Ng Jian Hui (1000717622)

Liban ali (1001026347)

Mohammed Saad Hadi (1000922875)
Tan Chern Yee (1000922102)
Ahmed Abdelmonim (1000820496)
Ahmed Abdullah Saleh (1001024906)


North Sea oil production platform fully managed and operated by Occidental
Petroleum (Caledonia) Ltd subsidiaries of Occidental Petroleum Corporation (Oxy).

California based company in oil and gas exploration and production.

on 6 July 1988, an accident that occurred killing 167 men leaving only 61 survivors.

Approximate financial lost was $3.4 billion dollars

located in the British sector of the North Sea oil field approximately 120 miles from
Aberdeen Scotland.

MCP-01 is a gas compressor platform.
The platform belonged to oil and gas production area consisting of the fields Piper,
Claymore and Tartan where each with its own platform.

The Flotta oil terminal in the Orkney Islands will receive and process oil in these fields.

It was accounted for around ten per cent of the oil and gas production from the North
Sea. Producing about 317,000 barrels of oil a day.

It had a crew of 226 men



Generally divided into 4 modules.

Module A : Wellheads

Module B & C : Gas compression and separation

Module D : production and generation of oil and gas
12.00PM

Condensate pump A & B were scheduled for maintenance.

Pump A had its pressure safety valve removed and sealed off using a metal plate as
the maintenance work could not be completed before the shift ends.

Person on duty filed a permit stating the condition of pump A and should not be turn
on in any case
6.00PM

Night shift starts with 62 personals on duty.

The permit stating the condition of pump A, fails to reach the hands of the night
shift manager as he was busy and was left in the control room.

Permit went missing and coincidentally a permitting stating a scheduled maintenance
of pump A & B has not started was found.

7.00PM

Automated fire-fighting system was switched to manual mode.

Manual mode is usually switched on whenever there were any diver in the waters to
prevent any accident from occurring.


9.45PM

Condensate pump B suddenly stop working & could not be restarting.

Power disruption was imminent because pump B was providing the power supply
throughout the platform.

The manager in charge searched for the documents to confirm whether condensate
pump A could be started to make up for the pump B.
9.52PM

Permit of scheduled maintenance was found but not the permit stating the condition
of condensate pump A.

Thus, causing the manager to assume pump A was safe to be started.

None of the personnel noticed the condition of the condensate pump A due to the
position of the safety valve is quite far from the designated pump and is obscured by
machineries.


9.55PM

As gas flows through the pump, the fitted metal plate dislodged.

Causing 6 gas alarms to go off.

Before any personnel can react, the leaked gas ignites and causing an explosion.

Which tore of apart the firewall and flying debris from the explosion caused a rupture
of a condensate pipe causing further fires across the area.

10.04PM

The explosion caused the control room to be abandoned as it was not
made to withstand any explosion. Evacuation signal was not attempt.

The staffs attempted to evacuate by making their way to lifeboats but was cut
off due to fire. They then made their way to the accommodation block
underneath the helipad awaiting further instructions.

Meanwhile, Tartan and Claymore continues to pump oil to Piper Alpha
causing the fires, unable to subside. The managers on Tartan and
claymore did not stop their operations because a shutdown on
operation would take several days to restart causing financial losses.
Also the decision to arrive takes a long time to arrive due to its
management structure.
10.20PM

A massive fireball engulfs piper alpha due to Tartan platforms gas line melting and
bursting into flames causing the eminent destruction of the Piper Alpha platform.

10.50PM

The Tharos a large submersible firefighting, rescue and
accommodation vessel attempted to elongate a rescue walkway but
failed as it takes too long due to design flaw and the heat from the fires
started to melt away the framework of the structure.

10.50PM

2
nd
gas line burst causing gas to spew out causing flames to flare up to 300ft in height.

11.20pm

Pipeline connecting Claymore and Piper alpha platform explodes.

11.50pm

Module D of the platform disengaged from the platform followed by the largest part of
the platform.
12.45AM

Module A is the only remains of what is left of Piper Alpha.
Miscommunication
After filling a permit/notice for condensate pump A it failed to reach the night shift managers
hands due to neglect.
Design Flaw
Platform is only design to be fireproof and nothing is implemented to withstand any
explosion.
Escape route and rescue flaw
The lack of alternative escape route and The Thaross design flaw making rescue
almost impossible.
Management structure
Due to the management structure, emergency response is slow and remedial action
did not arrive in time to prevent further damage. Tartans oil pump did not stop
pumping to Piper Alpha preventing fire to subside.

Following the inquiry of Scottish judge William
Cullen.(The Cullen report)
He recommended that owner of every fixed and mobile installation operating in UK
waters to submit a safety case for its acceptance to UK Health and Safety
Executive (HSE). HSE is given the task to enforce this recommendation.

The Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations was
established in 1992.
Which requires the duty holder to provide details of health and safety management
and major accident hazard control systems on the installation, which includes
identify and reduce risks as much as practicable.
A refuge area is to be establish on every platform to enable safe evacuation.
Cont
All platform manager must be trained to respond the emergencies situation on other
platforms.
Practice of Permit to Work (PTW) system is placed to high priority with regular audit
and review.
All personnel on site must be train on the usage for SMS for emergency situation and
understand the risk of operations.

GRA and ALARP are to be used in understanding the risk and hazard when designing
the process of the Oil Rig.
Where, Hazardous areas are to be segregated from control rooms and
accommodations.
Blast wall and firewall are more integrated into design.
Evacuation route are to be improved.
Active and passive fire protection system to be integrated.

Cont
All personnel must attend annual safety training.
All existing and new employee to attend emergency response training once or twice a
year.
Workplace to be audited and inspected regularly.
Law enforced on workers health and safety

Other laws that were implemented following this accident:
The Offshore Installation and Pipeline Works (Management and Administration)
Regulations 1995
The Offshore Installations and Wells (Design and Construction, etc) Regulations
1996
The End.