Recent Jurisprudence on

Expropriation
Republic vs. Mangotara, GR. No. 170375, 2010
The owner of the property is not an
indispensable party in an action for
expropriation.

When the property already appears to
belong to the Republic, there is no sense in
the Republic instituting expropriation
proceedings against itself.
Curata vs. Philippine Ports Authority, GR. No. 154211-12,
2009
In Republic v. Gingoyon,
[109]
on the issue of how much
must the government pay by way of initial deposit, the
Court, after positing the applicability of RA 8974 to the
expropriation of NAIA Passenger Terminal III (NAIA III),
stated the observation that the appropriate standard of
just compensationinclusive of the manner of payment
thereof and the initial compensation to the lot owners
is a substantive, not merely a procedural, matter.
In Lintag v. National Power Corporation,
[110]
we reiterated
that RA 8974 is a substantive law that cannot be applied
retroactively
Tinio vs. NPC, GR. No. 160923, 2011
It is settled that the nature and character of the land at the
time of its taking is the principal criterion for determining how
much just compensation should be given to the landowner.
[10]


Hence, the argument of the Tinios that the subject property
should benefit from the subsequent classification of its
adjoining properties as industrial lands is, likewise, untenable.
The Court, in a number of cases,
[11]
has enunciated the
principle that it would be injustice on the part of the
expropriator where the owner would be given undue
incremental advantages arising from the use to which the
government devotes the property expropriated.
[10]

NPC vs. Teresita Diato-Bernal, GR. No. 180979, 2013
It is evident that the above conclusions are highly speculative and devoid
of any actual and reliable basis. First, the market values of the subject
propertys neighboring lots were mere estimates and unsupported by any
corroborative documents, such as sworn declarations of realtors in the
area concerned, tax declarations or zonal valuation from the Bureau of
Internal Revenue for the contiguous residential dwellings and commercial
establishments. The report also failed to elaborate on how and by how
much the community centers and convenience facilities enhanced the
value of respondents property.
[23]
Finally, the market sales data and price
listings alluded to in the report were not even appended thereto.

As correctly invoked by NAPOCOR, a commissioners report of land prices
which is not based on any documentary evidence is manifestly hearsay and
should be disregarded by the court.
[23]
See National Power Corporation
v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 156093, February 2, 2007, 514 SCRA 56.
NPC vs. Sps. Zabala, GR. No. 173520, 2013
It has likewise been our consistent ruling that just
compensation cannot be arrived at arbitrarily. Several
factors must be considered, such as, but not limited to,
acquisition cost, current market value of like
properties, tax value of the condemned property, its
size, shape, and location. But before these factors can
be considered and given weight, the same must be
supported by documentary evidence.
In Republic v. Santos,29 we ruled that a
commissioners land valuation which is not based on
any documentary evidence is manifestly hearsay and
should be disregarded by the court,
NPC vs. Tuazon, et al, GR. No. 193023, 2011
In sum, we categorically hold that private land taken for the
installation of transmission lines is to be paid the full market value
of the land as just compensation. We so ruled in National Power
Corporation v. Benjamin Ong Co,
[40]
and we reiterate this ruling
today:

As earlier mentioned, Section 3A of R.A. No. 6395, as amended,
substantially provides that properties which will be traversed by
transmission lines will only be considered as easements and just
compensation for such right of way easement shall not exceed 10
percent of the market value. However, this Court has repeatedly
ruled that when petitioner takes private property to construct
transmission lines, it is liable to pay the full market value upon
proper determination by the courts.
NPC vs. Heirs of Makabangkit Sangkay, GR. No. 165828, 2011
We rule that the prescriptive period provided under Section
3(i) of Republic Act No. 6395 is applicable only to an action for
damages, and does not extend to an action to recover just
compensation like this case. Consequently, NPC cannot thereby
bar the right of the Heirs of Macabangkit to recover just
compensation for their land.

The action to recover just compensation from the State or its
expropriating agency differs from the action for damages. The
former, also known as inverse condemnation, has the objective
to recover the value of property taken in fact by the
governmental defendant, even though no formal exercise of
the power of eminent domain has been attempted by the
taking agency.
Republic vs. Hon. Judge Samson-Tatad, GR. No. 187677, 2013
The sole issue in this case, i.e., whether or not the court that
hears the expropriation case has also jurisdiction to determine,
in the same proceeding, the issue of ownership of the land
sought to be condemned, must be resolved in the affirmative.
That the court is empowered to entertain the conflicting claims
of ownership of the condemned or sought to be condemned
property and adjudge the rightful owner thereof, in the same
expropriation case, is evident from Section 9 of the Revised
Rule 69, xxx
If at all, this situation is akin to ejectment cases in which a
court is temporarily authorized to determine ownership, if only
to determine who is entitled to possession. This is not
conclusive, and it remains open to challenge through proper
actions.
End of Part 2