Lecture 10

Risk
Public Safety

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 Today’s Lecture
ILP Continued Risk Management
1) Development
1) Issues
2) Nature of transformation

2) CCTV & Intel 3) Characteristics of Risk Society

4) Why Risk?

5) Policing Risks

6) Criticisms?

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 And…
PUBLIC SAFETY

1. Introduction
2. Origins
3. PS in Government
4. Interoperability
5. Implications
6. Conclusions
 1. Intelligence-Led
Policing
Issues…

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The Arar Case…

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 O’Connor’s
Recommendations
Independent arms-length review of information
sharing practices and arrangements
Information reviewed before sharing for reliability
and accuracy
Sharing of personal information must comply with
Privacy Act and the Charter of Rights
No information sharing with countries with
questionable human rights records lest Canada
becomes complicit in torture and other human rights
abuses

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 Cope’s ILP Study
Issue of buy-in among frontlines

Lack of credibility (of civilian analysts)

Internal culture (keeping secrets, demand for

information leading to arrests, etc.)

Problematic information flows:

Inaccurate / incomplete or no information
provided by frontlines and investigators to
analysis, which in turn leads to poor and
improper intelligence

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 Cope’s Study
Qualitative differences between large and smaller
police agencies (as smaller forces lack capacity for
better training etc.)

Overtasking of analysts

‘Policing-led intelligence:’ targets established

because of group-think

Incompatibility between ‘craft’ knowledge of the

patrolwomen & ‘intelligence’

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 Ultimately...
There are impediments in at least two areas:
Quality of intelligence
Police culture

Are there solutions to these?

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 2. Public CCTVs &
 
Intelligence?

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 CCTV Society?
London

• Sheptycki (2000): in 1995, the London Underground deployed 5000

CCTVs and Home Office deployed 10,000 cameras throughout the
UK at a cost of 15 million Pounds (approx. $30 million CDN)

• Today:
• 4.2 million closed circuit cameras
• Several billion dollar cost

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 CCTV Society?
• Public CCTVs in London tied into Central
Communications Centre Complex of New Scotland
Yard…

• Biometric facial recognition (Mandrake)

• Includes more than 500 traffic enforcement cameras

according:
• Computer Aided Dispatch (monitors license plate
numbers) “to aid minimizing traffic congestion”

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 In Windsor...

Video from traffic cameras on Huron Church used to

identify a car believed involved in a recent homicide

Casino Windsor’s CCTVs utilize facial recognition

technology and are used by police

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Click Article…

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 Group Discussion...

Are there problems with relying upon ‘intelligence’ to

carry out policing?

What are the alternative (if any)?

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 Risk
Management
A pervasive way in which western
governments control crime!

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1. Development of Risk
‘Risk’ is not ‘danger’

Risk is relatively new, stemming from the 19th

century development of statistics

“Statistics” from German 18th century origins means

“data of state”

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 Development of Risk
Based on actuarial calculation & prediction of various
measurable or predictable events:

E.g. the risk of death has been associated with various

static and dynamic factors such as age, sex, geographic
location, occupation, income, marital status, lifestyle,
etc.

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 Development of Risk
Insurance companies (simplistically) make money
because events they insure are calculable and
therefore distributable:

E.g. Airline accident insurance

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Development of Risk

Many (e.g. Ericson & Haggerty 1997) argued

that policing the risk society represents a
profound transformation – from professional
policing!

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 2. The nature of this
transformation?

Crime understood as a set of risks, more or less

inevitable, predictable, and manageable in
aggregate terms

Prevention and risk-distribution become central

(rather than detection and correction)

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 3. Characteristics of “Risk
Society”
Risk-based techniques for controlling crime:

1. Manipulate the environment / effects of

problematic activities, rather than attempt to
correct errant individuals

2. Risk categories seemingly ‘objective’

3. Perceived as less coercive

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 4. Why Risk?
 Efficiency and cost-effectiveness

 Facilitates cost/benefit analyses to justify

decisions

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 Eg: Risk management of
immigrating teenage child
Risks:
Uncle: Under police investigation for grooming
prostitutes / sexual harassment

Action Taken:
Uncle prevented access to child by
immigration officials

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 5. Policing Risks…
Prioritize resources through intelligence / risk
management:
Information systems (Versaterm / Niche / Entrepol)
Example of ‘Barb’ with the barbwire tattoo

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 Risk management is becoming
pervasive in western
government…
Customs (baggage checks)

Revenue Canada (Income Tax Audits)

Health (risk assessments for heart disease,

cancer, etc.)

Environmental risk assessments

National security (threat assessments, e.g.

U.S. Homeland Security Alert Levels)

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 6. Criticisms?
Categories often crude (e.g. low, medium, high)
…

Reinforce common sense notions

Internally predictable outcomes? (e.g. Homeland

Security Advisory – prev. slide)

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Objective or Normative?
E.g. high-risk airline passengers?
Use of static and dynamic factors such as age,
‘sex’, place of origin or destination, whether
traveling alone or with family, etc. may target
single males in their 20s, of Middle-Eastern or
East-Indian descent (i.e. racial profiling)

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Criticisms of Risk Classifications &
Assessments…
Risk classifications based on limited information:
Assessments can always be more comprehensive
Justifies intrusive surveillance, greater infringements on
privacy, etc.
Has led to the ‘information sharing’ age of government

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Public Safety
&

Governmental Interoperability

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 1. Introduction
Public Safety (through) Interoperability is a fairly new
development

Becoming globally pervasive governmental approach…

Canada (all levels of government)
US
UK & EU
Russia
Many Asian countries like Indonesia, Thailand etc.

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 Introduction
A Working Definition
PSI represents a different way of thinking about
governance:

PSI is the “management, prevention and distribution

of risks within a network of government departments
and agencies to achieve a common strategic
objective.”

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 Introduction
There is next to nothing published academically on
this word-wide trend (yet)

The (draft) paper you’ve read by Dr. Cradock and I will

likely be published next year

This class probably represents one of the few

university lecture(s) on this topic in Canada or
elsewhere

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 2. Origins of
Interoperability

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 The origins of
‘interoperability’
May be traced through various loosely related
threads:
1. Military
2. Social Work / Child Protection
3. Public Policing / Security Intelligence
4. Health
5. Other fields???

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 Origins of
Interoperability
Advancements in:
Computational Processing
Data Storage Capacity
Distributed Systems / Networking
Cryptography
Automated Risk Assessment
Among many others…

Have allowed for a greater capacity for the desired

integration to take place

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 Military Origins…
‘Interoperability’ originally stems from the military
desire for ‘seamless’ coordination between
different branches

During Vietnam, operations were largely

uncoordinated between the US Army, Navy, Air
Force & Marines
Incompatible communications technologies
Chain-of-command ‘silos’

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 Military Origins
uncoordinated operations led to:
High rates of ‘friendly fire’
Low rates of operational success

Both stemmed from the military’s inability to share

intelligence in an effective, timely and horizontal
fashion

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 Military Origins
In the 1980s, the US DoD embarked on a number of
projects to foster ‘interdepartmental operability’ or
‘interoperability’ for short

Projects focused on standardizing:

Radio equipment
Frequency use protocols
Encryption & decryption protocols
Tactical codes

The projects were minimally successful

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 Origins in Child Protection
Dept. of Health & Social Services (1982) reviewed
reports of 18 public inquiries into child deaths
between 1973-1981:
Nearly all identified the lack of interagency coordination
and info-sharing as a major contributing factor, yet
none of the recommendations had been implemented…

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 Origins in Child
Protection
Late-1990s: child case-workers in Canada & UK
begin utilizing manual risk assessments to
prioritize cases / visitations / removal orders

2002 ACPO (UK) introduced joint social services

and police detective teams (SSITs) – of
significance, SSITs began vetting applicants from
working with children

Still, problems identified in the 1970s remain

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Origins in Child Protection
Ian Huntley (UK)

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 Origins in Child Protection
Ian Huntley (UK)
1995-1999: Humberside police and social services
aware of 10 separate incidents of rape, underage sex,
indecent assault (with girls aged 11-17), and burglary

Two charges (rape & burglary) were both withdrawn /

girls not placed in protection

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 Origins in Child Protection
Ian Huntley (UK)
2001 moved near Soham

Job as caretaker at Soham Village College

SSIT background checks did not reveal Huntley as a risk

Aug 4 2002: Huntley invites 10 year-old Holly Wells

and Jessica Chapman to his house under false
pretence and murders the two / dumps and burns
bodies in a ditch 30 Km away

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 Origins in Child Protection
Ian Huntley (UK)
Police suspicious of Huntley after he becomes closely
involved in the search (offering help / interviewed on
tv)…

Police find scorched shirts of victims at Soham College

/ bodies discovered shortly after

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 Origins in Child Protection
Ian Huntley (UK)
At trial, Huntley testified that he accidentally knocked
Wells into a bathtub (where she drowned) &
inadvertently suffocated Chapman when she started
screaming

Found guilty / sentenced to 40 years

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 The Bichard Inquiry
Public outcry led to two Inquiries

Significantly the Bichard report proposed a national

multi-agency system to integrate data across police
and social service agencies

This was not a new recommendation!

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 IMPACT-NI
In Dec. 2005 the UK unveiled the
Intelligence Management Prioritisation Analysis
Coordination and Tasking – Nominal Index (INI) system

Allows Social Service & Police to leverage risk / intel

across agencies

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 INI Case Narrative
“One force carried out an INI check on a man
acquitted of assaulting his girlfriend's eight-year-
old daughter to see if he appeared likely to present
a continuing risk. The system showed that the man
had been linked to identical incidents in five other
forces.”

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 Origins in Policing
(Late 1980s / early 1990s) Bernardo

Campbell (1996) recommended interagency

information sharing / greater use of ViCLAS across
Ontario

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 Origins in Policing
1997: RCMP FPS engaged in process of interagency
partnering under a (re)interpretation of the CP
approach

Chretien announced plans for the Integrated Justice

Information Initiative in support of such partnerships

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 Origins in Policing
Adoption of ILP (2001 / 2002) in Canada
Development of N-III (National Integrated Interagency
Information) system (discussed below)

NIM (2000) in UK

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 3. ‘Public Safety’ in
Government
Overarching strategic objective of government(s)
"There is no more fundamental role for
government than the protection of its citizens”
(PSC Webpage)

Governmental reorganization and integration:

EG Solicitor General Canada now Public Safety

Canada

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 ‘Public Safety’ in
Government
Integrated objectives across ‘public safety agencies’
“Public Safety Canada (PS) was created in
2003 to ensure coordination across all federal
departments and agencies responsible for
national security and the safety of Canadians.

From natural disasters to crime and terrorism,

our mandate is to keep Canadians safe.”
PSC Web

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 4. Public Safety
Interoperability
Facilitated through systems like the INI and Canada’s
N-III

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 N-III
Interconnects:
Police Information Portal
Query tool capable of accessing data used by most
Canadian police services. A single PIP query searches all
participating agency data and returns consolidated
responses.

Integrated Query Tool

Federal public safety agencies

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 N-III
“N-III will provide the ultimate solution”

“…the PIP and IQT can be integrated. As a result,

Canada’s law enforcement community will have
access to a tool capable of producing consolidated
results from one seamless query and the bi-directional
communication of the PIP and IQT. This will advance
the interoperability objectives of the Government of
Canada …”

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 Public Safety
Interoperability
Interconnectivity across ‘Public Safety Agencies’
(PSAs)

PSAs includes wide array of governmental service

provision:

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 Canadian PSAs /
Partners
Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada  Health Canada
Canada Border Services Agency
 Human Resources and Skills 
Development Canada - Labour Program
Canada Firearms Centre  Industry Canada
Canada Revenue Agency  Justice Canada
 National Defence
Canadian Coast Guard (Fisheries and Oceans
Canada)  National Parole Board
Canadian Food Inspection Agency
 National Search and Rescue Secretariat 
(National Defence)
Canadian Security Intelligence Service  Natural Resources Canada
CBRN Research and Technology Initiative  Privy Council Office
 Royal Canadian Mounted Police
Citizenship and Immigration Canada
 Transport Canada
Correctional Service Canada

Environment Canada

Financial Consumer Agency of Canada

Fisheries and Oceans Canada

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Provincial Public Safety
Alignment with Federal Ministry:
BC: Ministry of Public Safety & Sol Gen
Alberta: Sol Gen and Public Security
Sask: Corrections, Public Safety & Policing
Ont: Community Safety and Corr Services
Quebec: Dept. of Public Security
NB: Dept. of Public Safety

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Security & Emergencies (Crit. Infrstr)

Police, Fire, Emergency Services

Safety Services
Coroner
Motor Vehicle
Technical Inspection Services
Compliance / Regulatory Services

Community & Correctional Services

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5. Implications

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 Government through
Interagency Risk Distribution?
Prevention through access control
Actuarial Justice
Suspected of drug use by police?
Transport license denials?
Social housing denials?
Denial of jobs in in certain fields?
Children?
Health Care?
Income Tax Audits?
Customs baggage checks?
Drug seizures (no fines but record)? 67

Information targeting?
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 Transformation of
Police?
Two-prong approach:
1. Spin-off various roles to new agencies
2. Focus ‘Police’ role on certain ‘proficiency’ areas…

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 Toward a model of public
policing
in the 21st century?
1. Elimination of tasks / roles:
9-11 Call Centre
Security/Employment Checks
Patrol/Order Maintenance
Minor Traffic
First Response to disorder, non-life-threatening and
minor/low-risk incidents
Forensic Services
Etc.

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 Toward a model of public
policing
in the 21st century?
2. Focus on proficiency roles:
Response to high-risk, major and/or life-threatening
incidents
Criminal investigations (of high-risk / serious crime)
Case processing
Oversight / support for major events

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 Rethink Justice More
Broadly?
Speeding?
Double highway limits outside populated areas
Safety cameras – automated reporting and risk assessment
system (e.g. UK’s Mandrake)
No fine:
Insurance info sharing
Warnings for high-risk drivers
Suspension / revocation of license for very-high risk

SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED ROLE FOR

Police
Courts / judges / lawyers
Justice administration

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Broadly Rethink Justice?
Prisons?
Used minimally, for highest-risk offenders, and as a last
resort for preventing future harm to society…

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 Distraught / Agitated
Visitor?
Present Options:
Police response:
4 large English-only speaking males
Armed with Tasers, Pepper Spray, Batons, Guns
All outcomes = undesirable!

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 A Public Safety
Approach?
New options:
Airport security / information services address situation
Independent 9-11 Call Centre
Public Safety response:
‘Minimally armed’ well informed females & males trained in
situational diffusion
Professional language translator
Immigration / customs
EMS / Paramedics ready
Police backup ready

In short, a networked approach…

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 New Role for PS
Workers?
Change of strategic expertise:
Risk Analyses
Based on centralized information system
Interagency networking / negotiation / mediation
Leveraging intelligence / risks

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 Privacy?
 Laws do not (yet) apply to computers (cybernetic
entities)!

 Ideally, computer systems will access, process and

‘vet’ information in compliancy with legislation /
policies

 Provide end-users with risk assessment results without

divulging information that violates privacy…

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6. Conclusions…

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 In Actuality
Far from ideal picture of seamless interoperability
across government:
Incompatibility of systems
Still a ways to go technologically
Limited information

Interagency integration potentially problematic:

Different agency values – enforcement,
administration, care, etc.

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 Major Issues
Information on subjects increasingly complex, disjoint,
contradictory, and fallible…

Risk is ultimately normative / subjective

Subjects potentially unaware of reasons for access

denials / governmental targeting

Rights?

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