Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
& DEFCON 17
Grant Bugher
8/17/2009
Agenda
About the Conferences
What’s Not New
XSRF (McRee, Bailey, Hamiel, Moyer)
Business Logic Flaws (Grossman, Ford)
De-Anonymization (RSnake)
What’s New
SSL Exploits (Kaminsky, Marlinspike, Zusman)
Cloud Computing Exploits (iSec, SensePost)
Firefox Addon Exploits (Freeman, Liverani)
About the Conferences
BlackHat Briefings 2009
Professional security conference
Training sessions followed by short
presentations and tradeshow
DefCon 17
Informal gathering of hackers
No tradeshow; many short presentations
Many people don’t even attend presentations
Contests and villages
What’s Not New
The same old threats are still 95% of web
application security
SQL and Other Injection Attacks
Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
Business Logic Flaws
Cross-Site Request
Forgery
“CSRF: Yeah, It Still Works,” Russ
McRee & Mike Bailey
“Weaponizing the Web,” Nathan Hamiel
& Shawn Moyer
Many recent attacks
StrongWebmail.com
McAfee Secure Web Scanner
Linksys routers
Cross-Site Request
Forgery
More recent attacks
osCommerce and ZenCart
cPanel and WHM (it’s a feature!)
Marblecake, Also The Game
Advanced Dynamic CSRF
MonkeyFist (http://hexsec.com/labs)
Cross-Site Request
Forgery
Defenses that Don’t Work
Require POST
Check Referrer
Require Multiple Steps
URL Rewriting
Defenses that Do Work
Good CAPTCHAs
Re-authentication
Dynamic canary
Business Logic Flaws
“Mo’money, Mo’ Problems,” Jeremiah
Grossman and Trey Ford
Non-Technical Hacks
eBay Holiday Doorbusters
Hacker Croll’s Twitter Hack
Cookie stuffing & link manufacture
Google Earth Recon
iPod Advance Replacements
Tunecore iTunes/Amazon Fraud
De-Anonymization
“De-Anonymizing You,” Rsnake
Variety of methods tried for anonymity
Anonymous proxies (CGI, SOCKS)
Free email
Hacked machines
Onion routing (TOR), anonymous remailers
Sites try to track and identify you anyway
De-Anonymization
SSL
Client certificate identifies system name, OS,
username, certificate dates
Browser Detection Tools (MrT, BeEF)
Enumerate plugins, history, screen resolution,
VMware detection, keylogging…
IP Detection
Java, Flash, Word, Acrobat bugs
scp: and itms: protocol handlers
De-Anonymization
File system enumeration
res:// timing attack, SMBenum (in BeEF)
Google Safe Browsing
Sends a unique ID automatically, 30 times an
hour, and obeys proxy settings
Can get all IP history for that cookie with a
subpoena
Google Chrome sends machine/user ID
every 5 hours
De-Anonymization
Onion Routing Attacks
TOR actually works very well, albeit very
slowly
Compromised exit nodes get lots of data
○ Not very targeted
○ Selected for confidentiality, though
Trojaned TOR clients on user machines
HackedTor.exe runs a malicious exit node
SSL Exploits
Multiple BlackHat & DefCon talks about
attacks on SSL
Dan Kaminsky, “Black Ops of PKI”
Moxie Marlinspike, “More Tricks for Defeating
SSL”
Mike Zusman, “Criminal Charges Were Not
Pursued: Hacking PKI”
More interesting in combination than
individually
SSL Exploits
SSL based on X.509 certificate PKI
Server presents a leaf certificate…
…which is signed by an intermediate cert…
…which is signed by one of the root CAs
intrinsically trusted by your browser.
Any intermediate cert can sign any leaf
Intermediates can also sign each other
Certificate Authorities
Anyone can run a CA, but to be trusted
by browsers, it must chain to a trusted
root
Certificate signing is not exclusionary
Any root can sign any certificate
Any signed intermediate certificate can sign
any certificate, too
This means there are 4,500 organizations
that can sign a cert for your bank’s web
site
Weak Cryptography on
CAs
A VeriSign root certificate was self-signed
with MD2
Actually no good reason to self-sign at all
MD2 subject to preimage attack
○ Complexity of attack is 273
○ Current crypto attacks are up to 263
http://stub.bz/sslrebinding/
Q&A