24th Mechanized Infantry OPLAN 91-3

24TH MECHANIZED INFANTRY
DIVISION COMBAT TEAM
OPERATION DESERT STORM
TTACK PLAN
OPLAN 91-3
24TH MECHANIZED INFANTRY

DIVISION COMBAT TEAM
OPERATION DESERT STORM
ATTACK PLAN
OPLAN 91-3
2 7 MAY 1992
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 92-060114
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

HEADQUARTERS. 24TH INFANTRY DIVISION (MECHANIZED) AND FORT STEWART FORT STEWART GEORGIA 31314-5000
REPLVT
February 1992
ATTENTION OF
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3
24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) OPLAN 91-3 represents the Victory Division's detailed plan of attack from pre-attack positions along the Saudi Arabian border to the Euphrates River Valley of Iraq. In just 100 hours of battle, the Division attacked 370 kilometers into the enemy's flank and rear to sever lines of communication, destroy an aggressor army, and to help free the nearly two million people of Kuwait. We hope that access to the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) DESERT STORM OPLAN will assist students of military history and serve as a foundation for a more complete understanding of armored combined arms maneuver warfare.
Lieutenant Colonel, General Staff

G-3/Director of Plans and Training
DECLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE
IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND "OPERATION DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM DECLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE" (ATTACHED), THE CONTENTS OF THIS REFERENCE BOOK ARE CONSIDERED UNCLASSIFIED.
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TO SECRET UPON F X F C U T I O N . R EF F I S JCS ^ C L A S S I F I C A T I O N OF FOCAL POINT C L A S S I F I C A T I O N O F A L I N G ^ U I T H OPERATIONS I N SOUTHWEST A S I A . / / RMKS/1. THE FOLLOWING I S US CF. NT COW S OE Cl. AS S I F I CA T I O.M GUIDANCE FOP OESERT SHTFLO/nESERT STORM O P E R A T I O N S , 2 A UG 9 0 - 31 MAY 9 1 THIS MSG I S I N T F N n F O TO n FA L WITH PAST OPERATIONS A NO I S NOT. PEPEAT NOT* TO RF CONFUSEO WITH C L A S S I F I C A T I O N GUIOANCE FOP ONGOING USCENTCOM OPERATIONS. 2, POST DESERT SH IF L O / n ESER T STORM. C L A S S I F I C A T I O N GUIOANCE I S PROVTOFO BY CATEGORIES OF SUBJECTS AND LEVELS OF PROTECTION. THE LEVEL OF PROTECTION L I S T E D I S THF RASE L TNE LEVEL OF CL ASSI i F I C A T I O N / P R O T F C T I O N . COMrtON S E N S E . SUBJECT MATTER EXPERTISE AND OPSEC CONSIDERATIONS MUST BE APPLIEO PRIOR TO PUBLIC RELEASE OF ANY INFORMATION. ULTIMATE R E S P O N S I B I L I T Y FOR 00U*J6PA0E ANO Q E C L A S S I F I C A T I ON RESTS WITH THF O R I G I N A T O R . ORIGIMATOP APPROVAL I S REOUIREO FOR ANY n ECLA SS I F IC AT ION OR DOWNGRADE. U SC IN CC EN T ORIGINATED INFORMATION TO RE C L A S S I F I E D AS FOLLOWS! A. UNIT P A R T I C I P A T I O N OATA: (1) I D F N T I T Y OF U N I T S DEPLOYED: UNCLASSIFIED. (?) GENERAL LOCATION AND PERSONNEL STRENGTHS OF UNITS OEPLOYEO 3 RUCJACC2599 UNCLAS (RELEASABLE TO UKt C A N , AUS) PAGE (E.G. GENERAL C I T Y * A I BASES ANO COUNTRY LOCATION> I S
UNCLASSIFIED. EXCEPT FOR S P F C I A L OPERATIONS UNITS OP PE9S0NMEL
EMPLOYED I N IRAQ PRIOR TO COMMENCEMENT OF OPERATION OE SE PT STORM.
(1) S P E C I F I C OPERATION OFSERT SHIELO/STORM U N I T LOCATIONS
( E . G . ) K R i n COORDINATES ARE U N C L A S S I F I E D .
(tt) THE DEGREE OF U . S . P A R T I C I P A T I O N WITH A L L I E D OP FPIEMOLY NATIONS I N COMBAT OR L OG I S TI C/ SUST A I NMEN T OPERATIONS REMAIN C L A S S I F I E D AS CURPFNTLY MARKED. S P E C I F I C CAVEATS AS TO WHICH THTPO PARTY NATIONS MAY HAVE ACCESS TO INFORMATION REMAIN IN EFFECT.
a.
LOGISTICS:
(1) OVERALL L O G I S T I C PLAN SHOWING SUST A I NA B I L i TY OF OEPLOYEO FORCES I S U N C L A S S I F I E D (?) HAP R E Q U I S I T I O N . U N C L A S S I F I E D .

C. FORCE M O B I L I T Y DATA. (1) TOTAL. AI R/SF A L I F T FLOW I S U N C L A S S I F I E D . (2) TPFDD O V E R M L K E P O K T I S U N C L A S S I F I E D .
( }> UNIT MAMF AND DESTINATION COMBINED I S UNCL AS SI FI Fn .
(U) UNIT NAMF ANO F A D / L A D COMRTISlEO I S U N C L A S S I F I E D (5) U L N , U IC A NO UNIT NA*E I S U N C L A S S I F I E D . (6) ULN AND D E S T I N A T I O N TS U N C L A S S I F I E D . PAGE RUCJACC2599 UNCLAS (PELEASABLE TO UK, C A N , AUS)
^7) ULN ANO E A O / L A U I S U N C L A S S I F I E O (8) O R I G I N . U I C ANO ULN TS U N C L A S S I F T E 0 . (9) SINGLE F L I G H T PLAN TO INCLUDE STOPS, DESTINATION A fJO L OA 0 OFSIGNATTON ARE UNCL AS SI F I f O (10> CONUS/OCONUS TRAVEL PLANS OF GENERAL OFFICERS WITH 09
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C O K M U N I C AT I O N S / A DP : (f) C O M M U N I C A T I O N S NETWORK U S E R S . C A I . L S I G N S . SPECIFIC F R E Q U E N C I E S * A N D I OE N T I F I C ft T TON OF NET P A R T I C I P A N T S A E S F C R E T . (? ) C O M M U N I C A T I O N E F F E C T I V E N E S S . SUSTA I N A B I I I TY A N D L I M I T A T I O N S ARE S E C R F T (3) C O M P L E T E L I S T OF C R Y P T O M A T E R I A L S H O R T T I T L E S I S S E C R E T . (4) CRYPTO SHORT 7 I T L E WITH A C T I V E E O I T I O N IS S E C R E T , (5) C R Y P T O S E C U R I T Y V I O L A T I O N S ARE S E C R E T . (h) C O M M O / A D P O U T A G E S T H A T D E G R A D E COMMAND AM 0 C O N T R O L A P E SECRET . (7) U U M C C S U S E R 1 0 I S U N C L A S S T F I F O .
(8 > U U M C C S P A S S U O R D I S T O P S E C R E T .
UNTIL (9) U U M C C S P R I N T E R O U T P U T I S C L A S S I F I E D TOP S E C R E T ACTUAL C L A S S I F I C A T I O N I S O E T F R M l N E O BY O R I G I N A T O R I A U JC S PUR 6 PAGE 5 R U C J A C C 2 5 9 9 UNCLAS ( R E L E A S A f l L E TO U K i C A M . A U S ) 03.7 . E. TERRORISM/SECURITY: (1) T E R R O R I S T T H R E A T L F V F L / C O N O I T I O N W I T H O U T ANY S U P P O R T I V E LE V E L / C O N O I T I O N S U I T H SUPPORTIVE COMMENT I S U WC L A S S I F I E H . C O M M E N T S . T H F C L A S S I F I C A T I O N U I L L BE D E T E R M I N E D BY THE O P T G I M A T O R BUT M I N I M U M OF C O N F I D E N T I A L . NOFORfO OR OTHER C A V F A T S A P E MOT A U T O M A T I C B U T APPLY UNDER THE RULES GOVERNING THOSE M A R K I N G S . (?) V U L N E R A B I L I T Y O F U . S . C E N T R A L COMMAND I N S T A L L A T I O N S T O S A B O T A G E AND P E N E T R A T I O N I S S E C R E T . (3) P E R S O N N E L A C C E S S ROSTERS APE F O U O . F. OPERATIONS: (1) O P E R A T I O N N A M E S ( E . G . DESERT S T O R M / D E S E R T SH I E 1 0 . E A S T E R N EXIT) ARE UNCL A S S I F I EO (?) COMBINFO U . S . / A L L T E O O P E R A T I O N S ORDERS A NO 0 90 ER O F R A T T L E A NNE XF S / A P P E N D I C ES ( E . G . S P F C I A l . O P S ) CO Ul 0 ARE U N C L A S S I F I E D N O T E ! BE S F C R E T OR T O P S E C R E T AND U I T H OR U I T H O U T S P E C A T C A V E A T S . THESE A N N E X E S / A P P F NO I C E S J T L L BE DOWNGRADED TO S E C R E T B U T THE S P E C A T FOR S P E C I F I C S P E C A T D O U N G P A O E CAVEAT U I L L R E M A I N I N E F F E C T . I N S T R U C T L O N S S FF P A R A ? K . (3) E N E M Y ORDER OF H A T T L F R E M A I N S C I A S S I F I E O A S C U R R E N T L Y PAGE A RUCJACC?59<? UNCLAS ( P - E L F A S A B L E TO U K . C A M , A U S ) MARKEO . (U) D E C F P T I O N P L A N N I N G I S S E C R E T AND A L L S P E C A T C A V E A T S R E M A I N
I N E F F E C T AS M A R K E O .
(5) P S Y C H O L O G I C A L O P E R A T I O N S AND P L A N N I N G A R E U N C L A S S I F I E D .
S F E PARA ? F 6 .
( M S U P P O R T F R O M OR TO OTHER U . S . GOVERNMENT A G E N C I E S I S SECRET. T H O S E O P E R A T I O N S A R E OOUNGRADEO TO SECRET U I T H SDECAT CAVEAT UHERE A P P L I C A B L E . (7). FRATRICIDE.
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(A) F R A T R I C I D E ISSUES ARE FOUO U I T H PELEASE AUTHDPITY AT THE D I S C R E T I O N OF USCENTCOM COMPONENT COMMANOF.RS. (R) F R A T R I C I O E I N V E S T I G A T I O N S ARE SECRET PENDING RESOLUTION!. (8) ACCIDFNT AND SAFFTY DATA ARE U N C L A S S I F I E D * (9) MARITIME INTERCEPTION OPS ART U N C L A S S I F I E D . (10) TARGETING METHODOLOGY t THF SELECTION PROCESS AND RESULTANT TARGET L I S T S A RF SECRET. (11) TARGFTS ATTACKED: UNCLASSIFIED. SEE PARA 2G . (12) COMMAND R E L A T I O N S H I P S * AGREEMENTSt ANO MEMORANDUMS OF UNDERSTANDING MINIMUM FOUOt C L A S S I F I E D AS MARKED I F DOCUMENT INCLUOFS I D E N T I F I C A T I O N OF A HOST NATION UHOSE L EV Fl /TYPE OF RT HV<?5 9
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COR 194TH ARMOBOE FT KfJOX KY / / A F V L - S / /
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AIG 1 2 1 2 6 P 2ft 1 9 05 7 J U N 9 1 FM U S C I N C C E N T MA CO I L L AF B F L / / C C J 3 / / TO A I G 7 8 A 7 BT UNCLAS ( R F L F A S A B L F TO U K * C A W , A U S ) F I M A L S E C T I O N OF 2 SUPPORT OF A C T I V E PA RT I C I P AT TON TS C L A S S I F I E D BY A WO TH E S O U R C E . SEE PA R A ?A( 4 ) . (13) CONCEPT OF O P F K A T I O N * T O T A L RESOURCES i M V O l VEHf O P E R A T I O N A L ANO T A C T I C A L L E V E L MANEUVERS AND O P E R A T I O N S APE UNCIJ SSIFIEO. (14) VULWF R A f l l L l T I K S A NO R E A O T N E S S OF U - S . / A l . L T E O U N I T S APE CL AS S I F I F O C O . M F T O E N T I A L OR H I G H E R . (15) S T A T U S / O F TA T L S OF U . S . A L L l A N C E S t I W C L U O I V G S T A T U S OF FORCES A f,PFFMF N T S * H F P L O Y M E ^ T R I G H T S ^ P R I V I l E G E S r A T P F l f L O USE A ^ PORT A V A I L A B I L I T Y A E C L A S S l F I E O O l F F E f i F N T L Y U I T H FA CH C OU MT P Y . C L A S S I F I C A T I O N S VARY F 0?1 SECRET TO UNCL AS S I F I 0 . ALL C L A S S I F I C A T I O N S R E M A I N A S C U R R E N T L Y MARKEO* NOFORN CAVEATS R E G A I N ALSO I F SO PIARKFO. ( US ) GROSS E S T I M A T E S OF O P E R A T I O N A L EFFECTIVENESS INCLUDING PAGE ? R U C J A C C 2 6 0 0 UNCLAS ( R E L F A S A B L E TO U K , C A M , AUS)
I N T E L L IGFNCE COUN TE R I NT ELL I GENCF t RESCUE ( L E S S A I L ESCAPE
E V A S I O N PLUS PROCEDURES FOR P R O C F S S I N G RECOVEREO P T? SO NN EL ) AND
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RECONNAISSANCE ARE UNC LA SS I F I E 0 . NOTE: E X C L U O I ^ THAT WHICH &FVEALS S E N S I T I V E SOURCES ANJ3 METHODSt WHICH REMAIN CLASSIFIED AS MARKED. ( 1 7 ) SPECIAL O P E R A T I O N S . SEF. REF C . (A) SOF D E P L O Y M E N T S / P A R T I C I P A T I O N ARE UNO. ASSI FT EO (B) S P E C I F I C M I S S I O N S ARE U N C L A S S I F I E D . NOTE: MISSIONS C L A S S I F I E O TOP SECRET WITH SPECAT CAVEATS REMAINING ARE OOUNGRADEO TO SECRET UITH SPECAT CAVEAT I N E F F E C T . (C) SOF OPERATIONS AREAS ARE U N C L A S S I F I E O . (18) UEATHEP OPERATIONS: (A) LOCATION OF OEACTIVATEO WEATHER FORECAST A M OBSERVATION O U N I T S ARE U N C L A S S I F I E D . (fl) L I N K I N G PROVISIONAL UEATHER GROUP UNTTS WITH THEI1? SUPPORTFO U N I T S I S U N C L A S S I F I E D . G. WEAPONS. (1) CURRENT C L A S S I F I C A T I O N OF U . S . WEAPONS SYSTEMS CHARACTERISTICS REMAIN I N E F F E C T . (?) NUMBERS ANO TYPE OF AIRCRAFT.OR OTHER WEAPONS EMPLOYED ARE PAGE 3 RUCJACC2600 UNCLAS CRELEASARLE TO UKt CAN* AUS) UNCLASSIFIED. (3) WEAPONS A P P L I C A T I O N WHEN MATCHED AGAINST S P E C I F I C TARGETS MAY COMPROMISE 2 G ( l > AfiOVE. THESE TARGETS WILL REMAIN C L A S S I F I E O AS MARKED* H. NUCLTAR ANO CHEMICAL OPERATIONS. (1) CW RETALIATORY P O L I C I E S AND PROCEDURES ARE SECRET. (2) REFERFNCF TO U . S . FORCES NUCLEAR C A P A B I L I T I E S ARE SECPET. (3) ASSIGNMENT OF OUAL CAPABLE FORCES TO USCENTCOM I S UNCLASSIFIED. (4) BIOLOGICAL DETECTION ANO PREVENTION MEASURES TAKEN ARE SECRET . I. C I V I L AFFAIRS OPERATIONS! UNCLASSIFIED. J. PUBLIC A F F A I R S . ANNEX Ft OF ALL USCENTCOM DE SE PT SHLELO/STORM OPOROS AND PLANS ARE D E C L A S S I F I E D * PUBLIC RELEASE AUTHORITY IS RETAINED BY THE OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS ( O A S O I PA) AND USCTNCCENT P U B M C AFFAIRS. K. SPECAT OOWNGRADE I N S T R U C T I O N S . (1) ALL NTKE A I R / P O S T MAN TOP SECPET OPERATION o PO ER S HAVE BEEN OOWNGRADFO I N RFF F TO SFCRET. THESE OPOROS APE SURSEOUEMTLY OOWNGRAOED TO U N C L A S S I F I E D . PAGE * RUCJACC2A00 UNCLAS (RELEASABLE TO UK C A N , AUS) (?) ALL NIKE A I R / P O S T MANt TOP SECRET* EAGER ANVIL OPERATION OPORDS ARE TO RF DEC LA SS I F IE 0* ANO THE EAGER ANVIL SUB PROGRAM u IL1 BE TERMINATED UPON JCS APPROVAL. L. PLANS. (1) USCINCCENT OPLAN 1 0 0 2 - 9 0 (SECOND DRAFT* 18 JULY 1 9 9 0 1 I S C L A S S I F I E O IAU THE OPLAN C L A S S I F I C A T I O N GUIDANCE OF THAT PLAN.
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Copy of Copies Headquarters 24th Inf Div (M) EASTERN SAUDI ARABIA APO NY 09315 1 .^January 1991
(U) 24TH INFANTRY DIVISION (MECHANIZED) OPLAN DESERT STORM 91-3 (Offensive Operations)(S) (U) REFERENCES: a. (U) Map Series 1501A/C: 1:250,000, NH38-2,3,4; NH38-6,7,8; NH38-10,11,12. b. (U) Map series K743: 4853 I, 4953 I/II, 5053 III, 5052 I/II/IV, 5152 II-IV, 5252 1I-IV, 5251 I/1V, 5352 II-IV, 5351 I-IV, 5350 1/lV, 5451 Mil; K745: 5450 I. 1:50,000. c. 24th Inf Div (M) Field SOP 350-19, May 90. (U) d. 24th Inf Div (M) and FSGA Regulation 525-1, May 88. (U) e. COMUSARCENT DESERT SHIELD OPERATIONS PLAN 003 (U), Operation to Conduct Offensive Operations Against Iraqi Forces (TS) (Draft), 23 Nov 90. f. XVIII ABN CORPS PLANNING DIRECTIVE DESERT SWORD (U), Operations to Conduct Offensive Operations Against Iraqi Forces (TS), 9 Dec 90. g. XVIII ABN CORPS OPLAN DESERT STORM (U), Offensive Operations Against IRAQI Forces (U) TIME ZONE USED THROUGHOUT THE OPLAN: ZULU (U) TASK ORGANIZATION: Annex A (Task Organization) 1. (U) SITUATION. a. (S) Enemy Forces. (See current PERINTREP) (1) (S) Current Situation. - IRAQIs continue to extend and fortify defensive positions west of the tri-border area.
- 25th Inf Div is the southwestern most division in the KTO; located approximately 40 km east of 3d ACR. - 26th Inf Div is repositioning: one brigade located 10 km north of the 25th Inf Div; one brigade located 20 km south of AL BUSAYYAH; one brigade is unlocated. - Six heavy divisions, positioned along the KUWAIT-IRAQ border, could affect 24th 1D(M) offensive operations: - 12th Ar Div - 17th Ar Div - 10th Ar Div - Tawalkana Div (RGFC) Madinah Div (RGFC) - Hamurabi Div (RGFC) - 12th Ar Div assessed to be repositioning west to a location north of the 16th Inf Div.
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- A mobile flank security force (80-120 unidentified by-type vehicles) is possibly located west of the 25th Inf Div. (2) (S) Planned Situation. - Major threat to 24th ID(M): heavy elements reinforcing/counterattacking from the east; then, enemy forces (RGFC) in BASRAH plain and egress points. Approximately a battalion-sized force defending in Division zone vie OBJ GREY. - Inf Bde ( + ) located at AS SALMAN. (3) (U) Annex B (INTELLIGENCE), b. (U) Friendly Forces. (1) (S) USARCENT conducts offensive operations to destroy RGFC, defeat IRAQI forces in KUWAIT, and restore the legitimate government of KUWAIT. COMUSARCENT intent is to cut IRAQI LOCs to facilitate the destruction of the RGFC while minimizing allied casualties and to conclude offensive operations within two weeks. USARCENT forces must be prepared to conduct follow-on civil-military operations in KUWAIT. (2) (S) VII (US) Corps will be the USCENTCOM/ARCENT main effort and will attack in zone to penetrate IRAQI defenses and to destroy the RGFC.
(3) (S) XVIII Abn Corps attacks to penetrate IRAQI forward defenses and to interdict IRAQI LOCs along the EUPHRATES RIVER in order to prevent reinforcement and escape from the KUWAITI Theater of Operations (KTO) by IRAQI forces; on order, continues the attack east to assist in the destruction of the RGFC. XVIII Abn Corps Commander's Intent. The purpose of XVIII Abn Corps operations is to interdict rapidly the IRAQI LOCs in the EUPHRATES RIVER VALLEY, and to assist in the destruction of the RGFC. XVIII Abn Corps attacks to penetrate IRAQI defenses, interdict key crossing sites on the EUPHRATES RIVER, and continue the attack east to complete the destruction of enemy in zone. Corps operations are characterized by a rapid operational tempo that employs complementary heavy and light corps forces supported by massed fires. We accept risk in the depth of Corps operations to surprise the enemy and gain positioning advantage and flexibility for our forces. Success is interdicting IRAQI LOCs on the EUPHRATES RIVER, blocking of IRAQI reinforcements into or escaping the KTO, and the destruction of the RGFC ICW joint and combined forces. (4) (S) 82d Abn Div (-) initially follows 6th French Light Div; On order, moves to OBJ BROWN; On order, establishes blocking position vicinity OBJ GREY and screen Corps southeastern flank from OBJ GREY to LD. (5) (S) 101st Abn Div (AASLT) conducts air assault operations to disrupt and destroy IRAQI forces in the EUPHRATES RIVER VALLEY LOC (south of AS SAMAWAH to north of AN NASIRIYAH), on order, relieves 24th ID(M) on OBJ GOLD. (6) (S) 6th French Light Division with Bde/82d Abn Div (OPCON) conducts attack to seize OBJ WHITE; on order, releases Bde/82d Abn Div (OPCON) and secures the Corps western flank. (7) (S) 3d ACR screens the Corps eastern flank from LD to PL LION; On order, establishes blocking position vie OBJ RED. (8) (S) 12th Avn Bde initially Corps reserve; priority of support to 24th ID(M), Corps main effort. c. (U) Attachments and Detachments: Annex A (Task Organization). d. (S) Assumptions: (1) (S) The 24th 1D(M) as part of XVUI Abn Corps is capable of repositioning combat forces within the allocated forward deployment time. (2) (S) Trafficability of all MSRs will support this operation. (3) (S) At commencement of Phase II ground operations, the air campaign will have attrited IRAQI forces in zone by 25 %. (4) (S) IRAQ will employ chemical weapons. (5) (S) Air superiority will be achieved and maintained during all phases of the operation. (6) (S) IRAQI populace will be hostile. 2. (S) MISSION: On order, 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) conducts Corps main attack in zone to block EUPHRATES RIVER VALLEY LOC (OBJ GOLD); continues attack to the east to destroy IRAQI forces vicinity
JALIBAH AFB (OBJ ORANGE).
3. (U) EXECUTION: a. (S) Commander's Intent: 24th Infantry Division's purpose in this operation is to penetrate enemy front line defenses; seize OBJs BROWN, GREY, AND RED; and then establish blocking positions astride the EUPHRATES RIVER VALLEY LOC (OBJ GOLD). On order, continue the attack to destroy IRAQI forces at JALIBAH AFB (OBJ ORANGE) and assist in the destruction of the Republican Guards Forces Command. b. (U) Concept of Operation: (1) (U) Maneuver. 24th Infantry Division conducts operation in five phases: - (S) Phase I (Prepositioning/Deployment) - (S) Phase II (Attack to PL LION) - (S) Phase III (Attack to OBJs BROWN, GREY, and RED) - (S) Phase IV (Attack to block the EUPHRATES RIVER VALLEY LOC) - (S) Phase V (Attack to JALIBAH AFB (OBJ ORANGE) - (S) The entire ground operation from final force prepositioning (to be conducted concurrently with the theater air campaign) through the ground offensive and subsequent consolidation is expected to take four weeks to complete. (a) (S) Phase I (Prepositioning/Deployment). (1) (S) (3 - 17 Jan 91) DISCOM prepositions CL I, III, V, IX at LOG POINT Site L-M. (2) (S) 2-4 Cav occupies Marshalling Area Victory NLT 132359 Jan 91. (3) (S) 1st Bde, 2d Bde, 197th Bde, and 212th FA Bde occupy staging areas vie Marshalling Area Victory NLT 152359 Jan 91. (4) (S) (18 Jan 91) Division moves to occupy final attack positions. Order of movement: - 2-4 Cavalry reinforced/1-24 Avn (Apache)/Div Jump TAC CP DISCOM Advance Party 2d Bde -212th FA Bde
DMATN and Signal Nodes - 197th Bde 1st Bde - Avn Bde (-) Division Logistics DREAR and closeout elements (5) (S) 24th 1D(M) will deploy to forward attack positions by MSC/Sep Bn serials in 17 hour segments. See Appendix 1 and 2 to Annex D. (6) (S) Brigades will run security sweep of assigned sectors on occupation of attack positions. (b) (S) Phase 11 (Attack to PL LION, H + 10 hrs). (1) (S) On order, 24th ID(M) attacks on G Day, H Hour, approximately 24 hours before VII (US) Corps. Following Division preparatory fires, 24th ID(M) attacks, with 197th Bde in Division leftône and 2d Bde in Division right zone; 1st Bde in trail in Division right zone. (2) (S) 2-4 Cav conducts an area recon forward of 197th and 2d Bdes from the LD to PL LION; focus of recon is on combat trails X-RAY and YANKEE. (3) (S) Priority of fires to 2-4 Cav initially; on order, 2d Bde, and then 1st Bde. (4) (S) Avn Bde priority of support to 2d Bde attack to seize OBJ GREY. (c) (S) Phase III (Attack to OBJs BROWN, GREY, and RED, H+10 to H + 24 hrs). (1) (S) 2d Bde, main effort, attacks to OBJ GREY and establishes blocking positions to the east in AO VANGUARD (H+ 14 hrs). (2) (S) 197th Bde attacks to OBJ BROWN and establishes blocking positions east and west oriented on route ZULU in AO HAMMER (H-f 14 hrs). (3) (S) 1st Bde attacks through AO STEWART to OBJ RED and establishes blocking positions east and north in AO LIBERTY (H+24 hrs). (4) (S) 2-4 Cav screens Division southeastern flank PL LION to PL BUC (secure FOB1 until established); On order, move to screen on Division left flank forward of combat trail X-RAY in AO SABER; guard 197th Bde move to Atk Posn KELLY. (5) (S) Priority of fires initially to 2d Bde; on order, 1st Bde.
(6) (S) Avn Bde priority to 2d Bde attack to OBJ GREY; priority of OH-58D to 1st Bde upon commitment to seize OBJ RED. (d) (S) Phase IV (Attack to Block EUPHRATES RIVER VALLEY LOC (OBJ GOLD), N L T G + 3). (1) (S) 1st Bde conducts main attack to BP 102 to block enemy reinforcements from the east in AO WOLF. (2) (S) 2d Bde attacks to BP 103 and establishes AO FOX. Prepare to conduct counterattack to the northeast to BP 104. (3) (S) 197th Bde attacks from Atk Posn KELLY to BP 101; establish AO COUGAR; block enemy reinforcements from the northwest vie EA V21. (4) (S) 2-4 Cav screens from BP 101 to PL VIKING; protect 24th ID(M) west (rear) flank and alonjj PL VIKING to the west. (5) (S) Priority of tires initially to 1st Bde; On order, 2d Bde. (6) (S) Avn Bde priority of support to 1st Bde. (e) (S) Phase V (Attack to JAL1BAH AFB (OBJ ORANGE), NLT D + 4). (1) (S) On order, 1st Bde and 2d Bde attack to destroy enemy forces vie JAL1BAH AFB following preparatory artillery battle. (2) (S) 2d Bde maneuvers to attack JAL1BAH AFB from the flank. (3) (S) 197th Bde Division reserve. Be prepared to become Division main attack toward BASRAH. (4) (S) 2-4 Cav screens the Division south (right) flank along PL VIKING. (5) (S) Priority of fires initially to 1st Bde; On order, 2d Bde. (6) (S) Avn initially support artillery battle; then deep battle vie EA V22. (7) (S) 101st Abn Div (AASLT) provides rear guard for 24th ID(M) by blocking EUPHRATES RIVER VALLEY toward north and west vie OBJ GOLD. (2) (S) Fires: (a) (U) Appendix 2 (Fire Support) (b) (S) Artillery, Air, and EW Attack Guidance. - Destroy IRAQI artillery immediately
- Destroy IRAQI ADA systems as acquired artillery - On order, destroy IRAQI artillery and maneuver headquarters with air and
On order, disrupt IRAQI C2 with EW - Position MLRS forward to facilitate the destruction of IRAQI artillery and maneuver formations with an intense volume of fire. - Conduct artillery battle early on in Phase V to destroy IRAQI forces vicinity JALIBAH AFB (OBJ ORANGE) (c) (S) Phase I: Division fire support systems occupy attack positions in preparation for offensive operations - 212th FA Bde (-) counterfire Hqs A/13 FADS to2-4Cav - DS Bns with habitually associated Bdes
(d) (S) Phase II: - Support Division attack in zone to PL LION - 2-4 Cav priority of fires; On order, 2d Bde; On order, 3d ACR - A/13 FA DS to 2-4 Cav - Div Arty TOC moves with 1st Bde - DS Bns with habitually associated Bdes - 212th FA Bde (-) Force FA Hqs for 2d Bde (e) (S) Phase III: Priority of fires 2d Bde; on order, 1st Bde - 212th FA Bde (-) Force FA Hqs for 2d Bde - On order, 3-27 FA GSR to 1-41 FA - Div Arty follows 1st Bde to seize OBJ RED - DS Bns with habitually associated Bdes
Be prepared to fight deep battle in EA V20 - A/13 FA DS to 2-4 Cav

(0 (S) Phase IV:
- Priority of fires to 1st Bde; On order, 2d Bde - 212th FA Bde (-) positions to support 1st Bde attack - 212th FA Bde Counterfire Hqs On order, A/13 FA GSR to 4-41 FA - Plan long duration FASCAM in EA V21 Plan short duration FASCAM east of BP 102 DS Bns with habitual associated Bdes (g) (S) Phase V: - Conduct artillery battle early on vicinity JAL1BAH AFB (OBJ ORANGE) to destroy IRAQI forces 1st Bde priority of fires, 1-41 FA DS, 4-41 FA is GSR 1-41 FA On order, priority of fires to 2d Bde; 3-41 FA DS to 2d Bde 212th FA Bde (-) reinforces Div Arty - Div Arty controls deep battle on EA V22 (h) (S) Targeting Priorities: - Phase I-I1I: Arty, ADA, C3, Maneuver - Phase 1V-V: Arty, ADA, C3, Lift/Log (HETS, ammo, fuel transport), Maneuver (3) (S) ADA: Air defense will be accomplished by the following priorities: Phase I: Provide air defense coverage during forward deployment. logistics, aviation, artillery, C2, maneuver units, in that order. Priority to:
Phase 1I-V: Provide air defense coverage during offensive operations. Priority to: aviation, logistics, artillery, C2, maneuver units, in that order. All attached air defense assets will ensure they coordinate with 1-5 ADA for early warning frequencies and locations.
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- Weapons control status "HOLD" until changed VOCO by CG, 24th ID(M).
(4) (U) Intelligence: (a) (S) Priority Intelligence Requirements (P1R): - Locations and strengths of enemy artillery battalions and fire control centers which can influence the Division zone (attention to SHELL FINDER and CYMBELINE radars)? - Locations and strengths of enemy armor and mech battalions within 24 hours of Division zone? Capability of enemy armor and mech units to reposition under aerial attack? Locations of division and brigade forward and main Cps within 50 km of the Division zone? - Locations and strengths of enemy deliberate defenses in the Division zone? - Location and condition of those routes capable of supporting heavy wheeled vehicles (5000 gal tankers/CL V S&Ps) in zone? - Condition of crossing points vie PL VIKING? - Location of civilian and military POL stockpiles in the Division zone? (b) (S) ESM: Priority to ECM/artillery target development. Priority of ta.sks: - Artillery fire direction/fire control - Committed brigade and division command and control - ADA nets - Identification of recon elements Identification of reserve tank and mechanized units (5) (S) Electronic Warfare: ECM (conducted only on order from Division): Priority to artillery fire control and target acquisition; select division and brigade command and control; air defense artillery command and control; uncommitted armor/mechanized unit command and control. Priority switches to SEAD during Avn Bde operations. Jamming on/off controlled by G3. (6) (S) Concept of Engineer Support: A combat engineer battalion will be employed well forward with each maneuver brigade to assist in the rapid movement of forces to the objectives and maintain the momentum of the attack. Engineer units under Division control will focus on: - Providing support to DISCOM at FOBs and the DSA
- Marking, opening, and maintaining routes from the Division attack positions to the 9
objectives - Increasing the survivability of Division command and control, signal, and artillery assets (a) (U) Priority of Engineer Effort. (a) (U) Phase I: (1) (S) Sustainment. - Maintenance of road network at Marshalling Area Victory - Routes into final attack positions - Support DISCOM establishment of DSA1 (2) (S) Survivability. - Dig-in command and control nodes - Provide protection for DSA assets (b) (U) Phase II-III: (1) (S) Mobility. Mark and open Combat Trails X-RAY and YANKEE to OBJ BROWN and OBJ GREY, vicinity PL SMASH. (2) (S) Sustainment. - Provide access roads for FOB1 Provide access roads for DSA2 (3) (S) Survivability - Dig-in command and control nodes (DTAC and DMAIN) - Dig-in signal nodes 40, 44, 45, and 49 - Provide protection for DSA assets (c) (U) Phase IV: (1) (S) Mobility support to mark and open Combat Trails X-RAY and YANKEE to vicinity Bps 101 and 102. (2) (S) Survivability of artillery and command and control nodes.
(3) (S) Countermobility. Construct hasty defenses in BP 101, 102, and 10
103.
(4) (S) Mobility support for counterattack from BP 103. (d) (U) Phase V: (1) (U) Survivability of artillery. (2) (S) Mobility support for attack to OBJ ORANGE, (c) (U) FASCAM Employment. (1) (S) Long duration artillery/short and long duration GEMSS mines employed only on order of the Corps Commander. Short Duration Artillery mines (less than 5 hours) employed only on order of the Division Commander. (2) (S) Brigades nominate FASCAM targets to Assistant Division Engineer. c. (U) Tasks to Maneuver Units: (1) (U) 1st Bde: (a) (S) Phase I: - Conduct security sweep of forward deployment sector before occupying attack positions. Coordinate with 2-4 Cav to assume indirect fires rcsponsibilty for bde sector. (b) (S) Phase II: - On order, follow 2d Bde and 212th FA Bde (-) in Division right zone. - Be prepared to establish blocking positions to the east from the LD to PL LION; defend in sector. - Improve combat trail YANKEE from LD to PL LION. (c) (S) Phase III: - Receive C/124 MI, smoke pit, NBC Recon Pit and GSR section from 2-4 Cav vie PL LION. - On order, attack through AO STEWART to seize OBJ RED. - Clear AO LIBERTY; establish blocking positions to the east.
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- Improve combat trail YANKEE from PL LION to FOB2; mark combat trail YANKEE from PL JET to FOB2. - Coordinate to pass through 2d Bde (AO VANGUARD) during attack to seize OBJ RED. Rearm, refit, and refuel; be prepared to continue offensive operations. (d) (S) Phase IV: - On order, conduct Division main attack to BP 102 to block EUPHRATES RIVER VALLEY LOC; establish AO WOLF. - Be prepared to defend in sector (AO LIBERTY) to the east. - Mark and improve combat trails north of FOB2 to BP 102. (e) (S) Phase V: - On order, attack (main effort initially) to fix IRAQI forces vicinity JALIBAH AFB (OBJ ORANGE). - Consolidate north of OBJ ORANGE astride HWY 8; rearm, refit, and refuel; be prepared to continue offensive operations to assist in the destruction of the RGFC. (2) (U) 2d Bde: (a) (S) Phase I: - Conduct security sweep of forward deployment sector before occupying attack positions. - Coordinate with 2-4 Cav to assume indirect fires responsibilty for bde sector. (b) (S) Phase II: - On order, conduct Division main attack in Division right zone. Be prepared to establish blocking positions to the east from the LD to PL LION; defend in sector. - Mark and improve combat trail YANKEE from LD to PL LION. - Be prepared to mark and improve combat trail WHISKEY from LD to FOB1. (c) (S) Phase III: - On order, conduct Division main attack to seize OBJ GREY.
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- Clear AO VANGUARD; establish blocking positions to the east. - Mark and improve combat trail YANKEE from PL LION to PL JET. - Be prepared to assist in the forward passage of 1st Bde through AO VANGUARD. - Rearm, refit, and refuel; be prepared to continue offensive operations. - Be prepared to be relieved by 3d ACR vicinity OBJ GREY (d) (S) Phase IV: - On order, attack to BP 103; clear AO FOX. Be prepared to counterattack to the northeast against the flank of IRAQI reinforcements from BP 104. Be prepared to defend in sector (AO VANGUARD) to the east. (e) (S) Phase V: On order, attack from the flank to destroy IRAQI forces vicinity JAL1BAH AF8 (OBJ ORANGE). Consolidate east of OBJ ORANGE; rearm, refit, and refuel; be prepared to continue offensive operations to assist in the destruction of the RGFC. (3) (U) 197th Bde: (a) (S) Phase 1: - Conduct security sweep of forward deployment sector before occupying attack positions. - Coordinate with 2-4 Cav to assume indirect fires responsibilty for bde sector. (b) (S) Phase II: - On order, attack in Division left zone. - Be prepared to become Division reserve if Division right zone is threatened; be prepared to counterattack into 3d ACR zone. - Mark and improve combat trail X-RAY from LD to PL LION. (c) (S) Phase III:
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On order, attack to seize OBJ BROWN. - Clear AO HAMMER; establish blocking positions east and west along combat trail ZULU; rearm, refit, and refuel. - Mark and improve combat trail X-RAY from PL LION to OBJ BROWN; mark and improve where necessary combat trail ZULU within AO HAMMER and AO STEWART. On order, move to Atk Posn KELLY in AO LIBERTY. - Be prepared to continue offensive operations. - Be prepared to be released TACON to 6th French Light Div or 82d Abn Div to assit in attack on OBJ WHITE. - Be prepared to conduct link-up with 82d Abn Div vicinity OBJ BROWN. (d) (S) Phase IV: - On order, attack to BP 101 to block IRAQI reinforcements from the north and west; clear AO COUGAR. Mark and improve combat trails north of FOB2 to BP 101. (e) (S) Phase V: - On order, Division reserve. Be prepared to become Division main effort in an attack towards BASRAH. (5) (U) Avn Bde: (a) (S) Phase II: Priority of support initially to 2d Bde; on order, 1st Bde. (b) (S) Phase 111: - Priority of support to 2d Bde to seize OBJ GREY; then to 1st Bde to seize OBJ RED. - Priority of OH58-D support to 1st Bde upon commitment to seize OBJ RED. - Be prepared to attack deep to EA V20. (c) (S) Phase IV: - Priority of support to 1st Bde; then 2d Bde. - On order, conduct deep battle vicinity EA V24.
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(d) (S) Phase V: - Priority of support to deep battle; then to 2d Bde. - On order, conduct deep battle vicinity EA V24. (e) (S) Phase Il-V: Coordinate with 12th Avn Bde. 12th Avn Bde priority of support to 24th ID(M), Corps main effort. (7) (U) 2-4 Cav: (a) (S) Phase I: - On order, screen Division sector south of LD; identify combat trails into Division zone; bypasses around enemy obstacles vie LD. - Coordinate to release control of indirect fires to bdes upon occupation of defensive sectors. (b) (S) Phase II: - On order, conduct area recon in Division zone from LD to PL LION; confirm combat trails X-RAY and YANKEE. - Be prepared to confirm combat trail WHISKEY. (c) (S) Phase III: - Release C/124 MI, smoke pit, NBC Recon Pit, and GSR section to 1st Bde. - On order, screen Division southeastern flank from PL LION to PL BUC (secure FOB1 until established). - On order, move to screen Division left flank forward of combat trail X-RAY in AO SABER from PL JET to PL VIKING; guard 197th Bde move to Atk Posn KELLY. - Confirm combat trail X-RAY from PL JET to PL VIKING. (d) (S) Phase IV: - On order, screen west flank of 197th Bde attack to BP 101; establish screen from PL VIKING to BP 101 and along PL VIKING to the west. - Confirm combat trail X-RAY from PL VIKING to BP 101. (e) (S) Phase V: On order, screen Division southern flank along PL VIKING on attack to JALIBAH AFB (OBJ ORANGE). d. (U) Tasks to Combat Support Units:
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(1) (U) Field Artillery (See Appendix 2 (Fire Support) to Annex C). (2) (U) 1-5 ADA:
(a) (S) Phase I: TF 1-5 ADA provide C2 and support for Division's forward deployment from Marshalling Area Victory to attack positions.. (b) (S) Phase 1I-V: Support Division offensive operations in accordance with air defense priorities. (3) (U) 36 Eng Group: (a) (S) Phase I: Support Division logistical buildup and force prepositioning operations in accordance with engineer priorities. (b) (S) Phase I-V: DREAR. (c) (S) Phase IIIII: Priority of Engineer effort directed towards the marking and improvement of combat trails and logistical sites in Division zone. (d) (S) Phase 1V-V: Support Division offensive operation in accordance with engineer priorities. (e) (U) Appendix 10 to Annex C. (4) (U) 124th MI Bn: (a) (S) Phase 1: On order, insert LRSD in advance of Division offensive operations to provide early warning and HUMINT. (b) (S) Phase 1I-V: Support Division offensive operations to destroy IRAQI forces in zone and block EUPHRATES RIVER VALLEY LOC. (5) (U) 24th Sig Bn: (a) (S) Support Division offensive operations to destroy IRAQI in zone and block EUPHRATES RIVER VALLEY LOC. (b) (U) Annex K (COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS). (6) (S) 91st Chem Co/327th Chem Co: generation in support of Division offensive operations. Provide decontamination, NBC recon, and smoke Provide an Engineer staff element to the DMA1N, DTAC, and
(a) (S) Priority of decon: maintenance, resupply, artillery and maneuver. (b) (S) Priority of NBC recon: MSRs and maneuver. (c) (S) Priority of smoke generation: maneuver, aviation, artillery, and logistics. 16
(7) ( U ) 2 4 t h M P C o . (a) (S) Support Division movement from Marshalling Area VICTORY to Division attack
positions.
(b) (S) Support Division offensive operations to IRAQI Forces in zone and block EUPHRATES RIVER VALLEY LOC. (c) (S) In coordination with DTO and Corps establish TCP's to control movement on Division MSRs. (d) (S) In coordination with Corps establish EPW holding area and evacuation route, e. (U) Coordinating Instructions. (1) (U) G Day, H Hour: TBD (2) (S) On order, Division rear boundaries; PL JET AND PL VIKING. (2) (U) This OPLAN is effective for planning on receipt and execution on order. MSC brielbacks scheduled starting 16 January 91. (3) (U) Direct coordination is authorized among subordinate commands in preparation of supp'orting plans and in effecting attachments and detachments. (4) (U) Rules of Engagement (See Appendix 14 to Annex C). (5) (U) Do not destroy water or fuel sources during combat operations. (6) (S) Link-up control measures I AW JLO SOP (See Appendix 16 to Annex C). (7) (S) MOPP 1 (Staging area), commanders upgrade as necessary. Commence NAPpretreatment on order. (8) (S) Ground operations are not authorized north of the EUPHRATES RIVER. (9) (U) Bypassed enemy forces criteria: Commanders must fix all enemy forces, and request permission to bypass forces greater than an armor/mech platoon or an infantry company within 15 km of combat trail X-RAY. (10) (S) Maneuver units will provide engineer survivability and mobility support to Divisional units operating in their sector. (11) (S) Conduct deliberate destruction of all enemy vehicles in zone whenever possible. (12) (S) FSCLs: See Appendix 2 to ANNEX C. 4. (S) SERVICE SUPPORT: 24th Infantry Division (Mech) Support Command supports deep attack in zone through a series of forward operating bases (FOBs) and Division support areas.
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a. (S) Phase IA: - DISCOM establishes Log Base L-M vicinity of Log Base BRAVO.
- Selected Class I, II, HIP, IV, V, VI, and IX are prepositioned prior to the air campaign to reduce the LOC to DSA1 and support future requirements (G+ I onward). b. (S) Phase IB: Establish FSB/MSB elements in the vicinity of Division attack positions at G-15, prestocking required supplies to sustain the Division until G Day. c. (S) Phase II: - 24 and 224 FSB vehicles which can traverse combat trail YANKEE (5ton cargo/HMMT) will follow 1st Bde. - 197th SB, FOB 1, and remaining 24/224 FSB vehicles follow 197th Bde on combat trail X-RAY. - FOB1 established vie NU180170; provides CL III, V, maintenance, and medical sustainment to support the Division rapid advance north to OBJs BROWN, GREY, and RED. d. (S) Phase III: - Division receives DS from COSCOM at FOB1, 5000k gal tankers and S&P trailers uploaded with ammunition configured in combat configured loads in order to sustain the Division through G-t-2. - DSA2 established vie NU600500. - Phase ends with an operational pause of sufficient duration to allow buildup of logistics necessary to execute Phase IV. e. (S) Phase IV-V: - FSBs and CSBs echelon trains to support attack on Bps 101, 102, and 103. - On order, DISCOM establishes FOB2 to reduce the LOC and support future operations to enable buildup of logistics at DSA2. - DISCOM and 171 CSG echelon support bns forward to support offensive operations. CL III and V is supplied by Corps throughput to MSB/FSBs. f. (U) Annex D (LOGISTICS) 5. (U) COMMAND AND SIGNAL: a. (U) Command: (1) (S) JTAC locations/Subsequent locations: Initially located MT735270; NU795395 (vie OBJ GREY); PU315945 (west of BP 102)
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(2) (S) Succession of Command. ADC-M, ADC-S, 2d Bde Cdr, CofS. (3) (S) Location of DMAIN: Initial location: MT790095; NU585490 (vie DSA2). (4) (S) Location of DTAC: Initial location: MT870170(vic2d Bde); NU434262(vic PL LION); PU025745 (vie OBJ RED). (5) (S) Location of DREAR: MT760970 (vie DSA); NU600500 (vie DSA2) (6) (S) Division Alt CP: DIVARTY CP b. (U) Signal: (1) (U) Communications employed 1AW Annex K (SIGNAL) and 24th 1D(M) FSOP. (2) (U) 24 S1G Bn will 1OM the Division Command Network. (3) (U) ARCENT JCEOI in effect. ACKNOWLEDGE:
MCCAFFREY MG
OFFICIAL:
LAMAR G3 ANNEXES: A - TASK ORGANIZATION

B - INTELLIGENCE
C - OPERATIONS
- Appendix 1, Operations Overlay - Appendix 2, Fire Support - Appendix 4, Chemical Warfare and NBC Defense Operations - Appendix 5, Electronic Warfare - Appendix 6, Army Aviation (TBP) - Appendix 9, Air Space Management - Appendix 10, Engineer
Appendix 12, Psychological Operations^T&P>
- Appendix 13, Combat Trail Overlay - Appendix 14, Rules of Engagement - Appendix 15, Rear Area Operations (TflP) - Appendix 16, Link-up Operations (T&?) - Appendix 17, Decision Support Template (TBP) 19
- Appendix 18, Terrain Index Reference System D - LOGISTICS E - PERSONNEL G - CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS K - COMMUNICATIONS AND ELECTRONICS M - MILITARY POLICE COMBAT SUPPORT OPERATIONS Z - DISTRIBUTION
TASK ORGANIZATION
ANNEX A TO 24TH ID (M) OPLAN DESERT STORM-TASK ORGANIZATION

24TH ID (M) TASK ORGANIZATION-PHASE I
1ST BDE
2-7 IN
3-7 IN
4-64 AR
1-41 FA (155,SP) (DS)
5 EN (-) (DS)
B/3 EN
A/1-5 ADA (-)(DS)
3-91 CHEM CO(DECON)
1/24 MP CO
l/B/24 SIG
24 FSB (DS)
TACP (DS)
DIVARTY
G-333 FA (TAB) (GS)
4/HHC(S) /197 ADA(DS)
DET/3/B/24 SIG
212 FA BDE (R DIVARTY)
2-17 FA (155,SP)
3-llf-FA (203, SP)
3-27 FA (MLRS)
C/25 FA (TAB)(ATCHD)
C/5-62 ADA
1/101 CM CO (DECON)
AVN BDE
2% BDE
3-15 IN
1-64 AR
3-69 AR(-)
3-41 FA (155,SP) (DS)
3 EN (-) (DS)
B/5 EN
A/299 EN
B/l-5 ADA(-) (DS)
2/B/24 SIG
1/91 CHEM CO (DECON)
7/25 CM CO(RECON-F)
TM A/124 MI(DS)
2/24 MP CO
4 X GSR TM
224 FSB (DS)
TACP (DS)
1-24 AVN
3-24 AVN
C/l-58 AVN (ATC)(OPCON)
4/HHB/1-5 ADA(DS)
DET/3/B/24 SIG
TACP (DS)
DISCOM
724 MSB
E/3 EN (-)
2/4/C/1-5 ADA (DS)
4/4/C/1-5 ADA (DS)
2/4/A/1-5 ADA (DS)
91 CHEM CO (-)
32 7 CHEM CO (DECON)
2/A/24 SIG
197TH BDE
1-18 IN
2-18 IN
2-69 AR
4-41 FA (155,SP)(DS)
299 EN (-)(DS)
72 EN CO
C/l-5 ADA (-)(DS)
3/4/A/1-5 ADA
4 X GSR TMS
DECON PLT/197 BDE
DET/10TH MTN SIG
197 MP PLT
19 7 FSB (DS)
TACP (DS)
171 CSG (DS)
2 60 POL 541 MAINT
548 S&S
DIV TRPS
TF CAV
2-4 CAV
D-4 CAV
B/3-69 AR
A-13 FA (MLRS)(DS)
A/3 EN
5/91 CHEM (SMK)
7/25 CHEM (RECON-F)
C/124 MI (DS)
4 GSR/124 MI
LOG TM/724 MSB
1/4/B/1-5 ADA
2/4/B/1-5 ADA
3 6 EN GP (DS)
3 62 CSE CO
2 64 MGB CO
DET/3/B/24 SIG
1-5 ADA (-)
DET/3/B/24 SIG
24 MP CO (-)
DIV BAND
211 MP CO (ATCHD)
24 SIG (-)
124 MI (-)
TM A/319 MI
QUICKFIX PLT (OPCON)
DET/3/B/24 SIG
519 PSC
24 PSC
24 FSU
422 CA CO
2 TM/360 CA BDE
DET/300 POSTAL CO
HHC, 24TH ID (M)
JTAC
DTAC
3/A/24 SIG
2/2/91 CM (DECON)
DMAIN
l/A/24 SIG
DREAR
AS OF 14 JAN 91

24TH ID (M) TASK ORGANIZATION-PHASE II
1ST BDE 2-7 IN
3-7 IN
4-64 AR
1-41 FA (155,SP)(DS)
5 EN (-) (DS)
B/3 EN
3 62 CSE CO
A/1-5 ADA (-) (DS)
C/124-MI (DS)
3-91 CHEM CO(DECON)
1/24 MP CO
l/B/24 SIG
24 FSB (DS)
PSYOPS^TM
TACP (DS)
DIVARTY
G-333 FA (-) (TAB)
4/HHC(S)/197 ADA(DS)
DET/3/B/24 SIG
{FORCE FA HQ 2D BDE}
2-17 FA (155,SP)
3-iy FA (203,SP)
3-2 7 FA (MLRS)
C/5-62 ADA
1/101 CM CO (DECON)
AVN BDE
2D BDE
3-15 IN
1-64 AR
3-69 AR(-)
3-41 FA (155,SP)(DS)
3 EN (-) (DS)
B/5 EN
A/299 EN
B/l-5 ADA(-) (DS)
2/B/24 SIG
2/24 MP CO
TM A/124 MI(DS)
4 X GSR TM
224 FSB (DS)
PSYOPS TM
TACP (DS)
1-24 AVN
3-24 AVN
4/HHB/1-5 ADA(DS)
DET/3/B/24 SIG
TACP (DS)
DISCOM
724 MSB
E/3 EN (-)
2/4/C/1-5 ADA (DS)
3/4/C/1-5 ADA (DS)
2/4/A/1-5 ADA (DS)
327 CHEM CO (-)(DECON)
2/A/24 SIG
197TH BDE
1-18 IN
2-18 IN
2-69 AR
4-41 FA (155,SP)(DS)
299 EN (-)(DS)
72 EN CO
C/l-5 ADA (-)(DS)
3/4/A/1-5 ADA
DECON PLT/197 BDE
DET/10TH MTN SIG
4 X GSR TMS
197 MP PLT
197 FSB (DS)
PSYOPS TM
TACP (DS)
171 CSG (DS)
60 POL
541 MAINT
548 S&S
DIV TRPS
TF CAV
2-4 CAV
D-4 CAV
B/3-69 AR
A-13 FA (MLRS)(DS)
A/3 EN(-)
TM C/124 MI(DS)
5/91 CHEM(SMK)
7/25 CM CO (RECON-F)
4 GSR/124 MI
LOG TM/724 MSB
1/4/B/1-5 ADA
2/4/B/1-5 ADA
3 6 EN GP (DS)
264 EN CO (MGB)
DET/3/B/24 SIG
1-5 ADA (-)
DET/3/B/24 SIG
24 MP CO (-)
DIV BAND
211 MP CO (ATCHD)
24 SIG (-)
124 MI (-)
TM A/19 MI
DET/3/B/24 SIG
91 CHEM CO (-)
1/327 CHEM CO
422 CA CO
2 TM/360 CA BDE
519 PSC
24 PSC
24 FSU
DET/300 POSTAL CO
HHC, 24TH ID (M)
JTAC
DTAC
3/A/24 SIG
DMAIN
l/A/24 SIG
DREAR
AS OF 14 JAN 91

24TH ID (M) TASK ORGANIZATION-PHASE III
1ST BDE
2-7 IN
3-7 IN
4-64 Ai?
1-41 FA (155,SP)(DS)
5 EN (-) (DS)
B/3 EN
A/1-5 ADA (-)(DS)
TM C/124 MI(DS)
3-91 CHEM CO(DECON)
5-91 CHEM CO(SMK)
1/24 MP CO
l/B/24 SIG
24 FSB (DS)
PSYOPS TM
TACP (5S)
DIVARTY
G-333 FA (-) (TAB)
DET/3/B/24 SIG
212 FA BDE R (DIVARTY)
{FA FORCE HQ 2D BDE}
2-17 FA (155,SP)
3-1? FA (203 ,SP)
3-27 FA (MLRS)
C/5-62 ADA
1/101 CM CO (DECON)
AVN BDE
2D BDE
3-15 IN
1-64 AR
3-69 AR(-)
3-41 FA (155, SP) (DS)
3 EN (-) (DS)
B/5 EN
A/299 EN
B/l-5 ADA(-) (DS)
2/B/24 SIG
7/25 CM CO(RECON-F)
2/24 MP CO
TM A/124 MI(DS)
4 X GSR TM
224 FSB (DS)
PSYOPS TM
TACP (DS)
1-24 AVN
3-24 AVN
4/HHB/1-5 ADA(DS)
DET/3/B/24 SIG
TACP (DS)
DISCOM
724 MSB
E/3 EN (-)
2/4/C/1-5 ADA (DS)
3/4/C/1-5 ADA (DS)
2/4/A/1-5 ADA (DS)
327 CHEM CO (-) (DECON)
2/A/24 SIG
19 7TH BDE
DIV TRPS
1-18 IN
2-18 IN
2-69 AR
4-41 FA (155,SP)(DS)
299 EN (-)(DS)
72 EN CO
C/l-5 ADA (-)(DS)
3/4/A/1-5 ADA
DECON PLT/19 7 BDE
DET/10TH MTN SIG
197 MP PLT
19 7 FSB (DS)
4 X GSR TM
PSYOPS TM
TACP (DS)
171 CSG- (DS)
2 60 POL
41 MAINT
S&S
TF CAV
2-4 CAV
D-4 CAV
B/3-69 AR
A-13 FA (MLRS)(DS)
A/3 EN(-)
5/91 CHEM (SMK)
4 GSR/124 MI
LOG TM/724 MSB
1/4/B/1-5 ADA
2/4/B/1-5 ADA
3 6 EN GP (DS)
2 64 EN CO (MGB)
3 62 CSE CO
DET/3/B/24 SIG
1-5 ADA (-)
DET/3/B/24 SIG
24 MP CO (-)
DIV BAND
211 MP CO (ATCHD)
24 SIG (-)
124 MI (-)
TM A/319 MI
DET/3/B/24 SIG
91 CHEM CO (-)
1/327 CHEM (DECON)
7/25 CHEM (RECON-F)
422 CA CO
2 TM/360 CA BDE
519 PSC
24 PSC
24 FSU
DET/300 POSTAL CO
HHC, 24TH ID (M)
JTAC
DTAC
3/A/24 SIG
DMAIN
l/A/24 SIG
DREAR
AS OF 14 JAN 91

24TH ID (M) TASK ORGANIZATION-PHASE IV
1ST BDE
2-7 IN
3-7 IN
4-64 AR
1-41 FA (155,SP)(DS)
5 EN (-) (DS)
B/3 EN
A/1-5 ADA (-)(DS)
TM C/124 MI(DS)
3-91 CHEM CO(DECON)
5-91 CHEM CO(SMK)
1/24 MP CO
l/B/24 SIG
24 FSB (DS)
PSYOPS TM
TACP (DS)
DIVARTY
3-2 7 FA MLRS
G-333 FA (-) (TAB)
DET/3/B/24 SIG
212 FA BDE R (DIVARTY)
2-17 FA (155, SP)
3-1? FA (203, SP)
C/5-62 ADA
1/101 CM CO (DECON)
AVN BDE
2D BDE
3-15 IN
1-64 AR
3-69 AR(-)
3-41 FA (155 ,SP) (DS)
3 EN (-) (DS)
B/5 EN
A/299 EN
B/l-5 ADA(-) (DS)
2/B/24 SIG
7/25 CM CO(RECON-F)
2/24 MP CO
TM A/124 MI(DS)
4 X GSR TM
224 FSB (DS)
PSYOPS TM
TACP (DS)
1-24 AVN
3-24 AVN
4/HHB/1-5 ADA(DS)
DET/3/B/24 SIG
TACP (DS)
DISCOM
724 MSB
E/3 EN (-)
2/4/C/1-5 ADA (DS)
3/4/C/1-5 ADA (DS)
2/4/A/1-5 ADA (DS)
327 CHEM CO (-)(DECON)
2/A/24 SIG
19 7TH BDE
DIV TRPS
1-18 IN
2-18 IN
2-69 AR
4-41 FA (155, SP) (DS)
299 EN (-)(DS)
72 EN CO
C/l-5 ADA (-)(DS)
3/4/A/1-5 ADA
DECON PLT/19.7 BDE
DET/10TH MTN SIG
197 MP PLT
19 7 FSB (DS)
4 X GSR TM
PSYOPS TM
TACP (DS)
171 CSG- (DS)
2 60 POL
41 MAINT
548 S&S
TF CAV
2-4 CAV
D-4 CAV
B/3-69 AR
A-13 FA (MLRS)(DS)
A/3 EN(-)
5/91 CHEM (SMK)
4 GSR/124 MI
LOG TM/724 MSB
1/4/B/1-5 ADA
2/4/B/1-5 ADA
3 6 EN GP (DS)
2 64 EN CO (MGB)
3 62 CSE CO
DET/3/B/24 SIG
1-5 ADA (-)
DET/3/B/24 SIG
24 MP CO (-)
DIV BAND
211 MP CO (ATCHD)
24 SIG (-)
124 MI (-)
TM A/319 MI
DET/3/B/24 SIG
91 CHEM CO (-)
1/327 CHEM (DECON)
7/25 CHEM (RECON-F)
422 CA CO
2 TM/360 CA BDE
519 PSC
24 PSC
24 FSU
DET/300 POSTAL CO
HHC, 24TH ID (M)
JTAC
DTAC
3/A/24 SIG
DMAIN
l/A/24 SIG
DREAR
AS OF 14 JAN 91

24TH ID (M) TASK ORGANIZATION-PHASE V
1ST BDE
2-7 IN
3-7 IN
4-64 AR
1-41 FA (155,SP)(DS)
4-41 FA (155,SP)(GSR 1-41)
5 EN (-) (DS)
B/3 EN
A/1-5 ADA (-)(DS)
TM C/124 MI(DS)
3-91 CHEM CO(DECON)
5-91 CHEM CO (SMK)
1/24 MP CO
l/B/24 SIG
24 FSB-(DS)
TACP (DS)
DIVARTY
G-333 FA (-) (TAB)
DET/3/B/24 SIG
2-17 FA (155,SP)
3-17 FA (203,SP)
3-2 7 FA (MLRS)
C/5-62 ADA
1/101 CM CO (DECON)
AVN BDE
2D BDE
3-15 IN
1-64 AR
3-69 AR(-)
3-41 FA (155,SP)(DS)
3 EN (-) (DS)
B/5 EN
A/299 EN
B/l-5 ADA(-) (DS)
2/B/24 SIG
2/24 MP CO
TM A/124 MI(DS)
4 X GSR TM
224 FSB (DS)
TACP (DS)
1-24 AVN
3-24 AVN
4/HHB/1-5 ADA(DS)
DET/3/B/24 SIG
TACP (DS)
DISCOM
724 MSB
E/3 EN (-)
2/4/C/1-5 ADA (DS)
3/4/C/1-5 ADA (DS)
2/4/A/1-5 ADA (DS)
327 CHEM CO (DECON)
2/A/24 SIG
197TH BDE
DIV 1-18 IN
2-18 IN
2-69 AR
299 EN (-)(DS)
72 EN CO
C/l-5 ADA (-)(DS)
3/4/A/1-5 ADA
DECON PLT/197 BDE
DET/10TH MTN SIG
4 X GSR TM
197 MP PLT
197 FSB (DS)
TACP (DS)
TRPS
171 CSG (DS)

2 60 POL
541 MAINT
48 S&S
TF CAV
2-4 CAV
D-4 CAV
B/3-69 AR
A-13 FA (MLRS)(DS)
A/3 EN(-)
5/91 CHEM)(SMK)
4 GSR/124 MI
LOG TM/724 MSB
1/4/B/1-5 ADA
2/4/B/1-5 ADA
3 6 EN GP (DS)
2 64 EN CO (MGB)
3 62 CSE CO
DET/3/B/24 SIG
1-5 ADA (-)
DET/3/B/24 SIG
24 MP CO (-)
DIV BAND
211 MP CO (ATCHD)
24 SIG (-)
124 MI (-)
TM A/'319 MI
DET/3/B/24 SIG
91 CHEM CO (-)
1/327 CHEM (DECON)
7/25 CHEM (RECON-F)
422 CA CO
2 TM/3 60 CA BDE
PSYOPS DET
519 PSC
24 PSC
24 FSU
DET/300 POSTAL CO
HHC, 24TH ID (M)
JTAC
DTAC
3/A/24 SIG
DMAIN
l/A/24 SIG
DREAR
AS OF 14 JAN 91
INTELLIGENCE
ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) TO 24TH INF DIV (MECH) OPLAN DESERT STORM

Reference: Map Series 1501; Sheets NI 38-13, 14, 15, 16;NH 38-1,
2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16; NI 39-1, 5, 9,
13, EDITION 5 & 6, 1:250,000 (S)
1. SUMMARY OF THE ENEMY SITUATION.
a. b. Enemy. Current Perintrep.
Enemy Situation. Basic OPLAN.
Appendix 2
c. Intelligence Estimate for OPLAN Desert Storm. to this annex.
d. Weather and Terrain. Analysis of the Area of Operations,

Appendix 1 to this annex (Published separately).
2. PRIORITY INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS.
a. Locations and strengths of enemy artillery battalions and

fire control centers which can influence the division zone.
(Attention to Cymbeline and Shellfinder radars.)
b. Locations and strengths of enemy armor and mechanized
battalion within 24 hour of the division zone. Capability of
enemy armor and mechanized units to reposition under aerial
attack.
c. Locations of division and brigade forward and main
command posts within 50 kilometers of the division zone.
d. Locations, dispositions and strengths of enemy deliberate
defenses in the division zone.
e. Location and condition of those routes capable of
supporting heavy wheeled vehicles (5,000 gal tankers) in zone.
f. Conditions of crossing points across the sebkkhas
vicinity PL Viking.
g. Locations of civilian and military POL stockpiles in the
division zone.
3. INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS.
a. Locations of enemy SCUD and FROG Bde CP's, launchers, and

resupply facilities within 90 kilometers of the division zone.
b. Determine the level.of UW i civil resistance in An
Nasiriyah and Tallil.
B-l

4. CONCEPT OF IEW EXECUTION.
a. SIGINT/EW: In order to support the division in its

initial attack, the short range ground IEW assets are DS to
forward maneuver elements. The most mobile ground communications
intercept/DF systems support 2d Bde, conducting the main attack,
in order to provide the earliest possible coverage of OBJ Gray.
The slower systems support 2-4 CAV in its forward screen mission,
permitting them to begin their move north at the earliest
possible time. QUICK FIX, in General Support, focuses on targets
at long range forward of the advancing maneuver units and on
potential counterattacking of reinforcing heavy brigades and
divisions. It also provides backup SIGINT/EW when ground systems
are moving. Division request similar long range and backup
support from Corps. When the division assumes a consolidated
sector at OBJ gold, and during its coordinated attack to OBJ
Orange, Company Team C, with its TRAILBLAZER and MSQ-103 is in
General Support, permitting coverage of a broader and more
dispersed baseline and thereby providing VHF and ELINT DF at
greater range to the east and west.
b. IPW: In Phase I and during the attack to Objectives
Brown and Gray, all divisional screening and interrogation is done
by the DS company teams supporting 2d Bde, 2-4 CAV, and later, 1st
Bde. Supported S2*s provide information to division. IPW teams
identify high value prisoners for further exploitation by corps.
During Phase 2 and early Phase 3, the division cage is only a
collection point which holds POW's awaiting evacuation by corps.
The corps IPW team is attached to Co Tm A until Phase 3, when it
assumes a GS mission at OBJ gray, and conducts detailed
interrogation at the division cage.
c. CI: division and attached counterintelligence tarns
function as a platoon, providing the information needed to
eliminate enemy HUMINT agents and surveillance units from the
vicinity of specified critical units of areas. The platoon is
initially within Co Tm C, DS to 2-4 CAV. In Phase 1, 2-4 CAV
provides counterintelligence support to secure critical logistics
and AVN sites in the attack positions. When the MI Battalion
MAIN CP is operational at the attack position, the CI platoon
assumes a General Support role. In Phases 2 and 3, the platoon
supports FOB 2 and the DTAC, the DMAIN, the DSA, the AVN Bde
helicopter assembly area in order. The CI platoon employs
liaison with U.S. and local personnel as a primary investigative
tool.
d. Long Range Surveillance: Published Separately.
LRSD is in general support, and OPCON to the ACofS, G2.
Teams will be inserted along the route of march. Special
arrangements will be made for them to report directly to
B-2

advancing brigades. Teams will generally remain in their hide
sites as U.S. units pass, and will be recovered by ground linkup
with their parent unit.
5. INTELLIGENCE ACQUISITION TASKS.
a. Standardized Reporting Thresholds: The division

standardized reporting thresholds (Tab A, App 2, Annex B, 24th
Inf Div FSOP) are in effect, with the following exceptions:
(1) Cancel the following standardized reporting
thresholds; l.b(3), I.e.(2).
(2) To the standardized reporting thresholds, add the
general reporting thresholds outlined in Appendix 2, of the Annex,
b. Orders to Subordinate and Adjacent units. Intelligence

acquisition reporting tasks for specified Division Units (TAB A,
APP 2, ANNEX B, 24TH INF DIV FSOP).
(1) Maneuver units; 1st, 2nd, 197th, AVN BDE, 2-4 CAV
(a) PHASE II-IV: Report the trace of units from LD

to PL Viking which permits movement between lateral boundaries.
Report locations of POL and engineer units available to support in
zone. Report type POL and amount for division use.
(b) PHASE IV: Report the condition of crossing points
of sebkahs vicinity PL Viking.
(2) 1st Bde:
(a) PHASE II: Provide security and surveillance of

division right flank.
(b) PHASE III: Report the trace of routes from PL
Lion to OBJ RED that can support 5,000 gal tankers.
(3) 2nd Bde:
(a) PHASE II-III: Provide security and

surveillance of division right flank. Report conditions of Route
Yankee. Report threats to armored and soft skinned vehicles along
the route.
(b) PHASE IV: Report trafficability and off-road
maneuver capability in the vicinity Highway 8 and the Tallil-Az
Zabayr Road.
(4) 197th BDE:
B-3
(a) PHASE II-III: Provide security and surveillance

for division left flank during movement. Report conditions of
Route X-Ray and its ability to support 5,000 gal tankers.
(5) (6) Divarty: Per FSOP.
24th Avn Bde:
(a) PHASE I: Report locations of armor/mechanized

units and defensive positions at the LD.
(b) PHASE I-V: Provide S2, 24th Avn Bde video
imagery of the FLOT after LRSD and other insertions.
(7) (8) (9) Discom: Per FSOP.
16th Engineer Group: Per FSOP for 24th ID.
2-4 Cavalry Squadron:
(a) PHASE I: Report locations of artillery and

enemy defensive positions at the LD.
(b) PHASE II: Report conditions and trafficability
of Routes X-Ray and Yankee and ability to support 5,000 gal
tankers. Identify additional routes in zone capable of supporting
5,000 gal tankers. Report terrain conditions vicinity of FOB 2
and its ability to support large numbers of heavy wheeled
vehicles.
(c) PHASE III: Locate ând identify routes in AO
Sabre capable of supporting 5,000 gal tankers. Report conditions
of crossing points of sebkahs along PL Viking in AO Sabre.
(d) PHASE V: Report on enemy defenses vicinity
JALIBAH AFLD, to include locations, dispositions, movement and
strengths of ground and air defense forces. Report on condition
of airfield runway.
(10) (11) 1-5 Air Attack Bn: 124 MI Bn:
Per FSOP.
(a) PHASE I-III: Provide Co Tm A DS to 2d

Brigade, and Co Tm C DS to TF 2-4 CAV to deploy from present
locations with their supported commands. Co Tm C becomes DS to
1st Bde when 1st Bde occupies its attack positions.
(b) PHASE IV-V: Execute the division GS military
B-4

intelligence missions when Co Tms A and C revert to GS role on
division order in Phase IV.
6. Coordinating Instructions: MSC*s and Sep Bns provide R&S
plans to G2 CM&D NLT 181200R Jan 91. Submit changes to R&S plans
ASAP.
7. MEASURES FOR HANDLING PERSONNEL, DOCUMENTS AND MATERIAL, PER
FSOP.
8. 9. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. Appendix 4 to this Annex
PER FSOP.
REPORTS AND DISTRIBUTION.
ACKNOWLEDGE
MCCAFFREY
MG
OFFICIAL
QUIRK
G2
APPENDICES:
1. Analysis of the Area of Operations
2. Intelligence Estimate
3. General Reporting Thresholds
4. Counterintelligence
5. IEW Operations Graphics by Phase
6. R&S Overlay (TBP)
B-5
HQ, 24TH INF DIV (MECH)

EASTERN SAUDI ARABIA
APO NY 09315
APPENDIX 1 (INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE) TO ANNEX B TO 24TH INF DIV
(MECH) OPLAN DESERT STORM
INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE 2 TO OPERATION DESERT SWORD
13 JANUARY 1990
1. 2. MISSION. See Basic OPLAN.
AREA OF OPERATION.
a. Weather. See Tab A (Weather) for Climatological and

solar and lunar data.
b. 3. 4. Terrain. See Analysis of the Area of Operations.
See Tab C, Current Enemy Situation.
ENEMY SITUATION.
ENEMY CAPABILITIES.
a. Capabilities. The Iraqi forces have the capability to

defend, reinforce, conduct a spoiling attack, conduct
unconventional warfare operations, conduct terrorist operations,
employ chemical weapons, conduct a major or limited attack, or
withdraw. Which course of action is chosen is dependent on where
Hussein perceives the main attack to be and on the amount of time
available to him to react to the perceived threat. Hussein will
not know how much time is available so he will most likely make
major adjustments quickly then fine tune his plan. Once the air
war begins can either reposition units or keep them in their
current positions with whatever protection is available. Should
the air war be extremely successful, the resulting chaos in the
Iraqi Army could cause a variety of independent actions by
divisional units.
b. Courses of Action. Iraq has four courses of action in
response to a US/Allied offensive: defend to retain Kuwait;
defend Basrah, retain Kuwait; defend Basrah, protect Baghdad;
conduct a spoiling attack. (See Intelligence Estimate 1 for
detailed discussion of these courses of action. The courses of
action described below are derived from those in Intelligence
Estimate 1.)
(1) Course of Action 1. Iraq continues to expand west
and build fortifications at the current rate. By 1 February, a
battalion-sized infantry element defends vicinity Objective Gray
and elements of two heavy divisions are located along the Corps'
right flank (Ar Bde to Ar Div at Busayyah, one Ar Div north of the
B-l-1

25th and 16th Infantry divisions. An infantry brigade is located
at As Salman. The RGFC remain in position.
(2) Course of Action 3. The Iraqis established a
second defensive line along the As Salman road through the oil
fields in northern Kuwait to the Persian Gulf coast in
northeastern Kuwait. This course of action becomes less and less
possible with time. It would take an estimated 70 days and all
available transportation assets to position the necessary forces.
Based on a planning date of 5 February, forces arrayed along this
defensive line would consist only of one to two mobile forces.
The RGFC repositions northwest between Tallil and Jalibah.
c. Air. During the Iran-Iraq War, the Iraqis based their
aircraft out of Saudi Arabia to protect their aircraft. We can
expect to see similar actions in this case. It is unlikely that
Iraq will challenge the US/Allies attempt to win air superiority
with air assets. Instead, SCUDs and ADA assets would be used in a
counter-air role. Iraq could base its aircraft in a nearby
"friendly" country (Iraq, Jordan, Yemen are possibilities) and
bring them to bear at the critical time and place against
US/Allied ground forces.
d. NBC. All water facilities are subject to contamination
by chemical and/or biological substances. It is extremely likely
that chemical munitions will be used against US forces, especially
XVIII Airborne Corps and the 24th Infantry Division in an economy
of force mission. The Iraqis could use chemicals to slow our
advance and channelize us to allow themselves more reaction time
and the opportunity to regain the initiative. A biological agent
storage facility and a chemical storage facility are located
vicinity the An Nasiriyah/Tallil area.*"
5. CONCLUSIONS.
Effects of the Area of Operations on Friendly Courses of
a. Action.
(1) US Forces will have a significant advantage at night. The Iraqi Regular Army units are not proficient in the use of night vision devices. During Iranian night attacks, Iraq
dedicated artillery units to continuously fire illumination rounds
to light the battlefield. The Iraqis have limited IR and thermal
capabilities.
(2) Rain could significantly impact on our operations,
especially in the wadis north of Objective Brown and Objective
Gray and vicinity the Sebkha areas along PL Viking.
B-l-2

b. Enemy Vulnerabilities.
(1) Command and Control. Iraqi commanders can be

expected to make the necessary decisions to accomplish assigned
missions, but above that, tactical decision-making is expected to
be somewhat stifled. Communications will be degraded by the vast
distances separating Baghdad and the leaders in the KTO. Problems
with communications could slow reaction times and hamper the
Iraqis ability to reposition forces at the decisive point and
time.
(2) Logistics. Iraq's main MSR leads from the Baghdad
area south through AD Diwaniyah and An Nasiriyah to Basrah. The
MSRs are extremely long and are vulnerable to interdiction. Two
additional routes exist for movement of supplies: one leads from
Baghdad to An Nasiriyah; the other leads from Baghdad to Al
Basrah. Currently the Iraqi's Corps level logistics site is
located vicinity Al Basrah. Another logistics site is located at
Al Busayyah.
(3) Iraq relies heavily on HETs to move equipment. The
use of HETs is critical to quickly repositioning forces. HETs are
extremely vulnerable to interdiction.
(4) Iraq is forced to accept risk somewhere in theater.
Vast distances will prevent the Iraqis from establishing well-
prepared linear defenses. They are forced to rely on their
ability to reposition.
(5) As evidenced during the Iran-iraq War, Iraqi fixed-
wing pilots lack aggressiveness and experience. The best pilots
are those trained in the west to fly the Mirage Fl.
(6) Forces in southern Iraq will be fighting a
substantial distance from the main defensive belt and may well not
expected to be reinforced.
B-l-3
TAB A (WEATHER) TO APPENDIX 1 (INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE) TO ANNEX B

TO 24TH INF DIV (MECH) OPLAN DESERT STORM
SOLAR AND LUNAR DATA: Compiled for Al Busayyah
Climatological Data: Due to the remoteness of and lack of

data on cities in zone, three cities in the geographic area with
similarities in terrain and evaluation were provided.
B-l-A-1
TAB B (LIGHT DATA) TO APPENDIX 1 (INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE) TO ANNEX

B TO 24TH INF DIV (MECH) OPLAN DESERT STORM
SOLAR DATA
Nautical Twilight, Civil Twilight, and Sunrise/Sunset
Latitude 30 deg FOR: AL BASAYYAH
8 min N Longitude Flying Altitude: 0
46 deg 6 min E
FEBRUARY 1991
ALL TIMES ARE CREENWICK MEAN TIME PLUS 3 HRS 0 MINS
DAY
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
BMNT 0553 0552 0552 0551 0551 0550 0549 0549 0548 0547 0547 0546 0545 0545 0544 0543 0542 0541 0540 0539 0539 0538 0537 0536 0535 0534 0533 0532
BMCT 0622 0621 0621 0620 0619 0619 0618 0617 0617 0616 0615 0614 0614 0613 0612 0611 0610 0609 0608 0607 0607 0606 0605 0604 0603 0602 0601 0559
RISE 0647 0646 0646 0645 0644 0644 0643 0642 0641 0641 0640 0639 0638 0637 0637 0636 0635 0634 0633 0632 0631 0630 0629 0628 0627 0626 0625 0624
SUN
SUN
SET
1732 1733 1733 1734 1735 1736 1737 1738 1738 1739 1740 1741 1742 1743 1743 1744 1745 1746 1747 1747 1748 1749 1750 1750 1751 1752 1753 1753
EECT
1757 1758 1759 1800 1800 1801 1802 1803 1804 1804 1805 1806 1807 1807 1808 1809 1810 1810 1813T1812 1812 1813 1814 1815 1815 1816 1817 1817
EENT
1826
1826
1827
1828
1829
1829
1830
1831
1832
1832
1833
1834
1835
1835
1836
1837
1838
1838
1839
1840
1840
1841
1842
1843
1843
1844
1845
1845
BMNT-Beginning Morning Nautical Twilight

EENT-Ending Evening Nautical Twilight
BMCT-Beginning Morning Civil Twilight
EENT-12nding Evening Civil Twilight
B-l-B-1
TAB B (LIGHT DATA) TO APPENDIX 1 (INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE) TO ANNEX

B TO 24TH INF DIV (MECH) OPLAN DESERT STORM
SOLAR DATA
Nautical Twilight, Civil Twilight, and Sunrise/Sunset
Latitude 30 deg FOR: AL BASAYYAH
8 min N Longitude Flying Altitude: 0
46 deg 6 min E
MARCH 1991
ALL TIMES ARE CREENWICK MEAN TIME PLUS 3 HRS 0 MINS
DAY
1 2 3
BMNT 0531 0530 0529 0527 0526 0525 0524 0523 0522 0521 0520 0518 0517 0516 0515 0514 0512 0511 0510 0509 0507 0506 0505 0504 0502 0501 0500 0459 0457 0456 0455
BMCT 0558 0557 0556 0555 0554 0553 0552 0551 0550 0548 0547 0546 0545 0544 0543 0541 0540 0539 0538 0536 0535 0534 0533 0532 0530 0529 0528 0527 0525 0524 0523
RISE 0623 0622 0620 0619 0618 0617 0616 0615 0614 0612 0611 0610 0609 0608 0606 0605 0604 0603 0602 0600 0559 0558 0557 0556 0554 0553 0552 0551 0549 0548 0547
SUN
SUN
SET
1754 1755 1755 1756 1757 1757 1758 1759 1759 1800 1801 1802 1802 1803 1803 1804 1805 1805 1806 1807 1807 1808 1808 1809 1810 1810 1811 1812 1812 1813 1813
EECT 1818 1819 1819 1820 1821 1821 1822 1823 1823 1824 1825 1825 1826 1827 1827 1828 1829 1829 18301831 1831 1832 1832 1833 1834 1834 1835 1836 1836 1837 1837
EENT
1846
1847
1847
1848
1849
1849
1850
1851
1851
1852
1853
1853
1854
1854
1855
1856
1856
1857
1858
1858
1859
1900
1900
1901
1902
1902
1903
1904
1904
1905
1906
4
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23
24
25 26 27 28 29 30 31
BMNT-Beginning Morning Nautical Twilight

EENT-Ending Evening Nautical Twilight
BMCT-Beginning Morning Civil Twilight
EENT-Endincr Evening Civil Twilicrht
B-l-B-2
TAB C (ENEMY SITUATION) TO APPENDIX 1 (INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE) TO

ANNEX B TO 24TH INF DIV (MECH) OPLAN DESERT STORM
ENEMY SITUATION.
a. Disposition. The Iraqi army is an experienced force,
which has the capability to tailor forces to tactical and
operational requirements. The best equipped and trained Air Force
squadrons are those with MIRAGE F-ls and their French trained
pilots. Although the continued defense of Kuwait and Iraq seems
to be Saddam Hussein most likely course of action, the Iraqi
military has the capability to develop a well-planned synchronized
initial offensive operation. In an offensive mode, Saddam Hussein
cannot be assured a decisive victory because of the increasingly
unfavorable correlation of forces, and may continue to defend or
seek to achieve his objectives by means other than war. The
initiation of offensive actions works against Saddam's primary
strategy to weaken U.S. will and disrupt the regional coalition.
It is believed that Saddam will continue to deter U.S. forces
while attempting to break up regional elements of the coalition,
in the hopes of turning coalition forces and Arab nations against
U.S. forces.
(1) The present crisis is portrayed as a confrontation
between the U.S. and Israel on one side, against the Arabs on the
other side. Saddam Hussein will attempt to defy the United
States, mixing propaganda with diplomacy to avert a military
assault, to pry apart the U.S. led coalition, to exploit antiwar
sentiment in Congress, and to shift attention from Kuwait to the
Palestinian issue. Accepting the Iraqi view of the crisis,
individuals from Jordan, Yemen, and Mauritania have volunteered to
defend Iraq.
(2) Current as of 9 January* 1991, elements of at least
35 divisions subordinate to five Corps 1 are assessed to be
operating in the KTO.
(a) A Corps (possibly the VII or II) probably
controls the sector of Jiliyah (3058N 04725E) southeast along the
Iran-Iraq border to the Al Faw Peninsula, then southeast to
include Bubiyan Island and the north coast of Kuwait Bay. The
Corps defends with what is assessed to be four Infantry Divisions,
a Mechanized Division, three unsubordinate Infantry Brigades and
an unsubordinated Armor Brigade. The 31st (possible) Infantry
Division is located in the vicinity of Jiliyah (3058N 04725E).
Further south along the Euphrates River, vicinity Shabban (3048N
04733E), is the 42nd (possible) Infantry Division. The 15th
(possible) Infantry Division stretches from Az Zubayr (3023N
04724E) SE to Umm Qasr (3302N 04756E). An unidentified Infantry
Brigade is defending the southern portion of the Al Faw Peninsula.
The 2nd (possible) Infantry Division is deployed along the
B-l-C-1

Northern entrance to Kuwait Bay and Southern Bubiyan Island. Two
unidentified Infantry Brigades are defending the Northern
coast of Kuwait Bay with an unidentified Armored Brigade to their
rear. The subordination of these brigades is unknown. The 51st
(possible) Mechanized Infantry Division (possibly with additional
armor) is deployed in NE Kuwait along a West-East line beginning
at the Uram Al Aysh Army Barracks (vie 2946N 04704E) to the Khawr
As Sabiyah Island, ah unsubordinated Mechanized Infantry Brigade
is located immediately Northwest of the 51st Mechanized Infantry
Division near the Arrawdatayn Forward CP (2956N 04743E): This
unidentified Mechanized Brigade is believed to be a newly
activated unit deployed from Tikrit.
(b) The III (possible) Corps area includes Al
Jahra, Kuwait City, Southeast Kuwait, the coast, and extends along
the Kuwait-Saudi border to vicinity 28257N 04730E then northeast
to vicinity 2915N 04745E. Three Infantry Division are deployed in
defensive positions along the Kuwait-Saudi Border, and an Infantry
Division, a Mechanized Division, and an Armor Division constitute
the corps second echelon/reserve. The 11th (possible) Infantry
Division is located in Kuwait City. Just east of Al Jahra, three
Special Forces Brigades, the 65th, 66th, and 68th are also
operating in Kuwait City. The 19th Funaytis (vicinity 2914N
04806E) south to Ad Didayah (vicinity 2855N 04812E). The 14th
(possible) Infantry Division is situated from the area of Ad
Didayah south to Mina Saud (2845N 04817E). An infantry brigade
(-), probably Faylakah Island in the vicinity of 2926N 04820E.
The 18th (possible) Infantry Division defends the border with
Saudi Arabia from Mina Saud on the coast west to vicinity 284ON
04815E. The 7th (possible) Infantry Division, with an
unidentified Infantry Division to its rear, defends from vicinity
2835N 04815E to the Umm Gudair Oil Fields south (2850N 04742E).
Then, the 8th (probable) Infantry Division defends the Al Jaber
and Umra Gudair corridor of the Kuwait-Saudi border west to an area
vicinity 2902N 04732E. Elements of the 5th (possible) Mechanized
Division are dispersed behind the 14th and 19th Infantry Divisions
in SE Kuwait along the Al Wafrah-Al Ahmadi road from 2845N 04813E
to 2905N along the Al Wafrah-Al Ahmadi road from 2845N 04813E to
2905N 04805E. The 3rd (possible) Armored Division is located west
and south of Kuwait International Airport, as the corps reserve.
(c) The IV (possible) Corps area extends South
from Al Jahra to the border near 2857N 04730E, then west to the
tri-border area near 2915N 04615E. The corps defends along the
Saudi Arabian border with seven reinforced Infantry Divisions, a
Mechanized Infantry Division, and one Armored Division. The 29th
(possible) Infantry Division defends from vicinity 2902N 04732E to
the East flank of the 21st (vicinity 2907N 04736E). Next, the
21st (possible) with the 30th (probable) Infantry Division to its
B-l-C-2

rear, defends the high speed avenue of approach southwest of Ali
Al Salem. The westernmost Infantry Division which defends South
of Al Abraq from An Namiratayan (2910N 04702E) West to the Wadi Al
Batin (2907N 046440E). An unidentified Infantry Division is
deployed to the rear of the 20th. The 16th (possible) Infantry
Division, with the 36th (possible) Infantry Division to its rear,
is located just East of the Wadi Al Batin and extends west to
2916N 04615E (these divisions may be resubordinated to the Western
Corps when it becomes fully operational). The 1st (possible)
Mechanized Division is located on and to the South-Southeast of
Ali Al Salem Airfield. The 6th (probable) Armored Division is
centered in an area 20 KM NW of Al Jahra (2930N 04728E) as a
probable Corps reserve.
(d) Another Corps (referenced as the Western Corps
and possible the VI or VII) appears to be prepared to defend
Southern Iraq from the Kuwait border, west as screening the
Western flank of Iraqi forces in the KTO with two Infantry
Divisions, an Armored Division, and a mixed brigade. The 25th
(possible) Infantry Division is deployed along the western flank
of the 16th Infantry Division of IV Corps (possible) from vicinity
2915N 04615E to 2915N 04535E. The 25th (possible) now is assessed
to have five brigades (which probably include elements of other
divisions, possibly the 26th and/or 31st) . Remnants of the 26th
(possible) Infantry Division (-) are deployed 110 km northwest of
the Tri-border area from 2940N 04610e West to 2940N 04550E. This
division has thinned out over the past weeks, leaving elements of
only one Infantry Brigade in its AOR. Northwest of the 26th
Infantry Division, located southwest if As Salman at 3004N 04413E
is an unidentified Infantry Brigade. The 12th (possible) Armored
Division is deployed west of the Iraq-Kuwait border and north of
the 36th Infantry Division of IV Corps-(possible) from 2928N
04637E to the vicinity of 2944N 04648E. An armored brigade of the
division is forward deployed behind the rear infantry defenses of
the 36th Infantry Division. Elements of the artillery brigade of
the 12th Armored Division may also be reinforcing the 36th
Infantry Division. The Corps subordination of the 12th Armored
Division is not clear at this time.
(e) The Republican Guard Forces Command (RGFC)
occupies the area from Safwan (vicinity 3007N 04739E) west along the Iraq-Kuwait border to vicinity 3035N 04700E and includes Az
Zubayr and Al Mufrash. Within this area are three RGFC Infantry
Divisions (possible Al Faw, Adnan, Nebuchadnezzar or Baghdad), and
RGFC Mechanized Division (Tawalkana), and two RGFC Armor Divisions
(Medinah and Hamurabi). An RGFC Heavy Division (probable
Hamurabi) is positioned in the area between Al Mufrash Airfield
(3014N 04723E) and Safwan Airfield (3007N 04739E). Another RGFC
Heavy Division (probable Medinah) is deployed in the Al Batin area
B-l-C-3

2958N 04708E northeast on a line running 3011N 04725E. The
Tawalkana (probable) RGFC Mechanized Division defends from
vicinity 2942N 04650E to 3005N 04657E. Republican Guard Infantry
Divisions (possible Al Faw) have occupied the cantonement area
previously held by the Tawalkana Mechanized Division, extending
east-west from 3025N 04715E to 3028N 04656E. The possible Adnan
RGFC Infantry Division occupies the RGFC logistics/assembly area
from 3034N 04722E near AR Rumaylah Airfield southeast to Az Zubayr
Airfield (3022N 04739E). The RGFC Special Operations Division,
with tow of its subordinate brigades, is deployed in southern
Iraq.
(f) The 10th and 17th Armored Divisions are in
Northern Kuwait. Their Corps subordination is not clear, although
the 10th could be part of the RGFC Corps. The 17th Armored
Division may relocate to the west in the future as part of the
Western Corps.
(g) There are three Special Forces (SF) Brigades
operating in an around Kuwait City. The following unit
designations have been noted: The 65th, 66th, and 68th Special
Forces Brigades. Comment: The brigades may be subordinate to an
unidentified Special Forces Division under the control of the
Iraqi General Headquarters (GHQ). However, there is no conclusive
evidence of the existence of a Regular Army Special Forces
Division; consequently, the brigades will be designated as
independent, possibly reporting through the III Corps HQ to GHQ.
Probable missions for these brigades are: Population control in
Kuwait City; counter-Kuwait resistance operations; and defense of
Kuwait City against a coalition offensive. As of the 9th of
January 1991, the brigade locations are assessed as: 65th Special
Forces Brigade at Al Ahmadi 2905N 04804E; 66th Special Forces
Brigade at Al Farwaniyah 2916N 04758E; and the 68th Special Forces
Brigade at Al Salimiayh 2920N 04805E.
1. Iraqi commando units support maneuver
units from the brigade to corps level and the primary mission of
rear area security in charge of protecting high military
officials, vital military installations, and supply routes.
Secondary missions include supporting attacking echelons, securing
just captured assets, and undertaking special missions such as
clearing marshes. There are some similarities in the missions,
manning, and equipment of commando and special forces units.
However, the latter is assessed to have a more offensive role,
particularly those roles deep in the enemy rear area.
B-l-C-4

aj All Special Forces units are __ elite and are manned primarily by those of the Sunni opposed to Shiites which make up the majority of the and possibly all SF personnel undergo some degree of helicopter assault training.
considered
faith, as
forces. Many
paradrop and
b^_ Iraq has a substantial airlift capability,

particularly rotary-wing, which can insert special forces behind
enemy lines. Most of the equipment is of soviet origin. The
backbone of the fixed-wing force are the approximate 26 IL-76
Candids, which can carry up to 140 troops of three BMD amphibious
airborne vehicles, up to 140 of which are believed to be in the
Iraqi army. Not all of these Candids are equipped to carry
troops, however. MI-8 HIP Helicopters, which make up much of the
transport helicopter force, can carry up to 24 troops. It would
then take nearly 25-30 HIPs to transport a battalion of personnel.
Because of the extremely limited capability to land or paradrop
large forces in a projected air environment forces would probably
be deployed no more than eight hours march ahead of the main
ground forces.
c. Organization. The largest commando unit
is the brigade, which is formed around three battalions of about
600 men each. Commando brigades are reported organized similarly
to infantry brigades, but with less heavy equipment due to their
rear area security role. Each battalion is assessed to have six
soviet 82mm mortars while each platoon (9 per battalion) is
assessed to have six 7.62 mm heavy machine guns, 4 RPD light
machine guns, and four trucks (medium transport) . Each of the
seven Iraqi army corps has one or two commando brigades. The
Madinah and Hamurabi Republican Guard Division probably have
commando brigades, the TOE of which may be similar to those of the
regular army. Maneuver divisions of the regular army also have
commando units of strengths that probably vary from battalion to
brigade. Maneuver brigades may also have company-size commando
units.
d. Iraqi commando units are not special
operations forces, but act as an elite light infantry force.
Their primary responsibilities are to provide rear area security
and act as a reserve force. Iraqi commando brigades are attached
to army corps1 and selected Republican Guards divisions. Regular
army divisions have commando units of varying size.
b. c. Composition.
Strength.
B-l-C-5

(1) Armor 3 Armor 8 Reinforcements Reinforcing Divisions: Mechanized 1 Reinforcing Brigades: Mechanized 5 Infantry 6 Infantry 22
(2) Air. The air approaches to Iraq are confined to areas that are about 300 kilometers beyond the border. Approaches
from the north of Iraq are mainly over high, rugged mountains and
hills. Weather conditions in these areas are best from June to
October. Approaches from the south are mostly over plains with
the exception of the southeast and southwest areas that are over
hills and mountains. Weather conditions in these areas are
generally good year-round. The majority of the cloudiness occurs
during the winter, and is mainly caused by migratory lows.
Thunderstorm activity is rare in the south, but turbulence can
occur over these and all approaches.
(a) The Iraqi Air Force controls the majority of
the nation's airfields with the exception of Saddam International,
Bashra International, Mosul, and a few smaller airfields with the
exception of smaller airfield mainly owned and operated by oil
companies. The Iraqi Air Force missions are to defend and protect
Iraqi air space from invasion, to attack foreign enemy targets,
and to provide tactical air support for army and navy operations.
Of Iraq's approximate 18,000 Air Force personnel, it is assessed
that 1200 are currently jet qualified pilots.
(b) The capabilities attributed to the Iraqi Air
Force are as follows: it can provide partial air coverage of
major military airbases and installations; it can provide local
support of Iraqi Army units; strike targets up to 1,500 kilometers
away with attack fighters, and up to 2,500 kilometers away with
medium bombers; it can defeat air forces of Saudi Arabia, Jordan,
and any of the smaller Gulf States; it can provide most of the
maintenance and repair on its aircraft, with the exception of the
BLINDERS, Floggers, FITTERS C/D,FOXBATES, and MIRAGE F-l's; and
have about 75 percent of its aircraft combat ready. Important to
the defense of the country is the fact that almost all civilian
aviation personnel can be activated for military duty in the event
of an emergency. However, such use of this personnel source for
an extended period of time would require foreign assistance
because of the lack of military maintenance and flight experience
among the civilian personnel. B-l-C-6

(c) The Iraqis in the past have shown a limited
ability to synchronize joint air and ground operations. Ground
attack aircraft normally conduct attacks against targets behind
the forward edge of the battlefield (FEBA). Battlefield air
interdiction was generally not conducted at optimal altitudes,
degrading its effectiveness. However, it did improve towards the
end of the Iran-Iraq war, against a diminished Iranian air threat.
In addition to relying on rotary-wing aircraft for close air
support, the Iraqis rely on air reconnaissance by their MIG-21 and
MIG-25 aircraft for artillery and air targeting imagery. The
overall Iraqi joint operations capability is assessed as marginal.
(d) In the event of offensive operations, the
objective of the air operation will be to disrupt allied close air
support operations: it is assessed that packages of 4 aircraft
will attack targets such as airfields, AWACS on the ground, and
air defense nodes. Airfields are also likely chemical targets.
History has shown that the ground forces will rely on rotary-wing
aircraft for close air support. The Iraqi army in attempting this
complex operation will have a number of vulnerabilities. The
potential reliance on elite units for critical operations such as
the Republican Guard, Mirage F-l and air reconnaissance make them
important targets, the Iraqi Air Force itself has a number of
vulnerabilities. Except for a small number of western-trained
Mirage F-l pilots and aircraft, the pilot proficiency and
operational effectiveness against a superior all-weather around
the clock air adversary is questionable. Their fixed wing close
air support in the past has not been effective and the supply
lines will be vulnerable to air interdiction from superior allied
air forces.
(e) The Iraqis rely heavily on rotary-wing
aircraft for close air support. Iraqi ground commanders
reportedly are satisfied with helicopter support, particularly
since the formation of the Army Aviation Command and subordination
of helicopter wings to each corps headquarters.
(f) Mission planning and control are the
responsibility of the corps commander and the Army Aviation
Command. Tactical control of helicopters is provided by ground-
based forward air controllers down to at least brigade level.
Flight activity is coordinated with the Air and Air Defense Force
through the sector operations center in the area of operations or
fires, to mark their frontline positions for friendly incomming
aircraft.
(g) Helicopters have been used primarily in a
defensive role, firing from behind friendly positions. Most
missions are performed by at.least on pair of helicopters. Iraq
B-l-C-7

has been noted employing helicopters in teams of three aircraft
for improved effectiveness and survivability: a Gazeile with HOT
missiles, a BO-115, with rockets, and an MI-24 as battle captain.
Targets normally are engaged by several helicopters firing from
different positions and angles. Reports indicate that attack
helicopters were invaluable in containing major Iranian ground
offensiveness during the Iran-Iraq war. During the 1986 Iranian
Al Faw campaign, helicopters were noted firing rockets in a nose-
up position to maximize weapons range while remaining behind
friendly forces.
b. Recent and Present Significant Activities.
(1) As of 10 January, a new Corps level command post,

probably the VI Corps Forward Command Post, has been identified
west of the 12th Armor Division in the tri-border area./CINCCENT/
(2) Current as of 10 January; for the tenth consecutive
day fighter activity has been well below normal levels. This
decrease has primarly been associated with poor weather conditions
and maintenance, but may be an indicator of forward staging and
possible preparation for offensive initiations.
(3) In the tri-border area, anti-tank guns have been
identified in the 36th Infantry Division area. A battalion of T-
12's have been located vicinity 292423N 0462814E, a battery of T-
12's (8 tubes) have been identified vicinity 292538N 0462412E, and
four T-12's are located vicinity 292228N 0463224E./18 ABC/
(4) Over the past three weeks heavy units have been
repositioning within Kuwait and along the western Kuwait-Iraq
border. Since 20 December, the 10th Armor has deployed from the
border of northern Kuwait to approximately 50 kms from the Saudi-
Kuwait to approximately 50 kms from the Saudi-Kuwait border
vicinity 2935N 04725E. This deployment significantly shortens the
time necessary for an Armor Division to counterattack into any
penetration of the tri-border area and increases armor support to
counter any penetration from west of Al Jaber Airfield, north to
the vicinity of Ali Al Salem Airfield./18 ABC/
(5) As of 7 January, along the western Kuwait-Iraq
border, recent reporting indicates at least two armor battalions
have departed the 12th Armor Division area and are currently
unlocated. Two heavy battalion task forces (-) have been
identified near the 25th Infantry Division sector. These are
believed to be elements of the 12th Armor Division moving west to
establish counterattack positions behind the 25th Infantry
Division. There are no indications at this time of additional
12th Armor Division elements .being deployed behind the 25th
B-l-C-8

Infantry Division. If the repositioning in Kuwait continues, we
anticipate the 12th Armor Division would relocate behind the 25th.
This would place a significant armor force in position to block
the approach west of the Wadi Al Batin and create the space to
relocate either the 10th, 6th, or 17th Armor Divisions to
counterattack from the east./18 ABC/
(6) On 30 Dec 1990, fourteen MI-8/17 HIP one SU-25
FROGFOOT and a fuel bladder were observed At Salih Airfield
vicinity 3127N 94717E for the first time. The HIPs could
transport approximately 436 troops. The presence of these
aircraft and fuel bladder indicates Iraq may intend to use this
dispersal base for future staging operations./18 ABC/
(7) An assessment of Shaibah Airfield (3026N 04739E)
indicates there are now at least 50 probable light to medium
helicopters staging here. This significant helicopter presence
could represent a mobile counterattack force should hostilities
ensure. While not a threat to friendly armor units, the
helicopters could become a formidable airmobile threat against
lightly armed infantry units. It is assessed that 50 light to
medium helicopters could carry 700-800 personnel, if the
helicopter force is MI-8/17 HIPs. Another possibility is the
helicopters could be used to move supplies back and forth to
Iraq's front-line combat units. Shaibah Airfield is in optimum
position for both an airmobile assault and to move supplies into
Kuwait./18 ABC/
(8) In southern Iraq, three BMD equipped battalions
were identified on Imagery of 1 January, in an area believed to be
occupied by the RGFC Special Forces Division. The first
battalion, at 3011N 04747E, consists of 35 revetted BMDs. The
second battalion, at 3012N 04740E, consists of 35 revetted BMDs.
The third battalion, at 3016N 04741E consists of 25 revetted BMDs.
The unit subordination is currently unclear. The traditional
soviet role of the BMD is as an airborne assault vehicle, however,
the Iraqis may be using the BMD as an armor reconnaissance
vehicle. The BMD is 18 feet long and is armed with a single 73mm
gun, tow bow-mounted 7.62 machine guns, and can accommodate either
the AT-3 sagger ATGM or the AT-5 spandrel ATGM. It has a crew of
three and can carry up to five inf antrymen/scouts. /18 ABC/
B-l-C-9
HQ, 24TH INF DIV (MECH)

EASTERN SAUDI ARABIA
APO NY 09315
APPENDIX 2 (ANALYSIS OF AREA OF OPERATIONS) TO ANNEX B TO
24TH INF DIV (MECH) OPLAN DESERT STORM
1. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE AREA FROM PL RAZOR TO PL
CHARGER.
a. TERRAIN.
(1) Relief. The area is generally flat with some

mesas and escarpments near the Id in front of 1st and 2nd
Brigades. Rocky and stony sections are interspersed
throughout the are; the largest area is in the 197th zone.
The highest point of elevation is 1197 ft (located at
MT600800); the lowest point of elevation is 922 ft (located
at MT800500).
(2) Drainage. Sebkhas are scattered throughout the
area, most are located in 2nd Brigade's zone. Each sabkha is
different in consistency and composition and must be checked
for trafficability. Some wadis exist throughout the area.
Wadi beds commonly consist of gravel and sand and provide fo
good trafficability during the dry season. Rain in the area
will severely degrade the trafficability of the wadis.
(3) Vegetation. Sparse desert vegetation of scrub
brush and grasses is located throughout the area.
(4) Surface Materials. The area consists of loose
sand with scattered rocky areas. The bedrock includes
granite, basalt, limestone and sandstone.
(5) Man-made Features. A two-lane bituminous graded
road exists and is oriented in a east-west direction just
north of the LD. Numerous trails are located throughout the
area and parallel the divisions direction of movement.
b. Military Aspects of the Terrain.
(1) Observation and Fields of Fire. In both 1st and

2nd Brigade's zone, observation is excellent from the
numerous mesas. Fields of fire to the north are good when
positioned on the mesas. The 197th Brigades zone is
excellent for fields of fire due to the gently rolling
terrain.
B-2-1

(2) Cover and Concealment. The mesas provide
concealment from ground detection. Cover from aerial
detection is poor due to the flat terrain.
(3) Obstacles. The natural escarpments throughout
the area and along the LD will channelize units in order to
bypass. The numerous sabkhas could restrict movement if wet.
(4) Key Terrain. The ridges in 1st and 2nd
Brigade's zones afford good observation, cover and
concealment. Spot elevation is 1263 ft at NT900600.
2. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE AREA FROM PL CHARGER TO PL
RAM.
a. Terrain.
(1) Relief. This area consists of generally flat

terrain. There is a large rocky area along the division's
eastern boundary with an area of rolling sand in the
southeast near PL Charger. The highest elevation in this
area is 1264 ft, located in front of 1st and 2nd Brigade's
zone at NU000100 and NV300100; the lowest elevation is 952 ft
at NT100800.
(2) Drainage. Numerous sabkhas are scattered
throughout the area. An extensive wadi system exists
throughout the area. The 197th Brigade has a major wadi in
zone from MT800900, oriented north-south.
(3) Vegetation. scrub brush and grasses.
The area consists of sparse desert
(4) Surface Materials. This area contains hard-

packed and loose sand with scattered rocky areas. The
bedrock includes granite, basalt, limestone and sandstone.
(5) Man-made Features. The area contains numerous
trails that are oriented north-south. A trail parallels the
division's direction of movement, located at NT000700 to FOB
#1.
(1) Observation and Fields of Fire. Both

observation and fields of fire are good due to the generally
flat terrain.
B-2-2

(2) Cover and Concealment. Cover and concealment
from aerial detection and ground observation are poor due to
the generally flat terrain.
(3) Obstacles. There are a few scattered
escarpments in the area. A major escarpment is located in
the northern edge of FOB #1. The 197th Brigade's zone has a
large escarpment along the division's western boundary.
(4) Avenues of Approach. Route XRAY is the best
combat trail in the division's western zone (197th Brigsde's
zone). Route YANKEE runs through the division's eastern zone
(1st and 2nd Brigade zones). This combate trail requires
engineer support at two locations (NU200000 and NU200100) .
3. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE AREA FROM PL RAM TO PL JET.
a. Terrain.
(1) Relief. The area is generally flat with heavily

dissected or rocky areas. The highest point of elevation is
919 meters; the lowest is 528 meters.
(2) Drainage. Sabkhas are scattered throughout the
197th Brigade zone. A large sabkha, approximately 5 km in
diameter, is located in the southwest corner of Obj Brown. An
extensive wadi system exists in 1st and 2nd Brigades zones
throughout DSA #1 and Obj Gray. The northeast portion of this
area below PL Jet is heavily inundated with wadis.
(3) Vegetation. The area contains sparse desert-
type brush; most is found along the wadi beds.
(4) Surface Materials. This area is generally rocky
with sharp-edged rocks that vary in size.
(5) Man-made Features. A paved/oiled road
running east from As Salman turns into a gravel road at
NV400600. The 197th Brigade zone has numerous junctions and
intersections of cart trails with the majority located
vicinity Obj Brown. 1st and 2nd Brigades zones have two major
intersections of cart trails located at the DSA.
(1) Observation and Fields of Fire. The flat
terrain in 197th Brigade zone provides good observation and
fields of fire. 1st and 2nd Brigades zones has
B-2-3

limite observation and fields of fire due to the numerous
wadis which are oriented north-south.
(2) Cover and Concealment. Cover and concealment
from areial detection and ground observation is poor due to
the generally flat terrain.
(3) Obstacles. There are a few escarpments in 197th
Brigades zone. An escarpment is located along the wadi
vicinity Obj Brown. 1st and 2nd Brigades zones contain
numerous enscarpments leading into DSA #1. There are few
escarpments northeast of Obj Gray.
(4) Key Terrain. The key is generally limited to
the paved/oiled road and cart trail intersections which
provide acess into our zone. These areas could become choke
points due to the volume of traffic.
(5) Avenues of Approach. Numerous good trails
run southwest-northeast along the division zone, some routes
run perpendicular, allowing for lateral movement.
4. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE AREA FROM PL JET TO PL VIKING
a. Terrain.
(1) Relief. This area is generally flat with
heavily dissected or rocky areas and scattered sandy areas.
The highest point of elevation is 430 meters; the lowest is
341 meters.
(2) Drainage. This area has a few sabkhas, most
of which are in AO Saber. One intermittent lake is located at
NV400800 in AO Saber. Wadis in this area are extensive. The
major wadi is located at NU600800. Wadis are extensive in the
area around Obj Red.
(3) Vegetation. Sparse desert scrub brush and
grasses are located throughout the area, with most of the
vegetation concentrated in the wadi beds.
(4) Surface Materials. AO Saber has a rocky surface
interspersed with loose sand. A sand dune field is located in
BP-103 and southeast of FOB #2.
(5) Man-made Features.
B-2-4

(a) Roads. An improved surface road leads from PL
Jet (PV000400) north to PV 100700 (the road changes to a
hard-surfaced road vicinity PV000600).
(b) Miscellaneous. There are two areas of ruins:
one in AO Saber (NV700900); one in AO Liberty (PV000700) .
(1) Observation and Fields of Fire. Observation and
fields of fire for the 197th Brigades zone are good except
near the wadi where it becomes limited and are limited
vicinity Obj Red also due to the wadis
(2) Cover and Concealment. Cover from aerial detection
is poor. Concealment from ground detection is fair overall,
but is good vicinity NU800600.
(3) Obstacles. There are some escarpments in the area:
the largest is at NV600900. The sabkha area and wadis can
also hindert movement.
(4) Key Terrain. Key Terrain in this area consists of
the high ground located vicinity NV800600 and the numerous
cart trail intersections in AO Liberty
(5) Avenues of Approach. There are numerous combat
trails throughout the area, with a parallel route connected
by a perpendicular route.
5. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE AREA FROM PL VIKING TO PL
RIPPER.
a. Terrain.
(1) Relief. The area slopes gently north toward the
Euphrates River.
(2) Drainage. Several mudpans are located just north
of PL Viking. The mudpans can hinder movement if wet.A major
intermittent stream junction is located vicinity PV100100.
This intermittent stream runs through the southern edge of
BP-101.
(3) Vegetation. Little to no vegetation is located in
this area
B-2-5

(4) Surface Materials, the predominant soil type is
loose sand and mirey soil.
(5) Man-made Features.
(a) Roads. A two-lane divided highway
oriented northwest runs through BP-101, Obj Gold, and BP-102.
An unimproved road leads northwest from PV200000. Numerous
hard surfaced secondary roads run throughout the northern
part of BP-101 and BP-102.
(b) Railroad. The Baghdad-Basrah Railroad runs
along PL Ripper.
(c) Pipelines. Numerous pipelines run
perpendicular throughout BP-101 and BP-102 are underground.
(d) Powerlines. Two powerlines pass through BP 101 and BP-102 oriented northwest-southeast.
(e) Miscellaneous. Two storage areas are
located northwest of BP-102. A major canal, estimates to be
70-100 meters wide runs parallel to the road for some unknown
distance north and south from PV300100. The canal is built-up
on both sides.
(1) Observation and Fields of Fire. Both
observation and fields of fire are excellent in this area due
to the flat terrain.
(2) Cover and Concealment. Both cover and
concealment from aerial and ground observation are poor.
(3) Obstacles. Few escarpments are located in this
area. However, the sabkha areas, if wet, can be a hindrance
to movement. It is estimated that the area has a high water
table and may not be maneuverable.
(4) Key Terrain. The crossing points across the
sabkhas and the road intersections in this area are key
terrain, the crossing points across the canal could be
considered key terrain should the division be required to
cross the canal or should enemy forces advance southwest to
the canal.
B-2-6

(5) Avenues of Approach. Several routes and
good cross country movement provide numerous avenues into
this area.
6. Effects of Terrain.on Enemy Courses of Action. (TBP)
7. Effects of Terrain on Friendly Courses of Action.
The trafficability of the routes remains questionable until
a ground reconnaissance can be accomplished. From the LD to
vicinity PL Lion, the terrain allows for somewhat restricted
cross-sountry movement. Vicinity the objective areas, the
terrain becomes more compartmentalized. Trails in the area
run NE-SW along the floors of wadis. Few routes run E-W
therefore, lateraal movement is difficult. Command and
controlof units in this area will be difficult as it becomes
nearly impossible to maneuver. The terrain in the 197th
Brigades zone is less restrictive. Once out of the wadis,
units must cross the sabkha area which appears wet on LANDSAT
imagery taken in August. North of the sabkha, man-made
obstacles will restrict ground movement and aerial movement
somewhat.
B-2-7
TAB A (GENERAL REPORTING THRESHOLDS) TO APPENDIX 2(ANALYSIS

OF THE AREA OF OPERATIONS) TO 24TH INF DIV OPLAN DESERT STORM
1. These general reporting thresholds supplement or replace
various standardized reporting thresholds contained in the
division FSOP. All units report this information as soon as
it is obtained.
2. l.b.(6): Report any sightings of RGFC signature equipment:
(t-72 Tank, BMP-2, SP Artillery, GHN-45 155mm howitzer, GCT
155mm howitzer) .
3. I.e.(2): Location of any multiple rocket launcher.
4. l.F.(6): Location of chemical or biological storage
facilities or contaminated areas in zone.
B-2-A-1
OPERATIONS
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24th Mechanized Infantry OPLAN 91-3

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24th Mechanized Infantry OPLAN 91-3

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24TH MECHANIZED INFANTRY

DIVISION COMBAT TEAM

OPERATION DESERT STORM

24TH MECHANIZED INFANTRY

OPERATION DESERT STORM

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 92-060114

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3

Lieutenant Colonel, General Staff

ACTION XJ&^/JIXLL-^S PRIMARY I N F O : COPIES F O R : S00( ) COR REAO F I L E ( ^

(1) OVERALL L O G I S T I C PLAN SHOWING SUST A I NA B I L i TY OF OEPLOYEO FORCES I S U N C L A S S I F I E D (?) HAP R E Q U I S I T I O N . U N C L A S S I F I E D .

PR TORI T Y PT 016 0fl 192/0403Z PAGE 0 1

(2) ?9 NOV EXCEPT PARA PARA

THF 90) FOR

(DATED GUIOANCE PfAN;

RFMAINS THF THROUGH THROUGH PARA

CLASSIFIFp 1-0. 3*B. ARE IS

REGAROING PARA OPLAN

JALIBAH AFB (OBJ ORANGE).

Be prepared to fight deep battle in EA V20 - A/13 FA DS to 2-4 Cav

(3) (S) Countermobility. Construct hasty defenses in BP 101, 102, and 10

LAMAR G3 ANNEXES: A - TASK ORGANIZATION

ANNEX A TO 24TH ID (M) OPLAN DESERT STORM-TASK ORGANIZATION

ANNEX A TO 24TH ID (M) OPLAN DESERT STORM-TASK ORGANIZATION

ANNEX A TO 24TH ID (M) OPLAN DESERT STORM-TASK ORGANIZATION

ANNEX A TO 24TH ID (M) OPLAN DESERT STORM-TASK ORGANIZATION

ANNEX A TO 24TH ID (M) OPLAN DESERT STORM-TASK ORGANIZATION

171 CSG (DS)

ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) TO 24TH INF DIV (MECH) OPLAN DESERT STORM

c. Intelligence Estimate for OPLAN Desert Storm. to this annex.

d. Weather and Terrain. Analysis of the Area of Operations,

a. Locations and strengths of enemy artillery battalions and

a. Locations of enemy SCUD and FROG Bde CP's, launchers, and

ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) TO 24TH INF DIV (MECH) OPLAN DESERT STORM

a. SIGINT/EW: In order to support the division in its

ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) TO 24TH INF DIV (MECH) OPLAN DESERT STORM

a. Standardized Reporting Thresholds: The division

b. Orders to Subordinate and Adjacent units. Intelligence

(a) PHASE II-IV: Report the trace of units from LD

(a) PHASE II: Provide security and surveillance of

(a) PHASE II-III: Provide security and

ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) TO 24TH INF DIV (MECH) OPLAN DESERT STORM

(a) PHASE II-III: Provide security and surveillance

24th Avn Bde:

(a) PHASE I: Report locations of armor/mechanized

(a) PHASE I: Report locations of artillery and

(a) PHASE I-III: Provide Co Tm A DS to 2d

ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) TO 24TH INF DIV (MECH) OPLAN DESERT STORM

REPORTS AND DISTRIBUTION.

HQ, 24TH INF DIV (MECH)

a. Weather. See Tab A (Weather) for Climatological and

a. Capabilities. The Iraqi forces have the capability to

APPENDIX 1 (INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE) TO ANNEX B TO 24TH INF DIV

APPENDIX 1 (INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE) TO ANNEX B TO 24TH INF DIV

(1) Command and Control. Iraqi commanders can be

TAB A (WEATHER) TO APPENDIX 1 (INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE) TO ANNEX B

Climatological Data: Due to the remoteness of and lack of

TAB B (LIGHT DATA) TO APPENDIX 1 (INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE) TO ANNEX

BMNT-Beginning Morning Nautical Twilight

TAB B (LIGHT DATA) TO APPENDIX 1 (INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE) TO ANNEX

BMNT-Beginning Morning Nautical Twilight

TAB C (ENEMY SITUATION) TO APPENDIX 1 (INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE) TO

TAB C (ENEMY SITUATION) TO APPENDIX 1 (INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE) TO