2007 Levente Buttyn and Jean-Pierre Hubaux

Security and Cooperation

in Wireless Networks
http://secowinet.epfl.ch/
Chapter 11: Wireless operators in shared
spectrum
multi-domain sensor
networks;
border games in
cellular networks;
Security and Cooperation in Wireless Networks
Chapter 11: Wireless operators in shared spectrum
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Chapter outline

11.1 Multi-domain sensor networks
11.2 Border games in cellular networks
Security and Cooperation in Wireless Networks
Chapter 11: Wireless operators in shared spectrum
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Typical cooperation: help in packet forwarding
Can cooperation emerge spontaneously in multi-domain
sensor networks based solely on the self-interest of the
sensor operators?


Multi-domain sensor networks
11.1 Multi-domain sensor networks
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Simplified model
C: Cooperation D: Defection

4 possible moves:
CC the sensor asks for help (cost 1) and helps if asked (cost 1)
CD the sensor asks for help (cost 1) and does not help (cost 0)
DC the sensor sends directly (cost 2
o
) and helps if asked (cost 1)
DD the sensor sends directly (cost 2
o
) and does not help (cost 0)
2

1 1
1
1 1
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11.1.1 Simplified model
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Example : CC CD (1/6)
CC the sensor tries to get help from the other sensor
and helps if the other sensor requests it

CD the sensor tries to get help but it refuses to help
CC CD
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11.1.1 Simplified model
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Example : CC CD (2/6)
CC the sensor tries to get help from the other sensor
and helps if the other sensor requests it

CD the sensor tries to get help but it refuses to help
CC CD
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11.1.1 Simplified model
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Example : CC CD (3/6)
CC
failure
CD
CC the sensor tries to get help from the other sensor
and helps if the other sensor requests it

CD the sensor tries to get help but it refuses to help
11.1 Multi-domain sensor networks
11.1.1 Simplified model
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Example : CC CD (4/6)
CC CD
CC the sensor tries to get help from the other sensor
and helps if the other sensor requests it

CD the sensor tries to get help but it refuses to help
11.1 Multi-domain sensor networks
11.1.1 Simplified model
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Example : CC CD (5/6)
CC CD
success
11.1 Multi-domain sensor networks
11.1.1 Simplified model
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Example : CC CD (6/6)
CC CD
Black player
Cost: 2
1 for asking
1 for helping

Benefit: 0
(packet dropped)
Gray player
Cost: 1
1 for asking


Benefit: 1
(packet arrived)
11.1 Multi-domain sensor networks
11.1.1 Simplified model
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2

1 1
Cost for black
Cost for grey
Outcome for black (0 = failure)
Outcome for grey (1 = success)
The simplified model in strategic form
11.1 Multi-domain sensor networks
11.1.1 Simplified model
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Reception threshold
time
success / failure of packet reception
Sliding window of history
Success
(= 1)
Failure
(= 0)
Reception
threshold
Average of the packet reception
Risk of going below threshold
adapt strategy (move to the
constrained state: only DC or DD
are eligible)
Reception threshold: computed and stored at each sensor node
The battery (B) level of the sensors decreases with the moves
If the battery is empty, the sensor dies

11.1 Multi-domain sensor networks
11.1.1 Simplified model
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Game Theoretic Approach
The mentioned concepts describe a game
Players: network operators
Moves (unconstrained state): CC, CD, DC, DD
Moves (constrained state): DC, DD
Information sets: histories
Strategy: function that assigns a move to every possible
history considering the weight threshold
Payoff = lifetime
We are searching for Nash equilibria with the highest
lifetimes

11.1 Multi-domain sensor networks
11.1.1 Simplified model
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Two-step Strategies
B initial battery
reception threshold
o path loss exponent (>2)

1,2
payoff of transient states

Cooperative Nash equilibrium


Non-cooperative Nash equilibrium

If > 1/3, then (CC/DD, CC/DD) is more desirable
11.1 Multi-domain sensor networks
11.1.1 Simplified model
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Generalized Model
11.1 Multi-domain sensor networks
11.1.2 Generalized model
Simplified model with the following extensions:
many sensors, random placing
minimum energy path routing
common sink / separate sink scenarios
classification of equilibria
Class 0: no cooperation (no packet is relayed)
Class 1: semi cooperation (some packets are relayed)
Class 2: full cooperation (all packets are relayed)
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Main simulation parameters
Parameter Value
Number of sensors per domain 20
Area size 100 x 100 m
Reception threshold
0.6
History length 5
Path loss exponent 234 (3)
11.1 Multi-domain sensor networks
11.1.2 Generalized model
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Impact of the path loss exponent
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e

o
f

s
i
m
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
s

Equilibrium classes ( 0 no cooperation, 1 semi
cooperation, 2 full cooperation)
Value of the path
loss exponent
2
3
4
11.1 Multi-domain sensor networks
11.1.2 Generalized model
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Conclusion on multi-domain sensor networks
We examined whether cooperation is possible without the
usage of incentives in multi-domain sensor networks

In the simplified model, the best Nash equilibria consist of
cooperative strategies

In the generalized model, the best Nash equilibria belong to
the cooperative classes in most of the cases

11.1 Multi-domain sensor networks
Security and Cooperation in Wireless Networks
Chapter 11: Wireless operators in shared spectrum
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Chapter outline

11.1 Multi-domain sensor networks
11.2 Border games in cellular networks
Security and Cooperation in Wireless Networks
Chapter 11: Wireless operators in shared spectrum
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Motivating example
11.2 Border games in cellular networks
Security and Cooperation in Wireless Networks
Chapter 11: Wireless operators in shared spectrum
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Introduction
spectrum licenses do not
regulate access over
national borders
adjust pilot power to
attract more users
Is there an incentive for operators to apply competitive
pilot power control?
11.2 Border games in cellular networks
Security and Cooperation in Wireless Networks
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System model (1/2)
Network:
cellular networks using CDMA
channels defined by orthogonal
codes
two operators: A and B
one base station each
pilot signal power control

Users:
roaming users
users uniformly distributed
select the best quality BS
selection based signal-to-
interference-plus-noise ratio
(SINR)
11.2 Border games in cellular networks
11.2.1 Model
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System model (2/2)
0
pilot
p i iv pilot
iv
pilot pilot
own other
G P g
SINR
N I I

=
+ + W
i
pilot
own iv iw
w
I g T
e
| |
=
|
|
\ .

M
i
pilot
other jv j iw
j i w
I g P T q
= e
| |
= +
|
|
\ .

M
A B v
P
A
P
B
T
Av
T
Bw
T
Aw
0
tr
p iv iv tr
iv
tr tr
own other
G T g
SINR
N I I

=
+ + W
,
i
pilot
own iv i iw
w v w
I g P T
= e
| |
= +
|
|
\ .

M
tr pilot
other other
I I =
pilot signal SINR:

traffic signal SINR:

P
i
pilot power of i

processing gain for the pilot signal

pilot
p
G
iv
g
0
N noise energy per symbol

W

iv
T
q
pilot
own
I
channel gain between BS i and user v

available bandwidth

own-cell interference affecting the pilot signal

own-cell interference factor

traffic power between BS i and user v
other-to-own-cell interference factor

i
M
set of users attached to BS i
11.2 Border games in cellular networks
11.2.1 Model
Security and Cooperation in Wireless Networks
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Game-theoretic model
Power Control Game, G
PC
players networks operators (BSs), A and B
strategy pilot signal power, 0W < P
i
< 10W, i = {A, B}
standard power, P
S

= 2W
payoff profit, where is the expected income
serving user v
normalized payoff difference:
i
i v
v
u u
e
=

M
v
u
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
max , ,
,
i
S S S
i i i
s
i
S S
i
u s P u P P
u P P

A =
11.2 Border games in cellular networks
11.2.2 Power control game
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Simulation settings
11.2 Border games in cellular networks
11.2.2 Power control game
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Is there a game?
only A is strategic (B uses P
B
= P
S
)
10 data users
path loss exponent, = 2

i
11.2 Border games in cellular networks
11.2.2 Power control game
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When both operators are strategic
10 data users
path loss exponent, = 4

11.2 Border games in cellular networks
11.2.2 Power control game
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Nash equilibria

10 data users 100 data users
11.2 Border games in cellular networks
11.2.2 Power control game
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Efficiency (1/2)
10 data users
11.2 Border games in cellular networks
11.2.2 Power control game
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Efficiency (2/2)
100 data users
11.2 Border games in cellular networks
11.2.2 Power control game
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convergence based on better-response dynamics
convergence step: 2 W
Convergence to NE (1/2)
P
A
= 6.5 W
11.2 Border games in cellular networks
11.2.3 Convergence to a Nash Equilibrium
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Convergence to NE (2/2)
convergence step: 0.1 W
11.2 Border games in cellular networks
11.2.3 Convergence to a Nash Equilibrium
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Conclusion on border games
not only individual nodes may exhibit selfish behavior, but
operators can be selfish too
example: adjusting pilot power to attract more users at
national borders
the problem can be modeled as a game between the
operators
the game has an efficient Nash equilibrium
theres a simple convergence algorithm that drives the system into
the Nash equilibrium
11.2 Border games in cellular networks