PRE-BAR REVIEW LECTURE

LAND TITLES AND DEEDS

POWERHAUS LAW REVIEW CENTER

ATTY. RONEY JONE P. GANDEZA

Professor of Law
University of the Cordilleras
Gov. Pack Road, Baguio City 2600

CONCEPT OF THE TORRENS

SYSTEM OF LAND REGISTRATION
The Torrens system of land registration
does not create or vest title to land. It
merely confirms and records title which
are already existing and vested.
It is not intended as a mode of acquiring
ownership. It is intended merely to confirm
and register the title which one may
already have on the land.
If the applicant possesses no title or
ownership over the land, he cannot acquire
one under the Torrens system.

PURPOSE OF THE TORRENS

SYSTEM OF LAND REGISTRATION
The real purpose of the Torrens system of
land registration is to quiet title to land, to
put a stop forever to any question as to the
legality of the registration in the certificate or
those which may arise subsequent thereto.
Once a certificate of title is registered, the
owner of the land might rest secure, without
the necessity of waiting in the portals of the
court, or sitting in the mirador de su casa, to
avoid the possibility of losing his land.

BASIC LAWS GOVERNING LAND

REGISTRATION IN THE PHILIPPINES

CADASTRAL ACT (ACT NO. 2259)

became a law on February 11, 1913.

The law was enacted primarily to put some

pressure on landowners to bring their
unregistered lands within the operation of the
Torrens system.
The proceedings under this law is also judicial,
but compulsory with respect to landowners
whose holdings are affected by the cadastral
survey.

IN WHAT WAY IS LAND REGISTRATION UNDER

THE CADASTRAL ACT COMPULSORY?
Unlike in the case of an ordinary land registration
proceeding under the Land Registration Act where
the owners may apply for registration of their titles
to property whenever they find it convenient, under
the Cadastral Act, the government initiates the
cadastral survey, following by a cadastral
proceeding in court for the settlement and
adjudication of the property involved.
Here the government files the petition for the
registration of the lands affected by the cadastral
survey, while the private claimants file their answers
to assert their claims or lose them if they should fail.

PUBLIC LAND ACT (C.A. 141)

the law took effect on December 1, 1936.

this law was intended to bring lands which are to

be segregated from the mass of public lands within
the operation of the Torrens system.
under this law, land registration proceeding may
either be judicial or administrative.
it is judicial when it involves the confirmation of
imperfect and incomplete titles (Secs. 48 and 51).

it is administrative when it involves certain

concessions such as homestead patent, a sales
patent, a lease patent or a free patent.

PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE

(P.D. No. 1529)
law took effect on June 11, 1978.
codified the various laws relative to registration
of property.
covers both ordinary and cadastral registration
proceedings; it supersedes Act No. 496 (Land
Registration Act) and Act 2259 (Cadastral Act).
Section 48(b), CA No. 141, The Public Land Act
still governs the procedure for the judicial
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles
over public lands.

MODES OF BRINGING LANDS

UNDER THE TORRENS SYSTEM
BY JUDICIAL PROCEEDING WHICH MAY BE:
VOLUNTARY/ORDINARY: At the landowners initiative
and expense under the following laws:
Act 496 (now Sections 14-34, PD No. 1529)
Sec. 48, CA No. 141, as amended by RA 6940.
COMPULSORY: At the instance of the government,
through the Director of Lands, under the following
rules:
Act No. 2259 (now Sections 35-38, PD No. 1529)
Sec. 53, CA No. 141, as amended.

BY ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING:
This mode does not require judicial intervention
and is compulsory with respect to:
Public land patents granted by the government
under CA 141. Section 103, PD 1529 provides
that upon the registration of the patent in the
Registry of Deeds, the land shall be deemed
registered for all intents and purposes.
Agrarian reform lands transferred to tenants by
way of emancipation patent under the CARL
provides that when an emancipation patent
covers heretofore unregistered private lands, the
lands, upon registration of the patent, shall be
deemed registered for all intents and purposes.

CHARACTERISTICS OF A DECREE OF
REGISTRATION/CERTIFICATE OF TITLE
A decree of registration or the corresponding
certificate of title binds the land, quiets title thereto,
and shall be CONCLUSIVE against all persons,
including the government. (Secs. 31, 32, PD 1529)
After one (1) year from its entry or even earlier in
cases where title to the land has been transferred to
an innocent purchaser for value, the decree
becomes final and INCONTROVERTIBLE. (Sec. 32, PD
1529).

A TORRENS title issued pursuant to a homestead

patent, free patent, or sales patent under the Public
Land Act has the same force and effect as a Torrens
title.

 The operative act that conveys or affects a

registered land is the act of registration insofar
as third persons are concerned.
No title to registered land in derogation of the
title of the registered owner shall be acquired
by prescription or adverse possession. (Sec. 47, PD
1529) However, the registered owner may be
barred from invoking the imprescriptibility of
his title by virtue of the equitable principle of
laches. (Heirs of Batiog-Lacamen v. Heirs of Lauran, 65 SCRA
605)

Torrens titles are not subject to collateral

attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or

TORRENS TITLE
A Torrens title is the certificate of ownership
issued under the Torrens system of land
registration by the government, thru the Register
of Deeds, naming and declaring the owner of the
real property described therein, free from all liens
and encumbrances, except as may be expressly
noted thereon or otherwise reserved by law.
Legally defined, a certificate of title is the
transcript of the decree of registration made by
the Register of Deeds. (PNB v. Tan Ong Zse, 51 Phil.
317)

SPANISH TITLES
Spanish titles are no longer valid.
By virtue of PD 892 which was issued on
February 16, 1976, the system of registration
under the Spanish Mortgage Law has been
abolished.
Consequently, Spanish titles are no longer
admissible in evidence to establish ownership
of land in land registration proceedings.
Such lands are now considered as
unregistered private lands. (Sec. 3, PD 1529)

PROBATIVE VALUE OF
A CERTIFICATE OF TITLE
The simple possession of a certificate of title does
not necessarily make the holder thereof the true
owner of the property described therein, such as
when the title includes by mistake or oversight
land which can no longer be registered, or when
the same land had already been registered.
Registration does not vest title; it is not a mode of
acquiring ownership over property. It is merely
evidence of such title over particular property. A
Torrens certificate is the best evidence of
ownership over registered land. (Villanueva v. CA,
198 SCRA 472)

PROBLEM:
A donated to B a piece of land belonging to C. B
promptly registered the donation and secured a title
in his name. Is Bs title valid?

ANSWER:
No, because a donor cannot lawfully convey what
does not belong to him. If at all, B merely holds the
property in trust for the true owner.
While land registration is a proceeding in rem, and
binds the whole world, the simple possession of a
certificate of title under the Torrens system does not
necessarily make the holder the true owner of the
property described therein. It is not a mode of
acquiring ownership. (Miranda v. CA, 177 SCRA 303)

QUESTION:
When two certificates of title are issued to different
persons covering the same parcel of land, in whole
or in part, which title prevails?

ANSWER:
The earlier in date prevails.
In case of successive registration where more than
one certificate is issued over the same parcel of
land, the person holding a prior certificate is entitled
to the land as against a person who relies on a
subsequent one. (Margolles v. CA, 230 SCRA 97)

VOID TORRENS TITLE

1. The title was procured thru fraud.
as when a person applies for registration of a land in
his name although he knows that the same belongs
to another.
as when a person, by means of a forged deed of
sale, succeeds in obtaining a certificate of title in his
favor on the strength of the deed supposedly signed
by the owner unless the property has been
transferred to an innocent purchaser for value.
2. The title covers land reserved for military, naval, or
civil public purposes.

3. The title was issued over a parcel of land

already covered by a prior Torrens title.
The court has no jurisdiction whatsoever to
inquire into, settle, and adjudicate a title
which it had previously determined.
The applicant in the latter registration
proceeding cannot complain because the
earlier proceeding was one in rem and he
was, therefore, made aware of registration
therein entered.

QUESTION:
Which of two titles is superior: an earlier title secured
administratively or a later title secured through a
judicial proceeding?

ANSWER:
The person holding the prior certificate of title is
entitled to the land as against the person who relies on
the second certificate.
Pursuant to Section 32 of PD No 1529, upon the
expiration of one year from the issuance or entry of the
decree of registration, the decree and certificate shall
become indefeasible and incontrovertible. This
provision also applies to titles acquired through
homestead patents. (Lahora v. Dayanghirang, 37 SCRA 346)

NATURE OF LAND
REGISTRATION PROCEEDINGS
The proceeding for the registration of lands under
the Torrens system is in rem and not in
personam.
As such proceeding in rem, it binds all persons
known and unknown, and the title issued as a
result thereof is binding and conclusive upon the
whole world.
All persons who may be adversely affected by the
proceedings are so bound by the proceedings,
innocent factually as they might have been of the
publication of the notice of initial hearing.

COURT OF COMPETENT JURISDICTION

RTCs have plenary jurisdiction over land
registration proceedings AND over all petitions
filed after registration of titles. (Sec. 2, PD 1529)
MTCs may be delegated to hear and decide
cadastral and land registration cases covering:
lots without controversy or opposition.

contested lots where the value does not exceed

100,000.00. (Sec. 34, BP 129, as amended by RA
7691 and SC Circular No. 6-93-A and SC Circular
No. 7-96 [Strict Observance of Land Registration
Authority (LRA) Circulars on Reconstitution and

SCOPE OF JURISDICTION
All petitions or motions after original registration
shall be filed and entitled in the original case in
which the decree of registration was entered.
(Sec. 8, PD 1529)

The RTC has jurisdiction over all civil actions

which involve the title to or possession of real
property or any interest therein. (Sec. 19, BP Blg
129)

Hence, the CA or the LRA has no jurisdiction to

cancel a certificate of title. (Manotok vs. Barque, GR.
No. 162335, 18 December 2008)

QUESTION:
If an application for registration of title is denied, may
the applicant refile it?

ANSWER:
The dismissal of an application for registration of title is
not deemed res judicata, except if such dismissal is
with prejudice.
The denial of the application for registration means that
the applicant has not furnished that quantum of proof
showing an absolute title in fee simple which is
required under the law. If later he can present evidence
to show his absolute ownership, he can refile the
application.

QUESTION:
Is a motion for intervention proper in a land registration
case?

ANSWER:
No. Unlike in ordinary civil actions where parties may include
the plaintiff, the defendant, third-party complainants, crossclaimants, and intervenors, the only parties in cases of
original applications for land registration are the applicant
and the oppositor. (Secs. 14 and 25, PD 1529).
A party wishing to be heard in a land registration case should
ask for the lifting of the order of general default, and then if
lifted, file an opposition to the application for registration. This
is so because proceedings in land registration are in rem and
not in personam, the sole object being the registration applied
for, not the determination of any right connected with the
registration.

QUESTION:
Is a motion to dismiss allowed in a land registration
case?

ANSWER:
Yes, because both the Land Registration Act and
the Property Registration Decree do not provide for
a pleading similar to a motion to dismiss.
However, Section 34 of PD 1529 specifically
provides that the Rules of Court shall, insofar as
not inconsistent with the provisions of this Decree,
be applicable to land registration and cadastral
cases by analogy or in a suppletory character and
whenever practicable and convenient.

REGALIAN DOCTRINE
The doctrine gives the legal presumption
that all lands of whatever classification
belong to the State. Unless it is shown that
the State has alienated or transferred
ownership thereof to a private person by
authority of the law, the land remains with
the State in dominus. Hence, in land
registration proceedings, the burden of
proof lies with the person claiming to have
acquired a registerable title to a parcel of
land.

EXCEPTION TO THE
REGALIAN DOCTRINE
Ancestral lands and ancestral domains are
not deemed part of the lands of the public
domain but are private lands belonging to
indigenous cultural communities or
indigenous peoples who have actually
occupied, possessed and utilized their
territories under claims of ownership, based
on NATIVE TITLE since time immemorial.

MODES OF ACQUISITION OF
LANDS BY ICCs AND IPs
The rights of ICCs and IPs may be acquired in two
modes:
by NATIVE TITLE, over both ancestral lands and
domains.
by TORRENS TITLE, under the Public Land Act and
Property Registration Decree with respect to
ancestral lands only. (IPRA Law of 1997 [RA 8371]
Oct. 29, 1997)

BASIS OF NATIVE TITLE

You ask if we own the land. . . How can you
own that which will outlive you? Only the race
owns the land because only the race lives
forever. To claim a piece of land is a birthright
of every man. The lowly animals claim their
place; how much more man? Man is born to
live. Apu Kabunian, Lord of us all, gave us life
and placed us in the world to live human lives.
And where shall we obtain life? From the land.
To work (the land) is an obligation, not merely a
right.

In tilling the land, you possess it. And so

land is a grace that must be nurtured. To
enrich it and make it fructify is the eternal
exhortation of Apu Kabunian to all his
children. Land is sacred. Land is Beloved.
From its womb springslife.

Macli-ing Dulag
Chieftain, Kalinga Tribe

THE CARINO RULING

An Igorot applicant was granted land registration
over a parcel of land held by him and his
ancestors for more than fifty (50) years prior to the
effectivity of the Treaty of Paris on April 11, 1899.
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes stated: x x x when,
as far back as testimony or memory goes, the land
has been held by individuals under a claim of
private ownership, it will be presumed to have
been held in the same way from before the
Spanish conquest, and never to have been public
land. (Carino v. Insular Government, 41 Phil 935 (1909);
also reported in 212 U.S. 449, 53 L. Ed. 594)

NON-REGISTRABLE PROPERTIES
PROPERTIES OF PUBLIC DOMINION
properties of public dominion are reserved for
public purposes.
properties of public dominion are held by the state
by regalia right, and incapable of private
appropriation.
a public market and public plaza are properties of
public dominion.
land already registered as patrimonial property of
the state.
navigable rivers and lakes are properties of the
public dominion.

FORESTS OR TIMBERLANDS, PUBLIC FOREST OR

FOREST RESERVES.
inclusion of a forest land in a title nullifies the title.
forest lands cannot be owned by private persons. It
is not registrable whether the title is a Spanish title
or a Torrens title. It is well-settled that a certificate
of title is void when it covers property of public
domain classified as forest or timber or mineral
land. Any title issued covering non-disposable lots
even in the hands of an alleged innocent purchaser
for value shall be cancelled.
mangrove swamps are comprised within public
forests.
mangrove lands are neither timber nor mineral
lands.

FORESHORE LANDS
land covered by the sea at high tide not due
to abnormal conditions are part of the shore
and therefore public land.
seashore, foreshoreland and portions of the
territorial waters and beaches cannot be
registered.

PREVIOUSLY TITLED LAND

MINERAL LAND
WATERSHED
GRAZING LAND
MILITARY RESERVATIONS

QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE IN LAND

REGISTRATION PROCEEDINGS
QUESTION: What is the quantum of evidence
necessary to overcome the presumption that
all lands belong to the public domain?
ANSWER: Incontrovertible evidence, not
merely preponderance of evidence, is
required to overcome the presumption that a
parcel of land belongs to the public domain
under the Regalian Doctrine.

QUESTION: If the title of a claimant or applicant

to a public agricultural land is incomplete or
imperfect, what is his remedy under the law?
PROBLEM: If the claimant or applicant of a
parcel of land cannot sustain his claim of
private ownership or does not have enough
evidence to overcome the presumption that the
land belongs to the public domain under the
Regalian Doctrine, his ultimate recourse is to
admit that the land is a public land but invoke
his right to confirm his imperfect or incomplete
title thereto under Section 48 of the Public Land
Act.

JUDICIAL REGISTRATION OF TITLE

Land registration proceedings under P.D. No.

1529 and judicial confirmation of imperfect title
under C.A. No. 141 (Public Land Act) are the
same.

REQUIREMENTS FOR JUDICIAL

CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLE
The

applicant must be a Filipino citizen.

The applicant has been in open, continuous,

exclusive, adverse, and notorious possession of the
land for a period of thirty (30) years prior to March 28,
1990. (RA 6940 which took effect on March 28, 1990)
Possession must be under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership.
The land must be agricultural, i.e. neither timber nor
mineral.
The period of possession must be thirty (30) years
prior to March 28, 1990. (RA 6940, March 28, 1990)

The area applied for shall not exceed twelve (12)

hectares.
NOTE: Before RA 6940, the maximum area allowed
is 144 hectares (RA 6389); under the original text
of CA 141, there was not limit as to the area.
The application must be filed within the period
prescribed by law.
NOTE: The deadline for the filing of the application
has been repeatedly extended every 10 years
since 1936, the latest of which was RA 6940, which
extended the deadline for the filing of such
application until December 31, 2000.

HISTORICAL NOTES ON
SECTION 48 OF CA 141
Originally, Section 48 (b) of CA 141 provided for
the possession and occupation of lands of the
public domain since July 4, 1945.
This was superseded by RA 1942 which provided
for a simple 30-year prescriptive period of
occupation by an applicant for judicial
confirmation of an imperfect title.
RA 1942 has been amended by PD 1073 approved
on January 25, 1977 which requires possession
since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto.

 Section 48 (b) of CA 141 in relation to Section

14 (1) of PD 1529 requires possession since
June 12, 1945. This provision does not require
that the land should have been alienable and
disposable during the entire period of
possession. The possessor is entitled to
judicial confirmation of his title as soon as the
land is declared alienable and disposable,
subject to the timeframe imposed by Section
47 of the Public Land Act.
the reckoning date to determine whether the
land is alienable and disposable is at the time
of application.

MAY A PRIVATE CORPORATION APPLY

FOR JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF
IMPERFECT TITLE TO PUBLIC
AGRICULTURAL LAND?
In its earlier rulings, the SC held that private
corporations are disqualified because of Section
11, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution (now
Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution)
which provides that a private corporation may not
hold alienable lands of the public domain except
by lease. (Meralco v. Bartolome, 114 SCRA 799 [1982];
Iglesia ni Cristo v. Director of Lands, 118 SCRA 729 [1982])

In recent cases, however, the SC completely

reversed itself and ruled that private corporations
are not disqualified to apply for judicial
confirmation under Section 48 of the Public Land
Act because if a piece of land of the public domain
has been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership for the period prescribed
by law, the land, after the lapse of said period,
ipso jure ceased to be party of the public domain
and becomes private property, thus removing it
from the ambit of the constitutional prohibition.

This dictum is derived from Section 48 of the

Public Land Act itself, which provided that the
possessor of the land shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title. The possessor
under such circumstance acquired by
operation of law, not only a right to a grant, but
a grant from the government; the actual
issuance of a title is not necessary in order that
said grant may be sanctioned by the courts.
(Susi v. Raton, 48 Phil 424 [1926]. Davao Grains v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 171 SCRA 612 [1989])

MAY THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH

HOLD OR OWN ALIENABLE LANDS
OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN?

Yes. Being a corporation sole, the Roman

Catholic Church is not covered by the
prohibition against private corporations or
associations from owning or holding such
alienable funds of the public domain. (Republic
v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 168 SCRA 165 [1988])

CONCEPT OF FOREST LAND

UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION
There is a big difference between forest as defined in
the dictionary and forest or timber land as a
classification of land of the public domain in the
Constitution.
One is descriptive of what appears on the land, while the
other is a legal status, a classification for legal purposes.
The forest land started out as a forest or vast tracts of
wooden land with dense growths of tree and underbrush.
The cutting down of trees and the disappearance of virgin
forest do not automatically convert the land of the public
domain from forest or timber land to alienable agricultural
land. (Republic v. CA, 154 SCRA 476)

ORDINARY LAND
REGISTRATION PROCEEDINGS
Who may apply for registration of title to land?
Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-ininterest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim
of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by
prescription under the provisions of existing laws.
Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned
riverbeds by right of accession or accretion under existing laws.
Those who have acquired ownership of lands in any other manner.
(Sec. 14, PD 1529)

PROBLEM:
Gloria is the owner of a parcel of land
adjoining the bank of a river. On the south
of the land is a small strip of land which
Gloria vigorously claims as hers by virtue
of accretion. Mario equally asserts
ownership over the same strip of land
because of his long occupation and by
virtue of the patent and title issued by the
Director of Lands.
Who between Gloria and Mario is the
owner of the disputed strip of land?

ANSWER:
Being the owner of the adjacent land, Gloria is
also the owner of the strip of land by virtue of
accretion, she being the riparian owner. The
free patent granted by the Director of Lands in
favor of Mario is a complete nullity. The Director
of Lands has no authority to grant a free patent
over a parcel of land that has passed to private
ownership and which has thereby ceased to be
a public land. For Gloria to become a registered
owner of the said strip of land, she must now
apply for its registration under the provisions of
PD 1529. (Ferrer v. Bautista, 231 SCRA 257)

QUESTION:
May an alien acquire private land in the Philippines?

ANSWER:
As a general rule, an alien may not acquire private land in
the Philippines. This is because public policy demands that
lands in the Philippines be exclusively owned by Filipinos.
But pursuant to B.P. 158, a former natural-born Filipino
citizen who wishes to come and reside in the Philippines
may acquire private land in the Philippines subject to the
following conditions:
(a) AS TO URBAN LANDS: 1,000 square meters;
(b) AS TO RURAL LANDS: one hectare;
(c) the land must be for residential purposes; and (d) he
must have decided to stay in the Philippines as a
balikbayan.

PROBLEM:
A, a Filipina, is married to B, an American. During
their marriage, A purchased with conjugal funds a
parcel of land and placed it in the name of A
married to B. Without Bs consent, A sold the
land. B now wants to annul the sale on the ground
that it was made without his consent, contending
that he is also an owner. Will the action prosper?

ANSWER:
No, because B never acquired ownership of the
land even if conjugal funds were used in acquiring
the same. This is because an alien is disqualified
from acquiring a private land in the Philippines.
(Cheesman v. IAC, 193 SCRA 93)

PROBLEM:
X, A Chinese national and a permanent resident of the
Philippines, purchased a private land from Y, a Filipino.
Two years after the sale, X became a Filipino citizen.
Can Y still recover the land on the ground that at the
time of the sale, X was an alien?

ANSWER:
Not anymore. While it is true that by reason of public
policy, aliens cannot acquire private lands in the
Philippines as the law reserves the ownership of lands
to Filipinos only, yet the subsequent naturalization of Y
erased the public policy sought to be enforced. The
rule is so because the land is now in the hands of a
qualified person. (Sarona vda. De Bersabia v. Cuenco, 118 SCRA
547 [1982])

QUESTION:
If a parcel of land is sold a retro, who between the
vendor and the vendee has the right to apply for
registration?

ANSWER:
Where a parcel of land has been sold under pacto de
retro, the vendor a retro may file an application for the
original registration of the land, provided that it
should be filed within the stipulated period of
redemption.
Should the redemption period expire during the
pendency of the registration proceedings and
ownership to the property is consolidated in the
vendee a retro, the latter shall be substituted for the
applicant and may continue the proceedings.

QUESTION:
X, Y, and Z are co-owners of a parcel of a
land. If they want to have the land
registered, can only one of them file the
application?

ANSWER:
No, because the law requires that all the
co-owners must file the application. (Sec.
14, PD 1529)

QUESTION:
May a non-resident Filipino citizen file an
application for land registration?

ANSWER:
Yes, but he shall file with his application an
instrument in due form appointing an agent or
representative residing in the Philippines, giving
his full name and postal address and shall therein
agree that the service of any legal processes in the
proceedings under or growing out of the
application made upon his agent or representative
shall be of the same legal effect as if made upon
the applicant within the Philippines. (Sec. 16, PD 1529)

QUESTION:
What is the best evidence to establish the identity
of the land applied for?

ANSWER:
The applicant in a land registration case must
submit in evidence the original tracing cloth plan of
the land applied for, duly approved by the Director
of Lands. This is a statutory requirement or
mandatory character which cannot be waived. The
purpose of this requirement is to fix the exact or
definite identity of the land as shown in the plan
and technical descriptions.

QUESTION:
An applicant in a land registration case failed to mark in
evidence the original tracing cloth plan of the land applied for.
Instead, he presented a blue print copy of the plan as evidence.
Is this sufficient?

ANSWER:
Yes. It is true that the best evidence to identify a parcel of land
for registration is the original cloth plan, yet the blue print copy
of the plan suffices for the purpose where the original tracing
cloth plan was attached to the application for registration.
(Republic v. IAC, 144 SCRA 705)

Moreover, even the true certified copy of the white paper plan
would suffice if it bears the approval of the Land Registration
Authority and verified by the Bureau of Lands. The fact
therefore that the original survey plan was recorded on white
paper instead of a tracing cloth plan should not detract from
the probative value thereof. (Dir. of Lands v. CA, 158 SCRA 586 [1988])

VIII. STEPS TO REGISTER A

LAND UNDER THE TORRENS
SYSTEM

QUESTION:
What are the steps in chronological
order to register a land under the
Torrens system?

ANSWER:
SF-ST-PS-FH-DIET-I
The various steps leading to the registration of
titles under the Torrens system are as follows:
1. Survey of the Land The land applied for
may be surveyed by the Bureau of Lands or
by a licensed private surveyor. If surveyed
by a private surveyor, the corresponding
plan, and technical description of the
property prepared by the surveyor has to
be approved by the Director of Lands.

The Property Registration Decree (PD 1529)

requires the Director of Lands to sign and
approve the survey plan of the land applied
for, otherwise, the title is void. No plan or
survey may be admitted in land registration
proceedings until approved by the Director
of Lands.
The submission of the plan is a statutory
requirement of mandatory character. Unless
a plan and its technical description are duly
approved by the Director of Lands, the same
are of no value. (University of the Philippines
v. Rosario, 355 SCRA 591 [2001])

2. Filing of Application Section 15 of

PD 1529 provides that an application
shall be in writing, signed by the
applicant or by the person duly
authorized to do so in his behalf.
The application shall contain a
description of the land and shall state
the citizenship and civil status of the
applicant, whether single or married,
and, if the marriage has been legally
dissolved, when an how the marriage
relation terminated.

The applicant shall likewise state the full

names and addresses of all occupants of the
land and those of the adjoining owners, if
known, and if not known, it shall state the
extent of the search made to find them.
The application must be accompanied with a
tracing cloth plan approved by the Bureau of
Lands.
The Clerk of Court will not accept any
application unless it is shown that the
applicant has furnished the Director of Lands
with a copy of the application and all
annexes. (Section 17, PD 1529)

3. Setting of date of Initial Hearing The

court shall, within five (5) days from
the filing of the application, issue an
order setting the date and hour of the
initial hearing which shall not be
earlier than forty-five (45) days nor
later than ninety (90) days from the
date of the order.
Section 23 of PD 1529 requires that
the public be given notice of the initial
hearing of the application by means of
publication, mailing, and posting.

4. Transmittal to LRA If the Land

Registration Authority (LRA) finds a
mistake committed in the application
or that certain documents required
were not submitted, it reports the same
to the court which issues an order
requiring the applicant to make the
necessary corrections or submit the
requirement documents.
Before the notice of hearing is
published, all these requirements must
first be complied with by the applicant.

5. Publication of Notice of Initial

Hearing Upon receipt of the
order of the court setting the
date and time for hearing, the
LRA shall cause a notice of initial
hearing to be published once in
the Official Gazette and once in a
newspaper of general circulation
in the Philippines.

6. Service of Notice upon

Contiguous owners the LRA
shall also, within seven (7) days
after publication of the notice of
hearing in the Official Gazette,
cause a copy of the notice of initial
hearing to be mailed to every
person named in the notice whose
address is known. (Section 23,
2(a), PD 1529)

7. Filing of answer or opposition A private

person may not oppose an application for
registration filed by a party on the ground
that the land applied for is a property of
the government.
If no person appears and answers within
the time allowed, the court shall, upon
motion of the applicant; order a general
default to be recorded and require the
applicant to present evidence. When an
appearance has been entered, a special
default order shall be entered against
persons who did not answer.

A general default is not a

guarantee to the success of an
application. The applicant must
show even though there is no
opposition, to the satisfaction of the
court, that he owns the property
under the Torrens system.

8. Hearing of the Application

9. Decision of the Court
10. Issuance of order declaring
finality of judgment

11. Entry of Decree of Registration After

receipt of the order from the court
directing him to issue the corresponding
decree of registration, pursuant to Section
39 of PD 1529, the LRA administrator
issues the corresponding decree. This
decree shall bind the land and quiet title
thereto.
12. Transmittal of Decree to the Register of
Deeds.
13. Issuance of Certificate of Title.

QUESTION:
May a non-resident Filipino citizen
file an application for land
registration?

ANSWER:
Yes, but he shall file with his application
an instrument in due form appointing an
agent or representative residing in the
Philippines, giving his full name and
postal address and shall therein agree that
the service of any legal processes in the
proceedings under or growing out of the
application made upon his agent or
representative shall be of the same legal
effect as if made upon the applicant within
the Philippines. (Section 16, PD 1529)

PROBLEM:
In a land registration proceeding, the
applicant failed to include the name
of a potential claimant in his
petition purportedly because the
name of such claimant did not
appear in his survey plan as an
adjacent owner, or claimant, or
possessor.

The applicant was merely informed

about the possibility that his
application may have included the
land of the potential claimant.
Is the omission to include the name
of a potential claimant fatal to the
application for registration of a land
title?

ANSWER:
Yes. Section 15 of PD 1529 is explicit
in requiring that in the application
for registration of land titles, the
application shall also state the full
names and addresses of all
occupants of the land and those of
the adjoining owners if known, and if
not known, it shall state the extent of
the search made to find them.

A mere statement of the lack of

knowledge of the names of the
occupants is not sufficient but what
search has been made to find them
necessary. (Divina v. Court of
Appeals, 352 SCRA 527 [2001])

QUESTION:
What is the best evidence to
establish the identity of the land
applied for?

ANSWER:
In director of Lands v. Reyes, 68 SCRA [1975],
the SC held that the applicant in a land
registration case must submit in evidence the
original tracing cloth plan of the land applied
for, duly approved by the Director of Lands.
This is a statutory requirement or mandatory
character which cannot be waived.
The purpose of this requirement is to fix the
exact or definite identity of the land as shown in
the plan and technical descriptions.

QUESTION:
An applicant in a land registration
case failed to mark in evidence the
original tracing cloth plan of the land
applied for. Instead, he presented a
blue print copy of the plan as
evidence. Is this sufficient?

ANSWER:
Yes. It is a settled rule that while the best
evidence to identify a parcel of land for
registration is the original cloth plan, yet
the blue print copy of the plan suffices for
the purpose where the original tracing
cloth plan was attached to the application
for registration. (Republic v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 144 SCRA 705 [1986];
Republic v. Court of Appeals, 167 SCRA
150 [1988] Republic v. Court of Appeals,
131 SCRA 150 [1984])

It is also settled that even the true certified

copy of the white paper plan would suffice if
it bears the approval of the Land
Registration Authority and verified by the
Bureau of Lands.
The fact therefore that the original survey
plan was recorded on white paper instead of
a tracing cloth should not detract from the
probative value thereof. (Director of Lands
v. Court of Appeals, 158 SCRA 586 [1988])

QUESTION:
In a land registration case, what are
the distinctions between the
decision rendered by the court and
the decree issued pursuant thereto?

ANSWER:
The decision of the land registration
court and the decree issued pursuant
thereto may be distinguished as follows:
1. The decision is rendered by the court
as soon as the evidence of both
parties have been submitted, while a
decree is issued in pursuance of an
order of the court after the judgment
has become final.

2. The decision contains a statement

of the facts proved in the hearing
and the law applicable thereto,
together with an order for the
registration of the property, while a
decree is in the form of an order of
the court stating that the property
is registered in the name of the
applicant, and contains a technical
description of the property, and a
statement of the encumbrances or
limitations affecting the same.

3. The decision is actually signed

by the judge rendering it, while
the decree which bears the name
of the judge ordering its
issuance is signed by the
Administrator of the Land
Registration Authority (LRA) who
attests the date and hour of its
issuance.

4. A decision in a land registration

proceeding does not become final till
after the expiration of fifteen (15)
days from receipt or notice thereof; a
decree of registration does not
become final till after the lapse of one
year from the date of its issuance and
entry.
5. The grounds for the review of the
decision and decree are different
(Section 32, PD 1529; Section 1, Rule
38, Rules of Court)

6. A petition for review of a decree

can be had on the ground of
actual fraud within one year from
entry thereof, while a review of a
decision or relief from judgment
must be filed within a period of
sixty days from the discovery but
not beyond six (6) months from
entry.

IX. Publication, Opposition,

Default

QUESTION:
What is meant by the provision
under Section 23 of PD 1529 that
publication of the notice of initial
hearing in the Official Gazette shall
be sufficient to confer jurisdiction
upon the court?

ANSWER:
As explained by the SC in Republic v.
Marasigan, 198 SCRA 219 (1991), the provision
under Section 23 of PD 1529 was never meant
to dispense with the requirement of notice by
mailing and posting.
What it simply means is that insofar as
publication is concerned, there is sufficient
compliance if the notice is published in the
Official Gazette.

Although the law mandates that it be

published once in the Official Gazette and
once in a newspaper of general circulation
in the Philippines, publication in the latter
alone would not suffice.
This is to accord primacy to the official
publication to the official publication.
According to the Supreme Court, such
provision was never meant to dispense
with the other modes of giving notice,
which remains mandatory and
jurisdictional.

If the intention of the law were otherwise,

Section 23 would not have stressed in detail
the requirements of mailing of notice to all
persons named in the petition who per Section
15 of the Decree, include owners of adjoining
properties and occupants of the land.
(Note: In Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals,
276 SCRA 276 [1997], it was held that public of
the notice of initial hearing in a newspaper of
general circulation is mandatory and
imperative. Absent such publication, the land
registration court cannot validly confirm the
title of the applicant for registration)

QUESTION:
What are the purposes of publishing
the notice of hearing in a land
registration case?

ANSWER:
Publication of the notice of initial
hearing has a dual purpose: (a) to
confer jurisdiction; and (b) to invite
all interested parties.

QUESTION:
What is the effect of a defective
publication?

ANSWER:
A defective publication of the notice of initial
hearing deprives the court of jurisdiction (Po
v. Republic, 40 SCRA 37 [1971]) When a court
lacks jurisdiction to take cognizance of a
case, it lacks the authority over the whole
case an all its aspects, it I the proper
publication of the notice of initial hearing that
brings in the whole world as a party in the
case and confers the court with jurisdiction to
hear and decree it. (Register of Deeds of
Malabon v. RTC of Malabon, Branch 170, 181
SCRA 788 [1990])

QUESTION:
X filed an application for land
registration covering 50 hectares of land.
After publication of the notice of initial
hearing, X amended his application tin
include 20 hectares of land.
Is there a need to republish the notice of
hearing? Will your answer be the same if
the amendment involves 200 square
meters only?

ANSWER:
If the amendment included another 20 hectares to
the original application, there is a need to
republish the notice of hearing because the
additional area applied for is substantial in
character.
However, if such additional area is only two
hundred (200) square meters, the amendment is
deemed not substantial and therefore no
republication of the notice of hearing is required.
The additional area applied for is subsumed in the
phrase more or less. (Benin v. Tuazon, 57 SCRA
531 [1974])

QUESTION:
If the original survey plan of the land
applied for is amended, is there a
need to republish the notice of initial
hearing?

It depends. If the original survey plan is

amended during the registration
proceedings, by the addition of land not
previously included in the original plan, a
republication of the notice of initial hearing is
required if the difference in area is
substantial.
However, if the difference in area is not so
substantial, republication is no longer
required.
The failure to publish the bigger area does
not perforce affect the courts jurisdiction.

If the amendment does not involve an

addition, but on the contrary, a reduction
of the original area that was published,
no new publication is required. (Republic
v. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 223 [1996])
(Note: If the amendment of the original
survey plan was made after the court has
rendered its decision, there is a need for
the re-opening of the land registration
proceedings. Republication is not the
solution)

QUESTION:
May the oppositor in a land
registration case pray for affirmative
relief that instead of the applicant,
he be declared the owner of the
land?

ANSWER:
Yes, because as an oppositor, he
can pray that he be declared the
owner of the land even if he is not an
applicant. He must, however, adduce
incontrovertible evidence to prove
his claim over the land. (City of
Manila v. Lack, 19 Phil 324 [1991])

PROBLEM:
Arthur filed with the RTC a petition for
registration of title to a parcel of land.
This was opposed by Ben who claimed to
be in actual possession of the land, and
by the Director of Lands who prayed that
the land be declared a public land, and by
the Director of Lands who prayed that the
land be declared a public land.

One week before the date of the

initial hearing, Arthur filed an exparte motion to withdraw his
application, which the court granted.
Because of Arthurs withdrawal, Ben
and the Director of Lands became
the only contending parties in the
registration case.

On the date set for the initial hearing, Ben

appeared and manifested his readiness to
present evidence to prove his registerable title
to the property.
However, the court denied the motion on the
ground that no further proceedings in the land
registration case could be pursued because the
conflicting interests therein involved ceased to
exist with the withdrawal of Arthurs
application.
Is Ben entitled to prove his registerable title
even if the original applicant had already
withdraw his application for registration?

ANSWER:
Yes, Ben is legally entitled to prove his
registerable title to the land which is
sought to be registered even if Arthur, the
original applicant, had already withdrawn
his application for land registration.
Under Section 37 of Act No. 496, as
amended by Act 3621, the withdrawal of
Arthurs application does not terminate
the registration proceeding when there is
an adverse claim.

The opposition filed by the Director of

Lands is, for all intents and purposes, a
conflicting interest as against that of the
applicant Arthur or of the oppositor Ben,
asserting a claim over the land sought to
be registered.
Consequently, the withdrawal by either
Arthur or Ben from the case does not ipso
facto obliterate the conflicting interests in
the case.

Neither is the case terminated

because under Section 37 of Act No.
496, as amended by Republic Act
3621, the Trial court is required to
resolve the claims of the remaining
parties, the withdrawal of the
application by the applicant and/or
the oppositor notwithstanding.
(Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals,
303 SCRA 495 [1999])

QUESTION:
Distinguish between general default
and special default?

ANSWER:
Under Section 26 of PD 1529, a general
default is ordered by the court if no
person appears within the time
prescribed.
This is done, as a rule, upon motion of the
applicant when the case is called at the
initial hearing, but may also be ordered by
the court motu proprio. If the applicant
himself fails to appear, the court may
dismiss his application without prejudice.

Where a party appears at the initial

hearing without having filed an answer
or opposition and asks the court for time
within which to file the same, and this
has accordingly been ganted, in case of
failure of such party to file his answer or
opposition within the period allowed, he
may be declared specially in default.
In other words, a special default
operates only against certain specific
person or persons.

PROBLEM:
In a land registration case, an
oppositor filed an answer based on
substantial grounds. At the initial
hearing, the oppositor failed to
appear despite notice.
May the land registration court
declare the oppositor in default?

Section 26 of PD 1529 which provides that if no

person appears and answers within the time
allowed, the court may at once upon motion of the
applicant, no reason to the contrary appearing,
order a general default to be recorded cannot be
interpreted to mean that the court can just
disregard the answer (now opposition) before it,
which has long been filed, for such interpretation
would be nothing less than illogical, unwarranted
and unjust. Had the law intended that failure of the
oppositor to appear on the date of the initial
hearing would be a ground for default despite his
having filed an answer, it would have been so
stated in unmistakable terms, considering the
serious consequences of default. (Director of
Lands v. Santiago, 160 SCRA 186 [1988])

X. THE REGISTER OF DEEDS

QUESTION:
May the Register of Deeds refuse to
register a contract of sale on the
ground that it is void?

ANSWER:
No. Section 10 of PD 1529 in relation
to Section 117 thereof, expressly
provides that the function of the
Register of Deeds with reference to
the registration of deeds,
encumbrances, instruments, and the
like is ministerial in nature.

The Register of Deeds is entirely

precluded by Section 10 of PD 1529 from
exercising his personal judgment and
discretion when confronted with a
problem of whether to register a
document or instrument on the ground
that it is invalid.
Such determination is a function that
properly belongs to a court of competent
jurisdiction. (Almirol v. The Register of
Deeds of Agusan, 22 SCRA 1152 [1968])

QUESTION:
If the Register of Deeds is in doubt
as the proper action to take on an
instrument or deed presented to him
for registration, what is his remedy
under the law?

ANSWER:
If the Register of Deeds is in doubt as
the proper action to take on an
instrument or deed presented to him
for registration, he may himself,
pursuant to Section 117 of PD 1529,
submit the question to the
Administrator of the Land
Registration Authority.

QUESTION:
If the Register of Deeds denies
registration of an instrument, what is
the remedy of the aggrieved party?

ANSWER:
The aggrieved party must resort to
the remedy of a consulta and not
resort to the remedy of mandamus.
(Almirol v. The Register of Deeds of
Agusan, 22 SCRA 1152 [1968])

QUESTION:
What is the effect of the resolution
or ruling of the LRA Administrator in
consulta?

ANSWER:
The resolution or ruling of the LRA
Administrator in consulta shall be conclusive
and binding upon all Register of Deeds.
However, the resolution or ruling of the LRA
Administrator may be taken by the aggrieved
party to the Court of Appeals by way of a
verified petition for review within fifteen (15)
days from notice of said resolution or order
or the denial of the aggrieved partys motion
for reconsideration. (see also Section 117,
PD 1529, SC Circular No. 1-95, June 1, 1995)

XI. Remedies in Land

Registration Proceedings

ANSWER:
The following are the remedies
available to the parties in land
registration proceedings.

1. Writ of Possession. This remedy is

available to the successful registrant
whenever the land applied for is in the
possession of an adverse claimant.
It is an order issued by the land
issued by the LR court commanding
the sheriff to enter the land and
deliver possession thereof to the
successful registrant.

a) The writ may be availed by the

successor-in-interest of the
successful registrant.
b) It is ministerial and it can be
invoked as a matter of right. The
court has no discretion and a
judge who refuses to issue the
writ can be compelled by
mandamus to issue it. (De Luna
v. Kayanan, 61 SCRA 49 [1974])

c) A collateral attack on the title does not

bar the issuance of a writ of possession
(Sorsogon v. Makalintal, 80 Phil 259)
d) The writ is available against all DANU
i. Persons who were defeated in the
case;
ii.Persons who answered and appeared;
iii.Persons who were served notice but
did not appear and answer
iv.Persons who unlawfully occupied the
land during the proceedings up to the
issuance of the final decree.

Note:
If occupied after a final decree,
remedy is to file a separate writ axn
not a writ of Possession.

e) However, a judgment in a land registration case

can not be executed by the issuance of a final
decree of registration while the case is on appeal.
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which allows
execution while the case is on appeal cannot be
applied because it violates PD 1529 which
provides that a final decree of registration can
only be issued after the decision has become
final and executor.
But more than that, it is fraught with dangerous
consequences and goes against the very essence
of the Torrens system of land registration.
(Director of Lands v. Reyes, 68 SCRA 177 [1975])

2. Motion for New Trial/Motion for

Reconsideration.
It is a remedy found in the Rules of
Court.
It is available to the losing party in
the land registration case during
the period within which to appeal
and may be granted on the
following grounds:

a) Fraud, accident, mistake or excusable

neglect which ordinary prudence
could not have guarded against and
by reason of which the movants
rights have been impaired.
b) Newly discovered evidence which he
could not, with reasonable diligence,
have discovered and produced at the
trial, and which presented would
probably alter the result.
c) The evidence is not sufficient to
support the decision; and
d) The decision is contrary to law.

3) Appeal. This remedy may be

availed of within fifteen (15) days
from the notice of the judgment.
An appeal can be perfected by
the simple expedient of serving a
notice of appeal upon the
adverse party and the court.

4. Petition for Relief from Judgment.

This remedy is available when a party
was unjustly deprived of a hearing (or
has been prevented from taking an
appeal) due to fraud, mistake or
excusable negligence.

He may file the petition with the same

court within sixty (60) days after he
learns of the decision, order, or
proceeding to be set aside, but not
more than six (6) months after such
judgment or order was entered.

The petition must be accompanied with affidavits

showing the fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
negligence relied upon and all the facts constituting
the petitioners good and substantial cause of action
or defense, as the case may be, which he may prove
if his petition may be granted (Section 3, Rule 38,
Rules of Court).
The period of six (6) months within which a petition
for relief may be field should be computed not from
the entry of such judgment or order.
Under Section 2, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court, a
judgment or order is entered by the Clerk after
expiration of the period for appeal or motion for new
trial, i.e. after fifteen (15) days from notice, according
to Rules 37 and 41. (Sorian v. Asi 100 Phil 785 [1957])

5. Petition for Review of the Decree for

Registration. A remedy expressly provided
in Section 32 of PD 1529. This remedy has
the following requirements. DAOP
a) The petition must be filed by a person
claiming dominical or other real right
to the land registered in the name of
another.
b)The registration of the land in the
name of the successful registrant was
procured by means of actual (not just
constructive) fraud and which must be
extrinsic.

c) The petition must be filed within one (1) year

from the date of issuance of the decree of
registration assailed of.
d) Title to the land has not yet passed to an
innocent purchaser for value (Libudan v. Gil,
48 SCRA 27 [1972]; Pablico v. Arrellana, 30
SRA 513 [1969]). This requirement is in
accordance with the rule that a buyer in
good faith does not have to look beyond the
Torrens title in search for any hidden defect
or inchoate right which may later invalidate
or diminish his right to what he purchased.
(Lopez v. Court of Appeals, 169 SCRA 271
[1989])

6. Action for Reconveyance. This action is in

the nature of an action in personam which
may be availed of by a person claiming to
own the land which was wrongfully
registered in the name of the defendant. It is
an action based on equity and has the
following requirements. DAMP
a) The action must be filed by a person
claiming ownership or other dominical
right over the land which was registered
in the name of the defendant.
b) The registration of the land in
defendants name was procured by
means of fraud or mistake.

c)

d)

The action is brought within four (4)

years from the date of discovery of the
fraud or mistake, but not later than (10)
years from the date of registration.
The property has not yet passed to an
innocent purchaser for value. (Walstrom
v. Mapa, 181 SCRA 431 [1990]) Where a
trustee registers a piece of land in his
name, the real owner can always ask for
conveyance of the title. But if the trustee
has repudiated the trust and such act
has been made known to the cestui que
trust, and evidence of such repudiation is
clear and conclusive, prescription will lie
and reconveyance will be barred.

Note:
Action to quiet title does not
prescribe

7. The Assurance Fund. This a special fund

created under the Torrens system of land
registration for compensation of certain
persons who sustain losses by the operation
of the system.
The fund is made up of of 1% of the
assessed value of the real estate to be paid
upon the original registration of a certificate of
title or of a building or other improvements on
the land, or upon the entry or of certificate of
title in the name of the registered owner.
For compensation under the fund to prosper,
the following requisites must be present.
GERSED

a) The claimant must be a person who

sustained damage or is deprived of
his land as a consequence of
bringing the land under the operation
of the Torrens system.
b) The claimant must not be guilty of
negligence or laches.
c) The loss or damage was due to fraud
or in consequence of any error,
omission, mistake, or malfeasance of
personnel of the Register of Deeds in
the performance of their duty.

d) The claimant is otherwise precluded

from bringing an action for the review of
the decree or recovery of such land or
estate or any interest therein, or
damages from the party causing the loss
or damage.
e) The action must be brought within six (6)
years from the issuance of the certificate
of title.
f) The loss is not caused by breach of
trust, whether express, implied or
constructive, committed by the
registered owner who was a trustee of
the claimant.

QUESTION:
Does the land registration court
have jurisdiction or authority to
issue a writ of demolition?

ANSWER:
Yes. Otherwise writ of possession is
ineffective.
A land registration court has jurisdiction or
authority to order, as a consequence of the
writ of possession issued by it, the demolition
of improvement introduced by the defeated
oppositor or his successor-in-interest.
The writ of demolition is but a complement of
the writ of possession, without which the latter
would be ineffective. (Baltazar, et. Al. v.
Caridad, et. al., 7 SCRA 460 [1966])

QUESTION:
What kind of fraud is contemplated by
laws as a ground for the filing of a
petition for review of a decree of
registration under Section 32 of PD
1529?
ANSWER:
Only extrinsic fraud or collateral fraud
as distinguished from intrinsic fraud,
is a ground for a petition for review.

QUESTION:
Distinguish between extrinsic fraud and
intrinsic fraud.
ANSWER:
Extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of
the successful party in a litigation which is
committed outside the trial of a case against
the defeated party, or his agents, attorneys or
witnesses, whereby said defeated party is
prevented from presenting fully and fairly his
side of the case.

On the other hand, intrinsic fraud refers to

acts of a party in a litigation during the
trial, such as the use of forged
instruments or perjured testimony, which
did not affect the presentation of the case,
but did prevent a fair and just
determination of the case. (Sterling
Investment Corp. v. Ruiz, 30 SCRA 318
[1969]), citing Palanca v. American Food
Mfg Co, 24 SCRA 819 [1968]; Libudan v.
Gil, 45 SCRA 17 [1972])

QUESTION:
If a false affidavit of loss was used in
reconstitution case, does it
constitute extrinsic fraud that would
warrant the invalidation of a final
judgment in said case?

ANSWER:
No. The use of a false affidavit of loss in a
reconstitution case is similar to the use during
trial of forged instruments or perjured
testimony.
In Palanca v. Republic, 24 SCRA 819 [1968], it
was held that the use of a forged instrument
constituted only intrinsic fraud, for while it
perhaps prevented a fair and just determination
of a case, the use of such instrument or
testimony did not prevent the adverse party
from present his case fully and fairly.

But a judgment otherwise final may be

annulled not only on the ground of
extrinsic fraud but also because of lack of
jurisdiction of the court which rendered it.
Thus, if a certificate of title has not been
lost but is in fact in the possession of
another person, the reconstituted title is
void and the court rendering the decision
has not acquired jurisdiction.
Consequently, the decision may be
attacked any time. (Demetriou v. Court of
Appeals, 238 SCRA 158 [1994)

PROBLEM:
X sold an unregistered parcel of land to Y in 1932
and the latter immediately took possession thereof.
Despite the sale, however, X obtained in 1937 a
certificate of title over the land pursuant to a decree
of registration issued by a land registration court
filed by X himself. In 1975, Y committed fraud in
causing the land to be registered in his name. X
countered by filing a motion to dismiss on the
ground that the action had already prescribed and
is already barred by laches.
Is Y barred from filing the action due to prescription
and laches?

ANSWER:
Ys right to bring the action to recover ownership of
the land had already prescribed and is already
barred by laches.
The law is clear on this point.
The remedy of a landowner whose property has
been wrongfully and erroneously registered in the
name of another person is to bring an action in the
ordinary courts of justice for reconveyance.
Under the law, however, an action for reconveyance
based on an implied or constructive trust
prescribes in ten (10) years from the issuance of the
Torrens title over the subject property.

In the present case, Y slept on his

right for thirty eight (38) years counted
from the time the certificate of title
was issued to X in 1937 until he filed
his action for reconveyance in 1975,
Ys right to bring such action is
already barred by laches as he took no
step towards that direction reasonably
after the title to the property was
issued under the Torrens system.
(Manangan v. Court of Appeals, 308
SCRA 139 [1999])

Note:
The ruling in the Manangan case contradicts the ruling
in the case of Heirs of Olviga v. Court of Appeals, 228
SCRA 330 [1993].
In both cases, the parties claiming ownership were in
actual possession of the disputed properties.
In the Olviga case, the SC emphatically declared that
the rule on which an action for reconveyance of a
parcel of land based on an implied trust prescribes in
ten (10) years applies only when the plaintiff is not in
possession of the property, and that if the person
claiming to be the owner is in actual possession, the
right to seek reconveyance, which in effect seeks to
quiet title to the property, and that if the person
claiming to be the owner is in actual possession, does
not prescribe.

In the Manangan case, the plaintiff is

also in actual possession of the disputed
property but the SC has declared that his
right to seek reconveyance had already
prescribed is barred by laches because
of his failure to file the action within 10year prescriptive period.
We respectfully submit that the ruling in
the Olviga case is more accord in law)

PROBLEM:
Arnold is employed as a contract worker in Saudi
Arabia. While on vacation in the Philippines, he
brought from Benito a parcel of land.
Before leaving for Saudi Arabia, he (Arnold) entrusted
the Deed of Sale of the Land and the corresponding
certificate of title still in the name of Benito to Cesar, a
fellow contract worker, who volunteered to register the
sale and transfer the title in Arnolds name.
Arnold later learned from Cesar through an overseas
telephone call that a transfer of certificate of title of the
land had already been issued in Arnolds name and
that Cesar will personally deliver the title to Arnold in
Saudi Arabia.

However, When Cesar arrived in Saudi Arabia, he

informed Arnold that he forgot to bring the title.
Arnold immediately called up his relatives in the
Philippines and asked them to find out from the
Register of Deeds what happened to his title.
To his dismay, Arnold was informed that the
certificate of title had indeed been transferred in
his name but was subsequently cancelled and a
new issued in the name of Dario.
Upon investigation, Arnold found out that while
he was in Saudi Arabia, a person identifying
himself as Arnold sold the land to Dario.

The sale was registered with the Register of Deeds as a

result of which Arnolds certificate of title was cancelled
and a new one issued in the name of Dario.
Arnold quickly returned to the Philippines, and thereafter
filed an action for the nullification of Darios title.
After trial, the court rendered judgment nullifying Darios
title. This decision was later affirmed by both the Court of
Appeals and the SC.
Aggrieved by the loss of the land, Dario filed suit against
the National Treasurer of the Republic of the Philippines
for compensation under the Assurance Fund.
Will the action prosper?

ANSWER:
The action will not prosper. It may be discerned from
Section 95 of PD 1529 that the persons who may
recover from the Assurance Fund are:
1)

Any person who sustains loss or damage under

the following conditions:
a) That there was no negligence on his part; and
b) That the loss or damage sustained through
any omission, mistake or malfeasance of the
court personnel, or the Register of Deeds his
deputy, or other employees of the Registry in
the performance of their respective duties
under the provisions of the Property
Registration Decree; or

2)

Any person who has been

deprived of any land or interest
therein under the following
conditions:

a) that there was no negligence on

his part;

b) that he was deprived as a

consequence of the bringing of his
land or interest herein under the
provisions of the Property
Registration Decree or by the
registration by any other person as
owner of such land or by mistake,
omission, or misdescription in any
certificate or owners duplicate, or
in any entry or memorandum in the
register or other official took book
or by an cancellation; and

c) that he is barred or in any way

precluded from bringing an
action for the recovery of such
land or interest therein, or claim
upon the same.

Darios circumstances do not fall under the first

case.
Dario has not alleged that the loss he sustained
was through any omission, mistake or
malfeasance of the court personnel or the
Register of Deeds, his deputy or other
employees of the Registry in the performance of
their respective duties under the Provisions of
the Property Registration Decree.
Moreover, Dario was negligent in not
ascertaining whether the impostor who
executed the deed of sale in his (Darios) favor
was really the owner of the land.

Nor does Darios situation fall under the

second case.
He was not deprived of his land as a
consequence of the bringing of the land or
interest therein under the provisions of the
Property Registration Decree.
Neither was the deprivation due to the
registration by any other person as owner of
such land, or by mistake, omission or
misdescription or owners duplicate, or in any
entry or memorandum in the register or other
official book or by any cancellation.

Darios claim is not supported by the

purpose for which the Assurance Fund
was established.
The assurance Fund is intended to
relieve innocent persons from the
harshness of the doctrine that a
certificate is conclusive evidence of an
indefeasible to land.
Dario did not suffer any prejudice
because of the operation of this
doctrine.

On the contrary, Dario sought to avail of

the benefits of the Torrens system by
registering the property in his name
unfortunately for Dario, the original
owner was able to judicially recover the
property from him.
That Dario eventually lost the property to
the original owner, however, does not
entitle him to compensation under the
Assurance Fund. (De Guzman Jr. v.
National Treasurer of the Republic of the
Philippines, 337 SCRA 238 [2000])

QUESTION:
May an owner of a registered land
seek the annulment of a transfer
thereof on the ground of fraud?

ANSWER:
Yes, an owner of a registered land
may seek the annulment of a
transfer thereof on the ground of
fraud.
However, such a remedy is without
prejudice to the rights of any
innocent purchaser for value with a
certificate of title.

This is because every person

dealing with registered land may
safely rely on the correctness of the
certificate of title issued therefor and
the law will in no way oblige him to
go beyond the certificate of title
issued therefore and the law will in
no way oblige him to go beyond the
certificate to determine the condition
of the property. (Obsequio v. Court
of Appeals, 230 SCRA 550 [1994])

The right of the innocent purchaser for value

must be respected even if the seller obtained
his title through fraud.
It is settled that a forged deed can legally be the
root of a valid title when an innocent purchaser
for value intervenes.
The remedy of the original owner (the person
prejudiced) is to bring an action for damages
against those who caused or employed fraud,
and if the latter are insolvent, an action against
the Treasurer of the Philippines may be field for
the recovery of damages against the State
Assurance Fund (Obsequio, ibid.)

NOTE:
The basic rule is that after the lapse of one
year, a decree of registration is no longer
open to review or attack although its
issuance is attached with actual fraud.
This does not mean, however, that the
aggrieved party is without a remedy in law.
If the property has not yet passed to an
innocent purchaser for value, an action for
reconveyance is still available (Javier v.
Court of Appeals, 231 SCRA 498 [1994])

XII. VOLUNTARY AND

INVOLUNTARY
REGISTRATION OF
INSTRUMENTS

QUESTION:
Distinguish between the effects of
voluntary and involuntary
registration of documents in the
Register of Deeds.

ANSWER:
In case of voluntary registration of documents,
an innocent purchaser for value of registered
land becomes the registered owner, and, in
contemplation of law the holder of a certificate
of title the moment he presents and files a duly
notarized and valid deed of sale and the same is
entered in the day book (primary entry book)
and at the same time he surrenders or presents
the owners duplicate certificate of title covering
the land sold and pays the registration fees,
because what remains to be done lies not within
his power to perform (DBP v. Acting Register of
Deeds of Nueva Ecija, 162 SCRA 450 [1988])

On the other hand, in cases of

involuntary registration of
instruments, an entry thereof in the
day book of the Register of Deeds is
sufficient notice to all persons even
if the owners duplicate certificate of
title is not presented to the Register
of Deeds. (Garcia v. Court of
Appeals, 95 SCRA 380 [1980])

QUESTION:
What is the operative act to convey a
parcel of land under the Torrens
system?

ANSWER:
An innocent purchaser for value of registered land
becomes the registered owner and in
contemplation of law the holder of a certificate
thereof the moment (1) he presents and files a duly
notarized and lawful deed of sale and the same is
(2) entered on the day book of the Register of
Deeds and at the same time (3) he surrenders or
presents the owners duplicate certificate of title to
the property sold and (4) pays the full amount of
registration fees.
This is so because what remains to be done lies
not within his power to perform. (DBP v. Acting
Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija, 162 SCRA 450
[1988])

QUESTION:
What are the effects of a forged deed
of sale?

ANSWER:
A forged deed of sale is a complete nullity and
therefore conveys no title. A deed of sale executed
by an imposter is null and void. (Section 53, PD
1529, Raneses v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
187 SCRA 397 [1990] Registration thereof will not
cure the infirmity.
But where a title to the land has been registered in
the name of the imposter who later transfers or
conveys the same to an innocent third party for
value, the third party acquires a good title thereto.
(Fule v. Legare, 7 SCRA 351, [1963], Eduarte v.
Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 391 [1996])

PROBLEM:
Tomas mortgaged a piece of
registered land to Ubaldo, delivering
as well his certificate of title to the
latter.
Despite delivery of the title, however,
Tomas continued to posses and
cultivate the land, giving one-half of
the harvest to Ubaldo in partial
payment of his loan obligation.

Without the knowledge of Tomas, Ubaldo

forged a deed of sale of the land in his favor,
got a certificate of title in his name, and then
sold the land to Victor, who bought the land
relying on Ubaldos title, and who thereafter
got a certificate of title in his own name.
It was only then when Tomas learned that
his land had been titled in Victors name.
Can Tomas recover the land from Victor?

ANSWER:
Being an innocent purchaser for value, Victor has
acquired a clean title of the land.
A forged deed of sale is an absolute nullity and
conveys no title.
The fact that the forged deed was registered and a
certificate of title was issued in his name, did not
operate to vest upon Ubaldos ownership of the
property of Tomas.
However once the title to the land is registered in the
name of the forger and title to the land thereafter
falls into the hands of an innocent purchaser for
value, the latter acquires a clean title thereto.

A buyer of registered land is not required to

explore beyond what the record in the
registry indicates on its face in quest for any
hidden defect or inchoate right may
subsequently defeat his right.
Besides, it appears that Tomas is guilty of
contributory negligence when he delivered
his certificate of title to Ubaldo, the
mortgagee, without annotating the mortgage
thereon. Between him and the innocent
purchaser for value, he should bear the loss.

QUESTION:
What is a notice of lis pendens?

ANSWER:
It means pending suit. Registration of
the pending suit is a notice to all that
anyone who deals with the same property
does so subject to the outcome of the
case.
This is applicable to possessory actions,
quieting of title, removal of cloud on the
title, partition, or any other case involving
to, or use and occupation of the real
estate in litigation.

QUESTION:
What is the purpose of a notice lis
pendens?
ANSWER:
The purpose of a notice lis pendens is to
keep the realty subject of the litigation
within the power of the court until entry
of final judgment. However, a notice lis
pendens may be cancelled or discharged
for good causes.

PROBLEM:
A sold to B in 1960 a parcel of land covered by TCT
1025.
One year later, C filed an action to annul the sale
on the ground that he, not A, is the absolute owner
of the property.
Accordingly, C caused the annotation of a notice
lis pendends on TCT No. 1025. After years of
protracted trial, the court dismissed Cs complaint
and declared B, the buyer, as the absolute owner
of the property.
Upon order of the court, the notice lis pendens
annotated on TCT No. 1025 was cancelled.

C appealed to the Court of Appeals.

During the pendency of the appeal, B sold the property to D
as a result of which TCT No. 1025 was cancelled and a new
one issued in Ds name.
When the title was already in Ds name, the Court of Appeals
rendered its decision recognizing Cs right to redeem the
property from B.
When no further appeal was taken, the decision became
final executory.
Armed with the ruling of the Court of Appeals, C sued D for
reconveyance of the property and for the annulment of Ds
title on the ground that D is a transferee of the property
pendent lite; hence, a buyer in bad faith.
Will the action prosper?

ANSWER:
The action will not proper.
The sole basis of Cs complaint that D is a
transferee pendente lite was the subsistence
was the subsistence of the notice lis pendens
annotated on TCT No. 1025.
However, it must be pointed out that even if
such notice lis pendents on TCT No. 1025 was
still subsisting at the time when D bought the
property from B, there also was a court order
ordering that the annotation be cancelled, as
in fact it was cancelled.

To hold that D is still bound by the

results of the litigation over the
property, despite and notwithstanding
the cancellation of the notice lis
pendens prior to the termination of
the litigation, would consider the
doctrine of lis pendens as one of
implied or constructive notice.
This view is erroneous.

The notice lis pendens although considered

a general notice to all the world, it is not
correct to speak of it as part of the doctrine
of notice.
A purchaser pendent lite is affected, not by
notice, but because the law does not allow
litigating parties to give to others, pending
the litigation, rights to the property in dispute
as to prejudice the opposite party.
The doctrine rests upon public policy, not
notice (Tirado v. Sevilla, 188 SCRA 321
[1990])

And since the doctrine rests on public policy, not notice,

upon the cancellation of the notice lis pendens, D
cannot then be considered as having constructive
notice of any defect in the title of his seller B as to make
him a transferee pendent lite and a purchaser in bad
faith of the property in question.
To hold otherwise would render nugatory the
cancellation of the notice lis pendens on TCT No. 1025
despite its cancellation would render said cancellation
an empty, unavailing, and purposeless act, which would
not have been the intent of the law Lex neminem cogit
ad vana seu inutilia peragenda. The law forces no one to
do vain or useless things;
(Cases: Specific Performance). The doctrine rests upon
public policy not notice. (Tirado v. Sevilla, 188 SCRA 321
[1990])

PROBLEM:
Amado sold to Abe a parcel of land for P10
million payable in installments.
Their contract of sale was not registered with
the Registry of Deeds nor annotated on
Amados certificate of title.
After paying about P6 million corresponding to
the downpayment and several semi-annual
installments, Abe made no further payments.
Hence, Amado filed suit in1981 to collect from
Abe the unpaid balance.

Simultaneous with the filling of his

answer, Abe filed with the Register of
Deeds a notice lis pendens requesting
that the same be annotated on Amados
title.
Although the notice lis pendens was
recorded on the ground that Amados
action was for collection of a sum of
money and did not involve title to or
possession of the subject property.

When Amado needed money to finance a business

undertaking, he offered to sell the property to Rey
for P24 million.
After determining that Amados title was clean and
genuine, Rey agreed to purchase the property for
P24 million.
After determining that Amados title was clean and
genuine, Rey agreed to purchase the property for
P24 million.
Upon payment of the agreed purchase price, Rey
obtained a certificate of title over the land in his
own name, free from any lien, encumbrance, or
adverse claim by a third party.

When Abe learned of the sale of the property

to Rey and the issuance of a certificate of title
in Reys name, he immediately filed suit
against Amado and Rey for Annotation of Lis
Pendens and Damages.
Among others, Abe asked the court to order
the Register of Deeds to annotate on Amados
title the notice of lis pendens in relation to the
case filed by Amado against him in 1981 and
to carry over the same to the title of Rey.
Will the action prosper?

ANSWER:
The action will not prosper because
there is no such action for annotation of
lis pendens as Abe sought in his
complaint.
A notice of lis pendens is not and can
not be sought as a principal action for
relief.
The notice is but an incident to an
action, an extrajudicial one.

It is intended merely to constructively advise,

or warn, all people who deal with the property
that they so deal with it at their own risk, and
whatever right they may acquire in the property
in any voluntary transaction would be subject
to the results of the action, and may well be
inferior and subordinate to those which may be
finally determined and laid down therein.
As a settled rule, the notice of lis pendens may
be annotated only where there is an action or
proceeding in court which affects title to or
possession of real property. (AFP Mutual
Benefit Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
327 SCRA 203 [2000])

QUESTION:
What is the denial by the Register of
Deeds of Abes request for
annotation of his notice lis pendens
on Amado certificate of title proper?

The denial of Abes request for annotation of his notice lis

pendens on Amados certificate of title was proper.
This is because the complaint filed by Amado against Abe
was for collection of a sum of money and did not involve
title to or possession of the property in question.
If Abe did not agree with the denial of the Register of
Deeds, he should have appealed the same in consulta to
the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority
(LRA) pursuant to Section 17 of PD 1529.
The decision of the Administrator may then be appealed
to the Court of Appeals which has exclusive jurisdiction
to decide the same pursuant to Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure. (AFP Mutual Benefit Association, Inc.
v. Court of Appeals, 327 SCRA 203 [2000])

QUESTION:
What is an adverse claim?
ANSWER:
An adverse claim is a statement in writing
setting forth a claimants alleged right or
interest over a realty covered by a certificate
of title, how and under whom such right or
interest was acquired, and a reference to the
volume and page of the certificate of title of
the registered owner, and a description of the
land in which the right or interest is claimed.

QUESTION:
When is an adverse claim sufficient for
registration?
ANSWER:
An adverse claim is sufficient for registration if
it meets the following requisites:
1. That it is adverse to the registered owner;
2. That it arises after original registration; and
3. That it cannot be registered under any other
provisions of the Land Registration Act.

QUESTION:
If an adverse claim is duly annotated at
the back of the Torrens title, is it deemed
automatically cancelled upon the lapse
of the 30-day effectivity period?
ANSWER:
No. after the lapse of the 30-day period,
the annotation of an adverse claim may
be cancelled only upon filling of a
verified petition by the party-in-interest.

XIII. PETITIONS AND

MOTIONS AFTER ORIGINAL
REGISTRATION

QUESTION:
Antonio, Bernardo and Carlito are coowners of a parcel of land.
When Antonio mortgaged his aliquot
share in the property (a right granted to
him by the Civil Code), his co-owners
refused to surrender the owners
duplicate copy of the title to the Register
of Deeds for registration.
What is Antonios remedy under the law?

ANSWER:
Antonios remedy is to file a petition in court for the
surrender of the owners duplicate copy of the
certificate of title pursuant to Section 107 of PD 1529.
Under the law, when the owners duplicate is being
withheld by any party, the latter may be compelled by
court process to surrender and present the same to
Register of Deeds if there is need to register a
transaction.
In case of refusal, the court may order the issuance
of a new one for the purpose of annotating the
mortgage since there is no substantive controversy
that is involved in the case. (Co Chin Leng v. Co Chin
Tong, 120 SCRA 821 [1983])

QUESTION:
In a petition for replacement of a lost duplicate
certificate of title, is notice to the Solicitor
General required?
ANSWER:
Notice to the Solicitor General in an action for
replacement of a duplicate certificate of title is
not imposed by Section 109 of PD 1529.
It is the Register of Deeds who should request for
representation by the Solicitor General. (Republic
v. Court of Appeals, 317 SCRA 504 [1999])

PROBLEM:
The GSS sold to Macaria in 1974 a parcel
of residential land under its Low Cost
Housing Project.
As a result, Macaria obtained TCT No. 1025
in her name with the annotation thereon
that she should not sell the property
covered within five (5) years from issuance
of the title, except in cases of hereditary
succession of resale to GSIS.

A day after the issuance of her title, Macaria sold

the property to Maximo.
The Sale was not registered immediately because
the GIS prohibited Maximo from registering the
same in view of the five-year prohibition to sell.
When Maximo was about to registered the sale after
the lapse of the five-year period, he discovered that
the owners copy of TCT No. 1025 was missing.
Accordingly, he filed an action for replacement of
the title with notice to Macaria at her given address.
After ex-parte presentation of Maximos evidence,
the court rendered judgment granting the petition.

Claiming that he was the present occupant of the

property and the heir of Macaria, Manuel filed a
motion to reopen the reconstitution proceedings.
He contends that the decision of the court is null
and void because of Maximos failure to send notice
to him who is in his capacity as the actual
possessor of the property.
He invokes the ruling of the Supreme Court in
Alabang Development Corporation v. Valenzuela, 116
SCRA 261[1982] which held that in reconstitution
proceedings, courts must make sure that
indispensable parties, i.e. the actual owners and
possessors of the lands involved, are duly served
with actual and personal notice of the petition.

He also contends that the sale

between Macaria and Maximo is void
because it was made within the fiveyear prohibition to sell under the
Public Land Act.
Is Manuel entitled to notice of
Maximos petition?

ANSWER:
No. he is not. Manuels reliance on the Alabang
case is misplaced because the cause of action
in that case is based on RA 26, entitled An Act
Providing A Special Procedure for the
Reconstitution of Torrens Certificate of Title
Lost or Destroyed, while the present case is
based on Section 109 of PD 1529.
Under RA 26, reconstitution is validly made
only in case the original copy of the certificate
of title with the Register of Deeds is lost or
destroyed.

And if no notice of the date of hearing of a reconstitution

case is served on a possessor or one having interest in
the property involved, he is deprived of his day in court
and the order of reconstitution is null and void. (Manila
Railroad Company v. Hon. Jose Moya, et.al. 14 SCRA 358
[1965]) The case at bar is not for reconstitution, but merely
for replacement of lost duplicate certificate.
Moreover, petitioner is not entitled to notice because he
does not appear to have an interest in the property based
on the memorandum of encumbrances on the title.
His claim as an heir of Macaria is also not annotated on
the title.
Neither was his claim as such heir entered on any
document on file with the Register of Deeds at the time
when Maximo filed his petition

QUESTION:
Is the sale between Macaria and
Maximo valid?

ANSWER:
Yes. The proscription under Public
Land Act on sale within the 5-year
restrictive period refers to
homestead lands only.
Here the lot in dispute is not a
homestead land, but owned by the
GSIS in its proprietary capacity.

Moreover, as far as the violation of

the 5-year restrictive condition
imposed by GSIS in its contract with
Macaria is concerned, it is the GSIS
and not Manuel who had a cause of
action against Maximo.
In this case, GSIS has not filed any
action for the annulment of the sale
between Macaria and Maximo, nor for
the forfeiture of the lot in question.

Accordingly, the contract remains valid

between the parties, unless and until
annulled in the proper suit filed by the
rightful party, the GSIS.
For now, the said contract of sale is
binding upon the heirs of Macaria,
including Manuel who alleges to be one
of the heirs, in line with the rule that heirs
are bound by contracts entered into by
their predecessors-in-interest. (Article
1311, Civil Code; San Agustin v. Court of
Appeals, 371 SCRA 348 [2001])

PROBLEM:
Anton filed with RTC a land registration
proceeding for the amendment of the
technical description of the land embodied in
his certificate of title which would increase
the area of his land and a reduction of the
area of Bernies adjoining lot.
Bernie opposed the action on the ground
that the Regional Trial Court acting as a land
registration court has no jurisdiction to hear
and decide the case. Is Bernies contention
correct?

ANSWER:
Bernies contention is correct.
Where a petition seeks the amendment of the
technical description of the land embodied in the
certificate of title which would result in the increase
of the area of one lot and a reduction of the area of
the adjoining lot, and this is opposed by the
interested party, there ensues a substantive
controversy which the RTC, acting as a land
registration court, is not competent to decide.
The proper remedy here is to bring the matter to the
competent civil court of general jurisdiction.
(Aguilar v. Chiu, 109 SCRA 43 [1981])

QUESTION:
Susan filed the RTC a petition seeking to
amend the civil status of the registered
owner inscribed in the certificate of title
from widower to married to Susan.
The heirs of the registered owner opposed
the action on the ground that the court
acting as a land registration court is not
competent to hear and decide the case. Is
the opposition tenable.

ANSWER:
Yes. Susans purpose in having the certificate of title
amended is to make it appear that the registered owner is
married to her, instead of the registered owner being a
widower.
Apparently, Susans ultimate purpose in filing the petition
is for her to claim conjugal share in the subject property.
Considering, however, that the petition is object to, a
serious controversy is involved and therefore an
amendment of the title is not the proper remedy.
The proper remedy being to institute an estate
proceeding where Susan may file her claim to the estate
of her alleged husband. (Soto v. Jareno, 144 SCRA 116,
1986])

PROBLEM:
In 1967, X, as vendor, and Y, as vendee,
entered into a contract to sell a parcel of
registered land.
Upon the death of Y in 1971, his children
assumed his rights and obligations in
the contract to sell.
Paying in full the selling price of the lot
from their own funds, which payment
was completed in 1978.

With the payment in full of the purchase price, X

then executed a deed of absolute sale in Ys
name who had died seven years earlier, instead
of his children who assumed his rights and
obligations in the contract.
Because o the error, a transfer certificate of title
was issued in the name of Y instead of his
children.
Aggrieved by the issuance of the certificate of
title in their fathers name, Ys children sought
judicial recourse for the cancellation and
correction of Ys title and the issuance of a new
title in their names and to reflect in said title
their distributive shares.

However, the trial court dismissed the petition

on the ground that it pertains more to the
partition of Ys estate which will in effect
transfer Ys ownership over the property to his
children as compulsory heirs.
The court concluded that Section 108 of PD
1529 (which calls for summary proceedings)
does not apply.
Was the court correct in dismissing the
petition?

ANSWER:
The court was not correct in dismissing the
petition. Section 108 of PD 152 is clearly available
as a remedy to correct the erroneous issuance of
the certificate of title Ys name.
It is undisputed that Y died in 1971 with payments
of the selling price from their own funds until its
full payment in 1978, the children of Y necessarily
became the owners of the subject lot in whose
favor the deed of sale should have been executed
by the vendor. (Dawson v. Register of Deeds, 259
SCRA 733 [1998])

NOTE:
In a contract to sell, title to the property
sold vests in the vendee only upon full
payment of the purchase price. Where the
installment agreed upon has not been
completely paid upon the death of the
original vendee and the certificate of title
was erroneously issued in his name, his
heirs who assumed his obligation and
completed the payment, can resort to
summary proceedings under Section 108
of PD 1529 to correct the manifest mistake

XIV. RECONSTITUTION OF
LOST OR DESTROYED
TORRENS TITLES

QUESTION:
What is meant by reconstitution of a certificate of title?
What is its purpose?
ANSWER:
Reconstitution of a certificate of title, in the context of RA
26 (An Act providing for the reconstitution in the original
form and condition of a lost or destroyed instrument
attesting to the title of a person to a piece of land.
The purpose of the reconstitution is to have, after
observing the procedures prescribed by law, the title
reproduced in exactly the same way it has been when the
loss or destruction occurred. (Republic v. Court of
Appeals, 309 SCRA 110 [1999])

QUESTION:
What is the nature of a petition for
judicial reconstitution of title?
ANSWER:
A petition for judicial reconstitution of
title partakes of a land registration
proceeding is therefore an action in
rem. The proceeding is governed by RA
26 in relation to Section 110 of PD 1529.

QUESTION:
In a reconstitution case, the
petitioner failed to prove the
existence of the certificate of title
which is sought to be reconstituted.
May the court adjudicate the land in
favor of the petitioner in the same
proceeding?

ANSWER:
No, because the only issue in a reconstitution is
whether there is a certificate of title to be
reconstituted.
If there is, then it is the duty of the court upon proof
of loss or destruction, to order its reconstitution.
If there was none, it is beyond the power of the court
to adjudicate and order the registration of the land in
the same proceeding.
The issue of whether or not the petitioner has been
registerable title to the land must be ventilated in a
proper procedeeding. (Abapo v. Reyes, 125 SCRA
628. [1983])

QUESTION:
If an original certificate of title is to be
judicial reconstituted, what sources
may the petitioner avail of?
ANSWER:
Pursuant to Section 2 of RA 26, the
sources for the judicial reconstitution
of an original certificate of title are as
follows:

a) Owners duplicate of the

certificate of title.
b) Co-owners, mortgagees, or
lessees duplicate of said title.
c) Certified copy of such certificate,
previously issued by the Register
of Deeds concerned or by a legal
custodian thereof.

d) Authenticated copy of the decree of registration

or patent as the case may be, which was the
basis of the certificate of title.
e) Deed of mortgage, lease, or encumbrance
containing description of the property covered by
the certificate of title, and on file with the Registry
of Deeds, or an authenticated copy thereof
indicating that its original had been registered,
and,
f) Any other document which, in the judgment of
the court, is sufficient and proper basis for
reconstitution.

NOTE:
The sources for the judicial
reconstitution of an original and a
transfer certificate of title are almost
identical. Except for the source
under the letter d.

PROBLEM:
Alberto filed for judicial reconstitution of his
lost title based on the owners duplicate
copy, which was in his possession.
As required, the notice of initial hearing was
published in two (2) successive issues of the
Official Gazette.
Thirty days before the date of hearing, the
notice of hearing was posted at the entrances
of the municipal hall building and provincial
building where the property is situated and
on the bulletin board of the trial court.

Together with a copy of the petition, it was

served on the Office of the Solicitor General,
the Register of Deeds, the Land Registration
Authority (LRA), the Land Management
Bureau, and the Office of the Prosecutor.
After trial, the court granted the petition as a
result of which the Register of Deeds issued
a reconstituted title in Albertos name.
After discovering that Bernard was
occupying a portion of the land covered by
this reconstituted title, Alberto filed suit to
recover its possession.

Bernard countered by filling an action to

annul the judgment in the reconstitution
case on the ground that Alberto failed to
comply with the mandatory and
jurisdictional requirements of RA 26 that
adjoining lot owners and actual
occupants of the land be served with
notice of the initial hearing.
Judgment for whom?

ANSWER:
Judgment for Alberto. RA 26 separates petitions for
constitution of lost or destroyed certificates of title
into main groups with two different requirements
and procedures. Sources enumerated in Sections
2(a), 2(b), 3(a) and 3(b) are lumped under one group
(Group A); and sources enumerated under Sections
2(c), 2(d), 2(e), 2(f), 3(d), 3(e), and 3(f) are placed
together under another group (Group B).
For Group A, the requirements for judicial
reconstitution are set forth in Section 10 in relation
to Section 9 of RA 26; while for Group B, the
requirements are in Sections 12 and 13 of the same
law.

Sections 9 and 10 of RA 26 require that 30 days before

the date of hearing, (1) a notice be published in two
successive issues of the Official Gazette at the expense
of the petitioner, and (2) such notice be posted at the
main entrances of the provincial building and of the
municipal hall where the property is situated.
The notice shall state the following: (1) the number of
the certificate of title, (2) the name of the registered
owner, (3) the names of the interested parties appearing
in the certificate of title to be reconstituted; (4) the
location of the property, and (5) the date on which all
persons having an interest in the property, must appear
and file such claims as they may have.

For petitions based on sources

enumerated in sections 2(c), 2(d), 2(e),
2(f), 3(c), 3(d), 3(e), and 3(f), Sections 12
and 13 add another requirement that the
notice be mailed to occupants, owners of
adjoining lots and all other persons who
may have an interest in the property.
To repeat, mailing of the notice is not
required for a petition based on Sections
2(a), 2(b), 3(a) and 3(b).

In the present case, the source of the reconstitution

of Albertos transfer certificate of title is the extant
owners copy, which falls under Section 3(a), it
follows that the applicable provision of law is
Section 10 in relation to Section 9 of RA 26, not
Sections 12 and 13.
When the reconstitution is based on extant owners
duplicate transfer certificate of title, the main
concern is the authenticity and genuineness of the
certificate, which could best be determined or
contested by the government agencies or offices
concerned, principally the office of the Solicitor
General.

The adjoining owners are actual occupants

of the property covered by the transfer
certificate of title are hardly in a position to
determine the genuineness of the certificate.
Giving them notice and inviting them to
participate in the reconstitution proceeding
is not only illogical, but constitutes a
useless effort to clog the dockets of courts
(Puzon v. Sta. Lucia Realty and
Development, Inc., 353 SCRA 699 [2001])

QUESTION:
What are among the conditions for the
reconstitution of a lost or destroyed certificate of
title?
ANSWER:
Among the conditions explicitly required by the
law for the reconstitution of a lost or destroyed
certificate of title is the publication of the petition
twice in successive issues of the Official Gazette,
and it posting at the main entrance of the
provincial building and of the municipal building of
the municipality or city in which the land is
situated, at least thirty days prior to the date of
hearing.

This directive is mandatory; indeed,

its compliance has been held to be
jurisdictional. (Republic v. Court of
Appeals, 309 SCRA 110 [1999]
It must be emphasized that under
the law, the public of a notice of
initial hearing in the Official Gazette
is not enough.

The posting of said notice at the main

entrances of both the municipal and
provincial building is another equally vital
requisite.
The purposes of the stringent and mandatory
character of the legal requirements of
publication, mailing, and posting are to
safeguard against spurious and unfounded
land ownership claims, to apprise all
interested parties of the existence of such
action and to give them enough time to
intervene in the proceeding (Ortigas &
Company Ltd. Partnership v. Velasco 234
SCRA 455 [1994])

QUESTION:
X filed for the judicial reconstitution of his lost title.
Therafter, the notice of initial hearing was published
for two (2) successive issues of the Official Gazette
and was posted at the main entrance of the
municipal building of the municipality where the
land is situated. Is this sufficient?
ANSWER:
No, RA 26 requests that a petition for reconstitution
of a lost or destroyed certificate of title must be
published in the Official Gazette and posted at the
main entrance of the provincial and municipal
buildings of the place where the property is situated.

This requirements is mandatory; strict compliance

therewith is jurisdictional.
Without such publication and posting at the main
entrances of both the municipal and provincial edifices,
the trial court granting the reconstitution is void.
The principle of substantial compliance cannot be
applied to the present case, as the trial courts
acquisition of jurisdiction over a reconstitution case
hinges on a strict compliance with the requirements of
the law.
In the present case, it is undisputed that the notice of
initial hearing was not posted at the main entrance of the
provincial building.
Clearly, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the

QUESTION:
May a lost or destroyed certificate of
title be administratively
reconstituted?

ANSWER:
Yes. The procedure for administrative
reconstitution of lost or destroyed certificate
of title was originally prescribed in Section 5
of RA 26.
This administrative procedure was later
abrogated by Section 110 of PD 1529.
However, under RA 6732 which was approved
on July 17, 1989, however, such administrative
procedure was revived in a limited scale.

As indicated in Section 1 thereof, it is

provided, among others, that the procedure
relative to administrative reconstitution of lost
or destroyed certificate of title may be availed
of only in case of substantial loss or
destruction of land titles due to fire, flood, or
other force majeure as determined by the
Administrator of the Land Registration
Authority; provided, that the number of
certificates of titles lost or damaged should be
at least ten percent (10%) of the total number
in the possession of the Register of Deeds and
provided, further, that in no case shall the
number of certificate of title lost or destroyed
be less than five hundred (500).

QUESTION:
If a certificate of title is to be administratively
reconstituted, what may be the basis of such
reconstitution?
Pursuant to Section 2 of RA 6732 which revived
and amended Section 5 of RA 26, administrative
reconstitution of title may be based on the (a)
owners duplicate of the certificate of title, and
(b) co-owners, mortgagees or lessees
duplicate of said certificate.

QUESTION:
If the certificate of title considered
lost or destroyed is subsequently
found or recovered, and is not in the
name of the person in whose favor
the reconstituted certificate of title
has been issued, what is the
procedure under the law for its
cancellation?

Pursuant to Section 7 of RA 6732 amending

Section 19 of RA 26, if the certificate of title
considered lost or destroyed is subsequently
found or recovered, and is not in the name of the
person in whose favor the reconstituted certificate
of title has been issued, the Register of Deeds or
the party concerned should bring the matter to the
attention of the proper regional trial court which,
after due notice and hearing, shall order the
cancellation of the reconstituted certificate of title
and render, with respect to the memoranda of new
liens and encumbrances, if any, made in the
reconstituted certificate of title, after its
reconstitution, such judgment as judgment and
justice and equity may require.

However, if the reconstituted certificate of

title has been cancelled by virtue of any
deed or instrument, whether voluntary or
involuntary, or by an order of the court, and
a new certificate of title has been issued, the
procedure described above, with respect to
the memorandum of new liens and
encumbrances made on the reconstituted
certificate of title, after its reconstitution,
shall be followed with respect to the new
certificate of title, and to such new liens and
encumbrances, if any, as may have been
made on the latter, after the issuance
thereof.

QUESTION:
P filed an action to nullify Ds
reconstituted title on the ground that it
does not contain the propertys technical
description. Will the action prosper?
ANSWER:
The action will not prosper. The lack of a
technical description in a reconstituted
title will not affect its validity.

A registered owner is given two (2) years to file

a plan of such land with the Land Registration
Authority (LRA).
The two-year period is directory, not
jurisdictional.
In other words the failure to submit the
technical description within two (2) years would
not invalidate the reconstituted title. At most,
the failure to file such technical description
within the two-year period would bar a transfer
of the title to a third party in a voluntary
transaction. (Alonzo v. Cebu Country Club, Inc.,
375 SCRA 390 [2002])

XV. PUBLIC LAND PATENTS

QUESTION:
What are the different kinds of public
land patents under the Public Land Act?
ANSWER:
The land patents issued by the
Government under the Public Land Act
are the homestead patent, free patent,
sales patent, and what is denominated
as special patents

QUESTION:
To whom may a public land patent be
granted?
ANSWER:
Section 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution expressly provides that only
citizens of the Philippines may acquire
not more than twelve (12) hectares of
agricultural land of the public domain by
purchase, homestead, or grant.

QUESTION:
What makes a public land patent
indefeasibly as a Torrens title?
ANSWER:
A public land patent becomes
indefeasible as a Torrens title only
when said patent is registered with the
Office of the Register of Deeds. (Ortigas
v. Hidalgo, 198 SCRA 635 [1991])

QUESTION:
What is a homestead?
ANSWER:
A homestead is a public land grant
whereon the grantee is to establish
his house and which he must
cultivate as required by law.

QUESTION:
To whom may a homestead patent be issued?
ANSWER:
Under Section 12 of the Public Land Act, a
homestead patent may be issued to any citizen of
the Philippines, 18 years of age or over the head of
a family who does not, own more than twentyfour hectares of land in the Philippines or has not
had the benefit of any gratuitous allotment of more
than twenty-four hectares of land since the
occupation of the Philippines by the United
States, and who has complied with the residence
and cultivation requirements of the law.

Under Sections 13 and 14 of the same law,

the applicant is required to have resided
continuously for at least one year in the
municipality where the land is situated,
and must have cultivate at least one-fifth of
the land applied for.
NOTE:
Because of the Constitutional limitation on
the number of hectares to be granted, the
twenty-four hectares stated in Section 12
of the Public Land Act should be
understood to refer only to twelve hectares

QUESTION:
X was granted a homestead patent in 1985. In
1989, X sold the homestead land to Y, Is the sale
valid?
ANSWER:
The sale is not valid.
The conveyance of a homestead before the
expiration of the 5-year prohibitory period
following the issuance of the homestead patent is
null and void and cannot be enforced for it is not
within the competence of any citizen to barter
away what public policy by law seeks to preserve.

PROBLEM:
The Bureau of Lands issued to Aragon, a
homestead patent in 1950.
Three years later, Aragon sold the homestead to
Baldemor. After the death of Aragon in 1990, his
heirs filed an action to recover the homestead from
Baldemor on the ground that its sale by their father
is void under Section 118 of the Public Land Act.
Baldemor promptly filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground that the heirs of Aragon can no longer
recover the homestead from him because their
action had already prescribed and that furthermore,
Aragon was in pari delicto.

a.) Has the action prescribed?

ANSWER:
The action has not prescribed.
The sale of the homestead land by Aragon to
Baldemor three (3) years after the issuance of the
patent, being in violation of Section 118 of the Public
Land Act, is void from its inception.
The action filed by the heirs of Aragon to declare the
nullity of the contract and to recover the land should
therefore be given due course. Baldemors defense
of prescription is untenable because an action which
seeks to declare nullity of a contract does not
prescribe.

b.) Was Baldemor correct in invoking the paril delicto

rule in his defense?
ANSWER:
Baldemors defense of pari delicto is untenable.
While as a rule, parties who are in pari delicto have no
recourse against each other on the principle that a
transgressor cannot profit from his own wrongdoing,
such rule does not apply to violations of Section 118
of the Public Land Act.
Because of the underlying public policy in said law to
conserve the land which a homesteader has acquired
by gratuitous grant from the government for himself
and his family.

In keeping with this policy, it has

been held that one who purchases
a homestead within the 5-year
prohibitory period can only recover
the price which he has paid by filing
a claim against the estate of the
deceased under the principle that no
one shall enrich himself at the
expense of another.

QUESTION:
May an applicant whose application for a
homestead had already been approved
transfer his right to the land to another
person?
ANSWER:
After the approval of the homestead
application, an applicant, with the previous
approval of the Secretary of the DENR, may
transfer his right to the land and improvements
thereon to any person legally qualified to apply
for a homestead.

Every transfer made without such

approval is void.
The approval of the Secretary is a prerequisite for the validity of the transfer
of the rights of a homestead applicant.
However, if the application has not yet
been approved, there is no longer any
need for the Secretarys approval for
the transfer of the rights of the
homestead applicant.

QUESTION:
May a homestead applicant occupy and cultivate the
land on behalf of another person, and after obtaining
title thereto, transfer a portion thereof to the latter?
ANSWER:
A homestead applicant is required by law to occupy
and cultivate the land for his own and his familys
benefit, and not for the benefit of someone else if he
occupies and cultivates it on behalf of another
person and obtains thereto on the understanding
that a portion thereof would be transferred to the
latter, such agreement is void. It is a ground for
cancellation of the entry and bars the issuance of the
patent.

QUESTION:
If a public land acquired under a free patent
or a homestead patent or a free patent is
sold, does the applicant have the right to
repurchase it?
ANSWER:
Yes, the sale of land acquired under a free
patent or a homestead patent, when proper,
is subject to repurchase by the applicant, his
widow, or legal heirs, within a period of five
(5) years from the date of the conveyance.

This right of repurchase cannot be

waived, such waiver being contrary
to public policy.
(Section 119, Public Land Act) The
reason for the law is to preserve and
keep in the family of the
homesteader that portion of land
which the State gratuitously gave
him. This right exists in the
homesteader and his heirs. (Pascua
v. Talens, 89 Phil 793 [1948])

PROBLEM:
In a suit for damages filed by P against D in
1961, the court rendered judgment ordering
D, the defendant, to pay P, the plaintiff, the
amount of P50,000.00.
To satisfy the judgment, Ds unregistered
land was levied on execution in 1965.
This parcel of land was later sold at public
auction in 1966 to P as the highest bidder.
Upon Ds failure to redeem, a final deed of
conveyance was executed in 1968.

As a result, P was able to obtain in his name a tax

declaration over the land
Unknown to P, D applied for a free patent on the land in
question. The application was approved in 1973 and the
patent and title issued in 1980.
Thereafter, D filed in 1985 an action to declare the nullity
of the auction sale and to quiet title over the land.
D invoked the provision of Section 118 of the Public
Land Act which prohibits the alienation of lands
acquired by homestead or free patent within five (5)
years from the issuance of the patent.
Will the action prosper?

ANSWER:
The action will not prosper.
The judgment obligation of D against P arose in
1964.
The land in question was levied in 1965 and sold at
public auction in 1966 to P as the highest bidder.
In 1968, the final deed of conveyance ceding the land
to P was issued after D failed to redeem it within the
reglementary period.
Ds application for free patent was approved only in
1973 and the patent was issued only in 1980.

The sequence of events leads to the inescapable

conclusion that even before the application for a
free patent had been approved.
D was no longer the owner of the land. The deed
of conveyance executed in 1968 finally
transferred the property to P. as of that date, D
did not actually have anymore right over the
land.
The prohibition under Section 118 of the Public
Land Act does not apply because it is very clear
that the judgment debt and the execution sale
took place prior to the approval of the
application for free patent.

As emphatically declared by the SC

in Amper v. Presiding Judge, 112
SCRA 327 [1983], the date when the
prohibition against alienation of
lands acquired by homestead or free
patent commences is the date of
the approval of the application and
the prohibition embraces the entire
five year period from and after the
date of issuance of the patent or
grant.

As plainly observed by the SC in Beniga v.

Bugas, 35 SCRA 111 [1970], the provision would
make no sense if the prohibition starting from
the date of approval of the application would
have no termination date.
Consequently, the specific period of five years
within which the alienation or encumbrance of a
homestead is restricted starts to be computed
from the date of the issuance of the patent, but
the prohibition of alienation commences from
the date the application is approved, whichever
comes earlier. (Taneo Jr. v. Court of Appeals,
304 SCRA 308 [1999])

QUESTION:
To whom may a free patent be issued?
ANSWER:
Under Section 44 of the Public Land Act, as amended by RA
6940 which was approved on March 28, 1990, any naturalborn citizen of the Philippines who is not the owner of more
than twelve (12) hectares and who, for at least thirty (30)
years prior to the effectivity of RA 6940, has continuously
occupied and cultivated, either by himself or through his
predecessors-in-interest, a tract or tracts of agricultural
public lands subject to disposition, who shall have paid the
real taxes thereon while the same has not been occupied by
any person shall be entitled to have free patent issued to
him for such tract or tracts of such land not to exceed
twelve (12) hectares. Under RA 6940, the period for the filing
of applications for free patents expired on December 31,
2000.

NOTE:
The filing and processing of an
application for free patent and the
issuance of such patent constitute the
administrative mode of confirming an
imperfect title, the judicial mode being
under Section 48 (b) of the Public
Land Act. (Kabayan v. Republic, 52
SCRA 357 [1973]

QUESTION:
To whom may a sales patent be issued?
ANSWER:
Under Section 22 of the Public Land Act, only
citizens of the Philippines of legal age, and
such citizens not of lawful age who is a head
of a family, may purchase public agricultural
land of not more than twelve (12) hectares.

The land applied for is sold at public

auction, and the highest bidder to
whom the land shall be awarded,
whether he be the applicant or any
other Filipino citizen, is therafter
required to have at least 1/5 of the
land broken and cultivated within
five (5) years from the date of the
award.

A sales patent may be issued only after full

payment of the purchase price and the
awardee shall have established his actual
occupancy, cultivation, and improvement of
at least 1/5 of the land until the date of such
payment.
(Sections 24 to 28, Public Land Act) Under
Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution,
private corporations or associations are not
qualified to purchase public agricultural land.

NOTE:
Section 22 of the Public Land Act in
relation to Sections 24 to 28 thereof
also apply to the sale of public
agricultural lands which are suitable
for residential or industrial
purposes.

Accordingly, the sales patent may be

issued only after the awardee has paid
in full the purchase price and after he
has completed the construction of
permanent improvements appropriate
for the purpose for which the land is
purchased within 18 months from the
date of the award.
[see Sections 59, 61, 63, 65 and 67 of
the Public Land Act]).

PROBLEM:
In 1982, the Bureau of Lands approved
the free patent application of Antonia
over a parcel of public land. In 1983,
Antonia executed a Deed of Transfer of
Rights over the land in favor of Bertha.
The Bureau of Lands approved the
document of transfer in 1985 and
allowed the amendment of the land
application from Antonia to Bertha.

After the issuance of the patent and the

corresponding certificate of title in favor of
Bertha, Conchita filed an action for
reconveyance claiming that Antonia donated
the land to her in 1984 and that such donation
had the effect of withdrawing the earlier
transfer of the land to Bertha.
She further claimed that Bertha acted in bad
faith when she acquired title to the property.
Will the action prosper?

ANSWER:
The action will not prosper. A private
individual may not bring an action for
reversion or any action which would
have the effect of cancelling a public
land patent and the corresponding
certificate of title issued on the basis
thereof, such that the land covered
thereby will again form part of the
public domain.

Only the Solicitor General or the officer

acting in his stead may do so. (Section
101, Public Land Act) Since Berthas title
originated from a grant by the
government, its cancellation is a matter
between the grantor and the grantee,
clearly then, Conchita has no standing at
all to question the validity of Berthas
title. It follows that he cannot recover
the property because, to begin with, he
has not shown that she is the rightful
owner thereof. (Alvarico v. Sola, GR
138953, June 6, 2002)

QUESTION:
May a public agricultural land be
sold without any public bidding?

ANSWER:
RA 730 which took effect on June 18, 1952
expressly allows the sale without public bidding of
public lands for residential purposes to any
Filipino citizen of legal age who is not the owner of
a home lot in the municipality in which he resides
and who has in good faith established his
residence on a parcel of land of the public domain
which is not needed for the residence on a parcel of
land of the public domain which is not needed for
the public service, of not more than one thousand
(1,000) square meters at a price to be fixed by the
Director of Lands with the approval of the Secretary
of Agricultural and Natural Resources (now
Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources).

Section 1 of this law makes it an

essential condition that the occupant
has constructed his house on the
land and actually resided therein.
Pursuant to PD 2004, the lands
acquired under RA 730 shall not be
subject to any restrictions against
encumbrance or alienation before and
after the issuance of the patent
thereon.

QUESTION:
What are the rules on redemption of extrajudicial
foreclosed properties acquired pursuant to a free
patent or a homestead patent?
ANSWER:
It depends. (1) If the land is mortgaged to a rural bank
under RA 720, the mortgagor may redeem the property
within two (2) years from the registration of the
Sheriffs certificate of sale in the Office of the Register
of Deeds. If the mortgagor fails to exercise such right
(redemption), he or his heirs may still repurchase the
property within five (5) years from the expiration of the
2-year redemption period pursuant to Section 19 of the
Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141).

(2) If the land is mortgaged to parties

other than rural banks, the mortgagor
may redeem the property within one
(1) year from the registration of the
certificate of sale pursuant to Act
3135. If he fails to do so, he or his
heirs may still repurchase the property
within five (5) years from expiration of
the redemption period also pursuant
to Section 119 of the Public Land At.
(Sta. Ignacia Rural Bank v. Court of
Appeals, 230 SCRA 513 [1994])