Prepared by EDGARDO E.

DAGDAG
Professor and Assistant to the Dean
for Academic Affairs, Asian Center, UP Diliman

Clinton and Bush (41)

strategy toward Asia
Bush (43) strategy toward
Asia
Obama pivot to Asia

East Asia Strategy Report of the DoD 1990, 1992, 1995, 1997 (Clinton
and Bush Administration Security Policy)

COMMON STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES (Bush and

Clinton)

Prevent rise of regional hegemony

Maintain strong forward presence to deter conflict in
Korea and preserve regional stability.
Ensure a level playing field regarding access to
markets of Asia.
Maintain freedom of navigation.
Halt the proliferation of nuclear weapons
Promote liberal democracy.

The United States is an "Asian power; it had vital

interests in the region.
The key to US strategy is its bilateral alliances in the
region (south Korea, Japan, Phil, Thailand).
Preventing the rise of a regional hegemon is a
fundamental strategic principle of the US.
The US military presence provides regional stability, and
that regional stability is the sine qua non for economic
development.
The US is committed to deterring a North Korean invasion
of South Korea.
The US is willing to use the threat of military force to
prevent Taiwan from being coerced or intimidated by
China.
The US is committed to fostering liberal democracy,
freedom of the seas and free trade.

The Clinton administration was ambivalent over whether

Japan or China was more important.
The Clinton administration was too timid or too
ambivalent about encouraging Japan to become more
involved in security issues in East Asia.
The Clinton administration was unconcerned about the
security implications of the rise of China and the
potential threat that a modernizing PLA posed to Taiwan
in the mid-term and to US interests in the longer term.
The Clinton administration was too anxious to engage
North Korea, and too willing to be manipulated by
Pyongyang with very little to show for years of dialogues
other than a flawed "Agreed Framework

During the campaign, Bush characterized China

as a "strategic competitor; on the other hand,
Clinton regarded China as a "strategic partner.
The White House characterized the US-China
relations "candid, constructive and
cooperative." (The Chinese only use
constructive and cooperative.)
Bush supported the entry of China in WTO in
Sept. 2001

During Clinton's eight years, the US govt

aggressively sought military-to-military engagement
with Beijing. The DoD was proactive.
In 1998, President Clinton publicly affirmed the so
called Three (3) nos Policy: (1) No support for
Taiwan's independence,(2) No support for two
Chinas, One China, One Taiwan and (3) no
support for Taiwans membership in international
organization that require statehood.
President Bush introduced "strategic clarity"
regarding US intentions should China make an
unprovoked attack on Taiwan, by stating that "the
US would do whatever it took" should Beijing attack.

Taiwan is critical for the continued credibility of the US

strategic commitments towards East Asia.
The US is benefitting from Taiwans economic
achievements; in 2007 Taiwan is the US ninth largest
trade partner with nearly $65 billion in bilateral trade.
Many in the US believes that how China handles Taiwan
will be an important measure of how the US and the world
will manage the challenges of a rising China.
Taiwans evolution from a one party authoritarian state to
a multiparty democracy and open society over the past
20 years has also added critical new component to US
interest.
Chinas Rise, Challenges and Opportunities, Bersten C.
Et.al, 2008.

The 2000 Armitage Report on Security Policy

toward Japan
Reaffirming and reassuring Japan that the U.S.
really values its bilateral alliance with her.
America's most important Asian relationship is
with Tokyo not Beijing.
The US quietly encourages Japan to move away
from the prohibition on collective self-defense.
This has taken new momentum in the wake of
9/11. In other words, the US encourages Japan
to be a more active alliance partner.
9

In March 2001, ROK President Kim Dae Jung

insisted on visiting Washington very early in the
Administration to ensure that Bush will continue
Clintons policy of engagement with North Korea.
This turned out to be a really bad decision. First
Kim Dae Jung came off as lecturing the White
House on Nokor. And second, no one either in
Seoul or in the Bush Administration appreciated
President Bush's personal antipathy toward
Nokor(KJI is not fit to lead his country; he is
willing to let his people starve, Nokor one of
the axis of evil countries, etc.)

10

For Clinton, the US has deterred NK's

conventional forces for 50 years; there is no
rush to solve this. First things first, focus on
WMD.
The Bush Administration has been more
outspoken about this "Axis of Evil" state, and
would be pleased if it collapsed tomorrow.
The big difference: US under Bush is not
willing to talk directly with North Korea to
achieve its disarmament objectives.

(Reuters)
Reuters) -- Former
Former U.S.
U.S. President
President Bill
Bill Clinton
Clinton

made
made a
a surprise
surprise visit
visit toNorth
toNorth Koreaand
Koreaand met
met
its
its reclusive
reclusive leader
leader on
on Tuesday
Tuesday to
to try
try to
to win
win
freedom
freedom for
for two
two jailed
jailed American
American journalists
journalists in
in a
a
11
move
move that
that could
could re-energize
re-energize nuclear
nuclear talks.
talks.

The eradication of terrorism is an important

policy objective of Pres Bush.
Bush declared the US withdrawal from the Kyoto
Protocol on Global Warming.
He showed a negative attitude towards
negotiations on the Protocol for the Biological
Conventions on the Prohibition on Biological
weapons.
He showed a marked reluctance towards ratifying
the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.
US withdrew from the treaty on Anti-Ballistic
Missiles Systems

12

The US military forces in the region are engaged

in the global war on terrorism, and Southeast
Asia is a major theatre in this conflict.
Southeast Asia has the highest strategic profile
among US strategic planners of any time since
the end of the Vietnam War because of the large
Islamic populations in the Philippines, Indonesia,
Malaysia and Thailand, and because Singapore
has been such a strong ally in this fight. More
than half of the Southeast Asian population are
Muslims and are perceived to be critical of the
US GWOT.

13

1. Japan is the USs most important strategic

partner in Asia.
2. China is a strategic competitor.
3. The US should be clearer in its support of Taiwan.
4. The US should have a tougher policy toward
North Korea.
5. There is uncertainty in Northeast Asia and
Southeast Asia that requires attention, especially
Indonesia.
Michael Muchizuki, US Foreign Policy Towards East
AsiaProfessor, George Washington University,2001

14

1. There is a perception that because of its global war on

terrorism and its military involvement in Iraq and
Afghanistan, the US has abandoned or did not give much
importance to Southeast Asia. It did not accede to the
ASEANs Treaty of Amity and Cooperation for Southeast
Asia, (TACSEA); and it has been noticeably absent in a
number of ARF meetings.
2. The US GWOT has antagonized the Muslim population in
Southeast Asia.
3. Because of the so-called US abandonment, there was
a resulting vacuum and this gave China and the ASEAN
countries the opportunity to forge closer links.

15

US PRESENCE: It plays a key role in preserving peace in

Asia.
US-JAPAN ALLIANCE : This plays a vital role in helping the
US maintain regional security.
SOUTH KOREA: There is a need not only to reaffirm the
alliance but also to enlarge its focus on issues beyond
those specifically tied to security on the Peninsulas.
NORTH KOREA: The US shall maintain the goal of
achieving complete and verifiable elimination of North
Koreas nuclear weapon program.
CHINA: There is a need for the US to monitor Chinas
growing military capabilities and to press its leadership
to end its support for authoritarian regimes like those in
Burma, Sudan, Iran and Zimbabwe.

16

Highlights of Obamas policy in East Asia

- Re-affirming solidarity with regional allies
- Reaching out to new regional powers ( such as Indonesia
and India)
- Continuing a policy of engagement with China.
- New approach to free trade: Example; put punitive tariffs on
Chinese automobile and light truck tires; pursue American
accession to ASEANs Treaty of Amity Cooperation (TAC)
- Returning to East Asia
- Downsizing the US GWOT by withdrawing from conflict
areas like Iraq and Afghanistan

17

Obamas pledge to re-engage with the

region has been met - - the first head of
State to visit the White House was PM Taro
Aso of Japan (February 24, 2009)
In Feb 2009, Sec. Of State Hilary Clinton
had her first overseas trip to Japan,
Indonesia, South Korea and China; in July
2009, she visited Thailand and India when
she attended the ASEAN Regional Forum.

18

East Asia has taken on growingThree

economic
importance
(3) Policy
as a major US trade partner
Goals of US:
East Asia presents security problems as well: (a)
1.Promotion of Economic
nuclear proliferation, (b) unresolved territorial issues,
growth within the
and (c) growing tensions over energy and natural
region.
resources
2. and
Structuring
stable
Emerging states like China
India can not
be
Security
ignored.
Source: East Asian Strategic
3. Expansion
Review 2011,
ofThe United
States: The Obama Administration
Facingand
Its second
Democracy
protection of human
Year of Challenges.

rights.

19

1. The US will deepen its alliance with Japan, ROK, Australia,

Thailand and the Philippines
2. It will strengthen its ties with emerging states such as
India and China as well as with Southeast Asian countries
like Indonesia, Vietnam and Singapore.
3. It will view the ASEAN, ARF and EAS as important regional
frameworks regarding security affairs (a role that APEC
performs regarding economic affairs) and it will actively
strengthen its engagement with each of these forums.
4. The Obama administration will seek to combine the
maintenance and enhancement of its relations with allies
and partners with building stable relations with the
emerging states and positive participation in regional
forums.

20

US JAPAN ALLIANCE
The year 2010 marked the 50th year of the
US-Japan Security Treaty; The Obama
administration views the alliance as the
cornerstone of its strategic relations with
East Asia.
The Obama administration has sought to
strengthen the relationship by emphasizing
close bilateral ties with the Naoto Kan
administration to deal with the regional and
global security issues.

Japanese
Japanese Prime
Prime Minister
Minister Naoto
Naoto Kan
Kan bows
bows after
after giving
giving a
a
speech
speech at
at the
the Democratic
Democratic Party
Party of
of Japan
Japan lawmakers'
lawmakers'
meeting
meeting in
in Tokyo
Tokyo Friday,
Friday, Aug.
Aug. 26,
26, 2011.
2011. Kan
Kan announced
announced he
he
was
resigning
after
almost
15
months
in
office.
21
was resigning after almost 15 months in office.

The US-Japan Roadmap for Realignment

Implementation

Reaffirming that the Roadmap emphasizes the

importance of force reductions and relocation to
Guam in relation to the realignment on Okinawa
and stipulates that approximately 8,000 III Marine
Expeditionary Force personnel and their
approximately 9,000 dependents will relocate
from Okinawa to Guam by 2014, in a manner that
maintains unit integrity, and recognizing that
such relocation will realize consolidation and land
returns south of Kadena.
Regarding the relocation of Marine Corps Air
Station (MCAS) Funtenma, the US and Japan
agreed to make efforts both towards relocation of
the air base within Okinawa Prefecture and
towards a reduction in the economic burden of
maintaining the base in Okinawa.
22

On territorial dispute

Regarding the 7 September incident in which a

Chinese fishing boat rammed into a patrol vessel of
the Japan Coast Guard in Japanese Territorial water
near the Senkaku islands, Secretary Clinton made
clear the US position that Article 5 of the Japan USDefence Treaty also applies to these islands during
the JAPAN-US foreign ministerial meeting held in 23
September.

23

2010 marked the 60th anniversary of the outbreak

of the Korean War. The Obama administration
ranked the US-ROK alliance alongside with the USJapan alliance as central to peace and stability in
the Asia Pacific region.

Source: Reuters
http://www.reuters.com/article/slideshow?articleId=USTRE6AM0YS20101123
&slide=1#a=11

24

US AND ROK
President Obama met on June 26, 2010, with ROK
President Lee Myung-bak and the two presidents agreed
that the transition of wartime operational control on the
Korean Peninsula, which during the term of former
President Roh was originally scheduled for April 2012,
would be extended to December 2015.
Strategic Alliance of 2015 would serve as
implementation for this transition of wartime operational
control, consolidation of U.S. bases into two hubs, tour
normalization, and management of U.S.forces in Korea
within broader, world-wide mission requirements.
The OPCON transition plan envisions South Korea as
taking the lead in defense against North Korea as well as
in other operational plan requirements
Source: Center for US-Korea Policy, A project of The Asia Foundation,
25
September 2010.

The US and the ROK continue to seek concrete

measures to the complex, verifiable, and
irreversible dismantlement of North Koreas
nuclear program.
The consultative meeting gave its full support to
the ROK position that the March 26 sinking of the
ROK patrol vessel Cheonan was caused by the
underwater detonation of a North Korea Torpedo;
in response to the sinking, the US and the ROK
conducted large-scale antisubmarine exercises in
July and September.

26

Before the meeting, Sec of State Hilary

Clinton and Secretary of Defence Gates also
visited the Demilitarized Zone, along with
ROK Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade YuMyung-hwan and Defence Minister Kim Taeoung to display the resolute US-ROK alliance
against North Korea.

27

The Obama administration is continuing to seek

to build a positive, cooperative and
comprehensive relationship.
President Obamas November 2009 visit to
China was marked by a mood of cooperation.
However, with the start of 2010, friction clearly
began to appear in the bilateral relationship as
a result of US arms sales to Taiwan, Googles
decision to withdraw from China in reaction to
Chinese censorship, and issues relating to the
actual value of the Chinese renminbi.
28

US AND CHINA

Amidst such circumstances, Hu Jintao attended the April

Nuclear Security Summit convened by President Obama.
In May, a US delegation of some 200 members, including
Secretary Clinton and Secretary of the Treasury Timothy
Geithner, visited Beijing and
took part in a US-China
Security and Economic Dialogue, the second such dialogue
following talks held at the end of July 2009 in Washington.
In addition President Hu was invited to Washington for USChina Summit talks on January 19, 2011, where the leaders
displayed a common understanding of the importance of
broadening and deepening the two states cooperative
relationship in a wide range of areas including economics and
security

29

The US has been giving attention to the Chinese military

growing capabilities regarding anti-access and area denial as
well as in space and cyberspace.
The US also is increasingly wary regarding remaining territorial
conflicts in the South China Seas and higher levels of activity on
the part of the Chinese military.
Secretary of State Clinton attending the ARF Meeting in Hanoi
Vietnam last July 23, stated that the US has national interest in
freedom of navigation, open access to Asias maritime
commons, and respect for international law in the South China
Sea, and she indicated that the US would contribute positively
toward peaceful resolution of territorial conflicts.
US-China military to military relationships, which had seen
considerable development in 2009, were cut off as part of the
Chinese reaction to the January 2010 US decision to sell arm
sales to Taiwan.
30

Secretary Gates attended the expanded ASEAN conference of defense

ministers (the ADMM-Plus Meeting) in early October 2010 where he met
with Chinese Minister of National Defense Liang Guanglie and reached
an agreement to normalize military exchanges.
After the agreement meeting of US and Chinese naval officials
responsible for ensuring safety was held in Hawaii on October 17 2010
under the Military Maritine Consultative Agreement (MMCA) exchanges
with China as a means of improving mutual understanding between the
two militaries and encouraging an accurate communication of ideas and
In January 2011 Secretary gates was able to visit China.
At the Asian Security Summit (the Shangrila Dialogue) in Singapore in
early June 2011, Secretary of Defense Gates responded by stressing the
importance of stable, on going military exchanges which were not
influenced by the political relations between the US and China and he
strongly urged China to resume the exchanges at any rate.

31

The dominant function of the USJapan alliance

has always been to sustain the US military
presence for the American regional and global
strategies.
The primary role of the USSouth Korea alliance
has been to defend South Korea against the
threat from North Korea.
The USChina relationship is a typical case of
strategic coexistence between great powers,
which is in essence competitive but will remain
cooperative in the foreseeable future out of
necessity
32

. US Deputy Sec. Of State James Steinberg:

- There are rising powers in Asia India and
China.
- There are allies like South Korea and Japan
that are seeking more normal status in the
international scene.
- There are countries in Asia trying to make
their way in a world that presents immense
opportunities, as well as problem.
- The US can not and should not ignore the
aspirations of these countries and the other
East Asian countries.
33

With the continuing rise of China, there is a

shift of global power to East Asia that makes
the US role in the region the subject of
continuing debate among regional states (even
among its traditional allies). The economic
woes currently faced by the US is also one
reason why regional states in East Asia are
looking for alternative security options.
US allies and friends need continuing
reassurance of support from the US
considering its long history of unilateralism.

34

How important is East Asia toward America?

How important is South East Asia in
American strategy in East Asia?
Do you think China is strategic competitor
or strategic partner to America?
What did Obama change in American policy
toward Asia? Why?
How do you predict American strategy
toward Asia in future?

35