Analytical & Normative Jurisprudence

Agus Brotosusilo Faculty of Law University of Indonesia

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Normative Jurisprudence

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Normative Jurisprudence
A philosophical system of legal and moral principles purportedly deriving from a universalized conception of human nature or divine justice rather than from legislative or judicial action; moral law embodied in principles of right and wrong <many ethical teachings are based on natural law>.
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Tending to establish a standard of correctness by prescription of rules; evaluative rather than descriptive. Normative ethics---any system dictating morally correct conduct---is distinguished from meta-ethics--the discussion of the meaning of moral terms without issuing directives. Agus Brotosusilo, 1992. 3

Analytical Jurisprudence

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Analytical Jurisprudence
A method of legal study that concentrates on the logical structure of law; the meanings and uses of its concepts; and the formal terms and the modes of its operation.
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A wider variety of Analytical Jurisprudence (Summers, 1966):

Analysis of the existing conceptual framework of and about law; Construction of new conceptual frameworks with accompanying terminologies; Rational justification of institutions and practices, existing and proposed; and Purposive Implication, the tracing out of what the acceptance of social purposes implies in terms of social arrangements and social ordering.
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The Modern Analytical Jurisprudence: Raz (1975) in MacCormick (1983) The best defence yet offered for the positivist thesis on the conceptual independence of law from morality (MacCormick , 1983):

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Razs breaks in legal thinking:

One result of pursuit of reason for action is to direct our attention when looking of a concept like obligation--, to the kinds of reasons we address when contemplating an actual or supposed obligation to act. Raz shows that there is a difference between there being some sound reasons for conduct being legally obligatory and its actually being so.
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Raz, 1975:
When we considering whether to do X should be an obligation, we are at the deliberative phase of practical reasoning. When an authoritative decisions is taken that to do X is obligatory, further deliberation is excluded.
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The reason to act in external forces

Even H.L.A. Hart (The Concept of Law), Austins most trenchant contemporary critic, sought the reason in external serious social pressure. John Austin: habitual obedience The continuity of law

H.L.A. Hart:

the rule of recognition.

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Analytical Jurisprudence: Visser t Hooft, 1988.

Aliran Filsafat Hukum yang dengan bantuan misalnya pemahaman-pemahaman Filsafat Bahasa berupaya untuk menjelaskan pengertianpengertian yang digunakan dalam Ilmu Hukum Praktikal (Practische Rechtswetenschap).
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TOPIK-TOPIK MENARIK DALAM WACANA HUKUM

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The Concept of Law; A Theory of Right; The Economic Analysis of Law; Libertarianism; A Theory of Justice.
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The Concept of Law: Law is a system of rules (Hart)

Primary Rules (duty imposing rules citizens) Secondary Rules (power-conferring rules officials) Rules of Adjudication Rules of Change Rules of Validity

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Harts Rules of Adjudication:

Rules which confer competence on officials to pass judgement and to enforce law

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Hart:
The minimum content of Natural Law:
Persons The Minimum form of Protection of Property Promises

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Lon Fuller: The Morality of Law, 1969.

8 (eight) procedural quality of legal system: 1. Generality; 2. Promulgation; 3. Prospective; 4. Clear & Intelligible; 5. Free of Contradiction; 6. Not require the impossible; 7. Constant in time; 8. Binding power.
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Ronald Dworkin: Taking Rights Seriously, 1978.

Dworkins attacks on the model of positivism represented by Harts Concept of Law began as an assault on its theory of adjudication. Dworkin was concern with the inadequacies of positivistic explanations of how disputes were determined when, as is so often the case, we run out of rules.
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Dworkin: moral - rules

Dworkin has attempted to construct a theory of law out of theory of adjudication. He shows that Judge use, and must use, moral considerations in addition to rules found in legislation and case law.

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Dworkin: The law does not just consists of rules

Dworkin argues that these moral considerations are integral to the moral theory justifying the enacted and case law binding on Judges. The law does not just consists of rules, as positivists such a Hart maintain, but there is no reason why a positivists theory should not be constructed to embrace other standards than rules.
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 In Laws Empire (1986), Dworkin begin with question that is at the heart of the whole legal system: in difficult cases, how do (and how should) Judge decide what the law is?

Ronald Dworkin: Laws Empire, 1986.

He shows that Judge must decide hard cases by interpreting rather than simply applying past legal decisions.
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Dworkins general theory of interpretation

Dworkin produces a general theory of what interpretation is---in literature as well as in law---and of when one interpretation is better than the others.

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Dworkins 3 (three)Theories on the General Character of Law Reflected in Legal Interpretation:

1. The law of a community to be only what the established conventions of that community say it is. 2. Legal practice is best understood as an instrument of society to achieve its goals. Dworkin argues forcefully and persuasively against both these views.
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Dworkins concept of political and legal integrity

3.Dworkin insist that the most fundamental point of law is not to report concensus or provide efficient means to social goals, but to answer the requirement that political community act in a coherent and principled manner toward all its member.

Dworkin systematically demonstrate that his concept of political and legal integrity is the key to Anglo-American legal theory and practice.
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Hart vs. Dworkin

Hart demonstrated the need for those interested in the concept of law to appreciates the insights of analytical, particularly linguistic philosophy. Dworkin has place the issue of jurisprudence back where they were in the days of Bentham--, in the realm of the moral and political philosophy.
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The Economic Analysis of Law

Dworkins contribution to jurisprudence are matched by his contribution to the development of a liberal political theory. It is his view that the right to equal concern and respect is the fundamental principle of moral theory (and of American constitutional law), and that utilitarianism is no substitute for a theory committed to Taking Rights Seriously. As a critic of utilitarianism Dworkin is naturally skeptical of The Economic

Dworkins skeptical of

Analysis of Law

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A Theory of Right

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Hart:
Rights-based theories individual interest Goal-based theories community interest

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Tentang hakekat Right dikenal 2 (dua) teori:

Teori yang menekankan will atau choice (Hart); dan Teori yang menekankan interest atau benefit.

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Will/Choice Theory:

Hart

Pendukung will/choice Theory, misalnya Hart (1955): tujuan hukum adalah untuk menjamin sarana yang memungkinkan ekspresi diri seluas-luasnya bagi individu, tingkat maksimum pengejawantahan-diri individu. Teori ini terkait sangat erat dengan ide kedaulatan; Satu-satunya jalan untuk penyelesaian perbedaan kehendak adalah dengan merumuskan kehendak yang superior, yang mengatasi semua posisi. Teori ini juga berhubungan erat dengan ide individualism-moral. Berdasarkan teori ini diskresi individuel adalah ciri tunggal dari konsep Right. Agus Brotosusilo, 1992. 29

The interest/benefit theory: Lyons, McCormick, Raz, Campbell

Sebaliknya, para pendukung the interest/benefit theory berpendapat bahwa tujuan Right bukan untuk melindungi pengejawantahan-diri individu, tetapi untuk melindungi kepentingan-kepentingan tertentu.

Right adalah kepentingan-kepentingan yang dijamin untuk pribadi-pribadi oleh aturan-aturan yang mengatur hubunganhubungan sosial dalam masyarakat.
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the interest/benefit theory

the interest/benefit theory adalah bahwa teori ini mencakup semua type Right, termasuk (a.l. hak untuk pendidikan, perawatan kesehatan, pemukiman yang layak), tidak hanya terbatas pada apa yang disebut sebagai liberties. Kekuatan utama dari
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Kekuatan utama dari

Related discussion:
The Economic Analysis of Law; (4TH Course)

A Theory of Justice. (including: Libertarianism) (7TH Course)

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Agus Brotosusilo, 2005 Agus Brotosusilo, 2002. Agus Brotosusilo, 1992. Agus Brotosusilo, 2011.

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