Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
This presentation is intended for use in higher education for instructional purposes only, and is not for
application in practice. Permission is granted to classroom instructors to photocopy this document for
classroom teaching purposes only. All other rights are reserved. Copyright 2003 by the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Inc., New York, New York.
Year 1
Year 3
Year 5
Year 7
Year 9
$600K
$4 million
$80 million
$600 million
$2.6 billion
$100
90
$ 10
1
$ 9
100%
90%
10%
Bank
$7 million fraud
$2 billion drop in
stock value
Fraud Internationally
Transparency Intl
1. Denmark
2. Finland
3. Sweden
4. New Zealand
5.Iceland
6. Canada
7. Singapore
8. Netherlands, Norway
16.
17.
25.
29.
43.
52.
81.
84.
85.
Hong Kong
United States
Austria
Japan
Taiwan
South Korea
China
Nigeria
Paraguay
Cameroon
Types of Fraud
Fraudulent Financial
Statements
Employee Fraud
Vendor Fraud
Customer Fraud
Investment Scams
Bankruptcy Frauds
Miscellaneous Frauds
2003 by the AICPA
Company
1. WorldCom
2. Enron
3. Texaco
4. Financial Corp of America
5. Global Crossing
6. Adelphia
7. PG&E
8. MCorp
9. Kmart
10. NTL
2003 by the AICPA
April, 1987
Sept., 1988
$25.5
$24.4
Jan., 2002
June, 2002
$21.5
$20.2
April, 2001
March, 1989
$17.0
$16.8
Jan., 2002
May, 2002
Moral Decay
Attendees at the April, 1998 Business Week Forum of Chief Financial Officers
revealed:
67% of CFOs said they had been asked by senior company executives to
misrepresent corporate financial results
12% of CFOs admitted they had actually misrepresented financial results
55% said they had fought off requests to cook the books
Honesty studies
1961: 12%
1986: 31%
2002: ???
Modeling & Labeling
More dishonest modeling (examples)
Less labeling (teaching & training)(10 hrs. per week less time)
Executive Incentives
Meeting Wall Streets Expectations
Stock prices are tied to meeting Wall Streets earnings
forecasts
Focus is on short-term performance only
Companies are heavily punished for not meeting
forecasts
Executives have been endowed with hundreds of
millions of dollars worth of stock optionsfar exceeds
compensation (tied to stock price)
Performance is based on earnings & stock price
2003 by the AICPA
Firm B
Auditorsthe CPAs
Failed to accept responsibility for fraud detection (SEC,
Supreme Court, public expects them to detect fraud) If
auditors arent the watchdogs, then who is?
Became greedy--$500,000 per year per partner
compensation wasnt enough; saw everyone else getting
rich
Audit became a loss leader
Easier to sell lucrative consulting services from the inside
Became largest consulting firms in the U.S. very quickly
(Andersen Consulting grew to compete with Accenture)
Educators
Havent taught ethics enough (cant
make up own rules to meet own needs
Need to teach students about fraudneed
a fraud course
Need to teach students how to think
We have taught them how to copy, not think
We have asked them to memorize, not think
We have done what is easiest for us and
easiest for our students
2003 by the AICPA
xxx
xxx
Accounts Involved
Fraud Schemes
1. Estimate all
uncollectible
accounts receivable
2. Sell goods and/or
services to
customers
3. Accept returned
goods from
customers
Sales returns,
accounts receivable
4. Write off
receivables as
uncollectible
Allowance for
doubtful accounts,
accounts receivable
Cash, accounts
receivable
Overstating Inventory
The second most common way to commit
financial statement fraud is to overstate
inventory.
Beginning Inventory
Purchases
Goods Available for sale
Ending Inventory
Cost of Goods Sold
Income
2003 by the AICPA
OK
OK
OK
High
Low
High
Disclosure Frauds
Three Categories of Disclosure Frauds:
1. Overall misrepresentations about the nature of the
company or its products, usually made through news
reports, interviews, annual reports, and elsewhere
2. Misrepresentations in the management discussions and
other non-financial statement sections of annual reports,
10-Ks, 10-Qs, and other reports
3. Misrepresentations in the footnotes to the financial
statements
2. Relationships
With Others
Detecting Financial
Statement Fraud
3. Organization & Industry
2003 by the AICPA
Enron Fraud
Compared to other financial statement frauds, Enron
was a very complicated fraud. (WorldCom, for example,
was a $7 billion fraud that involved simply capitalizing
expenses (line costs) that should have been expensed
(Accounting 200 topic.) Enron involved many complex
transactions and accounting issues.
What we are looking at here is an example of superbly
complex financial reports. They didnt have to lie. All
they had to do was to obfuscate it with sheer complexity
although they probably lied too.
Senator John Dingell
2003 by the AICPA
Enrons History
In 1985 after federal deregulation of natural gas pipelines,
Enron was born from the merger of Houston Natural Gas
and InterNorth, a Nebraska pipeline company.
Enron incurred massive debt and no longer had exclusive
rights to its pipelines.
Needed new and innovative business strategy
Kenneth Lay, CEO, hired McKinsey & Company to assist
in developing business strategy. They assigned a young
consultant named Jeffrey Skilling.
His background was in banking and asset and liability
management.
His recommendation: that Enron create a Gas Bankto
buy and sell gas
2003 by the AICPA
Enrons History
Created Energy derivative
Lay created a new division in 1990 called Enron Finance
Corp. and hired Skilling to run it
Enron soon had more contracts than any of its competitors
and, with market dominance, could predict future prices
with great accuracy, thereby guaranteeing superior profits.
Skilling began hiring the best and brightest traders and
rewarded them handsomelythey were allowed to eat
what they killed
Fastow was a Kellogg MBA hired by Skilling in 1990
Became CFO in 1998
Started Enron Online Trading in late 90s
Created Performance Review Committee (PRC) that
became known as the harshest employee ranking system
in the country---based on earnings generated, creating
fierce internal competition
2003 by the AICPA
The Motivation
Enron delivered smoothly growing earnings (but not cash flows.) Wall
Street took Enron on its word but didnt understand its financial
statements.
It was all about the price of the stock. Enron was a trading company
and Wall Street normally doesnt reward volatile earnings of trading
companies. (Goldman Sacks is a trading company. Its stock price
was 20 times earnings while Enrons was 70 times earnings.)
In its last 5 years, Enron reported 20 straight quarters of increasing
income.
Enron, that had once made its money from hard assets like pipelines,
Enrons Arrogance
Those whom the Gods would destroy they first make
proud.
Enrons banner in lobby: Changed from The Worlds
Leading Energy Company to THE WORLDS LEADING
COMPANY
Older, stodgier companies will topple over from their own
weight
Skilling
Conference of Utility Executives in 2000: Were going to
eat your lunch.Jeff Skilling
2003 by the AICPA
Notable Events
Jeff Skilling left in Augustgave no reason for his
departure.
By mid-August 2001, the stock price began falling
Former CEO, Kenneth Lay, came back in August
Oct. 16announced $618 million loss but not that it had
written down equity by $1.2 billion
OctoberMoodys downgraded Enrons debt
Nov. 8Told investors they were restating earnings for
the past 4 and years
Dec. 2Filed bankruptcy
Revenues
Income
1997
$20.2 B
$105 M
Income
(Restated)*
$9 M
1998
$31.2 B
$703 M
$590 M
1999
$40.1 B
$893 M
$643 M
2000
$100.1 B
$979 M
$827 M
* Without LJM1, LJM2, Chewco and the Four Raptors partnerships. There
were hundreds of partnershipsmainly used to hide debt.
2003 by the AICPA
(Enrons principal method of financial statement fraud involved the use of SPEs
(Special Purpose Entities))
in Central Asia)
Investors wanted risk and reward exposure limited to the
pipeline, not overall risks and rewards of the associated
company
Pipeline to be self-supported, independent entity with no
fear company would take over
SPE limited by its charter to those permitted activities only
Really a joint venture between sponsoring company and a
group of outside investors
Cash flows from the SPE operations are used to pay
investors
2003 by the AICPA
Mark-to-Market Accounting
Marketable securities, derivatives and financial contracts are
million
In 1993, Enron and the California Public
Employees Retirement System (Calpers) formed
a 50/50 partnershipJoint Energy Development
Investments Limited (JEDI)
In 1997, Enron bought out Calpers interest in
JEDI
Half of the $11.4 million that bought the 3%
involved cash collateral provided by Enron
meaning only 1 and percent was owned by
outsiders
2003 by the AICPA
LJM1 SPE
Responsible for 20% of SPE restatement or
$100 million
Should have been consolidatedan error in
judgment by Andersen (per Andersen)
After Andersens initial review in 1999, Enron
created a subsidiary within LJM1, referred to as
Swap Sub. As a result, the 3% rule for residual
equity was no longer met.
Andersen was reviewing this transaction again at
the time problems were made publicinvolved
complex issues concerning the valuation of
various assets and liabilities.
2003 by the AICPA
Fastows Explanation of
Partnerships (SPEs)
The partnerships were used for
Enrons Disclosures
SEC Regulation S-K requires description of
Enrons FootnotesDisclosures of
Enron Partnership
Report
8/14/2000
11/14/2000
5/15/2001
8/14/2001
11/19/2001
Footnote
Negative Cash Flows: 1st three quarters in 1999, 1st three quarters in 2000,
1st two quarters in 2001.
2003 by the AICPA
Role of Andersen
Was paid $52 million in 2000, the majority of which was for non-audit
No