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Bud Adler
Director, Business Development with AE Solutions Active in process instrumentation field for over 40 years Numerous sales, marketing and executive positions with instrumentation vendors Life Member of ISA Member of ISA SP84 Safety Committee
Member of the BMS Subcommittee Member of the FGS Subcommittee
Author of numerous technical papers related to process safety Frequent presenter at technical conferences and user seminars worldwide Director-elect of ISA Safety Division
Project Overview
Installation of two (2) new redundant Boilers
Single Burner Boiler (NFPA 85) Capable of firing natural gas, oil and / or waste gas 1365 PSIG steam at 310,000 lbs/hr
Client is fully S84 aware and has implemented numerous IEC61511 compliant projects Complex multiple entity project team
Multiple sub-contractors Various degrees of SIS application knowledge Boiler OEM had primary PO for Boiler Burner OEM and SI-BMS contracts were subs to Boiler OEM
SIS Aware
Chemical Manufacturer
Semi-SIS Aware
Engineering Firm
NON-SIS Aware
Boiler OEM
NON-SIS Aware
Burner OEM
SIS Aware
SI-BMS Consultant
Risk Assessment
Perform LOPA Develop
SIF List SIS Design Basis Support Report
Safety Lifecycle
Start Establish Operating & Maintenance Procedures Pre-Startup Safety Review Assessment SIS Startup, Operation, Maintenance, Periodic Functional Testing Modify or Decommission SIS?
Perform SIS Detail Design SIS Installation, Commissioning, and PreStartup Acceptance Test
Apply non-SIS Protection Layers to Prevent Identified Hazards or Reduce Risks No SIS Required? Yes
SIS Decommissioning
(Based on ISA-S84)
FO
SV 108 SV 109
Pilot Line
FC
SV 105
FC
Combustion Chamber
Igniter
FO
HV 103 HV 104
Flame Sensor
BS 102A
BN 102
Natural Gas
FC
BS 102B
PT 101A
PT 101B
PT 101C
BS 102C
FO
HV 103 HV 104
Bio Gas
FC
PT 107A
PT 107B
PT 107C
PT 111A
PT 111B
PT 111C
HV 203
HV 204
Combustion Chamber
FC
SV 305
No.2 Oil
FC
PT 201A
PT 201B
PT 201C
FO
HV 304
Steam
PT 301A
PT 301B
PT 301C
FT 309
10
Clean Air
FT 501A FT 501B FT 501C
Combustion Chamber
PT 602A
ID Fan
STACK
PT 601B
PT 601C
FD Fan
Combustion Air
FGR Air
PDT 401A
PDT 401B
PDT 401C
11
PT 702A
PT 701B
PT 701C
Steam Drum
LT 801A
LT 801B
LT 801C
12
No
Yes
Calculate Lifecycle Cost
No
Lowest LCC?
Yes
13
ID No.
I-001a
SIF-002a SIF-003a SIF-004a SIF-005a
Description
High steam drum pressure causes Master Fuel Trip (MFT). (2oo3) Sensor Architecture Low steam drum level causes Master Fuel Trip (MFT). (2oo3) Sensor Architecture Loss of combustion air flow causes Master Fuel Trip (MFT). (1oo1) Sensor Architecture High furnace pressure causes Master Fuel Trip (MFT). (1oo1) Sensor Architecture Low instrument air pressure causes Master Fuel Trip (MFT). (1oo1) Sensor Architecture Flameout caused by low pressure natural gas causes Fuel Gas Trip. (1oo1) PT, (2oo3) BS Sensor Architecture High pressure natural gas causes Fuel Gas Trip. (1oo1) Sensor Architecture Low pressure biogas causes Biogas Trip. (1oo1) Sensor Architecture High pressure biogas causes Biogas Trip. (1oo1) Sensor Architecture Flameout caused by low fuel oil pressure causes Fuel Oil Trip. (1oo1) PT, (2oo3) BS Sensor Architecture Low atomizing steam pressure causes Fuel Oil Trip. (1oo2) Sensor Architecture Safe purge conditions must be satisfied prior to introducing an ignition source into furnace during pilot light-off. (3 groups of 1oo1 Sensors) Overall XooX Architecture Proof of no flame in firebox (by flame scanner) prior to initiating purge sequence. (2oo3) Sensor Architecture Manual ESD Emergency Boiler Shutdown causes Master Fuel Trip (MFT). Flameout (all other causes) results in Master Fuel Trip (MFT). (2oo3) Sensor Architecture Low Air to Fuel ratio results in a Master Fuel Trip (MFT)
Reqd SIL
A 2 2 2 1 1 1 A A 1 1 1 1 N/A 2 A
SIF-006a
SIF-007a I-005a I-006a SIF-010a SIF-011a SIF-012a
SIF-013a I-007a
SIF-015a I-008a
Is a BMS a SIS?
Yes, a BMS is a SIS if:
Risk Analysis determines additional risk reduction is required and a Safety Integrity Level of 1 or greater is assigned to a BMS Safety Instrumented Function
15
Func Test 24 24
Reqd SIL 2 2
Achvd SIL 2 2
24
5.83E-03
172
20.41
3a
24
6.47E-03
155
18.01
4 4a 5 5a
24 24 24 24
2 2 1 1
2 2 2 2
High furnace pressure causes Master Fuel Trip (MFT). (1oo1) Sensor Architecture
Low instrument air pressure causes Master Fuel Trip (MFT). (1oo1) Sensor Architecture Low instrument air pressure causes Master Fuel Trip (MFT). (1oo1) Sensor Architecture Flameout caused by low pressure natural gas causes Master Fuel Trip (MFT). (2oo3) Sensor Architecture
24
5.83E-03
172
19.79
6a
Flameout caused by low pressure natural gas causes Master Fuel Trip (MFT). (1oo1) Sensor Architecture
High pressure natural gas causes Master Fuel Trip (MFT). (2oo3) Sensor Architecture High pressure natural gas causes Master Fuel Trip (MFT). (1oo1) Sensor Architecture
24
5.85E-03
171
17.74
7 7a
24 24
1 1
2 2
5.84E-03 6.47E-03
171 155
20.52 20.3
16
Description
Flameout caused by low fuel oil pressure causes Master Fuel Trip (MFT). (2oo3) Sensor Architecture Flameout caused by low pressure natural gas causes Master Fuel Trip (MFT). (1oo1) Sensor Architecture
Func Test
24
Reqd SIL
1
Achvd SIL
2
PFDavg
5.83E-03
RRF
172
MTTFS (Years)
19.79
10a
24
5.85E-03
171
17.74
11
Low atomizing steam supply (low flow) causes Master Fuel Trip (MFT). (1oo1) Sensor Architecture
Low atomizing steam supply (low flow) causes Master Fuel Trip (MFT). (1oo1) Sensor Architecture Proof of gun in position signal is required prior to startup of fuel oil firing. (1oo1) Sensor Architecture Proof of gun in position signal is required prior to startup of fuel oil firing. (1oo1) Sensor Architecture Safe purge conditions must be satisfied prior to introducing an ignition source into furnace during pilot light-off. (2oo3) Sensor Architecture Safe purge conditions must be satisfied prior to introducing an ignition source into furnace during pilot light-off. (2oo2) Sensor Architecture Proof of no flame in firebox (by flame scanner) prior to initiating purge sequence. (2oo3) Sensor Architecture Proof of no flame in firebox (by flame scanner) prior to initiating purge sequence. (1oo1) Sensor Architecture
24
3.66E-02
27
14.48
11a
24
3.66E-02
27
14.48
12
24
3.09E-02
32
48.01
12a
24
3.09E-02
32
48.01
13
24
3.10E-02
32
1501.7
13a
24
3.15E-02
32
146.06
15
24
8.58E-06
116508
14.5
15a
24
2.30E-04
4345
28.54
17
No
Yes
Calculate Lifecycle Cost
No
Lowest LCC?
Yes
18
Benefit-to-Cost-Ratio
B-C Ratio =
= Ratio of benefits to cost = Frequency of the unwanted event without a SIS = Frequency of the unwanted event with a SIS = Total expected value of loss of the event without a SIS = Total expected value of loss of the event with a SIS = Total lifecycle cost of the SIS (Annualized) = Cost incurred due to nuisance trips (Annualized)
19
SIF-002 SIF-003 SIF-004 SIF-005 SIF-006 SIF-007 SIF-010 SIF-011 SIF-012 SIF-013 SIF-015
EVSIS EVNo-SIS $5,125,000 $5,125,000 $5,125,000 $5,125,000 $5,125,000 $5,125,000 $5,125,000 $5,125,000 $5,125,000 $5,125,000 $5,125,000 $5,125,000 $5,125,000 $5,125,000 $5,125,000 $5,125,000 $5,125,000 $5,125,000 $5,125,000 $5,125,000 $5,125,000 $5,125,000
FNo-SIS (1/Yrs) 0.05555556 0.00546448 0.05555556 0.05555556 0.05555556 0.05555556 0.05555556 0.05555556 0.00546448 0.05555556 0.05555556
PFDAv g 5.86E-03 5.83E-03 5.84E-03 6.42E-03 5.83E-03 5.84E-03 5.83E-03 3.66E-02 3.09E-02 3.10E-02 8.58E-06
FSIS Nuisance Trip Rate (Yrs) (1/Yrs) 0.00032556 20.49 0.00003186 20.41 0.00032444 20.52 0.00035667 18.09 0.00032389 19.79 0.00032444 20.52 0.00032389 19.79 0.00203333 14.48 0.00016885 48.01 0.00172222 1,501.70 0.00000048 14.50
Cost NT ($/Yr) B-C Ratio $ 3,660 10.59 $ 3,675 1.04 $ 3,655 10.60 $ 4,146 10.40 $ 3,790 10.54 $ 3,655 10.60 $ 3,790 10.54 $ 5,180 9.71 $ 1,562 1.10 $ 50 11.94 $ 5,172 10.08
20
SIF-002a SIF-003a SIF-004a SIF-005a SIF-006a SIF-007a SIF-010a SIF-011a SIF-012a SIF-013a SIF-015a
EVSIS EVNo-SIS $5,125,000 $5,125,000 $5,125,000 $5,125,000 $5,125,000 $5,125,000 $5,125,000 $5,125,000 $5,125,000 $5,125,000 $5,125,000 $5,125,000 $5,125,000 $5,125,000 $5,125,000 $5,125,000 $5,125,000 $5,125,000 $5,125,000 $5,125,000 $5,125,000 $5,125,000
FNo-SIS (1/Yrs) 0.05555556 0.00546448 0.05555556 0.05555556 0.05555556 0.05555556 0.05555556 0.05555556 0.00546448 0.05555556 0.05555556
PFDAv g 7.10E-03 6.47E-03 6.47E-03 6.42E-03 5.85E-03 6.47E-03 5.85E-03 3.66E-02 3.09E-02 3.15E-02 2.30E-04
FSIS Nuisance Trip Rate (Yrs) (1/Yrs) 0.00039444 18.78 0.00003536 18.01 0.00035944 20.30 0.00035667 18.09 0.00032500 17.74 0.00035944 20.30 0.00032500 17.74 0.00203333 14.48 0.00016885 48.01 0.00175000 146.06 0.00001278 28.54
Cost NT ($/Yr) B-C Ratio $ 3,994 13.28 $ 4,164 1.30 $ 3,695 13.48 $ 4,146 13.19 $ 4,228 13.15 $ 3,695 13.48 $ 4,228 13.15 $ 5,180 12.21 $ 1,562 1.44 $ 513 15.48 $ 2,628 14.29
21
No
Yes
Calculate Lifecycle Cost
No
Lowest LCC?
Yes
22
Description
Engineering costs associated with Front End Loading and Detailed Design Cost of Equipment including Factory Acceptance Testing and Shipping Construction costs associated with SIS
Start-up
Operating Costs
Engineering Changes
Description
Engineering costs associated with maintenance
Consumption
Maintenance
Cost of MTTFS
Lost Production Asset Loss
Description
Cost of lost production Cost of lost equipment
23
Description
Low steam drum level causes Master Fuel Trip (MFT). (2oo3) Sensor Architecture Low steam drum level causes Master Fuel Trip (MFT). (1oo1) Sensor Architecture Loss of combustion air flow (or differential pressure) causes Master Fuel Trip (MFT). (2oo3) Sensor Architecture Loss of combustion air flow (or differential pressure) causes Master Fuel Trip (MFT). (1oo1) Sensor Architecture High furnace pressure causes Master Fuel Trip (MFT). (2oo3) Sensor Architecture High furnace pressure causes Master Fuel Trip (MFT). (1oo1) Sensor Architecture Low instrument air pressure causes Master Fuel Trip (MFT). (1oo1) Sensor Architecture Low instrument air pressure causes Master Fuel Trip (MFT). (1oo1) Sensor Architecture Flameout caused by low pressure natural gas causes Master Fuel Trip (MFT). (2oo3) Sensor Architecture Flameout caused by low pressure natural gas causes Master Fuel Trip (MFT). (1oo1) Sensor Architecture High pressure natural gas causes Master Fuel Trip (MFT). (2oo3) Sensor Architecture High pressure natural gas causes Master Fuel Trip (MFT). (1oo1) Sensor Architecture
$27,650
$207,946 $11,802
$92,213 $27,222
3a
$196,144
$64,991
4 4a 5
5a
6 6a 7
$195,513
$211,886 $13,573 $198,313 $207,272 $27,208
$64,941
$92,529 $27,364 $65,165 $92,159 $28,454 $63,705
7a
$180,064
24
Description
Flameout caused by low fuel oil pressure causes Master Fuel Trip (MFT). (2oo3) Sensor Architecture Flameout caused by low pressure natural gas causes Master Fuel Trip (MFT). (1oo1) Sensor Architecture Low atomizing steam supply (low flow) causes Master Fuel Trip (MFT). (1oo1) Sensor Architecture Low atomizing steam supply (low flow) causes Master Fuel Trip (MFT). (1oo1) Sensor Architecture Proof of gun in position signal is required prior to startup of fuel oil firing. (1oo1) Sensor Architecture Proof of gun in position signal is required prior to startup of fuel oil firing. (1oo1) Sensor Architecture Safe purge conditions must be satisfied prior to introducing an ignition source into furnace during pilot light-off. (2oo3 FT, 2oo3 PDT, 1oo1 ZSC) Sensor Architecture Safe purge conditions must be satisfied prior to introducing an ignition source into furnace during pilot light-off. (1oo1 FT, 1oo1 ZSC) Sensor Architecture Proof of no flame in firebox (by flame scanner) prior to initiating purge sequence. (2oo3) Sensor Architecture Proof of no flame in firebox (by flame scanner) prior to initiating purge sequence. (1oo1) Sensor Architecture
$27,364
11
$246,614 $15,724
$83,495 $15,724
$67,771
11a
$230,890
12
$122,793 $15,724
12a
$107,069
13
$83,860 $12,693
13a
$71,167
15
$259,209 $115,658
15a
$143,551
25
Final Results
SIF
Description
Option 1
2oo3 Architecture
$4,354,860
$1,940,226
$572,086
$553,008
Option 1A
1oo1 Architecture
$3,782,774
$1,387,218
26
Conclusion
Complex project team with multi-layered contractual arrangement Implementation of a SIS FEL saved project team cost and schedule Implementation of Safety Lifecycle reduced Risk associated with BMS Implementation of Economic Analysis coupled with Safety Availability requirements resulted in over $500K in savings
27
Conclusion
28 28
Thank You!