 300,000 horses (ponies) that the Mongols brought on Syrian campaigns would have needed perhaps 5 (U.S.) gallons of water a day each, or 1.5 million gallons a day for them all.""During the rainy season, they would have had no trouble obtaining this. The fresh grass they ate would have had a large water content: fresh bromus inermisis 67.5% water, and a pony's ration of 31.3 lbs. would have included 2.6 gallons. And the chief rivers of Syria, the Quwaiq flowing past Aleppo, the upper Orontes and its affluents by lIamTh and Ijom*, and the Barada and Acwaj in and around Damascus, flow in spate at rates, respectively, of about 167, 89, and 8.9 million gallons a day. But April is usually the last rainy month, and in May the summer drought begins. The pasture grasses dry up, diminishing
99 The water requirement is derived from the estimates in The Horse, pp. 280-81, scaled down for a pony of 600 lbs.

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in nutritional value and retaining probably 10% or less of moisture by weight. The flow in the rivers also drops dramatically. The average flows in the Quwaiq, Orontes and Barada-Acwaj are only 1.8, 7.1, and 2.2 million gallons a day, and the minima are much less even than this (the Barada declines to about half the average flow) .IO But because the seasons of Syria are either wet or dry, the "average" flow seldom obtains: the rivers tend to be either in spate or flowing minimally. The Orontes at lIamTh, for instance, begins to rise in mid-January, and declines again to a near-minimal level in midApril.101 By late spring, therefore, the Mongol horses could have drunk the rivers dry around Aleppo or Damascus. They did not only because most of them were sent away, with the soldiers who rode them, by April at the latest.102 The Mongols leaving Syria had to leave by April because many or most of them had to travel over a thousand miles to Azerbaijan and needed, travelling at 15 miles a day, a bit over two months to do it. They had to be out of the Fertile Crescent before summer. On Ghazan's last Syrian campaign, in 1302-1303, logistic problems led again to disaster, as at cAyn Jaliit, but in this case by hampering the Mongols' tactical as well as strategic efforts. Ghazan undertook but the invasion with, probably, six tfimens,103 after leading three of these up the Euphrates to the Syrian frontier, while Qutlughshah brought the other three west through the northern Fertile Crescent, Ghazan withdrew personally from the campaign, but sent "all his amirs" to join Qutlughshah.104 This presumably meant two of the
100Syria, Ministry of National Economy, Department of Statistics, Statistical Abstract of Syria, 1950, p. 4. See also J. Edde, Geographie Liban-Syrie,5th ed. (Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique, 1941), p. 113. 101Naval Intelligence Division, Great Britain, Syria (1943), p. 47, fig. 16. 102 Some modern nomads using regions near, and with conditions similar to those of, the Syrian districts in which the Mongols campaigned, also leave the lowlands behind Antakya/Antioch in April to migrate to the central Anatolian highlands for the summer. See Bates, fig. 2 facing p. 7 and p. 8, fig. 3. 103 Maqrizi (2.4:198) gives the Mongols 80,000 men at the outset, but names, in addition to Ghazan, only five principal Mongol commanders, as do Rashiduddin (RaD! J, pp. 145, 147) and Vassaf (pp. 409-12). The sources are consistent on four of these names: Qutlughshah, Chuiban, Mfldi and Sfitai; Rashiduddin has in addition Sultan, Vassaf has Alghfilfitai, and Maqrizi "Karmedji"/(Qurmishi). A number of other Mongol officers are named by Rashiduddin and Vassaf, but these appear from Vassaf's account to be hazdraleaders in Chuaban'stuzmen. 104 RaD/J, p. 147; Vassaf, p. 409.

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three tuimensin Ghazan's Euphrates corps, Siital's and another (probably commanded by Sultan Yisavul).105 Ghazan's own guard timen no doubt stayed with Ghazan. Siitai probably commanded this reduced corps, since the other commander is not consistently named in the sources, and was apparently not arraigned, unlike Siitai, during the inquiry into the Mongols' defeat.106 But since Siitai is not named in the accounts of Qutlughshah's campaigning, his reinforcements must not have reached Qutlughshah. They probably did not have enough time to do so. Ghazan's corps had taken two months to travel the 250-odd miles from Baghdad to the Syrian frontier, probably adapting its pace to the three to four miles a day that could be covered by the sheep brought along for food. This meant that when Siitai was sent on by Ghazan early in April there were fewer than three weeks left before Qutlughshah was to encounter the Mamluiks at Shaqhab beyond Damascus, over 400 miles away via Aleppo, or about 270 miles straight across the desert. Siitai probably travelled on without sheep, averaging some 15 miles a day as the Mongols normally did when campaigning with horses alone. Otherwise it could have taken him as long as three months and into summer to reach Qutlughshah. At this faster rate, the march via Aleppo would have required about 28 days; passage of the desert should have needed only 18. Since Stitai missed the battle, he must either have taken the long way, or taken too long on the short. Either way, he was probably able to exculpate himself at the inquest into the defeat by adducing the problems of a desert crossing.107 Either way, Qutlughshah had to face the Mamliuks with three tumens instead of five. Qutlughshah had three tiumens in theory, that is. In practice, Miilai's tumen was in some way not fully or continuously involved, so that the Mongols were somewhat fewer than 30,000 men at the outset, and by the start of the second day's fighting, fewer than 20,000: the tumens of Qutlughshah and Chiiban, less casualties of the previous day. Even so, they must have outnumbered the Mamluiks. Maqrizi's description of the initial Mamliuk order of battle lists the sultan and some eighteen amirs, commanding, probably, a nominal thousand

105 106 107

RaD/J, p. 145. Rashiduddin accompanied Ghazan on this campaign. Maqrizi, 2.4:204.

RaD/J, p. 145.

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men each.108 The Mamliiks' strategy was a cautious one as befitted the smaller force: they stood on the defensive until the last hours of the battle, and they occupied a strong defensive position, between hills and a lake, with a stream before them. 109This position was near Shaqhab,110 so their front probably extended from the marshes shown on the map as lying just northeast of Shaqhab-marshes that doubtless become lakes during the rainy season-and behind the stream running from the marshes into the Zariqiya River that flows south past Ghabaghib, to the three hills that stand in a row running northwest-southeast just behind (east of) the Zariqiya and crossing the Damascus road some 33 miles north of Ghabdghib.111 In the first day's fighting, the Mongols with some difficulty crossed a streamthe Zariqiya in my interpretation-and attacked the Mamliuks, with indecisive results. Late in the day, Qutlughshah drew his forces back onto a hill-the three hills north of Ghabaghib as I understand itto see from high ground how things stood on the battlefield, and to gain a strong defensive position in which to pass the night in the presence of the enemy."12 Some sources allege that Miilai then retreated prematurely, while Qutlughshah and Chuiban held their ground. But had Miilli left the field at this moment on his own initiative or in contravention of orders from Qutlughshah, he would surely have received more than a thrashing in subsequent retaliation.

108 Maqrizi (2.4:199-200) gives a list of the Mamlfik commanders, but also asserts or commanders were present (pp. 199-200, 204), which is implies that five Mongol tuimen doubtful, since Vassaf (p. 410) and Rashiduddin (RaD/J, p. 147, and, implicitly, on p. 148, when discussing the three divisions of Qutlughshah's force in battle) name only three. Rashiduddin (RaD/J, p. 148) says that the Mongol Right Wing was "weakened"; this may have been the consequence of losses in earlier engagements (see Maqrizi, 2.4:198 and Howorth, 3:468, recounting information from Abfi al-Fida'), or, as I would guess (see below), from the detachment of some units for other purposes. 109Haithon, p. 202. Haithon, a participant with the Mongols in the campaign, is the most useful source for the geographic details of the battlefield. 110 Maqrizi, 2.4:199; Howorth, 3:469, from Abui al-Fida'. 1ll The marshes are shown on the map Israel with Jordan, 1: 350,000 (Edinburgh: Bartholomew World Travel Series, 1975). For the other details here and below, see the Map of Syria and Lebanon,Damas Sheet, 1:200,000 (Damascus: Military Survey Administration, 1927-1977) and Map of Syria, Sanameine Sheet, 1:50,000 (Damascus: Military Survey Administration, 1942-1977). 112 Haithon, p. 202; RaD/J, p. 148; Vaj?af, p. 409, Maqrizi, 2.4:201-02.

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The nature of his punishment suggests that whatever he did was not wrong, but done badly."13 The Mongols and their animals suffered from lack of water in their hilltop position,"14 and it appears from the map that most of the local waters, the seasonal lake by Shaqhab and the Zarlqiya and its affluents, would have been behind, or, in the case of the part of the Zariqiya flowing in front of the Mongols' hills, within bowshot from, the Mamliuk lines. Even if partially accessible, the small Zarlqiya would probably not have sufficed to water Qutlughshah's 100,000-odd horses. The nearest alternative source was the Acwaj and one of its branches some six to nine miles to the north. Miilai's withdrawal was probably a move intended to give part of the Mongol force a chance to water its horses, and perhaps some of those belonging to other units as well, in the Acwaj. Miilal may also have been told to collect reinforcements: parts, perhaps of the "weakened" Mongol Right Wing that may have been left behind to block Damascus or to forage; or the tilmensof Siitai that never arrived. Mtilai got away successfully, but did not come back, which is doubtless what the court-martial later held against him. The movement of Mamliuk forces behind QutlughshTh,"15 and thus between him and Mfaly, meant that Mflli could not come back, especially if he led a small force that had in its charge a large part of the army's horses. Qutlughshah, Chuiban, their subordinate commanders and their remaining horses attacked again on the second day, and were again stood off by the Mamluiks. Then, pressed by thirst more than by the Mamliiks, the Mongols abandoned their position and retired to the north, intending, according to Haithon, to water and revive their horses on the Damascus plain before returning to fight the Mamliiks once more. The Mamliiks neither attacked the Mongols on their hills nor tried to take them from the rear despite their strategic success in encircling the Mongols; they followed the Mongols as they marched away, and merely managed to cut up the Mongol rearguard as it crossed a river-doubtless the Acwaj-after the main force.116 The real debacle of the Mongols came when, as they
113

Vassaf, p. 412; Maqrizi, 2.4:201, 205.

114 Haithon, p. 202; RaD/J, p. 148; Maqrizi, 2.4:202. 115 RaD/J, p. 148; Maqrizi, 2.4:202. 116 Maqrizi, 2.4:202.

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camped and grazed and watered their horses around Damascus, the Damascenes diverted the local rivers, flooded the plain, scattered or bogged down the Mongols and their horses, and panicked Qutlughshah into fleeing with the remaining mounted units (which then suffered more heavy losses swimming across the Euphrates) 117 The failure of Qutlughshah thus stemmed largely from logistic problems. Ghazan's approach along the Euphrates had been too slow, because he brought along his family (and perhaps those of his army) and their slow-moving sheep and goats, so that Siitai could not reinforce Qutlughshah before the battle. Then the inaccessibility of water on the battlefield first made Qutlughshah detach Miilai and then forced him to retreat to restore his horses around Damascus, the nearest area with enough water, but where this same adequacy made it possible for the Damascenes, encouraged by the set-back to the Mongols, to wreck his army. We can thus see that the Mongols in Syria carefully took into account both the resources of the country and, after their initial miscalculation in 1260, the military capabilities of their enemies. But despite their care, the Mongols could not-as long as they relied on the horses and methods of nomadism-reconcile the conflicting demands of logistic dispersal and movement with strategic concentration and tactical positioning. Any forces that were small enough to be concentrated amid adequate pasture and water were not large enough to take on the Mamluiks. We can also see better the capacities and virtues of the Mongols. Much has been written asserting the superior quality of Mongol soldiery, bows, horses and tactics, in attempts to explain their remarkable successes.118 The Syrian campaigns help us take a truer measure both of the Mongols and of these appraisals. The Mongols could not defeat the Mamluiks when they fought on approximately equal terms. The Mamliiks' archery was better than the Mongols', and the Mamluiks adopted tactics that employed this advantage to offset the Mongols' superiority in horsepower and mobility. So much for the quality of Mongol archery and tactics. Even the Mongols' horses need to be cut down to size. Since they subsisted by grazing, they were small, only ponies, and were only capable of low
117 118

Haithon,

p. 202.

E.g. Martin, Ch. 2.

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levels of sustained exertion and of brief spurts of vigorous activity. The "long, rapid march; the swift raid"11'9and the "almost incredible journeys" I20 are notional. The Mongols could travel far because grazing was widely available, but they could not travel fast if their ponies were to make use of it. The Mongols could ride fast in combat because they used lots of horses, but individually the steppegrazed pony was inferior to the grain-fed mounts of sedentary cavalries. The Mongols persisted in bringing what was logistically too many ponies into Syria because they were tactically indispensible in the face of the Mamliiks; the Mamluiks tried, when they had the opportunity in 1299, to fight the Mongols hand-to-hand and horseto-pony. Had the Mongols possessed better horses, they would not have needed so many of them, and might have solved both their logistic and tactical problems. But they could not keep better horses without abandoning nomadism. The accomplishments of Mongol horses were like those of the Mongols themselves, products of collective effort rather than individual superiority. Chingis' genius lay not in the discovery or creation of better weapons, tactics, horses or soldiers, but in the political inspiration and mobilization, in unprecedented and usually overwhelming numbers, of the ordinary Inner Asian nomads, with their traditional military resources, home-made but serviceable and universallyavailable bows and arrows, unprepossessing but plentiful horses; and the simple and effective methods of harrassment, evasion and encirclement long since developed in accordance with the virtues and limitations of this weapons-system.

119
120

Lattimore, "Chingis Khan," p. 66.

Martin,p. 18.