Art. 3 Sec. 17.

No person shall be compelled to be a

witness against himself.
Based on common law and humanitarian and
practical considerations.
It is available not only in criminal prosecutions but
also in all other government proceedings, including
civil actions and administrative or legislative
investigations.
Can be invoked by person accused of an offense and
by any witness to whom an incriminating question is
addressed.
It refers therefore to the use of the mental process
and the communicative faculties, and not merely
physical properties.

SCOPE

As long the question will tend to incriminate, the witness.

The kernel of the right, it has been held, is against not all
compulsion but testimonial compulsion only.
A person can be compelled to submit to physical examination
to determine his involvement in the offense.
Applies to compulsion for the production of documents,
papers and chattels that may used as evidence against the
witness, except where the state has a right to inspect the
same.
Protects the accused against attempt to compel him to
furnish a specimen of his handwriting in connection with his
prosecution for falsification.

When to avail?

Can only be invoke only when and as the

incriminating question is asked, since the witness
has no way of knowing in advance the nature or
effect of the question to be put to him, however this
is only true to ordinary witness.
In case of the accused himself is the witness, it is
settled that he can refuse at outset and altogether to
take the stand as a witness for the prosecution, on
the reasonable assumption that the purpose of his
interrogation will be to incriminate him.

Waiver
Either by direct or by failure to invoke it, provided the waiver is
certain and unequivocal and intelligently, understandingly and
willingly made.
One who under a subpoena duces tecum voluntarily surrenders
an incriminating paper which is put evidence against him.
the witness may be cross-examined and asked incriminating
questions on any matter he testified to on direct examination.

U.S v. Tan Teng

Facts: The defendant herein raped Oliva Pacomio, a seven-year-old
girl. Tan Teng was gambling near the house of the victim and it was
alleged that he entered her home and threw the victim on the
floor and place his private parts over hers. Several days later,
Pacomio was suffering from a disease called gonorrhea. Pacomio
told her sister about what had happened and reported it to the police.
Tan Teng was called to appear in a police line-up and the victim
identified him. He was then stripped of his clothing and was
examined by a policeman. He was found to have the
same symptoms of gonorrhea. The policeman took a portion of the
substance emitting from the body of the defendant and turned it over
to the Bureau of Science. The results showed that the defendant
was
suffering
from
gonorrhea.
The lower court held that the results show that the disease that the
victim had acquired came from the defendant herein. Such disease
was transferred by the unlawful act of carnal knowledge by the latter.
The defendant alleged that the said evidence should be inadmissible
because it was taken in violation of his right against selfincrimination.

Issue: Whether or Not the physical examination conducted was a

violation of the defendants rights against self-incrimination.

Held: The court held that the taking of a substance from his body
was not a violation of the said right. He was neither compelled to
make any admissions or to answer any questions. The substance
was taken from his body without his objection and was examined
by competent medical authority.
The prohibition of self-incrimination in the Bill of Rights is a
prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort
communications from him, and not an exclusion of his body as
evidence, when it may be material. It would be the same as if the
offender apprehended was a thief and the object stolen by him
may be used as evidence against him.

Beltran v. Samson

Facts: Felix Samson, Judge of the Second Judicial District

ordered Francisco Beltran to appear before the Provincial Fiscal
of Isabela, Francisco Jose, to take dictations in his own
handwriting from the latter. The purpose for such was for the
fiscal to compare Beltran's handwriting and to determine if it is he
who wrote certain documents supposed to be falsified. Beltran
filed a petition for a writ of prohibition.

Issue: Whether the writing from the fiscal's dictation by Beltran for
the purpose of comparing the latter's handwriting and determining
whether he wrote certain documents supposed to be falsified,
constitutes evidence against himself within the scope and
meaning of the constitutional provision

Held: The court ordered the respondents and those under their orders
desist and abstain absolutely and forever from compelling the petitioner to
take down dictation in his handwriting for the purpose of submitting the latter
for comparison. Writing is something more than moving the body, or the
hands, or the fingers; writing is not a purely mechanical act, because it
requires the application of intelligence and attention; and in the case at bar
writing means that the petitioner herein is to furnish a means to determine
whether or not he is the falsifier, as the petition of the respondent fiscal
clearly states. Except that it is more serious, we believe the present case is
similar to that of producing documents or chattels in one's possession. We
say that, for the purposes of the constitutional privilege, there is a similarity
between one who is compelled to produce a document, and one who is
compelled to furnish a specimen of his handwriting, for in both cases, the
witness is required to furnish evidence against himself. It cannot be
contended in the present case that if permission to obtain a specimen of the
petitioner's handwriting is not granted, the crime would go unpunished.
Considering the circumstance that the petitioner is a municipal treasurer, it
should not be a difficult matter for the fiscal to obtained genuine specimens
of his handwriting. But even supposing it is impossible to obtain specimen or
specimens without resorting to the means complained herein, that is no
reason for trampling upon a personal right guaranteed by the constitution.

CHAVEZ V. CA
Facts: Judgment of conviction was for qualified theft of a motor
vehicle(thunderbird car together with accessories). An information
was filed against the accused together with other accused, that they
conspired, with intent to gain and abuse of confidence without the
consent of owner Dy Lim, took the vehicle. All the accused plead not
guilty. During the trial, the fiscal grecia (prosecution) asked roger
Chavez to be the first witness. Counsel of the accused opposed.
Fiscal Grecia contends that the accused (Chavez) will only be an
ordinary witness not an state witness. Counsel of accused answer
that it will only incriminate his client. But the jugde ruled in favor of
the fiscal.
Petitioner was convicted.
ISSUE: Whether or not constitutional right of Chavez against self
incrimination had been violated to warrant writ of HC?

HELD: YES. Petitioner was forced to testify to incriminate himself, in full

breach of his constitutional right to remain silent. It cannot be said now that he
has waived his right. He did not volunteer to take the stand and in his own
defense; he did not offer himself as a witness;
To place with the circumstances of the case heretofore adverted to, make
waiver a shaky defense. It cannot stand. If, by his own admission, defendant
proved his guilt, still, his original claim remains valid. For the privilege, we say
again, is a rampart that gives protection even to the guilty
Habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ. It is traditionally considered as an
exceptional remedy to release a person whose liberty is illegally restrained
such as when the accuseds constitutional rights are disregarded. Such
defect results in the absence or loss of jurisdiction and therefore invalidates
the trial and the consequent conviction of the accused whose fundamental
right was violated. That void judgment of conviction may be challenged by
collateral attack, which precisely is the function of habeas corpus. This writ
may issue even if another remedy which is less effective may be availed of by
the defendant. Thus, failure by the accused to perfect his appeal before the
Court of Appeals does not preclude a recourse to the writ. The writ may be
granted upon a judgment already final. For, as explained in Johnson vs.
Zerbst, the writ of habeas corpus as an extraordinary remedy must be liberally
given effect so as to protect well a person whose liberty is at stake. The
propriety of the writ was given the nod in that case, involving a violation of
another constitutional right, in this wise:

A courts jurisdiction at the beginning of trial may be lost in the

course of the proceedings due to failure to complete the court
as the Sixth Amendment requires by providing Counsel for an
accused who is unable to obtain Counsel, who has not
intelligently waived this constitutional guaranty, and whose life or
liberty is at stake. If this requirement of the Sixth Amendment is
not complied with, the court no longer has jurisdiction to proceed.
The judgment of conviction pronounced by a court without
jurisdiction is void, and one imprisoned thereunder may obtain
release of habeas corpus.

 Section 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses

punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong,
shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to
bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required

Bail is the security given for the release of a person in custody of

the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, conditioned upon his
appearance before any court as required under the conditions
specified by the rule(Sec 1, rule 114).

Purpose of bail:
To relieve an accused from the rigors of imprisonment until his
conviction and yet secure his appearance at the trial (Almeda v.
Villaluz, G.R. No. L-31665, August 6, 1975);
To honor the presumption of innocence until his guilt is proven
beyond reasonable doubt;
To enable him to prepare his defense without being subject to
punishment prior to conviction.

Conditions of the Bail:

The undertaking shall be effective upon approval, and unless
cancelled, shall remain in force at all stages of the case until
promulgation of the judgment of the RTC, irrespective of whether
the case was originally filed in or appealed to it;
The accused shall appear before the proper courts whenever so
required by the court or these Rules;
The failure of the accused to appear at the trial without
justification despite due notice shall be deemed a waiver of his
right to be present thereat. In such case, the trial may proceed in
absentia;
The bondsman shall surrender the accused to court for execution
of the final judgment.

Bail as a matter of right:

Before conviction by the inferior courts
After conviction by the inferior courts
Before conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment
Before conviction by the RTC when the imposable penalty is
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment AND the evidence
of guilt is not strong.

Bail is Discretionary:
Upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, admission to bail
is discretionary (Sec. 5);

After conviction by the RTC wherein a penalty of imprisonment

exceeding 6 but not more than 20 years is imposed, and not one of
the circumstances below is present and proved, bail is a matter of
discretion (Sec.5):
a. Recidivism, quasi-recidivism or habitual delinquency or
commission of crime aggravated by the circumstances of
reiteration;
b. Previous escape from legalconfinement, evasion of
sentence or
violation of the conditions of bail without valid
justification;
c. Commission of an offense while on probation, parole or
under conditional pardon;
d. Circumstance of the accused or his case indicates the
probability of flight if released on bail;

 Undue risk of commission of another crime by the accused during

pendency of appeal.
When bail will not be granted:

Before conviction by the RTC when accused is charged with an

offense punishable by reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or
death AND the evidence of guilt is strong (Sec. 7);
After conviction by the RTC when penalty imposed is death, life
imprisonment or reclusion perpetua
After conviction by the RTC imposing a penalty of imprisonment
exceeding 6 years but not more than 20 years and any of the
circumstance enumerated above and other similar circumstance is
present and proved, no bail shall be granted (Sec.5);

Judgment is final and executory UNLESS accused applied for

probation before commencing to serve sentence of penalty and
offense within purview of probation law (Sec. 24).
5. Court martial cases

Factors to be considered in fixing the reasonable amount

of bail: (NOTEXCLUSIVE)
1. Financial ability of the accused to give bail;

2. Nature and circumstances of the offense;

3. Penalty of the offense charged;
4. Character and reputation of the accused;

5. Age and health of the accused;

6. Weight of evidence against the accused;
7. Probability of the accused appearing at the trial;

8. Forfeiture of other bail;

9. The fact that the accused was a fugitive from justice
when arrested; and
10. Pendency of other cases when the accused is on bail.

Bail is cancelled:
Upon application of the bondsmen with due notice to the
prosecutor, upon surrender of the accused or proof of his
death;

Upon acquittal of the accused;

Upon dismissal of the case; or
Execution of judgment of conviction.

Paderanga v. CA
FACTS: Miguel P. Paderanga was included in an amended information for
the crime of multiple murder as the mastermind.
Paderanga, through his counsel, filed a Motion for Admission of Bail
before a Warrant of Arrest could be issued by the lower court. Copies of
the motion were furnished to the State Prosecutor, the Regional
Prosecutors office and the Private Prosecutor.
The lower court proceeded to hear the application for bail, four of the
petitioners counsels appeared before the court but only Erlindo Abejo,
the Assistant Prosecutor of the Regional State Prosecutions Office
appeared.
Paderanga was unable to appear for the hearing due to an ailment that
needed medical attention. His counsel manifested that they were
submitting custody over the person of their client to the local chapter
president of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and that, for purposes
of said hearing, he considered being in the custody of the law.

Prosecutor Abejo, in accordance to the stand of the Regional State

prosecutor informed the court that the prosecution was neither
supporting nor opposing the application for bail, and that they were
submitting the same to the sound discretion of the court. He also waived
the presentation of evidence in the prosecutions behalf, leading to the
grant of bail with P200,000.00 as bail bond.

Later, a motion for reconsideration was filed by Henrick Guingoyon,

the State Prosecutor, who alleged that he received his copy of the
petition for admission to bail on the day after the hearing but his
motion was denied. With this, he elevated the matter to the Court of
Appeals through the special civil action of certiorari.
The Court of Appeals reasoned that Paderanga was granted bail
when was not in the custody of the law, thus not eligible for the grant
of the petition. Then, it annulled the order granting Paderanga bail.
The latter challenged the judgment of the Appellate court, hence the
case at bar.
ISSUE: Whether or not Paderangas petition for bail is admissible?

Held: YES. An arrest of the second kind exists, that is by submission

to the custody of the person making the arrest. It is enough that the
person, although not physically restrained, has surrendered himself
to the jurisdiction of the court. Other procedures in this case are
followed.

In the case, it may be conceded that Paderanga had indeed filed his
motion for admission to bail before he was actually and physically
placed under arrest. He may, however, at that point and in the factual
ambience therefore, be considered as being constructively and
legally under custody. Thus in the likewise peculiar circumstance
which attended the filing of his bail application with the trail court,
for purposes of the hearing thereof he should be deemed to have
voluntarily submitted his person to the custody of the law and,
necessarily, to the jurisdiction of the trial court which thereafter
granted bail as prayed for. In fact, an arrest is made either by actual
restraint of the arrestee or merely by his submission to the custody
of the person making the arrest. The latter mode may be exemplified
by the so-called house arrest or, in case of military offenders, by
being confined to quarters or restricted to the military camp area.

PEOPLE V. DONATO
Facts: Salas aka NPAs Ka Bilog was arrested and was charged for
rebellion. He was charged together with the spouses Concepcion.
Salas, together with his co-accused later filed a petition for the Writ
of Habeas Corpus. A conference was held thereafter to hear each
partys side. It was later agreed upon by both parties that Salas will
withdraw his petition for the Writ of Habeas Corpus and that he will
remain in custody for the continued investigation of the case and
that he will face trial. The SC then, basing on the stipulations of the
parties, held to dismiss the habeas corpus case filed by Salas. But
later on, Salas filed to be admitted for bail and Judge Donato
approved his application for bail. Judge Donato did not bother
hearing the side of the prosecution. The prosecution argued that
Salas is estopped from filing bail because he has waived his right to
bail when he withdrew his petition or habeas corpus as a sign of
agreement that he will be held in custody.

ISSUE: Whether or not Salas can still validly file for bail.

HELD: The SC ruled that Salas did waive his right to bail when he
withdrew his petition for the issuance of the Writ of Habeas Corpus.
The contention of the defense that Salas merely agreed to be in
custody and that the same does not constitute a waiver of his right to
bail is not tenable. His waiver to such right is justified by his act of
withdrawing his petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

GELACIO V. FLORES
FACTS: Juana Marzan-Gelacio filed two counts of rape against
Emmanuel Artajos before RTC, Branch 20, Vigan, Ilocos Sur, wherein
the respondent Judge Alipio Flores is the presider of the sala.
After going over the records of the case and the recommendation of the
1stAssistant Provincial Prosecutor Redentor Cardenas, the Judge
concluded that the evidence of guilt was weak but made a finding of
probable cause. Consequently he issued warrants of arrest with a
recommendation of P200,000.00 bail bond in both cases.
Gelacio through her private prosecutor filed an urgent motion to deny
bail. On a later date, the accuseds counsel filed a petition to reduce
bail bond to P100,000.00 for each case.
After a series of exchange motions by the counsels of Gelacio and
Artajos, and the Judges recalls of his previous orders, the Judge
ordered the grant of the Motion to reduce bail by the accused.
Gelacio through her counsel filed an Administrative Complaint against
the Judge for Gross Ignorance of the Law and Evident Partiality for
granting the bail without any hearing.
ISSUE: Whether or not a Judge can grant an accuseds petition for bail
without a hearing.

HELD: No. A judge cannot grant a petition for bail without a trial.
The procedural necessity of a hearing relative to the grant of bail
cannot be dispensed with especially in this case where the accused
is charged with a capital offense. Utmost diligence is required of trial
judges in granting bail especially in cases where bail is not a matter
of right. Certain procedures must be followed in order that the
accused would be present during trial. As a responsible judge,
respondent must not be swayed by the mere representations of the
parties; instead, he should look into the real and hard facts of the
case.
To do away with the requisite bail hearing especially in those cases
where the applicant is charged with a capital offense is to dispense
with this time-tested safeguard against arbitrariness. It must always
be remembered that imperative justice requires the proper
observance of indispensable technicalities precisely designed to
ensure it proper dispensation. In this regard, it needs be stressed
that the grant or the denial of bail in capital offenses hinges on the
issue of whether or not the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong
and the determination of whether or not the evidence is strong is a
matter of judicial discretion which remains with the judge.

PEOPLE VS JUDGE CABRAL

Facts: Accused-respondent Roderick Odiamar was charged with rape

upon the complaint of Cecille Buenafe. In a bid to secure temporary
liberty, accused-respondent filed a motion praying that he will be
released on bail which petitioner opposed by presenting real,
documentary and testimonial evidence. The lower court, however,
granted the motion for bail in an order. The prosecution appealed to
the court of Appeals, but the CA denied the motion for recall or
reconsideration for lack of merit.

Issue: whether or not the granting of bail is valid.

Held: No, the SC ruled that the judge exercised grave abuse of
discretion in granting the petition for bail.

There are two corollary reasons for the summary. First, the summary
of the evidence in the order is an extension of the hearing proper,
thus, a part of procedural due process wherein the evidence
presented during the prior hearing is formally recognized as having
been presented and most importantly, considered. The failure to
include every piece of evidence in the summary presented by the
prosecution in their favor during the prior hearing would be
tantamount to not giving them the opportunity to be heard in said
hearing, for the inference would be that they were not considered at
all in weighing the evidence of guilt. Such would be a denial of due
process, for due process means not only giving every contending
party the opportunity to be heard but also for the Court to consider
every piece of evidence presented in their favor. Second, the
summary of the evidence in the order is the basis for the judges
exercising his judicial discretion. Only after weighing the pieces of
evidence as contained in the summary will the judge formulate his
own conclusion as to whether the evidence of guilt against the
accused is strong based on his discretion.

Based on the above-stated reasons, the summary should

necessarily be a complete compilation or restatement of all the
pieces of evidence presented during the hearing proper. The lower
court cannot exercise judicial discretion as to what pieces of
evidence should be included in the summary. While conceding that
some prosecution evidence were enumerated, said enumeration was
incomplete. An incomplete enumeration or selective inclusion of
pieces of evidence for the prosecution in the order cannot be
considered a summary, for a summary is necessarily a reasonable
recital of any evidence presented by the prosecution. A summary
that is incomplete is not a summary at all. According to Borinaga v.
Tamin, the absence of a summary in the order would make said
order defective in form and substance. Corollarily, an order
containing an incomplete summary would likewise be defective in
form and substance which cannot be sustained or be given a
semblance of validity. In Carpio v. Maglalang, said order was
considered defective and voidable. As such, the order granting or
denying the application for bail may be invalidated.

 Jeopardy is the peril in which a person is put when he is regularly

charged with a crime before a tribunal properly organized and
competent to try him.
Double Jeopardy means that when a person is charged with an
offense and the case is terminated either by acquittal or
conviction or in any other manner without the express consent of
the accused, the latter cannot again be charged with the same or
identical offense.

Kinds of Double Jeopardy:

No person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the SAME OFFENSE.

The same offense; or

An attempt to commit the said offense;
A frustration of the said offense; or
Any offense which necessarily includes the first offense
charged.
Any offense which necessarily included the first offense
charged.
When an act punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or
acquittal under either shall be a bar to another prosecution for the
SAME ACT.(Sec. 21, Art. III, 1987 Constitution)

Requisites for Double Jeopardy:

A previous case must be filed and must contain the following:

The complaint or information or other formal charge was sufficient in

form and substance to sustain a conviction and
the competent court had jurisdiction;
The accused had been arraigned and the accused had entered a valid
plea; and
There was a final judgment of conviction or acquitted or the case was
dismissed without his express consent;

Tests for determining whether the two offenses are identical:

There is IDENTITY between two offenses when the second offense:
Is exactly the same as the first;

Is an attempt to or frustration of the first;

Is necessarily included in the first; or
Necessarily includes the first and is necessarily included in the
offense charged in the first information.

Doctrine of Supervening Event

The accused may be prosecuted for another offense if a
subsequent development changes the character of the first
indictment under which he may be already been charge or
convicted.
The graver offense developed due to supervening facts arising
from the same act or omission constituting the former charge;
The facts constituting the graver charge became known or
were discovered only after a plea was entered in the former
complaint or information;
The plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the
consent of the prosecutor and of the offended party; except
when the offended party failed to appear during the
arraignment.

INSEPERABILITY OF OFFENSES
where one offense is inseparable from another and
proceeds from the same act, they cannot be the
subject of separate prosecutions.