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Testing two predictions of this hypothesis: 1. natural number tasks depend on core representations of large approximate numbers. 2. natural number tasks depend on language
3. Some people with damage to language areas show impaired exact (but not approx) arithmetic. But is language involved in adults' calculation, or are exact calculation processes just happening near language processes?
Importantly, this effect has only been reported in cases where adults must represent numbers exactly: making exact change vs. giving approx. bills. Do all these findings say that a specific natural language is necessary for representing exact numbers? Or is language just habitually used for this purpose?
Exact Addition
(49 + 63 = 112)
Russian training
English training
Russian training
Trained language
Learning new exact (but not approximate) arithmetic facts is specific to the language of training. Further studies: same effect for learning exact-number facts of (Tsivkin & Spelke, 2001) other kinds (e.g., dates in a history lesson).
Today's topic: Do any of our concepts depend on language? (specific version just considered: do large, exact number concepts like 17 depend on language, or are these concepts just habitually associated with a specific language?)
Outline
First question: Do any of our concepts depend on the acquisition of variable properties of language: properties that differ from one language to another? i.e., do speakers of one language have concepts that aren't available to speakers of a different language? spatial prepositions grammatical gender Second question: Do any of our concepts depend on the acquisition of universal properties of language: a lexicon of words and a set of rules for combining them to form expressions? i.e., do speakers of any language have concepts that aren't available to people who have not fully learned any language? language and number language and space language and object kinds
Whorf's Hypothesis
amateur linguist, student of Native American languages. Struck by differences between English & other languages: (e.g.) Hopi: tense. Turkish: source of knowledge. Benjamin Lee Whorf (1897-1941) Do these differences affect how one thinks about actions?
One possible answer: No. Differences between languages lead to differences in what we can communicate to one another but not to differences in what we can think. (see Pinker, The Language Instinct)
Whorfs Hypothesis
We dissect nature along lines laid down by our native languages. The categories and types that we isolate from the world of phenomena we do not find there because they stare every observer in the face; on the contrary, the world is presented in a kaleidoscopic flux of impressions which has to be organized by our minds--and this means largely by the linguistic systems in our minds. We cut nature up, organize it into concepts, and ascribe significances as we do, largely because we are parties to an agreement to organize it in this way--an agreement that holds throughout our speech community and is codified in the patterns of our language. Prediction: speakers of different languages will have different concepts: linguistic relativity. Strongest version: no concept of X without language expressions for X Weakest version: all concepts are possible without language, but a concept is less accessible if language does not reinforce it. Two cases: prepositions & gender
Prepositions: Languages vary in their obligatory marking of relations between objects across languages
Support/containment
Languages differ in whether and how they obligatorily categorize relations of support and containment.
Some languages differ even more and express different mechanical relationships. English: in/on Korean: tight/loose
Loose-on
Korean distinction
Tight-in
Tight-on
English distinction
vs.
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
Tight in
ns
ns
No effect of tight/loose on rated similarity of crosscutting on vs. in events for adult English speakers.
tight loose
tight loose
vs.
ns ns
Little effect of tight/loose on rated similarity of in events for adult English speakers. But, big effect of in/on for these speakers.
Hespos & Spelke, 2004
tight loose
tight loose
How do these differences develop? Do children construct the relevant concepts over the course of learning a language, or do they have access to the concepts independently of language experience?
Studies of infants in U.S., tested on the Korean distinction.
Tight-in test
Loose-in test
20 15 10 5 0
Tight-in test
Loose-in test
20 15 10 5 0
In the absence of any experience with Korean, infants are sensitive (Hespos & Spelke, 2004) to the tight/loose distinction.
Young infants are sensitive to the core distinctions captured by English and Korean. (like 6-month-old English infants discriminating Hindi sound contrasts)
With development, decline in response to non-native distinctions.
How serious is the decline? (NB: the English lexicon includes tight & loose)
More studies of English-speaking adults: vs.
Some languages categorize two of these events together and treat the third as different. Can you guess the categories? In/on: 100% success Simple tight/loose: 75% success. Tight/loose cross-cutting in/on: 70% success.
Adult English speakers retain considerable access to the tightloose distinction.
(Hespos & Spelke, 2004)
Gender
Languages vary in their assignment of gender to nouns: Chinese: no gender (even for people & animals) English: gender for people & animals, not for objects. Spanish: gender for all nouns. When languages assign gender to all nouns, the assignment often is arbitrary. Masculine Feminine German moon sun toaster bridge Spanish sun moon bridge toaster
Gender affects forms of articles, adjectives, and some verbs: Ex: French-- Le vieux chat est mort; la vielle vache est morte. Do these forms influence speakers conceptions of the things they talk about?
Gender
Participants: Stanford & MIT students Native speakers of German or Spanish
Exp 1: learn English proper names for each of 24 objects (half masculine in Spanish & feminine in German; half the reverse).
This is Patrick/Patricia
Conditions: Congruent Spanish: toaster = Patricia, bridge = George Congruent German: toaster = Patrick, bridge = Georgia (NB: congruent Spanish = incongruent German)
(Boroditsky)
Gender
-Patricia
Findings: Better memory for the pairs in which the gender of the name in English matched the gender of the common noun in subjects native language. The gender assigned by their native language colors speakers representations of objects, even when they are speaking English. Will native-language gender affect subjects English-language descriptions of objects?
Exp 2: write down the first three adjectives in English that come to mind when you see pictures of each of these 24 objects. Example findings: German speakers (key = masculine): hard, heavy, jagged, metal, serrated, useful Spanish speakers (key = feminine): golden, intricate, little, lovely, shiny, tiny
German speakers (bridge =feminine): beautiful, elegant, fragile, peaceful, pretty, slender Spanish (bridge = masculine): big, dangerous, long, strong, sturdy, towering The gender assigned by their native language affects speakers descriptions of objects, even when they are speaking English.
Are these effects of grammatical gender positive or negative (relative to a language without gender)?
More on the proper name learning study: Performance of native speakers of Spanish & German compared to that of native speakers of English, for the same names & objects: Congruent-Spanish Spanish good German bad English good Congruent-German bad good good
Patricia
Experience with a language in which toasters are masculine interferes with the ability to conceive of toasters as feminine. In the absence of such experience, adults can conceive of toasters either as masculine or as feminine.
Gender: Summary
Native speakers of a language with grammatical gender show influences of that language on representations of the masculinity/femininity of inanimate objects. But: The nature of this effect is negative, relative to the object representations of speakers of a language without grammatical gender. --in English, a bridge can be either Patrick or Patricia. --in German, a bridge can only be Patricia. Like tight/loose and like speech perception, humans can form gendered representations of objects without language. Acquisition of a gendered language pares down these representations. More evidence against Whorfs strong claims and favoring the weak claim.
Beneath the patterns of variation, strong universals in human conceptual capacities, in these cases and others (mind, space, number). In general, strong universals in human capacities of all sorts, despite apparently large differences in the ways people in different cultures live, behave, and talk: universal systems of core knowledge universal language faculty
Four profoundly & congenitally deaf adults, living in a hearing community, with no exposure to any spoken or sign language. They communicate by homesign: they have developed gestures denoting objects and actions, and they use gestures to convey number. They live in a numerate culture, with money, calendars, etc. Because they have no formal schooling, compared to hearing adults in Nicaragua with no formal schooling. NB: a way to separate effects of language from effects of culture.
(Spaepen, Coppola, Spelke, Carey & Goldin-Meadow, 2011)
same task given to hearing people with no schooling from the same villages.
(Spaepen, Coppola, Spelke, Carey & Goldin-Meadow, 2011)
Cultural pressure is not sufficient for the development of full natural number concepts, which depend on one or more aspects of language that fail to emerge spontaneously in homesign.
(Spaepen, Coppola, Spelke, Carey & Goldin-Meadow, 2011)