GRID FAILURE:

A PERSPECTIVE AS A POWER PRODUCER

Team from Kudgi Super Thermal Power Project

SANTOSH KUMAR V, Dy Manager
RACHANA KAMATH M, Asst Manager
ARUN A THOMAS, Asst Manager

PRESENTATION OUTLINE

EXISTING POWER NETWORK

Five Regional grids namely
Northern Grid
Western Grid
Eastern Grid
North Eastern Grid
Southern Grid

GRID LOCKOUT
TheJuly 2012 India blackoutwas thelargest power outage in
history, occurring as two separate events on 30 and 31 July
2012.
32GW OF
GENERATION
TAKEN
OFFLINE

9% OF
WORLD
POPULATION

620
MILLION
PEOPLE

1/2 OF
INDIAS
POPULATIO
N

NTPC Ltd. Suffered a loss of 38% of its genera

capacity.

Fig: Affected regions during the grid failure

INITIATION OF THE GRID DISTURBANCE

The NEW grid was operating in an insecure condition due
to a large number of line outages particularly near the
WR-NR interface.
On this day also, effectively 400 kV Bina-Gwalior-Agra
(one circuit) was the only main circuit available between
WR-NR.

CONDITION BEFORE GRID FAILURE

The details of the generation-demand and power
export/import scenario in the four regions of the NEW
grid on 31.07.2012 are given below.

The over withdrawal by NR utilities, utilizing Unscheduled

Interchange (UI), contributed to high loading on this tie
line.

1000MW

Since the interregional interface was very weak, tripping of

400 kV Bina-Gwalior line on protection of distance relay
caused the NR system to separate from the WR.
This happened due to load encroachment (high loading of line
resulting in high line current and low bus voltage).

On 30th , as NR system got separated, it collapsed due to

internal power swings. However on 31st , the disturbance
affected the eastern and the north-eastern region.

After NR got separated from the WR

due to tripping of 400 kV BinaGwalior line, the NR loads were met
through WR-ER-NR route, which
caused power swings in the system.

Subsequently, all the three grids, NR,ER and NER

collapsed due to multiple tripping attributed to the
internal power swings, under frequency and overvoltage
at different places.

POWER SWINGS
The rotors of synchronous machines inter-connected by AC
lines tend to run at the same electrical speed in steady state.
Under small disturbances, restorative torques bring back the
machines to synchronism .
For large disturbances (e.g faults, loss of critical transmission
links), the electrical torques may be unable to bring all the
generators to the same electrical speed.
This causes large variations in voltage and power flow
in lines.

CASCADING FAILURE
Cascading failure is common inpower gridswhen one of
the elements fails and shifts its load to nearby elements in
the system.

Those nearby elements are then pushed beyond their

capacity so they become overloaded and shift their load onto
other elements.
It is the power swings that cause these cascading failure.

DOMINO EFFECT

COULD THE GRID HAVE BEEN SAVED?

Better coordinated planning of outages of state and regional
networks, specifically under depleted condition of the interregional power transfer corridors.
Under-frequency and df/dt based load shedding relief in the
utilities networks.
Better regulation to limit overdrawal/underdrawal under UI
mechanism, specifically under insecure operation of the system.
Frequency
services.

Control

through

Generation

reserves/Ancillary

FACTORS THAT CAN HELP TO IMPROVE GRID STABILITY

( In the perspective as a power producer)

PRIMARY RESPONSE FROM GENERATOR

Primary control involves the action of turbine speed
governors in generating units, which will respond when the
speed (frequency) deviates as a result of an imbalance
between generation and demand.

Free Governor Mode of Operation, (For short FGMO) is a

defense mechanism against grid disturbances and is a
standard practice worldwide.
In FGMO, there is no dead band.

Inadequate governor action in Grid Disturbances on 30th

and 31st July 2012.

The sudden rise in frequency, close to 50.5 Hz in the

WR, indicates inadequate primary response from
generating stations.

The provision for putting all generating units on free

governor action has been part of Indian Electricity Grid
Code (IEGC) for several years.
This was not getting implemented as generators pointed out
few difficulties including wide frequency fluctuations and
various commercial issues.
Many difficulties have also been addressed in the new IEGC
issued in April 2010 by providing for restricting the governor
action in such zone.
Though impediments in implementation of governor action
have been removed, there is still inadequate governor action
in Grid Disturbances on 30th and 31st July 2012.

FORMATION OF ISLANDS
The two system protections include Automatic under frequency
load shedding
System and islanding scheme.
Islanding scheme protection is really a system
protection of last resort.
The islanding scheme
sectionalizes the whole system
into sustainable small systems.

To maintain essential services and quick restoration.

Some of the generators which survived in NR due to

islanding or on house load were NAPP, BTPS , Dadri Gas,
Faridabad Gas.
The chances of survival of electrical islands would be
abysmally low if generating units included in these islands are
not on governor action.

A CASE IN POINT :

Badarpur TPS survived and operated in Island mode till

06:58 hours on 30.7.2012 when the Island collapsed.
The operation in an island mode could had been
continued had all the other generators been operating on
free-governor action.
Consequently, Faridabad GPS tripped at 0658 hours with
the collapse of Badarpur island.

POWER SYSTEM STABILIZER

Generating units are equipped with Power System

Stabilizers (PSS), which can save the grid from several
potential destabilizing conditions.
However no evidence of stabilizer action was found
in Grid Disturbances on 30th and 31st July 2012.
Power grid disturbances cause big oscillations in active and
reactive power, low voltage and voltage instability.

Ex. When a generation unit trips, the required electrical

power from the remaining generators increases.
The energy furnished by the rotor decreases, which will
cause oscillations in rotor angle and can result in severe
power flow swings.

Suitably tuned Power System Stabilizers (PSS), will

introduce a component of electrical torque in phase with
generator rotor speed deviations.
This
results in damping of low frequency power
oscillations in which the generators are participating.
Ensure proper coordination with POSOCO to ensure that
exercise of PSS tuning is planned and implemented.
Settings of these dynamic stabilizing devices should be
reviewed at appropriate intervals.

RESTORATION OF THERMAL POWER PLANTS

The black start procedure has already been prepared by

RLDCs and is available with all utilities.
During the recent grid disturbances it has been observed that
substantially longer time has been taken by certain generating
stations to come on bars.
In case of some units LP diaphragms had burst during the
occurrence, for which additional time was taken to
rectify/replace the diaphragms.

MOCK EXCERCISES

Since the present grid failure occurred after almost a decade, the
preparedness and response was perhaps not up to the level
expected.
More frequent need of having periodic mock exercises to ensure
preparedness of all stakeholders involved as actual grid
disturbances needs emphasis.

CONCLUSION
The grid failure of 2012 has served as a social epiphany about
the problems associated with the Indian electricity grid. As
pointed out before, We as a power generator can contribute to
the strengthening of our grid by
Ensuring IEGC guidelines are followed
Coordinate with agencies for implementation of
islanding schemes for all our stations
Ensure the operation of the PSS
Develop procedures by which quick restoration of power
plants is possible
Being a rare occurrence, ensure the level of
preparedness and response by mock drills or other ways.

Then, why not think about having a policy

to ensure grid discipline? The time is ripe
to have a comprehensive policy entailing
all the processes and systems that NTPC
is conforming to, so as to support the
cause of grid discipline.